SECOND DIVISIONJETHRO INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY CORPORATION and YAKULT PHILS., INC.Petitioners,- versus -THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, FREDERICK GARCIA, GIL CORDERO, LEONIELYN UDALBE, MICHAEL BENOZA, EDWIN ABLITER, CELEDONIO SUBERE and MA. CORAZON LANUZA,Respondents.G.R. No.172537Present:CARPIO,*CARPIO MORALES,Acting Chairperson,BRION,CASTILLO, andABAD,JJ.Promulgated:August 14, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES,J.:Petitioner Jethro Intelligence and Security Corporation (Jethro) is a security service contractor with a security service contract agreement with co-petitioner Yakult Phils., Inc. (Yakult).On the basis of a complaint[1]filed by respondent Frederick Garcia (Garcia), one of the security guards deployed by Jethro, for underpayment of wages, legal/special holiday pay, premium pay for rest day, 13thmonth pay, and night shift differential, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)-Regional Office No. IV conducted an inspection at Yakults premises in Calamba, Laguna in the course of which several labor standards violations were noted, including keeping of payrolls and daily time records in the main office,underpayment of wages, overtime pay and other benefits, and non-registration with the DOLE as required under Department Order No. 18-02[2].Hearings on Garcias complaint and on the subsequent complaints of his co-respondents Gil Cordero et al. were conducted during which Jethro submitted copies of payrolls coveringJune 16 to 30, 2003, February toMay 16-31, 2004,June 16-30, 2003, andFebruary 1-15, 2004.Jethro failed to submit daily time records of the claimants from 2002 to June 2004, however, despite the order for it to do so.ByOrder[3]of September 9, 2004, the DOLE Regional Director, noting petitioners failure to rectify the violations noted during the above-stated inspection within the period given for the purpose, found them jointly and severally liable to herein respondents for the aggregate amountofEIGHT HUNDRED NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TEN AND 16/100 PESOS (P809,210.16)representing their wage differentials, regular holiday pay, special day premium pay, 13thmonth pay, overtime pay, service incentive leave pay, night shift differential premium and rest day premium.Petitioners were also ordered to submit proof of payment to the claimants within ten calendar days, failing which the entire award would be doubled, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8188, and the corresponding writs of execution and garnishment would be issued.Jethro appealed[4]to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE), faulting the Regional Director for, among other things, basing the computation of the judgment award on Garcias affidavit instead of on the data reflected in the payrolls for 2001 to 2004.[5]By Decision[6]datedMay 27, 2005, then SOLE Patricia A. Sto. Tomas partially granted petitioner Jethros appeal by affirming with modification the Regional Directors Order dated September 9, 2004by deleting the penalty of double indemnity and setting aside the writs of execution and garnishment, without prejudice to the subsequent issuance by the Regional Director of the writs necessary to implement the said Decision.Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[7]of the SOLE Decision having been denied,[8]they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, insisting that the affidavit of Garcia should not have been given evidentiary weight in computing the judgment award.By Decision[9]ofJanuary 24, 2006, the appellate court denied the petition, it holding that contrary to petitioners contention, Garcias affidavit has probative weight for under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence are not controlling, and pursuant to Rule V of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Rules of Procedure,labor tribunals may accept affidavits in lieu of direct testimony.Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution[10]datedApril 28, 2006, they filed the present petition for review on certiorari.Petitioners attribute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOLE Regional Director and the SOLE in this wise: (1)the SOLE has no jurisdiction over the case because, following Article 129 of the Labor Code, the aggregate money claim of each employee exceededP5,000.00; (2) petitioner Jethro, as the admitted employer of respondents, could not be expected to keep payrolls and daily time records in Yakults premises as its office is in Quezon City, hence, the inspection conducted in Yakults plant had no basis; and (3) having filed the required bond equivalent to the judgment award, and as the Regional Directors Order of September 9, 2004 was not served on their counsel of record, the writs of execution and garnishment subsequently issued were not in order.And petitioners maintain that Garcias affidavit should not have been given weight, they not having been afforded the opportunity to cross-examine him.The petition is bereft of merit.The sole office of a writ ofcertiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission ofgraveabuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.It does not include the correction of a tribunalsevaluation of the evidence and factual findings thereon, especially since factual findings of administrative agencies are generally held to be binding and final so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record of the case.[11]In dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari and thus affirming the SOLE Decision, the appellate court did not err.The scope of the visitorial powers of the SOLE and his/her duly authorized representatives was clarified inAllied Investigation Bureau, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,[12]viz:While it is true that under Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases where the aggregate money claims of each employee exceeds P5,000.00, said provisions do not contemplate nor cover the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives.Rather, said powers are defined and set forth in Article 128 of the Labor Code (as amended by R.A. No. 7730) thus:Art. 128.Visitorial and enforcement power.x x x x(b)Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee exists,the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have thepower to issue compliance ordersto give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection.The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders,exceptin cases where the employer contests the finding of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection. [Emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied]x x x xThe aforequoted [Art. 128] explicitly excludes from its coverage Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Codeby the phrase (N)otwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary xxx thereby retaining and further strengthening the power of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representative to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of said Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection.[13](Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)InEx-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. v. Laguesmacase,the Court went on to hold thatx x x if the labor standards case is covered by the exception clause in Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, then the Regional Director will have to endorse the case to the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.In order to divest the Regional Director or his representatives of jurisdiction, the following elements must be present:(a) that the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues therein; (b) that in order to resolve such issues, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters; and (c) that such matters are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection.The rules also provide that the employer shall raise such objections during the hearing of the case or at any time after receipt of the notice of inspection results.[14]In the case at bar, the Secretary of Labor correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case as it does not come under the exception clause in Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code.While petitioner Jethro appealed the inspection results and there is a need to examine evidentiary matters to resolve the issues raised, the payrolls presented by it were considered in the ordinary course of inspection.While the employment records of the employees could not be expected to be found in Yakults premises in Calamba, as Jethros offices are inQuezon City, the records show that Jethro was given ample opportunity to present its payrolls and other pertinent documents during the hearings and to rectify the violations noted during the ocular inspection.It, however, failed to do so, more particularly to submit competent proof that it was giving its security guards the wages and benefits mandated by law.Jethros failure to keep payrolls and daily time records in Yakults premises was not the only labor standard violation found to have been committed by it; it likewise failed to register as a service contractor with the DOLE, pursuant to Department Order No. 18-02 and, as earlier stated, to pay the wages and benefits in accordance with the rates prescribed by law.Respecting petitioners objection to the weight given to Garcias affidavit, it bears noting that said affidavit wasnotthe only basis in arriving at the judgment award.The payrolls forJune 16-30, 2003andFebruary 1-15, 2004reveal that the overtime rates were below the required rate.[15]That Garcia was not cross-examined on his affidavit is of no moment.For, asMayon Hotel and Restaurant vs. Adana[16]instructs:Article 221 of theLabor Code is clear:technical rules are not binding, and the application oftechnical rules of procedure may be relaxed inlabor cases to serve the demand of substantial justice.The rule of evidence prevailing in court of law or equity shall not be controlling inlabor casesand it is the spirit and intention of the Labor Code that theLabor Arbiter shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure,all in the interest of due process.Labor laws mandate the speedy administration of justice, with least attention to technicalities but without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process.[17](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)It bears noting that while Jethro claims that it did not cross-examine Garcia, the minutes of theJuly 5, 2004hearing at which Jethros counsel was present indicate that Garcias affidavit was presented.[18]Jethro had thus the opportunity to controvert the contents of the affidavit, but it failed.Respecting the fact that Jethros first counsel of record, Atty. Benjamin Rabuco III, was not furnished a copy of the September 9, 2004 Order of the Director, the SOLE noted in her assailed Decision thatsince Atty. Thaddeus Venturanza formally entered his appearance as Jethros new counsel on appeal and an appeal was indeed filed and duly verified by Jethros owner/manager, for all practical purposes, the failure to furnishAtty. Rabuco a copy of the said Order had been rendered moot.For, onaccount of such lapse, the SOLE deleted the double indemnityaward and held that the writs issued in implementation of the September 9, 2004 Order were null and void, without prejudice to the subsequent issuance by the Regional Director of the writs necessary to implement the SOLE Decision.Thus, the DOLE-Regional Office subsequently issued the following Orders: Order[19]ofJuly 31, 2006holding in abeyance the release of the amount equivalent to the judgment award out of Yakult accounts pending the receipt of the supersedeas bond; and Order[20]ofFebruary 27, 2007ordering the immediate release of the garnished amount.It bears emphasis that the SOLE, under Article 106 of the Labor Code, as amended, exercises quasi-judicial power, at least to the extent necessary to determine violations oflabor standards provisions of the Code and otherlabor legislation.He/she or the Regional Directors can issue compliance orders and writs of execution for the enforcement thereof.The significance of and binding effect of the compliance orders of the DOLE Secretary is enunciated in Article 128 of theLabor Code, as amended,viz:ART. 128.Visitorial and enforcement power.x x x x(d)It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to obstruct, impede, delay or otherwise render ineffective the orders of the Secretary ofLabor or his duly authorized representatives issued pursuant to the authority granted under this article, and no inferior court or entity shall issue temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order or otherwise assume jurisdiction over any case involving the enforcement orders issued in accordance with this article.And Sec. 5, Rule V (Execution) of the Rules on Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in Regional Offices provides that the filing of a petition for certiorari shall not stay the execution of the appealed order or decision, unless the aggrieved party secures a temporary restraining order (TRO) from the Court.In the case at bar, no TRO or injunction was issued, hence, the issuance of the questioned writs of execution and garnishment by the DOLE-Regional Director was in order.WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIEDand the Court of Appeals Decision datedJanuary 24, 2006and Resolution datedApril 28, 2006areAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeARTURO D. BRIONAssociate Justice

MARIANO C.DELCASTILLOAssociate JusticeROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice

ATTESTATIONI attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate JusticeActing ChairpersonCERTIFICATIONPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-3404 April 2, 1951ANGELA I. TUASON,plaintiff-appellant,vs.ANTONIO TUASON, JR., and GREGORIO ARANETA, INC.,defendants-appellees.Alcuaz & Eiguren for appellant.Araneta & Araneta for appellees.MONTEMAYOR,J.:In 1941 the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother Antonio Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land with an area of 64,928.6 sq. m. covered by Certificate of Title No. 60911 in Sampaloc, Manila, in common, each owning an undivided 1/3 portion. Nieves wanted and asked for a partition of the common property, but failing in this, she offered to sell her 1/3 portion. The share of Nieves was offered for sale to her sister and her brother but both declined to buy it. The offer was later made to their mother but the old lady also declined to buy, saying that if the property later increased in value, she might be suspected of having taken advantage of her daughter. Finally, the share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc., a domestic corporation, and a new Certificate of Title No. 61721 was issued in lieu of the old title No. 60911 covering the same property. The three co-owners agreed to have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then sold, the proceeds of the sale to be later divided among them. This agreement is embodied in a document (Exh. 6) entitled "Memorandum of Agreement" consisting of ten pages, dated June 30, 1941.Before, during and after the execution of this contract (Exh. 6), Atty. J. Antonio Araneta was acting as the attorney-in-fact and lawyer of the two co-owners, Angela I. Tuason and her brother Antonio Tuason Jr. At the same time he was a member of the Board of Director of the third co-owner, Araneta, Inc.The pertinent terms of the contract (Exh. 6) may be briefly stated as follows: The three co-owners agreed to improve the property by filling it and constructing roads and curbs on the same and then subdivide it into small lots for sale. Araneta Inc. was to finance the whole development and subdivision; it was prepare a schedule of prices and conditions of sale, subject to the subject to the approval of the two other co-owners; it was invested with authority to sell the lots into which the property was to be subdivided, and execute the corresponding contracts and deeds of sale; it was also to pay the real estate taxes due on the property or of any portion thereof that remained unsold, the expenses of surveying, improvements, etc., all advertising expenses, salaries of personnel, commissions, office and legal expenses, including expenses in instituting all actions to eject all tenants or occupants on the property; and it undertook the duty to furnish each of the two co-owners, Angela and Antonio Tuason, copies of the subdivision plans and the monthly sales and rents and collections made thereon. In return for all this undertaking and obligation assumed by Araneta Inc., particularly the financial burden, it was to receive 50 per cent of the gross selling price of the lots, and any rents that may be collected from the property, while in the process of sale, the remaining 50 per cent to be divided in equal portions among the three co-owners so that each will receive 16.33 per cent of the gross receipts.Because of the importance of paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 of the contract (Exh. 6), for purposes of reference we are reproducing them below:(9) This contract shall remain in full force and effect during all the time that it may be necessary for the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART to fully sell the said property in small and subdivided lots and to fully collect the purchase prices due thereon; it being understood and agreed that said lots may be rented while there are no purchasers thereof;(11) The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART (meaning Araneta Inc.) is hereby given full power and authority to sign for and in behalf of all the said co-owners of said property all contracts of sale and deeds of sale of the lots into which this property might be subdivided; the powers herein vested to the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART may, under its own responsibility and risk, delegate any of its powers under this contract to any of its officers, employees or to third persons;(15) No co-owner of the property subject-matter of this contract shall sell, alienate or dispose of his ownership, interest or participation therein without first giving preference to the other co-owners to purchase and acquire the same under the same terms and conditions as those offered by any other prospective purchaser. Should none of the co-owners of the property subject-matter of this contract exercise the said preference to acquire or purchase the same, then such sale to a third party shall be made subject to all the conditions, terms, and dispositions of this contract; provided, the PARTIES OF THE FIRST PART (meaning Angela and Antonio) shall be bound by this contract as long as the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART, namely, the GREGORIO ARANETA, INC. is controlled by the members of the Araneta family, who are stockholders of the said corporation at the time of the signing of this contract and/or their lawful heirs;On September 16, 1944, Angela I. Tuason revoked the powers conferred on her attorney-in-fact and lawyer, J. Antonio Araneta. Then in a letter dated October 19, 1946, Angela notified Araneta, Inc. that because of alleged breach of the terms of the "Memorandum of Agreement" (Exh. 6) and abuse of powers granted to it in the document, she had decided to rescind said contract and she asked that the property held in common be partitioned. Later, on November 20, 1946, Angela filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila asking the court to order the partition of the property in question and that she be given 1/3 of the same including rents collected during the time that the same including rents collected during the time that Araneta Inc., administered said property.The suit was administered principally against Araneta, Inc. Plaintiff's brother, Antonio Tuason Jr., one of the co-owners evidently did not agree to the suit and its purpose, for he evidently did not agree to the suit and its purpose, for he joined Araneta, Inc. as a co-defendant. After hearing and after considering the extensive evidence introduce, oral and documentary, the trial court presided over by Judge Emilio Pea in a long and considered decision dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. The plaintiff appealed from that decision, and because the property is valued at more than P50,000, the appeal came directly to this Court.Some of the reasons advanced by appellant to have the memorandum contract (Exh. 6) declared null and void or rescinded are that she had been tricked into signing it; that she was given to understand by Antonio Araneta acting as her attorney-in-fact and legal adviser that said contract would be similar to another contract of subdivision of a parcel into lots and the sale thereof entered into by Gregorio Araneta Inc., and the heirs of D. Tuason, Exhibit "L", but it turned out that the two contracts widely differed from each other, the terms of contract Exh. "L" being relatively much more favorable to the owners therein the less favorable to Araneta Inc.; that Atty. Antonio Araneta was more or less disqualified to act as her legal adviser as he did because he was one of the officials of Araneta Inc., and finally, that the defendant company has violated the terms of the contract (Exh. 6) by not previously showing her the plans of the subdivision, the schedule of prices and conditions of the sale, in not introducing the necessary improvements into the land and in not delivering to her her share of the proceeds of the rents and sales.We have examined Exh. "L" and compared the same with the contract (Exh. 6) and we agree with the trial court that in the main the terms of both contracts are similar and practically the same. Moreover, as correctly found by the trial court, the copies of both contracts were shown to the plaintiff Angela and her husband, a broker, and both had every opportunity to go over and compare them and decide on the advisability of or disadvantage in entering into the contract (Exh. 6); that although Atty. Antonio Araneta was an official of the Araneta Inc.; being a member of the Board of Directors of the Company at the time that Exhibit "6" was executed, he was not the party with which Angela contracted, and that he committed no breach of trust. According to the evidence Araneta, the pertinent papers, and sent to her checks covering her receive the same; and that as a matter of fact, at the time of the trial, Araneta Inc., had spent about P117,000 in improvement and had received as proceeds on the sale of the lots the respectable sum of P1,265,538.48. We quote with approval that portion of the decision appealed from on these points:The evidence in this case points to the fact that the actuations of J. Antonio Araneta in connection with the execution of exhibit 6 by the parties, are above board. He committed nothing that is violative of the fiduciary relationship existing between him and the plaintiff. The act of J. Antonio Araneta in giving the plaintiff a copy of exhibit 6 before the same was executed, constitutes a full disclosure of the facts, for said copy contains all that appears now in exhibit 6.Plaintiff charges the defendant Gregorio Araneta, Inc. with infringing the terms of the contract in that the defendant corporation has failed (1) to make the necessary improvements on the property as required by paragraphs 1 and 3 of the contract; (2) to submit to the plaintiff from time to time schedule of prices and conditions under which the subdivided lots are to be sold; and to furnish the plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plans, a copy of the monthly gross collections from the sale of the property.The Court finds from the evidence that he defendant Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated has substantially complied with obligation imposed by the contract exhibit 6 in its paragraph 1, and that for improvements alone, it has disbursed the amount of P117,167.09. It has likewise paid taxes, commissions and other expenses incidental to its obligations as denied in the agreement.With respect to the charged that Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated has failed to submit to plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plains, list of prices and the conditions governing the sale of subdivided lots, and monthly statement of collections form the sale of the lots, the Court is of the opinion that it has no basis. The evidence shows that the defendant corporation submitted to the plaintiff periodically all the data relative to prices and conditions of the sale of the subdivided lots, together with the amount corresponding to her. But without any justifiable reason, she refused to accept them. With the indifferent attitude adopted by the plaintiff, it was thought useless for Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated to continue sending her statement of accounts, checks and other things. She had shown on various occasions that she did not want to have any further dealings with the said corporation. So, if the defendant corporation proceeded with the sale of the subdivided lots without the approval of the plaintiff, it was because it was under the correct impression that under the contract exhibit 6 the decision of the majority co-owners is binding upon all the three.The Court feels that recission of the contract exhibit 6 is not minor violations of the terms of the agreement, the general rule is that "recission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract, but only for such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement" (Song Fo & Co. vs. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47 Phil. 821).As regards improvements, the evidence shows that during the Japanese occupation from 1942 and up to 1946, the Araneta Inc. although willing to fill the land, was unable to obtain the equipment and gasoline necessary for filling the low places within the parcel. As to sales, the evidence shows that Araneta Inc. purposely stopped selling the lots during the Japanese occupantion, knowing that the purchase price would be paid in Japanese military notes; and Atty. Araneta claims that for this, plaintiff should be thankfull because otherwise she would have received these notes as her share of the receipts, which currency later became valueles.But the main contention of the appellant is that the contract (Exh. 6) should be declared null and void because its terms, particularly paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 which we have reproduced, violate the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code, which for the purposes of reference we quote below:ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community. Each may, at any time, demand the partition of the thing held in common.Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified length of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This period may be a new agreement.We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not applicable. The contract (Exh., 6) far from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to remain a party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-owners. By virtue of the document Exh. 6, the parties thereto practically and substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the best and most expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said partnership to end when the object of its creation shall have been attained.This aspect of the contract is very similar to and was perhaps based on the other agreement or contract (Exh. "L") referred to by appellant where the parties thereto in express terms entered into partnership, although this object is not expressed in so many words in Exh. 6. We repeat that we see no violation of Art. 400 of the Civil Code in the parties entering into the contract (Exh. 6) for the very reason that Art. 400 is not applicable.Looking at the case from a practical standpoint as did the trial court, we find no valid ground for the partition insisted upon the appellant. We find from the evidence as was done by the trial court that of the 64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of the parcel held in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of the entire area remained unsold at the time of the trial in the year 1947, while the great bulk of 97.5 per cent had already been sold. As well observed by the court below, the partnership is in the process of being dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and even assuming that Art. 400 of the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by agreement may agree to keep the thing undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years, there should be no fear that the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the four years left of the ten-years period fixed by Art. 400.We deem it unnecessary to discuss and pass upon the other points raised in the appeal and which counsel for appellant has extensively and ably discussed, citing numerous authorities. As we have already said, we have viewed the case from a practical standpoint, brushing aside technicalities and disregarding any minor violations of the contract, and in deciding the case as we do, we are fully convinced that the trial court and this Tribunal are carrying out in a practical and expeditious way the intentions and the agreement of the parties contained in the contract (Exh. 6), namely, to dissolve the community and co-ownership, in a manner most profitable to the said parties.In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. There is no pronouncement as to costs.So ordered.Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ.,concur.Paras, C. J.,I certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted to affirm.

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