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Gradual Enlightenment, Sudden Enlightenment and EmpiricismAuthor(s): Ivan Strenski

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Ivan Strenski Gradual enlightenment, sudden enlightenment and

empiricism

In its history, the scholarly study of meditation has been the preserve of orien-

talists, historians and phenomenologists of religion, and, more recently,

psychologists of consciousness. These investigators have, on the whole, been

mindful of philological, textual, and descriptive matters. Little attention has

been given to philosophical, theoretical, or sociological aspects of meditation.

In particular, the many possible connections between characteristicsof medita-tional practice and institutionalized theories of knowledge, brought to lightin other areas by the sociology of knowledge, have been ignored.

By way of innovation, I want to see how epistemological perspectives mightilluminate the shape of Buddhist attitudes toward the gradual or sudden

attainment of enlightenment. Using a modified and rather informal struc-

turalism, I want to compare the structures of institutionalized theories of

knowledge with the structures of meditational practices and beliefs to see

whether one might understand the characteristics of these practices and

beliefs in terms of their underlying epistemological structure. I want to arguethat one can plot the salient characteristics of meditational practices-here,whether enlightenment occurs gradually or suddenly-as symptoms of the

presupposed structure of their institutionalized theory of knowledge.But before embarking on the critical study of meditational practices we

ought to first clarify just what the Buddhists themselves thought about gradualand sudden enlightenment, and how they conceived the relation of these

aspects of meditational practice to their beliefs about the acquisition of knowl-

edge.I. APPROACHESTO THE PROBLEMOF GRADUAL AND SUDDEN ENLIGHTENMENT:

NATURALISMAND PHENOMENOLOGY

It is commonplace to read that Theravada Buddhism teaches that nirvana

is attained gradually and that Chan or Zen Buddhism teaches 'sudden' en-

lightenment. Little is said about the bases for studying what such meditational

claims mean, and less is said about the logical grammar of words as peculiaras 'gradual'. Typically, it is facilely assumed that this problem is merely a

factual matter about temporal duration. On this view, to say enlightenment is'gradual' usually means that it takes a long time for this quasi-mental state

to occur. Such a claim does not seem logically different than saying that it

took a person a long time to get 'dizzy' or 'drunk,' and so on. Now, to

put a factual stress on this matter should immediately strike anyone familiar

with the pragmatic attitude of (early) Buddhism as odd. Surely, it must have

Ivan Strenski is an associate professor in the Departmentof Religious Studies, ConnecticutCollege,New London, Connecticut.

NOTE:Thisarticle wasfirst read inanotherversionat theInternationalHistory of ReligiousCongress,

August, 1975 at the University of Lancaster,Lancaster,England.All references to the Pali Canon are given in standardform and are quotedfrom the translations

of I. B. Horner, Middle Length Sayings, 3 volumes (London: Luzac, 1959, 1957, 1954).PhilosophyEast and West 30, no. 1 (January, 1980). ? by The University Press of Hawaii. All rights reserved.

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4 Strenski

been unedifying for an early Buddhist to be concerned with rather speculativematters of fact. Is this just an example of 'corruption' in early Buddhism,

analogous to the storied medieval Christian scholastic problem of angels on

the head of a pin? What could be the practicalsalvific value of talk of gradualismin various Buddhist contexts? What could have been the possible interest for

anearly

Buddhist insaying

thatenlightenment

was to be attainedgradually?

Despite such considerations, scholars of meditation have persisted in treatingmeditational discourses as mere descriptive matters of fact. This is true, even

though these scholars disagree implicitly about what counts as a 'fact', or,

perhaps more accurately, stress different views about what counts as a fact.

Basically, two such emphases seem current. As applied to my earlier exampleof dizziness, one may take the fact of dizziness to be an experience in which

case one might term such an approach 'phenomenological.' However, one

might feel required to seek Jacts in some supposedly underlying neurophysio-

logical process, in which case one might term such an approach 'naturalist.'Although both naturalist and phenomenologist would agree that temporalduration was crucial to the meaning of 'gradual', they would not agree about

the nature of what endured in time.

I am convinced both these approaches emphasize the wrong things about

Buddhist gradualism-for whatever different reasons. Not only does the

Pali Canon tell a more complete story, but another order of analysis of the

texts is required. Basically I believe those tempted by either of these two

approachesmistake a normfor a matter of fact, and that where a fact

maybe

indicated, it tends more often to be a spatial fact, rather than a temporalone.

Although the temporal and the factual question may not be without interest,

it does not seem to be the chief concern of the Pali Suttas. Here, the Buddha

recommendsa particular mode of life-an issue which reads far beyond anysuch unedifying factual matter of the speed of the attainment of nirvana.

Taking the temporal point first, it would seem important to note that the

term 'gradual' is ordinarilyused in two quite differentways: Insofar as 'gradual'

is used factually, it may indeed mean something temporal, like 'slow.' But,

it may also mean 'graded.' It may be a temporal word just as easily as it maybe a spatial one. The same is true of the Pali term anupubba,as I shall show in

the discussion of the Pali Canon's view of "gradual" enlightenment. Thus,

'gradual' is like other words that play across the temporal and spatial condi-

tions of experience. Does a 'dashing' man need to be fleet of foot? Does a

'snappy' dresser need to be quick with buttons and zippers? Although spatial

and temporal uses of 'gradual' often coincide, they need not do so. Doing

something gradually-by degrees, in stages-may take less time than trying

to do the same task at one go. Gradual methods are, indeed, often devised to

save time-say, in building a house, taming a horse, writing a book, or attaining

nirvana-especially when contrasted to available alternatives in achieving

the same sophisticated result. Perhaps, part of the reason this spatial sense of

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'gradual' escapes our attention may have something to do with the fact that

the ordinary English contrast word, 'sudden,' does not seem to have a spatialsense at all. It only seems to have temporal uses, and thus by analogy, we think

of 'gradual' in the same way. Attention to the contexts of the discourses on

gradualism tells another story.As one

might emphasizeeither

temporalor

spatial aspectsof

gradualismso also have scholars of meditation emphasized different senses in which

meditational forces arefacts. Through their reliance on neurological research,the psychologists of consciousness exemplify a naturalistic approach. The

question of gradual attainment of enlightenment would become a questionto be settled by measuring the duration of 'extent' of certain neurological

processes. Now, the psychologists of consciousness have not, to my knowl-

edge, dealt with our particular problem. Yet, it would seem important-atleast in passing-to representtheir increasingly popular work in this context-

even if I am forced to extrapolate from their more general work on meditation.They seem to exemplify an extreme contrast to the kind of epistemological

approach I advocate, since they seem to avoid the whole issue of the theory-ladenness of meditational 'facts.'

A characteristic of this loosely related group of writers is their reliance on

quantitative neurological investigation of meditation. Typical of this view is

the work of Dan Goleman. Here, EEGs supposedly get the investigator behind

"abstract concept"-'the realm of discourse' (the beliefs and reports of

meditators) to the "raw data." 1Conveniently, this move (if possible) liberates

the investigator from the need to deal with troublesome institutions, beliefs,

theories, and critics! Thanks to the EEG one reaches the promised land of

value-free inquiry. Consistent with this supralinguistic approach, no argumentswill be found supporting such claims that a conceptually neutral realm has

been reached. In their stead one finds pronouncements and decrees-poor

surrogates for solutions to our awkward epistemological position. But, instead

of evading epistemological issues, I believe we ought to face them squarely:What presuppositions, theories, beliefs, and institutions condition mystical

or meditative experience? What sense can one make of truth claims madeunder such conditions?

It is to the phenomenologists of religion, like Winston King, however, that

one must look for the most direct discussion of our problem. In a comparisonof Theravada and Zen meditation, King concludes that there is really no

difference between sudden and gradual attainments of enlightenment. As

one might expect from a phenomenologist, King believes that there is infactno difference, because there is no experiential difference between sudden

and gradual attainment of enlightenment.

"suddenness" or "gradualness" of enlightenment ... appears to dependprimarily upon emphasis and/or point of specification. One may choose toemphasize the prior preparation ... and call it "gradual"; or one may stress

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6 Strenski

the experiential breakthrough and call it "sudden." But in both Theravadaand Zen, there are development and pinpointed breakthrough.2

For King, this virtually closes the case. If, however, one takes seriouslythe theory-ladenness of meditational experiences, the hard questions just

begin. Why, indeed, the differences in "stress," as King himself is compelled

to ask? Why the canonical, commentarial, and modern norm among Thera-vadins that nirvana comes gradually? King's reply to his own question is

couched in terms of "the Indian penchant for classification and analysis"versus the "Sino-Japanese impatience with metaphysical speculation and a

fundamental reliance upon intuitional apprehension of existential truth."3

One wonders what the Buddha would say to the implication that he was

not impatient with metaphysical speculation. Or what the Hua-Yen philoso-

phers would say to the implication that they were not among the most supreme

speculative metaphysicians of all time. But, like many cultural generalizations,

King's also contains an unexpected germ of truth.

Surprisingly, King drops the matter at this point. Yet, one should not be

altogether puzzled, since King's approach will not let him push beyond the

reports of experiences to levels of structuring which may give rise to these

experiences. I want to suggest that an appreciation of fundamental attitudes

toward knowledge may help stimulate understanding of these divergentviews of what may or may not be identical processes or experiences. In part,I aim to reinforce Jayatilleke's views about early Buddhist empiricism by

arguing that its underlying structural pervasiveness accounts for much ofthe character of early Buddhist belief in the gradual attainment of nirvana.4

Contrary to what Buddhist empiricists themselves might believe, I believe

that their empiricist epistemology is symptomatic of a deep yet compromised

empiricist structure.

II. THEPALI CANON ON GRADUALISM

The classical and principal discussions of gradualism occur in four places in

the Majjhima Nikiya (MN). In two condensed analogies, the Buddha teacheswhat has become known crudely as "gradual enlightenment." Both these

analogies-taming a thoroughbred colt (MN 1.445-446; MN III.1-6) and

mastering complex skills (calculating and archery: MN III.1-6)-indicatemuch of the character of gradualism, which I shall explain shortly. In MN

1(480-481), the Buddha deals directly with gradual attainment of pahha.

Contrary to popular misconception, this shows that the distinction between

gradual and sudden enlightenment differs from the distinction between those

who attain nirvana by pania and the jhanas, respectively. As the Buddha

implies in MN I(478ff), thepahhavimuttaseems to achieve nirvana mmediately

(in both spatial and temporal senses), because he has previouslyachieved those

stages of sanctity which others may only now be set to achieve.

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The compounds of the Pali anupubba (Skt., anu-pfrva) "gradual" are

numerous, and occupy nearly three columns in Trenckner's Critical Pali

Dictionary.5 For the purposes of this article, I shall treat only the relevant

compounds and deal with the pertinent aspects of their logical grammar.This pragmatic approach may leave the linguistic survey of these compounds

incomplete, but I believe I have covered all pertinent issues from the philo-

sophical point of view. The compounds of anupubbahave both broad and

narrow references: they may refer to the entireeffort of attaining enlightenmentas well as to the stages of meditational attainment and pedagogical practice.

Thus, terms like anupubba-karana, "gradual training," anupubba-kiriyi,

"gradual working," anupubba-patipadi, "gradual progress," anupubba-sama-

patti, "gradual attainment," and anupubba-sikkhi, "gradual training" refer

broadly to the systematic or successive character of the whole Buddhist wayof life, from first silas to final release. Considering the narrower context of

the jhdnas, one completes a gradual cessation of consciousness (anupubba-nirodha),or one is said to come to dwell in certain graded levels of meditational

abodes (anupubba-vihira). Finally, one may speak about pedagogical matters,

in what seems a prescriptive epistemological way, about the Buddha's nor-

mative gradual method of instruction (anupubba-kathi) and its correlative,

the student's gradual method of study or training (anupubba-sikkhi).6Some of these notions need explaining. The early Buddhists held definite

beliefs about the details and reality of the mental landscape. The meditator

was thought to ascend a graded trail of real, though impermanent, mental

steps (jhinas), one after another, until the summit of nirvana was won. Itis true that nirvana is not itself another jhina and, that, strictly speaking, is

not necessarily 'won' by meditation: it is not the causal product of the processof meditation. Yet, there is some relation between meditation and nirvana,

although the precise nature of it is often difficult to make out. More on this

matter shortly. Moreover, the progress of the meditator through the jhinaswas also thought to be open to precise location in terms of a psychological

map of the real, though impermanent, mind. To follow the Buddha meant,in

part,to

accept his map of the mind-at least provisionally for the purposeof testing its accuracy and its utility for attaining release. In meditation, these

directions were, in turn, tested for their truth-although, of course, the questionof vicious circularity is conveniently passed over by the Buddhists. One mightalso add that as the route to nirvanaby meditation was graded, so was the goal

itself, in some sense, graded. Early Buddhist notions of levels of accomplish-

ment, like "Streamwinner," "Once-returner," and so on, seem to point in

the same direction of gradual-graded-attainment.

Apart from these descriptive uses of the grades of attainment, two aspects

of the early Buddhist attitude to saving knowledge are also termed "gradual"although in a different sense than we have seen thus far. The context of this

new sense of "gradual"is the classical Buddhist milieu of learningand teaching

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8 Strenski

Gradual teaching or instruction (anupubba-katha) refers to the Buddha's

normative analytical and graded pedagogy.7 This method of instruction

exemplifies the Buddha's use of skill-in-means (upaya-kosalla)8 which, as

Jayatilleke has argued, encompasses a kind of openness to falsification and

corresponding obligation for verification.9 Because of his compassionate care

and sympathy for humanity and its physical and intellectual suffering, the

Buddha prescribed teaching the dhamma in orderly and logical ways, tailored

to the needs and capacities of his listeners, and open, in large measure, to

dispute and verification.10 Although, at times he speaks in the didactic mode,

the Buddha eschewed an abrupt, paradoxical, or esoteric mode, typical of the

thwacks and slaps of some Zen Buddhist pedagogy and the later Mahayana

uses of upaya, respectively.From the perspective of the student, gradualism requires a correspondingly

earnest methodical and analytic study of the dhamma.A student is responsible

for testing and verifying the dhammaexperientially. If one follows Jayatillekehere, epistemological gradualism-this attitude of experiential scrutiny-

applies to all aspects of the dhamma-both to preliminary matters as well as

to those which arise at rarified meditational levels."1

One cannot then conclude that the gradual attainment of enlightenment

primarily meant that nirvana came slowly, or that it was the norm of the

slow-witted. This, at any rate, is not the view of the Pali Canon. For the early

Buddhists, gradualism was a complex notion, involving both the description

of a graded model of the meditational and cognitive landscape, along with

certain values or prescriptions about the proper epistemological attitude of

scrutinyand experiential testing needed at all levels of the teaching and learning

process of attaining release.

In another discussion on Theravada meditation, Winston King underscores

this opposition of description and prescription by repeating it in terms of the

contrast between jhanic and vipassanic aspects of meditation.12 Although

these two aspects are "set in tension with each other,"13

they also complement

each other.14 Vipassana(insight) supplies "critical awareness"15of the jhanic

attainments, a "reviewing of the path."16

The jhanic route thus describes ajourney through a series of gradually ascending stages, while vipassanacensors

and scrutinizes the quality of those achievements.

For King, the central question still remains why these two disciplines are

combined at all. What is achieved by theircombination in the tranceof cessation

(nirodha-sampitti), or in the Theravada tradition as a whole? Once again

King couches his explanation in experiential or phenomenological terms:

The jhanic discipline contributes meditational expertise, which may strengthenthe concentration of the vipassanic meditator ... and very importantly givesa quality of depth and lastingness of experiential attainment.... On thereverse sides, vipassana keeps the whole jhanic progression within Buddhistbounds so that none of its utterly peaceful states will be construed as the final

goal of meditation. 17

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Now, I do not wish to quibble with these admirable conclusions. They

strike me as sensitive and germane. Indeed, I should like to confirm them,

and also take them a step further beyond the phenomenological level which

they occupy. I am urging the reader to consider that there are deeper reasons

behind this felicitous conjunction of meditational modes, which I, first of all,

identify as epistemological in nature. My 'hunch' is that the connection

between the jhanic description of cognitive growth with the vipassanic epis-

temological scrutiny suggests a fundamental connection with a comprised

empiricist syndrome recently spelled out by Ernest Gellner.18 There are

parallels to the specific conjunction of the jhanic and vipassanic modes of

meditation in similar conjunctions in the general development of empiricist

approaches to the growth of knowledge. Jhanic and vipassanic modes of

meditation are joined for the same reason similar aspects of the general em-

piricist theory of knowledge arejoined.

III. THE "GHOST" MEETSTHE "MACHINE"

One can speak of an 'empiricist syndrome' today largely because it has been

the subject of intense debate by modern epistemologists. This is perhaps

especially true of north Atlantic analytic philosophy, although the ferment

on the continent in Marxist and structuralist circles seems to focus on similar

issues from the opposite philosophical shore. Among philosophers of science,

Ernest Gellner has been particularly active in recent years in this area. Gellner

believes one ought to distinguish two moments in the life of empiricism asit has developed in certain favored contexts: empiricism is both a description

of how knowledge works and a prescription about what ought to count as

knowledge. As a description, empiricism offers a mere "toddler's toy" model,19

far too crude and simple to reflect the complexity of cognition; but, as a pre-

scription, it provides a useful "touchstone," 20admirably stating a clear norma-

tive attitude toward the limits of cognition. In this latter sense, empiricism

acts as a "censor" or "selector,"21 laying down two imperatives: "Be sensitive

to whether or not assertions are testable (in the specified approved manner)!

Spurn those which are not!"22 Gellner realizes that an empiricist would not

typically recognize that empiricism itself rests of prescriptions. Indeed, part

of what being an empiricist has meant in the past, has been bound up with the

conviction that our cognitive situation is grounded in unbiased observations.

But, for Gellner and any one of the numerous critics of empiricism today,this is just not so.

As for the empiricist "toddler's toy" model, it can be summarized along the

lines of an acquisitive enterprise. Beginning with an active external world and

apassive

internal one, the inner world of'concepts'

or'knowledge'

is built

up by accumulating sense-data. But, since all one 'knows' consists of sense-

data, the existence of a world behind sense-data becomes theoretically proble-

matic, and unless something intervenes, one is led down the primrose path to

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10 Strenski

phenomenalism and nominalism. In this condition one can still 'generalize,'

by assembling sense-data into complex 'beliefs' or 'ideas' by 'induction.'

The truth of these beliefs is tested or verified by 'correspondence' with the

facts of sense experience. This comparison of simple and complex is achieved

through the process of 'analyzing' complex 'beliefs' into their constituent

sense-data. Normative statementsanalyzed

in this fashion reveal no world

of 'good' or 'bad,' but mere pleasures, pains, or emotions. Science, especiallyin its reductionist and impersonalist moods, represents the kind of model

explanation of the world of experience to which all other cognitive enterprisesshould aspire.

For Gellner, empiricism tends toward solipsism and eventually idealism-as

long as it remainspure. After all, experienceisjust my experience. My experienceis composed of private sense-data, and the existence of the external world is

necessarily left in doubt. Yet, historically and, in Gellner's view, happily,

empiricism did not in every case actually retain its purity and develop intoidealism and soliphism; Bishop Berkeley was not the sole heir to the empiricisttradition. The Utilitarians, Locke, Russell, and others, claim this birthrightas well. Their thought embodies a salutary convergence of empiricism and

materialism-the "ghost" and the "machine," in Gellner's words. These

thinkers sought a "stable, recognisable structure that could somehow be

reached through the qualitative sense-data available to the ghost."23 Because

of their confidence in knowing the world, they also believed that the world

wasimprovable,

and thatanalysis

andscrutiny

were both worthwhile and

appropriate activities for human beings.

IV. EARLYBUDDHIST EMPIRICISMAND MEDITATION

Gellner's myth about this compromised empiricism fits remarkably well with

K. N. Jayatilleke's account of early Buddhist theory of knowledge-especiallyin the way it resists idealism (as later Buddhist thought does not) and allies

itself with materialism.24 Early Buddhism populates the vacuum between

experience and the otherwise noumenal world with real, though impermanent

and causally conditioned, causally agent, material sense-data. These sense-data,in turn, activate the causally passive (initially, at any rate) and material mind,

producing 'knowledge' of the world. For both Gellner and early Buddhism

this convergence of "ghost" and "machine" reinforces the characteristic

empiricist epistemological attitude of analysis.25 This analytic spirit-like

perhaps the "spirit" of Protestantism or capitalism in Weber-fits with the

spirit of the development of traditional empiricism and early Buddhism.

Both take the world seriously, because it is not illusory; both exhibit a "salutarycensoriousness" which "seems only to come when cognitive hope and con-

fidence have already been raised high."26 This is why both Gellner's com-

promised empiricism and early Buddhism (surprisingly and in different waysto be sure) lead to "puritanical orderly world-reform and cognitive explora-

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tion,"rather han to Schopenhaurianessimism,aestheticism, ndmysticism,on the one hand,or to indulgenthippiegrooviness,on the other.27

To thosewhoimagineBuddhismo beSchopenhaurian,essimistic,mystical,and so on, this claimwill come as a shock.And, it is true that muchof the

Buddhisttraditionhas been all these things.Yet, Jayatilleke's esearch, or

one,has done muchto

rectifyhis

imageof Buddhism-at leastas it seemsto

have takenshapein the PaliCanon.The Utilitarians, or example,"took the

worldseriously."But, this meantattentionto politicalreform,technological

development,and cognitive explorationin the natural sciences. With the

early Buddhists,this earnestspirit took the form of individualethical and

psychologicalreform,the establishment f an alternativemodelsociety-theBuddhistmonasticcommunity,heSangha-cognitive exploration ndtherapyaimed at seekingthe psychologicalroots of sufferingmore in the style of

Freudandthepsychotherapists.28

This is not to denythe differencesbetweenGellner'scompromised mpiri-cism andearlyBuddhistempiricism;t is onlyto showthattheyare not differ-

ences of "spirit."Moreover,in some ways, early Buddhism s even more

optimisticthan its counterparts n Europeanempiricism.It stands for the

possibilityof the radicaldevelopment f humancognitivepotentials:Men can

know the real nature of the world and nirvana.This enlargesthe rangeof

experiential nowledge, aking n meditational tates,kindsof ESP,and states

transcendentalo the ordinaryman.29

Thecognitive

optimismof earlyBuddhism ests, n turn,on thepresupposi-tions underlyingthe theory of meditationoutlined earlier. The Buddhists

thought they knew how the mind workedand what techniqueswould best

serve to enable it to work for humanhappiness.Insofar as earlyBuddhist

meditationmethods are concerned,they are specific to the compromised

empiricistheoryof knowledge pelledoutbyGellner.Onecan,infact,generatethe modelof earlyBuddhistmeditationmerelyby reversing he orderof the

empiricistmodelof criticalaccumulation f sense-data.As one hadgraduallyaccumulatedense-dataandpassedthem beforetheinnercensor,the "ghost,"

beforeriskingknowledge-claims,o alsoin meditationonegradually urpassesclassesof sense-dataexperienceand knowledge.Urgedon by vipissanacriti-

cism, the meditatorpressesalong the jhanic route to higher meditational

levels,completely trippedof sense-data nformation.

Thus, reliable ordinaryknowledge as well as nirvanarequire gradual,

diligent,and criticalattention-analytic care in siftingour perceptionsand

beliefs.In meditation, his becomeseven moresevereas the meditator mptiesthe mind of thesedata,notingtheir content andformas theyare transcended

untilnirvianatself is attained.One is not typicallyencouraged o leapto con-

clusions(or nirviana)n earlyBuddhism.One is invited to analyzeand verifythe dhammaxperientiallyndultimatelyn meditation.Themeditator nitiates

a relentlessand deliberateselectionprocess,which seeksto liberatethe per-

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12 Strenski

ceiver from the bondage of the inward flow of causally agent sensations.

In meditation, a Buddhist tries to understand sense-data, and therefore knowl-

edge, in their own terms, and declare them for what they are.

All this makes for a measured and certain optimism about man's potentialfor salvation unaided by occult power or cosmic fate. In the context of this

analytic, trial-and-error cognitive quest, one is advised not to expect rapidresults, although these could, of course, occur. The early Buddhists encouraged

persistence. Effort brought results. The point was to keep at it, to form the

habits of mind and action which would surely (but not automatically) bringresults.

V. GRADUAL AND SUDDEN ENLIGHTENMENT:HISTORICDEBATESI: CHINA

Thus far, I have tried to illuminate the nature of early Buddhist meditation and

the belief in gradualenlightenment by appealing to the notion of early Buddhist

empiricism. In a nutshell, I have argued that early Buddhist meditation theoryis imbedded in a compromised empiricist epistemology and, as such, will

reflect salient characteristics of this epistemological syndrome. Even though

ordinary knowledge requires accumulating sense-data, both processes occur

by 'gradual' means-in both the descriptive and prescriptive senses of that

term. As a structuralist, I have shown that Gellner's compromised version of

empiricism is homologous to early Buddhist empiricism in both descriptiveand prescriptive dimensions. Meditation in early Buddhism constitutes a

counterpointvariant of this common

theme, seemingfor the most

parta

structural inversion of the empiricist statement about ordinary acquisitionof knowledge.

The critical reader will want some test of this thesis. And, if structuralism

is not to become just another occasion for clever dialectical shenanigans,structuralists must offer some check on their own method. The perfect test

of this thesis would be a debate between a proponent of early Buddhist empiri-cism who held the gradualist position, and another kind of Buddhist who held

the sudden position-typically a Rinzai Zen Buddhist. The nature of the test

would be to see if one could correlate opposed beliefs about the attainment ofenlightenment with opposed epistemological beliefs-understanding all the

while that both kinds of epistemologies may operate in these contexts in

compromised forms.

In the history of Buddhism, the issue of gradual and sudden enlightenmenthas arisen on two conspicuous occasions: the eighth-century controversies

between the Northern and Southern schools of Ch'an Buddhism in China,and between the Indian and Chinese parties at the Council of bSam Yas

(792-794) (the so-called Council of Lhasa) in Tibet.30 Of the two, the Chinese

controversy gives fullest treatment to the sudden position. Indeed, the locus

classicus of the sudden view remains the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch,attributed to the 'victor' of the debate and founder of the Southern school of

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Ch'an, Hui-Neng (638-713). Thanks to Yampolsky's recent research of this

text and its historical context,31 much has become clear. For one, Yampolsky

argues that one should attribute the authorship of the sitra to Shen-hui,

one of Hui-Neng's disciples, rather than to the sixth patriarch himself. To-

gether with Dumoulin's work in this area, one can be reasonably certain in

correlatingHui-Neng'ssudden

theoryof

enlightenmentwith a certain

epistemo-logical-cum-ontological position opposed to that of early Buddhism.

We know that Hui-Neng (Shen-hui)32 taught the "sudden" attainment

of enlightenment against the celebrated Ch'an teacher, and sixth patriarch

accordingto the Northern school, Shen-hsiu. But, what did he mean? Dumoulin

claims that Hui-Neng even makes it the sole criterion for orthodoxy! 33 What

can be contained in this cryptic claim to merit such importance? And what

can explain the fierce attacks Hui-Neng aimed at Shen-hsiu? Well, Hui-Nengmost certainly did not mean enlightenment was "easily obtainable" or even

quickly won,34 although these were not ruled out. Like the early Buddhists,Hui-Neng had higher purposes in mind. Both were concerned to make certain

points about human psychology and knowledge, using the idioms of temporalduration and spatial levels when these suited their purposes. Both seem to

insist, quite often without apparent purpose, that enlightenment occurred in a

way harmonious with their practices and basic views.

Dumoulin35 and Yampolsky agree that the belief in sudden enlightenmenthas two sides. Negatively, it denies that the goal, prajii, can be produced bya "step-by-step process of meditation,"36 dhyina-odd, one would have

thought, for the Dhyana school (Ch'an) to assert. Positively, it was a way of

asserting the truth of a priori nonduality-that prajhdis "something possessedfrom the outset by everyone."37 The point is to realize the imminent a priorinature of enlightenment and to let it shine through. Meditation cannot effect

enlightenment because, strictly speaking, meditation and the passions it seeks

to purge are ontologically empty and illusory.

Thus, at bottom, the doctrine of sudden enlightenment is a way of denyingthe jhanis and of asserting the a priori nature of enlightenment in the idiom

of meditational practice. As the early Buddhists set out to operationalize earlyBuddhist empiricism with the descriptive and prescriptivesenses of gradualism,so also does Hui-Neng seem intent on operationalizing his own philosophical

position in the sudden view of the attainment of enlightenment: there are no

real-even impermanent-grades of enlightenment; thus there is no need to

test for a priori enlightenment, since all beings are enlightened by nature.

One will recall that the Pali Canon would certainly tell another kind of story.

Although meditational progress through thejhinas does not causally producenirvana on the early Buddhist view, in conjunction with vipassana, it is one

important way to attain it. However impermanent they may be, one seeks to

transcend the constraints of real (though impermanent) mind and world.

Impermanence itself signals that progress can be made. But, early Buddhist

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soteriological optimism could not lead to the seemingly exaggerated optimismembodied in the belief in a priori enlightenment-that the battle was already

won, or that virtuallyno battle needed to be fought. Nirvana,on the other hand,transcends experience without being prior to experience. It is not, strictly

speaking, posterior to experience either, since it is not, as it were, an inductive,

empirical generalization,or caused

bymeditation. If I

maybe

permitteda

neologism, the word 'transposterior' (to experience) may capture the flavor of

the relationship of nirvana to ordinary experience. By this I mean that nirvana

is not a priori, and only can be said to be a posteriori if one stipulates that it

is held to transcend experience.38 Historically, this position may have arisen

from conflict with brahminical rationalists, if we follow Jayatilleke's39 sug-

gestion. What remains important is the early Buddhist aversion to apriorism-even if it meant constructing an empiricism which finally may have (to put it

charitably) transcended itself in the special case of the nature of nirvana.

Hui-Neng and the Southern school of Ch'an Buddhism felt no such aversionfor the a priori. In fact, they celebrated it, and consequently thought that it

merely had to be seen beneath the surface of an already illusory world. En-

lightenment was 'sudden' because it was a priori and without even ontological

competition from an impermanent world.

VI. GRADUAL AND SUDDEN ENLIGHTENMENT:HISTORICDEBATESII: TIBET

The second classic locus of this debate is the late eighth-century controversywhich occasioned the Council of bSam Yas

(so-calledCouncil of

Lhasa).Here, the Indian Madhyamika logician, Kamalasila (742-804) argued a

gradualistposition against a Chinese Ch'an teacher, Hva San, and his Tibetan

allies the rDzogs-chen. Far more importance is attached to this debate than

may seem warranted. Yet, the issue was clearly thought to have been central

to the subsequent development of Buddhism in Tibet. Our accounts of the

debate records the point of view of the victor, in this case Kamalasila in his

own Bhavanakrama.We learn little of the views of Hva-San and his companyfrom this text and are thus led to speculate about their fuller form and the

possible relationship with the earlier teachings of Hui-Neng and his school.Although the connections between these two are not certain, many similarities

of points of view can be established, which in themselves may point in the

direction of relationship.The interesting thing about Kamalasila is that he seems to arguea gradualism

similar to what we have discovered in early Buddhist meditation but, at first

sight, without sufficient theoretical basis to do so. His philosophical position,

as best one can make out from the often conflicting accounts of it, is exceedingly

rich and complex. He seems at once a Svatantrika Madhyamakin,40 Siinya-

vadin, as well as logician and pragmatist in the tradition of Dharmakirti.41

Historians of Indian philosophy have also identified him as a critic of the

Yogacarins.42 Kamalasila, himself,43 seems to recognize that these philo-

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15

sophicalpositionsproduce n himacertainamountof intellectual ndpracticaltension.This is so especiallyn connectionwith his desirebothto acknowledgethe transcendent rimacyof Sgnyavadamonism,alongwith the rathermun-

dane, thoughnonethelesswholehearted,devotionto the bodhisattva deal of

compassionand meditation. What makes Kamalasilainterestingthen, is

his convictionthatenlightenment

omesgradually

and that one shouldpresson withdhydna ndkaruna,despite he awkwardhigher ruthof theSunyata.44

Thiscannothavebeena concernoriginal o Kamalasila.OtherMadhyamikasmust have shared it. But, it must have been especiallyacute in the face of

Hva-San's dealist monisticteachingswhichreflectedno such qualmsabout

pressingon with the worldlyexercisesof dhyinaand karina. Hva-San,like

Hui-Neng, taught suddenenlightenmentn the sense that meditation n the

progressivemanner was unnecessary.45Perhaps reflecting the supposed

Yogicarabackground f Ch'an,Hva-San eaches heidealistviewthatthought

is at the root of all suffering.One needmerelystop thinking o stop suffering.And thinkingcould be stopped suddenly-without progress through the

jhdnas or bodhisattvabhimis.46 In this way a priori enlightenment simplyshinesthrough.Hva-Sansoundsverymuchthe Yogacarinor close relativeof

Hui-Neng'sCh'an Buddhism n thispassage:

[We] ourselves [are]coessential with the Buddha, and all representationswhich constitute he worldbeingillusoryor a magicplayof the Absolute....Whatwe needis only to jump ... fromthe planeof representationsnto thatBuddhahood, ur truenature,by suddeneliminationof those mentalrepresen-tations. We must arrestthe play of theiremanation,stop our mind,and seeinto our own nature.47

But, what is it about havingthe Buddha-naturewithinus that requiresa

sudden interpretationof the attainment of enlightenment,along with the

rejectionof the jhinas, analysis, and the compassionof the bodhisattva?

Exceptfor the doctrineof a priori enlightenment, rounded n the possessionof the Buddha-nature,Kamalasilaand Hva-Sanwouldseemto shareat least

the transcendentalmonism,characteristic f both Sunyavadaand Yogacara,

respectively.One will, of course,want to makeappropriatequalificationsordifferencesn thesecharacteristics f the Absolute.Yet, in spite of that, one

wondershow and why Kamalasilacan commithimself so thoroughly o the

worldlypracticesof dhyanaandkariina,knowing ull well that these areonto-

logically nsubstantial?Has notHva-San eallydrawn he natural onsequencesof transcendentalmonism? Is not Kamalasilaquixoticallysupportingsome

venerable,but outmoded, traditionof the sutras,which by some kind of

intellectualnertia,now soldierson withoutadequate heoreticalbasis?Tucci is one of the few scholars o have appreciatedhe awkwardness nd

poignancy of Kamalasila'sposition.48But, his rather oblique solution toKamalasila'squandry only precipitatesa puzzle of his own. Speakingfirst

of Hva-San,Tucci claimsthe suddenenlightenment octrine ollowsfromthe

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16 Strenski

simultaneous granting of ontological status to both abhitaparikalpita ("power

of subjective representation") and Suinyata. By contrast, Kamalasila then

would be said to hold gradualism because he maintains loyalty to Sunyavada

monism by refusing to grant ontological status to anything but the Absolute.

Yet, it seems incoherent of Tucci to say that it is Hva-San's simultaneous

admission ofontological

status to both theseprinciples

which breaks "the

monism of Mahayana,"49 causing meditation to recede into the backgroundand dictating a subitist view of the attainment of enlightenment. If anything,the opposite should occur: If one breaks the monism of the Mahayana into

such a dualism, how then can either of these realities pass away suddenly? If

the abhiutaparikalpitas empowered to project the world of representation,how does it also pass away in the face of suinyati,which Tucci implies is onto-

logically distinct? It seems that either the "monism of Mahayana" is not

really broken, in which case Tucci's solution does not even get started, or that

it is broken, in which case one is not yet enlightened, because one has not yet

penetrated into suinyati. Either way, Tucci does not seem to have succeeded

in his aim. Moreover, in the fact of his own supposed monism Kamalasila's

gradualism becomes all the more mysterious, and not less so.

I would merelypoint out that the text of theBhivanikrama gives no indication

that Hva-San is any kind critic of monism. And, if he were, he would probably

prefer gradual enlightenment over the sudden view. Kamalasila, on the other

hand, does give indications of having watereddown the transcendentalmonism

onemight expect

him to have observed.

This stems from Kamalasila's philosophical indebtedness to Bhavaviveka

and Dharmakirti through his teacher, Santaraksita. Potter50 and Warder51

argue independently that Kamalasila's thought represents a partial synthesis

of the epistemological traditions of the Praminavarttikarmof Dharmakirti

and the Svatdntrika Madhayamaka of Bhavaviveka. Taken together, these

influences seem to confirm Kamalasila's belief in the worth of logic and analy-

sis,52 against what Potter believes to have been the Yogacarin attempt to

downgrade them.53 Bhavaviveka is said to have made this kind of point by

advancing the unique view of graded levels of truth withinsunyati--as well aswithin the empirical realm.54If this be monism, it is certainly highly modified.

To admit grades of being is virtually to admit kindsof being, which is really to

break the purer forms of the monism of Mahayana. For Dharmakirti, the

ontological basis of his positive attitude toward reason seems to be a certain

materialist or physicalist-tending convictions: Against the Yogacarins,

Dharmakirti argued the "relative independent reality of objects," 55 and that

reality has "arthakryatra, the character of doing something ... of makinga difference."56 Empirical perception (pratyaksa) is therefore a pramina

(a means of knowledge), and "'effect of reality"' and not an illusion.57 In

this way Dharmakirti undercuts any attempt to empower thought alone to

make real changes in the status of a person seeking enlightenment.

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The views of Bhavaviveka and Dharmakirti, then, seem remarkably similar

to Kamalasila's conviction, throughout the Bhavanakrama, that the world

and ordinary knowledge could not merely be thought away, but had to be

undermined by serious meditative and analytic praxis. Dharmakirti even

explicitly holds this view. In Potter's words, "one obtains yogic insight ... by

sharpeningone's

understandingor

insight bymeditation and dialectic."58

For both Dharmakirti and Kamalasila this seemed also to mean that testingand a spirit of censoriousness (Gellner) become important. In classic empiricist

style, Dharmakirti believed a theory of knowledge ought to stand the test of

experience" and "practice."59

Quite probably reflecting this influence while

quoting the sitras in his Nyayabindupurvapaksasanksipiti,Kamalasila reportsthe Buddha saying:

O Brethern! ... never do accept my words from sheer reverential feelings!Let learned scholars test them....6

In the Bhavandkrama,Kamalasila himself brings meditation into play with

experiential testing:

Having thus ascertained reality by means of gnosis consisting in investigation,in order to make this evident, one should have recourse to the gnosis consistingin contemplation....61

Kamalasila even seems to share the view of King about the complementaryroles of thejhinas and vipassana n Theravada Buddhism. Here speaking of the

jhanas in terms of samidhi, Kamalasila seems to repeat the division of labor

between these two branches of meditation which I also linked with Gellner's

claims about the descriptive and prescriptiveaspects of empiricism:

... when his mind has been taken hold of by the hand, as it were, of samadhi,the yogin, by using the sharper weapon of gnosis should root out the seeds offalse imagination....62

In these ways, Kamalasila seems to conform to much of the empiricist-cum-materialist spirit of early Buddhism through the influence of Bhavavivekaand Dharmakirti. To the extent that these empiricist and materialist tendencies

inform Kamalasila's thinking about meditation one would explain Kamalasila'steaching of the doctrine of gradual attainment of enlightenment on the same

grounds as I have tried to do with the early Buddhists.

VII. CONCLUSION: BELIEF,PRACTICE,AND STRUCTURE

To gain a unifying structural insight into Kamalasila's situation I want to

conclude this discussion by pushing beyond the rather straightforward dis-

cussion of the history and content of Kamalasila's thought. Granted that

Kamalasila was influenced by both Bhavaviveka and Dharmakirti, one might

go on to ask what conditions of Kamalasila's practical situation reinforcedhis adherence to an empiricist and materialist-tending tradition? Here, I want

to suggest that Kamalasila's practical discipline of analysis and compassion

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18 Strenski

may have 'fit' better with the world-view he inherited from Bhavaviveka and

Dharmakirti, and thus that, in consequence, it was 'favored'. Kamalasila

could not have been a pure SunyavadinAbsolutist without sufferingsubstantial

disharmonies in his overall approach to the world. Kamalasila may have

thought and taught more like an empiricist-cum-materialist early Buddhist,

partlybecause he also acted like one. In

takingthe world of

thoughtand

being as at least provisionally real in meditation, analysis, and compassionate

behavior, Kamalasila may very well have come to think about the appropriatemeans of release as gradual-much as did the early Buddhists.

I am suggesting that Kamalasila's belief in gradual enlightenment may have

been connected to his practice in somewhat the same way some beliefs mightbe said to be inducedby certain practices. In the Buddhist tradition one thinks

of the belief in the transcendental Buddha as having possibly been induced

by the practice of buddhapiiji,which does not in itself require such a transcen-

dental object of worship. Although buddhapuja s, strictly speaking, an act ofremembrance,such practices tend, quite often, to induce a belief in the existence

of their object. Gombrich suggests that in modern Theravadin countries one

can observe this movement from mere recollection of the exemplary earthlylife of the long-deceased historical Buddha to the belief in the transcendental

existence of the Buddha, now thought to be available to human entreaties.63

I do not believe these processes happen mechanically or through causal

connections, as typically conceived. Human culture seems too intricate and

humanbeings

too subtle for the mechanisticprocess

to be thestrongest

can-

didate explanation here. A likelier model might be one which takes its rise

from Levi-Strauss64: to the degree one finds structural affinities between

practices and beliefs, perhaps one should consider such affinities either a

working out of certain deep common structures, or perhaps related by a sort

of formal or structuralcausality. Men often do things for structural reasons-

whether the structureslie behindthe things in question or whether they operateon the same level. In Kamalasila's case, he may have advocated the belief in

gradual release and the practice of meditation, analysis, and compassion be-

cause of some deep common structure, or because either belief or practicewere causally prior, and same in form.

This speculation suggests that a kind of formal causality may be at work

in the passage from deeper levels of culture to other more accessible to com-

mon sense, or between things on the same level of culture. In the context of

Buddhist meditation and theories of release, I offer that one does not practice

analytic methods of meditation and painstaking human compassion for lengthsof time without having something of those activities 'rub off' on other levels

of life-in our case the gradualist theory of the attainment of release. (The

same also goes for the effect of beliefs on practices.) Among the things which

'rub off', I want to identify the notion of form or structure. Critical analytic

meditational methods and serious concern for ordinary human well-being,

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conform to the gradualkind of enlightenment, t once described s a gradedroute and prescribedas a critical,analyticcensoriousnessabout claims to

knowledge.

NOTES

1. D. Goleman, "Perspectives on Psychology, Reality, and the Study of Consciousness,"Journalof TranspersonalPsychology 4 (1974): 4.

2. W. King, "A Comparison of Theravada and Zen Meditation," History of Religions,

(1969): 310.

3. Ibid., p. 311.

4. K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London: George Allen and Unwin,

1963). See also D. Kalupahana, "A Buddhist Tract on Empiricism," Philosophy East and West

19, No. 1 (1969), and Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism(Honolulu: University of

Hawaii,1975)

and BuddhistPhilosophy (Honolulu: University

of Hawaii,1976).5. V. Trenckner,A Criticial Pali Dictionary, Volume 1 (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy

of Sciences and Letters, 1924-1948): 201-202.

6. T. Rhys-Davids and W. Stede, eds., Pali Text Society's Pali English Dictionary (London:

Luzac, 1966): 39.

7. Ibid., pp. 39, 101.Nyanatiloka, BuddhistDictionary (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Frewin, 1972): 17.

8. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theoryof Knowledge,p. 40.

9. Ibid., chap. 8.

10. Ibid., p. 277.

11. Ibid., p. 466.

12. W. King, "The Structureand Function of the Tranceof Cessation in TheravadaMeditation,"

manuscript read at Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Chicago, November,1975.

13. Ibid., p. 4.

14. Ibid., p. 11.

15. Ibid., p. 7.

16. Ibid., p. 8.

17. Ibid., pp. 14f.

18. E. Gellner, Legitimation of Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).19. Ibid., p. 36.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., pp. 32f.

22. Ibid., p. 38.

23. Ibid., p. 115.

24. Ibid., chaps. 5, 6.

25. Ibid., p. 124.

26. A. K. Warder, "Early Buddhism and Other Contemporary Systems," Bulletinof the School

of Orientaland African Studies, 17 (1956): 43-63.

27. Gellner, Legitimation, p. 120.

28. P. De Silva, Buddhist and FreudianPsychology (Colombo: Lake House, 1974).29. R. Johanssen, The Psychology of Nirvana, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969).30. P. Demieville, Le Concile du Lhasa (Paris: ImprimerieNationale, 1952).

E. Obermiller, "A Sanskrit Ms. from Tibet-Kamalasila's Bhavana-krama," Journal of the

Greater India Society 2 (1935): 1-11.

G. Tucci, trans., Minor Buddhist Texts, Part II. The First Bhavana-Kramaof Kamalasila, SerieOrientale 9 (2) (Rome: Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1958).

31. P. Yampolsky, trans., The Platform Sfitra of the Sixth Patriarch (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1967).

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20 Strenski

32. For "Hui-Neng" one may therefore read "Shen-hui," the historical proponent and/orsource of the teaching attributed to Hui-Neng.

33. H. Dumoulin, Historyof Zen Buddhism,P. Peachev, trans., (New York: Pantheon, 1963),87.

34. Yampolsky, Platform Sutra, p. 116.

35. Dumoulin, History of Zen, p. 95.

36. Yampolsky, Platform Sutra, p. 116.

37. Ibid., p. 115.

38. G. Dharmasiri,A

BuddhistCritique of the ChristianConceptof God (Colombo, Sri Lanka:Lake House, 1975), pp. 199ff.

39. Jayatilleke, Early BuddhistTheoryof Knowledge,chap. 5.

40. Obermiller,"A Sanskrit Ms.," p. 5.

41. A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), pp. 467f.

42. Ibid., pp. 477ff.

43. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, pp. 173-175.

44. Ibid., pp. 175f.

45. Ibid., p. 60.

46. Ibid., p. 105.

47. Ibid., pp. 64, 103, 104-111.

48.Ibid., pp.

104-111.

49. Ibid., p. 105.

50. K. Potter, Presuppositionsof India'sPhilosophies(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-

Hall, 1963), pp. 239f.

51. Warder,IndianBuddhism,pp. 476f.

52. Tucci, Minor BuddhistTexts, p. 160.

53. Potter, Presuppositions,p. 233.

54. Ibid., p. 240.

55. Ibid., p. 233.

56. Ibid., p. 141.

57. Warder,IndianBuddhism,p. 468.

58. Potter, Presuppositions, p. 194. Also Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy, pp. 138f., that

Kamalasila held the principle of causality to be central to Buddhist conceptions of reality.59. Warder,IndianBuddhism.p. 468.

60. T. Stcherbatsky,BuddhistLogic, 2 volumes (New York: Dover, 1962of original 1930), 1: 76f.

61. Tucci, Minor BuddhistTexts, p. 477.

62. Ibid., p. 170.

63. R. Gombrich, Precept and Practice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 121f.

64. C. Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropologyi(New York: Doubleday, 1967), chaps. 1-4,

11, 15, 16.

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