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NATO Parliamentary Assembly

DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE

NATO’S RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN 2016

SPECIAL REPORT

Wolfgang HELLMICH (Germany)Special Rapporteur

www.nato-pa.int 20 November 2016

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................1

II. INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN: THE UNITED STATES AND NATO’S MISSIONS................................................................................................................................1

III. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW................................................................................3

IV. INSURGENT FORCES.............................................................................................................6A. THE TALIBAN..................................................................................................................6B. OTHER INSURGENT GROUPS.....................................................................................6C. DAESH IN AFGHANISTAN – ISIL-K...............................................................................7

V. AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES (ANDSF)..................................9

VI. COUNTER-NARCOTICS........................................................................................................10

VII. DEVELOPMENT.....................................................................................................................11

VIII. ECONOMY.............................................................................................................................14

IX. REGIONAL COOPERATION..................................................................................................15

X. REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS....................................................16

XI. PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE TALIBAN.....................................................................17

XII. CONCLUSIONS AND POINTS OF CONSIDERATION FOR NATO PARLIAMENTARIANS 18

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....................................................................................................................20

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The security situation in Afghanistan is fragile. It is clear that NATO and its partners must invest renewed energy in their continued work alongside the government in Kabul for individual freedoms, security and future institutional development in the country. The vast majority of the Afghan people seek peace and security, along with the economic and social development of their country. This goal is not only in their interest, but it is also in the interests of the region, NATO member states, the EU, and the UN. To this end, the Heads of State and Government of NATO member states reaffirmed their commitment to building lasting security and stability this July at their biennial summit in Warsaw.

2. Given the significant, long-term investment by all NATO Allies and their partners in the peace and stability of Afghanistan since the beginning of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in 2003, the NATO PA Defence and Security Committee (DSC) continues to follow NATO’s mission in the country along with the relevant security sector reforms taking place in the country. As reported last year, 2015 marked an important transitional year for the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) as they took over responsibility for all of Afghanistan, a milestone event in the over thirteen years of international commitment to the country.

3. The transition continues to be a significant challenge for the ANDSF and their international partners. Still, the ANDSF persevere, in large part due to the engagement of the international community, particularly under the aegis of Resolute Support Mission (RSM). Unfortunately, a marked increase in security operations throughout the country is bringing a paralleled rise in ANDSF casualties. As the Taliban’s 2016 offensives demonstrate, much work remains to improve the capabilities as well as command and control of the ANDSF.

4. Despite setbacks throughout the year, the ANDSF continue to work to ensure the peace and security of Afghanistan. Public confidence in the ANDSF continues to be relatively high, as the majority of the population is behind a Kabul-driven peace. Still, near and long-term challenges remain and will continue to pose significant challenges for both the government in Kabul and the security institutions they are building alongside their international partners in ensuring the future security of the country.

5. In addition to the progress of the ANDSF and the NATO mission designed to support it, this special report gives an overview of the results of the more broad-based state-building efforts in Afghanistan and the persistent problems weighing heavily on Kabul, as well as the collection of international powers and organisations working to assist it. NATO member state parliamentarians have worked to understand the developments in the country over the years as they have tried to pledge focused, constructive aid and political support to help with rebuilding the beleaguered state of Afghanistan. This report will highlight a series of areas where NATO member states governments and their parliaments can have an impact on maintaining positive security sector and other institutional reforms in the country.

II. INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN: THE UNITED STATES AND NATO’S MISSIONS

6. NATO’s Resolute Support Mission (RSM) began its second year on 1 January 2016. RSM is a train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission intended to assist the ANDSF, consolidate gains made by NATO’s ISAF combat mission, and maintain a secure operating environment for the government in Kabul. The United States military also maintains a parallel counterterrorism (CT) mission in the country, directing defensive as well as limited offensive operations against the remnants of Al-Qaeda and associated terrorist groups. As the size and scope of the Islamic State-affiliated

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groups’ presence has grown in the country, they have also become particular targets of the US counterterrorism mission.

7. Both RSM and the US CT mission operate within the frameworks established by the Status of Forces and Bilateral Security Agreements (SOFA and BSA) signed in Kabul on 30 September 2014 and ratified by the Afghan Parliament on 27 November 2014. The mission is also supported by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2189, adopted unanimously on 12 December 2014. The BSA signed by Washington and Kabul provides the legal basis for US forces to remain in Afghanistan post-2014. NATO representatives signed the SOFA for a more broad-based international security force presence in the country.

8. RSM consists of 12,930 soldiers from 39 nations (25 NATO Allies and 14 partner countries), 7,006 of the force is from the United States (NATO, 2016)1. In accordance with UNSCR 2189 (2014), the mission is based on a limited regional TAA approach operating with one hub (Kabul/Bagram) and four spokes: Mazar-e-Sharif in the north, Herat in the west, Kandahar in the south, and Laghman in the east. Four countries serve as framework nations with organisational responsibilities for command and control within their respective regions: the United States (east and south Afghanistan), Germany (north), Italy (west), and Turkey (Kabul).

9. RSM provides essential TAA to senior officials of the army and police in eight principal areas: multi-year budgeting; transparency, accountability, and oversight; civilian oversight of Afghan security institutions; force-generation and sustainment; strategy and policy planning; resourcing and execution; intelligence; and strategic communications. The ANDSF benefit significantly from the support provided by the RSM, particularly in areas where Afghan capacities need further improvement.

10. Initially conceived as a two-year mission, withdrawal dates for RSM and the US CT force presence are a subject of significant debate in Brussels, Washington, and Kabul. As Patrick Turner, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations, noted at the NATO PA Joint Committee Meetings in February: the current intention is to broadly retain the current levels of troops for the remainder of 2016. The initial change of plans resulted from a series of consultations with the government in Kabul and the US Force Commanders in Afghanistan about the evolving security situation in the country over 2015.

11. Throughout the difficult security transition the international community has remained steadfast in its commitment to supporting Afghanistan. In a visit to Kabul on 15 and 16 March 2016, the Secretary-General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, met Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive of Afghanistan, Abdullah Abdulllah, and reaffirmed NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan (UN, 2016a). On 20 May, RSM-supporting nations’ Foreign Ministers agreed to extend the RSM beyond 2016.

12. By 6 July 2016, citing the fragile security situation and the continued need to support the further development of Afghan forces, President Obama announced a change of position vis-à-vis US security assistance to Afghanistan, making US withdrawal more conditions-based than calendar-based. As such, the United States will maintain 8,400 soldiers in Afghanistan until the end of its term, rather than reduce its forces to 5,500 as had been previously decided (SIGAR, 2016a; Landler, 2016). The US troops will continue to train Afghan forces and support counterterrorism operations. Following suit, NATO member states will maintain — or, in Germany’s case, increase — their RSM troop level contributions (UN, 2015a).

13. The size and scope of international forces’ engagements in Afghanistan have been broadening throughout 2016, led by US changes to their rules of engagement in areas of operation. On 20 June 2016, President Obama eased restrictions on assistance by US forces to their Afghan counterparts, allowing US troops to accompany Afghan forces fighting insurgents on

1 RSM personnel numbers from June 2016

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their offensive operations against the Taliban, rather than previous restrictions which had confined them to a defensive role. In addition, the modified US rules of engagement also permit the increased use of US air power, including close air support, particularly in cases where “engagement can enable strategic effects on the battlefield” (Stewart, 2016). US officials stress that the US role will continue to be a TAA mission, and US troops will not be replacing Afghan forces in the fight against insurgent forces in Afghanistan (Rosenberg, 2016). It is clear that the change in US rules of engagement stems from a concern about the deteriorating security environment and the capacity of the ANDSF to push back the Taliban insurgency, which is now in control of more territory than at any other time since the invasion of US Forces in 2001.

14. On 13 May 2015, NATO member state Foreign Ministers endorsed a set of regulations and principles for the Alliance’s post-2016 support of the ANDSF. In the wake of RSM, NATO intends to maintain its support of Afghanistan through the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership that will be a civilian-led mission with a military component. For the German government and the majority of the German Bundestag, troop reduction in Afghanistan is a conditions-based decision, rather than a calendar-based one.

15. At the 8-9 July 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO member states Heads of State and Government alongside the President and Chief Executive of the National Unity Government of Afghanistan reaffirmed their commitment to “ensure long-term security and stability” in the country. NATO member states reiterated that their ultimate goal is to prevent Afghanistan from never again becoming a safe haven for terrorists, and for Afghanistan to be able to sustain its own security, governance, and development. This remains a significant challenge. While NATO member states and partners highlighted achievements in the areas of democratic processes, education, healthcare and women’s rights, they also underscored the areas still requiring significant attention, including electoral reforms, women’s rights, combatting corruption, counter-narcotics efforts, and increasing employment and economic opportunities. As will be discussed more below, such developments are understood to happen in an increasingly secure environment.

16. In order to meet their political objective, NATO member states and their partners pledged at the Warsaw summit to sustain the RSM beyond 2016 via the provision of training, advice and assistance to Afghan security institutions including the police, the air force, and special operations forces. The contributing nations also committed to continue financial sustainment of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces, by pledging over USD800 million annually between 2018 and 2020 (SIGAR, 2016a). Furthermore, NATO members and Afghanistan remained committed to continuing political dialogue and practical cooperation, in order to strengthen the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership. At the Warsaw summit, the Afghan government, with the support of NATO member states and partners, made commitments to reach the end goals by further developing Afghan security institutions and forces, strengthening the Afghan economy, continuing to pursue reforms, and improving women's rights and the protection of children.

III. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW

17. Afghan and NATO-led coalition forces faced serious challenges not only from the Taliban and the Haqqani Network, but also from other groups, such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIL-K) or groups claiming to operate under the ISIL flag (SIGAR, 2016). Exceptionally high levels of violence followed the launch of the 2016 fighting season. As a result, the overall security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated, resulting in record high casualties among the Afghan security forces2 and civilians. Encouragingly, in 2015 and 2016 insurgent forces suffered from resource deficiencies, challenges to group cohesion and severe casualties, especially amongst lower-level Taliban fighters (US DoD, 2015). In contrast to

2 ANDSF attrition continues to be a persistent concern. The United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) recorded 12,169 ANDSF casualties (4,541 killed and 7,628 wounded), a 20% increase compared to 2014 (UNAMA, 2016).

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previous years, in the winter of 2015-16 did not experience a significant decrease in fighting, but rather attacks intensified throughout the autumn (Felbab-Brown, 2016). While violence in Afghanistan typically escalates between spring and summer, the beginning of the fighting season in 2016 witnessed a notable rise in insurgent attacks, particularly after the Taliban declared the start of their spring offensive, dubbed “Operation Omari”, on 12 April (SIGAR, 2016a). In the two weeks following the announcement, attacks initiated by the Taliban rose significantly (UN, 2016a). In the first four months of 2016, the United Nations reported a 14% increase in armed clashes compared with the same period in 2015, with insurgent tactics and strategy focusing more on pushing towards district centres, than on targets of civilian governance (UN, 2016a; SIGAR, 2016a).

18. In 2015, expected violence in insurgent strongholds, such as Helmand and Kandahar, increased in intensity, but the Afghan security forces were also confronted with a higher level of violence in the north and northeast as well, including the dramatic, though temporary, seizure of Kunduz in September 2015. Since the Taliban’s temporary seizure of Kunduz on 28 September 2015 – their first seizure of a provincial capital since coalition forces began operations in Afghanistan in 2001 – the Taliban continued to close in on several provincial capitals in 2016. In perhaps a sign of more provincial capitals switching hands in the near future, Afghan elders reported that the Taliban were close to taking Tirin Kot, the provincial capital of Uruzgan province in early September 2016. Throughout 2016, insurgent groups have displayed a strong ability to challenge the territorial claims of several district centres simultaneously, thereby stretching the ability of the ANDSF to respond and defend the territory (US DoD, 2016a). The effects are clear enough.

19. Insurgent fighting and advances have been particularly fierce in Helmand, Uruzgan, Kunduz, Baghlan, Faryab, Kunar and Nangarhar, provinces (UN, 2016a). In Afghan media, the spokesman of the Ministry of Interior stated that nine districts were under the control of insurgent forces, including four districts in Helmand, two in Badakhstan, one in Ghazni, one in Zabul and one in Sar-e Pul Provinces (SIGAR, 2016a). Throughout the year, Helmand province has been under increasing pressure, as Taliban campaigns are advancing on the capital, Lashkar Gah. The intense fighting is forcing Afghan forces to withdraw from several districts, including Musa Qala, Nad Ali and Now Zad (Felbab-Brown, 2016; Rasmussen, 2016; Mashal, 2016; Faizy and Bengali, 2016).

20. By the end of May 2016, of the 407 districts within the 34 provinces, 268 districts (65.6%) were under government control, 36 districts (8.8%), were under insurgent control, but 104 districts (25.6%) were considered at risk (SIGAR, 2016a). United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) assessed the increase of successful insurgent district seizures to be understood within the Afghan security strategy, which seeks to redeploy Afghan forces from lower, to higher-priority areas to obtain their strategic and operational objectives (SIGAR, 2016a).

21. The deteriorating security environment over the past year has highlighted critical deficiencies in the capabilities of the Afghan security forces, including in the areas of logistics and planning, intelligence and air support, leadership, and, in some cases, the need to strengthen working relationships between security institutions and civilian authorities. With the aim of reinforcing these ANDSF gaps, the coalition and US forces maintain limited assistance in key areas: air; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) throughout the country (US DoD, 2015).

22. The insurgency remains resilient. The United Nations registered 6,122 security incidents between 16 February and 19 May 2016, 68.5% of which were reported in the southern, southeastern and eastern regions (UN, 2016a). The registered number of incidents is a slight decrease when compared with the same period in 2015 (3%). However, while there has been a decrease in the total number of security incidents, the number of armed clashes and civilian casualties increased in 2016 (SIGAR, 2016a). The data shows intense violence was also recorded

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in the north and northeastern provinces, including Kunduz, Baghland, and Nangarhar (US DoD, 2016). Armed clashes accounted for 64% of the reported security incidents, while improvised explosive devices (IEDs) accounted for 17.4% (UN, 2016a). Targeted killings and suicide attacks declined, with 15 suicide attacks and 163 assassination attempts – successful and unsuccessful (UN, 2016a).

23. Civilian casualties are also on the rise. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented a record high of 11,002 civilian casualties (3,545 deaths and 7,457 injuries) in 2015, a 4% increase from the previous year. In the first half of 2016, UNAMA recorded 5,166 civilian casualties (1,601 deaths and 3,565 injuries), another increase of 4% compared to the previous year (UNAMA, 2016a). 2016 also witnessed the highest level of civilian casualties occurring in the first six months, since the UN began documenting civilian casualties in 2009 (UNAMA, 2016a). Compared to the first half of 2015, casualties among children increased by 18%, and casualties among women decreased by 11% (UNAMA, 2016a).

24. In the first half of 2016, insurgent groups caused most of the casualties (60%), representing an 11% decrease compared to the same period in 2015 (UNAMA, 2016a). Despite this decrease, insurgent forces continued to target civilians deliberately: complex and suicide attacks, targeted killings, and indiscriminate use of IEDs. Of particular concern is the rise in civilian casualties by pro-government forces, since Afghan forces took over responsibility for security in 2015. In 2016, pro-government forces were responsible for 23% of casualties, a 47% increase compared to the first six months of 2015 (UNAMA, 2016a). Most of the civilian casualties by pro-government forces resulted from the use of indirect and explosive weapons during ground engagements, as well as from aerial operations conducted by Afghan forces (UNAMA, 2016a). UNAMA attributed 13% of casualties to ground engagements between warring parties.

25. The increasing trend pro-government forces-related civilian casualties is unsettling. The significant year-on-year rise in civilian casualties since the 2014 security transition indicates that the ANDSF is still far too careless about considering the risks to nearby civilian populations when using force. The UN and Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Restriction (SIGAR) report a trend in continued, inappropriate use of heavy weaponry in populated areas, in irregular and unsupervised deployment of pro-government militias with inadequate supervision, and in a lack of accountability at military judicial level for abuses of power and inappropriate use of force in the combat theatre.

26. The intensity of the 2015 and 2016 fighting seasons is reflected in the declining public perception of security. The 2015 annual Asia Foundation survey conducted among 9,586 Afghan citizens representing 14 ethnic groups and 34 provinces showed Afghan optimism about the overall direction of the country and confidence in the government at its lowest point in a decade, after a steady rise in 2014. A majority of Afghans (57.5%) said the country is moving in the wrong direction, citing deteriorating security, unemployment, and corruption as the main reasons for their pessimism. The presence of Daesh3 has also impacted Afghan’s perception of their safety, 40.3% of participants saying the group poses a threat (Asia Foundation, 2015). Still, the population remains largely confident in the ANDSF, with 70% supporting them. According to the NATO-sponsored Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research survey, which conducts interviews in 34 provinces, 2016 public security perceptions were close to an all-time low, with only 20% of the participants reporting that security in their community was good (US DoD, 2016a).

IV. INSURGENT FORCES

A. THE TALIBAN

3 Arabic acronym of the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL)

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27. The Taliban-led insurgency remains an ongoing challenge to peace and stability, and, as noted above, Afghan forces are stretched increasingly thin in their efforts to prevent the Taliban’s territorial expansion (SIGAR, 2016a). The insurgency is forcing the ANDSF to become more reactive, as opposed to proactive, with its tactics of manoeuvring in rural districts while simultaneously carrying out ambitious attacks in more populated centres (US DoD, 2015).

28. Overall, the insurgency in Afghanistan is achieving a degree of success by modifying its tactics, with more prevalent high-profile attacks against soft targets, particularly in Kabul, to weaken confidence in the government. Although the ANDSF managed to retake territories with the the assistance of coalition forces, insurgents have exploited certain of their vulnerabilities, weakening the security situation in key areas and placing others at risk (SIGAR, 2016c). In 2016, the Taliban has conducted attacks across the country, including checkpoint overruns and coordinated attacks in Kandahar, Helmand, Faryab, Uruzgan, Ghazni, Kunduz and the provinces surrounding Kabul. The 21st of December 2015 saw the deadliest Taliban attacks on US forces since 2012, for which the Taliban claimed responsibility (SIGAR, 2016c; US DoD, 2015). Since the beginning of this year’s spring offensive, 36 attacks by the Taliban have targeted district administrative centres (UN, 2016a).

29. Insider attacks continue to challenge the ANDSF and the coalition forces. Although the number of such attacks has declined from the peak in 2012, RSM advisors are at risk as they train Afghan forces. Seven insider attacks by Afghan forces on US forces, so-called green-on-blue attacks, occurred between 1 January 2015 and 19 May 2016. Whereas green-on-blue attacks have not caused any casualties in 2016, 2015 saw three US soldiers killed and 14 wounded (SIGAR, 2016a). Over the same period, there were 77 green-on-green attacks, wherein Afghan forces face attacks from their own rank and file, killed 205 soldiers and wounded 103 (SIGAR, 2016a).

30. A power struggle emerged following the July 2015 announcement of the death of former Taliban leader Mullah Omar (in 2013), when Mullah Mansour was appointed as the new Taliban leader. The Taliban continues to face group cohesion challenges. For example, Mullah Omar’s son, Mullah Yaqub, openly questioned Mullah Mansour’s right to rule and called for an intensification of the group’s military campaign, rejecting peace negotiations with the government in Kabul (UNAMA, 2015a; Osman, 2015). Evidence also suggests an opposing faction has been created under Mullah Mohammed Rasool Akhund, with reported clashes between their rival loyalists (UN, 2015a; UN, 2016b).

31. After Mullah Mansour’s death by a US drone strike in May 2016, however, Mansour’s successor, Haibatullah Akhundzada, has increasingly taken steps to improve Taliban cohesion. While Mansour reportedly pushed out Taliban members who opposed his leadership, Akhundzada is working to mend divisions and has appointed former rivals of Mansour to official posts (Totakhil and Donati, 2016). Internal disagreements have yet to have a significant demonstrable effect on Taliban battlefield capabilities (US DoD, 2015; Felbab-Brown, 2016). The Taliban continue to demonstrate the ability to conduct high-profile attacks which undermine public confidence in the government and wrest control of rural areas from the government (US DoD, 2016a). Still, it is very important to highlight the lack of popular support that the Taliban receives from the rural population, which rather than supporting the group more often than not seeks to expel them.

B. OTHER INSURGENT GROUPS

32. In parallel with the Taliban’s intensified attacks, other groups, including Al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network, increasingly expanded their presence in 2015 and 2016. The Haqqani Network remains the most significant threat to coalition and Afghan forces, and continues to be the most critical enabler of Al-Qaeda (US DoD, 2016a, p. 27). According to the US Department of Defense (DoD), the Haqqani Network leads the insurgency in the eastern Afghan provinces of Paktika and Khost. Despite Pakistan’s military operations in North Waziristan earlier in 2015, the group demonstrated the capacity to plan and launch high-profile attacks across the country as well as in

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the Kabul region (US DoD, 2015). The recent change of Taliban leadership led to the appointment of Siraj Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani Network, as the deputy to Mullah Mansour, underlining the reality that the Haqqani Network will continue to be an important component of the Taliban-led insurgency (Roggio and Joscelyn, 2015).

33. Al-Qaeda’s presence in the country remains mostly restricted to isolated areas in eastern and northeastern Afghanistan (US DoD, 2016a). Counterterrorism efforts have forced Al-Qaeda to focus on survival and regeneration, rather than external operations. However, Al-Qaeda continues to support insurgent groups targeting Afghan and international coalition forces (US DoD, 2016a). According to US Brigadier General Charles Cleveland in May 2016, Al-Qaeda’s support for the Taliban has increased, as Al-Qaeda is providing greater “capabilities and skills” than in the past (Gibbons-Neff, 2016). In late October 2015, the joint US-Afghan operation against what was “probably the largest” Al-Qaeda training camp found in Afghanistan, demonstrates the importance of continued counterterrorism efforts against the group (SIGAR, 2016c).

C. DAESH IN AFGHANISTAN – ISIL-K

34. In early January 2015, Daesh declared its intention to expand to Afghanistan and Pakistan, establishing the Wilayat Khorasan (ISIL-K)4. US General Wilson Shoffner, RSM’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, estimated the number of fighters who have pledged their allegiance to ISIL-K “in the lower 1,000 to 3,000 bracket” (Europe Diplomacy and Defence, 2016). The group consists of mostly dissatisfied mid-level Taliban commanders, primarily former members of Pakistan’s Tehrik-e Taliban and to a lesser extent the Afghan Taliban (Osman, 2015). ISIL-K has established a limited presence in approximately five districts of Nangarhar, reportedly carrying out suicide bombings, small arms attacks and kidnappings against civilians and ANDSF (Europe Diplomacy and Defence, 2016; UN, 2015a). Nevertheless, the role of ISIL-K in Afghanistan remains limited, facing strong resistance from international military air strikes, as well as rival militant Islamists such as the Taliban (Barr and Moreng, 2016).

35. The presence of Daesh raised concerns within the Afghan government and the international community. In March 2015 President Ghani told the United States that Afghanistan was the “frontline” against the terrible threat of Daesh. A month later, RSM officials called Daesh’s presence “nascent at best”, but by October 2015 the concern over ISIL-K had significantly increased, with the RSM and USFOR-A Commander, John F. Campbell, claiming the group had transitioned from “nascent” to “operationally emergent” (US DoD, 2015).

36. At the beginning of 2016, President Obama granted additional authorisation to USFOR-A to conduct offensive operations against ISIL-K (Schmidt and Schmitt, 2016). As a result, airstrikes against the group have increased substantially (Europe Diplomacy and Defence, 2016). An example of this is the 8 January 2016 drone strike, which reportedly killed 15 ISIL-K militants in the Achin district of Nangarhar after a provincial council official had warned US Forces of ISIL-K presence in five Nangarhar districts. On 14 January 2016, the US State Department designated ISIL-K as a foreign terrorist organisation (SIGAR, 2016c). By July 2016, US and Afghan officials announced that US forces would be deployed to eastern Afghanistan to assist the ANDSF in counterterrorism operations against Daesh (Donati and Totakhil, 2016).

37. The success of ISIL-K in securing the defection of some high-level Taliban commanders has sparked national and international concern. Two high-level Taliban commanders, Rauf Khadem and Hafiz Saeed Khan, joined the group: the former was appointed as the governor of the so-called Khorasan province, while the latter was appointed as the deputy governor. The two worked together to open up recruiting cells in Nangarhar (Osman, 2015). However, soon after its establishment, ISIL-K suffered a major setback when Khadem was killed by a US drone strike. Throughout 2015 and in 2016, Daesh has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks (though

4 Hereinafter will be referred to as the ISIL-K; Khorasan is a historical name for a region straddling Pakistan and Afghanistan.

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none substantiated), including the spring and autumn attacks in Jalalabad and an attack on the Pakistan Consulate in January, an attack against a Shia mosque in Kabul and the beheading of Taliban fighters (UN, 2015b; Joscelyn, 2016).

38. Daesh’s presence in Afghanistan has mostly been confined to foreigners and a small group of former Taliban fighters. While some Taliban commanders defected from the Taliban due to internal quarrels, dissatisfaction with the Taliban leadership, and a perception of being deceived by the prolonged concealment of Mullah Omar’s death, the influence of Daesh in Afghanistan remains unclear (Barr and Moreng, 2016). Some groups may merely be sympathetic, using the group’s banner for credibility and recruitment, while others may be seeking new funding. For instance, the Central Asian Taliban-aligned militant group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), claimed allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, yet reportedly continued fighting alongside the Taliban during the Kunduz takeover (Rubin, 2016).

39. The potential growth of ISIL-K in Afghanistan is challenged by other militant Islamists, primarily the Taliban, and by the complexities of local Afghan politics, which the group’s leaders understand poorly and which is naturally hostile to foreign presence. Understanding its disadvantage, ISIL-K has built up a robust media apparatus to disseminate its propaganda. The group has attacked the Taliban, implying that the Taliban and its leaders are serving Iran and the Pakistan’s intelligence agency. Al-Qaeda has also been the target of Daesh. Al-Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has been discredited, in the hope that Al-Qaeda militants operating in Afghanistan can be persuaded to change allegiance (Barr and Moreng, 2016).

40. Daesh’s criticism of Pashtunwali, the tribal code of Pashtuns, and its disapproval of Deobandi Islam is an additional challenge to its expansion in Afghanistan. As an indigenous force, the Taliban can draw on tribal relationships and ethnic loyalties (Barr and Moreng, 2016). Deobandism is the prevailing religious philosophy of the Taliban, and the majority of Taliban militants adhere to the Pashtunwali code. The Taliban’s deeply entrenched presence in Afghanistan’s militant communities, therefore, means Daesh’s propaganda and recruitment efforts have a relatively limited reach in the country (Laub, 2014). Furthermore, Daesh’s support and promotion of “brutality” makes the group unappealing to civilians (Europe Diplomacy and Defence, 2016).

41. While ISIL-K is facing obstacles to its expansion in Afghanistan, analysts argue that it will remain a threat as factions within the Taliban may provide ISIL-K with more fighters, and weak controls of borders in the north and east make it somewhat easier for fighters to transport resources and themselves into and out of the theatre of operations (Johnson, Karokhail and Amiri, 2016).

42. Over the year, the ANDSF have mounted an offensive campaign against Daesh, and in July 2016 Afghan troops, supported by US Special Forces and airstrikes, pushed into the Kot district of Nangarhar province (Ahmad, 2016). As a result of operations by Afghan security forces backed by international air strikes, and pressure from the Taliban, the number of fighters has reportedly been reduced to about 2,500 (Johnson, Karokhail and Amiri, 2016). Faced with enemies from virtually all sides, Daesh’s footprint in the country has reduced over the past year. Despite these setbacks however, ISIL-K has been able to develop a small presence outside of Nangarhar province in Kunar and Nuristan provinces (UN, 2016a).

43. Concerns over the strength and persistence of ISIL-K’s presence in Afghanistan remain, however, as Daesh claimed responsibility for the 23 July 2016 attack in Kabul that killed 80 and wounded hundreds during a peaceful demonstration by the Hazara minority. Not only was this the first attack in Kabul by Daesh, but it was also Kabul’s deadliest attack since 2001 (Rasmussen, 2016).

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V. AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES (ANDSF)

44. The authorised total force level for the ANDSF remains 352,000 for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). An additional 30,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP) is also authorised and is technically independent of the ANP, despite an effort to place the ALP under the command and control of the ANP. USFOR-A reported that, as of May 2016, neither the ANA nor the Afghan Air Force (AAF) are operating at fully-authorised levels, with the ANA at 87.9% (SIGAR, 2016a).

45. The sustainability of Afghan forces remains a key concern: security forces have faced high attrition rates and low re-enlistment rates (UN, 2016a). Between December 2015 and May 2016, monthly attrition rates for the ANDSF increased 2.4% compared with June 2015 and November 2015, but remain around 2% per month; personnel absent without leave (AWOL) is the most common reason for being dropped form the rolls (US DoD, 2016a). Further complicating matters is the debilitating trend of so-called ‘ghost soldiers’, which are fictitious names added to an enlistment record for the misappropriation of precious military funding. The creeping problem of ‘ghost soldiers’ undercuts the military readiness of the ANDSF, drains the relatively scarce funds needed for capability development and investment, and makes the government more inclined to recruit more local police forces and irregular militias and deploy them in combat situations for which they are either under (or not at all) prepared or where they only add a more complicating variable with their questionable tactics.

46. The majority of ANDSF funding comes from international donors. The budget for the ANDSF for the 2015 financial year was USD5.4 billion, of which USD4.1 billion was provided by the United States and another USD923 million by other international donors. The Afghan government covered USD419 million of the costs. US and other international funding covered all costs related to equipment, salaries, facilities and equipment maintenance, fuel, information technology, aviation training, uniforms, and medical supplies. The Afghan government’s contribution was allocated to food and general force subsistence costs. The required budget for the ANDSF in FY 2016 is USD5.01 billion, with the United States providing USD3.65 billion (US DoD, 2016a). The budget for the ANDSF for FY 2017 is projected to decrease to around USD4.9 billion (US DoD, 2016b).

47. The ANDSF proved resilient throughout the 2015 fighting season, despite facing a range of challenges, particularly from the concerted offensive campaign of the Taliban. The ANDSF were forced to increase their operating tempo to twice that of 2014, with particularly intense combat campaigns. In the wake of the Taliban’s July 2015 campaign in Helmand and its temporary seizure of Kunduz in October, it is clear that the ANDSF still needs to improve intelligence, logistics, and planning and coordination. Close air support from US forces in Afghanistan still proved essential to ANDSF operations, as the AAF continues to receive training and equipment allowing for incremental independence in this capability as well. The AAF is scheduled to receive deliveries of MD530F combat helicopters and Embraer Super Tucanos, which will only broaden the spectrum of offensive capabilities available to the forces in their missions going forward (IISS, 2016). The ANDSF continue to need more widespread training and education for force-generation and sustainment.

48. As of July 2016, the ANDSF included 4,228 women among its ranks: 1,039 in the ANA, 97 in the AAF, 2,879 in the ANP, and 213 in the Afghan Special Security Forces (SIGAR, 2016a). While the number of women serving in the ANDSF is steadily increasing, women represent only 1.3% of the ANDSF (SIGAR, 2016a). Broadly speaking, cultural and religious beliefs continue to obstruct greater participation of women in the ANDSF and, those that do serve often experience harassment and threats (US DoD, 2016a). Moreover, male ANDSF officials have prevented women serving in the Afghan security forces from fulfilling their range of duties, for instance by not permitting women to carry weapons or drive vehicles (US DoD, 2016a). Both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior have taken steps to increase opportunities for women in the ANDSF. Each of the ministries has created 5,000 women or gender-neutral positions in their

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tashkil,5 in order to ensure that women have the opportunity to work in an occupation they are qualified for and the ability to progress in their profession (US DoD, 2016a).

VI. COUNTER-NARCOTICS

49. The illicit cultivation, production, trafficking, and consumption of narcotics continues to play a major role in Afghanistan’s political, economic and social fabric. In its annual Afghan Opium Survey, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated the total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2015 at 184,000 hectares, a 19% decrease from 2014 – the first since 2009. In addition, total Afghan opium production (3,300 tonnes) also decreased by 48% in 2015 as compared to 2014. Helmand remains the country’s main opium poppy cultivating province, with an estimated 86,400 hectares (47% of the national total), followed by Farah, Kandahar and Badghis.

50. Government eradication programmes, coupled with poor weather, are the principal driver behind the decline in poppy cultivation. Nevertheless, Afghanistan remains the world’s largest opium producer (SIGAR, 2015). In 2015, there were only 14 provinces free from poppy cultivation, a decline from 15 provinces in 2014 (UNODC, 2015a).

51. President Ghani approved the new counter-narcotics strategy for 2015-2019 on 15 October 2015. The National Drug Action Plan (NDAP) sets out three key goals: to reduce poppy cultivation, production and trade; to reduce lower domestic demand for opium, as well as other illicit drugs; and to increase treatment capacity for users (SIGAR, 2015). The NDAP focuses primarily on alternative agricultural development and eradication, interdiction, anti-money laundering and asset confiscation, as well as improved regional and international cooperation to combat illegal drug production, trade, and usage (UN, 2015a).

52. The estimated gross value of opiates in Afghanistan in 2015 decreased by 33% from 2014 to USD0.57 billion, but still accounts for the equivalent of roughly 4% of Afghanistan’s GDP (UNODC, 2015a). In addition, the opium poppy economy is the principal source of basic livelihoods for vast segments of the Afghan rural population. However, the drug economy has a negative impact on national economic growth, generating market distortion, such as high domestic inflation and a decrease in the competitiveness of other sectors (Felbab-Brown, 2015).

53. The nexus between organised crime and militant insurgents – in which the illicit drug economy appears to play a role – remains a serious threat to Afghanistan (UNODC, 2015b). The Taliban uses illicit drug revenue to raise financial resources and facilitate weapons procurement and logistics. The group’s protection of drug trafficking has also strengthened it politically, as it defends the basic livelihood of the population in the poppy cultivating region (Felbab-Brown, 2015). Still, it should be noted that drug production, cultivation and trafficking are not limited to insurgent-controlled areas alone, and the drug economy undermines governance and the rule of law throughout Afghanistan (US Department of State, 2015).

54. Illegal drug use and abuse remains a large and growing problem in Afghanistan. Addiction to opiates and heroin remains high and the population addicted to crystal meth has risen in recent years (US Department of State, 2015). In the 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the US Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) highlighted the “alarming prevalence of drug use among adult men and women, adolescents and children” (US Department of State, 2015). According to the UN Afghanistan Drug Report 2015, the addiction to and consumption of drugs in Afghanistan is “more than double the global drug use rate”, equivalent to 12.6% of the Afghan adult population (UN, 2016b). The report noted that Afghanistan is home to between 1.9 and 2.4 million adult drug users (UN, 2016b).

5 The tashkil is the Afghan government’s official list of required ANA and ANP personnel by position and rank.

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55. The burden of providing shelter and treatment centres for the increasing number of drug-addicted population is already falling heavily on provincial government’s shoulders (SIGAR, 2016c). As of now, Afghanistan has 123 centres with the ability to treat only 10.7% of existing drug users. In an effort to increase treatment capacity, the Afghan government opened the largest treatment and rehabilitation centre in Kabul on December 2015.

56. The Governor-Led Eradication Programme (GLE) intends to reduce drug production, by reimbursing provinces for the cost of eradicating poppies (SIGAR, 2016c). In 2015, the GLE eradicated a total of 3,760 hectares of opium poppy, an increase of 40% from 2014 (UNODC, 2015a). Despite the positive figures, the eradication of opium poppy has been decreasing over the past few years, since the peak of 9,672 hectares in 2012. One of the missing components for effective eradication continues to be the lack of political will at both local and Kabul level (US Department of State, 2015). Still, on a positive note, the specialised units of the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan carried out 571 counter-narcotics operations, resulting in the seizure of an estimated 194,607 kilograms of narcotics between November 2015 and February 2016 (UN, 2016b).

57. Afghanistan relies strongly on international assistance to implement its national counter-narcotics strategy. A significant amount of international assistance in combating the drug economy comes from the United States: USD8.5 billion since 2002 (SIGAR, 2016a). In order to support the newly-established Afghan counter-narcotics strategy, the United States committed to continue providing available resources and future funding. The alternative development programmes of the US Agency for Independent Development (USAID) have also supported US counter-narcotics efforts by helping Afghanistan develop economic alternatives to illicit drug production. Meanwhile, the United Nations has played an important role in fostering talks between Afghanistan and its neighbours in order to bolster counter-narcotics efforts. From 21 to 24 September 2015, the UN-initiated Third Regional Workshop on Illicit Use of Money and Value Transfer Services hosted Financial Intelligence Units from Afghanistan and Tajikistan, who signed a memorandum of understanding that provides a basis for sharing information on suspicious financial transactions so as to counter illicit financial flows (UN, 2015a). On 14 December 2015, the UN and Afghanistan co-chaired a high-level meeting in Vienna, at which Afghanistan’s drug action plan and the UN’s country programme were presented. Afghanistan’s partners expressed readiness to support both measures to combat the threat of illicit drugs (UN, 2016b).

VII. DEVELOPMENT

58. More than a year after the Afghan National Unity Government (NUG) was established, it continues to struggle to bring about a unified Afghanistan. Popular support for the government has diminished and an increasingly vocal political opposition has emerged, feeding on the anxiety generated by deteriorating security and economic distress. Public frustration with the government was on clear display on 11 November 2015 when protestors, aggrieved at the killing of seven civilians in Zabul Province, marched through Kabul to the presidential palace, calling for improved security and justice (UN, 2015a). The UNSGR for Afghanistan, Nicholas Haysom, stressed that “in 2016, it is vital that the NUG demonstrates increasingly its effectiveness, not only for the Afghan people but also for donors, on whom it is largely dependent for financial, material and technical assistance” (UNAMA, 2015b).

59. Tensions within the NUG have slowed down progress on key appointments within the government over the past two years. This is slowly changing however. On 24 February 2016, the government filled the long-awaited position of Attorney General and Minister of the Interior. In addition, on 20 June 2016 Lieutenant General Abdullah Habib was appointed the new Defence Minister. On the same day the former acting Defence Minister, Masoom Stanekzai, was appointed head of the National Directorate of Security (SIGAR, 2016a).

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60. On 5 September 2015, international donors met with Afghan government officials in Kabul for a Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) to review progress on the Afghan reform agenda, discuss key policy issues, and jointly decide on the way forward (SIGAR, 2016). The September session was the first high-level meeting since President Ghani introduced the “Realising Self-Reliance” reform agenda at the December 2014 London Conference. As a result of the conference, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) became the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF), which will now guide the activities of the Afghan government and the international community in key areas6.

61. During the conference, SOM donors reaffirmed their Tokyo commitment to provide Afghanistan with USD16 billion through 2015 and to maintain support at or near the levels of the past decade through 2017 (SIGAR, 2015). In November 2015, the Ministry of Finance circulated the first progress report on Afghanistan’s mutual accountability commitments, indicating that only 5 out of 39 deliverables had been achieved (USAID claims only 2). In April 2016, the Afghan government assessed that only four deliverables had been achieved and five were in progress, while one deliverable has been delayed until the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security is implemented (SIGAR, 2016a). Moreover, on 9 May the Afghan government issued a draft of its Afghan National Peace and Development Framework, and stated that three out of 20 national priority programmes had been making progress, such as developments in plans for justice reform, women, economic empowerment and the citizens’ charter (UN, 2016a, p. 10).

62. At the 5 October 2016 Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, the international community reaffirmed its commitment to an Afghanistan on the path to peace and stability. At the conference, donors and Afghan officials reviewed the Afghan government’s progress on fulfilling mutual accountability measures. International donors pledged an additional USD15.2 billion for the 2017-2020 period; USD1.3 billion of which will come from the EU, USD1.7 billion from Germany, USD1 billion from both the United Kingdom and the United States, and USD100 million from France (EDD 925).

63. Annually, around 700,000 Afghans, 400,000 of whom are high school and college graduates, enter the workforce with little or no employment prospects (SIGAR, 2016c). In November 2015, President Ghani announced the first phase of the Jobs for Peace programme, a 24-30 month job-focused stimulus and stabilisation programme at an estimated overall cost of USD1.18 billion (SIGAR, 2016c). The central aim of the programme is to provide short-term, labour-intensive employment in rural and urban areas, focusing particularly on those who are especially vulnerable to insurgent recruitment (Mashal, 2015).

The slow progress of electoral reform

64. Issues over electoral reform continue to challenge the Afghan government, as electoral reform has been a source of significant tension within the fragile National Unity Government (NUG). As noted in this committee’s previous report, international monitors reported substantial levels of fraud during the 2014 presidential election, underscoring the urgent need for electoral reforms in Afghanistan. The September 2014 agreement between Ashraf Ghani and his former election rival, current Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, called for ambitious goals: the implementation of electoral reforms before the parliamentary elections; parliamentary elections within two years of the NUG’s establishment; a Loya Jirga convention by October 2016 to amend the constitution and create the position of Prime Minister (Van Bijlert, 2016).

6 SMAF will provide guidance in at least six areas: 1) improving security and political stability; 2) anticorruption, governance, rule of law and human rights; 3) restoring fiscal sustainability; 4) reforming development planning and management; 5) private-sector development; 6) development of partnerships and aid effectiveness.

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65. In reality, Afghanistan has seen only marginal progress on the implementation of electoral reforms. In September 2015, President Ghani issued a decree in which he approved seven of the ten initial recommendations of the Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC), including those on voter registration, polling centre allocation, eligibility requirements for the Board of the Commissioners and the appointment of the election commissioners (UN, 2015a). On 21 December, the SERC presented final electoral system recommendations, in which it proposed that the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC) be merged, election violations be prosecuted, and a special court for election disputes be established. Both the decree and recommendations were rejected by the Wolesi Jirga (lower house) a few days later (Van Bijlert, 2016).

66. The January 2016 IEC announcement that the date for long-delayed parliamentary and district council elections would be 15 October 2016 raised criticism from the political opposition, observers, and the CEO administration (UN, 2016b). A spokesperson for Abdullah Abdullah stated that the electoral commission is illegitimate, that election reforms are a precondition for the parliamentary elections, and that a new commission will be appointed to the IEC and IECC to administer the elections (Mashal, 2016). In response, the chairman of the election committee stated that the Afghan government has no authority to remove election commissioners (SIGAR, 2016c).

67. On 28 February, President Ghani issued two electoral decrees known as the Law on the Structure, Duties and Authorities of the Independent Electoral Commission and Electoral Complaints Commission intended to review and reform the responsibilities and powers of the IEC and IECC, which was sent to parliament in April 2016 (UN, 2016a). Approval of the law would have brought the long-awaited parliamentary elections significantly closer, but it was resoundingly rejected by parliament’s lower house on 13 June 2016 (SIGAR, 2016a). Following the law’s rejection, President Ghani’s Office issued a statement noting the serious “regression” in the process of electoral reform as a result of the vote (Adili, Ahmadi, Linke and Clark, 2016).

68. The National Unity Government appears to be increasingly fragmenting, particularly following Chief Executive Officer Abdullah’s comments on 11 August that President Ghani was unfit to govern, criticising the President for bypassing him when making decisions (Mashal, 2016). Opposition groups continue to criticise the government for failing to implement the September 2014 agreement, urging that parliamentary elections be held by September 2016. Some have argued that since the NUG expires in September 2016, it must either be replaced by early presidential elections or by a loya Jirga (Felbab-Brown, 2016; UN, 2016a). While parliamentary elections are technically scheduled for 15 October 2016, the lack of significant electoral reform has put this date in doubt yet again.

69. Insufficient progress towards electoral reform also has budgetary implications for Afghanistan, as international donors have reduced funding for Afghan electoral organisations, resulting in the reduction of staff in the IEC. Both the IEC and IECC are seeking supplementary funds from Afghanistan’s Finance Ministry to maintain core capacities (SIGAR, 2016c). Reforms should move faster in the wake of the recent resignation of the Chairman of the Election Committee.

VIII. ECONOMY

70. The deteriorating security environment and fragile political situation have also put a considerable damper on Afghanistan’s economic growth. The NUG has embarked on an ambitious reform agenda to revitalise the economy, tackle corruption, and improve the business climate (Byrd, 2015). However, it will take time for these reforms to have an impact, which will leave the

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government in a delicate position vis-à-vis the demands from its population and the international community supporting it.

71. Afghanistan’s real GDP growth dropped precipitously from 14.4% in 2012 to 3.4% in 2013 and 1.3% in 2014 (SIGAR, 2016c). In January 2016, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that its growth projection for 2015 has been adjusted downwards to 1.5% and highlighted the need for immediate reforms to boost economic growth (IMF, 2015). Negative inflation plagues the country, and is now at -1.9%, reflecting weak domestic economic activity and lower global fuel and food prices. According to the World Bank, real GDP growth for 2016 is projected at 1.9%, which will be the third consecutive year with the rate below 2% (World Bank, 2016, p. 11). Real GDP growth for 2017 and 2018 is projected at 2.9% and 3.6% respectively, but this projection is made on the assumption of improved security conditions and “strong reform momentum” (World Bank, 2016). Given the fact that approximately 400,000 individuals enter the job market annually, higher growth rates are necessary to increase per capita income and employment opportunities (World Bank, 2016). Both the IMF and World Bank continue to emphasise the importance of continued development and progress on reforms, along with an improvement in security conditions (UN, 2016a).

72. Afghanistan’s economic constraints are relatively unique due to its overreliance on foreign aid, which currently accounts for approximately 45% of its gross national income (IMF, 2016). However, due to the country’s economic slowdown in 2015 there has been a significant decline in private sector confidence and investment. The number of new firm registrations – an indicator of investor confidence – dropped by 26% in 2015 across all economic sectors. The World Bank stressed in one of its biannual reports the importance of predictability and improved transparency in the continued implementation of economic and fiscal reforms as a means of building investor confidence and stimulating economic growth (World Bank, 2015).

73. Economic investments and business opportunities in the country have decreased in parallel with the reduced presence of international forces. Apart from agriculture, which is a volatile sector due to its dependency on weather conditions, other economic sectors have been directly affected by the departure of international forces (IMF, 2015). Lower foreign military spending has reduced demand for goods and services, leading to the loss of tens of thousands of jobs. For instance, growth in services, which averaged 12% in the past decade, declined to 2.2% in 2014. Manufacturing and construction have declined by 2.5 % and 2.2% respectively (World Bank, 2015). Meanwhile, the strength of the insurgency has caused the government to focus more of its budget on defence spending and less on economic investments (SIGAR, 2016c). The ability of Afghan youths to seek professional-level education is an essential foundation for future economic development in the country.

74. The lower house of the National Assembly approved a USD6.6 billion budget for the 2016 fiscal year (22 December 2015 - 21 December 2016)7 (SIGAR, 2016c). The economic performance in the 2015 fiscal year demonstrated that the domestic revenues of USD1.6 billion (21.1% increase from year 2014) paid for only 40% of Afghanistan’s total budget spending. In order to restore fiscal stability and reduce overreliance on foreign aid, the government must implement much-needed reforms in the areas of revenue collection, budget expenditure prioritisation, and securing stable donor assistance (IMF, 2016). The Afghan government has made progress in its discussions with the IMF concerning future funding. For example, the IMF Staff-Monitored Programme was successfully completed on 13 April 2016. Further, the Afghan government and the IMF agreed on a three-year, USD45 million Extended Credit Facility (ECF) loan agreement, which was approved by the IMF Executive Board on 20 July 2016 (SIGAR, 2016a).

75. On 17 December 2015, WTO trade ministers approved Afghanistan’s accession to the organisation, subject to its ratification by 30 June 2016. The terms for Afghanistan’s accession to 7 The Government of Afghanistan refers to 2015 as the 1395 (Hijri calendar), FY 2016 is therefore

noted as FY 1395 in official documents.

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the WTO were ratified by the lower house of the Afghan Parliament on 18 June 2016, and by the upper house on 21 June 2016 (SIGAR, 2016a). Afghanistan became a member of the WTO on 29 July 2016, making it the ninth least developed country in the organisation. The Afghan government hopes that accession to the WTO will open new economic opportunities for the country. Afghanistan’s First Deputy Chief Executive described the accession requirements as a driver for achieving structural reforms, and a way for the country to adopt market-economy principles, an open and transparent economy, are rule of law and good governance (SIGAR, 2016c).

The dilemmas of endemic corruption

76. Long-term stability and economic prosperity cannot be secured without tackling corruption. Although the new government has shown great commitment and political will to fight corruption through its comprehensive reform agenda, Afghanistan continues to suffer from widespread and endemic corruption. In 2015, Transparency International ranked Afghanistan 166 out of 168 countries, where 89.9% of citizens put corruption as one of the top issues of Afghanistan (Transparency International).

77. The NUG has made progress. In October 2014, it established the National Procurement Agency to oversee corruption in procurement activities in the public sector. Since then, the government stated that the agency has saved over USD70 million and blacklisted over 50 companies involved in corruption (Transparency International). Regarding the promotion of transparency and accountability, the registration of assets of all government representatives with the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption has been completed. In January 2016, anti-corruption offices were set up in Balkh, Herat and Kandahar provinces to conduct corruption assessments throughout the country (UN, 2015a; UN, 2016b).

78. The government has demonstrated its commitment to proceed with anti-corruption policies. Following a decree by President Ghani on 19 March 2016, the Afghan government established the Higher Council on Governance, Justice, and the Fight Against Corruption, (SIGAR, 2016a). The Council will manage the drafting and implementation of an Afghan anti-corruption strategy, which will be chaired by President Ghani, with members including Chief Executive Officer Abdullah, the Chief Justice, Afghanistan’s two Vice-Presidents, the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General. Furthermore, in May 2016 President Ghani announced the establishment of an anti-corruption court, as well as plans to develop the major crimes task force (UN, 2016a; SIGAR, 2016a).

IX. REGIONAL COOPERATION

79. Regional support remains critical for Afghan-led reconciliation efforts, improved security, and economic advancement. The Islamabad Declaration at the fifth Heart of Asia – Istanbul Process conference chaired by Afghanistan and Pakistan demonstrated the readiness of Afghanistan’s neighbours and partners to establish long-lasting peace in the country (UN, 2015a). Representatives of Istanbul Process signatories met in New Delhi in April 2016, where they further emphasised the need to address efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism (UN, 2016a). 80. Although Afghanistan and Pakistan acknowledge the strategic importance of bilateral relations for improved security and stability in Afghanistan, a series of high-profile attacks and cross border exchanges of fire renewed tensions in 2016 (US DoD, 2016a). Afghan and Pakistani leaders held bilateral meetings during the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris, in which Pakistan reiterated its commitment to cooperate with Afghanistan for the establishment of national reconciliation in the country (UN, 2016b). In an effort to develop enhanced cooperation in trade, energy and the economy, the two countries held the 10th conference of the Joint Economic Commission in November 2015 (UN, 2015a). In December 2015, Afghanistan and Pakistan chaired the Heart of Asia conference in Islamabad

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together, with both sides declaring their commitment to increased border security cooperation, intelligence-sharing, and combating terrorism. Following multiple formal meetings in Kabul and Islamabad between Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff and Afghanistan’s acting Minister of Security, the two sides agreed to establish direct military communications and further discuss areas for collaboration in countering terrorism and improving intelligence-sharing (UN 2015a; UN 2016).

81. Despite efforts to improve bilateral relations, recent events highlight persistent tensions between the two countries. Following the Taliban’s attack on the National Directorate of Security building in Kabul on 19 April 2016, which killed 56 civilians and injured 337, President Ghani addressed a joint session of parliament on 25 April, in which he questioned Pakistan’s willingness to encourage the Taliban to participate in talks, and urged Pakistan to take action against insurgent and terrorist groups (UN, 2016a; van Bijlert, 2016). In July 2016, President Ghani reportedly said that Afghanistan-Pakistan relations was one of Afghanistan’s biggest problems, as Pakistan provides a safe haven for terrorist and insurgent groups (Putz).

82. Afghanistan has also committed to improving trade, transport and energy interconnectedness. As a result of these efforts, the countries committed to increasing regional connectivity and plan a trilateral Afghanistan-India-Iran transit corridor, engendering a trilateral transport and transit agreement between the countries on 23 May 2016 (UN, 2016a). On 13 December 2015, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Indian leaders attended a ground-breaking ceremony for the development of a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline project. The project envisages the transport of up to 33 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Turkmenistan to the other three countries (SIGAR, 2016c). In the same month, President Ghani visited Azerbaijan and Turkey to discuss transport routes that would link Afghanistan to Europe (UN, 2016b). China and Afghanistan continue to increase cooperation as well. During the May 2016 visit to China by Chief Executive Officer Abdullah, a total of six bilateral agreements within areas of infrastructure, humanitarian assistance and economic cooperation were signed (UN, 2016a).

83. In December 2015, member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) expressed concern over a “growing terrorist threat” from Afghanistan. In order to create greater regional collaboration on counterterrorism, Russia underscored the need for enhanced cooperation between CSTO and Afghanistan, a statement repeatedly made by the Afghan government.

X. REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

84. The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan sharply deteriorated in 2015 as a result of intensified fighting. In 2015 the UN registered 335,000 new internally displaced persons (IDPs), representing a 78% increase in comparison to 2014. In the first half of 2016, UNAMA recorded 157,987 Afghans displaced by the conflict, a 10% increase compared with the same period in 2015 (UNAMA, 2016a). The UN now estimates approximately 1.2 million IDPs as a result of the continued conflict in Afghanistan (UNAMA, 2016). The United Nations reported that since the beginning of the Taliban’s 2016 spring offensive, another 15,000 people have been newly displaced (UN, 2016a). Afghans represent the second largest refugee group after Syrians under UNHCR’s mandate with an excess of 2.7 million.

85. According to the US Department of State, 58,412 Afghan refugees returned from Pakistan and Iran during 2015. Following the December 2014 Peshawar school attacks and the Pakistani security response, many of the returnees have felt pressured to come back to Afghanistan due to mistreatment by Pakistan’s authorities (SIGAR, 2016). Furthermore, 143,154 undocumented Afghans were deported from Iran (UN, 2016). In the first three months of 2016, the International Organisation for Migration registered 102,000 undocumented Afghans who had been deported or spontaneously returned from Iran or Pakistan (SIGAR, 2016a).

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86. Citizens from 147 countries sought asylum for the first time in the EU in 2015. Among them, there were 213,000 Afghans, representing the second largest population group after Syrians, or 21% of the total (Eurostat). This number had increased to 26% by mid-February 2016. Around 13% of the Afghan asylum seekers were unaccompanied minors or separated children (UN, 2016). Nearly 75% of Afghan refugees applied for asylum in Germany, Sweden, and Austria. Due to the challenges created by the migration crisis, several European countries deported approximately 3,000 Afghan asylum seekers (SIGAR, 2016c). Eurostat reported that in the first four months of 2016, around 48,000 Afghans sought asylum in the EU (SIGAR, 2016a). Many European countries continued attempts to return Afghan asylum seekers who have been rejected (UN, 2016a). The Afghan government and partners are discussing necessary measures to be taken in order to reduce the flow of Afghans out of the country.

XI. PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE TALIBAN

87. The government of Afghanistan has undertaken efforts to revive the peace process (UN, 2016b). However, since the first formal meeting between Afghan government officials and Taliban members on 7 July 2015, the status of negotiations has been at an “impasse” with lack of commitment from the Taliban to participate in direct talks (UN, 2015a).

88. The NUG and the international community have continuously stressed the importance of achieving national reconciliation through an Afghan-led peace process. In January and February 2016, representatives of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) on an Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Process – United States, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan – met in Islamabad and Kabul to talk about further efforts towards a national reconciliation (Weinbaum). On 23 February, representatives of the Group stated that they expected direct peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban to begin in early March (UN, 2016b). Pakistan offered to host this meeting. However, the Taliban leadership rejected “all such rumours” of peace talks, repeating its preconditions for joining the peace dialogue. Neither the international community nor the Afghan government accepted these outlined preconditions, including the granting of freedom to Taliban prisoners and the withdrawal of all foreign military presence (UN, 2015a).

89. While the QCG held five meetings between 11 January and 18 May, a presidential spokesman for the Afghan government stated that Afghanistan had not planned any further meetings with the QCG (SIGAR, 2016a). According to the United Nations, the QCG’s “initial momentum” on the peace process was “lost” (UN, 2016a). The likelihood of near-future talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban appears increasingly uncertain, following the Taliban’s several high-profile attacks and the change in leadership of the Taliban (US DoD, 2016a).

90. In parallel, the International Non-Governmental Organisation Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, convened a “Track II” non-official dialogue in Doha on 23 and 24 January 2016, with 55 participants. Afghan politicians and representatives of the Taliban participated in a personal capacity to discuss efforts on establishing peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan (Pugwash, 2016). President Ghani voiced his opposition to the dialogue outside of the official process (UN, 2016b).

91. An Afghan-led peace initiative to integrate former insurgent fighters into Afghan civil society, the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP), reported that 1,462 persons have joined the Programme this year. This is however a smaller number compared to 2015 when 1,716 persons joined. In March 2016, the Afghan government, APRP donors and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) decided to close down the initiative (SIGAR, 2016a). The initiative faced several challenges to its continuation, including an outdated peace and reintegration programme, and reluctance by insurgent fighters to reintegrate following the deteriorating security environment in the country (SIGAR, 2016a). Until a new programme starts,

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an assessment of the APRP will be undertaken to develop a new national strategy for peace and reintegration (SIGAR, 2016a).

92. In an interesting parallel development, the government signed a draft peace deal with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of the most renowned and long-standing warlords in the country, dating back to the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. This is the first successful peace accord between the government and the insurgents opposed to it. A condition of the deal was the removal of UN and US sanctions against Hekmatyar (Nordland, 2016). Making a separate peace with Hekmatyar, and his militia Hezb-e-Islami could prove to be a powerful example for many of the other militias operating more or less independently of the Taliban, showing that there is a way to give up violence and work in cooperation with the government. During the recent Brussels Conference on Afghanistan on 5 October 2016, US Secretary of State John Kerry said the deal “is an important step towards peace and reconciliation” and is “a model of what might be possible” (EDD, 5 October 2016).

XII. CONCLUSIONS AND POINTS OF CONSIDERATION FOR NATO PARLIAMENTARIANS

93. The hurdles to lasting peace and security in Afghanistan remain high. It is clear from this report that the security transition in the country continues to pose significant challenges for the ANSF in providing security throughout Afghanistan. Taking advantage of the ANDSF’s strategic and tactical weaknesses, the Taliban and its allies have gained significant territory, particularly in the south. And, as this report makes clear, the significant uptick in the tempo of the fighting is also taking its toll on the rank and file of the ANDSF, which is losing forces at an untenable rate to battlefield casualties and desertion.

94. To help push security sector reform back onto the right track, NATO member states must focus renewed attention on the problems plaguing the ANDSF and the government in Kabul. As Alliance member states have brought their attention back to their own territorial concerns, particularly those in Europe, they cannot afford at this late stage to neglect the urgency and importance of the longstanding support they have committed to bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan.

95. To get there, investments in the ANDSF by NATO member states must be followed up by strong political pressure to strengthen the oversight mechanisms of these institutions. One way to build strong oversight of the armed forces is to support and strengthen the Afghan Parliament. NATO member state parliamentarians can work with their Afghan counterparts to build consensus around tighter supervision of all aspects of Afghan defence institutions from the procurement process to enlistment rosters and beyond. Transparent defence institutions will be strong defence institutions, and they can set an example for others in the Afghan government plagued by corruption and neglect.

96. One way to start the process of strengthening parliamentary oversight of the armed forces in Afghanistan is to put pressure on the Afghan Parliament to find a workable solution to the proposed electoral reform process, the continued stalling of which is only delaying necessary reforms at all levels. The very health of the budding Afghan democracy depends on the ability to hold free and fair elections, which hold political leaders responsible for their actions in office. Free and fair election cycles must be secured for all eligible voters. The high expectations with regard to the political participation of women in civic life must be met with free access to the ballot.

97. More broadly, the international community as a whole must convene again to find new approaches for working together on building a peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan. The international community must do so admitting the dire realities on the ground, facing not only security sector reform, but also the myriad development-related projects and the factors hindering their success, particularly corruption. Endemic corruption can be weighed as the among the most

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significant variables producing the undesirable outcome of the international efforts in Afghanistan to this day.

98. As such, we must call for a new UN conference on Afghanistan at which, admitting the realities on the ground facing the ANDSF and the government in Kabul, the international community can understand the urgent need for renewed action and attention at all levels in Afghanistan. The recent EU-led conference in Brussels on 5 October 2016 is a good start, but should be the precursor for a broader UN project, as the future of Afghanistan is a global problem.

99. Allies pledged to continue their investment in Afghanistan, the parallel supervision of this investment is also needed. Renewed attention to the challenges of Afghanistan is the only way forward for the Alliance and the country in which it intervened over 15 years ago to bring peace and stability back to the country and the region. The investments of these past years must not be in vain.

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