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Florentine Popular Government (1343-1348) Author(s): Marvin B. Becker Source: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 106, No. 4 (Aug. 22, 1962), pp.

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FLORENTINE POPULAR GOVERNMENT (1343-1348)

MARVIN B. BECKER*

Department of History, Western Reserve University

LATE -in July of 1343 the Florentines acted in concert to overthrow the despotism of Walter of Brienne. An aristocratic Signoria was formed which proved as unpopular as Brienne's tyranny, and in late September of that same year, a new government was established which gave representation to men from new families who were matriculated in both the greater and lesser guilds of the city. New men had filtered into politics before, but never had so many entered public life en masse as in the fall of 1343. For the first time in communal history, one half of those who held high office were parvenus. These novi cives were characterized as brazen upstarts by the chroniclers and literary men of the period and were judged to be incapable of governing themselves, let alone ruling others.1

Florentine historians of the 1340's were unani- mous in this verdict and when the greatest of their number, Giovanni Villani, attributed the ruin of the state to the political ineptitude of these new men, he was voicing a widely held opinion. By the 1350's, however, this consensus had broken down and, when Matteo Villani, the continuator of his brother's chronicle, recorded the events of Florentine history, the novi cives were frequently cast in a heroic role, while the aristocrats were seen as the principal threat to good government.2 This altered view came to

* Research for this article was done while the author was a recipient of a grant from the American Philo- sophical Society.

1 For the background of the novi cives, see J. Plesner, L'emigration de la campagne a la ville libre de Florence au XIIIe siecle, 119 ff., Copenhagen, 1934. The tax assessments of the novi cives reveal that they were affluent men and their holdings in the funded communal debt of 1345 (the Monte) averaged the considerable sum of fifty-seven florins. Cf. G. Brucker and M. Becker, The Arti Minori in Florentine politics, 1342-1378, Mediaeval Studies 18: 101, 1956. The prestanze and estirni of the novi cives stood in a ratio of five to six and one-half in comparison to those imposed upon the members of the patriciate. This figure is based upon a study of surviving tax records for the Trecento.

2 G. Villani, Cronica, ed. F. G. Dragomani 12: 43; 12: 72, Florence 1845; G. Boccaccio, Lettere Volgari, 12 Florence. 1834. For Matteo Villani's views, see G.

be imbedded in the writings of the Florentine humanists of the late Trecento and finds its clearest expression in the letters of the most eminent classical scholar of his age-Coluccio Salutati, who speaks of Florence as being gov- erned by an aristocracy of deeds-the merchants and artisans, rather than by an aristocracy of blood-the milites.3 Clearly, then, the tenure of the regime founded in the autumn of 1343 de- serves to be studied in some detail. Perhaps through an examination of the policies initiated by this popular Signoria it will be possible to understand better some of the reasons for this change in attitude. Throughout Florentine history certain members of the patriciate had recog- nized that there was a compatability of interests between their class and the newcomers based upon common guild affiliations, mutual ownership of property, similarity of patrimonial endowment, and joint business ventures. This bond had been further reinforced through intermarriage and membership in such social and religious organiza- tions as the tower societies and confraternities.4 When the public offices of the popular government (1343-1348) were divided almost equally between the novi cives and the patricians, these two orders were compelled to carry the coopera- tion that characterized certain areas of their private lives into the arena of communal politics. What policies was this combination of orders to formulate in the realms of communal finance, relations between the Signoria and the Church, state bureacracy, government of the contado, regulation of the business community, and control over the Florentine magnati?

Brucker, The Ghibelline trial of Matteo Villani (1362, Medievalia et Humanistica 13: 52-53, 1960. For the attitude of the literary men of Dante's generation toward the newcomers, see C. T. Davis, Dante and the idea of Rome, 97 ff, Oxford, 1957; N. Rubinstein, The beginnings of political thought in Florence, Jour. Warburg and Cour- tauld Institutes 5: 198-225, 1942.

3 E. Garin, I cancellieri umanisti della Repubblica Fiorentina, Rivista Storica Italiana 71: 194-195, 1959.

4 Cf. M. Becker, An essay on the Novi Cives and Florentine politics, to be published in Mediaeval Studies.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY, VOL. 106, NO. 4, AUGUST, 1962 360



VOL. 106, NO. 4, 1962] FLORENTINE POPULAR GOVERNMENT 361

Except for the work of Antonio Panella, modern historians have neglected the politics of this interlude of popular government. And yet this was the first time in the annals of the republic that newcomers and patricians joined to conduct public affairs.5 That the chroniclers, Matteo Villani and Stefani, along with the leading civic humanists, were to take a much more positive view of the political capacities of the new men than did the previous generations of Dante and Giovanni Villani, suggests that this unorthodox coalition between the old and the new can hardly be looked upon as a failure. But before judg- ments can be made as to the success of this political experiment, an effort must be made to describe the problems faced by the new Signoria and the bold policies formulated to resolve them.

I

The most serious difficulty confronting the popular Signoria was the alarming deterioration of the republic's fiscal position. Based upon evidence from the Florentine treasury records, it would appear that the twelve-month interval which preceded the inauguration of the new regime marked the nadir in communal finance.6 Revenues from both direct and indirect levies had fallen sharply, and this general decline of the city's fiscal strength was certainly a critical factor in bringing on the two revolutions that culminated with the founding of the new government. The

5 For a discussion of A. Panella's thesis on the ecclesiastical policies of the Florentine government from 1343 to 1348, see M. Becker, Some economic implications of the conflict between church and state in Trecento Flor- ence, Mediaeval Studies 21: 2-5, 1959. Panella in his Politica ecclesiastica del comune fiorentino, Archivio Storico Italiano 2(IV) : 281-283, 1913, and N. Rodolico, I Ciompi, 53 ff., Florence, 1945, contend that the anti- clericalism of the popular government stemmed from the participation of il populo minuto in the formulation of governmental policy. This class did not have representation in the regime, and, therefore, they played no part in the enactment of any of the measures taken against the church.

6 The gabella portarum was collected at a monthly rate of 4,402 florins between October of 1342 and September of 1343. Cf. Camera del Comune, 2-2 bis. (Henceforth this source will be abbreviated as C.C. All documents cited in this article are to be found in the Archivio di Stato, Florence.) At its height, this gabelle produced 7,5162%3 florins a month. This statistic is given by Gio- vanni Villani in his Cronica 11: 92. The reliability of these statistics has been substantially confirmed by E. Fiumi in: La demografia fiorentina nelle pagine di Gio- vanni Villani, Archivio Storico Italiano 108: 78-158, 1950. See also footnote 14.

republic was deeply in debt and could not honor her domestic and foreign commitments; short- term loans were no longer being amortized and the Camera was unable to pay the salaries of her officials.7 In August and early September of 1343 the treasury collected revenues from only a few of the state's many indirect taxes (gabelles), and the judicial authority of the courts had col- lapsed so that it was virtually impossible to enforce the law.8 A moratorium had been in effect on all governmental long-term loans for almost a year and there appeared to be little likelihood that the Signoria would be able to resume interest payments on these prestanze for some time to come. Men who were willing to advance the treasury money on the basis of anticipated revenue had been in short supply for several years and the announcement of the moratorium only worsened the situation.9 Conditions had never seemed less hopeful and public confidence in the capacity of the guild patriciate to lead the commune out of this economic wilderness was further shaken when many of the great Florentine companies publicly acknowledged that they were unable to repay their creditors. Leading firms such as Acciaiuoli, Bardi, Frescobaldi, and Peruzzi had already compromised themselves through their close association with the tyrant, Walter of Brienne, while other great houses had damaged their political prestige by championing foolish

7 The retainers of the Priors petitioned the Signoria for unpaid wages dating back seven months. Provvisioni Duplicati, 4, f. 7, 4 September, 1343. (Henceforth this source will be abbreviated as P.D.) See also the re- quests of Florentines who were serving as hostages in Verona for expense money owed them. Ibid., 4, f. 9r, 16 September, 1343. Among these hostages were members of leading families such as the Alamanni, Antella, Rossi, and Tornaquinci. For demands for reimburse- ment of short-term loans, see ibid., 4, f. 10, 16 September, 1343.

8 The only condemnations recorded in the Camera were a handful of fines for gambling and roaming the city streets after curfew. The only source of revenue that produced generously at this time was the gabelle on pawnbrokers which increased over a hundred per cent; this in itself is a pertinent comment on the state of the republic's economy at this time. C.C., 2.

9 Balie, 2, fols. 29-30, 20 November, 1342. This docu- ment is published in C. Paoli's, Della Signoria Gualtieri Duca D'Atene in Firenze, 81-82, Florence, 1862, and the economic motivation for this decree is considered by A. Sapori in La crisi delle compagnie mercantili dei Bardi e dei Peruzzi, Florence, 1926. The Signoria found it extremely difficult to farm the taxes and the old buyers repeatedly repudiated their contracts with the government or petitioned for sizable reductions. Balie, 2, fols. 38-104, 8 December, 1342, to 6 March, 1343.



362 MARVIN B. BECKER [PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC.

and costly military schemes for the capture of neighboring Lucca. Finally, in the summer of 1343, the hard-won Florentine empire began to disintegrate and cities, once under the proud republic's sway, humiliated the Florentines by gaining their freedom. Arezzo, Castiglione, Colle, Pistoia, San Gimigniano, and Volterra launched successful revolutions and caused Machiavelli, the lover of paradoxes, to observe: "Thus Florence found herself deprived of both her tyrant and her dominions at the same moment, and in recovering her liberty, taught her subjects how they might become free." 10

The success of the popular Signoria depended upon a recovery of state finances, for without an increase in her present revenues, the city could not hope to carry out even the most elemental tasks of government, or to win back even a small measure of public confidence. The condition of private finance was intimately bound to that of the public treasury since so many of the greater guildsmen were among the commune's principal creditors. These men could remain solvent only if the Camera honored her commitments. Since 1315, the chief source of revenue at the disposal of the Camera had been the yield from indirect taxation. Communal councils had always been extremely reluctant to impose direct levies upon real estate and capital, and it is doubtful whether the Signoria could have won over the necessary two-thirds majority required by law to enact this dreaded form of taxation in the autumn of 1343.11 The Florentines associated this type of taxation (the estimo) with the despised tyrannies of Charles of Calabria (1325-1328) and Walter of Brienne (1342-1343); therefore, the well-being of the state would have to be wholly dependent upon the monies from indirect imposts.

While considerable data have been collected on the private sector of the Florentine economy, the study of fluctuations in communal finances has been overlooked. It would be a serious mistake to attempt to transpose the results of the re- searches of Sapori in the field of business history

10 Niccolo Machiavelli, History of Florence and of the affairs of Italy, trans., F. Gilbert, 101, New York, 1960.

11The estimo had been suppressed in the city in 1315, and, despite repeated efforts of the Signoria to have it re-enacted, the communal councils regularly rej ected it. Cf. B. Barbadoro, Le finanze della repubblica fiorentina, 124-130, 207-208, 210-211, Florence, 1929. In 1341 the government went so far as to elect a commission for the purpose of re-establishing this levy but the communal councils would not assent to its imposition despite the magnitude of the economic crisis.

to the area of state finance, since the latter underwent a very different metamorphosis. During the interval from 1343 to 1348, when many of the great Florentine companies were declared bankrupt, sweeping advances were taking place in the communal fisc.12 Giovanni Villani presents extensive statistics on state revenues for the prosperous years 1336-1338, and recent scholarship has confirmed his data.13 The republic's income from her single most important tax-a duty on imports and exports passing through the city gates-was 90,200 florins a year. By 1343 this gabella portarum had fallen to 68,000 florins, only to rise again two years later to 75,000 florins; just before the onslaught of the Black Death it totaled 79,000 florins.14 The republic's second most lucrative tax was the impost upon the sale of wine within the city walls and the contado. It averaged 58,000 florins for the years between 1336 and 1338, but had declined to 36,000 florins in 1342; however, it was returning 44,000 florins, and just prior to the Black Death it brought in 45,000 florins.15 The revenue from the gabelle on contracts shows a similar fluctuation during these years; yielding 20,000 florins an- nually between 1336 and 1338, it fell to 7,322 florins in 1342. It then rose to 17,137 florins in 1344, and within three years it had virtually recovered its original value when it brought in 18,500 florins to the communal treasury.16 The gabelle on salt averaged 14,450 florins in the interim of 1336-1338. In 1342 it dropped to 4,697 florins, but by the autumn of 1343 it was up to 10,03313 florins and it remained constant for the next three years; but by 1346-1347 it had almost reached its earlier high when it re-

12 Tratte, 1155 contains the names of all bankrupts from the letter "A" through "S," and was to be used for the purpose of barring these "falliti" from communal office. The Atti del Podesta and the Camera del Comune contain additional names. The total number of bankrupts cited in the above sources is three hundred and one.

13 Cf. footnote 6 and A. Sapori, L'attendibilita di al- cune testimonianze cronistiche dell' economia medievale, Archivio Storico Italiano 86: 19-30, 1929. For an extensive discussion of the figures presented by Villani, also see Sapori's, L' eta della rinascita secoli XIII-XVI 132- 163, Milan, 1958.

14G. Villani, Cronica 11: 92; C.C., 5, f. 18; C.C., 6, f. 47; C.C., 7, f. 115; C.C., 8, fols. 4-5, 16r, 18; C.C., 12, f. 43; C.C., 14, f. 18; C.C., 18, f. 102; C.C., 25, f. 104r.

15 C.C., 9, f. 39r; C.C., 10, f. 84; C.C., 11, f. 33r; C.C., 25, f. 104r.

16 C.C., 10, f. 108r; C.C., 11, f. 34; C.C., 14, f. 18; C.C., 17, f. 6. For a discussion of this type of tax, see B. Barbadoro, op. cit., 536-543.




turned 14,000 florins.17 The communal levy on pawnbrokers was 3,000 florins a year for the interval described by Giovanni Villani. In March of 1343 it brought in only 1,950 florins, but by 1346 it had climbed to 2,800 florins.8 The tax on cattle slaughtered in the contado averaged 4,400 florins per year between 1336 and 1338; this sum was reduced substantially as a result of the political pressures exerted by the influential butcher's guild and in 1344 it yielded only 1,475 florins, but like all of the other gabelles, its yield increased until it was bringing in 1,650 florins by the year 1347. Comparable gains were regis- tered by other communal levies between 1343 and 1348: the returns on the imposts on cattle markets in Florence and in the parish of San Giovanni, outside the city, tripled during these years, while the gabelle on the hawkers of foodstuffs increased ten times in yield during that same period.19 In part, this startling recovery in state revenues can be attributed to the many administrative reforms inaugurated by the popular Signoria during its tenure. The collection of indirect taxes was systematized and severe punishments were meted out to the lax and corrupt officials of the earlier regimes.20 The trend was towards a more impartial and impersonal enforcement of communal law. However, no amount of loophole tightening or efficiency can account entirely for this resurgence of public revenues. It would appear that the principal factor inducing this recovery was the durability of the complex Florentine economic system which could sustain a series of severe jolts and still be in a position to reassert itself vigor- ously. Such a rally could have occurred under

17 CC., 6, f. 45r; C.C., 9, f. 59r; C.C., 14, f. 77r. 18 C.C., 8, f. 3; C.C., 24, f. 47. For the brief ascent of

this gabelle during the late summer of 1343, see footnote 8.

19 CC., 12, f. 41r; C.C., 11, f. 34; C.C., 23, f. 26; C.C., 10, f. 107; C.C., 16, f. 102r; C.C., 10, f. 9.

20 The authority of the judicial officials over gabelles was extended and special officers were appointed to reduce expenses. Among those selected were two novi cives, a dyer and a sword maker. Provvisioni, 32, f. 59. (Henceforth this source will be abbreviated as P.) Un- paid gabelles were collected and suits were initiated against the heirs of those who were delinquent. C.C., 16- 18. Dispensation for failure to pay gabelles was frequently granted by the courts and the communal councils throughout the tenure of the oligarchical regime (1328- 1342). Cf. Guidice degli Appelli, 122, parts II and III. For an attempt to differentiate between oligarchical and popular regimes, see M. Becker, Some aspects of oligarchical, dictatorial and popular Signorie in Florence, 1282-1382, Comparative Studies in Society and History 2: 425-434, 1960.

any type of regime, but what is significant is the way in which the popular Signoria nurtured and husbanded this recovery. By making certain fundamental decisions, the Florentine Signoria was able to relieve the economy of crushing burdens.

In November of 1342 the despot, Walter of Brienne, enacted a decree suspending payment of interest to communal creditors. Formerly the revenues from city tolls and the taxes on wine, salt, and contracts had been assigned for this purpose. Now the income from these levies was to revert to the communal treasury so that Florence might be able to pay the back wages of her mercenaries. Giovanni Villani tells us that the outlay for troops averaged 140,000 florins for the years between 1336 and 1338. As a bitter afterthought, he adds that this exorbitant sum did not include the pay for those mercenaries hired by the republic to fight the disastrous campaigns in Lombardy. At first Walter of Brienne did little to curtail these expenditures which devoured almost a half of the commune's return from indirect levies. But by November of 1342, the situation was too critical to be ignored; the treasury had a balance of only 15,138 florins which was barely enough to meet the day-to-day exigencies of government.21 It was at this moment that Brienne decided to issue his infamous decree; now he could use the money from the gabelles to pay his troops and functionaries instead of making restitution to communal creditors. In addition, he was compelled to resort to the dreaded estimo and to numerous forced loans; but even then he was unable to resume payment of the public debt. In fact, these desperate measures only succeeded in enlarging the public debt, since the recent forced loans merely added to the total, and the returns from indirect and direct levies were being dispensed to mercenaries by the Camera almost as soon as they were received. Unless the popular government could devise a series of remedies, it would be necessary for communal creditors to relinquish both the interest and principal on their loans. An increase in returns from indirect imposts could not be substantial enough to alleviate this increased pressure if it were not coupled with sizable reductions in the communal budget, for even if income from the gabelles rose, it would only be consumed by mounting governmental expenditures.

21 C.C., 2 bis, f. 7. For a more detailed analysis of Brienne's rule, see M. Becker, op. cit., 434-439.




Both the novi cives and the patriciate who sat in the Signoria after 1343 were holders of government securities, and indeed the Florentine state can be likened to a giant corporation in which the 8,000 most affluent men in the community were the principal shareholders. The program initiated by the newer shareholders not only saved the equity of their social superiors, but it also demonstrated to the more experienced patriciate the prudence of the newcomers in fiscal matters. When the new Signoria renounced traditional Florentine imperialism in favor of a policy of dis- engagement and isolation, it was moving in a direction of reconstituting a solvent fisc. The popular Signoria acted to curtail military expenditures after 1343, and so successful was this policy that by 1345 the military budget had been halved and the republic was spending only 75,000 florins a year for this purpose.2 Florence was indeed fortunate at this time not to be menaced by any adversaries of the stature of a Castruccio Castra- cane or an Uguccione della Faggiuola. No neighboring state had either the leadership or energies to begin again the terrible contest for dominion over Tuscany. Therefore, except for the ubiquitous marauding companies, there was no sustained threat to Florentine liberta in the years just before the Black Death. The popular regime was eager to avoid foreign entanglements that might involve her in the disputes of other states, and happy to renounce territorial ambitions that might incur the enmity of her neighbors. This task was made easier during these years since Florence did not have to contend with meddling German emperors and popes bent on the reconquest of the Patri- mony. There were obstacles, however, and the gravest of these was the republic's own Guelf legacy. The patrician elite of Giovanni Villani's generation who guided the destinies of the city's most aristocratic club-the pro-papal Parte Guelfa -had strong allegiances to the Guelf alliance system which, in the past, had contributed so much to the glory, strength, and prosperity of the city. Throughout the thirteenth and early fourteenth century, banking tycoons, industrialists, and great merchants had received many concessions from the papacy and the rulers of South Italy. As early as 1340, however, leading Florentines became convinced that the numerous liabilities in- curred through ties with Avignon and Naples far

22This figure is based upon a comparison of the statistics presented by Villani and those found in the Camera del Comune, Entra.ta e Uscita.

outweighed the commercial advantages, since the republic was now being compelled to lay out huge sums for the military support of the overly ambitious plans of their allies. The Bardi and Frescobaldi, two of the mightiest of the Florentine banking families, led an abortive revolt designed to reverse this policy and to liberate Florence from her crushing commitment. What these leading families were unable to accomplish in 1340 was achieved three years later when the popular Signoria proved unresponsive to the lure of the city's old Guelf ties. The new government elimi- nated traditional subsidies and reduced her budget by curtailing her obligations abroad. Only in this manner could Florence effect savings substantial enough to make the Camera solvent and thus avert communal bankruptcy.

During the 1330's over seventy per cent of all the high communal offices were held by members of Florence's three greatest guilds; the Lana, the Cambio, and the Calinala. These industrial and banking patricians advocated that the commune be financed through indirect taxes that fell on the consumer (gabelles) and by forced loans (prestanze) at high rates of interest. The result of this fiscal policy was to increase the communal debt until it became a crushing burden. By the summer of 1343 it had mounted to 800,000 florins -a sum roughly equal to the total revenue of the commune over a period of almost three years. Even as early as 1340 it was evident to the Signoria that the republic could not hope to repay its creditors unless it made startling innovations in communal fiscal policy. The councils were reluctant to permit the government to introduce needed reforms despite the fact that the situation was worsening day by day. The Signoria first sought to ease this mounting fiscal crisis by placing a hearth tax on the citizenry; it was calculated to bring six hundred florins a day into the communal treasury. Then the interest rates on forced loans were slashed.24 Un-

23 The public debt was only 47,275 florins in 1303, but by 1338 it totaled approximately 450,000 florins. Cf. E. Fiumi, Fioritura e decadenza dell' economia fiorentina, Archivio Storico Italiano 117: 455, 1959. Over the next four years it almost doubled, reaching for those times, the astronomical figure of slightly more than 800,000 florins.

24 B. Barbadoro, op. cit., 400-401; C. Paoli, op. cit., 65-66; P., 32, f. 48r. The treasurer of the hearth tax was also camerarius of the forced loans "et aliarum rarum," so that when payment was made into the Camera del Comune, it included monies from a variety of sources. Therefore, it is not possible to know whether or not the




fortunately, these measures had a negligible effect, for the returns from the gabelles, which still constituted the principal source of public revenue, were still not coming into the treasury since they had long ago been pledged to amortize the prestanze. Walter Brienne's solution to this dilemma had been the infamous declaration of a moratorium on the communal debt.

Although the new regime could look forward to increased returns from indirect taxation and substantial savings on the military budget, the problem of funding the communal debt remained formidable. Tax returns were not high enough to permit the treasury to amortize over a half million florins in communal debts. The money saved by curtailing military expenditures was just sufficient to pay the 75,000 florins a year in carrying charges on the debt. The Signoria began to work towards a solution to this problem in December of 1343, and by 1345 they had consoli- dated all the outstanding old loans under a single orderly system. The varied items of public indebtedness were unified and lumped together in what the Florentines were to call the Monte, or mountain.25 By partially abandoning the redemp- tive feature of public finance, the Signoria freed the republic from the obligation of repaying over a half million florins of principal. This was accomplished by declaring the public debt to be interest bearing, and stating that credits in the Monte were negotiable. Interest rates on the debt were cut to five per cent and this marked a substantial reduction, since most of the loans had been made at rates ranging from ten to fifteen per cent. The effect of this innovation was to lower the amount of the carrying charges for the public debt from 75,000 florins a year to approximately 25,000 florins.

This reform was made in the face of intense ecclesiastical opposition; clergy and laity alike were troubled by nagging doubts as to whether the funding of the republic's debt was contrary to the teachings of canon law on the subj ect of

gabella dei fumanti actually brought in six hundred florins a day. Notations in the treasury records suggest that it probably did not. Cf. C.C., 2 bis, fols. 4r, 32, 219.

25 By taking this action the Signoria was able to scale the communal debt down to 505,044 florins. A reduction of over 300,000 florins in the public debt was not due solely to the founding of the Monte, but was also a resultant of the fact that the popular Signoria had succeeded in amortizing certain of the prestanze. Cf. B. Barbadoro, op. cit., 629-687; C.C., 4-15.

usury.26 The Franciscans and Dominicans were divided on this perplexing question, but the Signoria remained unperturbed and continued to enact communal legislation which expressed deep confidence in the fundamental righteousness of the institution of the Monte. And there were few among the Florentines who were tormented enough to refuse to accept the proffered interest. After 1345 the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts was severely limited in cases involving a charge of usury and it was difficult to prosecute those who had violated the prohibition against taking interest from an investment without risk. The popular regime flouted clerical liberties with unprecedented zeal: the authority of the Holy Office was undermined, clergy were now held liable for many communal levies and the jurisdiction of secular courts reached into matters that had formerly been the exclusive preserve of ecclesiastical tribunals.

II The innovations made by the popular Signoria

in church-state relations were closely related to the government's efforts to ameliorate the problems confronting the Florentine business community. The new men and the patricians who held high office at this time were extremely anxious about the welfare of the great companies. Together they acted to create an environment that would be congenial to the hard-pressed Florentine bankers and industrialists. While it is difficult to determine the extent to which the policies of the new regime contributed to the recovery of these harassed companies, there is little doubt that these policies did much to alleviate the impact of the economic crisis. Sweeping legislation was enacted to protect the companies from the insistent claims of their creditors, both lay and ecclesiastical. In 1345, and again a year later, petitions were submitted by the captains of the twenty-one guilds aimed to prevent creditors from initiating suits for restitution in non^om- munal courts.27 When these petitions became

26 For the debate on the legitimacy of the Monte, see R. de Roover, Il trattato di fra Santi Rucellai sul cambio, il monte comune e il monte delle doti, Archivio Storico Italiano 111: 3-34, 1953.

27 A. Panella, op. cit., 327-365; G. Villani, Cronica 11: 22. Stefani states that the captains of the guilds were responsible for other important measures including legislation against the "grandi" which were opposed unsuc- cessfully by the "buonomini." Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronica fiorentina, ed. N. Rodolico, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, new ed., 30: rub. 607, Citta di




law, they went so far in pressing the claims of secular jurisdiction that they constituted a clear violation of ecclesiastical liberties. After their enactment, prelates and Neopolitan barons could bring suit only in Florentine courts against the teetering companies, and these tribunals were notoriously slow in taking action. Cases of this type could and did drag on interminably and, therefore, what these measures actually won for the companies was precious time-years that could be well used to liquidate assets. Since much of their wealth was in land, it was imperative that this real estate could not be placed on the market en bloc, for if it were, prices would plummet. Prolonged litigation over bankruptcy procedures was also advantageous to the companies in that it gave them an opportunity to transfer titles and conceal holdings. Delays and devious proceedings helped to make bankruptcies mere epi- sodes in the history of many of the great companies of Florence. These houses were able to salvage much of their wealth, and were soon again to play a leading role in civic life.28 In taking up the cudgel against church courts, the captains of the twenty-one guilds, of whom the majority were new men, were acting in a manner consistent with their past history. Whenever new men came into the Signoria in large numbers, the tendency was to attack ecclesiastical jurisdiction and to extoll the authority of the commune.29 In 1345-1346 this movement towards increasing state power was especially felicitous since it served the needs of a floundering mercantile patriciate. The popular government was proving itself to be a most sympathetic guardian of the interests of the great companies.

Any generalization about business conditions in Florence under the aegis of the popular government must remain tentative since few merchant account books survive for the period. In the two

Castello, 1903-1955. Later, in the 1370's, when the twenty-one guilds were to be again very active in affairs of state, it was to be the "artes et populares" or the "artifices et mercatores" or the "artifices et populares" in whose name important legislation against the church or against the great families was to be presented. Cf. Consulte et Pratiche, 12, f. 13; P., 60, f. 143; P., 63, f. 70r.

28 The Acciaiuoli, Bardi, Del Bene, Frescobaldi, Mozzi, and Peruzzi all suffered bankruptcy during the first half of the fourteenth century, and yet were to be ubiquitous in Florentine politics during the latter part of the Tre- cento. Cf. Consulte et Pratiche, 1-10; Estimo, 386, fols. 4 ff.; ibid., 391, fols. 12 ff.

29 M. Becker, The church and state in Florentine politics, to be published in Speculum.

instances where we do have commercial records, however, the firms in question continued to make profits. The Albizzi company paid its partners a return of nearly thirty-three per cent on their investment, while the Alberti fortunes continued to show an appreciable improvement.30 Both of these firms were soon to enter the highest echelons of European finance and were to become great international houses by the second half of the Trecento. Villani tells us that there was another order of businessmen who weathered the crisis of the 1 340's-"the most recent capitalists." Chief among these was the house of Strozzi whose ricordanze show that this aggressive family seized the opportunity to acquire real estate from the hard-pressed companies during the years immediately preceding the Black Death. Like many other members of the Florentine business community, this newish family realized substantial profits from these transactions. Shortly thereafter, the Strozzi entered the field of international finance wholeheartedly, and by 1367 Carlo and Pazzino had formed a company with a total capitalization almost equal to that of the famous pre-1343 firms.31 The Panciatichi, Petreboni, Rinuccini, and Uzzano were but a few of the many other families who rose to fiscal eminence during the middle years of the Trecento. There are few intervals in communal history more replete with instances of socio-economic mobility, and this surge of new families continues until the decade of the 1380's. It would appear then, based upon the criterion of the founding of new fortunes, that a decline does not set in until the late Trecento.

The industry most vital to the Florentine economy, and consequently the one that causes most

30 R. de Roover, The story of the Alberti Company of Florence, 1302-1348, Business History Review 32: 38-39. 1958; I libri degli Alberti del Giudice, ed. A. Sapori. Milan, 1952; A. Sapori, Studi di storia economico, secoli XIII-XIV-XV, 3rd ed., 2: 975-1012, Florence. 1955. Neither the Bardi nor the Peruzzi made substantial business profits during the 1330's; the latter actually suffered a very serious decrease in capital. A. Sapori. La crisi delle compagnie mercantili dei Bardi e dei Peruzzi, 105, Florence, 1926; R. Davidsohn, Geschichte von Florenz 4: 208, Berlin, 1896-1927. For a record of the holdings of the Albizzi in the Monte of 1345, see Monte, S. Giovanni, fols. 21, 964r.

31 P. Jones, Florentine families and Florentine diaries in the fourteenth century, Papers of the British School at Rome 24: 187-188, 1956. This company had a capital of 53,600 florins and this was just a bit less than the company of Giotto de' Peruzzi that was revived in 1331. Cf. A.Sapori, La crisi, 105.




controversy among economic historians, was wool manufacturing (Lana).32 During the 1330's the Lana had been the rock on which Florentine prosperity was founded, offering, as it did, em- ployment to one-third of the city dwellers. Over- expansion and foreign competition in the early forties threatened the well-being of this industry and many leading firms were compelled to close down. The problems of these wool manufacturers were intensified with the outbreak of worker unrest in 1342. The popular government was confronted with a declining Arte della Lana and its response was to exert every energy towards the establishment of an economic environment that would be favorable to the interests of this guild. Despite the fact that many of the lanaiuoli were ineligible for communal office because they had been declared bankrupt, this guild succeeded in increasing its representation in the popular Signoria between 1343 and 1348.3 From 1328 to 1343 members of the Lana held one-fourth of the high posts in the republic; after 1343, however, this figure rose to thirty and a half per cent. It would appear that the purported economic decline of the Lana did not affect the political prestige of this guild and that the novi cives were anxious to cooperate with the lanaiuoli to assist in their recovery. The Signoria first took action to annul the many privileges bestowed upon the wool workers by their self-appointed bene- factor, Walter of Brienne. Once again the day- laborers employed by the lanaiuoli were placed under the jurisdiction of the guild courts and policed by an official elected by the guild masters.34 The hand of the Lana was also much in evidence when the new government met to formulate monetary policy. In 1345 there was a dearth of silver coinage and this, according to the chronicler, Giovanni Villani, caused "great discomfort to the lanaiuoli." 35 Therefore, the Signoria and the

32 R. Davidsohn, Blilte und niedergang der florentiner tuchindustrie, Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissen- schaft 85: 225-255, 1928; A. Dorin, Die florentiner wol- lentuchindustrie, 412 ff., Stuttgart, 1901. In his Studi di storia economica, Armando Sapori presents a more cautious view of the alleged decline of the Lana in Florence. Cf. especially 1: 544 ff.

33 The average Monte holdings of the lanaiuoli who served in the popular government were 542 florins.

34 Cf. M. Becker, The republican city-state in Florence: an inquiry into its origin and survival (1280-1434), Speculum 35: 46-48, 1960; Atti del Capitano, 17, f. 72.

35G. Villani, Cronica 12: 97; Statuti, 15, bk. 3, f. 16r; G. Brucker and M. Becker, The Arti Minori in Floren- tine politics, 1342-1378, Mediaeval Studies 18: 98-99, 1956; R. de Roover, op. cit., 16; Capitoli, 18, fols. 93-94.

communal councils passed legislation prohibiting the export of this precious metal from the city and contado. Two years later the government devaluated the silver currency. This step was urged by the lanaiuoli since they received payment for their cloth in gold while paying their em- ployees in silver coinage. The effect of this policy was to cause depreciation of silver currency, with the result that the gold florin rose in value in terms of the silver money. According to the statute of the Podesta, only the masters of the greater guilds were permitted to use the gold florin as the standard of value in their business transactions and to keep their books in this monetary unit.

The Lana was not the only major guild to increase its representation during the era of popular government. The silk guild more than doubled its representation in the Signoria: from 1328 to 1342, 6.3 per cent of those elected to the priorate were matriculated in this arte, while in the five years after 1343 this figure rose to 14.5 per cent. Like the lanaiuoli, these men were among the most affluent in urban society, having holdings in the funded communal debt averaging the substantial sum of one hundred forty-six florins.36 Particularly prominent among their number were the many novi cives who entered communal politics at this time. Families such as the Baldese, the Buoniuti, the Del Panchia, the Pantalioni, and the Sanguigni were to con- tinue to play a crucial role in Florentine civic life over the next five decades. The phenomenal growth of silk manufacturing in Florence during the middle years of the Trecento certainly contributed to the political mobility of these men from the Por Santa Maria. As a tribute to their growing economic importance, doublet makers and hosiers now sat regularly in the communal councils. Soon they were to be joined by the master dyers and the soap manufacturers whose skills were also essential to the textile industry. Judg- ing from the frequency with which the names of these men appear on the lists of Priors after 1343, it is difficult to argue that the textile manufacturers suffered any appreciable decline in political influence.

The guilds who lost representation in the new government were the Cambio (bankers) and the Calimala (the finishers of imported cloth). The

36 On the rise of the silk industry at this time, see P. Pieri, Intorno alla storia dell' arte della seta in Firenze, 117 ff., Bologna, 1927.




men of the Cambio held 30 per cent of the posts in the Signoria from 1328 to 1342; after 1343 this figure fell to 15 per cent, while the representation of the Calimala declined from 16.25 per cent to 8.8 per cent. These statistics suggest that industries and professions more deeply rooted in the domestic economy such as the Lana and Seta were less prone to sudden reversals in fortune than the Camnbio which was dependent upon the international money market. As for the Calimala, this guild had already reached its height, and its dominance over the Signoria had come to an end at the close of the Dugento.

Fortunately, reliable population statistics exist for the period under consideration. Modern demographical studies have not substantially im- paired the validity of the figures presented by Giovanni Villani in his Cronica of Florence: in 1338 there were 90,000 inhabitants living within the city walls; the number fell to 75,000 in the year 1340, only to rise again to 80,000 in early 1347.37 This increment of 5,000 reverses the trend that had been in effect since 1300 when the city's population was 105,000, and suggests that during the five years before the Black Death, there was definite urban growth for the first time in almost half a century. It is also interesting to note that there is a remarkable correlation between gate tolls and population figures. One can project the annual return from the gabella portarum so that its decline and rise coincides with the demographical curve. At its height, in 1338, it was 90,200 florins, averaging approximately one florin per inhabitant; it fell as did the population, and then rose again maintaining virtually the same ratio-79,000 florins in gate tolls for a population of 80,000. It would appear then that the yield from indirect taxation, and hence the economic recovery of the fisc, was closely tied to the gains Florence made in population in the years immediately preceding the Black Death. If one were called upon to determine the temporal locus of the Florentine "depression," based on data offered by this study, then he would have to place the nadir somewhere between 1340 and 1342. For in the earlier year, Florentine population struck a new low, while, in the latter, tax returns fell to new depths. These data indicate that the interval after 1343 was, in fact, a period

37 E. Fiumi, La demografia fiorentina, op. cit., 78-158. For a translation of the relevant chapter from Villani's chronicle, see R. Lopez and I. Raymond, Medieval trade in the Mediterranean world, 71-74, New York, 1955, and the bibliographical comments on page 70, footnote 85.

of adjustment and growth, rather than of pro- tracted depression as has been traditionally depicted.38 A question which yet remains un- answered is: What relationship was there between this partial recovery in revenue and population, and the continuing political prestige of the Floren- tine textile industry? It can tentatively be sug- gested here that increases in city population were, to some extent, related to the persistent needs of the Lana for manpower, and the city fathers felt this very strongly when they requested that the masters of this guild put up money for the purchase of grain in order to take care of the destitute newcomers during the famine of 1346.39

III If the popular Signoria of 1343 was to achieve

a longer tenure than its two predecessors-ten months and two months respectively, then this government would have to gain a larger measure of public confidence. The question of communal fiscal responsibility was met almost immediately when the new Signoria assumed complete liability for the many loans made by Brienne in the months of June and July of 1343. But an even more vexing problem concerned the breakdown of communal fiscal and juridical authority in the territories under the aegis of Florence. Not only had many outlying cities led successful revolts against the republic, but communal power over the re- mainder of the contado stood in danger of deterio- rating. In the month preceding the foundation of the popular regime, no revenues were received by the Camera from these territories.40 Even during the late 1330's, judging from fragmentary treasury records, rural communes and popoli were

38 For recent bibliography on this question, see W. Ferguson, Recent trends in the economic historiography of the Renaissance, Studies in the Renaissance 7: 7-26, 1960. For a cautious description of general economic tendencies in Trecento Europe, see R. Lopez, The trade of Medieval Europe: the south, in The Cambridge Eco- nomic History of Europe 2: 338-354, Cambridge, 1952. Y. Renouard in his Recherches sur les compagnies com- merciales et bancaires utilisees par les papes d'Avignon avant le Grand schisme, Paris, 1942, depicts the middle years of the Trecento as being a time of unmitigated economic decline for Florence and does not see a substantial recovery until the 1360's.

39 Lana, 41, f. 203, 13 September, 1346. It is stated in the guild records that this money was paid "sponte" because of the number of "foreign persons who were received into the city of Florence" at the behest of this guild "and considering the amount of grain they con- sume. . . ."

40 C.C., 2, August, 1343.



VOL. 106, NO. 4,1962] FLORENTINE POPULAR GOVERNMENT 369

falling far in arrears in their obligations to the republic. Not only were there unpaid levies, reaching back as far as 1331, but there were also unfilled services owed the commune such as castle guard and road maintenance.41 Particularly dis- turbing to the new Signoria was the reluctance of the rural communes to report crimes committed in their territories to the tribunals in Florence. Many of those condemned as outlaws, or banished to foreign lands, continued to live in the outer reaches of the contado. A comparison of communal policy on the contado, as it was formulated by the oligarchical regime from 1328 to 1342, with that of the popular Signoria suggests that the former was essentially laissez- faire, while the latter tended to enforce the law rigorously. The early volumes of records of inquests by Florentine magistrates for the years immediately after 1343, are replete with charges against the syndics and rectors of rural communities who, in one way or another, had transgressed the law.42 Administrative reforms were intro- duced simplifying the task of the communal magistrates, but as the Trecento wore on, their role was taken over by a rapidly burgeoning bureaucracy which could operate with greater efficiency and at a lower cost. So effective was this new bureaucracy that within two generations, the ministration of justice in the contado came to rest mainly in their hands. Paralleling this develop- ment was the increased use of communal notaries who were being sent out in ever greater numbers to handle many problems of the contado.43

The question of the syndication of communal officials in the countryside looms especially large at this time, for the populace of the city was particularly incensed at certain great Florentine families who used high public office for their own personal aggrandizement. The regime had been established, as had earlier popular Signorie, to initiate reforms, and one of its first moves was to review the conduct of those men who had formerly held high posts in rural Tuscany. Schiata Bartolo Cavalcanti, Bartolomeo Gherardo Adi- mari, and Giovanni Piero Alberti were among the first of the great patricians to be convicted for malfeasance, negligence, and peculation while

41 C.C., 2 bis, fols. 214r, 227, 250-257r, 293. 42See especially C.C., 12, November-December, 1345;

CC., 13, January-February, 1346; C.C., March-April, 1346.

43 Sindicato del Podesta, 1-2; C.C., 4, f. 81r.

occupying vital positions in the countryside.44 The Captain of Custody levied heavy fines upon syndics and rectors in the contado who had failed to seize malefactors or who had neglected to report on crimes committed in their bailiwick. Rural communes and popoli were also condemned for harboring exiles or fugitives from communal j ustice.45

Particularly critical to a government seeking to reconstitute the fisc without imposing new forms of taxation, was the prompt payment of military subsidies and the regular collection of imposts levied on the contado. When the officials in charge of the estimo in the contado brought suit against rural communes and popoli for tax delin- quency, the Florentine magistrates were quick to convict.46 By communal decree, an appraisal of property was to be made and then the Captains of the Leagues were enjoined to collect a subsidy of four foot-soldiers for every hundred of estimo (pro quolibet centum estimi). When rural communities failed to comply with this edict, they were subject to heavy fines.47 The city's capacity to meet its military budget without adding to public indebtedness, depended upon the vigor with which her captains and magistrates exacted these levies from the contado.

It is probable that the returns from the estimo, imposed on the contado in late 1343, were being paid directly to communal creditors.48 Therefore, the Signoria was eager to increase receipts from this source, and the administrative reforms of that year which rearranged the boundaries of the various districts outside the city walls reflected the regime's desire to make assessment and collection of taxes simpler. At best, however, at- tempts at systematization tended to be makeshift

44Schiata was fined 320 lire, 15 soldi; Bartolomeo was fined 300 lire, and Giovanni 322 lire, 10 soldi. C.C., 7, fols. 140, 150, 14-23 August, 1344; C.C., 8, f. 18, 19 October, 1344.

45 Fines for this type of offense reached as high as 300 lire; if payment was made within the allotted time, a twenty-five per cent reduction was allowed. C.C., 14, f. 22r; C.C., 12 ,fols. 40r-58r, 18 November-12 December 1344.

46 On November 29, 1344, twenty-five hamlets were fined a total of 1,600 lire on this charge. This figure must be used with caution since "compositione" was made with the treasury and the amount actually paid into the Camera could have been much less. C.C., 10, f. 94.

47 C.C., 15, fols. 65r ff. 48 Returns from this tax do not appear in the treasury

records until the early 1350's. In most instances, when this occurred it signified that the money had been pledged for repayment of prestanze.




and it was difficult to establish sound procedures for reckoning and exacting communal imposts. Most troublesome to the tax assessors was the problem of determining the ownership of a particular piece of property, and hence fixing responsibility for taxes. In 1346 the Signoria appointed an extra-ordinary commission, composed of nine leading notaries, who were to draw up lists of the names of those who held real estate in the contado and describe the properties. As a result of this directive, there followed an unprecedented survey and evaluation of property; from this effort emerged "La tavola delle possessioni." 49 This was the first comprehensive attempt by any Florentine regime to systematize taxation in the Florentine territories. A major problem the Signoria hoped to resolve through the drawing up of the "tavola" concerned the precise identification of all rural rate-payers with a notation of their status. In the past, individuals had claimed that they were inhabitants of the city and, therefore, not liable for country levies. Rural parishes, communes, and popoli had contended, on the other hand, that these men were denizens of the contado and, therefore, indeed responsible for the impost in question. The rectors and syndics of these outlying communities were liable for the difference between what was assessed and what was collected. These disagreements caused "scandala" among the citizenry, and the men of the contado supplicated the Signoria to correct this inequitable state of affairs. It was also hoped that the "tavola" might aid creditors to locate the holdings of their debtors. After nine years of intensive effort, this ambitious plan had to be abandoned. Some claimed that the objectives of the "tavola" generated too much dissension in Florence.50 Perhaps, too, the republic lacked an experienced bureaucracy so necessary for the ac- complishment of this project. Much later, and on a vaster scale, the dream of a "tavola" was to be realized with the foundation of the Florentine Catasto in 1427. The groping effort of the popular government to order communal finances and to construct a more rational base for Florentine taxation did represent, however, a significant start, and while the machinery of the young state was incapable of implementing these rational objec-

49 E. Fiumi, L' imposta diretta nei comuni medioevali della Toscana, in Studi in onore di Armando Sapori 1: 341-342, Milan, 1957. For the names of the notaries, see C. C., 21, f. 47r.

50M. Villani, Cronica 5: 74; Provvisioni Duplicati, 6, f, 43r,

tives, the impulse towards systematization was indeed present.

IV Communal policy towards the contado should

be seen within the context of the total program induced by the general economic crisis of the early forties and the democratization of Floren- tine politics. The same impulses towards reform in rural Tuscany were also present within the city walls. In the past, popular Signorie had ad- dressed themselves to the problem of recovering and then safeguarding communal rights and properties.51 In the thirties, when Florentine government was oligarchical and revenues were at high levels, controls over the "iura et buona communis" were frequently ineffectual. More- over, much state property had been assigned to magnates and great popolani for nominal rents. In other instances these potentes simply appropriated communal prerequisites, and thus returns to the Camera were minimal. The new regime, however, faced with imminent bankruptcy, tight- ened controls over state property by appointing numerous officials to supervise these valuable assets. Among their number were such novi cives as Benitendi Tini, Piero Giafii, and Francesco ser Gramaldi.52 Symptomatic of the tenor of the new government are the many new men who came to hold responsible posts in a growing communal bureaucracy; dyers, bakers, spicers, hosiers, and butchers were now to serve in the Florentine Camera and notaries of modest origins were to be appointed repeatedly to the offices of state auditor and assessor.53 Not so closely tied by marriage or political affiliation to the upper echelons of Florentine society, these men could administer the law with a zeal that was shocking to the adherents of the patriciate.

In May of 1345 the Signoria and the communal councils enacted sweeping legislation to recover communal property.54 Giovanni Villani reserved his sharpest invective for the new men whom he held responsible for passing this nefarious de-

51 Cf. N. Ottokar, II comune di Firenze alla fine del dugento, 278 ff., Florence, 1926; B. Barbadoro, op. cit., 62 ff.

52 C.C., 5, f. 10, 16 March, 1344. 53 Sixty-five per cent of all notaries who held com-

munal office, between 1343 and 1382 came from families recently migrated to the city. The holdings of these men in the funded communal debt averaged two hundred florins.

54 P., 33, f. 43; Provvisioni Duplicate, 5, f. 64, 13 May, 1345.



VOL. 106, NO. 4, 19621 FLORENTINE POPULAR GOVERNMENT 371

cree.55 The ingratitude of il popolo, he reminded his readers, knows no bounds, for had not the plebes, even in the golden days of Rome, deprived the great patriot heroes of their just rewards? The Signoria, sensitive to this type of criticism, sought to justify its actions by contending that the expenses of government were "indeed heavy" and if this step were not taken then it would be necessary to impose new taxes. Therefore, certain state properties which had fallen into the hands of the great magnati families of the Della Tosa, Pazzi, and Rossi were to be restored to the commune. Villani claimed that much of this land had been conferred upon these ancient houses by the government in recognition of the many services they had performed for their country. Just or unjust, this measure was part of an overall policy designed to raise revenue through the recovery of properties deemed to be public, and each time laws of this type were enacted, the Signoria offered the same justification: if we don't resort to this, then we shall be compelled to tax further "cives et districtuales." 56

The officers, vulgarly called "uffiziali della torre" in former years, and who were known now as "offitiales super iuribus communis," made their first sizable payment of 5,800 lire, 11 soldi, 10 denari into the Florentine treasury on the seventeenth of November, 1343, less than two months after the new regime took office.57 Act- ing in concert with the "rationerii super iuribus communis" and specially elected magistrates, these "offitiales" brought to trial many of the most influential of the Florentine nobility, among whom were certain of the Adimari, Bondelmonti, Gherardini, Lupiciuni, Pulci, and Tigliamochi. All of these great magnates were judged to be guilty of usurping public property and condemned to heavy fines.58 In June of 1344 the most prominent of all the Florentine magnati-the house of Bardi-was brought before the Executor of Jus-

5Cronica 12: 54; P., 34, f. 37. 56Provvisioni Duplicate, 6, f. 29, 27 March, 1346; G.

Villani, Cronica 12: 44. 57 C., 3, November-December, 1343. See especially

entry on folio 36. 58 P., 33, fols. 2r-3r, 2 June, 133; ibid., f. 6, 9 June,

1344; C.C., 17, f. 16 r, 9 September, 1346. These convictions support Stefani's contention that magnati who held communal office had appropriated much state property and committed numerous extortions. Cf. Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, op. cit., rub. 588. After the fall of the popular government, frequent dispensations were made to magnati who had been convicted on this charge. Cf. especially C.C., 33-34, May-August, 1349.

tice on the same count. This family, more than any other noble clan, had influenced the course of Florentine politics during the preceding decade and had used their prestige and power to advance their private fortunes. Now they were being forced to disgorge their gains; sixteen of these Bardi paid the substantial fine of 3,000 florins to the Camera on June 10.59 The nobility was not the only group to be affected by the vigorous and impartial enforcement of communal law: many popolani who had appropriated state properties were also condemned and forced to make restitution.60

Acting from the same set of imperatives, the popular Signoria made tax evasion much more difficult when it extended the power of the communal judiciary over the collection of gabelles. Proceedings were now initiated against those former buyers of the gabelles who had failed to fulfill their financial commitments to the commune, and indirect taxes were collected with unaccustomed rigor. Steps were also taken to prevent tax farmers (buyers of the gabelles) from committing frauds and, in general, the policies of this new regime can best be characterized by their deep concern for the assertion of state fiscal prerogatives.6'

This surge of public spiritedness is reflected in the increased control exerted by the Signoria over the republic's many judicial and administrative officials. One of the most pronounced features of popular government is the strict syndication of communal magistrates. When the term of a Podesta, Captain of the people, or Executor of Justice was served out, then the Signoria elected special notaries, accountants, and lawyers to review the actions taken by these re~ctors during their tenure. The first conviction occurred on the nineteenth of June, 1344, and involved a Captain of the People who was found guilty of peculation of communal funds.62 Theoretically, it was extremely easy to punish such a magistrate, since the commune always withheld part of his salary until his term was completed; however, condemnations of this sort are rarely found in the judicial records. An explanation of this paradox can be sought through an understanding of power politics in fourteenth-century Italy. The magis- tracy was drawn from other areas of Italy and,

59p., 33, f. 15. 60 CC., 6, f. 52; C.C., 7, f. 95. 61 An extra-ordinary commission was created to prose-

cute these violators. C.C., 6, f. 52r. 62C.C., 6, f. 62r.




therefore, if Florence condemned a judge from an adjacent state for a shortage in his accounts, she ran the risk of antagonizing her neighbor. Many Florentines served abroad as judicial officials and they might find themselves in an awk- ward position. Morever, there was the unpleasant prospect of reprisal; another state might feel strongly enough to penalize Florentine merchants who were doing business within her confines. During intervals of oligarchical government, the Florentine courts were reluctant to convict the republic's magistrates from abroad, but with the advent of the popular Signoria, this trend tended to be reversed. This regime demonstrated an enthusiasm for the strict enforcement of law rarely displayed by any of its oligarchical predecessors. Nor was this zeal confined to the foreign judiciary: it reached out to encompass the whole of communal administrative personnel. Little regard was evidenced for status-worthy individuals, and more convictions resulted from syndication during this five-year interval of popular government than were to occur in a decade of oligarchical hegemony.63 As a matter of fact, the regime that succeeded the popular government regularly exempted communal officials from syndication and did its utmost to squash investigations of this type. The elaborate machinery used by the popular government to check abuses and violations of public trust fell temporarily into disuse, and grants of judicial dispensation from the verdicts of courts came to be commonplace in 1349 and 1350.64

The numerous frauds committed by those patricians who had held office during the 1330's and early forties were prosecuted by the popular Signoria. Particularly prominent among those condemned for peculation and malfeasance in office were the members of the important commission of the "Twenty." These men, the elite of the old governing patriciate, had been given extra- ordinary authority in 1341 to wage war against Pisa. Charges of corruption and ineptitude oc- casioned a public scandal in the following year,

63 Particularly interesting are the condemnations of rectors of rural popoli. C.C., 8, f. 18, 19 October, 1344; C.C., 9, f. 30r, 13 November, 1344.

64 C.C., 34, f. 124, 2 July, 1349. Frequently when an individual was elected to serve as a magistrate in the contado, it was stated that he was to be free from syndication. Cf. P., 38, f. 74r, 21 June, 1350, for such a provision concerning a member of the Tornaquinci family. Treasurers of balie were granted exemption from syndication. Cf. P., 39, f. 1, 17 August, 1351; P., 39, f. 15, 20 August, 1351.

and criminal proceedings were initiated against them by Walter of Brienne. The specificness of the accusations, and the additional evidence fur- nished by Giovanni Villani's Cronica, have led the modern Florentine historian, Armando Sapori, to conclude that the "Twenty" were indeed guilty. They stood trial under Brienne in January of 1343 but were not convicted; it was not until the new government assumed office that they were condemned.65 In addition to these high-born oice holders, many magnati were brought to justice for similar offenses; such actions were a regular feature of popular rule throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and stemmed in part from the very forces that had encouraged the genesis of revolutions. The failures of the old ruling patriciate became increasingly apparent to il popolo and this realization gave impetus to the new reforming Signoria. The tendency was to blame communal misadventure on prominent individuals, for the environment of the city-state was intensely personal. After 1343 the Albizzi, Bondelmonti, Visdomini, and others were singled out and charged with fraud and negligence in the fulfillment of public trust.66 Upon conviction, however, the troubles of the state began, for frequently these men were tried in absentia and, therefore, the courts were actually passing sentence upon those who had put up security for the culprits. The prudent Giovanni Villani never tired of citing the Tuscan proverb that any Signoria which threatened one citizen, must in the end threaten all. In this instance his chatty maxim was almost prophetic, since the conviction of a Bondelmonti meant that a Rossi or a Fresco- baldi going security for him was made liable for the money fine.67 Similarly, the condemnation of one errant Bardi for exceeding the prerogatives of his office, meant that assessments could be

65 A. Sapori, La crisi, 132-147; C. Paoli, op. cit., 103- 104; Libri Fabarum, 25, f. 16r; Capitoli, 18, f. 88, 11 December, 1344.

66 On 7 May, 1344, two novi cives, Agostino Cocchi, a dyer, and Sandro Mancini seconded proposals designed to punish former castellani. Cf. Libri Fabarum, 23, fols. 10-lOr. The Signoria consulted with the captains of the city's twenty-one guilds on the feasibility of punishing other communal officials. There was great opposition to actions of this type, especially in the Council of the Podesta where the older patriciate had its greatest representation. Cf. ibid., f. 10r, 8 May, 1345; P., 33, f. 43, 13 May, 1345.

67 A Bondelmonte was fined 5,161 lire, 16 soldi; for the names of those who were held liable for this condemnation, see P., 34, f. 3r; C.C., 6, f. 72r, 19 June, 1344.




made against the property of his relations.68 Each communal office holder was required to have fideiussores who would post bond for him and, therefore, when the popular Signoria took action against a single corrupt official, it posed a serious threat to the many who were responsible for him. Any regime embarking on the treacherous waters of reform could count upon incurring the enmity of the many by moving against the few.

V

One of the most troublesome problems so little investigated by historians of Trecento Florence concerns that class of men designated by custom, public opinion, or law as magnati. Composed of just under a hundred clans, with a membership of well over a thousand, the magnati have a history which yet remains to be written. Certainly by Northern European standards, these Floren- tines would hardly qualify as nobles. Many not only failed to practice the ancient and honorable profession of arms, but what was even more deplorable, at least one half of their number engaged in some form of business. The matriculae of the great guilds of the period disclose that magnati were regularly inscribed as masters.69 Few of their number would have been welcomed as peers by the knights of the North, and by the same token, these magnati were suspect to il popolo of Florence. Traditional explanations of this popolani hostility have emphasized the natural antipathy between a commercial bourgeoisie and a class of land-holding magnati. In the light of recent studies, however, this interpretation must be rejected, for both classes owned real estate in the city and contado, and both engaged in com- merce and manufacturing.70 And yet distinctions did exist between the two orders; not the least of these involved their style of life. The magnati tended to take lightly the laws of the commune, for after all had they not been enacted by their social inferiors ? They were, therefore, more prone to resort to violence in settling grievances than were the commoners. Belonging to a powerful consorteria, certain of these magnati could count upon the support of as many as a

68 C.C., 6, f. 89, 30 June, 1344. 69 For a critique of the older conception of class divi-

sions in Florentine economic life, see A. Sapori, La crisi, 118-120.

70 E. Fiumi, Fioritura d decadenze dell' economia fiorentina, Archivio Storico Italiano 115: 385-439, 1957; M. Becker, Somes aspects of oligarchical, dictatorial and popular signorie, op. cit., 421-425.

hundred of their kinsmen when there was trouble. Intimidation of witnesses was a commonplace; street fights and blood feuds were an everyday occurrence, and attacks upon communal officials who sought to execute the law were frequent. In the far reaches of the contado where communal writ scarcely ran, these families could be a law unto themselves. Tower societies in the city, and rural fortifications in the countryside made the administration of justice even more uncertain. Feudal prerogatives persisted and ecclesiastical magnates continued to employ their authority and status to frustrate the execution of Florentine law.71 Gradation in dress, position in proces- sionals, choice seats at festivals and solemn cere- monies lent distinction to this class; service abroad in the great courts and intermarriage with the Italian nobility added further luster. Finally, membership in honorific institutions such as the Parte Guelfa gave the Florentine magnati a great sense of their own worth. The Parte was closely tied to the Roman church and a religious aura surrounded the Guelf captains. Magnati were well represented in the high offices of the Parte as well as in the ranks of the Tuscan upper clergy. The Bishoprics of Florence and Fiesole had virtually become the preserve of this order.72 There- fore, any Signoria seeking to curb the more intractable members of the great clans would incur the hostility of the great Florentine clergy as well as the Parte. The new men deeply re- sented the fact that high offices in the church and the Parte were monopolized by the magnati. Magnati clans fused with the great popolani families so subtly that frequently the two were in- distinguishable. Intermarriage, political alliances, and business partnerships throughout the thirteenth century had brought these two echelons of communal society so close together that by the middle of the fourteenth century the most powerful magnati-the Bardi-differed little from leading popolani such as the Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli. Judging from the history of the rather newish Strozzi family, the inference can be drawn that the new popolani were anxious to embrace the more violent style of life extant among the magnati.

71Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, op. cit., rub. 616; N. Rodolico, I Ciompi, 42, Florence, 1945.

72 The then Bishop of Florence was Angelo Acciaiuoli, and over the next generation the episcopal sees of Flor- ence and Fiesole were occupied by such great families as the Antella, Ricasoli, and Corsini. Cf. A. Panella, La guerra degli Otto Santi e le vicende della legge contro i vescovi, Archivio Storico Italiano 99: 36-49, 1941.




The desire to emulate these magnati led to a recourse to arms whenever a Strozzi suffered a slight-real or imagined. This tone of brutal egoism is fully documented in the Florentine court records after 1343 when we find popolani families such as the Strozzi engaged in avenging their honor; only a generation ago their fathers had been busily engaged in engrossing property and lending on pledges.73 The problem confronting a popular Signoria then involved the regulation of lawless behavior now rampant among magnati as well as high popolani. In speaking of these lawless men, contemporary documents made no distinction between these two orders, but referred to them collectively as potentes.74

The Florentine chronicler, Dino Compagni, whose view of politics was always tempered by moral imperatives, when writing about an earlier interval of popular rule, stated that the Signoria took pains to enjoin communal magistrates to see that justice was ministered to all. Especially was the judiciary urged to prevent the great and the powerful from oppressing the small and the weak. While serving in the Signoria of Giano della Bella (1293-1295), Compagni had an opportunity to assist in writing into Florentine legislation just such a provision designed to curb the abuses of the overmighty against the helpless.75 Despite repeated efforts by communal authorities, many of the magnati continued to defy the law with impunity. During the decade of the 1330's, ten Aleis, five Bardi, seven Cavalcanti, ten Fresco- baldi, eight Giandonati, ten Norli, eleven Rossi, five Squarcialupi, four Della Tosa, and three Tornabelli committed crimes ranging from assault with a deadly weapon to homicide. Forty-six magnati families were convicted of one hundred forty-six serious breaches of communal law; most of these convictions stemmed from attacks by magnati on popolani but there were more spec- tacular charges such as arson, murder, devastation of church property, attacks on communal fortifications, highway robbery, and treason. Despite the verdicts of the courts, these sentences were never carried out because the magnati families were able to secure judicial dispensation. Upon payment of a small fine, the magnati were able to have even the most severe of condemnations

73 P. Jones, op. cit., 186-191. 74 Still extremely useful on this and a variety of other

questions concerning the Florentine nobility is Gaetano Salvemini's, La dignita cavalleresca nel comune di Fi- renze, 22 ff., Florence, 1896.

75 P., 4, fols. 129-130.

annulled, and in the years immediately preceding the popular revolution, 1341-1343, this practice became chronic.76

Those who recorded the events from 1343 to 1348 agreed that il popolo were particularly hostile to those magnates, lay and ecclesiastical, who employed their great power to oppress the poor and the weak. According to the chronicler Stefani, il popolo were most incensed at those grandi who used the inhabitants of the contado cruelly. Giovanni Villani and an anonymous priorista joined Stefani in maintaining that the animus of il popolo was also directed against those high clergy from great families who exercised their ecclesiastical authority for self- aggrandizement.77 It should be understood at the outset that the policies formulated by the popular Signoria were aimed to check the chronic abuses perpetuated by the overmighty-whether they were noble or commoner-and that this program was not generated by class antipathy towards the nobility. Rather it was part of a resurgence of feeling against those great families who not only had been a law unto themselves, but also had made the Signoria their own personal preserve throughout the preceding decade. There- fore, we must consider two types of legislation passed during the tenure of the popular government: first, measures directed against the criminous potentes, and then laws designed to reduce the inordinate influence of the great families.

Two months after the new regime took office, the Ordinances of Justice-so despised by the magnati-were re-enacted. More than any other set of Florentine laws, these "Felicita" ordinances reflected the passion of the medieval commune for an end to violence. Through this type of legislation the Northern Italian cities hoped to win the fruits of a tranquil and orderly society so necessary for the prosperity of the artisan merchants. Much to the horror of the Florentines, the despot, Walter of Brienne, had permitted these ordinances to lapse. The short-lived aristocratic coalition which ruled Florence in the late summer of 1343

76 There were ninety-eight magnati families living in Florentine territory at this time. For a list of the dispensations, see Guidice degli Appelli, 122 and C.C., 2 bis. Very significant was the removal of condemnations against such Ghibelline magnati as the Amadori, Fal- conieri, and Pulci. Cf. C.C., 2 bis, f. 70, 23 December, 1342.

77 Cf. footnote 71. Stefani states: "Seguendo i cherici molti soperchi in moti modi, ed infra quali erano molti Grandi e popolani grassi, li quali battiano e oltraggiavano li minuti, cognizione non era appo li secolari rettori."




took an even more radical and unpopular step when it annulled these fundamental laws. Now in November of that same year the popular Signoria decreed that the ordinances were once again in effect and, therefore, all magnati must post security for their continued good behavior.78 The penalties for crimes of violence were doubled and tripled so that the magnati were now to be dealt with more severely than other classes. In the following year the new regime strengthened the provisions of these ancient ordinances by extending the principle of collective responsibility so that magnati were to be held liable for the crimes of their distant kinsmen.79

The earliest instances of convictions stemming from the now rigorously enforced Ordinances of Justice occurred only a month after these laws were reactivated. Gerio Manetti Gherardini, "magnates et potentes," was tried in absentia and found guilty of the homicide of a "populares," a certain Francesco Lapuccio. Fifteen of Ghera- dini's consorts were compelled to pay the stiff fine of 3,000 lire for their kinsman's flagrant violation of the Ordinances.80 During the same month, Bernardino messer Filippo, of the noble house of Cavalcanti, was likewise condemned in absentia on an identical charge, and his consorteria was required to pay a similar fine.8' Shortly thereafter, the Gherardini again ran afoul of the law and this time the fine reached the exorbitant sum of 6,000 lire.82 The Janbernardi, a branch of the noble house of AEdimari, had two members who were each fined 500 lire for molesting the Florentine artisan, Master Jacapo, a popolano.83 Pierozzo Bertolino Giandonati, a magnate, paid 300 lire in fines for assaulting the eminent guildsman and leading popolano, Matteo Zuccheri Soderini.84 A few days later, Guerra messer Monte Bondelmonti, of the aristocratic clan of Bondelmonti, attacked a humble contadino with a knife; for this he paid 1,000 lire into the treasury. Early in 1344 his kinsman, Valore, son of the knight, Peppo Bondelmonti, was condemned by the Podesta for attacking a popolano and fined 3,000 lire in accord with the provisions of the

78 p., 32, f. 73, 14 November, 1343. 79P., 33, f. 2r, 2 June, 1344; ibid., f. lOOr. 80 C.C., 4, f. 57r. 14 January, 1344. 8l Ibid., fols. 60r-61, 20 January, 1344. 82 Payment was made into the Camera by fifteen mem-

bers of this house. Ibid., f. 66r, 28 January, 1344. 83 Ibid., f. 65, 20 January, 1344. 84 Ibid., f. 67, 28 January, 1344.

Ordinances of Justice.85 Among the many other magncati families who felt the full force of these laws were the Adimari, Aleis, Bordini, Della Tosa, Donati, Mancini, Pazzi, Rossi, and Torna- belli.86

The Camera del Comune records the many payments made by the consorterie and the fideiussores of the criminous magnati from 1343 through 1347. Unlike the earlier era of oligarchical government, the verdicts of communal courts were executed and not thwarted by grants of judicial dispensation. It was only with the fall of the popular Signoria in 1347-1348 that the highborn were once again permitted to purchase absolution from the decisions of the courts of the republic.87 More than any other single practice, the granting of judicial dispensation serves to illustrate an essential difference between an oligarchical and a popular regime. The latter is characterized by its more impartial and impersonal enforcement of the law, while the former tends to be more per- missive towards men of status and influence.

Not only was communal law enforced with greater vigor throughout the tenure of the popular government, but the Florentine statutes disclose that penalties for crimes of violence were especially severe. In 1344 a provision was enacted decreeing that any person from Florence or the contado who offended a citizen or a contadino "by violence studiose vel premeditate" would be dealt with harshly. If he committed the same offense twice, the fine was to be doubled and his name was to be inscribed in the book of "Male- abliati." The evil doer was not permitted to escape with a mere fine, but was required to suffer the loss of a hand. In addition to this, the culprit was to be barred from communal office for life.88 The first person to be convicted under this law was the noble, Simone Boscoli who was condemned by the Podesta in August of 1344 to

85Ibid., 5, fols. lr, 24, 3 March-3 April, 1344. 86Ibid., 5-17. 87 See the reversals of the condemnations against cer-

tain of the Bondelmonti who were convicted of peculation of communal funds in October of 1344. Fines of 2,000 lire were cancelled in May of 1349, upon payment of 87 lire. This practice was a commonplace during the years immediately after the Black Death. Cf. C.C., 33, f. 99. It began late in 1347 when the authority of the popular government was already much weakened. Cf. ibid., 22, 68, 30 July, 1347, for grants of dispensation to members of the Frescobaldi family who had been convicted of seizing church lands in July of 1344. By special provision, sentences were to be commuted at the rate of three denari per lira.

88 Statuti, 15, bk. 3, rub. 78.




have his name inscribed in this book for the homicide of the popolano, Ser Francesco. He was tried in absentia. and it should be noted that he returned to the city shortly after the fall of the popular government and bought judicial dispensation for seventy-five lire.89 Coupled with this measure were the several provisions increasing the fines against Florentines who carried weapons. Even short knives were prohibited; nor was any- one to be permitted to bear arms unless he was an authorized official of the commune. Legisla- tion at this time specifically stated that this proscription was to apply no matter what "the status, office, or dignity" of the individual. The intent of these laws was not only direct and obvious in that they aimed to weaken the might of the coni- sorterie, but also there was a subtler and more devious purpose behind them: church dignitaries were not permitted to grant magnati the right to bear arms. Traditionally, the inquisitor had li- censed armed men to aid him in performing his duties. The Holy Office in Florence had a small army of perhaps as many as two hundred and fifty men to do its bidding. Now the Signoria denied this right to the inquisitor and went a step farther when it refused to lend this official the assistance of the secular arm. These measures did much to unsettle popular respect for the Holy Office in Florence at this time.90

The popular Signoria was moving towards impersonal government and this encompassed more than the impartial enforcement of communal law. It also implied the attenuation of the privileged status of the great families through the shift of power from the hands of clergy and great magnati to communal rectors, and the extension of representation to the upper-middle echelons of society. This transition had been in process for over two centuries and one of its clearest manifestations was to be found in the weakening of the medieval ties of kinship. The same movement was at work throughout the European world in the later Mid- dle Ages, and the tendency to restrict the right of vendetta, the intrusion of state justice into what was formerly a clan matter, statutory proscription

89 C.C., 34, f. 127, 2 July, 1349. On the same day, Simone's kinsman, Nerio, paid 50 lire to have a condemnation of March, 1344, canceled. He had been convicted for committing assault against a populano and fined 2,900 lire.

90For the background of the conflict between the commune and the church over the activities of the inquisitor in 1345 and 1346, see M. Becker, Florentine politics and the diffusion of heresy in the Trecento, Speculum 34: 62-64, 1959.

of what constituted blood relationship, and the acceptance of petitions by governments from those individuals who "forswore" their consorteriac, bear witness to this fact. The more prosperous the region, the greater the possibility that family ties would be modified. The extension of capitalistic methods to agriculture tended to break up large family holdings, and land came to be subdivided, while title was transferred at speeds sometimes bordering on the frantic. The urban economy also played a crucial role in weakening the bonds of kinship. Some families had a member on virtually every point of the economic spectrum. The varieties of metiers followed by a single clan might run the gamut from pawnbroker to butcher to international banker, with the consequences that one Strozzi, or Medici, or Bardi, or Donati might be the wealthiest man in his quarter, while another from the same family might be inscribed among the city's large roll of paupers. Even among the nobles of the contado we might find a member of an ancient clan cultivating land as a contadino, while his kinsmen lived the lordly, rustic life. Communal politics was another factor that acted to undermine family solidarity: some magnati associated themselves with the parte popolare, while their kinsmen retained traditional aristocratic allegiances. In the years immediately after 1343, political factionalism also eroded the cohe- siveness of certain great commoner families such as the Strozzi and Medici. The former were to provide a leader for a worker's rebellion and at the same time help staff the captaincy of the anti- popular Parte Guelfa. Certain Medici were to be among the engineers of popular revolution, while others were to align themselves with those who sought to preserve the status quo."

This trend, long in evidence, was much encouraged by the policies of the new government. As the authority of the state expanded, voluntary withdrawal from the kindred group likewise increased. In times past, the individual had been compelled to rely upon his consorteria for protection; now that the state was more effective, he stood less in need of this protection. Therefore, we witness a marked increase in the number of petitions submitted to the Signoria by men who desired to live "peaceful and tranquil lives" and believed that the way to achieve this goal was to forswear their lawless consorts. Particularly note- worthy are the many magnati who took this dras-

91 G. Brucker, The Medici in the fourteenth century, Speculum 32: 7-10, 1957.




tic step and even went so far as to renounce their coats-of-arms and change their family names. There were some who broke up their households and moved to another quarter of the city in order to disassociate themselves from their kin.92

Many of the Florentine magnati lived in such a manner as to win the admiration of the good burghers of the city. Long ago they had shunned appeals to arms and evolved a style of life that was to earn the contempt of the greatest of Floren- tine historians-Machiavelli. To their contem- poraries, however, the decline of martial spirit among the magnati of the fourteenth century was a blessing. In October of 1343, the new Signoria rewarded five hundred and thirty of the most law-abiding magnati by bestowing commoner status upon them. Almost one half of the city's magnati were now liberated from the harsh and repressive stipulations of the Ordinances of Jus- tice.93 No longer would they be required to post security for their continued good behavior, nor would they be held accountable for the crimes of their kinsmen. Moreover, they were declared eligible for certain communal offices which hitherto had been closed to them; even the highest positions in the commune were to be accessible to them within twenty-five years. Such measures had been enacted by earlier popular Signorie and they had the effect of undermining the solidarity of this class, but never had an effort been made on so large a scale as in October of 1345. The consorteria of certain houses were shattered and during the remaining years of the Trecento we find an ever-increasing number of ex-magnati becoming involved in the life of the commune. In this way the transfer of loyalties from private to public concerns was encouraged.

Machiavelli drew his facts for the history of this period from the chronicle of Giovanni Villani, but the inferences he made were disarmingly original. In his History of Florence he advanced a thesis that has not been given the serious atten- tion it merits: "The ruin of the nobility was so complete, and depressed them so much, that they never afterward ventured to take arms for the recovery of their power, but soon became humbled and abject in the extreme. And thus Florence lost the generosity of her character and her distinction in arms." 94 It was this popular government that tamed the old nobility, and their leveling can be

92P., 42, fols. 99-113. 93 G. Villani, Cronica 12: 22. 94 N. Machiavelli, op. cit., 107.

attested to with only the most casual of backward glances into communal history. The three principal conspiracies formed to overthrow the government between 1323 and 1343 were led and staffed mainly by magnati. After 1343, as Machia- velli justly observed, there was never again to be a major magnati insurrection in the city. The leadership of the contending factions was to pass into the hands of the great popolani families of the Albizzi, Medici, Ricci, and Strozzi. In the 1370's when certain of the magnati were outraged by the direction that communal policy took, they found their spokesmen in the ranks of the popolani.95 We cannot establish Machiavelli's grand thesis which seeks to correlate the decline of military prowess with the humbling of the magnati class in the middle years of the Trecento. But this does not give us license to ignore his incisive comments concerning the changing status of the magnati: ". . . it became necessary for them (the magnati) not only to seem like the people, but to be like them in behavior, mind and mode of living." 96 So far had the Florentines moved from their ancient commitments, that for the balance of the fourteenth century such chivalric rites as tournaments and jousting appeared ludicrous to the good burghers of the city. Yet it would be an error to assume that medieval knightly ritual had lost its appeal to the Florentines for all time. Again in the fifteenth century the trappings, pomp, and contests of chivalry were to entrance the citizenry; the Renaissance knight was in flower. Similarly, we must not associate, as does Machiavelli, generosity of feeling and concern for the precepts of honor with the magnati class alone; these virtues also found a place in the discordant ethic of the burghers which lauded benevolence, magniminity, and largesse. It is simpler to trace the decline of feudal style by observing the disappearance of armorial bearings and family titles than it is to depict the gradual process by which the chivalric code was grafted on to the merchant's family tree. It was a bour- geois of the early fifteenth century, Leon Battista Alberti, who was to extoll the cult of the clan and dedicate himself to the proposition that rational business conduct was indeed compatible with feudal conditions.97

95 For the opinions of this most obdurate of the arci- guelfi, the eminent canon lawyer and man of letters, Lapo da Castiglionchio, see P. Jones, op. cit., 191-192.

96 N. Machiavelli, op. cit., 109. 97 See the pertinent comments of R. de Roover, op. cit.,

18-19.




VI

The new Signoria of 1343 spoke for the many affluent artisans, merchants, and industrialists of the city. These 3,500 or so guild masters, each matriculated in one of the twenty-one legally constituted guilds, had initiated an unprecedented political experiment.98 Never before had office been distributed so widely, and never before had so many newcomers been called to positions of public trust. Dyers now served in the communal treasury, vintners handled public money, bakers recruited troops, blacksmiths were entrusted with the maintenance of bridges and roads, mercers reviewed the accounts of rectors and audited the balance of the Camtera, grocers and butchers served as high magistrates in rural districts, and doublet makers held ambassadorial posts and staffed important diplomatic missions. This was the "buono reggimento" favored in the abstract by Tuscan Aristotelians and Florentine chroniclers; for representation was not only extended to the prosperous popolani and the nobility, but also to the middling and lesser guildsmen.99 To preserve this constitution of 1343 which afforded such extensive representation to the novi cives, it would be necessary to curb the political influence and ambition of the great families in order to prevent the displacement of the new guildsmen

98This statistic is based upon the fact that approximately 3,500 men were matriculated in the guilds in the years immediately preceding the Black Death. Interest- ingly enough, it corresponds almost exactly with the figure, presented by Villani in his Cronica, of 3,446 citizens who were considered for high office in 1343 (12: 22). To be eligible for consideration, one had to be a guild master; presumably then, since the numbers are virtually equal, all guild masters were considered to be candidates for the Signoria. Cf. footnote 100.

99 Political theorists such as Ptolemy of Lucca accom- modated St. Thomas's Aristotelianism to the Tuscan communal experience. Ptolemy turned St. Thomas's teachings so that they were no longer directed towards thq support of monarchy as the ideal form; now the Thomistic arguments were used to buttress the contention that the republic was the best of all types of regimes. This tendency to identify "buon governo" with republican and representative Signorie is to be seen in the art of Trecento Tuscany. Cf. N. Rubinstein, Political ideas in Sienese art, Jour. Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 21: 178-207, 1958; H. Wieruszowski, Art and the commune in the time of Dante, Speculum 19: 14-33, 1944. It is also much in evidence in sermons and other ecclesiastical writings of the period. Cf. C. T. Davis, An early Floren- tine political theorist: Fra Remigio De' Girolami, Proc. Amer. Philos. Soc. 104: 662-676, 1960. Giovanni Villani criticizes the regime of 1340 because it did not bestow representation upon the mezzani or the minori, as a "buono reggimento di comune" should (Cronica 11; 118).

from office. This was accomplished in October of 1343 when the divieto was put into effect.100 This ancient legislation prohibited members of the same family from holding high office simultane- ously, and fixed an interval during which a citizen was judged to be ineligible for re-election; it also barred the nobility from occupying certain key positions. This type of enactment lent an impersonal tone to the conduct of civic affairs since it restricted the influence of the large old families and encouraged the political mobility of the newer elements. Giovanni Villani and his brother Mat- teo contended that it was the divieto more than any other form of legislation that was responsible for the rise of the mezzani and the minori.101 The lists of names of candidates for office inscribed in the Tratte show that many patricians were excluded from posts because of the effectiveness of the divieto. If one of the Strozzi sat in the priorate, then fifty of his kinsmen might be denied entry; the larger the clan, the less opportunity for holding office. But like so many other communal statutes, the divieto was frequently observed in the breach and such was the case before the coming of the popular Signoria. From 1343 through 1347, however, few old families held high posts repeatedly, instead public trust came to be vested more in the hands of novi cives from families recently come to prominence in the guilds of the city. Now newcomers served in all the important offices with the exception of the captaincy of the Parte Guelfa and the Court of the Merchants. It was not to be long before they were to win representation even in these two august bodies.'02 Further restrictions were placed on patrician power in 1346 when laws were enacted prohibiting the grandi from marrying foreign princes, lords, or barons and denying them the right to exercise any judicial or fiscal prerogatives.103

100 G. Villani, Cronica, 12: 22. Only ten per cent of the 3,446 citizens considered eligible for office were found to possess all the necessary qualifications for the highest communal posts-the priorate and the colleges. This did not mean that they were excluded from lesser positions, and the treasury records are replete with the names of guild masters who served in a minor capacity.

101 M. Villani, Cronica 8: 24; Donato Velluti, Cronica, ed. I. del Lungo and G. Volpi, 241-249, Florence, 1914.

102 The new men who were declared eligible for ad- mission into the capacity of the Parte in 1366 and for entry into the Mercanzia six years later were masters from the minor guilds. Cf. P., 54, fols. 81-83, 8 Decem- ber, 1366; Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, op. cit., rub. 734; Capitoli 11: 27.

103 Provvisioni Duplicati, 6, fols. 144-147r. This measure was counselled by a bridle-maker. Statuto del Capitano 5: f. 54, 1355.



VOL. 106, NO. 4, 19621 FLORENTINE POPULAR GOVERNMENT 379

The oligarchical government of the thirties which had been directed by the scions of the great houses was replaced by a Signoria of the twenty- one guilds. It was the captains of these guilds who met in October of 1343 to draw up lists of candidates for office. If we compare the statutes of the Podest'a of 1322-1325 with those enacted just thirty years later, then the singular growth of the authority of the twenty-one guilds is strik- ing. The earlier code of laws declared that only the captains of the twelve greater guilds would be eligible to serve on commissions for the revision of communal statutes, while the latter entrusted this vital task to the captains of all twenty-one guilds.'04 During the thirties only the rectors of the greater guilds were called in by the Signoria to consider important political questions, but during the subsequent decades, the opinions of repre- sentatives from both major and minor guilds were solicited. After 1345 the consuls from the twenty- one arti participated in the election of high communal magistrates and extra-ordinary officials whose selection had hitherto been the exclusive concern of the greater guildmen. After 1343 it was to be the captains of the greater and lesser guilds who would introduce the most important laws for consideration.105

Gains made by the lesser guilds were not limited to the area of communal politics but extended to other matters of vital interest to the guild masters. Prior to 1343 severe limitations had been placed upon the juridical competence of the lesser guilds; only the tribunals of the first five major guilds were empowered to hear suits calling for unlimited damages, the remaining sixteen arti were given jurisdiction over cases involving only small sums.'06 Now revisions were made: the first five guilds still had unlimited jurisdiction, but the next seven were given authority over litigation up to the sizable amount of three hundred lire, while the rest were permitted to try cases involving sums up to two hundred lire. These

104 Compare the Statuto del Podesta', bk. I, rub. 53, 1322-1325, with Statuto del Podesta', bk I, rub. 264, 1355. It should be noted that upon occasion the number of guilds legally defined as major arti was twelve, however, the usual procedure was to limit the arti maggiori to seven.

105 See footnote 27 and Provvisioni Duplicati, 5, f. 54, 2 April, 1345; ibid., 6, f. 35r, 4 April, 1346 for laws against the church. Now all arti participated in imbor- sation for office and the consuls of the twenty-one guilds took part in the election of communal magistrates. Cf. P., 34, f. 41, 21 April, 1346.

106 Mercanzia, 3, f. 115; Legnaiuoli, 3, f. 15; Statuto del Podesta', bk. II, rub. 85, 1322-1325,

reforms represented a victory for the elite of the lesser guilds whose tribunals were now able to try cases involving amounts eight times higher than their former prerogatives had allowed.

The authority of the master butchers, vintners, catrpenters, and other domestic artificers was further enhanced in August of 1344 when the Signoria accepted a petition of the twenty-one arti giving the appropriate guilds jurisdiction over all those who followed their particular metier. This enactment is especially complex and never has been adequately discribed by economic historians; even now there are aspects of this legislation which cannot be readily interpreted. Essentially the law was framed to force small retailers and petty manufacturers into the guild matrix.107 Not only were they to be amenable to guild jurisdiction, but they were also to be liable for all guild imposts. This latter requirement was particularly troublesome since many petty tradesmen at- tempted to avoid the incidence of these levies by refusing to inscribe their names on guild rolls. The advantages of resisting matriculation were considerable, but now the force of communal law was on the side of the minori elite. In April of 1345 the treasurer and syndics of the bakers' guild petitioned the Executor of Justice to compel each person who plied this trade to pay all taxes, condemnations, and assessments levied by the consuls of this guild.'08 In July of that year a similar request from the vintners was acted upon by the same magistrate.109 Two years later the authority of the twenty-one guilds was further strengthened when the Signoria acted to prohibit any appeals from the verdicts of the consuls of the arti. Here- tofore, it had been possible for dissident guilds- ment to call upon the Court Merchant to reverse the decisions of the tribunals of the twenty-one guilds. 10

The tendency to encourage the fragmentization of the lesser guilds, so much in evidence during intervals when the oligarchs of the arti maggiori dominated the Signoria, was now in process of being reversed, and the consequences for Flor- ence's domestic economy were to be considerable. Before attempting to deal with the effects of this change, however, we must consider the problem of the relationship between the elite of the lesser

107 Statuto del Podesta', bk. II, rub. 84, 1355. This rubrica is a copy of the provision enacted by the communal councils on August 17, 1344.

108Atti del Esecutore, 29, fols. 196-197. 109Ibid., 40, f. 112. 110 P., 34, f. 43, 11 April, 1346.




guilds and the great body of petty artisans and shopkeepers. There are many different gradations within the ranks of the arti minori, ranging from the highest degree of affluence and social status to the meanest of stations in the artisan world. It was the former-the arti minori elite-who held high posts in the republic at this time and who dominated guild machinery. These great mninori sought to compel their less fortunate guild brethren to contribute toward the expenses of the arte and to pay their share of communal levies. It was this same minori elite who were anxious to extend guild control over the many unorganized artisans and retailers who plied their trades within the city. Especially was this elite eager to use the courts of the lesser guilds to collect outstanding debts from the petty artificers and merchants. But of much greater concern to these 1iinori leaders were the policies favored by certain of the greater guildsmen which had the effect of depress- ing the price of foodstuffs by fostering competition between independent sellers and producers on the one hand, and those who were inscribed in the lesser arti on the other. Such competition was encouraged by permitting artisans and tradesmen who were not matriculated in any arte to sell their wares at prices far below those that pre- vailed among the guildsmen. This tactic could be especially effective when it was coupled with the provisions of communal anti-monopoly legislation which forbade the minori consuls from in- terfering with the business dealing of the un- matriculated.111 Free trade and fierce competition were thus stimulated by allowing nonguild members to sell in the marketplace without being subject to the authority of the guild consuls or amenable to the provisions of the guild constitu- tions. All those who desired to vend meat or wine or wood could do so, and any effort by the minori elite to hamper them was deemed monopolistic and to be punishable by heavy fine. There- fore, when the great pork butchers, vintners, and wood corders wished to force the unorganized venders to matriculate in the appropriate guild, they were attempting to put an end to policies detrimental to the interests of the upper echelons of the arti minori. Within less than a year the minori elite won a singular victory; in August of 1344, unorganized producers and distributors were brought under the aegis of the minori consuls and the courts had begun to interpret anti-monopoly

11" P., 6, f. 24, 15 May, 1296; P., 9, f. 47r, 31 July, 1298.

legislation so that it no longer weakened the authority of the rectors of the lesser guilds.112

From the late thirteenth century Florence, like so many other medieval cities, had been preoccu- pied with the formulation and enforcement of legislation against any guild practices that might increase the price of goods and services to the consumer. Vague precepts to this effect were included in the ordinances of the city, but they were stereotyped and innocuous and, therefore, it is difficult to draw inferences about the specific policies Florence followed in the enforcement of this type of legislation. Fortunately, however, there are data from the treasury records which permit us to examine this matter in some detail. During the 1330's many individual guildsmen were cited by communal rectors and fined by the courts for violations of the ordinances against monopoly."3 In each instance the person convicted was a minor guildsman selling food or services; not a single condemnation was against a major guildsman. The seven greater guilds had autonomy in a variety of economic matters, while the fourteen lower guilds were frequently subject to government regulation. It would appear then that ordinances were enforced in a discriminatory fashion and that the twenty-one guilds were in fact not equal before the communal law. After 1343 when the minor guilds were granted representation, the ordinances on monopoly were interpreted very differently. Now accusations were brought against both the consuls of the major and the minor guilds. Although individual guildsmen were not involved directly, the entire body of the twenty-one guilds was cited by the communal courts on charges of violating ordinances against monopolistic practices.114 No longer were minori relegated to an inferior position; all the arti were now accorded equal treatment and the city was well on the way to becoming a guild republic. The sovereignty of the Signoria and her courts ex-

112 A. Doren, Le arti fiorentine 2: 17-18, Florence, 1940; Vanattieri, 1, fols. 41-44; M. Becker, La esecu- zione della legislatura contro le pratiche monopolistiche delle arti fiorentine alla meta del secolo quattordicesimo, Archivio Storico Italiano 117: 8-28, 1959.

113 M. Becker, op. cit., 11-12. 114 Equality before the law, in this instance, resulted

in the dismissal of the charges against the arti. With the fall of the popular Signoria, the courts once again interpreted the law in a discriminatory fashion and only lesser guildsmen were convicted. Cf. A tti del Esecutore 211, 9 August-27 December, 1349. This volume contains "inquisitiones contra artifices contrafacientes ordinamen- tis comunis florenti(a)e."




tended over all the guilds of the city; public law had triumphed over those corporate rights which had sought to preserve the differential status and treasured immunities of the arti.

VII Other periods of reform in Florentine history

had much in common with the interval under consideration. To speak about the ethos from which this type of movement draws its vitality is to raise questions that can be treated only impressionisti- cally. The deeper significance of the efforts of men to promote the victory of public law over matters that were formerly private or guild concerns implies an interest in a more unitary political system. Underlying the genesis of this political system is the presumption that through the vehicle of communal law the area of public moral concern can be extended. Matters that formerly were dealt with by the church, the magnati, the Parte Guelfa, or the consorteria now are disposed of by elected officials. The tendency is to weaken the pluralistic civic structure of the commune with its conglomeration of jurisdictions and immunities and then to substitute in its stead something much more cohesive which can best be described as a "territorial state." The Signoria of 1343 sought to accomplish this through a government of the twenty-one guilds which disre- garded certain traditional claims for differential treatment. Communal society was democratized to the extent that the clergy, the mnagnati, and even the arti were brought under the rule of communal law. The government became more impartial, and impersonal criteria tended to replace the ancient claims of status and family influence. Moreover, the Signoria began to assume responsibility for the disposition of various questions which hitherto had been under ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The prosecution or non-prosecution of heretics, and the punishment or licensing of pawnbrokers are cases in point. State tribunals and communal councils dealt with these two problems and acted to extend the republic's prerogatives until she was the sole arbiter of many controver- sial issues.115 The extension and regularization of Florentine authority in the contado is another manifestation of this same trend.

115 One of the first steps of the oligarchical regime that succeeded the popular Signoria in 1348 was to acknowledge that the church had jurisdiction over cases involving a charge of usury. Cf. M. Becker, Three cases concerning the restitution of usury in Florence, Jour. Econ. Hist. 17: 449-450, 1957.

If we take the word "Puritanism" to mean the identification of private and public morality, and we suggest that the men of 1343, driven by cir- cumstance and conviction, founded a regime that was essentially puritanical, then we can come closer to sensing the vitality that was at the core of this popular revolution. This energy expressed itself in the remarkable reconstruction of state finances which culminated with that imaginative tour de force-the institution of the Monte. But much more subtle was the expression of Floren- tine puritanism in other by-ways of communal life. Many political movements can be characterized by their vitality and abiding faith in the effi- cacy of public law and yet be far removed from the ethos of puritanism. It is at the moment when there is a strenuous attempt to make private morality conform to the dictates of public law that we can speak legitimately of a puritanical Flor- ence. This period most closely resembles the era of Savonarola with its enthusiasm for legislated morality. Like the Dominican a century and a half later, the new Signorica inaugurated a program of strict enforcement of communal sumptuary laws; in October of 1343, all women were required to register the various items of their gauidy apparel with the state notary, and the courts were enjoined to prosecute those who continued to adorn themselves with "such vanities." Gone were the easier days of the late thirties and early forties when those who had been convicted of violations of the sumptuary laws were able to purchase judicial dispensation for a few lire."16 Gone, too, was the more tolerant attitude towards the evils of prostitution; in the fall of 1343, communal bailiffs with whips drove the women from the brothels onto the streets where they were ridiculed and jeered at by the populace. The communal courts continued to exact heavy fines from those who persisted in their ancient profession and it was not until the collapse of the popular government that the easier morality re-

116 Guidice degli Appelli, 117, f. 1, states that action was to be taken against all who violated the sumptuary laws in accord with the communal ordinance of October 29, 1343. After this statement a list of 1,008 names of women follows and appended thereto are many of the convictions. With almost no exceptions, the violators were women of the patriciate. In contrast, when the oligarchs exercised hegemony, many of the convictions were levelled against wives and daughters of the novi cives. Cf. Atti del Esecutore, 121, fols. 2-55, 9 August- 10 November, 1349.




turned."7 Conviction of adulterers became the order of the day and condemnations of sodomites became a commonplace; houses where these illicit acts took place were burned to the ground. This was indeed a far cry from the laissez faire morality of a few years past.

The extent to which this puritan elan disturbed the proto-humanistic outlook of Giotto's generation has far-reaching implications. The last of Giotto's followers, Maso di Banco, disappeared from the scene in the early 1340's and the younger painters turned towards Orcagna and Nardo. It would seem that the harsher morality of the new Signoriat not only created an environment un- sympathetic to the growth of naturalism in art, but that the political changes in Florence brought to the fore a new audience whose tastes in art were traditional in that they preferred the ritualistic to the newer narrative forms. The novi cives, according to Petrarch, were incapable of appreciating a narrative artist such as Giotto who

117 Both before and after the tenure of the popular regime, frequent dispensations were granted to those who had been convicted of crimes against public morality. Upon payment of from two to three per cent of the original condemnation, the sentence was canceled. The fine for adultery was generally 500 lire and dispensation was given upon receipt of 10 lire. Cf. Guidice degli Appelli, 122-123.

painted au naturale."8 The new Signorica spon- sored such puritanical Augustinians as Fra Si- mone Fidati who exhorted the artists to repress the natural emotions, animation, and spontaneity of their figures in favor of formal and ritualistic composition.119 The artists of the middle years of the Trecento did indeed create figures who were aloof and self-contained; no longer did their subjects seek to communicate their deep emotions, but as Millard Meiss has pointed out, deeply stirred feelings smoldered behind their rigid masks.120 Were these the emotions that were to find expression in the puritan equalitarianism of the Spiritual Franciscans, the religious fervor of the War of the Eight Saints, and the demo- cratic zeal of the Ciompi revolutionaries of 1378? 121

118 For the appropriate quotation from Petrarch's will, see M. Meiss, Painting in Florence and Siena after the Black Death, 71, footnote 50, Princeton, 1951. Cf. also Boccaccio's, The Decameron, 6: 5.

119 Cf. M. Becker, Florentine politics and the diffusion of heresy in the Trecento, op. cit., 68. This article follows F. Tocco's dating of the delivery of Simone's sermons. For a discussion of the influence of the Augus- tinian's thought upon contemporary Florentine art, see M. Meiss, op. cit., 26.

120 Ibid., 15-16. 121 In a subsequent study I shall treat the fall of the

popular Signoria and the founding of an oligarchical government which assumed power in 1348-1349.



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