IS THE SUCCESS OF ‘ISLAMIC STATE’ IN IRAQ A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF THE FAILURE TO BUILD A LEGITIMATE BAGHDAD GOVERNMENT? WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS TO UNITED KINGDOM

NATIONAL SECURITY?

Ryan Kelly (1405286)The University of Buckingham

1. INTRODUCTION

Between 2003 and 2011, Iraq was occupied by a US and UK led coalition with the stated intent of establishing freedom and democracy (Bush, 2003)i. In spite of, or perhaps because of these efforts, Iraq is now labelled by many observers as a ‘Failed State’. In late 2008, ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’ (AQ-I) was on the verge of total defeat, however as of March 2015 their successor, the self-styled ‘Islamic State’ (IS), controls a huge territory in Northern Iraq.

This paper seeks to explore how the failure of the coalition to establish a legitimate government has led to state failure in Iraq, and identify how that failure set the conditions for IS’s continuing successes. It will identify key policy missteps of the Coalition Provisional Authority that may have raised sectarian tensions, which in turn have ultimately led to an environment where IS can flourish. The paper will conclude by analysing the impact of IS on Iraq, its neighbours, and the group’s wider impact on the United Kingdom’s domestic Security.

2. SECTARIANISM AND STATE BUILDING

Fuller (2003)ii argues that when totalitarian regimes are removed, Islamist movements tend to thrive in a political vacuum with no rivals of their own. This is usually due to any other opposition groups being previously oppressed out of existence. This was not necessarily the case following the removal of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq, as a number of sectarian divides already existed.

The minority Sunni Muslims (approximately 20 percent of the population) generally prospered under the Saddam regime, but now faced political isolation with the installation of democracy in Iraq. The Shia Muslim majority (approximately 60 percent) were heavily influenced by neighbouring Iran but had been oppressed by Saddam, which caused mass resentment. The Iraqi Kurds (approximately20 percent) had also been brutally oppressed by Saddam, but at the time of the invasion they enjoyed a semi-autonomous status in parts of northern and eastern Iraq known as Iraqi Kurdistan. (Kay, 2006)iii

The US-led Coalition of 30 countries mounted the invasion of Iraq on 19 March 2003(Schifferes, 2003)iv. The following occupation was administrated through the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which was created in May 2003 and headed by United States diplomat L. Paul Bremer (Diamond, 2003)v. In its attempts to quickly establish a lasting democracy in Baghdad, the CPA were forced to make some controversial decisions. Some of their policies may have contributed to lessening the capability and legitimacy of subsequent Baghdad governments and increasing the existing ethno-sectarian tensions.

Isolation of the Sunnis - De-Ba'athification and Disbandment of the Iraqi Army

One of the most controversial decisions made by the CPA was to pursue a process known as De-Ba'athification. These steps sought to remove the top four ranks of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party from the civil service. By doing this the US officials sought to remove those that had abused the Iraqi people under the Saddam regime (Bremer 2003). However, due to the politicisation

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of Iraqi society under the former regime, De-Ba'athification effectively removed everyone with the knowhow to keep the country operating (Sissons, Al-Saiedi 2013)vi.

Along with the De-Ba’athification, Bremer also implemented the disbandment of the Iraqi Army, as well as an initial refusing to pay pensions and wages owed to Army personnel. Prior to the occupation the Iraq military comprised of approximately 389,000 regular personnel and 650,000 reservists. These measures effectively put hundreds of thousands of fighting aged men onto the streets. It is notable that these men, who were initially reluctant to fight the US military on behalf of Saddam, were now incentivised to do so for their own ends. A large number of these aggrieved, military trained, men went on to form and join insurgent groups in Northern and Western Iraq, including ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’. Both de-Ba’athification and the disbandment of the Iraqi Army were results of a misguided liberal idealism. Dodge (2009)vii argues that these were major catalysts in the rise of the Iraqi insurgency.

Disbanding the Iraqi army also had the effect of stripping away the years of experience within the senior officers and NCOs who had fought in three wars in the previous 20 years. This experience and esprit-de-corps lost in this process would be impossible to replace when trying to re-establish an Iraqi Army in the future.

Illegitimate Governance

Whilst attempting to install a democratically elected government in Baghdad, the CPA failed to recognise the dominance of Shia clerics in Iraq (The Iraq War, 2013)viii. The most influential was Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani (Wimmer, 2003)ix. In Jun 2003, Sistani issued a fatwa stating that an Iraqi constitution could only be written by democratically elected representatives (Otterman, 2004)x. In haste to end their occupation, and unable to organise timely elections, the US circumvented Sistani’s fatwa and installed an interim government responsible for producing an Iraqi constitution prior to elections taking place.

By ignoring Sistani’s fatwa the CPA effectively permanently diminished the credibility of the Iraqi central government, making it look like a puppet of the administration. In an environment so fraught with distrust and paranoia, the nature of the establishment of the post-occupation government set a precedent of distrust toward Baghdad from many of Iraq’s disparate groups.

Even after the establishment of a democratically elected government, political factionalism continued. Many of those with political aspirations spent much of the Saddam regime in exile, and grievances long held on to during that exile seemed dictate political mind-set in government. By the end of Nouri al-Mailiki’s tenure as Prime Minister, the political culture was almost indistinct from the ousted Saddam regime. Parker (2012)xi described Maliki’s Iraq as: “a system rife with corruption and brutality, in which political leaders use security forces and militias to repress enemies and intimidate the population. The state is unable to provide basic services, such as regular electricity, clean water and healthcare. Whilst high unemployment rates make criminal gangs and militias an attractive option to the young.”

3. FAILED STATES AND WESTERN SECURITY

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, state-building has become a particularly important element in the Security strategies of the US and UK. This consequentialist attitude was particularly dominant in the Bush Administration following 9/11. The UK National Security Strategy (2010)xii states the importance of “Fragile, failing and failed states” to domestic security. It identifies that terrorist organisations can exploit the vacuums in government to operate, train and expand in failed states. Wyler (2008)xiii, states that the threats emanating from failed states include:

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“..providing safe havens for terrorists, organized crime, and other illicit groups; causing conflict, regional instability, and humanitarian emergencies; and undermining efforts to promote democracy, good governance, and economic sustainability.”

Clapham (2010)xiv defines a working state as capable of, “maintaining the monopoly on violence in its territory, controlling the interactions between that territory and the outside world, and securing the obedience of its population”. Call (2010)xv, however, argues that states should be categorised by three different ‘gaps’;

Security Gaps; where the state is unable to provide adequate levels of security and is unable to repel organised armed groups within its borders.

Capacity Gaps; where a state is weak and cannot provide basic services to the population.

Legitimacy Gaps; where the credibility of the state government is undermined.

It would be fair categorise the Iraq of late 2013 as a failed state due to all three ‘gaps’ existing in abundance. The dismissal of 50,000 civil servants through de-Bathification left Iraq with a government incapable of providing basic services, further antagonising its people. This coupled with a lack of perceived legitimacy in Baghdad, paranoia and corruption led to the wholesale isolation of the Sunni Muslim population. Finally, the disbandment of the Iraqi Army had left Iraq with an inexperienced Security Force established, trained, and heavily invested in by the US. The Iraqi Security Forces were unable to adequately provide security internally or externally; they had no allegiance to their government, and lacked leadership and experience. These conditions set the perfect environment for a Sunni insurgent group, in this case ‘Islamic State,’ to entrench itself in northern Iraq. 4. THE ISLAMIC STATE

The insurgent group known as ‘Islamic State’ (IS) grew from ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’ (AQ-I), one of the most prolific and brutal Sunni insurgent groups operating in post invasion Iraq. AQ-I was strongly affiliated with the ‘al-Qaeda (AQ) global brand’, but was not a wholly owned subsidiary or franchise (Nelson and Sanderson, 2011)xvi. AQ-I went through numerous name changes, eventually settling on ‘Islamic State’ due to its ambition to establish a caliphate across areas of northern Iraq, and to distance itself from AQ.

The seeming demise of IS came between 2007 and 2008 with the rise of US supported Tribal Awakenings, in 2008. These were seen by coalition officials as being the decisive element in the defeating IS, when a number of Sunni ‘sheikhs’ raised local militias to oppose radical Sunni insurgent groups in their areas. (Harvey and Pregent, 2014)xvii. The Syrian Civil War in 2011 allowed for IS to resurge by switching focus against the Asaad Regime. IS was successful in incorporating the more extreme jihadist elements of the Syrian Opposition, due to its strong historical ties to al-Qaeda. Strengthened by successes in Syria, and facilitated by former Ba’athist Iraqi political leaders, ISIS was able to re-expand into Northern Iraq, and in January 2014 took control of Fallujah. (Stephens, 2014)xviii

In June 2014, IS took control of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, displacing approximately 500,000 citizens in the process (BBC, 2014)xix. IS had approximately 1,500 fighters and were outnumbered by fifteen to one by the Iraqi Army personnel garrisoned there. The Economist (2014)xx reported that Iraqi personnel stripped off their uniforms and fled, despite their overwhelming advantage, allowing IS to seize “six Black Hawk helicopters as well as untold plunder from the vaults of Mosul’s banks”. It

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was at this point they once again came to international attention due to their brutal treatment of civilians and the ensuing humanitarian crisis.

Ba’athist Influence on Islamic State

Aranngo (2014)xxi suggested that former Ba’athist regime officials, including numerous Intelligence and Republican Guard officers, ‘opened the door’ to IS establishing an uneasy alliance. The secular Ba’athist’s had a residual influence on the Iraqi Sunni population, which was exacerbated by the sectarian practices of Maliki’s government. They were instrumental in allowing IS, primarily comprised of foreign fighters, the freedom to operate in Sunni areas in Iraq. The military and geographical knowhow of the Ba’athists gave IS many of their tactical and strategic gains. These groups had mutual goals in furthering Sunni interests and opposing Iranian influence in Iraq, however the secular Ba’athists ideology was broadly incompatible, with that of a radical Islamist group, who wished to establish a caliphate in Iraq. If true it would only be a matter of time before fissures appear between these two ideologies.

Patel (2015)xxii offers an alternate, and perhaps more likely, reality that is even more concerning. He argues that IS was; “led by Iraqis and these Iraqis are almost all former Baathists”. He argues that many of the recruits to insurgent groups during the occupation were younger officers whose careers were cut short by de-Ba’athification. This generation of officers were trained and educated during a period when the Saddam regime was expanding religious education, and would not be as indoctrinated into the secular ideology as their predecessors would have been. It is therefore likely that many Ba’athists are fully integrated into IS, and that the ideological divides, hoped for by western observers, will not surface because they have never existed.

Sunni Opposition to Islamic State Brutality

Many commentators hypothesise that the brutal tactics of IS will eventually be their undoing, and tribal awakenings do provide a precedent of Iraqi Sunni’s rising up against Islamist groups. However, by 2013, the Tribal Awakenings were almost non-existent as Baghdad politicians, fearful of the potential political and military power of the Sunni sheikhs, broadly refused to incorporate the Awakenings into the Iraqi Armed Forces (Harvey and Pregent, 2014)xxiii. Furthermore, Patel (2015)xxiv argues that ‘Sheikhs stood up to AQI because they expected the coalition to guarantee resources to them in return”. Without this transactional relationship of continued concessions to Sunni Sheikhs, there is little incentive for Sunnis to reject IS. This means that this phenomena is unlikely to repeat itself in the absence of US or Iraqi government forces. It may also be argued that Sunni Muslim Iraqis have never condemned the brutal actions of extremist groups, but sheikhs acted in self-interest when they fought AQ-I in 2008.

Kurdish Opposition to ‘Islamic State’

Due to the mass retreat of regular Iraqi Armed forces, the majority of the forces remaining to counter IS on the ground are comprised of Kurdish ‘Peshmerga’ forces defending Kurdish areas from the IS advance and some Shia political militias. The US began a campaign of airstrikes against IS in August 2014, which included contributions by the UK, however no ground forces were committed. This was likely due to a lack of political will in the US and UK to commit troops again to Iraq, coupled with the wider regional implications of supporting the Kurdish Peshmerga

The Kurds have long sought independence from Baghdad for Iraqi Kurdistan. By supporting the Kurds militarily, especially when regular Security Forces are notably absent, Western governments flirt with the risk of legitimising any future Kurdish claim to independence. This could be problematic to Turkey, who are a NATO ally. Ankara have long feared the establishment of an independent

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Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. If successful, Iraqi Kurds could promote the separatist cause of Kurds in Turkey who may wish to unite with them. (Kay, 2006)xxv Any lethal aide that the UK wishes to provide to support the fight against IS must be sent through Baghdad, which due to the political and military situation, is vastly inefficient (Chulov, 2015)xxvi.

Establishing a Cyber Caliphate

On 12 Jan 15, ‘Cyber Caliphate’, a hacking group that has claimed to be closely associated with IS hacked into the Twitter and YouTube accounts of the US Central Command (Constine, 2015)xxvii. IS have also conducted an extremely successful, and accomplished social media campaign, which has gone beyond blogging to incorporate feature length, professionally edited propaganda films (France24, 2014)xxviii. It has been argued that the prevalence of the IS internet campaign has made them appear much more powerful than they actually are. Indeed it was likely that policy makers’ fears of IS overrunning Baghdad in mid-2014 were based more on grandiose claims made by IS on social media, rather than their actual capability and manpower. (Kingsley, 2014)xxix It is clear that this perception of IS has bolstered their successes, and their reputation may be a factor in the Iraqi Security Forces’ decision to retreat when faced with an IS advance.

The level of violence and brutality displayed in the IS internet campaign, is matched by the professionalism of its presentation. This has shown a high degree of awareness and technical proficiency within the group, and the notoriety gained from these cyber and social media successes have given IS a global reach. It now has a growing number of affiliations with other jihadist groups, and an increased ability to recruit western born individuals who wish to join them in Iraq (Gambhir, 2015)xxx. Their campaigns have been so successful that at the time of writing, more British Muslims had joined IS than the British Army (Hashmi, 2015)xxxi. 5. CONCLUSIONS

The failure of the Iraqi State is fundamentally due to the shortcomings of the United States and Great Britain’s policy of state building. IS are now ascending beyond that of a localised insurgency into an organisation with true global reach; they were only able to achieve this because of the Coalition’s failure to establish a functional, legitimate and inclusive government in Baghdad. IS now present a very real threat to UK National Security due to, their ability to engage and coordinate with a network of jihadist groups, their corruption of British citizens currently fighting in Iraq, and their ability to inspire attacks domestically.

As a case study, IS provides an important lesson of the possible unforeseen circumstances arising from state building efforts not ensuring that legitimate, capable governments with the capacity to provide security are left behind. The short-sightedness of the Coalition strategy has also caused long lasting damage to the reputation of the United Kingdom, and her armed forces internationally. The fact that the Coalition left Iraq in such turmoil has had the effect of completely dampening the appetite for foreign military intervention, even if the reasons support our own strategic aims, and national morality. In 2013, British Parliament, in fear of entering into another situation like the 2003 Iraq War, voted against supporting US intervention in Syria without a UN mandate (BBC, 2013)xxxii. The vote made it clear that Parliament would now only vote for military action to defend British territories (Burt, 2014)xxxiii. This makes it extremely unlikely that the United Kingdom will commit ground troops to combat IS, and do little more than continue to support the US led air campaign.

Simons (2003)xxxiv argued that unassailable nature of American power will remain extant for some time. This will likely stimulate resentment, especially from the global Muslim community. America and her allies will likely provoke animosity no matter what their response to the failure of the Iraqi state will be. Inaction from the West will likely cause resentment for not fulfilling their historical

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obligations to Iraq. Decisive military action, such as troop deployments, is similarly likely to be met with protest over perceived anti-Islamic foreign policy.

It could be argued that intervening earlier may have led to a decisive outcome in Syria, and prevented the resurgence of IS altogether. Presently, a full military intervention against IS could have wider ranging repercussions to the region by; legitimising Iraqi Kurdistan, further undermining Baghdad, and eliminating the block to Iranian influence that IS represents. However a lack of political will exists, borne from the failures of the coalition that created the current situation, which will likely prevent the United Kingdom from intervening in a meaningful way.

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