BIOS:

Elshad Nasirov – Vice President of SOCAR Past Jobs:

o President, Azerbaijan Institute of Strategic Research of Caucasus Development (Past)

o Board Member, Azerbaijan Institute of Strategic Research of Caucasus Development

o President, Centre for Economic and Political Research (Past)o Head of the Division of Marketing, Centre for Economic and Political Research

(Past) LG’s Take: Mr. Nasirov is considered one of the most esteemed men in Azerbaijan,

though he will not show you that. He was even considered for President should Aliyev had not stepped in. He knows everything from pipelines, energy, politics, etc. He smokes like a chimney (and likes you to smoke with him – hee)

Elkhan Nuriyev – Direcetor of Center for Strategic Research Has worked in the US with partnerships with Woodrow Wilson Institute, Georgia

Washington University, Monterey Institute, etc. Very Western leaning in his views Knowledable on topics like BTC Pipeline, Nagorno-Karabakh Sees Russia as a “partner” for Azerbaijan: “Russia, as a major power, understands and

supports balanced policy of Azerbaijan”

Shahmar Movsumov – State Oil Fund Master's degree, Public Administration, international economics, Moscow Institute of

International Relations Master of Public Administration degree, John F. Kennedy School of Government at the

Harvard University LG’s Take: The State Oil Fund is a fascinating beast and intricately designed to hold

much of the country’s oil wealth, but not spend most of it unless the country is desperate—which it has never been.

Ali Hasanov - Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Committee for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Hasanov is incredibly pro-Turkey - “The issue of military-strategic cooperation between

Turkey and Azerbaijan should also be solved. There is such an understanding between Russia and Armenia. Why should not we take similar step?”

Hasanov is very outspoken against the US, especially the US subcommittee ruling against Azerbaijan and its support for the Turkey-Armenia protocols.

Hasanov sees Russia and Azerbaijan as equal partners.

Elnur Aslanov - Head of Presidential Political Analysis Mr. Aslanov is very close to President Aliyev Mr. Aslanov is a firm backer of the “pragmatism” of Azerbaijan in dealing with all regional

powers. He is critical of the US He says Azerbaijan is in solidarity with the Turks on this issue and wants the US to give up

illusory claims of Armenia. On the Genocide issue, he calls the US recognition a “historical mistake”. On Russia: “Azerbaijani-Russian relations have a solid base and are characterized by

balanced and mutually beneficial growth.” LG’s Take: Mr. Aslanov is very pragmatic and will talk incredibly openly with you. He

wants to hear your opinion on all matters too. A balanced discussion is his way. His assistant’s name is Roya, who is a doll.

Novruz Mammedov – Head of Presidential Foreign Policy Past Jobs:

o Head, Foreign Relations Department, United Nations Development Programmeo President, AZERBAIJANI AND ARMENIAN (Past)o Member, Foreign Relations Department, Foreign Relations Department of

Azerbaijan (Past)o Head of the Presidential Administration, Foreign Relations Department of

Azerbaijan (Past)o Head of the International Relations Department, Presidential Office (Past)o Head of International Relations Department of the Office, President's Office.

(Past)o Chief of the Foreign Relationships Department, President's Office. (Past)

Mr. Mammedov is one of the most important men in Azerbaijan. He is the creator of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy.

Believes that Azerbaijan is the only “useful” country in the FSU and can really balance power with every other regional power.

Willing to play hardball with Turkey when needed. Believes in a balanced relationship with Russia Believes the US is pro-Armenian

Araz Azimov - Deputy Foreign Minister Speaks English, Persian, Turkish and Russian Negotiator for NATO partnerships Staunch on Armenia releasing Nagorno-Karabakh Sees Russia as a backer of Armenia Critical of Washington over the Turkey-Armenia protocols

Ogtay Asadov - Head of the National Assembly

Jobs:o Since 1976, worked for the Baku-plant air conditioners assistant masters. o Since 1979, worked for the Civil Affairs Department of the General and Special

Installation Engineero Since 1981, the General Affairs of the Ministry of Construction Custom Installation

and "Azərsantexquraşdırma” Trust texnoloqu great, department, was the chief union. (???)

o 1996-2004, Absheron Regional Water Joint-Stock Societyo 2004-2005, President, "Water Company" Joint Stock Company.o Chairman of the Milli Majlis of Azerbaijan Republic since Dec. 2, 2005.

Member of the New Azerbaijan Party Member of the International Water Association Heads the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-speaking states of

the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly Ogtay graduated with a degree in mechanical engineering from Azerbaijan State Oil and

Chemistry Institute. He speaks Russian and English.

Nazim Ismayilov - Mayor of Shamakhi(not much out there on Ismayilov)

Except that he did have a meeting with Iranian Deputy Interior Minister recently

Azerbaijani Diplomatic AcademyThe Azerbaijani Diplomatic Academy is a school of international affairs located in Baku. It was established in January 2007. Its website describes the academic program as a highly flexible program offering professional training to Azerbaijani civil servants working in the area of international affairs. The AFSP is designed to enhance skill sets of these officials and prepare them for public sector leadership.LG’s Take: The ADA is pretty much were EVERY Azerbaijani leader comes from (one of my sources who went there jokingly referred to it as the Azerbaijani state cult).

Center for Strategic Studies of AzerbaijanOverviewSAM is Azerbaijan’s first governmental, non-profit think tank founded on November 12, 2007 by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, It is a research and policy recommending institution dedicated to innovative studies on national, regional and international issuesThe current director Dr. Elkhan Nuriyev was appointed February 8, 2008.The Center is divided into 4 parts:

Domestic Policy Analysis Department Foreign Policy Analysis Department Economic Analysis and Global Affairs Department Financial-Administrative Department

Key parties

The ruling New Azerbaijan Party of president Ilhem Aliyev is entrenched in power, with 56 seats in parliament compared to the next highest party having 5 seats. The party was formed by former president Heydar Aliyev and is now controlled by current president Ilham Aliyev.

The opposition is divided and very weak relative to the ruling party. There is friction between the key opposition forces in the country –the Musavat and Popular Front parties. These parties rival each other and have ceased cooperation since the last parliamentary elections due to Musavat’s participation in the work of the newly elected parliament, whereas the Popular Front adopted a more radical stance and called for the boycott of the election results. Otherwise there are a handful of other opposition parties with minimal impact.

Key personalities

President - Ilham Aliyev Appointed as president in 2003 by his father, who had served as president for 10 years

previous. Subsequent elections later in the year saw Aliyev dominate with over 75% of the vote

Aliyev has maintained Azerbaijan's independent policy of not fully allying with Russia nor the west.

However, since Turkey began to pursue normalization of relations with Armenia, this has driven Azerbaijan closer to RUssia under Aliyev.

Foreign Minister - Elmar Mammadyarov In office since 2004 In 1998-2003 he served as counselor in the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the

USA

Defense Minister - Safar Abiyev In office since in 1995 one of the longest serving defense ministers in the Commonwealth of Independent States

held a meeting in Moscow May 27 over the security situation in the Caucasus

ARMENIA

Key parties

The ruling Republican Party of President Serzh Sarkisian is by far the largest and most popular political party, and it controls most government bodies in Armenia. It gained 64 seats in the latest parliamentary elections (comparex to 18 for the next highest party).

Opposition parties pale in comparison to Sarkisian's ruling party. Republican Party candidates prevailed in the last nationwide local polls held in 2008, which were boycotted by the opposition. The main opposition Armenian National Congress (HAK) has since contested only the May 2009 municipal elections in Yerevan, the official results of which gave a landslide victory to the presidential party. The opposition has generally not been in favor of Armenia's normalization process with Turkey.

Key personalities

President - Serzh Sarkisian took office in April 2008 originally from Nagorno Karabakh autonomous oblast

organized several battles in the Nagorno-Karabakh War and is considered to be one of the founders of Nagorno-Karabakh's and Armenia's armed forces

has entrenched political control of the country

Prime Minister - Tigran Sarkisian appointed by Sarkisian in 2008 former chairman of the central bank of Armenia

no relation to president Sarkisian

Defense Minister - Seyran Ohanyan appointed by Sarkisian in 2008 served as the Second Battalion commander in the 366th Motor Rifle Regiment of Soviet

Ground Forces's 23rd Motor Rifle Division with the rank of a major before joining Nagorno-Karabakh's newly formed army in 1991 and playing a major role in the Nagorno-Karabakh war against Azerbaijan.

HOT TOPICS: AZERBAIJAN-ARMENIA:

The dominant issue for both Armenia and Azerbaijan is Nagorno Karabakh, as well as the related issue of normalization talks between Armenia and Turkey.

Armenia-Turkey Protocols - For all intents and purposes, the normalization talks between Armenia and Turkey have stalled for the foreseeable future. The protocols for normalization of ties and opening the border that were signed by each country's foreign ministers months ago are deadlocked in parliament, with Armenia refusing to pass the protocols until it sees the Turkish parliament do so. The main sticking point remains the dispute over the breakaway region of Nagorno Karabakh. Far from making any headway on the issue, the two countries regularly issue threats that renewed military action may be taken if there is no diplomatic resolution soon - which there won't be. A new war isn't likely to take place, as Azerbaijan isn't militarily prepared to intervene and as regional power broker would like to avoid at all costs and continue to reap the benefits of manipulating the regional actors to its benefit, but it cannot be completely ruled out given the tensions in the region.

Relations with Turkey - With talks stalled between Armenia and Turkey, Turkey has begun to re-focus its attention on repairing ties with its traditional ally in Azerbaijan. Turkey has assured Azerbaijan that no movement will be made with Armenia without Nagorno Karabakh being addressed, and the two countries are expected to sign a new energy deal  during a visit by Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev to Turkey on Jun 7. Russia will be watching carefully as it oversees the interplay of the countries within the region, as any new deals between Azerbaijan and Turkey would have to be reach with an understanding with Moscow.

Relations with Russia - Azerbaijan is a country attempting to balance its relationship with Russia against other regional powers like Turkey, Iran and the West. Its ability to continue such a balancing act is mainly due to its energy wealth, which gives it cash and leverage within those relationships. Russia has significant influence with Azerbaijan, due to energy, political, and economic links. Moscow has also strengthened its hand in the country by masterfully orchestrating a rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia that Russia knew would fail and drive Baku closer to it.

But Azerbaijan remains an independent player relative to other FSU countries. Russia holds other cards it can use in the future - such as influence within the minority populations in Azerbaijan, especially the Dagestani groups in the northern part of the country that are linked to militant movements in the Russian Caucasus but have been since purchased by pro-Russian forces in the region. STRATFOR sources have indicated that Russia has threatened to use those populations against Baku in the past, something Azerbaijan is acutely aware of, as evidence by a recent visit of Dagestan's regional president to Azerbaijan.

Relations with Iran - Nearly a quarter of Iran's population is ethnically Azeri and many of them claim their rights are being trampled on by Tehran, increasing tension between Iran and Azerbaijan. Right now their language and literature are banned in Iranian schools and they claim the authorities are worried about unrest among ethnic Azeris and about the government's

relationship with Israel. Azerbaijan wants to keep a pragmatic relationship with Iran, but also doesn’t want to tick off the West.

Energy – This is the hot topic in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan currently supplies oil and natural gas to Russia, Iran and Turkey (via Georgia).

Nabucco - The main topic is whether Azerbaijan will feed the pro-Western Nabucco pipeline. Turkey is pushing this too. The Nabucco pipeline though is like the chiken-and-the-egg. Europe doesn’t want to sign onto Nabucco without a supplier and Azerbaijan doesn’t want to commit as a supplier unless Europe is ready to invest. Azerbaijan alone can’t fill Nabucco—its too big—so a partner like Iraq , Iran or Turkmenistan would have to get on board. Iraq is a mess, Iran is not viable to supply Europe politically and Turkmenistan isn’t interested in a deal with Azerbaijan.

Option 2 - Azerbaijan could instead strike a deal to fill the Interconnector pipelines instead of Nabucco. This line goes form Turkey-Greece-Italy and is almost complete. Azerbaijan alone could fill this pipeline. This deal will most likely be struck in 2 weeks when the presidents meet.

Russia option – Azerbaijan is already re-starting supplies to Russia, but Russia isn’t really interested in moreAzerbaijani natural gas because there is a gas glut in Russia. It knows Azerbaijan has to strike a deal with someone. It would rather not have Azerbaijan sign onto the anti-Russian Nabucco, but is comfortable with Azerbaijan signing onto the Interconnector project because Russia is looking to buy the Italian or Greek sections of that pipeline in the future—sneaky Russians.

US Ambassador Appointment – There is a current diplomatic tussle going on with the White House recently nominating Matthew Bryza as possible Ambassador to Baku. In my opinion, Bryza is over qualified for this post, but is a message from Washington that it is still friends with Baku. Bryza has a LONG history with Azerbaijan and is considered incredibly pro-Azerbaijani. Both Armenia and Turkey HATE Bryza. The Armenian lobby is going to come out in force in the next few weeks to get his nomination blocked (which could happen). Be interesting to see what the Turks say too.

ARMENIA

Domestic politics - A senior member of Armenia's ruling Republican Party has downplayed the possibility of early elections, which have been called for by the opposition. The next parliamentary elections aren't scheduled for another two years, and the opposition has been

trying to move them to an earlier date. The ruling Republican Party of President Serzh Sarkisian is by far the largest and most popular political party, and it controls most government bodies in Armenia. Opposition parties pale in comparison to the ruling party, and therefore there is very little domestic threat to Sarkisian's hold on power.

Relations with Russia - As far other issues, Russia continues to have overwhelming influence in the country, with roughly 5,000 troops stationed within its borders and a clamp down on economic and energy assets within the country. Armenia has recently expressed interest in joining the customs union Russia has formed with Belarus and Kazakhstan, which could serve to entrench Russia's influence in Armenia even further.

NON-STRATFOR ARTICLES:

Is the United States Losing Azerbaijan?: Part OnePublication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 78April 22, 2010 04:51 PM Age: 35 days

By: Vladimir Socor

Azerbaijan’s long-standing alignment with the United States is rapidly unraveling in the wake of Washington’s recent policy initiatives. As perceived from Baku, those US initiatives fly in the face of Azerbaijan’s staunch support over the years to US strategic interests and policies in the South Caucasus-Caspian region.

Current US policies, however, are seen to favor Armenia in the Karabakh conflict resolution negotiations, curry favor with Armenian advocacy groups in domestic US politics, split Turkey and Azerbaijan from one another over the Karabakh issue, isolate Azerbaijan in the region, and pressure Baku into silent acquiescence with these policies.

Key actors in the region tend to share Azerbaijan’s perceptions in this regard. During last week’s nuclear safety summit in Washington, Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili, and Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, spoke frankly in this regard. They told US interlocutors at every step that the refusal to invite Azerbaijan’s President, Ilham Aliyev, to the summit was a mistake, counterproductive to US interests in the region, and confirming perceptions that Washington was attempting to isolate Baku.

US President, Barack Obama’s, meeting with his Armenian counterpart, Serzh Sargsyan during the Washington summit (while failing to invite the Azerbaijani president) confirmed perceptions that Armenian issues in US domestic politics distort Washington’s policy on the Karabakh conflict and toward Azerbaijan.

Ankara had cautioned Washington against such moves ever since Erdogan’s December 2009 visit to the US. At least from that point onward, Turkey has closed ranks with Azerbaijan, instead of distancing from it and opening the Turkish-Armenian border promptly and unconditionally at the Obama administration’s urging. The administration insists on de-linking the border opening from the continuing Armenian military occupation of seven districts beyond Karabakh, deep inside Azerbaijan. The administration had, instead, hoped to link the border opening with the April 24 US anniversary of the 1915-1918 Armenian events in Ottoman Turkey.

Washington’s summit miscalculation is the latest in a year-long series of blows to US-Azeri relations. This trend continues amid an apparent US strategic disengagement from the wider region (rationalized as a “strategic pause” to assuage pro-US governments there). In Azerbaijan’s case, Washington seems unable even to fill the long-vacant post of US ambassador in Baku. The vacancy deprives the United States of steady high-level access to Azerbaijan’s leaders (which had never been a problem previously), while making it more difficult for Washington to grasp the crisis in US-Azerbaijan relations and its region-wide implications.

Addressing an April 14 cabinet meeting in front of TV cameras, President Aliyev criticized the US policy of pushing Turkey to open the border with Armenia, despite the latter’s occupation of seven Azeri districts beyond Karabakh. This move pulls the rug from under Azerbaijan’s carefully constructed negotiating position for a stage-by-stage peaceful solution to the conflict. It also seems designed to separate Turkey from Azerbaijan. Accordingly, Aliyev complained about “certain countries that believe that they can meddle in everything…by exerting pressure and blackmailing. This is how we see it. This policy clearly runs against Azerbaijan’s interests, and the Azeri state is taking appropriate steps.” Aliyev strongly objected to the US de-coupling the Armenian border opening issue from that of troop withdrawal from the seven Azerbaijani districts. De-coupling the two issues would enable Yerevan to renounce negotiations on troop withdrawal altogether, he observed: “This is a completely wrong and incorrect position and contrary to Azerbaijan’s national interests.” Aliyev also urged the “certain country” carefully to “consider regional processes, history,

historical relations. What do those who are unaware of regional processes want to achieve?” (Az TV, April 14; Khalk Gazeti, April 15).

Baku and Ankara have now reached the common view that the border opening and normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations is a bilateral matter between Ankara and Yerevan, rather than an issue for Washington to push from outside onto the regional agenda (Trend, Anatolia News Agency, April 16, 17).

Azerbaijan considers that Washington is moving from equidistance to partisanship as a co-chair of the “Minsk Group” of mediators in the Karabakh conflict resolution negotiations. Those negotiations are premised on a first-stage Armenian troop withdrawal from those districts. However, Washington’s push from outside the Minsk Group to open the Turkey-Armenia border unconditionally would remove Armenia’s incentive to withdraw those troops.

In a lengthy statement to the media on this issue, the Azeri presidential administration’s political department chief, Ali Hasanov, criticized Washington’s “loss of neutrality” on Karabakh conflict resolution as, “incompatible with the US role in the Minsk Group.” Evidently reflecting his president’s position, Hasanov hailed the Turkish leaders’ response to their US and Armenian counterparts during the Washington summit. There, Erdogan and Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, again declined to break ranks with Azerbaijan. “We maintain unique ties with Turkey on the principle of ‘one nation, two states’ and we are not going to spoil them under anyone’s dictation. This is what Turkey thinks too,” Hasanov noted.

On a cautionary note for Washington, Hasanov remarked that “relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have intensified significantly in the last few years…Russia views Azerbaijan as an equal partner, and Azerbaijan considers Russia a major factor in the region, a friend and partner and attaches special importance to relations with it” (ANS TV, Turan, APA, April 15). As a rule, public statements by Azerbaijani presidential team members reflect a prior consensus reached within it.

Is the United States Losing Azerbaijan? : Part TwoPublication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 79April 23, 2010 09:00 AM Age: 34 days

By: Vladimir Socor

Washington’s current policies seem about to turn the US-Azerbaijan strategic partnership, from an operational concept into an empty phrase, when it is ever uttered on the US side.

On April 19 the US-Azeri military exercise Regional Response 2010, scheduled to be held in May in Azerbaijan, was cancelled, with no reasons given and no substitute dates offered. The cancellation was announced two days after the US Undersecretary of Defense, Michelle Flournoy’s, meetings with Azerbaijan’s leadership in Baku. Publicly describing Azerbaijan as a “vital partner” of the United States, Flournoy praised its contribution to the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, as well as the Azeri security

services’ successful prevention of terrorism, including planned terror attacks against US interests (www.day.az, APA, Trend, April 19, 20).

Whether Baku cancelled the exercise to signal displeasure with the overall US policy or for economic reasons (as it did in Georgia recently) or in deference to Moscow, are matters of speculation. Whichever the case, it reflects the ongoing erosion of US influence in the region.

Baku, however, is left questioning the meaning of such a strategic partnership while Washington tilts toward Armenia on the Karabakh conflict, which is the main issue in Azeri national interests. Baku is also deeply concerned by a US policy bent on splitting Turkey from Azerbaijan, in which case an isolated Baku would be forced to seek rapprochement with Moscow.

Pro-Western officials in Azerbaijan’s presidential entourage and government are aghast at the post-2009 turn in Washington’s policy, a shift clearly driven by US domestic electoral politics. As Novruz Mammadov, the head of the presidential administration’s foreign relations department, points out, US policy is consumed with debating the Armenian events of a century ago (1915), even as Armenian forces today occupy seven districts inside Azerbaijan, from which 800,000 Azeris have been “ethnically cleansed.” Current US policy also seems ready to sacrifice the Turkish-Azeri connection, although the two countries are “strategic allies with deep historic ties. Turkey is important to Azerbaijan’s partnership with the West on key security and energy projects” (Mammadov’s interview with Radio Free Europe, cited by www.day.az, April 22).

Azerbaijan has spearheaded the opening of Caspian energy resources to the West; holds the only non-Russian key to Central Asia; contributed troops and other resources to NATO and US-led operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan; provides transit passage for US forces and their supplies en route to Afghanistan and Central Asia; has mastered terrorism challenges in cooperation with the US; promoted US-backed security and political projects in the region (NATO partnerships, GUAM, arms control); and it provides (in line with post-2001 US policy objectives) an example of successful secular development and Western alignment in the Muslim world. In pursuing these policies, Azerbaijan has incurred serious, if calculated, risks vis-à-vis Russia and Iran.

Baku, however, feels taken for granted by the United States since the 2009 turn in Washington’s policy. The bilateral relationship had flourished during the Clinton administration; coasted on those achievements during the Bush era, by the end of which it had entered a phase of benign US neglect; and it is now perceived as malign neglect, as US domestic politics and relations with Moscow seem to outrank strategic considerations in Washington’s South Caucasus policy.

Whether inadvertently or deliberately, Washington is not nominating an ambassador to Azerbaijan. From Baku’s vantage point, this omission looks like disrespect, or the dysfunctional condition of the US political system, or both; with corresponding conclusions in Baku about the US capacity for leadership in the region. Due to the long ambassadorial vacancy, feedback about Azerbaijan’s mounting alienation hardly percolates to the top US policy making levels. US working-level officials display awareness and concern in off-the-record conversations, as do Azerbaijan’s Turkish and Georgian partners.

With the strategic partnership painfully hurt, Washington nevertheless continues to expect certain deliverables from Azerbaijan. Visiting US officials from time to time are asking Azerbaijan to support various measures against neighboring Iran, or increase contributions to the Afghanistan operations, or to stop asking Turkey to maintain the linkage between Armenian border re-opening and Armenian troop withdrawal from the inner-Azerbaijani districts.

Azerbaijan was willing for many years to bear certain burdens and risks in partnership with the US. At present, however, Baku feels that its national interests are no longer taken into account or are even jeopardized by US policies. As the officially connected, staunchly pro-Western pundit Rasim Musabayov observes: “With such a one-sided approach, Washington must be prepared for receiving not support, but ‘advice’ in response to its own treatment [of Baku]. It is unrealistic to think that one can ignore the interests of Azerbaijan, or act against those interests, while extracting dividends from its partnership with this country” (www.day.az, April 22).

Is the United States Losing Azerbaijan? : Part ThreePublication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 80April 26, 2010 02:05 PM Age: 31 days

By: Vladimir Socor

Some 15 years ago Azerbaijan cast its lot in almost existential ways with the United States and Turkey. Although it was never strain-free in Washington, and fulfilled only a part of its strategic potential, the US-Azerbaijan relationship worked to mutual benefit on energy and international security issues crucial to both sides.

The relationship began fraying at the margins during the Bush administration’s final years, when Washington side-tracked the Caspian energy agenda and relegated contacts with Azerbaijan mainly to the deputy assistant secretary of state’s level. By contrast, Russia’s president, prime minister, and other top officials were personally and assiduously courting Baku, but met with a cautious response there. The US’s unedifying response to Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia raised serious questions in Baku, as elsewhere, about Washington’s capacity to stand up for its friends’ and its own interests in the region. President, Ilham Aliyev, and his government responded by bidding for time, hoping that a new US administration would put the relationship back on track.

This did not happen, however. In April 2009, the newly elected US administration launched a set of initiatives

toward Turkey and Armenia that discounted and isolated Azerbaijan, undermining Baku’s negotiating position on the Karabakh conflict resolution, and potentially allowing Moscow to exploit Baku’s alienation.

After a twelve-month effort, Washington’s initiatives are seen to have backfired not only in Baku, but also in Ankara and Yerevan. This was seen in the tense, fruitless meetings of US, Turkish, and Armenian leaders during the April 12-13 nuclear security summit in Washington, and the acrimonious follow-ups (Anatolia news agency, Zaman, Milliyet, Hurriyet, Arminfo, Noyan Tapan, Armenpress, PanArmenianNews, April 14–16). This allows a time-out for reflection and an assessment of what went wrong.

As is generally recognized, the Obama administration’s April 2009 initiatives were mainly driven by domestic politics. Candidates Barack Obama, Joe Biden, and Hillary Clinton had all promised during the electoral campaign to recognize the 1915-1918 Armenian events in Ottoman Turkey as “genocide.” Once in office, however, the administration could not deliver on that promise without destroying US-Turkish relations. Moreover, the administration sought a way to avoid the domestic political crisis sparked annually by the April 24 “Armenian genocide” anniversary. That crisis forces Washington every year to choose between critical relations with Turkey and vociferous US-Armenian advocacy groups with perceived electoral power.

Thus, the administration embarked on a three-pronged policy seeking to:

    1. “Normalize” Turkish-Armenian relations, particularly by persuading Turkey to open the border with landlocked Armenia for trade and transit.

    2. Relegate the assessment of the 1915-1918 Armenian events, from the US political arena to a historians’ commission, in effect “getting the issue off the administration’s back.”

    3. Separate the Turkish-Armenian “normalization” from the long-running negotiations on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, thereby practically fracturing the solidarity of Turkey with Azerbaijan.

The administration hoped to deliver the Turkish-Armenian border re-opening in lieu of Armenian genocide recognition. In return, it expected at least some US-Armenian groups to accept a historical commission, and Yerevan henceforth to abstain from the genocide recognition campaign. Washington tried hard to persuade Turkey to abandon its long-standing policy, whereby opening the border for Armenian trade and transit is conditional on a withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan’s interior districts (apart from Karabakh itself). Breaking that conditionality would gravely compromise Azerbaijan’s position in the negotiations to resolve the conflict.

From Baku’s perspective, Azerbaijan is being asked to pay the price of a domestic political bargain in Washington and of a US overture towards Yerevan. At times, Baku (where no US ambassador is stationed) was not even asked, but was rather expected to acquiesce. Azerbaijan feels that its interests did not seem to enter Washington’s calculations, except as a potential currency of exchange in the ongoing negotiations among other parties.

Is the United States Losing Azerbaijan? : Part FourPublication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 80April 26, 2010 02:07 PM Age: 31 days

By: Vladimir Socor

US officials claim that improving Turkish-Armenian relations and opening the border would change the whole atmosphere in the region and induce Yerevan to be flexible on troop withdrawal. Using this argument, Washington insists on separating the border-opening issue from the troop withdrawal issue, pressing for the former while delaying the latter.

Instead of pursuing this approach on convergent tracks (with both tracks converging toward a comprehensive balanced outcome), the US State Department opted from the outset for parallel tracks, with different speeds and favoring the Armenian side. It then moved overtly to a “separate-track" approach, and adopted a peremptory tone in insisting on such separation (Philip H. Gordon, US Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Sabanci Lecture, The Brookings Institution, Washington, March 17). Thus, the State Department pushed hard for progress on the Turkey-Armenia border-opening track, while relegating the issue of Armenian troop withdrawal from Azerbaijan to a slow-moving, or indeed stationary, side-track.

Baku and, eventually, Ankara did not lend credence to that argument. A premature re-opening of the Turkish-Armenian border would have removed Yerevan’s main incentive to withdraw its troops from Azerbaijan’s districts around Karabakh. By the same token, it would have removed Baku’s main (possibly sole) leverage to persuade Armenia to withdraw those troops, as the first stage in the process to resolve the conflict. The linkage between border opening and troop withdrawal had been a fundamental element in the negotiating process for almost a

decade, and is Turkish policy since 1993 (when Armenian forces crossed from Karabakh into Azerbaijan’s interior). Breaking that linkage –as per the October 2009 Turkey-Armenia protocols, strongly encouraged by the US– would undermine Baku’s patiently constructed diplomatic strategy for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Baku proposes opening all borders to trade and transit as part of the first stage in the conflict resolution process, linked with the Armenian troops’ withdrawal.

In parallel with Washington’s diplomatic initiatives, US officials criticized actual or purported human rights violations in Azerbaijan; fed (as is assumed in Baku) a media story about the presidential family’s alleged property acquisitions; and published a US State Department report claiming (without evidence) that 30 percent of Azeri students are drug users (a claim soon retracted amid an outcry). Such moves added unnecessary strain to the relationship. Azeri authorities and local analysts perceive such moves as designed to pressure Baku into acquiescing in Washington’s recent initiatives that adversely affect Azerbaijan’s top national interest –the stage-by-stage resolution of the Karabakh conflict.

Azerbaijan reacted with a surprisingly effective outreach to Turkey’s body politic, undercutting US initiatives there. Azeri government officials, parliamentarians, independent non-governmental organizations, think-tank experts, and journalists liaised with their counterparts in Ankara and Istanbul, arguing against premature Turkish ratification of the Armenian-Turkish protocols. Initially, Azerbaijan reached out to Turkey’s Kemalist opposition, where nationalist identification with kindred Azerbaijan is strong. Soon, however, a critical mass in the Islamist-rooted, governing AKP party and Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, also embraced Baku’s position. Already during his December 2009 Washington visit, Erdogan publicly turned down President Obama’s entreaties to proceed with ratification of the protocols and re-opening the border. Erdogan reaffirmed his stance during his meetings with Obama and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan at the Washington nuclear security summit and in the summit’s aftermath (Anatolia news agency, Zaman, Milliyet, Hurriyet, April 14–16). Erdogan and his Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, briefed Baku in detail about the discussions with the US and Armenian sides at the Washington summit, where Azerbaijan had been kept demonstratively away by the US. Erdogan has again given public assurances that “as long as the occupation persists, we will not open the border” (CNN Turk, ATV, April 18).

With a high-stakes electoral campaign looming in Turkey, and a plateful of controversial nationalist issues already weighing on its agenda (Kurdish opening, other minority issues, Cyprus, to name a few) the AKP government will hardly risk ratifying the protocols and opening the border for Armenia, at Azerbaijan’s expense. Were the government to take that risk in response to US urgings, the issue of 800,000 Turkic Azeris ethnically cleansed from those territories would be injected into Turkey’s electoral campaign by the opposition. In asking Erdogan to face that risk, Washington may have underestimated the resilience of nationalist identification among large parts of AKP’s Islamist electorate, quite apart from the parties of Kemalist legacy.

In the run-up to the annual April 24 political drama, Washington proved unwilling to ask Yerevan to commit to withdrawing the troops from inner Azerbaijan. US initiatives have also failed to de-commit Yerevan from the pursuit of genocide recognition. Diaspora groups have kept up political pressure toward that goal in the United States, instead of easing that pressure on the Administration. Nor could Washington’s initiatives be expected to open even slight cracks in the Russia-Armenia alliance.

The US-Turkish relationship is ultimately unsinkable, despite mutually inflicted damage in recent years. Washington’s relations with pro-US Azerbaijan, however, have reached a point of critical deterioration in recent months. Whether Washington’s policy thrust is deliberate or inadvertent, or the top US policy makers are fully alert to the possible consequences or oblivious to them, remain a matter of internal debate in Baku for the time being. Traditionally accustomed to take Azerbaijan’s support for granted on the full range of US strategic interests, and currently bereft of an ambassador there, Washington does not seem to notice or appreciate the alienation that its recent initiatives have produced in Azerbaijan.

US Conflict Resolution Policy Backfires in YerevanPublication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 81April 27, 2010 07:00 PM Age: 30 days

By: Vladimir Socor

The US State Department seems disappointed, but not entirely surprised, by Yerevan’s April 22 suspension of Armenian-Turkish “normalization.” Assistant Secretary of State, Philip Gordon, in charge of this policy, finds solace in Armenian President, Serzh Sargsyan’s decision to suspend, rather than terminate the effort; and hopes that Yerevan would continue to cooperate with the US-driven process goal. Gordon as well as State Department Spokesman, Philip Crowley, argued that such normalization meets the interests of Armenia, Turkey, and other [unnamed] countries in the region (press releases cited by News.Az and Arminfo, April 23).

These statements, however, seem to ignore Azerbaijan’s view and the change in Turkey’s view. Inasmuch as the normalization focuses on opening the Turkish-Armenian border unconditionally, or no longer linked to a withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan’s interior –Baku deemed it to be against its interests all along. Ankara had rallied to Baku’s view last December already.

Since April 2009, US President, Barack Obama’s administration has pressed for opening Turkey’s border with Armenia unconditionally Thus, the October 2009 Zurich protocols, strongly backed by the US, required Turkey to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia and open the mutual border “without preconditions.”

Washington’s policy seems driven primarily by domestic politics. The administration hopes to remove the annual drama of Armenian genocide recognition from the center-stage of US politics. It seeks its way out of the dilemma of losing Turkey versus any loss of the US Armenian vote. “Normalization” of Turkish-Armenian relations, centered on the re-opening of that border, was offered as a substitute for the unfulfilled electoral-campaign promises to recognize an Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey.

Washington’s normalization concept, however, has also turned out to be unfulfilled. Tilting sharply in Armenia’s

favor at Azerbaijan’s expense, it backfired first in Azerbaijan and shortly afterward in Turkey. Instead of de-aligning Ankara from Baku, as seemed briefly possible, it led Turkey and Azerbaijan to close ranks against an unconditional “normalization” of Turkish-Armenian relations, prior to a first-stage withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan.

The US initiative seemed unrelated to any regional strategy in the South Caucasus. It actually coincided with an overall reduction of US engagement in that region, downgrading the earlier goals of conflict-resolution and promotion of energy projects. Moreover, it risked splitting its strategic partner Azerbaijan from Turkey, compromising the basis for a subsequent return to an active US policy in the region.

Previous US administrations had also proposed to open the Turkish-Armenian border, but never as a goal in itself, unconditionally, or by some deadline in the political calendar, as has most recently been the case. Moreover, those earlier discussions considered opening both the Turkish and Azeri borders with Armenia, as part of an overall settlement, without dividing Ankara and Baku from each other on that account. Those border-opening proposals were being discussed as one element in comprehensive negotiations toward stage-by-stage resolution of the Armenian-Azeri conflict, and in conditional linkage with Armenian troop withdrawal from inner-Azeri districts, again in contrast to Washington’s recent proposals.

Yet, there is an element of continuity between those earlier border-opening proposals and the latest one. That common element is the optimistic belief that open borders and freedom to trade are a prerequisite to resolution of conflict and durable peace. This carryover from Manchesterianism often colored US political debates about the possibility of opening the Azeri and Turkish borders with Armenia. Yet, the diplomatic process integrated this issue within the broader negotiations. It did not single it out from that context or allow it to become a currency of exchange in US domestic politics.

The logic of the administration’s initiative from 2009 to date has implied that Washington would “deliver” the re-opening of Turkey’s border with Armenia; while Turkey would in turn “deliver” Azerbaijan by opening the Turkish-Armenian border, without insisting on the withdrawal of Armenian troops from inner-Azeri territories. That conditionality is a long-established one in these negotiations. However, Washington currently insists that the two processes be separated and that Turkey opens that border unconditionally as per the October 2009 Zurich protocols.

Breaking that linkage would irreparably compromise the chances of a peaceful, stage-by-stage settlement of the Armenian-Azeri conflict. It would indefinitely prolong the Armenian military presence inside Azerbaijan, placing Russia in a commanding position to arbitrate the conflict, with unprecedented leverage on an Azerbaijan alienated from its strategic allies.

Washington had persuaded Ankara to break that conditionality in the October 2009 protocols, which came close to splitting Turkey from Azerbaijan. However, Turkey reinstated that conditionality unambiguously from December 2009 onward. Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, declared this repeatedly and publicly, contradicting Obama and the US State Department on this account at the December 2009 and April 2010 Washington summits and afterward. Following the latter event, Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, flew to Baku with reassurances that Turkey would only open the border with Armenia if Armenian troops withdrew from inner-Azeri districts. The assurances were the more significant after the US White House had demonstratively excluded Azerbaijan from the Washington summit (Anatolia News Agency, April 14, 18-20).

The US administration’s policy has now backfired on all sides, Yerevan being the last to abandon it after the policy had failed to “deliver” Ankara and Baku. The Obama administration can now be expected to revert to a balanced approach by taking Azeri and Turkish views more carefully into account.

Parliamentary Race Looms in AzerbaijanPublication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 91May 11, 2010 05:40 PM Age: 16 days

By: Alman Mir - Ismail

On May 6, the official date for the next parliamentary elections was announced in Azerbaijan. According to the spokesman of the central election commission, Azer Sariyev, the next elections for the legislative body of the country will be held on November 7 (Trend News Agency, May 6).

Although, according to law, the official election campaign will start only 75 days prior to voting day, the opposition parties in the country have spent the last several months discussing various options for coalition building. In that respect, the situation is reminiscent of many previous elections, in which the small, divided opposition parties engage in endless talks about partnership and forget about election tactics, such as message development, communication and the organization of a proper door-to-door campaign. Most of their attention and energy is spent on fighting each other on the pages of opposition dailies, rather than meeting with voters. As a result, the elections always end in deep disappointment for the fragmented opposition forces.

The main current debate appears to be unfolding between the key opposition forces in the country –the Musavat and Popular Front parties. These eternal rivals have ceased cooperation since the last parliamentary elections due to Musavat’s participation in the work of the newly elected parliament, whereas the Popular Front adopted a more radical stance and called for the boycott of the election results. The opposition daily, Yeni Musavat, reported on May 7 that the chairmen of both parties have met to discuss bilateral cooperation and possibly joint campaigning in the elections. The same newspaper quoted the Musavat Chairman, Isa Gambar, as saying that it is too early to talk about any concrete results. However, it is important that the two parties meet and discuss the political situation in the country and hear each other’s opinions. The strained relations between the two parties can be judged by the fact that the Popular Front party still refuses to talk to journalists working for the Yeni Musavat newspaper, which was founded by Isa Gambar.

Meanwhile, a Member of Parliament from the opposition group Panah Huseyn, always known for his pro-Musavat stance, has criticized Isa Gambar for not uniting the opposition. He said that Isa Gambar is viewed as the only figure capable of uniting the opposition parties. In that respect, Gambar should not focus on the marginal interests of his own party but instead consider the unity of the entire opposition (Yeni Musavat, May 4). Arif Hacili, the head of

Musavat’s central executive apparatus replied: “This statement is a hit to the newly emerging unity of the opposition” (www.day.az, May 7). Earlier in the week, Musavat and the Alliance in the name of Democracy, a coalition of a few very small opposition parties, led by Panah Huseyn, signed a protocol on cooperation in the upcoming elections. Yet, immediately after the signing ceremony, Panah Huseyn announced his dissatisfaction with the pace of cooperation, namely in the area of agreeing on the unified candidates in the election districts.

The ruling Yeni Azerbaijani Party seems to be untouched by these developments. Vice Parliamentary Speaker, Bahar Muradova, and member of the party, told the state news agency Azertac on May 3 that the political situation in the country can be considered as normal and that all preparations are being made for the elections. “But it would be better if the opposition forces did not look for help outside the country, but inside, among the Azeri people. Otherwise, their defeat is irreversible,” Muradova suggested.

Deputy Chairman of the ruling party, Ali Ahmadov, said that the party will be implementing many innovations in the upcoming elections. One of these will be the active participation of women and youths in the election process, both as candidates as well as voters, campaign workers and observers. “We tried this innovation in the last municipal elections in 2009 and the results were very positive. The number of women candidates has increased from 4 percent to 28 percent,” Ahmadov explained. Outlining other innovations, Ahmadov said that the election strategy of the party will be based upon steady economic growth and the well-being of the country and its citizens (Trend News Agency, May 5).

It appears that the election process in Azerbaijan may pass calmly in 2010. The ruling party seems more confident than ever, due to the continuous economic growth in the country. Opposition parties are bickering and divided as always. Most attention will now be paid to the details of the election process, rather than its anticipated outcome.

Excluding Azerbaijan Can't Bring Stability To The South Caucasus April 21, 2010

By Novruz Mammadov LG: Mammadov will be in one of the meetings

The United States has recently stepped up efforts to repair relations between Turkey and Armenia. Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993 in response to the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding Azerbaijani territories by Armenian forces. Lately, U.S. officials have been urging Turkey to ignore Armenia's continuing occupation and reopen the border. While Washington says that its aim is to improve stability and development throughout the region, in reality U.S. policies have become increasingly pro-Armenian -- and exclusive of Azerbaijan.

Washington believes that a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement could kill two birds with one stone. First, it might smooth over -- at least temporarily -- one of the major trouble spots in U.S.-Turkish relations: the issue of Armenian genocide claims. Second, some U.S. officials argue that improving ties between Armenia and Turkey will ultimately contribute to a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They appear to believe improved relations will lead to a moderation of Armenian policies and open the way to new initiatives on Karabakh.

However, we must disagree. Armenia continues to occupy almost 20 percent of Azerbaijan's internationally recognized territory. It is ironic that while claiming to be the first victim of genocide in the 20th century, Armenia itself carried out one of the century's major ethnic-cleansing campaigns in Europe -- a campaign that resulted in thousands of deaths and the displacement of nearly 1 million Azerbaijanis. Many members of the Armenian political elite -- including President Serzh Sarkisian -- rose through the ranks because of their personal involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh war. They have used the war as a pretext for strengthening their own hold over Armenian politics, so it is not surprising that they have not been constructive in settlement talks.

Pretext For Occupation

Azerbaijan has proposed granting the highest form of autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh and is prepared to invest heavily in the region's development once a peace deal is reached. Baku has been cooperating closely with the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to resolve the conflict peacefully.

However, Armenia remains intransient, and this creates the suspicion that Yerevan wants to keep the conflict unresolved as an excuse for indefinite occupation.

In this context, Armenia's closed borders are the main form of leverage that might compel Yerevan to engage seriously in the resolution of the conflict. There is no reason to believe that opening the borders will make Armenia more willing to compromise; on the contrary, removing this sole punishment will only increase Armenia's interest in further entrenching the status quo.

We understand that Armenia has a powerful diaspora and that justice does not necessarily always prevail. Over the last 15 years, despite maintaining the occupation of part of a neighboring country, Armenia has received preferential treatment from the West, which has actually punished Azerbaijan. The infamous Section 907 of the U.S. Freedom Support Act, which banned direct U.S. aid to Azerbaijan, is a clear example of this. Western governments and media have largely been silent on the plight of the nearly 1 million Azerbaijanis who were displaced by Armenian aggression. This has naturally led the Azerbaijani public to think that the West's talk of democracy and human rights is nothing more than a selectively applied method of promoting its own interests.

In Defense Of Justice

It is high time for the United States and Europe to adopt a fair position and to prevent the narrow interests of their Armenian lobbies from prevailing over justice and their own national interests.

In any event, attempts to pressure Ankara to abandon Azerbaijan are shortsighted and likely to backfire. Azerbaijan and Turkey are strategic allies with deep historical ties. Turkey has played an important role in Azerbaijan's partnership with the West on key security and energy projects. Azerbaijan spearheaded the opening of Caspian energy resources to the West and insisted that major oil and gas pipelines be routed through Georgia and Turkey.

Baku has also wholeheartedly supported U.S. security initiatives by sending troops to Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Azerbaijan also provides supply-transit support for the NATO effort in Afghanistan. Those who know the region understand the significant risks Azerbaijan took and the pressure it overcame in order to pursue close cooperation with the West on energy and security issues.

Long-term peace and normalization of relations in the South Caucasus cannot be achieved by rewarding aggression and by excluding the region's strategically most important country. By pushing Turkey to abandon Azerbaijan, the United States risks alienating one of its most important and reliable partners in a critical region of the world.

Novruz Mammadov is head of the Foreign Relations Department of the presidential administration of Azerbaijan. The views expressed in this commentary are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL

Azerbaijan Calls Nagorno-Karabakh Elections ‘Illegal’ May 20, 2010

BAKU -- Azerbaijan's Central Election Commission has denounced as illegal the upcoming parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan's breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh region, RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service reports.

The commission said in a statement that the May 23 elections violate Azerbaijan's constitution and international law. It says holding elections and referendums on the territory of Azerbaijan is the exclusive prerogative of the country's Central Election Commission.

It further condemns as interference in Azerbaijan's domestic affairs the arrival of international observers in Stepanakert to monitor the voting.

The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry has also condemned the upcoming elections.

Sergei Nasibian, the head of the Nagorno-Karabakh election commission, told the Caucasian Knot website on May 19 that Karabakh's leadership attaches no importance to the statements. He said they serve only to promote solidarity among the Armenian population of Karabakh.

Armenian and Azerbaijani forces fought a three-year war that ended in 1994 and left Armenian forces in control of virtually all of Nagorno-Karabakh and large parts of the surrounding territory.

US Armenians criticize Obama nominee for Azerbaijan post

Thursday, May 27, 2010

Matthew Bryza is presently serving as deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs. Hürriyet photo

Angered by official plans to nominate Matthew Bryza as the new ambassador to Azerbaijan, the largest U.S. Armenian group has called on U.S. senators to "scrutinize Bryza's diplomatic record" before voting on his nomination.

"We continue to have an array of concerns about Mr. Bryza's conduct of U.S. diplomacy – as a National Security Council official, a deputy assistant secretary of state, and as the U.S. negotiator in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process – and, as such, look forward to a vigorous process of advice and consent by the Senate," Aram Hamparian, executive director of the Armenian National Committee of America, or ANCA, on Wednesday.

"We look to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the full U.S. Senate to carefully scrutinize Mr. Bryza's record, his formal testimony, and responses to the inquiries that he will face during his confirmation process," Hamparian said, according to an ANCA statement.

ANCA urged senators to grill Bryza over his past and present-day views on a number of issues, including what the ANCA calls the "Armenian genocide" and "Turkey and Azerbaijan's blockade of Armenia and the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic."

Last summer, "ANCA Chairman Ken Hachikian called specific attention to a number of Bryza’s public statements, including the application of flawed and one-sided" principles as a basis for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, ANCA said.

Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave inside Azerbaijan, along with parts of Azerbaijan proper, have been under Armenian occupation since a war in the early 1990s after Armenia and Azerbaijan gained independence from the former Soviet Union.

The territory’s unilateral independence is not recognized by the international community.

Bryza's selection

The White House announced Tuesday U.S. President Barack Obama’s nomination of Bryza as ambassador to Baku. According to procedures, Bryza must be confirmed by the Senate before assuming his appointment.

Bryza is presently serving as deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs. During the first term of former President George W. Bush between 2001 and 2005, he served as the director for Europe and Eurasia at the National Security Council at the White House. Previously, he was the special advisor to the president and the secretary of state on Caspian Basin energy diplomacy. He has also held diplomatic positions in Russia and Poland.

In recent years, pro-Armenian senators have repeatedly intervened in ambassadorial nominations.

In the most memorable case, Richard Hoagland, a Bush nominee for ambassador to Yerevan, was unable to gain the Senate's confirmation for the post, as Democratic Senator Robert Menendez, a strong supporter of the Armenian cause, blocked his nomination three years ago on grounds that he had failed to qualify World War I-era killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as "genocide."

Eventually, the White House had to withdraw Hoagland's nomination, and Bush instead nominated Marie Yovanovitch for the post. Another pro-Armenian senator, Barbara Boxer, then temporarily blocked her nomination, but later withdrew her objection.