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Thunder without LightningThe High Costs and Limited Benefits of the F-35

Program

By Bill French with Daniel Edgren

August 2015

Bill French is a policy analyst at the National Security Network (NSN). Daniel Edgren is a

former researcher at NSN.

The authors would like to thank Chris Strong and Graham Clark for their numerous research

and editorial contributions. Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton (Ret.) provided important guidance in

conceptualizing of the project early on. John Bradhsaw’s patience and input was greatlyappreciated. We would especially like to thank David Axe, Winslow Wheeler, Mandy

Smithberger, Pierre Sprey, Larry Korb, Kate Blakeley, and Bill Hartung for reviewing drafts of

h d idi l bl f db k h i l b fi d hi k Of h


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Introduction and ExecutiveSummaryIn June of this year, Gen. Joseph Dunford testified that the Department of Defense

(DOD) is reviewing the total number of F-35s it will purchase.1 Under current plans,

DOD intends to purchase and operate nearly 2,500 aircraft at an expense of roughly $1.4

trillion to replace most of the 4th-generation fighter and attack aircraft in the inventories

of the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, including the F-16, F/A-18C/D, AV-8B, and

A-10. If this procurement plan or something close to it is maintained, the F-35 will form

the backbone of American airpower for the first half of the 21st century.

The ongoing review provides an opportunity to refocus attention on the F-35 program,

especially for Congress, which is charged with its funding and oversight. Past attentiongiven to the F-35 in Congress has focused primarily on the program’s cost overruns and

expensive development shortcomings. In light of the review, this focus should be

expanded to a broader cost-benefit assessment of the program that considers the extent

to which the F-35’s capabilities, or lack thereof, advance U.S. national security.

In this paper, we assess the capabilities of the F-35 and show how the aircraft is

mismatched to meet emerging threats. Considered alongside the exorbitant cost of theprogram, this capability mismatch entails that it would be unsound to maintain a full-

scale commitment to the F-35 program and that alternatives to the full program should

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Contrary to Gen. Dunford’s comments and DOD’s beliefs , our analysis concludes that

the F-35 does not have the capabilities to be effective against near-peer adversaries. It

would be an error for DOD’s review to sustain a large-scale commitment to the F-35

based on the aircraft’s supposed utility against near-peer competitors. To perform

against near-peer adversaries, the F-35 will have to be capable of executing a range of

missions, from defeating enemy aircraft to penetrating enemy air defenses to strike

surface targets. But the F-35 will struggle to effectively perform these missions due to

shortcomings in its design and program requirements, despite costing between threeand nine times more than the 4 th-generation aircraft it is designed to replace.

Drawing on detailed comparisons to other aircraft (see Appendix A), we identify four

crucial areas where the F-35’s capability is mismatched against near-peer competitors:

1. The F-35 is less maneuverable than many of the 4th-generation fighter aircraft it is

intended to replace or those it would likely face in combat, making it unlikely to be effective in within-visual-range (WVR) air-to-air engagements.

2. The F-35’s small internal payload capacity will significantly limit its effectiveness

in beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air engagements, and, to a lesser extent,

strike missions against surface targets. The F-35 will also likely have difficulty

generating high rates of sorties to deliver payloads to targets over time.

3. The F-35’s short range means that it will be of limited use in geographically

expansive theaters like the Asia-Pacific or against so-called anti-access threats


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F-35 Capability MismatchThe F-35 was developed to sustain America’s global advantage in airpower by serving

as a multi-service, multi-role fighter capable of a host of missions, especially defeating

enemy aircraft, penetrating enemy air defenses to strike surface targets, and close air

support. While the F-35’s design emphasizes strike roles over air superiority, the Air

Force believes it will be necessary for the F-35 to perform air-to-air missions in the earlystages of high-end conflict.3 In the following section, we assess key capabilities of the F-

35 relevant to its performance , focusing on the aircraft’s maneuverability, payload,

range, and stealth features. There are significant problems with each. Far from

representing an effective next-generation fighter, the F-35 is more likely to find itself

outmaneuvered, outgunned, out of range, and visible to enemy sensors in contingencies

against near-pear militaries.

The F-35 program’s shortcomings are not just a matter of spending resources

inefficiently or buying too many of an underperforming weapon system. Because the F-

35 is currently slated to make up the vast majority of the U.S. fighter fleet, its

inadequacy puts American airpower at greater risk vis-à-vis near-peer adversaries.

With an inferior fighter fleet, American airpower will be handicapped in supporting top

functions assigned to the U.S. military, including deterring, denying, and defeatingcapable state adversaries.4 As a result, a continued full-commitment to the F-35 program

is likely to pose a liability that American pilots and commanders will have to overcome

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Pilots’ attempts to avoid WVR engagements will be hindered by the aircraft’s

comparatively small missile payload and slow speed, which will complicate

successfully killing enemy aircraft at BVR distances (we detail this problem in a later

section) or running from close-in engagements altogether.

1.

1 Performance vs. U.S. 4th-Generation Fighters

As Figure 1 and Appendix A show, the F-35 compares unfavorably to already deployed

Figure 1: F-35 Performance Compared to 4th-Generation Fighters It Will

Replace or May Face in Air Engagements

USAF (F-35A replaces

F-16)

Navy (F-35C replaces

F-18)

Marine Corps (F-35B

replaces AV-8B)

Foreign Fighters

F-35A F-16C Block

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F-35C F/A-18C/D F-35B AV-8B MiG-29 Su-27

Acceleration 63 sec 28 sec 108 sec 42 sec 81 sec n/a 31 sec 27 sec

Wing loading 86.62 lb/ft2 84.39 lb/ft2 68.07 lb/ft2 78.44 lb/ft2 89.75

lb/ft2

84.33

lb/ft2

69.32 lb/ft2 75.35 lb/ft2

Thrust-to-weight 0.63 (1.00

Aft. Burn)

0.70 (1.15

Aft. Burn)

0.53 (0.85

Aft. Burn)

0.69 (1.13

Aft. Burn)

0.63 (0.92

Aft.

Burn)

1.16 0.71 (1.17

Aft. Burn)

0.67 (1.31

Aft. Burn)

Max payload 18,000 lb

(4,788

internal)

19,522 18,000 lb

(4,788

internal)

15,500 lb 15,000 lb

(2,69

internal)

17,000 lb 9,921 lb 17,637 lb

Combat radius 613 nm 200-845 nm 610 nm 290-600 nm 456 nm 594-627

nm

459-702

nm

840 nm

NOTE: see Appendix A for additional comparisons and more information, including relevant assumptions.


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5g sustained turns; and the F-35B was downgraded from 5g to 4.5g sustained turns.6

This places the ability of the F-35 to sustain turns in the class of 3rd-generation fighter

aircraft like the F-4 Phantom, which was capable of 5.5g sustained turns and entered

service with the Navy in 1960.7

One comparison that has attracted considerable attention is to what extent the F-35A

can match the maneuverability of the F-16. There is a double significance to this

comparison. First, matching the maneuverability of the F-16 was a “threshold” design

requirement of the program, meaning it was a minimally acceptable parameter(matching the more maneuverable F/A-18C/D was a key program objective).8 Second,

the F-35A will be by far the most widely produced variant, with 1,763 aircraft planned

for the U.S. Air Force. Compared to the F-35A, the F-16 enjoys superior wing-loading

(84 lb/ft2 vs. 87 lb/ft2), as well as significant advantages in transonic acceleration (28

seconds vs. 63 seconds) and thrust-to-weight (0.77 and 1.15 with afterburners vs. 0.63

and 1.0 with afterburners).

In response, F-35 advocates have insisted that comparisons with 4th-generation aircraft

should account for factors that decrease their performance, such as the drag and weight

added by external fuel tanks or externally stored weapons. They claim the F-35 was

designed to carry larger amounts of fuel without the use of external tanks and can carry

weapons in internal bays, thereby minimizing drag. But this rationale is misleading.

First, the F-16 performance data cited by F-35 critics compares the acceleration of an F-

16 with four externally mounted air-to-air missiles9 to an F-35 after its onboard weapons

have already been expended.10 (The same is true of the data that compare the F/A-18 to

the F-35C).11 Second, while it is certainly true both that external fuel tanks confer


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engagement,” meaning the aircraft was unable to effectively mane uver against its

mock adversary either defensively or offensively. The pilot concluded that F-35

performance was “substantially inferior” to 4th-generation legacy fighters. Notably,

the F-35 was outperformed despite flying in a clean configuration without the weight

of armament while the F-16 was handicapped with two large external drop tanks. 14

In response, Lockheed Martin did not contest the report that the Air Force test pilot

had written. Instead, the company asserted that the exercise did not take into account

the aircraft’s ability to engage aircraft from beyond visual range (BVR) or its stealthcharacteristics. 15 However, as we will detail later, neither of these aspects is likely to

provide a significant net advantage for the F-35 against a near-peer opponent.

1.2

Performance vs. Foreign Fighters

As Figure 1 and Appendix A show, the F-35’s performance characteristics also compare

unfavorably to already deployed foreign 4th-generation fighters such as the Russian-designed MiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-27 Flanker (also produced by China) in service with

air forces around the world. These are the kinds of aircraft the F-35 would most likely

face in air-to-air engagements against a high-end opponent. Compared to both the Su-

27 and MiG-29, the F-35 is grossly inferior in terms of wing loading (except for the F-

35C), transonic acceleration, and thrust-to-weight. All F-35 variants also have

significantly lower maximum speeds, Mach 1.6 for the F-35 compared to Mach 2.2 forthe Su-27 and Mach 2.3 for the MiG-29.

Air-to-air simulations paint an even grimmer picture In 2009 U S Air Force and


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Can the F-35 Replace the A-10?

Airpower analysts and members of Congress have extensively debated the merits of

whether the F-35 can suitably replace the A-10 for performing close air support

(CAS). The CAS mission has been critical in the past decade of conflict in Iraq and

Afghanistan and remains relevant to deterring or fighting contingencies against

near-peer competitors, as demonstrated by Russian aggression in Ukraine. Despite

costing roughly nine times as much as the A-10, the F-35 is much less capable in thismission area. One F-35 pilot explains, “An A-10 is always going to be better at CAS

than an F-35 is. That’s because the A-10 was designed specifically for that

mission.”A

While the maximum external payload that the F-35 is capable of carrying is

comparable to A-10, the F-35 comes up short in most other areas.B Only the F-35A is

fitted with an internal cannon, and, while the A-10 is armed with 1,150 rounds of

30mm ammunition for its tank-killing GAU-8 Avenger cannon, the F-35A is limited

to 180 rounds for its less powerful 25mm cannon, effective only against light-

armored vehicles.C The F-35B and C variants removed the gun to save weight and

rely instead upon a “semi-stealthy” and “missionized” ventral gun pod that carries

slightly more ammunition.D But gun pods have not performed well historically,

most notably in the case of the F-4 Phantom.E

A 30mm pod was tested on the F-16 asan earlier proposed A-10 replacement, but the experiment was plagued by severe

inaccuracy and abandoned.F


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2.

Payload Capacity and Sortie Generation

In addition to lacking maneuverability, the F-35 is hampered by limited space for

storing weapons in its internal bays. A deficient weapons capacity has significant

consequences for the aircraft’s ability to conduct missions against air and surface

targets. In air-to-air engagements, the F-35 will be outgunned by foreign fighters that

can carry greater numbers of missiles and cannon rounds. Nor can the aircraft carry

enough long-range missiles to ensure it can fight effectively and reliably in beyond-

visual-range (BVR) engagements. In engagements against surface targets, the F-35’ssmall internal payload means it will be able to destroy fewer targets per sortie if

maintaining a stealthy configuration. This problem will be exacerbated by the F-35’s

limited ability to generate sorties, i.e., fly missions, to repeatedly deliver its weapons to

targets over the duration of a campaign.

2.1 Air-to-Air Implications

The F-35’s small weapons capacity puts the aircraft at a sizable air-to-air disadvantage

against its competitors. If limited to its internal bays, the F-35 carries a standard load of

only two long-range air-to-air missiles, although four missiles can be carried if no other

munitions are on board.20 Major Richard Koch, chief of the U.S. Air Force Air Combat

Command advanced air dominance branch, said, “I wake up in a cold sweat at the

thought of the F-35 going in with only two air-dominance weapons.”21

But the aircraft isstill sizably outgunned even when carrying the maximum four missiles. Top-tier

foreign 4th-generation fighters like the Su-27 have 10 external hard points to carry air-to-

i i il th di S d l d i d f th S 27 lik th S 35


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However, the above gains in missile effectiveness should not be expected to apply to

conflict against near-peer competitors. According to analysis by RAND, the U.S. AIM-

120 record is weighted heavily by circumstances that favor the shooter: None of the kills

was achieved against adversaries that themselves had similar BVR missiles; the downed

pilots did not employ electronic countermeasures, in some cases were fleeing, non-

maneuvering, or lacked radar; and one case (out of a total of six) was an instance of

friendly fire. U.S. aircraft also enjoyed quantitative parity or superiority in all cases.25

These circumstances should not be expected to characterize BVR engagements between

the United States and an advanced adversary. For example, the presence of electroniccountermeasures alone would probably result in a drastically lower probability of kill

as Russian and Chinese fighter aircraft presently employ electronic countermeasures

that use digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) jamming reported to significantly

hinder radar-guided missile effectiveness.26

2.2

Air-to-Ground Implications

The F-35 has an internal payload capacity of just over 2,500 lbs. for the F-35B and just

under 5,000 lbs. for the F-35A and F-35C. These payloads are less than one-third that of

4th-generation fighter and attack aircraft. As a result, the F-35 will carry only two Joint

Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) or other heavy munitions to engage more robust

ground targets, or a larger number of Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs) to strike lighter

targets,27

except for the F-35B which cannot fit SDBs in its internal bays – an issue notscheduled to be resolved before 2022. 28

Advocates of the F-35 correctly point out that today’s precision munitions require fewer


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2.3 Sortie Generation

While payload is a measure of the ordinance and destructive potential of an aircraft per

sortie, during a campaign the effectiveness of an aircraft depends on delivering

ordinance to targets over time in the course of multiple missions. The number and

duration of missions an aircraft can fly in a given time is therefore a key variable in its

ability to actualize its combat power, something referred to as an aircraft’s “sortie

generation rate.” It is doubtful the F-35 will be able to sustain high rates of sorties dueto heavy maintenance necessitated by the complexity of the aircraft. As of October 2014,

the F-35 was only able to achieve 61% of planned sorties (51% for the F-35C, 55% for the

F-35A, and 72% for the F-35B) due to maintenance issues. Each variant of the aircraft is

also behind its reliability and maintenance targets set for the current stage of

development,30 and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has characterized

engine reliability as “very poor.”31

While the F-35 has not accumulated enough flight hours to be considered mature, key

elements of the program’s approach to satisfying its sortie generation requirements are

proving unsound. Efficient maintenance on the aircraft depends on the Automated

Logistics Information System (ALIS), an information network created specifically for

the F-35 to diagnose maintenance issues and facilitate supporting logistics and supply

chains. Unless ALIS functions properly, the F-35 will not meet its sortie generationrequirements. The GAO reports that the system “has failed to meet basic requirements,

including having the ability to identify faults and failures in the aircraft,” despite being

on a development timeline that is already seven years behind schedule 32


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perspective of prevailing doctrine, this emphasis is becoming increasingly untenable on

account of geography and the proliferation of so-called anti-access capabilities that hold

U.S. forward airbases at risk. These two factors are most severe in the Asia-Pacific,

where they combine to challenge the ability of the United States to project power.

3.1

Geographic Challenges

Today’s defense planners are increasingly focusing on the geographically expansive

Asia-Pacific region, where 60% of American airpower will be deployed by 2020.34

Compared to Europe, the Asia-Pacific offers limited basing options and poses different

challenges to gaining and maintaining operational access. The geographic size of the

Asia-Pacific inherently limits the operational utility of short-ranged tactical fighters like

the F-35. While the F-35’s combat radius of 600nm is greater than some of the aircraft it

will replace, it is over 200nm less than that of the Su-27 and similar models employed

by the Russian and People’s Liberation Army Air Forces. China also enjoys the

advantage of considerable strategic depth that allows it to mass fighter aircraft in areasof interest to project power into nearby spaces. Moreover, this depth is well developed.

For example, China operates 41 military and dual-use airfields within unrefueled

combat radius of the Taiwan Strait.35

3.2

Anti-Access Challenges

Defense planners increasingly characterize near-peer adversaries in terms of posing

anti-access challenges to U.S. power projection.36 Anti-access threats hinder the ability to

j t i t i th t i l di di ti th bilit t i l


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carrier strike groups, especially anti-ship ballistic missiles, advanced anti-ship cruise

missiles, and quiet diesel-electric submarines.

To mitigate anti-access challenges, planners are experimenting with dispersing air

forces to many locations and operating from austere, less-predictable locations to

complicate enemy targeting.39 However, it is not clear that the F-35 will be able to

operate effectively from austere locations given its delicate design and reliance on

maintenance-intensive features like radar absorbent coatings. Moreover, dispersal is a

method to reduce high levels of risk incurred by dependence on short-ranged tacticalfighters and vulnerable basing, not an argument to invest severe costs doubling down

on that dependence.

In dealing with anti-access and geographic challenges, defenders of short-ranged

aircraft may suggest mid-air refueling as a solution. While mid-air refueling extends

range, it takes for granted a permissive environment where an adversary cannot target

U.S. tanker aircraft. While this has been the U.S. experience against mid- to low-endadversaries like Iraq’s military in the 1990s and 2003 , it cannot be taken for granted

against a near-peer military with advanced air forces.

The fragility of mid-air refueling means the usefulness of the F-35 will be limited by

what some analysts have called the “tanker-tether problem.”40 The tanker-tether

problem states that aircraft combat ranges are limited by the geographical points where

they can be refueled by tanker aircraft. Refueling points, in turn, must remain out of the

combined range of enemy aircraft or else accept high levels of risk. Today in the

Western Pacific, the combination of Chinese aircraft unrefueled combat radii and


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associated with minimizing radar signature, an effect produced by a combination of

radar-deflecting shapes and absorbent materials.

Today’s stealth technology is an outgrowth of a broader “hider-seeker” competitive

dynamic for an information advantage fundamental to all warfare, i.e., the evolving

competition between the methods for finding an opponent and the methods for

hiding.42 The kind of stealth technology used in modern aircraft has a development

history dating back to World War II, when Germany experimented with radar-

deflecting shapes and radar-absorbing materials to counter allied radars. During theCold War, the United States attempted to develop stealth technology in a series of

projects, culminating in the stealthy F-117A, B-2, and F-22. By the end of the Cold War,

the United States had invested heavily in stealth and adopted the technology as a part

of its efforts to maintain an airpower advantage. The F-35 is the latest instance of this

trend in the form of a multi-trillion dollar bet that the kind of stealth technology that

has worked in the past will continue to work over the program’s five-decade-long

service life.

The problem for the F-35 is that there is growing evidence that the program is betting

on the wrong side of the hider-seeker competition. Instead, it seems that the seekers –

not the hiders – are gaining the advantage. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Greenert

wrote in 2012 that technological innovations “make stealth and its advantages

increasingly difficult to maintain,” referring primarily to innovations in radar,

computing, and infrared sensors. “Those developments do not herald the end of stealth,

but they do show the limits of stealth design,” he concluded.43 Greenert more recently

characterized stealth as “over-rated.”44 As we detail below, the limits of stealth are very


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meters from the same narrow frontal aspect.48

But the returns on the kind of stealth technology employed by the F-35 are beingdiminished by advances in radar technology. The low-observable technology on the F-

35, and to a lesser extent the F-22, is designed to be effective against radar operating in

the X-band range and at shorter wavelengths. The rationale behind this decision was

that X-band radars detect aircraft with a high degree of accuracy and, as a result, are

used to provide fire-control information to anti-aircraft missiles to engage targets.

However, the same properties that make the F-35 stealthy against X-band radars do notapply as effectively to lower-frequency radars that operate on longer wavelengths.

Lower-band radars are widely employed as surveillance radars to provide early

detection of incoming targets at ranges that typically exceed those of X-band systems.

Since lower-band radars detect targets with less accuracy, they were traditionally

considered unsuitable for providing fire-control information to engage targets.49

But countries threatened by stealth aircraft have had decades of strong incentives torefine anti-stealth radars. As a result, lower-band radar technology has advanced

considerably. So-called very high frequency (VHF) and ultra-high frequency (ULF)‡

radars that operate on longer wavelengths are now capable of providing usable

targeting information, largely due to more powerful computers that can process

returning radar signals more effectively to filter through clutter and more precisely

locate targets.50 One former Navy official said plainly that because “Acquisition and fire

control radars are starting to creep down the frequency spectrum…I don’t see how you

long survive in the world of 2020 or 2030 when dealing with these systems” using

today’s stealth technology employed by fighter aircraft.51 This is not strictly new. The


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fighter can allegedly detect low-observable targets with a RCS of 0.01 square meters –

the same as or smaller than the F-35 from non-frontal angles – at a distance of 50nm.56

4.2 Counter-Stealth Infrared Sensors

Perhaps more significant than counter-stealth radar is the F-35’s vulnerability to

detection by infrared sensors. Infrared search-and-track (IRST) systems, which are

widely deployed on foreign fighter aircraft, can detect aircraft otherwise invisible to

radar at significant distances without emitting any signal of their own. Nodding to IRSTtechnology’s implications in bypassing radar stealth, Chief of Naval Operations

Admiral Jonathan Greenert stated, “Let's face it, if something moves fast through the

air, disrupts molecules and puts out heat—I don't care how cool the engine can be, it's

going to be detectable.”57 The F-35 will be particularly vulnerable to IRST detection

given its enormous engine that puts out 40,000 lbs. of thrust with no infrared shielding

or suppression.

Already, the OLS-35 IRST featured on the Su-35 can detect aircraft from the frontal

aspect at nearly 30nm, from the rear at 50nm, and missile launches at similar distances.

The Eurofighter Typhoon and other Western fighters are equipped with comparable or

better technology. Moreover, IRST sensors are poised for significant boosts in detection

ranges in the near future. Some analysts have predicted that IRST sensors will soon be

able to detect aircraft or missile launches at ranges of 70nm or greater.58

F 35 Program Costs


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as part of a broader vision of a 5th-generation high-low mix for the U.S. fighter fleet,

whereby the F-22 would provide high-end capability at high cost while the F-35 would

provide less capability at less cost with greater numbers.60 To reduce production anddevelopment expenses in line with this scheme, the F-35 program used a single aircraft

design as the baseline for all three variants that were to share 70-90% common parts.61

However, the design process produced three variants that have only 25%

commonality.62 Rather than save money, analysis by the RAND Corporation found that

the cost of the F-35 program actually exceeds likely costs for three separate aircraft

models by between 37% and 65%.63

Costs mounted and capability decreased as the F-35 program advanced, undermining

the logic of modest capability at an affordable price. Excluding the expense of operating

and sustaining the aircraft, the most recent estimates anticipate a total program cost of

$391.1 billion. These cost estimates are 70% greater than the initial projections of $233

billion made in 2001 when the program intended on acquiring 2,852 aircraft rather than

the 2,457 under current plans (meaning that the program cost per plane has actuallydoubled).64 Total program expenses include research and development costs of $54.9

billion (up 60% from an estimate of $34.4 billion in 2001), procurement costs of $331.6

billion (up 71% from $196.6 billion), and military construction costs of $4.6 billion (up

140% from $2 billion).65 Simultaneously, the aircraft grew heavier, less maneuverable,

and shorter-ranged than initially anticipated.

The President’s FY2016 budget request for the Department of Defense requested over

$11 billion for the F-35 program, approximately $8.7 billion of which was for

procurement.66


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These costs make the F-35 significantly more expensive than the 4th-generation aircraft it

will replace or serve alongside despite offering less capability in key areas. While someadvocates have claimed the F-35 is comparable in price to 4th-generation fighters and

attack aircraft, the data do not agree. As Figure 2 shows, the Program Acquisition Unit

C t (PAUC) f th F 35 i l $160 illi 70 hi h i h f th t i

159.2

$57.3050.5

27.9

51.6

18.7

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

C o s t i n M i l l i o n s ( 2 0 1 4 C o n s t a n t D o l l a r s )

F-35* F/A-18C/D F-15** F-16 AV-8 A-10

*does not distinquish between variants **indicates may replace

Figure 2: Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) For F-35

and 4th-Generation Aircraft it Will or May Replace


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ConclusionDespite plans for the F-35 to replace most of America’s fighter and attack aircraft, the

platform is ill-suited to cost-effectively counter near-peer foreign militaries. The aircraft

lacks the maneuverability, payload, likely ability to generate sorties, and range to

effectively compete with near-peer competitors despite its lifetime costs of $1.4 trillion.

The aircraft’s survivability depends largely upon stealth characteristics that are already

at risk for obsolescence against adversaries who over the next 50 years will onlycontinue to upgrade their radar and infrared detection systems. Given the critical

failings of the F-35 program and its exorbitant costs, the aircraft should be regarded as a

bad bet. As such, proceeding with the full program buy of nearly 2,500 units–or any

large-scale buy that approaches that number–should be avoided.

It is not too late to change course. While the outcome of the DOD’s review of its total F-

35 requirement is not yet clear, the program does not enter into full-rate productionuntil 2019. Policymakers should take this opportunity to engage in debates about the

future of airpower that have the potential to provide alternatives to a full-scale F-35

program.

Airpower analysts are outlining new options to help counter near-peer adversaries.

While that debate is outside the scope of this study, those options include unmannedsystems, prioritizing effective munitions over expensive aircraft, and returning to a

quantitatively driven approach to airpower featuring large numbers of comparatively

inexpensive platforms While these are some options Congress and DOD should begin


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Appendix A: Comparing F-35

Performance to Other Fighters In making aircraft performance comparisons, we consulted an array of authoritative

data sources, including Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2014-2015 (In Service; Development

and Production), Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched , Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft

2004-2005 , manufacturers’ specifications, and reports by the GovernmentalAccountability Office, the Department of Defense, Congressional Research Service, and

Air Power Australia.

F-35 data presented here consist of official estimates relative to program threshold and

objective requirements or the results of testing and evaluation. As the program is

currently in developmental testing, the F-35’s real performance is still uncertain ,

although we did incorporate test results when possible. We reached out to Lockheed

Martin Aeronautics Company in Fort Worth to ensure we portrayed the F-35 as

accurately as possible but received no assistance.

Using performance categories and scenarios collected from these sources, we compared

all three F-35 variants to 4th-generation aircraft they will be replacing in the U.S.

inventory (or may end up replacing in part, as with the F-15), 5th

-generation aircraftthey will serve alongside, and foreign 4th generation threat aircraft. These side-by-side

comparisons involved 12 aircraft types measured against 16 performance characteristics

id tifi d l t t ti th F 35’ i i i di t d b th K


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open-source performance data. Nonetheless, what follows is the most comprehensive,

detailed, and transparent comparison of the F-35 to other fighter and attack aircraft in

any single source of which we are aware.

Performance Categories

Acceleration: How quickly aircraft can accelerate to a given speed determines their

ability to engage and egress at will and also affects fuel burn. The available literature

indicates that acceleration for combat aircraft is typically measured by the number ofseconds it takes to increase speed through the transonic regime (Mach 0.8-1.2).

Transonic speeds are more realistically achieved in combat, as opposed to higher

supersonic speeds that require too much fuel and acceleration time. Altitude and

payload (weapons and fuel) are major factors in acceleration. The acceleration data we

found and present assume comparable payload and are calculated at 30,000 feet, with

the exception of the F-15E (for which the data were calculated at maximum payload and

at 40,000 feet, where acceleration is slower), and Su-27 (fuel and altitude assumptions

unspecified).

Wing loading: Wing loading is the weight of the aircraft divided by wing area, or the

weight supported by each given unit of lifting surface. Wing loading is a measure of an

aircraft’s available lift and an important metric for comparing aircrafts’ ability to

maneuver and turn. Aircraft can maneuver harder when a given weight is supported bymore lift. Note that wing area does not necessarily account for total lift (which can be

produced by surfaces other than the wing of an aircraft). Nor is wing loading the final


23/39

in some sources to generate more meaningful comparisons. For our purposes, we

treated combat weight as 50% internal fuel and a full air-to-air weapons load-out, the

composition of which was determined after reviewing weapons configurations andimagery found in authoritative data sources. This produced the equation Wc = IF/2 + We

+ Ww (except in the case of the A-10, where air-to-ground munitions were added). The

objective was to provide typical and realistic, not necessarily maximum, load-outs (for

example, our F/A-18C has four AIM-120 AMRAAMs when it can technically carry up to

10) to account for factors such as pylons taken up by dropped fuel tanks or the drag

penalties imposed by dual missile rails. We provide separate values for thrust/weight of

engines with and without the use of afterburners.

Maximum thrust: Maximum thrust is the total engine static thrust output with

afterburner. Thrust is important to acceleration, speed, and maneuverability. While the

use of afterburner increases thrust, it consumes large amounts of fuel and is only used

temporarily to enhance performance. Thrust output is measured in pounds of force, or

pound-force (lbf).

Military power: Military power is the total engine static thrust output without

afterburner. Thrust is important to speed and maneuverability. Thrust output is

measured in pounds of force, or pound-force (lbf).

Empty weight: Empty weight is the weight of aircraft with systems, engines, etc.

installed minus internal/external fuel and payload. Empty aircraft weight is measured

in pounds (lbs.).


24/39

Ferry range: Ferry range is the maximum safe range an aircraft can travel for purposes

of redeployment without needing to return to base, maneuver, or carry payload. Ferry

range is measured in nautical miles (nm).

Range (IF): Range is the distance an aircraft can fly while taking into account fuel

requirements for relevant maneuvers or payload weight. Range is measured in nautical

miles (nm).

Combat radius: Combat radius is the range for conducting and returning from a

particular mission with a specific flight profile without in-flight refueling. Combat

radius is generally calculated rather than proven in testing. Combat radius is subject to

variable inputs such as mission flight profile (i.e., assumptions about getting to the

target area, maneuvering against targets, and returning home), payload configuration,

payload drag, etc. Although combat radii are highly variable, they are nonetheless

important values that capture operational distances in real-world circumstances. We

used combat radius figures from authoritative sources and detailed their assumptionsregarding mission inputs in the footnotes in as much detail as possible. These

assumptions frequently included external fuel tanks or heavy weapons that would

reduce other performance parameters, such as acceleration or thrust to weight, but may

not be reflected in those values on the chart (this was a feature of much of the data we

observed in the literature as well). Combat radius is measured in nautical miles (nm).

Maximum +g: Maximum +g measures the maximum amount of gravitational forces (g-

forces) that an aircraft’s structure can sustain without damage while maneuvering.

Maximum +g rating of an aircraft is an important variable for airframe durability.


25/39

KEY:

Pink = F-35 Variant; Blue = 4th-generation aircraft F-35 will or may replace (may replace marked with an asterisk); Green = 5th-generation aircraft F-35 will serve

alongside; Red = Foreign 4th-generation fighters; Gray = no authoritative data discovered.

F-35A CTOL F-35B

STOVL

F-35C CV F-15C* F-15E* F-16C 50/52 F/A-18C/D AV-8B A-10 F-22A MiG-29/S Su-2775

Acceleration 63 sec76

81 sec77

108 sec78

~100 sec79

28 sec80

42 sec81

24 sec82

31 sec83

27 sec84

Wing loading 86.99 lb/ft2

85

89.75

lb/ft2 86

68.07

lb/ft2 87

62.53

lb/ft2 88

79.05 lb/ft2

89

84.39 lb/ft2

90

78.44 lb/ft2

91

84.33 lb/ft2

92

62.73 lb/ft2

93

65.60 lb/ft2 94

69.32 lb/ft2

95

75.35 lb/ft2

96

Thrust/Weight 0.62, 1.00

reheat97

0.63, 0.92

reheat98

0.53, 0.85

reheat99

0.77, 1.25

reheat100

0.74, 1.21

reheat101

0.70, 1.15

reheat102

0.69, 1.13

reheat103

1.16104

0.51105

1.27 reheat106

0.71, 1.17

reheat107

0.67, 1.31

reheat108

Max thrust 40,000 lbf

109

38,000 lbf110

40,000

lbf111

47,540 lbf112

58,200 lbf113

29,100 lbf114

35,508 lbf115

70,000 lbf116

36,600 lbf117

66,140 lbf118

Military power 25,000 lbf119

26,000 lbf120

25,000

lbf121

29,180 lbf122

35,600 lbf123

17,800 lbf124

21,800 lbf125

23,800 lbf126

18,130 lbf127

22,220 lbf128

33,750 lbf129

Empty weight 29,300 lb130

32,300 lb131

34,800 lb132

28,600 lb133

33,946 lb134

19,643135

23,832 lb136

14,859 lb137

23,611 lb138

43,340 lb139

24,030 lb140

36,111 lb141

MTOW 70,000-lb

class142

60,000-lb

class143

70,000-lb

class144

58,250 lb145

81,000 lb146

48,000 lb147

56,000 lb148

30,999 lb149

47,400 lb150

83,500 lb151

43,431 lb152

72,752 lb153

Max payload 18,000 lb

(4,788)154

15,000 lb

(2,695)155

18,000 lb

(4,788)

156

23,600 lb157

24,500 lb158

19,522 lb159

15,500 lb160

17,000 lb161

16,000 lb162

23,087 lb

(3,069)163

9,921 lb164

17,637 lb165

Internal fuel

(IF)

18,200 lb166

13,100 lb167

19,200 lb168

13,455 lb169

23,340 lb170

7,116 lb171

10,860 lb172

7,759 lb173

10,700 lb174

18,000 lb175

10,229 lb176

20,723 lb177

Ferry range 2,500 nm178

2,400 nm179

2,415 nm180

1,800 nm181

1,965 nm182

2,300 nm183

1,600 nm184

1,565 nm185

2,370 nm186

Range (IF) 1,200 nm187

900 nm188

1,200 nm189

1,089 nm190

1,133 nm191

2,046 nm192

Combat radius 613 nm193

456 nm194

610 nm195

685 nm196

685-750 nm197

200-845 nm198

290-600 nm199

594-627

nm200

250-540

nm201

459-702

nm202

840 nm203

Max +G204

9.0205

7.0206

7.5207

9.0208

9.0209

9.0210

7.5211

8.0212

7.33213

9.0214

9.0215

9.0216

Max speed at

altitude

Mach 1.6217

Mach 1.6218

Mach 1.6219

Mach 2.5220

Mach 2.5221

Mach 2.0222

Mach 1.8223

Mach 0.98224

Mach 0.56225

Mach 1.7226

Mach 2.3227

Mach 2.17228

Rate of climb229

50,000

ft/min230

50,000

ft/min231

50,000

ft/min232

50,000

ft/min233

14,700

ft/min234

6,000

ft/min235

64,960

ft/min236

45,275

ft/min237

Service ceiling238

60,000 ft239

60,000 ft240

50,000 ft241

50,000 ft242

38,000 ft243

45,000 ft244

50,000 ft245

59,060 ft246

59,060 ft247


26/39

24

Notes 1 Gen. Dunford stated, “With projected adversarial threats challenging our current capabilities in coming years, the Joint Strike Fighter is a vital component of our effort to

ensure the Joint Force maintains dominance in the air. Given the evolving defense strategy and the latest Defense Planning Guidance, we are presently taking the newest

strategic foundation and analyzing whether 2,443 aircraft is the correct number. Until the analysis is complete, we need to pursue the current scheduled quantity buy to

preclude creating an overall near-term tactical fighter shortfall.” “Advance Questions for General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., USMC, Nominee for the Position of Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff." United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. Last modified July 9, 2015. Available at: http://www.armed-

services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dunford_07-09-15.pdf 2 Gen. Dunford stated, “Fifth-generation fighter aircraft, including the F-35, are critical as we contend with the technological advancements of near-peer competitors. We must

ensure that we do not allow shortfalls in fighter capability or capacity to develop. The Department has been working diligently to make the overall cost per F-35 more affordable.

Additionally, there will continue to be critical updates throughout the life cycle of the F-35 that will ensure the platform maintains a tactical advantage.” Ibid. 3 Chief of Staff of the U.S Air Force Gen. Mark Welsh said, "The decision to truncate the F-22 buy has left us in a position where even to provide air superiority, which was not the

original intent of the F-35 development, but even to provide air superiority on a theater scale, in a full-spectrum fight against a well-armed foe in 10 years from now, let's say --

and, remember, as a platform-based force, we're investing today for capability we'll need then -- you have to have the F-35 to augment the F-22 to do the air superiority fight at

the beginning of a high-end conflict to survive against the fifth generation threats we believe will be in the world at that point in time." Thank you to Mandy Smithberger for

pointing this out to me. “Press Briefing by Acting Secretary of the Air Force Eric Fanning and Air Force Chief of Staff General Mark A. Welsh III on the State of the Air Force in the

Pentagon Briefing Room.” U.S. Department of Defense. December 13, 2013. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5344 4 “Deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries” is listed as a top national military objective in the National Military Strategy. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The National Military Strategy of

the United States of America. June 2015. Available at: http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf 5 Lockheed Martin claims the F-35 will succeed in its air-to-air role by leveraging BVR engagements. The Air Force made the same claim with the F-4 Phantom, which turned out

to be false. “The U.S. Air Force Promised the F-4 Would Never Dogfight.” War is Boring. Last modified July 6, 2015. Available at: https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-u-s-air-

force-promised-the-f-4-would-never-dogfight-3e1a66da4e73 6 Time Magazine, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Time Magazine, Military, 2013. Available at: https://timemilitary.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/f-35-jsf-dote-fy12-annual-report.pdf .

7“The Sustained Turning Performance of the F-35A Lightning II was recently disclosed as 4.95 G at Mach 0.8 and 15,000 ft. A 1969 F-4 Phantom II could sustain 5.5 Gs at 0.8 Mach

with 40 percent internal fuel at 20,000 feet.” Goon, Peter, and Carlo Kopp, “Air Combat: Russia’s PAK-FA versus the F-22 and F-35.” Air Power Australia. Available at:

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-300309-1.html#3. 8 See the program objectives: “Joint Strike Fighter.” Air Power Australia. Last modified June 7, 2014. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/jsf.html

9 Air Power Australia, “Joint Strike Fighter.” Air Power Australia. Last modified June 7, 2014. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/jsf.html.

10 “The fuel levels and payloads at which maneuverability is calculated differs for each variant but generally focuses on a post-weapons release payload and f uel state at 50% ofthe required combat radius.” Bowman, Geoffrey P. “Scorecard: A Case study of the Joint Strike Fighter Program.” Air Command and Staff College, Air University. Last modified

April 2008. Available at: https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_19233467-2759-4d04-8da4-

e22afe648499/display.aspx?rs=enginespage11

Government Accountability Office , “ Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost,” H.R. Doc. No. 104-GAO/NSIAD-96-98, 2d Sess.

(1996). Available at: http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96098.pdf . 12

Mills, Chris. “Review of the Defense Annual Report 2010-2011 – Assessing the Evidence Provided by AVM KYM Osley, New Air Combat Capability Project Manager.” Testimony

provided to the Defense Sub-Committee, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade, Parliament of Austral ia. March 30, 2012. Available at:

www.aphref.aph.gov.au-house-committee-jfadt-defenceannualreport_2010_2011-submissions-sub11(1).pdf

http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dunford_07-09-15.pdfhttp://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dunford_07-09-15.pdfhttp://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dunford_07-09-15.pdfhttp://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dunford_07-09-15.pdfhttp://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5344http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5344http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5344http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdfhttp://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdfhttp://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdfhttps://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-u-s-air-force-promised-the-f-4-would-never-dogfight-3e1a66da4e73https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-u-s-air-force-promised-the-f-4-would-never-dogfight-3e1a66da4e73https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-u-s-air-force-promised-the-f-4-would-never-dogfight-3e1a66da4e73https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-u-s-air-force-promised-the-f-4-would-never-dogfight-3e1a66da4e73https://timemilitary.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/f-35-jsf-dote-fy12-annual-report.pdfhttps://timemilitary.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/f-35-jsf-dote-fy12-annual-report.pdfhttps://timemilitary.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/f-35-jsf-dote-fy12-annual-report.pdfhttp://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-300309-1.html#3http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-300309-1.html#3http://www.ausairpower.net/jsf.htmlhttp://www.ausairpower.net/jsf.htmlhttp://www.ausairpower.net/jsf.htmlhttp://www.ausairpower.net/jsf.htmlhttp://www.ausairpower.net/jsf.htmlhttp://www.ausairpower.net/jsf.htmlhttp://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96098.pdfhttp://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96098.pdfhttp://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96098.pdfhttp://www.aphref.aph.gov.au-house-committee-jfadt-defenceannualreport_2010_2011-submissions-sub11%281%29.pdf/http://www.aphref.aph.gov.au-house-committee-jfadt-defenceannualreport_2010_2011-submissions-sub11%281%29.pdf/http://www.aphref.aph.gov.au-house-committee-jfadt-defenceannualreport_2010_2011-submissions-sub11%281%29.pdf/http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96098.pdfhttp://www.ausairpower.net/jsf.htmlhttp://www.ausairpower.net/jsf.htmlhttp://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-300309-1.html#3https://timemilitary.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/f-35-jsf-dote-fy12-annual-report.pdfhttps://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-u-s-air-force-promised-the-f-4-would-never-dogfight-3e1a66da4e73https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-u-s-air-force-promised-the-f-4-would-never-dogfight-3e1a66da4e73http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdfhttp://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5344http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dunford_07-09-15.pdfhttp://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dunford_07-09-15.pdf


27/39

25

13 Bill Sweetman, “Controversy Flares Over F-35 Air Combat Report,” Aviation Week , last modified July 2, 2015. Available at: http://aviationweek.com/defense/controversy-

flares-over-f-35-air-combat-report. 14

See: “Test Pilot Admist the F-35 Can’t Dogfight.” War is Boring. Last modified June 29, 2015. Available at: https://medium.com/war-is-boring/test-pilot-admits-the-f-35-can-t-

dogfight-cdb9d11a875. See also: “Read for Yourself – the F-35’s Damning Dogfighting Report.” War is Boring. Last modified July 1, 2015. Available at: https://medium.com/war-

is-boring/read-for-yourself-the-f-35-s-damning-dogfighting-report-719a4e66f3eb 15

“Joint Program Office Response to ‘War is Boring’ Blog.” Lockheed Martin – F-35 Lightning II. Last modified July 1, 2015. Available at: https://www.f35.com/news/detail/joint-

program-office-response-to-war-is-boring-blog 16 Mills, Chris. “Submission No. 11: Review of the Defense Annual Report 2010-2011 – Assessing the Evidence Provided by AVM KYM Osley, New Air Combat Capability Project

Manager.” Testimony provided to the Defense Sub-Committee, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade, Parliament of Australia. March 30, 2012.

Available at: www.aphref.aph.gov.au-house-committee-jfadt-defenceannualreport_2010_2011-submissions-sub11(1).pdf

18 Mills, Chris. “Submission No. 5: Review of the Defense Annual Report 2010-2011 – Loss-Exchange-Ratios Information.” Defense Sub-Committee, Joint Standing Committee on

Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade, Parliament of Australia. Available at: www.aphref.aph.gov.au-house-committee-jfadt-defenceannualreport_2010_2011-submissions-

sub5(1).pdf 19

The simulation against Su-35s was conducted by a f irm named REPSIM and modelled force-on-force engagement between 24 Chinese Su-35 as 24 F-35s plus enabling aircraft.

The model assumed U.S. forces were operating from Guam, on the basis that access was denied from closer air basing by PLA precision strikes, and that land-based High-

Frequency Over-the-Horizon Radar directed Chinese forces towards the U.S. forces until other advanced sensors allowed them to engage the otherwise stealthy F-35s. See the

following section for why these assumptions are consistent with developments in counter-stealth sensors.20

Lockheed Martin, “F-35C Carrier Variant.” Available at: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35c-carrier-variant.html and Majumdar, Dave, “Pentagon Worries

That Russia Can Now Outshoot U.S. Stealth Jets.” The Daily Beast. Last modified December 4, 2014. Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/04/pentagon-

worries-that-russia-can-now-outshoot-u-s-stealth-jets.html. 21

Axe, David, “Joint Strike Fighter’s Outrageous Claim.” Wired. Last modified September 9, 2008. Available at: http://www.wired.com/2008/09/joint-strike-fi/. 22

SinoDefence, “PLAAF SU-27 / J-11 ‘FLANKER’.” SinoDefence | Chinese Aeronautics and Astronautics. Last modified June 20, 2014. Available at:

http://sinodefence.com/chinese-military-aircraft/plaaf-su-27-j-11-flanker/. 23

Patrick Higby, “Promise and Reality: Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Air-To-Air Combat.” Air War College, Air University. Last modified March 30, 2015. Available at:

http://pogoarchives.org/labyrinth/11/09.pdf 24

John Stillion and Scott Perdue, “Air Combat Past, Present and Future.” RAND Corporation, Project Air Force. Last modified August 2008. Available at:

http://www.mossekongen.no/downloads/2008_RAND_Pacific_View_Air_Combat_Briefing.pdf 25

Ibid.

26 Russian and Chinese aircraft deploy digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) jammers which are reported to “effectively memorize an incoming radar signal and repeat it backto the sender, seriously [hampering] the performance of friendly radars. Worse, these new jammers essentially blind the small radars found onboard air-to-air missiles like the

Raytheon AIM-120 AMRAAM, which is the primary long-range weapon for all U.S. and most allied fighter planes.” See: Majumdar, Dave, “Pentagon Worries That Russia Can Now

Outshoot U.S. Stealth Jets.” The Daily Beast. Last modified December 4, 2014. Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/04/pentagon-worries-that-russia-

can-now-outshoot-u-s-stealth-jets.html. 27

See Hayward, Doug. “F-35 Weapon System Overview. Report no. JSF 10-205.” N.p.: Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, 2010. Available at:

http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2010armament/TuesdayLandmarkADougHayward.pdf . 28

Osborn, Kris, “New Small Diameter Bomb Doesn’t Fit Inside Marine’s F-35B.” Military.com. Last modified March 4, 2015. Available at: http://www.military.com/daily-

news/2015/03/04/new-small-diameter-bomb-doesnt-fit-inside-marines-f35b.html.

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29 Rogoway, Tyler, “ Pierre Sprey's Anti-F-35 Diatribe Is Half Brilliant And Half Bullshit.” Foxtrot Alpha. Last modified June 20, 2014. Available at:

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/pierre-spreys-anti-f-35-diatribe-is-half-brilliant-and-1592445665. 30

Department of Defense, Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. FY2014 Annual Report: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Last modified January 2015. Available at:

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1667970-2014f35jsf.html#document/p22/a205814. 31

Brian Dowling, “Federal Auditors Rate Reliability of F-35 Engine ‘Very Poor,’” Military.com, last modified April 28, 2015. Available at: http://www.military.com/daily-

news/2015/04/28/federal-auditors-rate-reliability-of-f-35-engine-very-poor.html. 32

Government Accountability Office, F-35 Sustainment: Need for Affordable Strategy, Greater Attention to Risks, and Improved Cost Estimates . By Cary Russell. GAO-14-778. Lastmodified September 2014. Available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666042.pdf. 33

French, Bill. “Reshaping Pentagon spending and Capabilities: Setting Priorities for the Future.” National Security Network. Last modified March 1, 2013. Available at:

http://nsnetwork.org/cms/assets/uploads/2013/03/NSN-Reshaping-Pentagon-Spending-and-Capabilities_Future-Priorities_FINAL-0313132.pdf. 34

Parish, Karen. “U.S. Following Through on Pacific Rebalance , Hagel Says.” U.S. Department of Defense. Last modified June 1, 2013. Available at:

http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120186 35

Eric Stephen Gons, “Access Challenges and Implications for Airpower in the Western Pacific.” RAND Corporation, Pardee RAND Graduate School. Last modified 2011. Available

at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2011/RAND_RGSD267.pdf 36

See: Department of Defense, 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. Last modified March 4, 2014. Available at:

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf Focus on countering anti-access systems has also been reflected in doctrine, first under the Air-Sea

Battle concept, now renamed Joint Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons.37

In some cases the level of risk incurred by operating within range of Chinese long-range strike systems is severe. For example, one RAND study concluded that 34 sub -munition

warheads delivered by short ranged ballistic missiles (SRBMs) could destroy or damage 75% of the aircraft stationed at Kadena Airbase on Okinawa. For more: John Stillion and

Scott Perdue, “Air Combat Past, Present and Future.” RAND Corporation, Project Air Force. Last modified August 2008. Available at:

https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/files/2008_RAND_Pacific_View_Air_Combat_Briefing.pdf For general information, see: Eric Stephen Gons, “Access Challenges and

Implications for Airpower in the Western Pacific.” RAND Corporation, Pardee RAND Graduate School. Last modified 2011. Available at:

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2011/RAND_RGSD267.pdf and Gunzinger, Mark A. “Sustaining America’s Advantage in Long-Range Strike.”

Center for Strategic and Budget Analysis. Last modified 2010. Available at: http://csbaonline.org/publications/2010/09/americas-strategic-advantage-long-range-strike/38

For a fairly extensive assessment of the implications of relying on Anderson AFB, see: Gons, Eric Stephen. “Access Challenges and Implications for Airpower in the Western

Pacific.” Publication no. RGSD-267. N.p.: RAND Corporation, 2011. Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD267.html Ranges of Anderson AFB to the East

and South China Seas were gathered from Google Maps.39

Berteau, David J., and Michael J. Green, et al . “U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment.” N.p.: Center for Strategic and International

Studies, 2012. Available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/120814_FINAL_PACOM_optimized.pdf .

See also: The Diplomat. “The US Air Force’s New Game Plan in the Asia-Pacific.” The Diplomat. Last modified October 9, 2013. Available at:http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/the-us-air-forces-new-game-plan-in-the-asia-pacific/ 40

Martinage, Robert. “Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability.” N.p.: Center for Strategic and

Budgetary Assessments, 2014. Available at: http://csbaonline.org/publications/2014/10/toward-a-new-offset-strategy-exploiting-u-s-long-term-advantages-to-restore-u-s-

global-power-projection-capability/.

See also: Knepper, Greg, and Peter W. Singer. “Short Legs Can't Win Arms Races: Range Issues and New Threats to Aerial Refueling put U.S. Strategy at Risk.” War on the Rocks.

Available at: http://warontherocks.com/2015/05/short-legs-cant-win-arms-races-range-issues-new-threats-aerial-refueling/?singlepage=1 41

Ibid42

Watts, Barry. "The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs." Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Last modified June 2, 2011. Available at:

http://csbaonline.org/publications/2011/06/the-maturing-revolution-in-military-affairs/

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r.htmlhttp://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/04/28/federal-auditors-rate-reliability-of-f-35-engine-very-poor.htmlhttps://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1667970-2014f35jsf.html%23document/p22/a205814http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/pierre-spreys-anti-f-35-diatribe-is-half-brilliant-and-1592445665


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43 Greenert, Jonathan W., Adm. "Payloads over Platforms: Charting a New Course." U.S. Naval Institute. Last modified July 2012. Available at:

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-07/payloads-over-platforms-charting-new-course 44

Osborn, Kris. "CNO: Next-Generation Navy Fighter Might Not Need Stealth." DefenseTech: Where Technology and Defense Interact. Last modified February 5, 2015. Available

at: http://defensetech.org/2015/02/05/cno-next-generation-navy-fighter-might-not-need-stealth/ 45

Global Security. "Radar Cross Section (RCS)." Global Security. Last modified November 7, 2011. Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/stealth-aircraft-

rcs.htm 46

Congressional Research Service. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program . By Jeremiah Gertler. Research report no. RL30563. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,2014. Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30563.pdf 47

Mills, Chris. "Air Combat: Russia's PAK-FA versus the F-22 and F-35." Air Power Australia: Australia's Independent Defense Think Tank. Last modified March 30, 2009. Available

at: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-300309-1.html 48

Ibid. 49

For a summary of radar, stealth, and counter-stealth radar technical considerations, see: Watts, “The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs,” available at:

http://csbaonline.org/publications/2011/06/the-maturing-revolution-in-military-affairs/ 50

For a summary of some current and potential dynamics involving lower-band radars, see: Kopp, Carlo. "Russian VHF Counter Stealth Radars Proliferate."

Defense Today , 2008, 32-36. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/SP/DT-Rus-VHF-Radar-2008.pdf 51

Majumdar, Dave. "Chinese and Russian Radars On Track to See Through U.S. Stealth." USNI News. Last modified July 29, 2014. Available at:

http://news.usni.org/2014/07/29/chinese-russian-radars-track-see-u-s-stealth 52

Global Security, “Radar Cross Section (RCS).” Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/stealth-aircraft-rcs.htm 53 See Kopp, “Russian VHF Counter Stealth Radars Proliferate,” 32-36. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/SP/DT-Rus-VHF-Radar-2008.pdf 54

Kopp, Carlo. "Russian / PLA Low Band Surveillance Radars." Air Power Australia. Last modified April 2012. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Rus-Low-Band-

Radars.html: Kopp, Carlo. "Assessing Joint Strike Fighter Defense Penetration Capabilities Annex A, B, C." Air Power Australia. Last modified January 7, 2009. Available at:

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2009-01-Annex.html#mozTocId787784 55

Minnick, Wendell. "China's Anti-Stealth Radar Comes to Fruition." Defense News. Last modified November 22, 2014. Available at:

http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20141122/DEFREG03/311220016/China-s-Anti-Stealth-Radar-Comes-Fruition 56

Kopp, Carlo. "Sukhoi Flankers: The Shifting Balance of Regional Air Power." Air Power Australia. Last modified April 2012. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-

Flanker.html 57

Osborn, “CNO: Next-Generation Navy Fighter Might Not Need Stealth.” Available at: http://defensetech.org/2015/02/05/cno-next-generation-navy-fighter-might-not-need-

stealth/ 58

Quantum Well Imaging Photodetectors (QWIP) increase the sensitivity of infrared sensors and allow the detection o f heat signatures from greater ranges and with greater

accuracy. Mills, Chris. “Air Combat: Russia’s PAK-FA versus the F-22 and F-35.” Air Power Australia. Last modified March 30, 2009. Available at:http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-300309-1.html 59

Gertler, Jeremiah, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JFS) Program ,” (CRS Report No. RL30563). Washington D.C: Congressional Research Service, 2014. Available at:

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30563.pdf . 60

Ibid .61

This strategy was intended to save “at least $15 billion” compared to the cost of producing three entirely separate aircrafts, one for each service. Ibid 62

Project on Government Oversight, “Air Force’s Rush to Station Unproven F-35A Joint Strike Fighter in Burlington is Irresponsible and Potentially Dangerous.” News release.

November 6, 2013. Available at: http://www.pogo.org/about/press-room/releases/2013/air-forces-rush-to-station-unproven-f35.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/. 63

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64 Thank you to Winslow Wheeler for pointing this out to me via e -mail.

65 Government Accountability Office, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Assessment Needed to Address Affordability Challenges ,” H.R. Rep. No. 114-GAO-15-364, 1st Sess. (2014).

Available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669619.pdf . 66

Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/CFO February 2015, “United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request: Program Acquisition Cost by

Weapon System ,” (2015). Available at: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_Weapons.pdf . 67

Government Accountability Office, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Assessment Needed to Address Affordability Challenges ,” H.R. Rep. No. 114-GAO-15-364, 1st Sess. (2014).

Available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669619.pdf