EVIDENCE CASES (Escolin) DNA Case 1. Agustin vs. CA GR 162571 June 15, 2005 Wire-Tapping 2. Gaanan vs. IAC GR L-69809 October 16, 1986 3. Salcedo vs. CA G.R. No. 110662. August 4, 1994. 4. Ramirez v. CA 248 s 590 Judicial Admissions 5. Torres vs. CA G.R. No. L-37421. July 31, Judicial Notice 6. 7. 8. On Tabuena vs. CA G.R. No. 85423. May 6, 1991 Lucido v. Calupihan Baguio v. Dejalagat G.R. No. L-28100. November 29, 1971 Tax Cases9. BPI-FB vs. CA G.R. No. 122480. April 12, 2000 10. Calamba Steel Center vs. CIR G.R. No. 151857. April 28, 2005 Rule 130 A. Object Evidence Photographs 11.Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58, November 6, 1995 Facts: On July 27, 1986, in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution, a rally w as scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Despite being denied a permit, three thousan d of them gathered at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta and started an impromptu singing contest, recited p rayers and delivered speeches in between. When the authorities arrived and no permit could be produce d, they were told to disperse. One of the leaders, Atty. Oliver Lozano, turned to his group and said G ulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators, and a commotion ensued. They eventually fled, and later, s ome of them converged at the Chinese garden of Luneta. Another commotion ensued and the loyalists star ted attacking persons in yellow, the color of the Coryistas, one of which was Salcedo. He was chased, boxed , kicked and mauled. One Ranulfo Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them, but several accused came forward and resumed mauling Salcedo despite his pleas for mercy. He died upon arrival at the Philippine General Hospital of hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic. Issue: Were the photographs of the incident presented properly given evidentiary weight despite lack of proper identification by their respective photographers? Held: Yes. Photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the ph otographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the origi nal, and its admissibility isdetermined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portray ed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent w itnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, there fore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witnesses who can testify to its exac tness and accuracy. In this case, the counsel for two of the accused used the same photographs to pr ove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the maul ing of the victim. When the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused, no objection was made by the defense, not until Atty. Lazaro interposed at the third hearing a continuing obj ection to their admissibility. The use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-pa rticipation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representation of the mauling incident was affirmed when some of the accused identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. The absence of two of the accused in the pho tographs, meanwhile, does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. However, the accused were unequivocally identified by two witnesses. Doctrine: Photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the pho tographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The y can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witnesses who can testify to its exactnes s and accuracy. 12.Adams Schook v. Hollaway (US Case), 13 A.2d 2 (1940) 1Facts: The plaintiffs brought an action in trespass against the defendants for p ersonal injuries and property damage arising out of a collision between a car owned and operated by p laintiff, Jack Adamczuk, and a car owend by defendant, Morris Cohen, and driven by Elmer Holloway. A phot ograph was presented as evidence for the plaintiffs, and Adamczuk identified the roads and buildings appearing in the picture, stating that the conditions presented by that picture truly represent the conditi ons of the crossing at the time of this accident except for the fact of daylight or dark. The photograph was offered in evidence several times, but in each case, no proof could be given as to who took it, or an y identity as to the picture, other than the physical view thereon or where the camera was standing, un der what conditions it was taken, and whether it was taken with a view to distorting it or not. The court ruled against Adamczuk, commenting that he had two days since adjournme nt last Friday, to procure the original taker of this photograph and thus establish it in the legal way with the right of crossexamination to defendants counsel of the photographer. Issue: Was the picture presented in evidence properly denied evidentiary weight due to the absence of proof as to its photographer and the conditions under which it was taken? Held: No. The rule is well-settled that a photograph may be put in evidence if r elevant to the issue and if verified. It does not have to be verified by the taker. Its verification depends on the competency of the verifying witness and as to that the trial judge must in the first instance deci de, subject to reversal for substantial error. The objection that a photograph may be so genuinely directed against its testimonial soundness; but it can be deliberately so taken as to convey the most false impression of e in his words. A photograph can falsify just as much and no more than es it. There is no more reason to exclude it on such ground. made as to misrepresent the object is is of no validity. While a photograph the object, so also can any witness li the human being who takes it or verifiIf a witness is familiar with the scene photographed and is competent to testify that the photograph correctly represents it, it should, if relevant, be admitted. Doctrine: A photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue and if ve rified. It does not have to be verified by the taker. Its verification depends on the competency of the veri fying witness and as to that the trial judge must in the first instance decide, subject to reversal for subst antial error. 13.State of Washington v. Tatum 360 P 2nd ed. 754 1961, j. Donworth Facts: William Tousin of Pasco received monthly welfare checks from the state ofWashington. In February, 1960, however, Tousin did not receive his check, which was usually mai led to and left on a window ledge in the hallway of the rooming house where he resided. The check tur ned out to have been endorsed and cashed at Sherman s Food Store in Pasco by someone other than Tousin. Caroline Pentecost, a employee at the store, testified that the initials appeari ng on the check were hers, though she could not specifically recall the above-mentioned transaction. Accord ing to her, whenever a check was presented to her for payment at the store, she was instructed by the s tore manager to initial it and then insert it into a Regiscope machine, which is designed to simultaneously p hotograph, through two separate lenses, both the check and the person facing the machine. Upon disc overy of the forgery of the endorsement on the check, the Regiscope film of the transaction was sent to the Regiscope distributor in Portland to be developed. The processed film showed both the check and Ralph Tatum, who lived in the same rooming house as Tousin, with the food store in the background. Both the ne gative and the print therefrom were admitted in evidence, above Tatum s objection. Issue: Were the authenticated Regiscope negative and print properly admitted as evidence? Held: Yes. Pentecost testified that the background shown in the photograph was t hat of the food store and that regiscoping each individual who cashed a check at the store was its standard procedure everytime a check was presented for encashment. Another witness, Phillip Dale, meanwhile, te stified as to the Regiscope process. These testimonies amounted to a sufficient authentication to warrant the admission of the negative and the print into evidence. Tatum was not precluded from attempting to prove that the individual portrayed i n the Regiscope print was not him, that it was inaccurate in any respect and that he was somewhere els e at the time the photograph was taken. However, these arguments go to the weight rather than to t he admissibility of said negative and print. The Regiscope films, coupled with the other evidence present ed, are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of first degree forgery. Doctrine: The admission and use of demonstrative evidence, including photographs , have for many years been encouraged. Such admission or rejection of photographs as evidence lies wit hin the sound discretion of the trial court. Such discretion extends to the sufficiency of identification . As to the required quantum of authentication of a photograph, some witness (not necessarily the photographer) may be able to give some indication as to when, where, and under what circumstances the photograph w as taken, and that the2photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects illustrated. The photograp h need only be sufficiently accurate to be helpful to the court and the jury. 14. Mendoza vs. Alarma G.R. No. 151970. May 7, 2008 Facts: The accused in a criminal case failed to appear in person before the cour t. Accordingly, the trial court declared his bail forfeited. The trial court gave the bondsmen a 30-day pe riod to produce the accused or a reasonable explanation for their non-production. However, two years had passed from the time the court ordered the forfeiture and still no judgment had been rendered ag ainst the bondsmen for the amount of the bail. Instead, anorder of execution was issued and the propert y was put up for sale and was awarded to the highest bidders in good faith. Issue/Answer: WON the bondsmen still go after the property, on the ground that the trial court did not render a judgment against them/Yes. Ratio: Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly provides for the procedure to be followed before a bail bond may be forfeited and a judgment on the bond rendered against the surety. There are two requisites before the trial court judge may rule adversely against the bondsmen in cases when the accused fails to appear in court. First, the non-appearance by th e accused is cause for the judge to summarily declare the bond as forfeited. Second, the bondsmen, after th e summary forfeiture of the bond, are given 30 days within which to produce the principal and to show ca use why a judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of the bond. It is only after this 30-day period (during which the bondsmen opportunity to be heard by the trial court) that the trial court may render a judgment on the bondsmen. Judgment against the bondsmen cannot be entered unless such judgment is rder of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the accused or ctory reason for their inability to do so. In this case, no such judgment was ever issued and neither has xed for which the bondsmen may be held liable. The law was not strictly observed the bondsmen s right to procedural due process. are afforded the the bond against preceded by the o to adduce satisfa an amount been fi and this violatedThe issue of good faith in buying the property at the auction sale is not materi al. Since the execution and sale of the land was invalid, the basis for which title to the land had been iss ued has no more leg to stand on. 15. People vs. Tan G.R. No. L-14257. July 31, 1959 Facts: Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and her co-accused were charged with the crime o f falsification of publicdocuments, in their capacities as public officials and employees, for having mad e it appear that certain relief supplies and/or merchandise were purchased by Gonzales for distribution t o calamity indigents, in such quantities and at such prices, and from such business establishments or per sons as written in said public documents. The truth was, no such distributions of such relief and suppli es as valued and as supposedly purchased had ever been made. The prosecution presented as evidence a booklet of receipts from the Metro Drug Corporation in Magallanes, Cebu City. Said booklet contained triplicate copies, the original in voices of which were sent to the company s Manila office, the dupicates given to customers, and the triplicates left attached to the booklet. One of the Metro Drug s salesmen who issued a receipt further explained t hat, in preparing receipts for sales, two carbon copies were used between the three sheets, so tha t the duplicates and the triplicates were filed out of the use of the carbons in the course of the prepar ation and signing of the originals. The trial court judge, Hon. Bienvenido Tan, interrupted the proceeding, holding that the triplicates were not admissible unless it was proven that the originals were lost and cannot be p roduced. Another witness was presented, and he alleged that the former practice of keeping the original w hite copies no longer prevails as the originals are given to the customers, while only the duplicates are submitted to the Manila office. Issue: Are the triplicates of the receipts admissible as evidence? Held: Yes. Under the law on evidence, the best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. The admissibility of duplicates or triplicates under this rule has long been settled. When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature o f the party to be charged thereby, produced 2 facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signatures being thu s reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others. 3Doctrine: The best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade o f evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. Carbon copies, however, when made at the same time and on the same machine as the original, are duplicate originals, and have been held to be as much primary evidence as the originals. Best Evidence Rule 16. People vs. Tandoy G.R. No. 80505. December 4, 1990 Facts: On May 27, 1986, Makati Police detectives organized a buy-bust operation, whereby Detective Singayan was to pose as the buyer. The target area was a store along Solchuaga S t. in Barangay Singkamas, Makati. Detective Singayan stood alone near the store, waiting until three men approached him. One of them, Mario Tandoy, asked Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor? To this, Detect ive Singayan asnwered yes. Two P5.00 bills, each marked ANU (Anti-Narcotics Unit), were excha nged for two rolls of marijuana. Upon consummation of the deal, the team moved in and arrested Tandoy. The marked money, as well as eight foils of marijuana were confiscated from Tandoy and an informat ion was filed against him. Tandoy was found guilty of violation of R.A. 6425. Hence, he appealed, alleging that the money was actually bet money, and that, under the best evidence rule, the Xerox copy of th e marked bills were inadmissible in court. Issue: Does the best evidence rule apply to the marked bills? Held: No. The best evidence rules applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence ru le does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. The marked money is not an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of t he Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary evidence, except in five specified instan ces. In this case, the marked money was presented solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitutionary evidence, such as a Xerox copy, is admissible w ithout need for the accounting of the original. Besides, the presentation at the trial of the buy-bu st money was not indispensable to the conviction of Tandoy since the sale of the marijuana had be en sufficiently proven by the testimony of the police officers involved in the operation, and the marijuan a actually sold had been submitted as evidence. Doctrine: The best evidence rules applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed or exists, or inthe circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence ru le does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. 17.Meyers v. US 171 F. 2nd Ed. Page 800 Nov. 8, 1948 18.Syller v. George Lucas and Co., Ltd. 797 F. 2nd ed 1504 august 26, 1986 19. US v. Balistoy G.R. No. 5791 December 17, 1910 Facts: Pedro Salazar filed a suit for the collection of a sum of money against E ustaquio Balistoy. Judgment was rendered in favor of the former, and Balistoy was ordered to pay him P275.92 , plus interest. Two rural properties belonging to Balistoy were attached and set for sale at a public auct ion on May 27, 1908. Before the auction, Bernardo Gregorio requested the deputy sheriff to exclude one of th e properties from attachment as he owned said property, having acquired it by purchase from Balist oy in 1905, prior to the filing of the complaint. Gregorio presented to the sheriff a document, at the en d of which appears a memorandum stating that Balistoy bought the land referred to from Luis Balistoy and subsequently sold it to Gregorio. Salazar filed a complaint for falsification against Gregorio and Balistoy for ha ving simulated the conveyance of the property in favor of Gregorio in order to avoid its attachment and sale. Salazar further alleged that, though the said memorandum was dated February 1905, it was actuall y written in April 1908. However, the original document setting forth the memorandum was not presented, a nd only a copy thereof was produced in court. Issue: Can a person be convicted of falsification of a document without the orig inal of said falsified document? Held: No. The issue in this case is whether the subject memorandum was falsified , having been made to appear to have been written on a date prior to the one when it was actually prep ared and simulating the sale to a third party of a land, with the intent to defraud the creditor who, th rough proper judicial process, solicited and obtained the attachment and sale of said land. Though the sheriff testified to having seen the original of the document wherein the memorandum was written, or at least the original memorandum of the conveyance, the mere exhibit ion of a copy of an unauthenticated private document cannot legally produce the effect of suspending the sale of said land inasmuch as such copy is not sufficient proof of the right of Gregorio, being a mere copy of a private 4document whose legality has not been proven. He was not able to compare the copy of the memorandum with that written on the original document, having only seen the original for a few moments. As the original document setting forth said memorandum was not presented, but me rely a copy thereof, and as it could not be ascertained who had the original of said document, nor th e exact date when it was written, doubt arises as to whether the original of the document really existed at all and whether the memorandum is an exact copy of that alleged to have been written at the end of s aid original document. Consequently, Gregorio and Balistoy cannot be convicted of its falsification. Doctrine: In a criminal case for the falsification of a document, it is indispen sable that the judges and the courts have before them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeit ed, or falsified, in order that they may find, pursuant to the evidence produced at trial, whether or not t he crime of falsification was actually committed; in the absence of the original document, it is improper to c onclude, with only a copy of said original in view, that there has been a falsification of a document which w as neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case, even the existence of such original may be d oubted 20. Compania Maritima vs. Allied Free Works Union G.R. No. L-28999. May 24, 1977 Facts: On August 11, 1952, the Compaia Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written contract whereby the union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring wo rk for Compaia Maritima s vessels at Iligan City. The contract was to be effective for one month. The company could revoke the contract before its expiration if the union failed to render proper s ervice, and it could be renewed by agreement of the parties. The company would also not be liable for th e payment of the services of the union for the loading, unloading and delivery of cargoes, which sh ould be paid for by the owners and consignees of the cargoes. The shippers and consignees paid the union only for the arrastre work (handling and hauling of cargo on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ship s tackle), but refused to pay for the stevedoring service (handling of the cargo in the holds of the vesse l or between the ship s tackle and the holds of the vessel). They claimed that the shipowner was the one obligated to pay for the stevedoring service because the bill of lading provided that the unloading of th e cargo was at the shipowner s expense. However, the company refused to pay for the stevedoring servi ce on the basis of the contract. As the union workers were in dire need of work, the contract was not t erminated, and was verbally renewed upon its expiration.The union requested recognition as the exclusive bargaining unit, but was denied . Hence, the union filed with the CIR a petition for certification. The company terminated the contract a nd entered into a new stevedoring contract with Iligan Stevedoring Association. The union filed an Unf air Labor Practice suit and picketed the wharf to prevent the Iligan Stevedoring from performing the arrastr e and stevedoring work. The company then sued the union, and the trial court awarded in favor of the com pany actual damages and other damages based on auditor s reports showing alleged losses sustained by t he company due to the acts of the union members. The union assailed the admissibility of said repo rts, alleging that they were hearsay evidence. Issue: Were the auditor s reports admissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like? Held: No. The exception to the best evidence rule, which states that when the ori ginal consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without g reat loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the wh ole, the original writings need not be produced, cannot be applied in this case. The voluminour character of the records on which the accountant s reports were based was not duly established. Moreover, in order f or said rule to be applied, the records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may be tested on cross-examination. The general rule is that an audit made by or the testimony of a private auditor i s inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like. The com pany failed to show the difficulty or impossiblity of producing the records in court and their examinati on and analysis as evidence by the court. Doctrine: The general rule is that an audit made by or the testimony of a privat e auditor is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the lik e, unless it is proved that there would be difficulty or impossibility in producing the records in court and the examination and analysis thereof. 21.Villarey Transit v. Ferrer G.R. No. L-23893 Oct 29 1968 Facts: Jose Villarama, the operator of the Villa Rey Transit bus company pursuan t to certificates of public convenience (CPC) granted to him by the Public Service Commission, sold two of t he CPCs to the Pangasinan Transportation Company (Pantranco), with the condition that Villarama shall not, for 10 years, apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the buyer. Three months la ter, the Villa Rey Transit Inc. (VRTI) was formed, with Villarama s wife and relatives as stockholders and in corporators. VRTI bought5 CPCs from Valentin Fernando, two of which was levied pursuant to a writ of exe cution in favor of Eusebio Ferrer, a creditor of Fernando. The CPCs were sold at auction, of which Ferrer w as the highest bidder. 5Ferrer then sold the CPCs to Pantranco. VRTI filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff s sale in favor of Ferrer and the subsequent sale of the CPCs to Pantranco. Pantranco, on its part, alleged that Jose Villarama and VRTI were one and the same; hence, the non-competition clause in the aboveme ntioned deed of sale executed by Villarama is also binding to VRTI. As evidence, Pantranco presented photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers, the admissibility of which was assailed by Villaram a on the ground that the best evidence were the originals themselves. Issue: Were the photostatic copies of the ledger entries and vouchers of VRTI su fficient to prove Pantranco s allegations, and thereby are admissible as evidence? Held: Yes. The photostatic copies of the ledger entries and vouchers showing tha t Villarama had comingled his personal funds and transactions with those made in the name of VRTI are very illuminating evidence. The requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the or iginal is in the custody of the adverse party are: a) the adverse party s possession of the original; b) reaso nable notice to the adverse party to produce the same; c) satisfactory proof of its existence; and d ) the failure or refusal of the adverse party to produce the original in court. Villarama himself admitted the previous existence of the files of VRTI. He said that the originals were missing and that VRTI was no longer in possession of the same. However, it is no t necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence o show that the original is in the actua l possession of the adversary. It is enough that circumstances show that the writing is in his posse ssion or under his control. It is also not required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument, u pon notice to produce it, admit having it in his possession. The party seeking its production may introduc e a copy thereof as in the case of loss because among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is when the o riginal has been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced in court. The original of the vourchers in this c ase must be deemed to have been lost, thus, secondary evidence are admissible. Doctrine: The requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the or iginal is in the custody of the adverse party are: a) the adverse party s possession of the original; b) reaso nable notice to the adverse party to produce the same; c) satisfactory proof of its existence; and d ) the failure or refusal of the adverse party to produce the original in court. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence o show that the original is in the actual possession of the a dversary. Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument, upon notice t o produce it, admit having it in his possession.22. De Vera v. Aguilar GR 83377; February 9, 1983 Facts: Marcosa Bernabe s children mortgaged Bernabe s land. Upon maturity of the mor tgage, the Spouses Mariano and Leona Aguilar redeemed the property, and were able to acquir e a title to said property. The title in the name of Bernabe, meanwhile, was cancelled. Three year s later, however, Bernabe s heirs wrote to the Spouses Aguilar, claiming that, as Bernabe s children, they were co-owners of the property and, hence, entitled to the partition thereof. They also claimed th at the Sps. Aguilar had resold the property to Bernabe. They filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot an d presented a Xerox copy of an alleged deed of sale executed by the Sps. Aguilar, selling, transferring and conveying back to Bernabe the disputed lot. The trial court ruled in their favor. The Sps. Aguilar assaile d the admissibility of the Xerox copy of the deed of sale on the ground that it was not the best evidence of the alleged sale and, hence, should be excluded. Issue: Was the Xerox copy of the deed of sale properly admitted as evidence? Held: No. Under the Rules of Court, when the original writing has been lost or de stroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unava ilability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses. Prior to the introduction of secondary evidence, therefore, the propon ent must first establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows : existence, execution, loss, contents, although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of t he court. The sufficiency of proof for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discret ion of the trial court. In this case, the trial court merely ruled on the existence and due execution of the alleged deed of sale. Existence was sufficiently proved by the xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of abs olute sale. Execution, meanwhile, may be established by the person or persons who executed it, by the p erson before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who, after its execution saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parti es to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof. However, the loss or destruction of the originals were not proved. This may be d one through the testimony of any person who knew the fact of its loss or by anyone who had made, in the ju dgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place(s) where papers of similar character are usu ally kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is in deed lost. However, allduplicates of such document must first be accounted for before using copies. Sin ce all the duplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the wr iting itself can be regarded 6as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable. Here, the notary public testified that there were 4 or 5 original copies of the alleged deed of sale. The petitioners, however, failed to account for all these copies. Therefore, secondary evidence cannot be admitted. Doctrine: Prior to the introduction of secondary evidence, therefore, the propon ent must first establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows : existence, execution, loss, contents, although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of t he court. 23.Magdayao v. People G.R. No. 152881, 17 August 2004 Facts: On September 16, 1993, Engr. Magdayao was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for having issued to Ricky Olvis a check dates September 30, 1991, in the amount of P600,00 0.00, despite not having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank, the Philippine National Bank , Dipolog Branch. Olvis alleged that, upon learning that the check was dishonored, Magdayao pleaded for time to pay the amount by retrieving the check and replacing it with two other checks. Magdayao, howeve r, reneged on his promise. Despite repeated demands by Olvis, Magdayao failed to make good the che ck s value. As evidence for the prosecution, a photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967 was admitte d by the court. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of Olvis. Issue: Was the photocopy of the subject check inadmissible in evidence for failu re of the prosecution to produce the original dishonored check? Held: No. The law says that the making, drawing and issuance of a check payment o f which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when prese nted within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of s uch insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due the reon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) ban king days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the contents thereof, especially the names of the drawer and endorsee, the date and amount and the dishonor thereof, as well as the reason for such dishonor. Under the Rules o n Evidence, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissi ble other than the original thereof. This rule requiring the production of the best evidence is to prevent f raud. If a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the best evidence was withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat. In case the ori ginal is in the custody or control of the adverse party, the latter must be given reasonable notice, and if he still fails or refuses to produce the original in court, only then may secondary evidence be presented. In this case, Magdayao never produced the original of the check, much less offer ed to produce the same. He deliberately withheld the original of the check as a bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, which he hailed to do due to nume rous unjustified postponements. Doctrine: As long as the original evidence can be had, the court should not rece ive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any c lear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. To w arrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or control o f the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, t hat he fails or refuses to produce the same in court. 24.Hutchison v. Buscas G.R. No. 158554, May 26, 2005 Facts: On October 1, 1987, the Spouses Ronald and Valentine Hutchison bought fro m V.A. Development Enterprises, Inc. a land in San Juan, Lubao, Pampanga, and occupied said land af ter a title was issued in their names. On August 2, 1989, Juanita Arrastia, the owner of the adjacent lot, sold a portion of her land to Enrique Buscas, as evidenced by a Quitclaim Deed in favor of Buscas. Though B uscas occupied said land, he failed to register his portion in his name and title remained in the na me of Arrastia. On January 10, 1995, Buscas commissioned geodetic engineer Narciso Manansala to survey his property. The survey revealed that a portion of Buscas land was occupied the Sps. Hutchiso n. Despite a demand latter to vacate sent to the Sps. Hutchison, however, the latter refused and ins isted that the area was part of their land. A complaint for accion reinvindicatoria was filed. Buscas present ed in evidence the Quitclaim Deed to prove his title over the disputed area, as well as testified on the surv ey conducted by Manansala. Another geodetic engineer confirmed the first survey with a verification plan an d report which had been made as directed by the MTC judge in the previous unlawful detainer case which h ad been dismissed. Issue: Was the Quitclaim Deed sufficient to prove Buscas ownership of the disput ed area? Held: No. The law requires that the party who alleges a fact and substantially a sserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it. Art. 434 of the New Civil Code providesthat to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real proeprty, the person who c laims a better right to it 7must prove two things: first, the identity of the land claimed, and; second, his title thereto. In this case, Buscas failed to establish both requirements. A cursory reading of the Quitclaim Deed reveals that it specified only the exten t of the area sold. Annex A of the Deed, where the entire lot of Arrastia was particularly described and whe re the specific portion of the property sold to Buscas was marked, was not presented at the trial. The D eed itself failed to mention the metes and bounds of the land subject of the sale. Thefore, it cannot be successfully used to identify the area Buscas was claiming and prove his ownership thereof. The prese ntation of the Annex A is essential as what defines a piece of land is not the size mentioned in the in strument but the boundaries thereof which enclose the land and indicate its exact limits. The surveys cannot be given evidentiary weight to prove the identity of the land sold to Buscas and his ownership thereo f, as they merely relied on the self-serving statement of Buscas that he owns the portion of the lot adjacen t to that of the Sps. Hutchison. Moreover, the rules on evidence provide that where the contents of the document are the facts in issue, the best evidence is the instrument itself. Here, the identity of the land claim ed and Buscas ownership thereof are the very facts in issue. The best evidence to prove such is the Quit claim Deed and its Annex A where Buscas derives his title and where the land from which he purchased a part was described with particularity, indicating the metes and bounds thereof. Failure to adduce Annex A in evidence or produce secondary evidence after proof of the loss of the former is fatal to his cause. Doctrine: The rules on evidence provide that where the contents of the document are the facts in issue, the best evidence is the instrument itself. Failure to adduce such in evidence o r to produce secondary evidence upon proof of loss or destruction of the former is fatal to the cause o f action. 25. Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga vs. Reyes G.R. No. 35366. August 5, 1931 Facts: The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel agains t Andres Guevarra, alleging that the latter, with malicious intent, published on page 9 of the July 13, 1930 issue of the weekly paper Ing Magumasid a sqib in verse, of which a Spanish translation was included, inte nded to impeach the honesty, integrity and reputation of Clemente Dayrit and of Mariano Nepomuceno. The criminal cases were set for a joint trial. As evidence, the fiscal attempted to present copies of the Ing Magumasid issue w hich contained the libelous article with the innuendo, another article in the vernacular published in the same weekly, and its translation into Spanish. The trial court held the copies as inadmissible, sayin g that, inasmuch as thelibelous articles were not quoted in the information, said evidence cannot be ad mitted without amending the information. The court denied the petition to amend the information on the g round that it would impair the rights of Guevarra, holding that the omission of the libelous article in the original was fatal to the prosecution. Issue: Are the copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published the best evidence of the crime of libel? Held: Yes. The general rules regarding admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The evidence must be relevant, and not hearsay. This being so, the rule of proce dure which requires the production of the best evidence, is applicable to the present case. The copies o f the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidenc e of the libel charged. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of a published article. Doctrine: The general rules regarding admissibility of evidence are applicable t o cases of libel or slander. The copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its trans lation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. 26. Ebreo v. Ebreo GR 160065 Feb. 28, 2006 Facts: Felipe Ebreo died intestate in 1926, leaving behind as his heirs his 5 ch ildren, Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and Felipa. He also left behind an untitled parcel of land in Barangay S ampaga, Batangas City, which, pursuant to the subdivision made by him, was subdivided into six lots, id entified as Lots A, B, C, D, E and F. On September 11, 1967, Felipe s heirs executed and asigned a document ent itled, Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa, whereby they extrajudicially partitioned the property, excep t the portion known as Lot No. 9046-F. They agreed that said Lot F would remain under the co-ownership of Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and the heirs of Felipa, who had already died. However, the plaintiffs w ere surprised to discover that Lot F was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Antonio Ebreo, Feli no s son. The defendants alleged that, after the execution of the partition agreement, Lot F was sold by the heirs to Santiago Puyo, by virtue of which, the corresponding Real Property Tax Declarati on was transferred in the latter s name. The lot was allegedly subsequently sold by Puyo to Antonio Ebreo, f or which a new tax declaration was issued. However, the deed of sale evidencing the alleged transac tion between the heirs and Puyo, which was claimed to have been executed and ratified in 1968 before At ty. Doroteo Chavez, was never presented. 8Issue: Was the defendants d to Puyo fatal to their claims?failure to present the Deed of Absolute Sale of the lanHeld: Yes. The defendants claim that the Deed of Sale could not be presented bec ause the copy on file with the Office of the City Assessor was lost in the fire which occurred in May 23, 1979. They presented the testimonies of Antonio Pajilan, an employee at the City Assessor s Office, Felino Ebreo, and Asuncion Aguado, the stepdaughter of Santiago Puyo. However, the testimonies are at most secondary evidence which are inadmissible c onsidering that the defendants failed to prove any of the exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and to establish conditions for their admissibility. Under this rule, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of a deed or document, the party has to prove with the requisite quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailabilit y of all the copies of the original of said deed or document. The offeror must prove a) the execution and e xistence of the original; b) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and c) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror. The annotation of the Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not sufficient proof of the transfer of property and inasmuch as the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on the defendants to adduce in evidence the original or a copy of the deed consistent with Sec. 3, Rule 130 of the Ruloes of Court. Doctrine: Under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, before a party is all owed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of a deed or document, the party has to prove with the requisite quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the original of said deed or document. The annotation of the Deed of Sale in a tax declaration i s not sufficient proof of the transfer of property. PAROL EVIDENCE 27. Yu Tek v. Gonzales GR No. 9935 Feb. 1, 1915 Facts: Yu Tek & Co. and Basilio Gonzales entered into a Purchase Agreement cover ing 600 piculs of sugar at any place within the municipality of Santa Rosa for P3,000, to be paid in adv ance. The validity of the Purchase Agreement was from January 1, 1912 up to March 31, 1912 only. It was al so stipulated that failure of Gonzales to deliver the 600 piculs of sugar within 3 months would res cind the contract, thereby obligating Gonzales to return the P3,000 to Yu Tek & Co., along with another P1, 200 as indemnity for loss and damages.Due to total failure of his sugar crop that year, Gonzales failed to comply with his obligation. As a defense, he claimed that the agreement between him and Yu Tek required delivery of the su gar from his own plantation and nowhere else. Yu Tek & Co., however, claimed that there was no su ch restriction as to the source of the sugar to be delivered. Gonzales was free to buy the sugar from the market or raise it himself, so long as he complied with his obligation. Issue: Should parole evidence be allowed to determine the true intent of the agr eement between Yu Tek & Co. and Gonzales? Held: No. This case appears to be one to which the rule excluding parol evidence to add to or vary the terms of a written contract is decidedly applicable. There is not the slightest intimation in the contract that the sugar was to be raised by the defendant. Parties are presumed to have reduce d to writing all the essential conditions of their contract. While parole evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating i nto the contract additional contemporaneous conditions not mentioned at all in the contract, in the absence of fraud or mistake. In this case, Gonzales undertook to deliver a specified quantity of sugar within a specified time. No restriction was placed as to matter of obtaining the sugar. He was equally at li berty to purchase it on the market or raise it himself. Though Gonzales owned a plantation and expected to r aise the sugar himself, he did not limit his obligation to his own crop of sugar. Therefore, the conditi on which Gonzales seeks to add to the contract by parole evidence cannot be considered. The rights of the p arties must be determined by the writing itself. Doctrine: Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all the essential cond itions of their contract. While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additi onal contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. 28. Ortanez v. Inocentes GR No. 107372 Jan. 23, 1997 29. Pastor v. Gaspar GR No. 1256 30. Eveland v. Eastern Mining Company GR No. 4976 Nov. 27, 1909 931. Chiu Chiong v. National City Bank GR No. L-7485 August 23, 1956 COLLATERAL AGREEMENT 32. Zacarias Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos GR No. 26173 July 13, 1927 Facts: As administratrix of the estate of her husband Zacarias Robles, Sr., Anas tacia de la Rama she leased the hacienda Nahalinan to Zacarias Robles, Jr. for six years. Robles, Jr., at his expense and without any right of indemnity at the end of the term, made various improvements and additions to the plant, such as new hydraulic press, reconstruction of dwelling house, building o f camarins, reconstruction of ovens, and others. Three years before the lease was to expire, Lizarraga Hermanos, a mercantile par tnership, proposed to buy all of the property belonging to the hacienda. As Robles, Jr., still had ove r two years in his lease contract, he was asked to surrender such last two years and permit Lizarraga Her manos to take possession as buyer. Lizarraga Hermanos agreed to pay him the value of all betterments made on the hacienda and to buy from him all that belonged to him personally on the hacienda. However, no re ference of such surrender of Robles rights as lessee, except in fixing the date when the lease sh ould end, nor of anything said concerning the improvements or property of a personal nature, was placed in the instrument of conveyance later executed. Robles, Jr., eventually filed a complaint against Lizarraga Hermanos for the rec overy of compensation for improvements made by him on the hacienda and the value of implements and farming equipment supplied by him, as well as damages for breach of contract. As evidence, he presented a l etter written by Severiano Lizarraga to him, in which a reference is made to an appraisal and liquidation. Lizarraga Hermanos, however, assailed the admission of the letter as being prohibited parole evidenc e. Issue: Is the letter admissible as evidence apart from the instrument of conveya nce? Held: Yes. The purpose of the parole evidence is to enforce an independent or co llateral agreement constituting an inducement ot the making of the sale, or part of the considerati on therefor. There is no rule of evidence of wider application than that which declares intrinsic evidence ina dmissible either to contradict or vary the terms of a written contract, such being deemed to superse de all oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its terms and the subject-matter which preceded the exec ution of the instrument, in the absence of accident, fraud or mistake of fact. However, such rule does no t extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous co llateral parole agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not thewritten agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and wheth er the action is at law or in equity. In this case, the deed of conveyance purports to transfer to Lizarraga Hermanos only such interests in certain properties as had come to the conveyors by inheritance, not those which Robles, Jr. had acquired by lease or purchase, or those that he had placed thereon by way of improvement. The verbal contract established in this case is therefore clearly independent of the main contract o f conveyance, and evidence of such is admissible under the doctrine above stated. The written contract is c omplete in itself, the oral agreement is also complete in itself, and it is a collateral to the written cont ract, notwithstanding the fact that it deals with related matters. Doctrine: The rule against the admission of parole evidence does not extend so f ar as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral paro le agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is a t law or in equity. 33. PNB v. Benito Seeto GR L-4388 August 13, 1952 Facts: On March 13, 1948, Benito Seeto presented to the Philippine National Bank at Surigao a check in the amount of P5,000, payable to cash or bearer, and drawn by one Gan Yek Kiao a gainst the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank of Communications. After consultation with the b ank employees, Seeto made a general and unqualified endorsement of the check, which was accepted by P NB s agency, which paid Seeto the value of the check therefore. Upon being presented to the drawee bank for payment, however, the check was dishonored for insufficient funds. PNB demanded refund from Seeto. Seeto, however, refused, claiming that at the time of the negotiation of the check, the drawer had sufficient funds in the drawee bank, and had not PNB delayed in forwarding the check until the dr awer s funds were exhausted, the same would have been paid. PNB alleged that Seeto gave assurances that the drawer of the check had sufficie nt funds with the bank, and that Seeto had made a general and unqualified indorsement thereon. As eviden ce, PNB presented two witnesses at the trial, who testified that the check was cashed due to assurance s given by Seeto and the promise that he would refund the amount paid by PNB should the check be dishonor ed. 10Issue: Should parole evidence with respect to the verbal assurances made by Seet o be admitted as evidence? Held: Yes. It has been held that any prior or contemporaneous conversation in co nnection with a note or its indorsement may be proved by parole evidence. An extrinsic agreement between indorser and indorsee which cannot be embodied in the instrument without impairing its credit is prova ble by parole. If, therefore, the supposed assurances that the drawer had funds and that the Seeto would refund the amount of the check if the drawer had no funds, were the considerations or reaso ns that induced the branch agency of PNB to go out of its ordinary practice of not cashing out of to wn checks and accept the check and to pay its face value, the same would be provable by parole, provided, of course, that the assurances or inducements offered would not vary, alter, or destroy the obligati ons attached by law to the indorsement. However, in this case, there was no express obligation assumed by Seeto that the drawer would always have funds, or that he would refund the amount of the check even if there was de lay in its presentation. Therefore, though the supposed assurances given were part of Seeto s obligation as an indorser, such assurances were discharged by the unreasonable delay in the presentation of the check for payment. Doctrine: Any prior or contemporaneous conversation in connection with a note or its indorsement may be proved by parole evidence. An extrinsic agreement between indorser and in dorsee which cannot be embodied in the instrument without impairing its credit is provable by parole. 34. Charles Woodhouse v. Fortunato Halili GR L-4811 July 31, 1953 Facts: Charles Woodhouse and Fortunato Halili entered into a written agreement o rganizing a partnership for the bottling and distribution of Mission Soft Drinks. Woodhouse was to secur e the Mission Soft Drinks franchise for and in behalf of the proposed partnership, having had already info rmed the Mission Dry Corporation of California, before the agremeent, that Halili was willing to inve st in the bottling and distribution of said beverages. Woodhouse was give a thirty days option on exclusi ve bottling and distribution rights for the Philippines. Formal negotiations between Woodhouse an d Halili began, and Halili was eventually granted exclusive right, license, and authority to produce, bottl e, distribute and sell the beverages in the Philippines. Upon operation of the bottling plant, Woodhouse demanded that the partnership pa pers be executed. Halili hedged, promising to do so after the sales of the products had been increased. H alili kept delaying and refusing to give further allowances to Woodhouse. He alleged that his consent tothe agreement was secured by the representation of Woodhouse that he owned, or was about the own a n exclusive bottling franchise. Such representation was false since the franchise had already expired and was given to Halili himself, who claimed his consent to the agreement was vitiated by fraud. As evidence, Halili presented, among others, drafts of the agreement prior to th e final one, which drafts are presumed to have already been integrated in the final agreement. The prior d rafts allegeldy showed that Woodhouse presented himself as the exclusive grantee of the franchise. Issue: Do the prior drafts fall under the prohibition against parole evidence? Held: No. As the purpose of considering the prior drafts is not to vary, alter, or modify the agreement, but to discover the intent of the parties thereto and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract, the principle of integration of jural acts is inapplicable in this cas e. The factual issue in this case is whether Woodhouse misrepresented himself to Halili. Hence, his acts or statem ents prior to the agreement are essential and relevant to the determination of the issue. Previous acts or statements are not being introduced as evidence to change or alter the terms of the agreement, but to prove how Woodhouse induced Halili to enter into it, to prove the representations or induc ements, or fraud, with which or by which he secured the other party s consent thereto. Such are expressly excluded from the parole evidence rule. Fraud and false representation are an incident to the creation of a jural act, n ot to its integration, and are not governed by the rules on integration. Were parties prohibited from proving s aid representations or inducements, on the ground that the agreement had already been entered into, it would be impossible to prove misrepresentation or fraud. Furthermore, the parole evidence rule expressl y allows the evidence to be introduced when the validity of the instrument is put in issue by the pleadin gs. Doctrine: Fraud and false representation, being an incident to the creation of a jural act, not to its integration, are not governed by the rules on integration. Furthermore, the paro le evidence rule expressly allows the evidence to be introduced when the validity of the instrume nt is put in issue by the pleadings. EXCEPTIONS TO PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 35. Canuto v. Mariano GR L-11346 March 21, 1918 Facts: Espiridonia Canuto and Juan Mariano entered into a contract of sale with a right to repurchase over a parcel of land for P360. Such right of repurchase was to expire on December 4, 1914, one year after. Two 11days before such expiration, Canuto begged an extension of tiem to repurchase th e land as she would only be able to get the money to pay Mariano within the end of the month. Mariano agr eed to extend it till December 31, as witnessed by Severino Pascual. The following Sunday, Canuto went to the house of Mariano, who promised to meet her at the house of an Atty. Mercado the next afte rnoon. However, when Canuto went to the meeting place the next day, Mariano didn t show up. Since then, Mariano has refused to carry out the alleged oral agreement, insisting that the redemption period as set in the deed of sale. Issue: Was there an oral agreement extending the redemption period, and should p arole evidence as to such extension be allowed? Held: Yes. Mariano had extended the time within which Canuto could repurchase th e land on the condition that she would find the money and make repurchase within the extended period. He cannot be permitted to repudiate his promise, it appearing that Canuto stood ready to make the payme nt within the extended period and was only prevented from doing so by the conduct of Mariano himself. The rule forbidding the admission of parole or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary , or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parole of an ag reement between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instr ument was executed, notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing, modif ying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing. S uch parole evidence does not in any way deny that the original agreement of the parties was that which th e writing purports to express, but merely goes to show that the parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent contract. It is immaterial how soon after the execution of the written contract the parole agreement was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable, it may be proved and enforced. Doctrine: The rule forbidding the admission of parole or extrinsic evidence to a lter, vary or contradict a written instrument does not apply to an agreement between the parti es, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed. 36. Enriquez vs. Ramos G.R. No. L-18077. September 29, 1962 Facts: Plaintiffs entered into a contract of conditional sale with Pedro del Ros ario over a land in QC for P600K, to be paid within 2 years. Upon a performance bond, Del Rosario was given possession of the land for development as a subdivision. He also undertook to pay for the subdivision s urvey, the construction of roads, the installation of light and water and the payment of whatever income tax may be required. Unable to pay, and to avoid court litigation, a contract of rescission was entered into . To release the performance bond, Del Rosario s partner, Socorro Ramos, was allowed to buy 20 of the lots on c ondition that she assume the payment of P50K as her share in the construction of roads and other i mprovements required in the subdivision. A new deed of sale was executed in consideration of P235,056.00 , of which an initial payment of P35,056 was made, the balance secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the 20 lots and a interest on a parcel of land in Bulacan. Ramos failed to pay the balance. Ramos claimed that the contract failed to mention certain important conditions a greed upon, such as the plaintiffs promise to construct roads in the lands to be subdivided for sale. Suc h condition was allegedly a superfluity, there being an ordinance in QC requiring the construction of roads in a subdivision before lots therein could be sold, and said ordinance was deemed part of the contract. Ramos also claims that the true purchase price of the sale was P185,000.00, not P235,056.00, the difference being the voluntary contribution of Ramos to the cost of the construction of the roads which plainti ffs allegedly assumed to do. Issue: Was there an oral agreement or understanding between the parties as claim ed by Ramos, and should parole evidence regarding such agreement be allowed? Held: Yes. The construction of the roads was a condition precedent to the enforc ement of the terms of the deed of sale for the reason that the subdivision regulations of QC requires, as a matter of law, that the sellers of land therein to be converted into subdivision lots construct the road s in said subdivision before the lots could be sold. The construction of roads in the prospective subdivision must have been uppermost in the mind of Ramos for her purpose in purchasing the property was to develop i t into a subdivision. Such is proven by the execution by the plaintiffs of a so-called Explanation along with the deed of sale, stating that P50K was advanced as Ramos contribution to the construction of the roads. Th e document specifically states that the P50K would be deducted from the purchase price appe aring in the deed of sale. The Rules provide that, when the terms of an agreement had been reduced to writi ng, it is to be considered as containing all that has been agreed upon and that no evidence othe r than the terms there can be admitted between the parties. This holds true only if there is no allegat ion that the agreement does not express the true intent of the parties. If there is and this claim is in iss ue in the pleadings, the same may be the subject parole evidence. Ramos has specifically pleaded in her answer that the contract of sale in question does not express the true intent of the parties with regard to the c onstruction of the roads. Doctrine: When the terms of an agreement has been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all that has been agreed upon, and no evidence other than the terms t here can be admitted 12between the parties. However, this holds true only if there is no allegation tha t the agreement does not express the true intent of the parties. 37. Madrigal v. CA GR No. 142944 April 15, 2005 Facts: In order to finance his wife Fermina s travel to the U.S., Jose Mallari ass igned to his son, Virgilio, a portion of a residential property situated at Olongapo City, upon assurance by t he latter that Jose could remain in the property and that his sister Elizabeth could continue operating a store thereat. Virgilio would occupy one of the rooms in the house whenever he would go to Olongapo City on va cation, and he would renovate the other room and reserve it for his mother when she comes back from t he U.S. It was also agreed upon that the property would not be disposed of without Jose s consent and that Jose could redeem the same as soon as he could. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, conveying to Virgilio the said property for P50,000.00, though it was worth much more at that time. Worse, the deed described the property as a one-storey residential house sitting on a 135-square meter lot, th ough it was actually a 2storey residential house sitting on a 340-square meter land. Eight months later, without Jose s knowledge, Virgilio, by virtue of a Deed of Abs olute Sale, sold the same property for P50,000.00 to Edenbert Madrigal, a longtime neighbor of the Mallari s. Jose was shocked when Madrigal demanded that he vacate said property. Jose then filed agianst Virgilio and Madrigal a complaint for annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him and his wife or for r edemption of the property at a reasonable price. Issue: Did the court err in receiving parole evidence to establish that the Deed of Absolute Sale is actually one of equitable mortgage? Held: No. The Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be viewed in isolation of the circums tances under which the same was executed by Virgilio s parents, more so in the light of Jose s disavowal of what the document, on its face, purports to state. It has been held that, even if the document appears to be a sale, parole evidence may be resorted to if the same does not express the true intent of the parties. Even when a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property may prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an issue the fact that the document does not express the true intent of the parties. Parole evidence then becomes competent and admis sible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the repayment of a loan. And upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court will enforce the agreement or unders tanding in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract. (Lus tan v. CA)Doctrine: Even if the document appears to be a sale, parole evidence may be reso rted to if the same does not express the true intent of the parties. Parole evidence becomes compete nt and admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security fo r the repayment of a loan. 38. Maulini v. Serrano GR No. 8844 Dec. 16, 1914 Facts: Don Antonio Serrano loaned P3,000 to Padern, Moreno & Co. in behalf of Do n Fernando Maulini. The loan was covered by a promissory note signed by F. Moreno in behalf of his own b ehalf and in behalf of his partner Jose Padern, payable to Serrano. Said promissory note was indorsed by Se rrano in favor of Maulini, who is the real creditor. Padern & Co. failed to pay at the time of the due date so Maulini instituted an action against the the company and Serrano for the collection of a sum of money. Serrano presented paro le evidence, claiming that he was merely negotiating as agent in behalf of Maulini to loan money to th e company, and that he received no other consideration for the said note other than a small amount for his services. Hence, he could not be held liable as an indorser. As there was no consideration, Serrano could not be deemed an indorser. Maulini claimed that all parole evidence should not have been admitted, the term s of the agreement having been deemed reduced to writing. The promissory note, as it serves as evid ence that there was a contract of indorsement, should be the only evidence admitted to determine the f acts and circumstances of the case. Issue: Should parole evidence be admitted to show the true intent of the parties ? Held: Yes. The prohibition in Section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure does no t apply to this case. The purpose of that prohibition is to prevent alteration, change, modification or co ntradiction of the terms of a written instrument, admittedly existing, by the use of parole evidence, except i n the cases specifically named in the section. In this case, the evidence offered was not for the purpose of varying, altering, modifying or contradicting the terms of the contract of indorsement admittedly e xisting between the parties, but to deny that there ever existed any agreement whatever. In other wo rds, the purpose of the parole evidence was to demonstrate that a relation of any kind whatever was crea ted or existed between him and the indorsee by reason of the writing on the back of the instrument and that no consideration ever passed to sustain an indorsement of any kind whatsoever. 13Where an indorser claims that his name was forged, it is clear that parole evide nce is admissible to prove that fact, and, if he proves it, it is a complete defense, the fact being that t he indorser never made any such contract, that no such relation ever existed between him and the indorsee, and that there was no consideration whatever to sustain such a contract. In this case, while the indor ser does not claim that his name was forged, he does claim that it was obtained from him in a manner which, between the parties themselves, renders the contract as completely inoperative as if it had been for ged. Doctrine: The purpose of the prohibition against parole evidence is to prevent a lteration, change, modification or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument, admittedly e xisting, by the use of parole evidence, except in the cases specifically named in the section. Where an indors er claims that his name was forged, however, it is clear that parole evidence is admissible to prove tha t fact, and if he proves it, it is a comlete defense. 39. Inciong v. CA, PBCom G.R. No. 96405. June 26, 1996 Facts: Baldomero Inciong, Jr., along with Rene Naybe and Gregorio Pantanosas, si gned a promissory note in the amount of P50,000.00, holding themselves jointly and severally liable to the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBC). Having failed to pay their obligation on the expiration da te of the note, PBC sent letters to both Inciong and Naybe, demanding payment of the debt. When neither I nciong nor Naybe respondend, PBC filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money against t he three debtors, of whom only Inciong was served summons. In his answer, Inciong attempted to adduce evidence in order to defeat the terms of the promissory note, claiming that parole evidence may should be allowed as the note was not a public deed but a mere commercial paper which did not bear the signature of attesting witnesses. Incion g alleged that he was only persuaded by third parties to act as a co-maker to the loan incurred by Naybe, w ho was allegedly interested ina certain falcata logs operation business but was unable to procure money to buy a chainsaw to be contributed thereto. Inciong claimed he only signed as co-maker for the lo an of P5,000.00, not P50,000.00, stressing that he indicated such in one of the five copies of the bl ank promissory note which he signed. He claimed that, through trickery, fraud and misrepresentation, he wa s made liable for P50,000.00. Issue: Does a promissory note fall under the Parole Evidence Rule? Held: Yes. The first paragraph of the parole evidence rule states: When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upo n and there can be,between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreem ent be a public document. What is required is that such be in writing. Thus, for the parole evid ence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form or signed by both partes. As a gener al rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject ot be varied or contradict ed by parole or extrinsic evidence. In this case, however, Inciong can adduce parole evidence to prove a contemporan eous agreement that was the inducing and moving cause of the written agreement. Inciong can prove by alleging fraud that he agreed to a loan of only P5,000.00. However, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence, which Inciong failed to do. Doctrine: For the parole evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form or signed by both partes. As a general rule, bills, notes and other instrum ents of a similar nature are not subject ot be varied or contradicted by parole or extrinsic evide nce. 40. Cruz vs. CA G.R. No. 79962. December 10, 1990 Facts: Salonga filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money in the amount of P35,000, which Cruz allegedly borrowed and of which loan only P20,000 had been paid. Cruz also alleg edly failed to comply with his part of a pakyawan agreement, whereby Salonga would be given an exclusive right to purchase the harvest of certain fishponds being leased by Cruz. Cruz, however, claims tha t the P35,000 had been received, not as a loan, but as consideration for their pakyaw agreement. It was S alonga who owed him money for actually occupying the fishpond, but failing to pay rentals for the 10 -month period. Salonga denied this, claiming that, aside from the P35,000 which he gave Cruz, he also p aid P28,000 as consideration for the pakyaw agreement, which was evidenced by a receipt. Cruz, as well as two other witnesses, testified that the receipt explained the t ransaction behind the pakyawan agreement. However, it was argued that, the receipt being very clear in i ts language in its non-reference to the transaction referring to the agreement, its tenor must not be clouded by any parole evidence which may be introduced by Cruz. Issue: Should parole evidence be admitted to explain the relationship between th e receipt and the pakyawan agreement? Held: No. The parole evidence rule is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement. As the receipt only attested to Cruz s receipt of P35,000 from Salon ga without even14mentioning the transaction which gave rise to its issuance, it is not and could not have been intended by the parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement. At most, it can only be considered a casual memorandum of a transaction between the parties and an acknowledgement of the re ceipt of money executed by Cruz in favor of Salonga. Usually, a receipt is merely a written adm ission of a transaction independently existing, and is not conclusive. Besides, Cruz and his witnesses t estified to show when and under what circumstances the amount was received. Though the word pakyaw does appe ar on the receipt, such testimonies do not in any way vary or contradict the terms of the receipt. A deed is not conclusive of every fact stated therein. A distinction should be m ade between a statement of fact expressed in the instrument and the terms of the contractual act. While the former may be varied by parole evidence, the latter may not. The Parole Evidence Rule refers to the term s of the agreement or the contractual act. In this case, the statement in the receipt is just a statement of fact, a mere acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment made by Salonga. Its reference to the amount as consideration of the pakyaw contract does not make it part of the terms of the agr eement. Parole evidence may therefore be introduced to explain the receipt, particularly with r espect to the date when the money was received. Besides, no objection was made by Salonga when Cruz introduc ed evidence to explain the circumstances behind the execution and issuance of the instrument. Doctrine: A deed is not conclusive of every fact stated therein. A distinction s hould be made between a statement of fact expressed in the instrument, which may be varied by parole evi dence, and the terms of the contractual act, which may not be varied by such. A receipt is merely a writ ten admission of a transaction independently existing, and is not conclusive. Hence, it does not fa ll under the Parole Evidence Rule. 41. Victoria Lechugas v. CA, Loza et.al GR No. L-39972 & L-40300 August 6, 1986 Facts: Victoria Lechugas allegedly bought the subject properties from Leoncia La sangue, as evidenced by a public Deed of Absolute Sale which was registered with the Register of Deeds. Le chugas claimed that the Lozas, by means of fraud, intimidation, strategy and stealth, unlawfully ent ered said properties and appropriated the produce thereof for themselves, refusing to surrender the same despite demands. The Lozas, however, deny that the properties which Lechugas bought from Lasangue in 1950 was the same subject land. They claimed that their predecessor, Hugo Loza, had bought a parce l of land from one Victorina Limor, and another adjoining land from one Emeterio Lasangue. The rema ining portion of the lot bought from Limor was allegedly the one bought by Lechugas. This was corroborated by Lasangue in her testimony, who, although illiterate, was able to specifically point out the land sold to Lechugas. Such testimony, however, was contrary to the contents of the deed of sale executed be tween Lasangue and Lechugas. Issue: Should parole evidence have been admitted to determine the land bought by Lechugas? Held: Yes. The Parole Evidence Rule does not apply where the controversy is betw een one of the parties to the document and third persons. While the deed of sale was executed between L asangue and Lechugas, the dispute over what was actually sold was between Lechugas and the Lozas. Lasa ngue, therefore, is a stranger to the dispute and is not bound by the rule. The Parole Evidence Rule applies only as between parties to the written agreemen t or their privies, and not to strangers. It does not apply where either one of the parties between whom the question arises is a stranger to the written agreement and does not claim under or through one who is party to it. Doctrine: The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoke d by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is n ot party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument o r assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. 42.Pioneer Savings v. CA GR No. 105419 September 27, 1993 TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE QUALIFICATIONS OF WITNESSES Husband and Wife; Sec. 22; Exception to the marital disqualification rule 43. Ordono v. Daquigan GR No. L-39012 Jan. 31, 1975 44. People vs. Castaneda G.R. No. L-46306. February 27, 1979 45. Lezama vs. Rodriguez G.R. No. L-25643. June 27, 1968 Facts: Jose Dineros, as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., fil ed an action for the annulment of a judgment rendered against La Paz in favor of Marciano Roque and t he Spouses Lezama. It was alleged that, due to the mismanagement by the Lezamas, La Paz was placed und er receivership, during which, Roque brought an action against La Paz for the collection of P150, 000.00, which was supposedly loaned to La Paz. Dineros accused the Sps. Lezama of entering into co llusion with Roque in obtaining a judgment by default against La Paz. The Sps. Lezama denied this, cla iming that they did not 15contest Roque s complaint, knowing it to be a legitimate obligation pursuant to a resolution of the board of directors. During trial, Dineros prayed for Mrs. Lezama to be issued a subpoena to testify as a witness. Such subpoena indicated that Mrs. Lezama was to do no more than testify as an adverse party in the case and that she would be doing so as secretary of the company who signed the minutes of the meeting where her husband was authorized to negotiate the loan. Issue: Does the marital disqualification rule apply in this case? Held: Yes. The complaint charges fraudulent conspiracy on the part of the Spouses and Roque to make it appear that La Paz was indebted to Roque. Mrs. Lezama was being called to tes tify as an adverse party witness on the basis of her participation in the alleged fraudulent scheme, whic h was as secretary of the company who signed the minutes of the meeting during which her husband was alleg edly authorized to negotiate the loan, and who made the entry in the books of the corporation. Evidently, Mrs. Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired duri ng the meeting and will be asked questions on the amtter of the veracity or falsity of the entry in the boo ks of the corporation. Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her against her husband. The interests of husband and wife in this cas e are necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the wife s own interests would tend to show the existence of collusive fraud between the spouses and would then work havoc upon their common defense th at the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the wife, to soften her own guil t, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the husband. It is argued that, when the spouses are parties to an action, there is no reason why either may not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone, and his or her te stimony could operate only agianst himself or herself. Even if such view were accepted as an exception to t he marital disqualification rule, or even as a separate doctrine, it would be inapplicable in this case wher e the main charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and a third person and the evident purpose o f examination of the wife is to prove that charge. Doctrine: A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her conse nt; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against t he other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.Dead Man s Statute 46. Reyes vs. Wells G.R. No. 30587. December 4, 1929 47. Guerrero vs. St. Clare s Realty G.R. No. L-58164. September 2, 1983 Facts: Isidro Guerrero verbally willed that the subject parcel of land be adjudi cated in favor of his son, Andres. By virtue of this verbal will, and upon his father s death, Andres possess ed said alnd and cultivated the same through his tenant, Dominador Ramirez. After the Japanese occupation, h e entrusted said land to his sister Cristina, with Dominador continuing his tenancy until Andres death. An dres heirs subsequently discovered that the land was in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero, by vi rtue of a deed of sale allegedly executed by Cristina in his favor. Manuel s heirs, the Guerreros, subseq uently sold the same land to St. Clare s Realty Company. Andres heirs are now asking the court ot annul the aforementioned sales and to aw ard the ownership of the land to them. As witness, Laura Cervantes testified as to her mother Cristin a s illness, as to a loan which Manuel had granted Cristina, and as to the fact that the land was lent to Cristina by Andres. The defendants counsel objected to Laura s testimony on the ground of Section 20(a), Ru le 130, with respect to the Dead Man s Statute. Issue: Does the Dead Man s Statute apply in this case? Held: No. In this case, no claim or demand is being made against the estate of M anuel Guerrero, and the Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such dec eased. The Guerreros are being sued in their individual capacities as claimants of ownership of the subje ct lot, which is not a part of Manuel s estate. The Dead Man s Statute cannot apply. Statutes which provide that a party in interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse party is dead or insane must be applied strictly in accordance with their express wording, irresp ective of their spirit. Section 20(a), Rule 130, expressly uses the phrase against an executor or adminis trator or other representative of the deceased person. The other representatives in the statute mea ns only those who, like the executor or administrator, are being sued in their representative, and not personal capacity, as emphasized by the use of the law of the words against the estate of such deceased persons. The last phrase convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the deceased at the time t he case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are to be asserted and defended in t he litigation by the person representing him, not the personal rights of such representatives. 16Doctrine: The Dead Man s Statute applies only against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, whose estate is being subjected to claims a nd demands. 48. Abraham vs. Recto-Kasten G.R. No. L-16741. January 31, 1962 Facts: Juan Ysmael obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham, Sr., in the amount of P 12,500.00 in Japanese currency, for which the former executed a promissory note in favor of the latter , promising to pay the loan wihtin 90 days, plus interest. Alfonso s wife, Florencio, affixed her signature at the bottom of the note as a witness thereto. Upon maturity of the note, and despite demands, however, Ysmael failed to pay. Both Ysmael and Alfonso died, leaving the note still unpaid. In the settlement of the intestate estate of Juan Ysmael, Florencia and her sons filed a Reclamation demanding payment of the amount represented by the note. Priscilla Recto-Kasten was appointed administratrix, and during the hearing before a commissioner, she objected to th e testimony of Florencio, invoking the provisions of the Dead Man s Statute. Issue: Should Florencia s testimony have been rejected for being violative of the Dead Man s Statute? Held: No. It is true that the Dead Man s Statute under the Rules of Court provides that parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against such pers on of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such decea sed person or before such person became of unsound mind. However, in this case, the prohibition is deemed w aived when the counsel for Recto-Kasen extensively cross-examined Florencia on the very matters subject o fthe prohibition. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the counsel s lengthy cr oss-examination on the prohibition matter was merely for the purpose of establishing the motive, prejudi ces and predilection of the witness. Doctrine: When the party invoking the Dead Man s Statute extensively cross-examine s the allegedly prohibited witness, the prohibition under the Statute is deemed waived. 49. People v. Francisco (78 Phil 694) GR No. L-568 July 16, 1947 Facts: Juan Francisco, who had been previously arrested on charges of robbery, w as detained in the municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro. Upon asking permission from the chief of po lice, he was allowed to go with Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel to see his wife. While waiting at the foot of th e stairs at the house of Francisco, Pimentel heard a woman scream. Running upstairs, he saw Francisco s wif e running out of the room and holding her bleeding right breast. Moments later, Pimentel saw Francisc o lying down with his 1 year-old son, Romeo, on his breast. Francisco had a wound on his belly, while Ro meo was dead, with a wound in the back. Francisco confessed to the crime in an affidavit signed and sworn to by him befo re the justice of the peace, stating that he had lost his senses and tried to wipe out his family because he remembered that his uncle had threatened to order someone to kill him for being a shame and a dishonor to the family. This was corroborated by both Sergeant Pimentel and his wife, Emilia Taladtad. Francisco later retracted his statement and imputed the crime to his wife. Issue: Should Emilia s testimony against her husband have been admitted as evidenc e? Held: Yes. The reasons why neither a husband nor a wife shall be in any case a w itness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other are: 1) identity of interests; 2) the consequent danger of perjury; 3) the policy of the law which d eems it necessary to guard the security and confences of private life even at the risk of an occasional fai lure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and 4) the danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. This rule, however, has exceptions, both in civil actions bet