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NATO Parliamentary Assembly

SUB-COMMITTEE ON TRANSATLANTIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION (DSCTC)

MISSION REPORT

ALGIERS, ALGERIA

12 - 14 APRIL 2016

www.nato-pa.int July 2016

This Mission Report is presented for information only and does not represent the official view of the Assembly. This report was prepared by Ethan Corbin, Director of the Defence and Security Committee.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Extending a hand of friendship across the Mediterranean, the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation (DSCTC) of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) visited Algiers from 12-14 April 2016 to engage with Algerian officials as well as other international actors in the region. Sverre Myrli (Norway), Chairman of the DSCTC, led the delegation of NATO member state parliamentarians representing seven different NATO Allies through its two-day visit.

2. Emphasising the importance of the visit, Mr Myrli stated: “We are here to understand the broader picture of North African and Mediterranean security, in which we see Algeria as a key player.” Several members of the delegation also stressed their understanding of Algeria’s central role in regional peace and stability, and, therefore, declared their full support for a strengthening of the levels of contact and cooperation between Algeria and the NATO PA.

3. Over the course of the two days, the topic of terrorism and Algeria’s long experience with the issue dominated discussions. Referring to the ‘black decade’ of the 1990s, when Algeria struggled with a Jihadist-led insurgency, key Algerian leaders noted Algeria was forced to find a solution to the violence on its own. As several Algerian officials said, the terrorist dilemma affecting Europe today will require a long-term solution involving all levels of national power, not exclusively security institutions. This understanding was reinforced during a briefing and engaging discussion between the delegation and representatives of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (CAERT).

4. In light of the challenge to her country in particular, Chairwoman of the Defence and Security Committee (DSC), Nicole Ameline (France), accompanied the visit, noting the “real importance today to foster stronger cooperation with our peers in Algeria, as we share common threats and can find better ways of handling these challenges over the long-run through a closer partnership.” Ms Ameline’s calls for inter-parliamentary cooperation on issues shared by all Mediterranean countries were echoed by her Algerian parliamentary peers throughout the visit.

5. This report will progress thematically. It will give an overview of the present political, economic, and security developments in the country as discussed with various interlocutors over the course of the visit. It will then discuss Algerian security sector policies and regional counterterrorism (CT) efforts. Algeria’s relations with NATO and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly will also be highlighted. Finally, the report concludes with an overview of the delegation’s meeting with officials at the CAERT.

II. ALGERIA TODAY: A STRATEGIC CROSSROADSA. DOMESTIC STABILITY AND LOOMING POLITICAL TRANSITION

6. Algeria is a haven of stability in an increasingly unstable region. The delegation learned that there are two principal reasons for this: First, the country keeps memories of the devastating civil war the country experienced in the 1990s close, the era is referred to simply as the “black decade”; Second, the relative economic and social stability promoted by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in power since 1999 with four successive mandates.

7. To the outsider, the Algerian governance system is a complex nexus of interplaying groups. President Bouteflika remains a popular figure on top of a strong presidential system; stronger than that of either the United States or France even. This gives Bouteflika a key central role in the management of the nation’s affairs; the prime minister executes the policies of the head of state.

8. As international interlocutors noted President Bouteflika’s 2013 ischemic attack has led to questions about the stability of the political status quo. Interlocutors cited some recent shake-ups

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as evidence, for example the long-standing central intelligence service, the DRS (Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité), saw its head of service forced to retire and the service divided into three separate agencies.

9. The impending political succession is the crux of today’s issues. The leading political class in power since the Franco-Algerian war is dying off, and with them the ability to draw legitimacy from the war of independence. As a result, a new class of politicians is searching for a new source of legitimacy; inklings of this can be seen in a new push for free and transparent elections. In addition, a new Constitution has been seen as a step forward for the country as it sets term limits and instates Tamazight (Berber) as an official language.

10. The long and difficult 1990s, which, as noted above were dominated by a brutal civil war, remains an open wound for society. Several international interlocutors told the delegation that some sectors (particularly education, religious affairs, social policy, and family rights) are still heavily influenced by Islamic elements. In the face of the growing transnational jihadi threat, the government is working hard to promote the Algerian state model of Islam. Government interlocutors noted their model is more moderate and purged of Salafist influence; implementing, for example, public control over locations for prayer and imams.

B. ALGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

11. As noted above, when it comes to Algeria’s position in the region and its foreign policy, the country has clear geostrategic importance. It became clear over the course of the slate of meetings with Algerian officials that Algerian foreign policy is dominated by the principles of non-interference and self-determination. Algeria’s unique character gives it multiple identities and, therefore, focuses in its external outlook and policies: Maghreb, Saharan, Arab, Mediterranean, African, and global.

12. The relative stability of Algeria is increasingly rare not only in North Africa, but throughout the Arab world. The delegation learned over the course of its meetings that Algeria works hard to be considered a good strategic counterterrorism ally with its neighbours. It also strives to present a strong barrier to illegal immigration. It also became clear that Algeria views itself as a security exporter at the regional and global levels. When it comes to its neighbourhood, Algeria’s principal areas of focus are on Libya, Tunisia, and Mali.

13. Meetings with Algerian parliamentarians and government officials revealed that finding a lasting political solution in Libya is a number one foreign policy priority for Algeria. Due to the direct security implications for Algeria, continued instability along Algeria’s border with Libya will continue to have an impact on Algerian domestic stability until a solution is found. It is clear the government in Algiers would ideally like a solution that would both keep the country together, while keeping external interference out.

14. Regarding the rest of its neighbourhood, the delegation learned from its international and Algerian interlocutors alike that, broadly speaking, Algeria serves a key central role to North African security. Specifically, they noted Algeria views itself as important to the stability of Tunisia and tries, therefore to play a constructive role in the context of the current transition to democracy. Algeria understands Mali is a key nation to the stability to the Sahel stability; its high level involvement with the country at all levels is a clear demonstration of this understanding. Algeria views a role for its diplomatic efforts. Finally, a regional point of contention surrounding the status of the Western Sahara persists between Algeria and Morocco. While Morocco may maintain what it views as its rightful control of the region, Algeria views the issue as a question of decolonisation and self-determination in the region. Algiers continues to champion the rights of the Sahrawi people as a result. Throughout the region, Algeria views its counterterrorism role as indispensable.

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15. More broadly, the delegation learned, Algeria is an important player in multilateral initiatives such as the various Mediterranean institutions, for example, the 5+5 Dialogue. In addition, international interlocutors noted Algeria views itself as having a leadership role to play in the African Union, as well as in the United Nations. When it comes to the EU, however, they stated that Algeria is somewhat distanced due to a perceived general lack of attention to Algeria and its interests emanating from Brussels.

C. ECONOMY

16. International interlocutors indicated that oil and gas are Algeria’s principal revenue sources, making the economy inherently vulnerable. Due to the global oil and gas market slump, the country now has a significant trade imbalance and a serious problem balancing the budget. Currently, the country is relying on cash reserves equalling roughly $140bn, down from over $192bn only a couple years ago. Despite this relatively negative news, Algeria’s GDP is slated to grow by about 3.5% in 2016.

17. To answer the country’s clear long-term economic woes, the government is seeking to reduce imports and diversify the economy international interlocutors noted. Real economic diversification, however, will take years, as any real investments outside of the hydrocarbon industry are far below potential. A past investment programme focusing on the construction of large civilian infrastructure projects has largely been frozen. Currently, the World Bank ranks Algeria about 153rd in terms of ease of doing business.

18. Further compounding problems for Algiers is that even Algeria’s oil and gas sector is shrinking; OPEC reported recently that the sector shrank 2% over 2015. Added to Algeria’s decreasing global market share is a rising domestic demand, which only further complicates economic matters international interlocutors added. As a result, the government is seeking to expand and make more efficient its present oil and gas sectors. In addition, the delegation learned from Algerian officials the country will seek to invest in new energy sources, particularly renewables.

D. ALGERIAN DEFENCE SECTOR: CAPABILITIES AND FOCUS

19. Relatively speaking, Algeria’s Defence Forces (ADF) are highly capable, by far the most capable on the African continent. Regional experts noted the ADF likely ranks 10 and 20 rungs higher than South Africa and Morocco respectively.

20. The delegation learned the ADF currently consist of 512,000 active duty personnel with 400,000 reserves. The country has a mandatory national service and a professionalised and well-developed officer corps. Women are integrated into all services – but obligatory service is required only for men.

21. The ADF can be divided into the Army, Navy, Air Force, the CFDAT (air defence), and the gendarmerie. Border control, ground army, and national police are all closely integrated with the gendarmerie. International interlocutors indicated that, due to its post-colonial and then Cold War legacy, there is a bit of a Soviet hangover in Algeria’s military organisation, which can mean stove-piped decision-making due to a top-heavy structure.

22. The ADF is equipped with mostly Russian-make weaponry, with a heavy conventional balance. The Air force consists of mostly airlift and transport aircrafts, fixed wing attack fighters, and attack helicopters. The navy counts a total of 69 vessels, which are relatively modernised, consisting mostly of frigates and corvettes.

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23. The 2015 Defence budget was about $10.5bn, representing a significant portion of Algeria’s GDP. The ADF’s doctrine, it was noted, is heavily rooted in notions of state sovereignty, which is also reflected more broadly in the country’s support for state independence and sovereignty in the region and beyond. This is a clear, lasting legacy of Algeria’s 1954-1962 war of independence with France international interlocutors noted.

24. The delegation also learned that the current defence strategy is shaped by the civil war decade in the 1990s, where the country felt abandoned to deal with the challenge of terrorism alone. As a result, international officials noted there is a tendency in Algiers to view their defence forces as pioneers in counterterrorism tactics; something the rest of the world was forced to catch up with in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.

25. International officials also informed the delegation that the insular nature of Algerian defence strategy means they prefer non-alignment and will maintain independent capabilities. While Algeria will likely retain its fierce attachment to independent security policy, they continued, this does not preclude its strong cooperation at the bi-lateral and multilateral levels. For example, they noted that, while Algeria refused to join the Saudi-led CT coalition, it has maintained its own strong regional CT efforts. Further, Algeria gives strong support to African Union peace operations, though mostly via the donation of airlift capabilities.

E. ALGERIAN COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

26. As noted above, Algeria maintains a significant and longstanding CT effort, which demands the allocation of significant domestic resources. As Ferdi Miloud, member of the Assemblée populaire nationale, noted: “Terrorism is the most prominent threat here in Algeria and across the globe. Able to disseminate their propaganda with new technologies, terrorist organisations are reaching further into sectors of our societies than ever before. Further, as they are plugged into the global criminal networks, terrorist organisations have the ability to finance and arm themselves far beyond what they were capable of only a couple decades ago.” Mr Miloud continued by noting that as a result of the complexity of the terrorist challenges, Algeria uses all levers available to it to fight terrorism, from local grassroots to the United Nations.

27. Throughout the visit, it became clear the persistent civil conflict and disorder in Libya is causing much concern for the Algerians, making it the clear number one priority. The challenges of stemming potential trafficking of all forms between Libya and Algeria are a daunting challenge. As Noureddine Belmeddah, of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the Assemblée populaire nationale said: “The situation in Libya is a very serious one for Algeria and the entire region, the continued destabilisation and militia-isation of the country is making Libya an exporter of terrorism, illicit arms, drugs, and war refugees.” Still, he continued: “The future now lies in a dialogue between the Libyans themselves. We believe in supporting the National Unity Government in its efforts to reconcile the country – military intervention is fruitless when it comes to lasting solutions.”

28. Algeria’s vast border regions (particularly with Tunisia, Libya, Niger, and Mali) make border stability a particular challenge. Mohamed Chenouf, Vice-President and Head of International Relations at the Assemblée populaire nationale, stated very clearly to the delegation: “The Algerian army never interferes outside of our borders – its mission is to protect borders, and will never participate in a mission outside of our borders.” Still, the management of 6,743km of borders is a daunting task for any country. Several Algerian interlocutors noted that the best form of cooperation between NATO and Algeria would come in the form of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) support for better border management.

29. Algeria is working hard to build the Tunisian military’s capacity, the delegation learned. The continued progress of the Tunisian military to control their territory, it was noted by several international interlocutors, certainly helps relieve some of the pressure on the Algerian forces. Still,

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it was clear that the train, advise, and assist efforts still have a long way to go between Algeria and Tunisia.

30. Regarding Algeria’s southern border, the delegation learned that Niger is essentially a willing, but weak partner. Algiers cooperates with Niamey to coordinate regional efforts to combat Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda’s regional presence. Algeria is engaged in a parallel capacity building partnership with Niger as a result. In addition, Algeria supports French and US CT presences in the Sahel. Still, several Algerian interlocutors warned that a protracted presence by France and the United States will cause problems.

31. The instability in Northern Mali is a constant threat as well, as government institutions are simply not strong enough. Algerian interlocutors were sceptical about the benefits the French intervention brought to the area. They noted that working to maintain stability in northern Mali was also a considerable burden on the Algerian military.

32. As noted above, the delegation learned that Western Sahara is a potential regional powder keg still, as Algerian interlocutors were clear in their condemnation of Morocco’s actions vis-à-vis the Sahwari people. The issue makes the Moroccan-Algerian border still an area of potential flair up.

F. ALGERIA AND NATO

33. Since March 2000, Algeria has been involved in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, which was created in 1994 with the aim of fostering regional peace and security, principally via reinforcing inter-country dialogue. Border security and counterterrorism efforts are central issues to the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative.

34. International interlocutors said Algeria continues to show a strong desire to be a capable regional partner; it does so by various means, through principally through officer exchange at exercises, Professional Military Education, Centres of Excellence, and the various NATO commands. Currently, 19 NATO member states have diplomatic missions in Algeria, 12 of which have Defence Attachés. Spain is currently serving as the NATO contact point embassy in the country.

35. Djamel Ould Abbes, Vice-President of the Conseil de la nation, the upper house of the Algerian Parliament, noted that Algeria is keen to foster closer relations with NATO; stressing the importance of the 2001&2002 visits to NATO HQ by President Bouteflika, and the receipt of many different high-level NATO officials in Algiers over the past decade. He continued by stating that Algeria includes its NATO cooperation in its broader portfolio of Mediterranean and North African regional outreach efforts, which, in addition to its efforts in the 5+5 Dialogue and the Union of the Mediterranean.

36. Ould Abbes was also critical of NATO’s role in the region, stating that the problematic flow of arms through the region is largely the result of NATO’s Libya intervention, which “did not plan for the day after and left an large ungoverned space in its wake – allowing militias and criminal networks to exploit the large weapons depots amassed by the Ghadafi regime.” He continued by telling the delegation that, “…only a few days ago, the Algerian Army was able to seize an attempted transfer of Stinger Missiles through to Libya.” Other Algerian interlocutors at the People’s National Assembly echoed Mr Ould Abbes’s statements supporting both an increased supporting role for NATO in transitional Libya, while simultaneously allowing the transition to be Libyan-owned – not influenced by outside powers.

37. In reference to NATO intervention in North Africa, Mr Ould Abbes stated: “These kinds of missteps underscore the reason that NATO parliamentarians should work harder to exercise oversight when it comes to NATO’s external operations.” A particular point of contention for many

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Algerian parliamentarians was the lack of concrete planning for continued humanitarian and state-building support, “after the guns fell silent” in Libya. Both houses of the parliament stressed the idea of expanded inter-parliamentary cooperation.

G. ALGERIA AND THE NATO PA

38. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly works closely with non-member parliaments in an effort to foster constructive parliamentary dialogue and capacity building initiatives. Algeria cooperates with the NATO PA as a Regional Partner and Mediterranean Associate Member state, working most closely with the activities of the Assembly’s Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group. In addition, the Algerian delegation to the NATO PA sends delegations to both the spring and annual parliamentary assembly sessions.

39. As Sverre Myrli stated at the beginning of the delegation’s visit: “The situation in North Africa and Mediterranean is of ever increasing importance to the NATO PA and understanding of the security issues and the Mediterranean Dialogue.” Nicole Ameline echoed Myrli’s sentiments by noting: “The NATO PA is here to develop partnerships because we view these problems as global ones, we do not view them in exclusion.” She continued by stating: “I think we will need to prioritise the threats and responses together. This will allow for us to find a level of cooperation that will encompass the rights of all people and each nation.”

40. Parallel sentiments were voiced by delegation’s Algerian counterparts throughout the visit: As Ghania EDDALIA, Vice President of the Assemblée populaire nationale, stated clearly: “this visit is a clear indication of the importance you attach to our country and this region. Global crises have made countries push selfishness aside. Our international cooperative efforts seek to find appropriate solutions to the world’s crises; working together we can find a way.” Mr Djamel Ould Abbes said that a delegation would attend the NATO PA Spring Session in Tirana, Albania from 27-30 May. At the session, he continued, he hoped dialogue about fostering greater cooperation between Algeria and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly would continue.

H. REGIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

41. The delegation was hosted by the Centre Africain d’Etudes et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme (CAERT) for a briefing and discussion about the Centre’s findings and outreach programmes. CAERT Director, Idriss Mounir Lallali, told the delegation that the centre was inaugurated in 2004, as a part of the African Union’s counterterrorism framework, inline with the efforts to implement UNSCR 1373, which calls on member states to “increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001).” Mr. Lallali noted that, as part of the protocol to the conventions, an organising mechanism must be made available for nations to develop their CT capabilities, and CAERT was a direct result.

42. CAERT has three principal lines of effort: 1.) Database and Documentation – which includes information on terrorist networks and activities, but also on individual country’s capacities; 2.) Early Warning Mechanisms – which consists of a situation room able to focus on regional CT efforts, but also contact a focal point in every country in Africa; 3.) Country Audits - audits and analysis of country’s achievements and shortcomings, to date CAERT has audited 18 of the 54 African continental countries (of which 52 are member states in the AU). Throughout the year, CAERT works diligently to identify places for capacity building, follow the investment of donor money, and to think creatively about future projects.

43. In terms of capacity building outreach, the delegation learned CAERT had developed a significant network for information. This network is reported to be effective and Mr. Lallali noted he sees it as having an impact on the efforts of the UN bodies (even UNSCR) working to mitigate the

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causes and impacts of terrorism. He noted that two important platforms had developed as a result: the Nouakchott Process (for information exchange) focusing on Boko Haram and AQIM; and, the Djibouti Process, which works with Eastern African and Horn of Africa countries menaced by the al-Shabab and Lord’s Resistance Army.

44. A parliamentarian asked Mr Lallali about his understanding of the broader recruiting networks and how they function. To which he replied: “We need to specify the kind of terrorism about which we are talking – jihadi, violent local groups, or pirates. The most visible and menacing is the jihadist terrorism. Why? Principal factor for radicalisation is economic. In many African states, terrorist and criminal networks are the principal employers in the region.” He continued by noting that the most common place for recruitment are the informal Madrassa schools. Mr Lallali clarified by noting that, in Africa, many countries often have a dual-education system, of sorts, the state-controlled regular schools and the madrassa networks.

45. Discussing the madrassa networks, he said that madrassas can have many different meanings – both formal and informal. He then asked, rhetorically, so what is the reality of an informal Koranic school? There is no need for permission to start the school if an interested group has its own means to start one. In many respects, he continued, these can also become a mix between a youth centre and school, looking after children when the parents cannot. In addition, he noted they are also often tuition free school systems that have no state control over curriculum or teacher selection at all. 46. In addition to the discussion about the school systems, CAERT experts noted that many miss the mark when thinking poverty is the pathway to terrorism; the general lack of state capacity to incorporate their populations into a sustainable framework is a better way of looking at it. In addition, many noted globalisation trends have diluted local identities, and created an artificial pull to the global Ummah (a term for the broader Muslim community), which seems to give people (particularly youths) a greater purpose in life than can their local government. They noted this was a particular driver of the significant uptick in foreign fighter flows into Syria and Iraq.

47. One member of the delegation stated: “Everything you have said is the same in the UK – the drivers are the same, with one exception: radicalisation happens principally over social media, rather than at madrassas. Even in our well-funded schools that are totally controlled, we are still seeing Muslim radicalisation. Fear of being perceived as racist has driven us to be too timid in our policies.”

48. Mr Lallali said exploiting these networks expands the power of terrorist networks over a much larger area. They have the ability to scan social networks to see users’ responses and postings to understand their sensitivities. By way of example, he referred to cases where young girls, expressing concern for human rights were contacted by recruiters saying they can connect them to networks to help with human rights. They manage to recruit even non-Muslims, interlocutors noted, luring people in through their sensitivities to humanist ideas. The goal of internet recruitment is to be able to cut the individual’s ties with family and to give them means to travel, thereby ensnaring them in their group.

49. This then led to a question from another parliamentarian who noted that, “Social media is here, so how do you kill the message? What about the government and development nexus?” CAERT experts replied that, while the propaganda of groups like Daesh* is captivating, we can find ways to develop similar products to construct a message that is attractive to a younger generation. “We are facing a fierce competitor, we need to meet them on the same playing field, not necessarily the military one,” concluded Mr Lallali.

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* Arabic acronym of the terrorist organisation “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria”

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