121129 Motion to Strike

PLAINTIFF TOOMEY’S MOTION TO STRIKE 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

DEBORAH L. TOOMEY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CITY OF TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES,

a municipal corporation,

Defendant.

No. 2:12-CV-01100-JB-LAM

PLAINTIFF DEBORAH L. TOOMEY’S MOTION TO STRIKE

INSUFFICIENT DEFENSES AND DENIALS OF FACTUAL

ALLEGATIONS FROM DEFENDANT’S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

COMES NOW self-represented Plaintiff DEBORAH L. TOOMEY to

hereby file this Motion to Strike Insufficient Affirmative Defenses and Denials of

Factual Allegations from Defendant’s Answer to Complaint, and as grounds states:

1. Defendant asserts 15 affirmative defenses in its Answer to Complaint

for Declaratory Relief and Injunction [Doc. 6].

2. Defendant’s affirmative defenses do not plead facts or apply law to

specific claims in the current complaint as required.


3. All 15 of Defendant’s affirmative defenses are invalid under

Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 8 pleading standards.

4. Additionally, Defendant flagrantly and fraudulently denies factual

allegations based upon official documents contrary to the official documents in

paragraphs 36, 37, 40, 41, 51, 52, and 53.

5. Defendant also admits to factual allegations 12, 14, 15, 23, 50, and 65

while denying “remaining allegations in paragraph” when there are no remaining

allegations in the paragraph.

6. Defendant’s legally insufficient affirmative defenses and fraudulent

denial of factual allegations clutter and confuse the litigation needlessly, adding

unnecessary costs and delays for the parties.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Rule 12(f) provides that upon a “motion made by a party … within 21 days

after being served with a pleading … [t]he court may strike from a pleading an

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter.”1 Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). In addition, Rule 12(f) may be utilized to test the

legal validity of a defense. The motion to strike should be granted only if the

insufficiency of the defense is clearly apparent. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group,

1 Although the Answer was filed on November 2, 2012, Defendant did not serve any parties until

November 8, 2012.


Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1986). Therefore, to prevail on a motion to strike

an insufficient defense, a plaintiff must show that there is no issue of fact that

might allow the defense to succeed, nor any substantial question of law. See EEOC

v. Bay Ridge Toyota, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 167, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). “A defense

should be struck when it is clearly irrelevant and frivolous and its removal from the

case would avoid wasting unnecessary time and money litigating the invalid

defense.” S.E.C. v. Elec. Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 73 (D. Conn. 1988),

aff’d, 891 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1989).

Furthermore, broad affirmative defenses such as laches may be stricken

where these defenses are alleged in conclusory fashion without any factual basis,

thereby depriving plaintiff a fair notice of the grounds upon which the defense

rests. See Qarbon.com, Inc. v. eHelp Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049-50 (N.D.

Cal. 2004). Plaintiffs are entitled to adequate advance notice of Defendant’s

theories of defense. Without such, Defendant’s conclusory assertions must be

stricken.

Defendant’s conclusory affirmative defenses contain no factual support or

context, much less any explanation. These conclusory assertions cannot satisfy the

relevant pleading standard under Rule 8.


Defendant also falsely denies factual allegations in violation of Rule

11(b)(4), denying official documents contain language that is clearly evidenced

those documents do contain the language Defendant’s deny.

A. First Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s First Affirmative Defense asserts that plaintiffs have failed to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “An affirmative defense raises

matters extraneous to the plaintiff’s prima facie case . . . . [Other] defenses negate

an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case; these defenses are excluded from the

definition of affirmative defense in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c).” In re Rawson Food

Serv., Inc., 846 F.2d at 1349. Defendant’s First Affirmative Defense is not an

affirmative defense and fails to meet the standards of pleading of Rule 8 and must

be stricken as insufficient.

B. Second and Third Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s Second and Third Affirmative Defenses assert that plaintiffs

have failed to join a necessary party, including the United States. Upon granting of

the Motion to Remand [Doc. 8], the second and third affirmative defenses will

become moot. Plaintiff Toomey reserves the right to request the second and third

affirmative defenses to be stricken upon the granting of remand to the state court.


Regardless, this defense fails to meet the standards of pleading of Rule 8 and

must be stricken as insufficient.

C. Fourth Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s Fourth Affirmative Defense asserts that plaintiffs are not real

parties in interest and have failed to join the real parties in interest. Upon granting

of the Motion to Remand [Doc. 8], the fourth affirmative defense will become

moot. Plaintiff Toomey reserves the right to request the second and third

affirmative defenses to be stricken upon the granting of remand to the state court.

Regardless, Defendant has failed to provide any basis of fact or law in this

defense. This defense fails to meet the standards of pleading of Rule 8 and must be

stricken as insufficient.

D. Fifth Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s Fifth Affirmative Defense asserts that plaintiffs assert claims

under laws of the United States which provide no private right of action for

plaintiffs. Upon granting of the Motion to Remand [Doc. 8], the fifth affirmative

defense will become moot. Plaintiff Toomey reserves the right to request the fifth

affirmative defense be stricken upon the granting of remand to the state court.




E. Sixth Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s Sixth Affirmative Defense asserts that plaintiffs lack standing to

pursue their alleged claims brought under the public land statutes of the United

States. Upon granting of the Motion to Remand [Doc. 8], the sixth affirmative

defense will become moot. Plaintiff Toomey reserves the right to request the sixth

affirmative defense be stricken upon the granting of remand to the state court.



F. Seventh Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s Seventh Affirmative Defense asserts that plaintiffs have not

shown any cognizable injury as a consequence of Defendant’s actions. Once

again, this defense fails to meet the requirements of an affirmative defense. This

defense fails to meet the standards of pleading of Rule 8 and must be stricken as

insufficient.

G. Eighth Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s Eighth Affirmative Defense asserts that plaintiffs’ claims are

barred in whole or in part by applicable statute of limitations. Defendant advances

no legal or factual basis upon which the court could conclude that the complaint

was untimely. Defendant has the burden of at least identifying the appropriate


limitations period and raising some plausible reason why it has expired. Defendant

has not even tried to do so. This defense fails to meet the standards of pleading of

Rule 8 and must be stricken as insufficient.

H. Ninth Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s Ninth Affirmative Defense asserts that plaintiffs’ claims are

barred in whole or in part by statutory limitations on the time within which to

perfect an appeal to the courts from a final administrative or legislative decision.

Defendant admits there were no legislative actions (i.e., ordinances or resolutions)

to acquire either a recycling facility in 2007 or a solid waste collection center in

2011. Defendant also admits there were no administrative actions to either grant or

deny a special use permit for either the recycling facility or the solid waste

collection center, since application was never made.

As NMSA 39-3-1.1 allows an administrative appeal to the court only when a

statutory right to appeal has been expressly granted, Defendant is required to

identify the statute upon which the right to appeal lies. Defendant fails to do so

because there are no New Mexico statutes which give Plaintiffs the statutory right

to appeal a failure to perform a legislative action (i.e., enact an ordinance or

resolution) nor a final administrative decision of granting or denying a special use


permit available for administrative appeal since said permit was never granted or

denied.

If Defendant had either granted or denied the special use permit, Plaintiffs

would have had the statutory right to appeal under NMSA 3-21-9. As Defendant

has admitted, there was never application for a special use permit so there was no

denial or grant and thereby no administrative decision to appeal.

If Defendant had enacted an ordinance to acquire a recycling facility in 2007

or solid waste collection center in 2011, Plaintiffs still would have no statutory

right to appeal since NMSA 3-48-2 does not grant such a right.2

Defendant advances no legal or factual basis upon which the court can

conclude that the complaint was untimely or that the action should be an

administrative appeal under NMSA 39-3-1.1, and its statute of limitations, rather

than Declaratory Judgment under NMSA 44-6-1. Defendant has the burden of at

least identifying the appropriate statutes granting an administrative appeal and

corresponding limitations period. Defendant has not even tried to do so and cannot

do so as a matter of law. The ninth defense is frivolous, fails to meet the pleading

standards of Rule 8 and must be stricken as insufficient.

2 Plaintiffs have a right to referendum, however, if an ordinance is enacted. NMSA 3-14-17.


I. Tenth Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s Tenth Affirmative Defense asserts that plaintiffs’ claims are

barred in whole or in part by the doctrine of laches. Defendant’s conclusory

affirmative defense contains no factual support or context, much less any

explanation, and does not satisfy the relevant pleading standard under Rule 8 and

must be stricken.

In addition, an affirmative defense of laches in this case will fail as a matter

of law:

Whether a claim is barred by laches must be determined by the facts

and circumstances in each and according to right and justice. Laches,

in legal significance, is not mere delay, but delay that works a

disadvantage to another. In order to prove the affirmative defense of

laches, the defendant must demonstrate that there has been an

unreasonable delay in asserting the claim and that the defendant was

materially prejudiced by that delay.

Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 564 (10th

Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted); see Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1337

(10th

Cir. 1982) (noting that “[l]aches will bar relief ‘only where the enforcement

of the asserted right would work injustice.’ Hoehn v. Crews, 144 F.2d 665, 671

(10th

Cir.), aff’d on other grounds, 324 U.S. 200, 65 S.Ct. 600, 89 L. Ed. 870.

Thus laches must be determined in light of the particular remedy fashioned.”).

Simply, there has been no delay upon any of the claims.


For example, Claim 1’s factual basis is an administrative decision that

Defendant had a right to appeal until October 9, 2012. Plaintiffs filed suit one

week later which cannot reasonably be construed as delayed.

Plaintiffs are not required by any stretch of the imagination to know the

secret dealings of Defendant and to act upon those secret dealings until known.

For example, the acquisition of the recycling center was NEVER discussed at any

open meeting at any time. Although required by NMSA 10-15-1 to formulate

policy or conduct business in an open meeting, Defendant asks the judiciary to

reward this failure by barring claims for delay.

Additionally, it appears as if a failure to comply with procedural due process

and mandatory notice requirements isn’t barred for delay even 12 years after the

fact. Carter v. City of Salina, 773 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1985).

An affirmative defense of laches also requires that Defendant be harmed by

the delay. Defendant cannot truthfully assert any harm by the requested relief.

Contrary to Defendant’s frivolous assertions, the State of New Mexico does not

require municipalities to acquire or maintain solid waste collection centers or

recycling facilities, or any other form of refuse disposal plants or areas. Nor will

there be trash piled high in the streets. Nor will there be a need to drive our

collection trucks 180 miles to the nearest refuse disposal facility, since the County


has several transfer stations capable of accepting Defendant’s waste no more than

10 miles away.

Defendant’s assertion of a defense of laches is nothing less than a request to

be rewarded for secret dealings in violation of every Democratic principle upon

which this nation was founded and the State of New Mexico is governed.

The Tenth Affirmative Defense must be stricken for failure to satisfy the

relevant pleading standard under Rule 8 and is frivolous. In addition, this defense

should not be amended as it will fail as a matter of law regardless of any

amendment.

J. Eleventh Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s Eleventh Affirmative Defense asserts that plaintiffs’ claims are

barred because they seek to prevent City from performing actions it is obligated to

perform under applicable law.

Defendant advances no legal or factual basis upon which the court can make

any conclusions and fails to meet the pleading standards of Rule 8. Defendant

does not identify what action is being prevented nor under what statute Defendant

is obligated to perform this unidentified action.

If Plaintiff Toomey assumes, based upon other pleadings, that the action

Defendant claims is being prevented from being performed as required by law is


the acquisition of a solid waste collection center or recycling facility, this defense

is frivolous. No New Mexico statute requires Defendant or any other municipality

to acquire a solid waste collection center or recycling facility or any other type of

refuse disposal plant or area.

The eleventh defense must be stricken as insufficient in failing to meeting

the pleading standards of Rule 8 and is frivolous. In addition, amendment of this

defense will not cure its defect as a matter of law since Defendant will not be able

to identify which New Mexico statutes require a municipality to acquire refuse

disposal plants or areas since no such statute exist.

K. Twelfth Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s Twelfth Affirmative Defense asserts that “at least some” of

plaintiffs’ are not residents or taxpaying electors and, therefore, lack standing to

pursue claims alleging wrongful acts by Defendant.

This defense also lacks the standard of pleading as required by Rule 8. Even

upon amendment, however, this defense will be barred as a matter of law.

Although the Defendant’s wording is vague, Plaintiff Toomey assumes

Defendant asserts the Williamsburg adjacent property owners are the “not residents

or taxpaying electors” of City that lack standing.


Defendant has the duty to perform due investigation for a basis in fact or law

of an affirmative defense. Defendant failed to perform said due investigation as to

whether adjacent property owners to a foreign municipality have standing to

pursue claims alleging wrongful acts of due process violations, etc., in zoning

decisions, or lack thereof. Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-

3897. Defendant has no legal or factual basis for the Twelfth Affirmative defense,

fails to meet the pleading standards of Rule 8, is frivolous, and must be stricken as

insufficient.

L. Thirteenth Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s Thirteenth Affirmative Defense asserts that plaintiffs’ claims

are barred because the relief is contrary to public policy. Defendant does not

identify which relief is barred nor which public policy is contrary. Defendant fails

to meet the pleading standards of Rule 8 and is frivolous.

Even upon amendment, however, this defense will be barred as a matter of

law. There is no stated public policy in New Mexico to violate due process. There

is no stated policy in New Mexico for municipalities to commit ultra vires acts and

illegally govern. There is no stated policy in New Mexico requiring or even

supporting that a municipality must acquire or operate refuse disposal plants or


areas. Defendant’s Thirteenth Affirmative Defense is clearly frivolous and must

be stricken as insufficient.

M. Fourteenth Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s Fourteenth Affirmative Defense asserts that plaintiffs’ claims

are barred in by the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. Defendant advances no legal or

factual basis upon which the court could conclude that the New Mexico Tort

Claims Act is relevant. Since Plaintiffs make no claims of tort in the complaint,

the Fourteenth Affirmative Defense is irrelevant, frivolous fails to meet the

pleading standards of Rule 8 and must be stricken as insufficient.

N. Fifteenth Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s Fifteenth Affirmative Defense asserts that plaintiffs’ claims are

barred because they are made in bad faith with frivolous arguments. Regardless of

the laughability that Plaintiffs are acting in bad faith with frivolous arguments (i.e.,

the municipality must follow its own local zoning ordinances) when Defendant is

actually acting in bad faith (i.e., denying factual allegations of clear language in

local ordinances and other official documents) with frivolous arguments (a

municipality is a kingdom which doesn’t have to follow any laws), this is simply

not an affirmative defense per Rule 8 and must be stricken.


O. Denial of Factual Allegations

1. Denial of Recycling Application Boundary Survey Plat

Defendant fraudulently denies, without support, the allegation in ¶36 of the

Complaint: “In the 2009 [recycling] application, Defendant attached a “Boundary

Survey Plat” which stated “this tract is subject to easements, restrictions and

reservations of record.”

The recycling application “Boundary Survey Plat” is an official document

evidenced in this case and clearly states “this tract is subject to easements,

restrictions and reservations of record.”

[Doc. 56, p. 25.]

This denial is frivolous, contrary to evidence of official documents and in

violation of Rule 11(b)(4).

Defendant also fraudulently denies ¶37 that these “restrictions and

reservations of record” are to restrict and reserve the patent land for recreational

purposes. Said denial is not warranted upon the evidence. Whether or not

Defendant disagrees with the substance of a final administrative decision is not

evidence to deny a factual allegation based upon official documents. If the


“restrictions and reservations of record” on the land are NOT the patent restrictions

and reservations, Defendant fails to provide evidence of what those restrictions and

reservations entail.

Denying that an official document of a boundary survey plat submitted by

Defendant to the State of New Mexico as part of its application for a recycling

facility does not state what it actually does state is fraudulent at best and

demonstrates bad faith upon the part of Defendant.

Defendant’s denial of allegations 36 and 37 must be stricken and entered as

admitted.

2. Denial of the plain language of Ord. 11-9-8

Defendant fraudulently denies, contrary to evidentiary support, the

allegations in ¶¶40-41 of the Complaint: “Recycling is not listed as a permitted

right in the M-1 District” and “Recycling is listed as a “special use” in the M-1

District,” respectively.

This denial is egregious beyond compare and clearly in violation of Rule

11(b)(4) and professional conducts of code of ethics.

Even though Defendant supposedly exhibited “relevant pages and sections

of the City’s Code of Ordinances,” Defendant actually failed to exhibit ANY

relevant pages and sections of Ord. 11-9-8. [Doc. 5, p. 8, fn. 2.] However,


Plaintiffs did include in their Complaint the entire text of Ord. 11-9-8, including

“special uses” which clearly lists “Recycling” as a “special use” and not a

“permitted right.” Complaint, p. 12.

A “snip” of the codified ordinances from City’s website at www.torcnm.org

clearly establishes Plaintiffs do not misstate recycling as a “special use” in an M-1

District, and Defendant’s denial is fraudulent and frivolous:

This denial is in violation of Rule 11(b)(4) and contrary to the plain

language of evidenced local ordinance 11-9-8.

Defendant’s denial of their own local ordinance which clearly lists recycling

as special use and not a permitted right is fraudulent at best and demonstrates bad

faith upon the part of Defendant.

Defendant’s denial of allegations 40 and 41 must be stricken and entered as

admitted.

http://www.torcnm.org/


3. Denial of Solid Waste Collection Center Application Documents

Defendant fraudulently denies, without support, the allegations in ¶¶51-53

which were based upon Defendant’s official application for registration of the

Solid Waste Collection Center.

Once again, Defendant denies the “Boundary Survey Plat” states: “this tract

is subject to easements, restrictions and reservations of record” in ¶51 for the solid

waste collection center.3

Although Defendant exhibited the Solid Waste Collection registration form

[Doc. 5-2, pp. 3-7], Defendant did not exhibit the entire application form. Plaintiff

Toomey includes as Exhibit A one of the missing pages from the entire application

form referencing Boundary Survey Plat recorded as Document No. 1482, which is

the same Boundary Survey Plat included in the 2009 application form exhibited in

this case as Doc. 56, p. 25. Due to the small size of the Exhibit, the relevant

section of Exhibit A is “snipped” and enlarged for ease of reading:

3 Although required by the State of New Mexico Solid Waste Bureau to include a Boundary

Survey Plat in an application, the 2011 solid waste collection center application attached the

Boundary Survey Plat utilized in 2009 through reference.


As such, the same factual allegations remain for the boundary survey plat

submitted with the 2009 application under ¶¶36-37 as it does for the 2001

application under ¶¶51-52.

Defendant also fraudulently denies in ¶53 that the 2011 application was not

a signed statement that the solid waste collection center is properly zoned in the M-

1 zoning district. This is simply another frivolous untrue denial by Defendant:

Doc. 5-2, p. 4. Defendant’s denial is fraudulent, contrary to official documents and

in violation of Rule 11(b)(4).

Defendant’s denial of allegations 51, 52 and 53 must be stricken and entered

as admitted.

4. Denials of “Remaining Allegations”

In Defendant’s denial of factual allegations 12, 14, 15, 23, 50, and 65,

Defendant admits to the factual allegation and “denies any remaining allegations”

contained in said paragraph. However, in each of those instances, there are NO

remaining allegations in the paragraph to deny. As such, the irrelevant denial of


remaining allegations in a paragraph that do not exist must be stricken and

allegations 12, 14, 15, 23, 50 and 65 should be admitted in full.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the above-stated reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests

this Court to:

A. Strike the affirmative defenses 1-15;

B. Strike denial of factual allegations 36, 37, 40, 41, 51, 52 and 53 and

order those allegations as admitted; and

C. Strike denial of nonexistent “remaining allegations” in Defendant’s

admission of factual allegations 12, 14, 15, 23, 50 and 65;

D. Any other relief the Court deems just and necessary, including but not

limited to a pro hac vice imposition of sanctions against Defendant.

DATED: NOVEMBER 29, 2012 _____________________________

Deborah L. Toomey, pro se

211 W. Riverside Drive

Truth or Consequences NM 87901

505-315-8503

505-214-5771 (fax)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that PLAINTIFF DEBORAH L. TOOMEY’S MOTION TO STRIKE INSUFFICIENT

DEFENSES AND DENIALS OF FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS FROM DEFENDANT’S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT was

hand-filed, on November 29, 2012, which caused all counsel of record and parties pro se registered in the CM/ECF system to be

served via electronic mail. In addition, I caused to be hand-delivered a copy of said document(s) on November 29, 2012, to all

parties pro se not registered in the CM/ECF:


BARBARA SALASIN


T or C, NM 87901

575-497-9549

RON FENN

BETHANN FENN

316 N. Foch Street

T or C NM 87901

GERALD TRUMBULL

905 Pine Street

T or C NM 87901

REBECCA OTERO

558 Mims

T or C NM 87901

YARROW DANKERT

819 Ivy Street

T or C, NM 87901

FELICITAS RODRIGUEZ

6 Mud Canyon Road

T or C NM 87901

DEBRA GEORGE

822 N. Pershing Street

T or C NM 87901

JAMES C. MALLEN

600 N. Foch Street

T or C, NM 87901

PATRICK FINLEY

735 Clancy Street

T or C NM 87901

LINDA SCOTT

508 S. Pershing Street

T or C, NM 87901

PATRICIA SISTRUNK

506 S. Pershing Street, # 1

T or C, NM 87901

JOAN CONWAY

316 E. 3rd Avenue

T or C, NM 87901

JOHN PAPE

212 Austin Avenue

T or C, NM 87901

ALISON RASHEDI

214 Oak Street

T or C NM 87901

ROBERT HANSECK

316 Broadway Avenue

T or C NM 87901

WILLIAM CHARLES BENNETT JR.

560 Mims

T or C, NM 87901

GORDON MISHLER

MONICA MISHLER

AUGUSTA MISHLER

JOSEPH MISHLER

604 Sunset Ave

Williamsburg, NM 87942

GLENN M. ALLEN

610 Sunset Avenue


JOHN E. RAYBURN

LYNN LARA

611 Sunset Avenue


BENJAMIN A. SANCHEZ

BONNIE SUE SANCHEZ

206 Central Street


MARYANN WALTER

703 Central Street


THOMAS P. BARTO

GRETCHEN M. BARTO

606 Central Street


ARTHUR LEVINE

RAMONA LEVINE

500 Central Street


ROBERT R. MUNNERLYN

503 Central Street

T or C, NM 87901

EARL FOX

DIANNE FOX

DANA VILLINES

DARONDA FOX

520 Central Street


LOUIE PALACIOS

JAMES PALACIOS

500 Central Street


PHYLLIS MADISON

DAVID MADISON

MICHELLE CAMBROTO

401 Central Street


WILLIAM MATA

705 Ridge Road


AMANDA BAILEY

205 Central Street


MICHAEL W REED

MILDRED I. REED

6306 Veater Street


CHERYL HOLLINGSWORTH

100 Rio Grande


DON CHILDERS

SHIRLEY M. CHILDERS

701 Sunset Avenue


BETTY DURHAM

613 S. Broadway


MARY ROSE

706 Sunset Avenue


CAROL NARANJO

705 Carmen


JOHN B. GILLEM

LUCY FARRESTER

717 Carmen


BRUCE THOMPSON

EDNA COBLE

714 Carmen


ANN B. SMILEY

KENNETH HUGHES SMILEY

408 N Magnolia

T or C NM 87901

MICHAL SCHARTZ

675 S. Pershing

T or C NM 87901

ALFREDO BACA

MARIA BACA

201 W. Riverside

T or C NM 87901

JOSEPH JARAMILLO

MARCUS JARAMILLO

1208 Aluminum

T or C NM 87901

MICHELLE ELLINGER

427 Van Patten

T or C NM 87901

KATHE BACHTEL

590 Mims #5

T or C NM 87901


DATED: NOVEMBER 29, 2012 ____________________________________________

Deborah L. Toomey, pro se


Truth or Consequences NM 87901

505-315-8503

505-214-5771 (fax)