UNITED STATEBDEPARTMENTOF THE INTERIOR

BUREAU OF M;[NES

DISmICT C

rINAL REPORT OF MAJOR MINE EXPLOSION PISA.STERNO. 31 MINE

POCAHONTAS FUEL COMPANX' 1 ;rnCORPOl~A"l;rEDMcDOWELL COwrY I WEST VIRGINIA

(Neal' Amonate.1~aZ(W"'eJJ. County.1 Virginia)

December 21, 1957

William R. ParkDistrict Supervisor

Edwt;l.rd M. LewisFederal Coal-l\fi.ne InsPector

and

Jolm Zeleskefi'eQ,eral Coal,..Mine Inspector

Or1gi~ting Oftiee • Bureau of M;L,nesMoullt Hope.1West Virginia

w. R. Parlti Distr;i.ct SUllerv;i.sorHealth anQ, Safety Dist;t'ict C

CONTENTSPAGE-

Introduction ••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••.••.••••."••11............ 1General Information •••••••••••••••••••••• o•• G........................ 2Mining Methods, Conditions, 8nd Equipment •••••••••••••• o•••••••••••• 3

Minint; Methods •••••••••••••••••••••• c••••••••••••••• o••••••••••• 3Explosives and Blasting......................................... 4Ventilation and Gases •••o....................................... 4Coal and Rock Dust •••••••••••• ~••• CI ••• o••••••••••••••••••• o..... 6Transportationo •••••.•.••.ou •••••••.••••••••.•••••• e.00.00.... ••.••••• 8Eleetricity •••••••••••••••••••• o•• o.o.o •••••••••••••••••••• 0.... 8Illumination and.Smoking •••• G.·•• o".o ••• o •• o•••••••••• o•••o.~o••• 10Mine Rescue.o •••oo ••••••••••••••• o ••••••••.••••• o •••••••••••••••• 10

Story of Explosion and Recovery Operationso ••o •••••••••••••••••••••• 10Participating.Organizations ••••••• oooog ••••.••••.••••• " •••• u ••••• 10Activities of Bureau of Mines Personnel.G ••••oe••••••••••••••••• 11Mining Conditions Immediately Prior to the Explosion •••••••••••• 11Evidence of Activities and story of Explosion •••~••••••• o •• o •••• 12Recovery Operations.o •••• o.o••••••••• o••~•••oo••••oo•••oooo~o ••• 18

Investigation of Cause of Explos;i.on••••••••••• o.ou ••••••••••• oo ••oo 19Investigation Committee ••••~o.~.o ••••oo••••• ~.ooo ••••••••• o.o••• 19Methane as a Factor in the Explosion.oo.oo ••o.o.ooo.oo ••ooo••••• 21Flame ••••••• 0e•• "•• .:t.00•• '0 •••••• 0 ••• 00' 00 •••••• 00. 00 •••••.••••••• 23Forces·ooo•• 00 ••••• 0 0" •• 0.0•••••• ~.o ••••••••••••• IIl.O ••••• 0 •••••• 24Probable Point of Origin ••••o••••• o••••• o••••••••••••••••••.•••••• 24Factors Preventing Spread of Explosion ••••••••••••••••••••• o •••• 24Summary of Evidence ••ooo ••••••••••••• oo •• o•••••••••••••••••••••• 24Cause of the Explosion •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 26

Recommendations ••••0 •••••••••••••••••••• 00 ••• 0 ••• 0 • 0 0 •••••••.••• 0 • 0 •• •• 21Acknowledgment •••••••• "•••"•••••••••••••••.••••••• oo••••••••••••••••• 29Table 1 • Analyses of Air Samples Collected After the Explosion in

Q Left AirwaysTable 2 • Analyses of Mine Dust SamplesAppendix

A Victims of ExplosionB ••Names of Entrapped MenC ••500•.Foot W-ne Map Showing Ventilation, Extent of Flame, Forces, etc.D ••Map of the Q Left Airways and Q Left HeadingsE Map of Q Left Airways Near FacesF ••Map of No. 4 Entry of Q Left Airways

FINAL REPORT OF MAJOR MINE EXPLOSION DISASTERNO. 31 MINE

POCAHONTAS FUEL COMPANY 1 INCORPORATEDMcDOWELL COUNTY; WEST VIRGINIA

(Near Amonate, Tazewell County" Virginia)December Z7, 1957

ByWilliam R. Park

District SupervisorEdward M. Lewis

Federal. Coal-Mine Inspectorand

John ZeleskeyFederal Coal-Mine Inspector

INTRODUCTIONAn explosion occurred in the No. 31 mine of the Pocahontas Fuel

Company" Incorporated" near Amonate" Tazewell County, Virginia, about6:35 p.m." Friday, December 27, 1957. Eleven men were killed by the ex-plosion; all died from burns and/or forces. None of the other 147 men inthe mine at the time of the explosion was injured; however, 14 men, includ •.ing a foreman, were entrapped when forces of the explosion destroyed thesection ventilation facilities (stoppings and an overcast). The 14 menerected a barricade in 2 right oft Q left headings and remained behindthe barric~e unt:L~ they were rescued about 4 hours later (12:00 midnightDecember 27) by a recovery crew; these men were in good physical conditionwhen rescued.

The names of the Victims" their ages, marital status, occupations,and the number of their dependents are listed in AppendiX A of this report.

Bureau of Mines investigators believe that tbe explosion originatedin No. 4 entry of Q left airways when an explosive mixture of methane-airwas ignited by an electric arc or spark from the face electric equipment ora power conductor. Forces of the explosion extended tbrou6hout tbe Q leftairways to the junction of Q ;Left airways and Q left beadings and tben spreadright and left at tbe Q junction and were diss:Lpated as tbey traveled righttoward tbe man shaft 1i'onQ,left toward the faces of Q left headings.

GENERALINFORMATION

TheNo. 31 mine of the Pocahontas Fuel Company,Incorporated,is in McDowellCounty, WestVirginia, near Amonate,Virginia, and it isserved by the Norfolk and WesternRailwayCompany. The operating officialsof the Pocahontas Fuel Company,Incorporated, on December27, 1957"were:

A. R. MatthewsA. V. SprolesP. P. FerrettiJ. W. PeroI. M. SampsonM. E. Hall

w. J. SkewesLouis ROQ.caglione

G. L. AsburyP. R. WilliamsJ. H. JOlulsonWalter BeeneEarl Parker

PresidentExecutive Vice PresidentVice President-QperationsAssistant Vice P;residentGeneral SuperintendentAssistant GeneralSuperintendent

Chief EngineerJ;>irectorof Safety andM;i.neInspection

DiVision SuperintendentSuperintendentAssistant Superintende~tMineInspectorMineForeman

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.PocahontasI VirginiaPocahontas, VirginiaBluefield, VirginiaPocahonta.s,VirgimaPocahontas, Virginia

Pocahontas, Virgin1aPocahontas, Virginia

Pocahontas, VirginiaAmonate,VirginiaAmonate,VirginiaAmonate,VirginiaAmonate,Virginia

A total of 754 menWiaoS employed;118 on the surface and 636. undeeground; 3 shifts a day, and produced an average of 6,500 tons ofcoal daily. Production for the first 11 monthsof 1957was 1,427,879tons of coal. The last Federal inspection of this mine prior to thedisaster was madeSepteniber30, October 9~;U, 14, and 16-).8, 1957.Access into the minewas by several drifts and 2 concrete-lined shafts,265 and 530 feet in depth, into the Pocahontas No.4 coal bed, which aver-aged 78 inches in thickness in the areas being minedand dipped to thesouthwest an average of about 15 percent.

The immediateroof is generally stratified sandstone, 2 feetor more in thickness; however, at a few locations the coal bed is over-lain by 1 to 18 inches of shale. ':Cheshale and sandstone were of such anature that artificial roof support was required. cover over the coa.;Lbed ranges from a few feet to 1,000 feet in thickness. The floor isfire clay or shale. The analysi~ of a coal sample from the PocahontasNo.4 coal bed in this mine as obtained fromTechnical Paper No. 626,Analysis of Hest Virginia Coals, pUblished by the Uniteq.States Bureauof Mines, is as follows:

MoistureVol,atile MatterFixe(}.C~bo:qAsh

Percent

1.623.269~35.9

100.0

Numeroustests by the Bureau of Mines have shownthat coal dusthaving a volatile ratio of 0.12 is explosive and that the explosibilityincreases with an increase in the volatile ratio. The volatile ratio ofthe coal in this mine as determined from the a.fQrementionedanalysi.s is0.25, indicating that the dust from this coal is explosive.

There is no record of an explosion having occurred in the No. 31mine prior to December2.7, 1957. Major mine explosions that have occurredin nearby mines include:

Mine Date Location Lives Lost- - -AlgomaNo. 7 September 15, 1902 Algoma,H. v«, 17GrapeVine February 26, 1905 Wilcoe, W. v«, 7Tidewater July 5, 1905 Vivian, vl. v«, 5Tidewater November4, 1905 Vi\1.an, W. v»: 7Standard August 1, 1911 Welch, W. s«, 6Bottom Creek November18, 1911 Vivian, Wo v«, 18King ~!8.rch28, 1916 Kimball, W••Va. 10Carswell July 18, 1919 Kimball, W. Va. 7Shannon Branch No. 3 May13, 1927 Capels, W. v«, 8KeystOneNo.2 April 2, 1928 Keystone, W•.Va. 8No.1 ~e.nuary 10, 1940 Bartley, W. ve, 91Carswell January 22, 1941 Carswell, W. Va. 6Havaco No. 9 January 15, 1946 Havaco, H••Va. 15No. 34 February 4, 1957 Near Bishop, Va. 37

MININGMETHOOOi CONDITIONS,ANDEQUIJ;lMENT

Mining Methods. An entry-and ...block system of mining was followed.Multiple entries, in eets of 5 to 7 and turned at various intervals, weredriven 18 feet wide on 75... or 8o•..foot centers, and crosscuts were turnedon 75... or 80-foot centers. Pillars were recovered by an open-end ~thodand. pillar lifts were aboui; 23 feet in width.. A high percentage of coalwas recovered in this mine.

Bolts were used for ·roof support in all areas of the mine, exceptin pillar lifts where the minimumstandards for roof support required thata double row of posts be set on the open side and at least 1 row of postsbe set on the pill~ side. Posts were required to be set on 4•.foot centersand to within 4 feet of the faces. Breaker posts were set in the pillarsections, and the rOOf-support plan required that additional supports beprovided where needed. Coal was bottom cut i~ solid work, where feasible,and top cut in pillar work. The cuts, sheared vertically 9ff center,averaged about 8 feet in depth. 'Ilhe cuts and shears were madewith rubber-tired mining machines It Eleven sections were operated daily and an extracontinuous miner eection and an extra. Joy loading machine section were

3

maintained for operation while equipment was inspected and repaired andother work done on an idled section. This procedure caused each sectionto be idle for a day periodically. There were 9 sections operated withconventional loaders and 4 sections operated with continuous miners.Faults were encountered frequently and excessive grades were common inthis mine.

Explosives and Blasting. Permissible explosives were used forblasting" and the blasting supplies were transported underground in spe-cially constructed cars and stored temporarily in suitable section boxes.Incombustible stemming was used. Three top and three bottom holes weredrilled for blasting in each cut. All shot holes were charged and thenfired" usually two at a time" by means of permissible multiple-shot blastingdevices. Designated shot firers charged and fired the shot holes. Duringthe last :Federal inspection, suitable examinations for methane were madebefore and after blasting.

Ventilati9n and Gases. Ventilation was induced by 3 electricallydriven axial-flow fans~ operating exhausting and circulating through themine approx1!Da.tely 633,,000 cubic feet of air a minute. A spare fan ~sprOVided at the Johnny Branch shaft. Each fan was operated continuously,installed in,a fireproof' structure on the s1J,rface,offset from its mineopening" provided with explosion doors, a recording pressure gage" and adevice to give alarm should the fan slow down or stop. Overcasts andpermanent stoppings were constructed of' incombustible material. Temporarystoppings were constructed of lumber and/or brattiee cloth. Check curtainsand line brattice were used to conduct air in the face regions. Ventilationdo,ors were not installed in tllemine.' Each set of entries (section) wasventilated with a separate split of intake air; however, in the Q leftheadings, Beech Fork entries, and M entries, intake air was coursed throughthe center entries,of each set, split right and left near the faces" andreturned by way of the outside entries. The quantities of air reachingthe last open entry crosscuts and the intake ends 01' pillar lines duringthe October 1957 Federal inspection ranged from 6,600 to 31,,000 cubic feeta minute.

The following air measurements and methane determinations weremade during the October 1957 Federal inspection:

Cubic FeetVolume of' Methane, of Methane

Location air, c"f.m. percent in 24 Hours!

Main return, No. 3 airwayDunford shaft 152,000 0.25 547,200Main return, No. 2 airwayDunford shaft 170,000 0,44 1,077,120

4

Cubic FeetVolumeof Methane, of Methane

Location air, .c.f.m. Rercent in 24 Hours

Main return, No. 2 airway0.16 105,984JohnnyBranch shaft 46,000

Mainreturn, No. 1 airway47,000 0.04JohnnyBranch shaft zr,072

Mainreturn, No.3 airway86,000 284,832JohnnyBranch shaft 0.23

Immediate return, No.5heading - P-2 section 25,,000 0.07 25,200

Immediate return, No. 1heading - Shaft entries 26,,000 0.06 22,464

Jinmec1j.atereturn, No.7heading - Q headings 31,000 0.87 388,368

Immediate return" No. 3heading ~ K section 16,000 0.32 73,128

lmmediate return" No.3heading - Msection 15,000 0.71 153,360

Immediate return" No. 5heading - BeechFork section 14,000 0.64 129,024

Immediate return, No.1heading - BeechFork section 15,000 0.54 116,640

Immediate return, No.1heading - 0 section 25,000 0.07 25,200

According to measurementsmade'by the section foremanDecember21,1957" the quantity of air in the immediate return of IQ left airways was32,400 cubic feet a minute.

The mine is classed gassy by the West Virginia DepartmentofMines and by the Bureau of Mines. During the October 1957Federal inspec-tion, the mine was liberating methane at a caJ,.culated rate of 2,824,416cubic feet in 24 hours. Fire bosses madepreshift examinations for gasand other haz8l'ds for tb.e :1,2:00 to 6:00 a.m." shifts~ other preshittexaminations for succeeding shifts were madeon shift by the section

5

foremenduring their regular tour of duty. The regular tire bosses examinethe entire mine once during each 24••hour period. Employeestestified thatsufficient gas to necessitate shutting downthe electric equipmentwasencountered one or IIlOl"etimes daily atter December5 in the Q left airWays.However,the fire boss' record books showedth~t they detected gas onlythree times in Q lett a.irwaysduting the period fromDecember5 to 27, 1957.

Each section foremE!Jlcompletes a production and delay recorddaily; this record for the Q left a.irwayson the s.oo a.m., to 4;00 p.m.,shift December9, 1957, contains the following de].w: "1: 30 to 1: 50 p.m.,2Q.•.minute delay, gas had to clear up, c:lErcU1o1,ltwater sprays." Onthesameshift, December23, 1957, the following delay was reported: "Sh20to9:45 a.m.,. 25-minutedelay, put oil in miner-repair canvas stopping (gas)."

On-shift exam:tnat~onsfor gas and.otller hazards were madebysection foremen, assistant foremen, and the mine foreman, but records ofsuch on-shift exsm:f..na.tionswere generaJ.ly not made. In most instances,records were not madeto showhowhazards reported by the preshift exam-iners were corrected, and occa.sionaJJ.ythe fire bosses did not record theexact location where gas was detected.

Operators of electrical face equipmentwere instructed to makesuitable tests for ga.sbefore such equipmentwas taken to the working facesand frequently while the equipmentwas being operated at the faces. Thecutting-machine operators were instructed to test for gas before takingthe machines to the working faces, after cutting two•.thirds of the dis.tance across faces or ~t least every 15 minutes, whichever occurred first,and after completion of the cuts. Continuous-mineroperators were instructedto test for gas every 15 minutes or oftener if necessary. Loading-machineoperators were instructed to test for ga.sbefore the machineswere takento the faces and at intervals not to exceed 30 minutes. However,duringthe October Federal inspection, tests for methanewere not madebeforeelectrically driven equipmentwas taken into the face regions of No. 3headiJ;'1gotf No.7 heacUngQ left sectio~, left side, or in No.5 headingBeechFork section, and frequent e~nat:i,.ons for methanewere not madeduring drilling operations ·in P-l main heading.

The sect~on forewan, f~re boss, and continuous-miner operatorin the Q left airways section had flame safety lazupsat the time of theexplosion. The tbree lamps were sent to the Burea.uof Mines1a1;)oratoriesin Pittsburgh, PeIl1ls,y1vania,tor testing and exam:i,.nation.These testsshowedtbat the three lampsw~e in permissible condition, and they didnOt ignite methanein any of the 25 tests made.

Coal and RockDust. TPe following information was obtaj,ned fromthe O~tober 1957 Federal inspection report: Theminewas d,.ry,except foraccumulations of water in someof the workingplaces in the Q and P headings.

6

Water was used to allay dust during cutting and loading operations, includingdust made by the continuous miners _ Excess! ve accumulations of coal dustand loose coal were present at several locations, but this loose coal andcoal dust was removed from the mine before the close of the inspection.Excessive coal dust was not in the air during the various mining operations.Rock dust was applied in several areas during the inspection, and the rock-dust applications were maintained to within 40 feet of the faces, includingall open crosscuts, at the close of the inspection. The back entries,haulage entries, and the intake airways connected by open crosscuts tomain haulageways were rock-dusted adequately III The incombustible contentof the 12 dust samples collected from rock-dusted areas during the inspec-tion ranged from 80.0 to 97.0 percent.

According to the superintendent, the loading-machine operators'helpers were required to shovel any loose coal and dust from along theribs to the middle of the places so that the ID&terial could be loaded bymachines. If loading operations were delayed or interrupted, all of themen available on the section were required to clean up loose coal and dust.In loading-machine sections, rock dust was to be maintained to within 40feet of the faces, including the last Open crosscuts. In continuous minerplaces, the surfaces of the places were to be kept wetted to the· lastapplication of rock dust and when the miners had been moved out of tbeplaces the places were to be cleaned up and rock-dusted to within 15 feetof the faces. Four 50-pound bags of rock dust, or more if needed, wereto be distributed by hand in the area for each cut of coal removed. Gen-eralized rock-dusting was done by machines on week-ends, during idle periods,and in some cases by portable rocl~-dusting machines between shifts. Companyrecords show that 4,166 tons of rock d~t were appl~ed, and 1,4~7,879 tonsof coal were produced during the first 11 months of 1957; this amounts toabout 6 pounds of rock dust used per ton of coal produced.

After the explosion, examination of the Q left airways and theQ left headings revealed that the sections were covered with ~ layer ofcoal dust and/or soot. This layer of dust was thickest in Q left airwaysand progressively became thinner as the explosion forces were dissipatedin travelin~ into Q left headings and Q entries. Evidence that the areashad been rock-dusted was apparent throughout the sections, and excessiveaccumulations of coal dust were observed only in the face· regions inbythe haulage loops and in several other scattered locations.

Rock-dusting of the areas was the principal factor in preventingfurther spread of the explosion, and during the investigation 119 samplesof the mine dust vTere collected in the areas affected by the explosionforces (see Table e), Only ~ of the 119 samples contained more than65 percent incombustibles, and the samples with sufficient incombustibleswere collected generally in fringe areas where the explosion forces wereweakest _ None of the 35 samples collected in Q left airways contained

7

60 percent incombustibles, and only 8 of these 35 samples contained morethan 50 percent incombustibles. Twenty-one of the 84 samples collectedin Q entries and Q left headings contained more than 65 percent incom-bustibles and 26 additional samples in these areas contained more than 50percent incombustibles. The remaining 37 samples collected containedless than 40 percent incombustibles; however, the dust samples collectedwere not representative of mine dust conditions prior to the explosion,as coal dust thrown into suspension and deposited on rock~usted surfacesdecreased the incombustible content.

Transportation. Permissible •..type cable-reel shuttle cars wereused for face haulage; they discharged the coal directly into 6-l/2-toncapacity mine cars or onto belt conveyors which disc~ged the coal intothe cars. The cars were hauled by trolley locomotives to the surface.The rolling equipment was maintained in reasonably good repair. Thetracks were well maintained and the clearance space along the haulagewayswas free of obstructions. Shelter holes were provided at 80-foot inter-vals, and shel'ter holes or more than 6 feet of clearance was prOVided atsWitcn throws. Men were trans!,orted in 12 special self-propelled man-tripcars and in regular mine cars. Special self -propelled cars were providedfor transporting a few men at a time I such as officials, inspectors, andrepair men.

Electricity. Electric power,llO, 220, 440, 13,200 and 33,000volts alternating current,was used on the surface; and 110, 440, and 13,200volts alternating current and 275 volts direct current was used underground.Alternating current was transmitted by armored cables through drill holesfrom the surface to underground compressor stations, rectifier stations,and a pump room. These stations and pump room were of fireproof construc-tion and were ventilated by separa'te splits of air. Trolley, feeder, andpower Wires were installed on insulators and sectionalized W1th cut-outsWitches. The electric face equipment was permissible type and was inpermissible condition at the close of the October Federal inspection.The trailing cables on the mobile eqUipment were fire-resistant, and thecables and the mobile electric equipment were prOVided with overload pro-tection. Temporary splices in size No.1 or larger cables were made Withsplicing rings; splices in tra.iling cables with smaller conductors weremade\ by tying the broken conductors with square knots. Splices were in-sulated With rubber and friction tape and the conductors were not tapedtogether e.tthe splices. At the close of the October Federal inspection,operators of electrically driven face equipment made sUitable tests forgas before taking the equipment into the face regions and at frequentintervals thereafter.

None of the face electric eqUipment in the Q left airways wasin permissible condition 'When examined by a Federal electrical inspectorand company electricie.ns e.ftel;."the explosion. ~s eq\p.pment had major

8

permissibility deficiencies, any one of which could have ignited an ex-plosive methane-air mixture. At the time of the explosion, 3 pieces ofthe equipment were in No 0 4 entry of Q left airways, the only place beingadvanced. The face of No.4 entry was about 75 feet inby the last crosscut,and the miner was at the face. The loe.ding machine was picking up the coalfrom the floor and loading into a 9 sa shuttle car. The continuous minerhad the following major permissibility deficiencies: A bolt missing fromthe cover on each of the top and bottom contactor compartments and openingsin excess of 0.004 inch into each compartment. Other deficiencies on theminer were: Headlight not sealed and locked and the control fuses in thetop contactor compartment were shunted by wires connecting the fuse lugs.Major deficiencies in the loading machine were: Openings in excess of0.004 inch in the tranmrl.ngcontrol and reset compartments. Other defi-ciencies were: Locks and seals missing on the left head motor inspectioncover and on the left traction motor. The trailing cable had 14 splices.The headlight on the 9 sa shuttle car lacked 1/2 inch of being screwedtight; other deficiencies were: Two inspection covers on the contactorcompartment were not locked and sealed, and the trailing cable had 9splices, 2 of which were bare. ,A 6 SC shuttle car was in the last opencrosscut between Nos. 3 and 4 entries; 2 bolts were missing from the cover

'to the resistance compartment for the headlight and this compartment andthe contact or compartment had openings in excess of 0.004 inch. Otherdeficiencies on this shuttle car included: Insufficient packing in thegland, the shield on the rear headlight was loose, the trailing cable had16 splices, and the brake inspection compartment and front headlight werenot locked and sealed. The gland for the auxiliary power cable in thecontrol box for the belt headpiece was not packed adequately. The inves-tigators do not believe forces or heat of the explosion were responsiblefor these deficiencies.

The surfaces of the excessive opening into the top contactorcompartment of the continuous miner showed evidence of dust, soot, andsmoke. The outer side of the cover plate at the opening had a groove cutin it extending diagonally from the corner of the cover plate. The grooveappeared to have been made prior to the explosion and possibly by a gather-ing arm of a loading machine; this damage to the cover likely was responsiblefor the excessive opening into the compartment. Employees and officialswho were familiar with the operation of the miner stated that it could notbe determined definitely by the position of the controls whether the minerwas being operated at the time of the explosion. Tlle body of the mineroperator was found on the side opposite and about 35 feet outby the controlsof the machine. In addition, the:r:ewas no coal on the conveyor of theminer and the ripper head was about 3 inches from the coal face. Powercontrols for the loading machine and 9 sa shuttle car and other evidenceindicated that this equipment was being ope:r:atedwhen the explosion occurred.

During the October Federal inspection, repairs were made andthe following equipment was restored to permissible condition: The

9

continuous miner and Nos. 19 and 20 shuttle cars in Q right section, No.1side; the continuous miner in the Dip entries; a shuttle car in Q right,No. 2 side; a shuttle car and a mining machine in the Shaft entries; No. 7shuttle car in L-5 section; and the loading machine in K section.

Illumination and Smoking. All persons used permissible electriccap lamps for portable illUmination underground. Smokingwas not permittedor observed underground at the 'trimeOf the October Federal inspection, andsearches for smokers' articles were conducted frequently. The clothes ofthe victims were examined by the morticians, and no evidence of smokingmaterials or lighters were found in apy of t~e clothes.

Mine Rescue. A mine-rescue team was not maintained at the mine;however, a ftilly equipped and trained team wa~ maintained at an affiliatedcompany's McCo~s mines. Fully equipped and regularly trained mine-rescueteams were also available at the Gary mines of the United States SteelCorporation and at the BerWindmines of the NewR1ver and PocahontasConsolidated Coal Company. Several other mine-rescue teams and a fullyeq1Uppedstate mine-rescue truck were within a 50-mile radiUs of the mine.Self-rescuers were available for purchase by the underground employees;however, only about 6 emplOYeeshad purchased self-rescuers. Sufficientescapeways were available from each work1ng section to the surface, anddirection signs were posted conspicuously to indicate the escapeways.In ~di tion to the automatic elevator, an emergenCYstairway was providedin the Dunford ehaft. '1:'hecheck-dn and. check-out system proVided positiveidentification 1,1ponthe person of each individual underground.

Each cutting ~chine and continuotls miner was equipped with ahand.•type fire-extinguishing unit and another unit was kept at the shuttle-car discharge point on each section. Each locomotive was eqUipped with afire extinguisher. A fire-extinguishing unit was provided at each com-pressor station, substation, and at the pumproom, and an adequate quantityof rock dust was placed at air .•compressor stations, pumps, along belt lines,and at other strategic locations. Water was J;>ipedto the faces of allworking places and a steel wa.ter-tank ear of 1,000 gallons capacity, equippedwith a high-pressure Pl.UnP and 300 feet of hose with nozzles, was prov;ldedfor the mine.

STORYOF EXPLOSIONANI) RECOVERYOPERATIONS

Participa.ting Oreani~ations. Officials of the several organiza-tions who took part in the direction of the recovery work inc1\lde: A. V.Sproles, executive vice president, P. P. Ferretti, vice president" andLouis Roncagllone, director of safety and mine inspection" of the operatingcompany; James LeeberJ safety engineer, Ullited MineWorkers of America;Crawford L. Wi~son, c1'1iefJ West Virg;i.nia Depa.rtment of M;i.nes;and MarlingJ. Ankeny" d1reGtor" and JaIlleS west;f'j.elQ., assiriltant director" Bureau ofMines.

10

Five mine-rescue teams of the following companies assisted:Uni ted States Steel Corporation, American Coal Company of Allegany County,New River and Pocahontas Consolidated Coal Company, and Island Creek CoalCompany.

Activities of Bureau of Mines Pez-sonne'l.,Crawford L. Wilson,chief, Westvirg1'nia Department of Mines , notified District SupervisorW. R. Park of the explosion about 8: 50 p (lm.,Deceniber 27, 1957, and anofficial of the company advised Federal Inspector Zeleskey of the occur-rence about the same time. Park and Zeleskey notified other Bureau ofMines personnel of the occurrence. Inspector Menta arrived at the mineabout 11:00 pC/mo, and Inspectors Zeleskey and Noe arrived at the mineabout 11: 50 p om. Ins!lectors Wiley, Allen, Aspenwall, and Pendergastarrived at the offices and man shaft about 11:30 p.m., and additionalBureau representatives arrived at the mine the next day, December 28,at the following times: McGinity - 1:00 a.m.; Park and Furin - 1:15 a.m.;Vickers, Puskas, and Fumich - 7:00 aem.; W. B. Michael - 10:00 a.m.;Ankeny, \-Jestfield,and Hock - 10:30 a.m.; and Leyns - 11:45 a.JIl.Inspectors J. D. Micheal and Ulshafer reported at the mine December 30.Inpsector Menta entered the mine immediately after his arrival, and onarriving at the mine, Zeleskey, Noe, Park, and :Furin were briefed regardingthe explosion damages and underground activities; after the briefing,these men entered the mine and assisted with the r~storing of ventilationin the affected areas and the recovery of the bodies .••

The bodies of the 11 victims were recovered at various timesduring the morning of December 28; the first 2 bodies were found nearthe trolley locomotive in a crosscut between Nos. 3 and 4 entries of Qleft aiI"\'1aysoThese bodies we:j:'eremoved from the area about 3:00 a.m .•;the other 9 bodies were located inby and nearer the faces and all bodieswere removed to the surface by 8:00 a.m.

Ankeny, Westfield, Park, Furin, Lewis, Noe, Menta, and Zeleskeyassisted with the underground investigation and official hearing to deter-mine the cause of the explosion.

Infipectors Vickers, J. D. Micheal, McGinity, Fumich, Puskas,and Ulshafer participated in the underground. investigation and W. B.Michael examined the electrical equipment and circuits in the explosionareas. Inspectors Vickers, Ulshafer, and Menta remained on duty onseparate shifts each day in the explosion area; the three inspectort;lremained at the mine until permanent ventilation was reestablished inthe explosion area, January 13, 1958.

!1!.ningConditions Immediately Prior to the Explot:lion. Theweather on December 27, 1957, varied from fair to cloudy, and tJletem-perature at Bluefield, West Virginia, about 40 mi;Les by air from Amonate,Virg:!.nia,ranged fl;"oma J,.OYT of 19 to a high ot 54 degrees, Fahrenheit.

Records of barometric pressures taken by the Olga Coal Company, at Coalwood,West Virginia, about 13 miles by air frOtn Amonate, Virginia, on December 26and 27, 1957, are as follows:Thursday, December 26, 1957 Friday, December 27, 1957

Barometric BarometricTime Pressure Time Pressure-2:00 a.m. 28.25 2:00 a.m. 28.404:00 a.m. 28.20 4:00 a,m. 28.406:00 a.m. 28.15 6:00 a.m. 28.428:00 a.m. 28.15 8:00 a •.m. 28.4510:00 a.m. 28.15 10:00 a.m. 28.4512 Noon 28.15 12 Noon 28.452:00 p.m. 28.15 2:00 p.m. 28.354:00 p.m. 28.20 4:00 p.m. 28.306:00 p.m. 28.25 6:00 p,m. 28.308:00 p.m. 28.30 8:00 p~m. 28.3010:00 p.m. 28.35 10:00 p.m. 28.3012 Midnight 28.35 12 Midnight 28.25

It is believed that the slight change in atmospheric pressurewas not a contributing factor in the explosion.

The mine was idle on Tuesday Wednesday, and Thursday, December 24.26, 1957, except that men (s1,l.pervisors~ entered the mine to check the generalmine ventilation and.otller conditions. The records indicate that eachunderground working section was fire bossed prior to the beginning of thefirst shift, 12:00 to 8:00 a.m., December 27, 1957, and all conditions werere~orded in the pre shift records as normal.

Evidence of Activities and Story of Explosion. At the beginningof the shift (4:00 p.m., to 12:00 midnight) 158 men entered the mine andthey were transported in special section man-cars to their respectivesections, except that the men working in the Shaft entries section walkedfrom the bottom of the man shaft to their section, a distance of approxi-mately 2,000 feet.. Underground employees reached their respective sectionswithout mishap, and all had baen in the face regions from 1-1/2 to 2 hourswhen the explosion occurred. Conditions found after the explosion indicatedthat coal was being produced in each section in the usual manner.

Marlin Pruitt, section foreman on the 8:00 a.m., to 4:00 p.m.,shift, made the preshift examination of the Q left airways section about2:00 p.m., for the oncoming shift on December 27, 1957,;Pruitt reportedthat he did not detect gas and the air was travel:i.ngin itElnormal courseand quantity. Pruitt stated further that he did not detect gas on thesection at any ti~ during the sl!.iftbefore the explosion. However, the

12

ventilation engineer, Robert G~y, detected a small amountof gas at theface of No. 7 entry of Q lett airways early in the morningof December27.This gas was cleared promptly by tightening a check curtain.

ThomasBailey, assistant night foreman,was traveling in a jeeptoward the Q lett sections whenthe explosion occurred; Bailey was on aeurve at the mouthof Q entries, about 4,000 teet outby Q lett airwaysIwhenhe was aware of the disturbance. A brakemana,bout150 teet outbyBaUey reported that he was knockeddownby th,e forces of the explosion.Bailey traveled to a tel~phone and then notified the mine superintendent,assistant superintendeflt, and other mine officials that something, mostlikely an explosion, had oecur-redunderground. Bailey and others con-tacted by telephone all undergrouridw01;'~ingsections except Q left airwaysand.Q left headings. AD,. mellcontacted were advised that an explosion hadoecuzred and the,t they were to proceed to the surface. Thesemen, a totalof 133, were in a~eas of the mine unaffected by the e~losion and, con-sequently, were uninjured and returned to the s~face unassisted. Baileyand several others traveled t9 the mB.1l shatt and thence to tbe sU+fl;l.ce,whe.replans were madeto examinethOSeparts of the minewhere contactby teleph,one cquld ~t be madeatter the exPlosion.

A section foremat1and 9 menwere producing coal in the Q lettairw~s section whenthe explosion occurred; a fire boss was alao in thesection. Thebodies of the 11menwere foundw;1.thin35 to 300 feet of theface of No. 4 entry. It is extremely doubtful that any of these menmovedmore than a few feet after the explosion, and all were apparently perform-ing normal duties in connection with prod,uctionot: coal. ThebocUesofthe 11 menshowedthat they h.adbeen killed immediatelyby flame and forcesof the explosion.

A section foremanan<;t13 menwere performing normal coal-producingduties in the Q left headings section. whenthe explosion occurrecl. Theseentry face regions were affecte<;tonlY slightly by the explosion, but tele-phone lines were blo~ d,ownand stoppings were blownout, short;'c:lrcuitingthe intake air currents at the intersect~on ot Q left airways and Q leftheadings, a distance of 2,500 feet outby the workingfaces of Q left headings.

The section for~rna.nand the other menin the Q left hea<Ungssection. realized that an explosion had occurred, but none of the menknewimmediatelywhether the explos!on origi~ted in their section or in otherparts of the mine. The foreIll{3.nwas near the cutting-machine crew and.roofbolters, and he knewthat these menwere uninjured, The foremanand severalof the employeesvisited the workingfaces and.found the loading machinein No.6 entry. After visiting No.6 entry, the foremanand menwere certainthat the explosion did not originate in the Q ;Left headings section. Severalof the men.removedthe trailing cable p.;i.psf;romthe power source, a~d tbeyattempted to reach. the cut""out·l:!witchesto deenergi;e the powercirCUits,but theee menwere ~ble to reach the cut.out switches because of dense

13

smokeand fumes. These menthen returned to the section "dinner hole"and decided they should barricade themselves~n 2 right off Q left head-ings, They procured 2 rolls of brattice cloth and the necessary tools andtraveled to 2 right entries, a distance of 500 feet outby the faces of Qleft headings. A first barricade consisting of 4 brattice-cloth stoppingswas erected. near the faces of the idle 2 right entries. A second barricade,consisting of 7 brattice-cloth stoppings, was erected across the Nos. 1,-2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 entries about 200 feet outby the idle faces and.outbythe first barricade in 2 right entries. The stoppings were wadeof 4 and.5 layers of brattice cloth. During the erection of the barricades, severalmenreturned to their working places in Q left headings for bratt1,.ce clothand for the lighted flame safety lamps left at the faces. The 14 menentered the second barricade and remained therein for approximately 4hours; they were rescued about 12:00 midnight by a recoven crew. The14 men showedno ill effects of their impriso~nt and all were in goodphysical condition whenrescued. The en:trapped victims planned to usethe emall barricade near the faces of 2 right entries if the air in theouter barricade became contaminated.

The actions that Should be taken and the value Of barricading ;tntne event menare trapped by a fire or explosion were discussed in detailduring cOIllpaIlysafety meetings and collferences during the 6 months previousto this explosion. Duripg one of the safety meetings, the section foremantrapped in Q left headings bad discl).ssed with higher companyofficials thearea where a barricade should be erected if necessary. The 10catioll pickedas most sui table by all concerned was the area used on the night of theexplosion. The entrapped section foreman stated that the discussion onbarricading during the safety meetings contributed materia.UY to the actionsof the crew after the explosion. The entrapped mendeserve the llighestcommendationfor using good judgment in baJ:'ricading themselves rather thantrYing to escape from the section. If they had. tried to escape by waJ,.ld,.ngfrom the section to the man shaft they would., unquestionably, have diedfrom the explosion tumes.. Whenthe 14 entrapped menwere certain that anexplosion had occurred in an outby section of the mine, all were agreedthat their best chance of survival consisted of barricading themselvesunti1 rescued, and all collaborated in the erection of the barricades.

Several days before the explosion, companyofficials began makingp1ans and arrangements to reduce drastically the daily output and, conse-quently, the worldng force at the No. 31 mine. Rumorsof the impendinglayoff of a large numberof menat the NOe 31 mine spread and had beenwidely discussed by the mine employees. The rumors concerning a largelayoff were confirmed about 5:00 pom., December27, 1957, whena noticewas posted on the mine bulletin board' advising that the following menwere laid off at the end of the 4:00 pcm., to 12:00 midnight shift,December27; the notice contained the namesof about 500menand foremen,the greater p~t of the worldng force. Although most or the menaffected

14

were aware that their nameswould be on the list, there was muchdiscussionand questioning by trolley phone and telephone by menunderground to sur-face employees as to whose nameswere listed. Worklayoffs have demoralizingeffects on work habi'ts, and a layoff of this magnitude certainly would haveeffected the underground employees adverselyo Whether the demoralizingeffect of the layoff contributed to the conditions that caused the explosionwill never be kno~; however, it is highly probable that the thoughts andactions of the menwould have been effected to such all, extent that theywere less alert.

Companyt'Ules require that the boommenon each shift notifythe dispatcher located near the bottom of the man shaft whenthe crewsarrive on their respective sections and further notify the dispatcherhourly of the amoU!ltof coal loaded and amount expected to be loaded inthe next hour 0 Details regarding unusual delays or anticipated delays arereported to the dispatchero Shortly before the explosion, the boommanin the Q left airways advised the dispatcher that his crew had loadednine cars of coal. and that loading operations would be slower during theIl,ext hour, as the crew had to paul supplies. Companyofficials mentionedthat the Q left airways section was three or four cars behfnd normal pro-duction at the time of the explosion.

Altho\.tghthe boomman in the Q left airways section advised thedispatcher shortly berore the explosion that nine cars of coal had beenloaded during the shift, examination of the section after the disastershowed that the ninth car of coal had not been loaded completely and thiscar was under the belt conveyor loa4ing point" Further examination of' thesection revealed that the need.edsupplies (crossbars) mentioned by theboommanto the dispatcher had been procured, as this material was in the6 SC shuttle car in the last crosscut and adjacent to No.4 entry. Theforeman for this section on the shift preceding the explosion stated thatsuch supplies had been left on emptymine cars in the haulage loop and thatit was necessary to take a shuttle car through check curtains to procurethe supplies. The bodies of the root' bolters and shuttle-car operatorwere found in the crosscut at the 6 SC shuttle car; these menwere thelikely face employeeswhowoul<lpick up SUPPlies a.ndthe locations of theirbodies indicate that the explosion occurred just as they returned to No. 4entry or immedit;l.telythereafter.

The No.4 entry wa.sthe only place in Q left airways sectionbeing advanced December27; normally, coal produced with the continuousminer was discharged onto the floor, picke<l up'withe. Joy 10adiIlg machine,transferred into a shuttle car, therea.fter unloaded onto a belt conveyor,and then loaded into regular mine cars (see. Appendixes E a.ndF). The faceQf No. 4 entry had been advanced about 75 feet inby the last crosscut,and. the continuous miner was on the left side of the place, but it couldnot be determined definitely by the position of the controls whether the

15

miner wasbeing operated whenthe igmtion occurred. Therewasno coalon the miner conveyor1 the ripper head was about 3 inches fromthe coalface, and the operatorts bodywas found on the side opposite and about35 feet oatby the controls of the machine. Powercontrols for the loadingmachineand,9 SCshuttle car indicated that this equj.pmentwasbeing oper--ated,and the conveyoron the loader was full of coal and the shuttle carwas nearly loaded whenthe explosion occurred; the shuttle car was apparentlyforced, or movedoutby a short distance and lodged against the corner of thecrosscut rib. Thebody of the loader operator. was found near the machinecontrols, and the shuttle..car operator's body (mecha.rU.c)was a few feetoutby the controls of the shuttle car. Therewas no coal on the beltconveyor, and the body of the boommanwas near the belt controls. Thehaulage crewarrived on the section only a shozottime before the explosion;the bodies of the brakemanand motormanwere at the locomotiveon the turninto the haulage loop. It is believed tbat the fire boss rode to the workingsection with the haulage crewand that he did not have time to examinetheface areas; the bodies of the section foremanand,the fire boss were foundalong the conveyorjust inby the belt drtves.

Evidenceof a large quantity of gas having burned in the faceregions or Q left airways proves unquestionabJ.ythat gas accumulatedinmost of these entries. This gas accumula.tioncould,have occurred onlyas a result of a ventilation interruption or a short~circuiting of theair current from someof the workingplaces l» Themethodof ventilatingthe area and,examinationafter the explosion indicate that the most logicalexplanation for such short-circuiting is that the check curtains 1.D No. 3entry were open for sometime previous to the explosion.

During the March1957 Federal inspection of the mine, the Q leftairways section wasbeing operated with a conventional loading machineandaccessories. The section was ventilated with a separate split of air;intake air was conducted,to the face regions through ~Tos.4, 5, 6, and 7entries and Nos. 1, 2, and 3 entries were used as return airways. Intakeair was conducted.to No. 7 entry by meansof check curtains; thereafterby meansof line curtain to the face; and thence progressively to thefaces of Nos. 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 entries. About1 percent of methanewaspresent in the immediatereturn (No~1 entry) during the inspection, andit is an accepted fact tha.t air coursed along solid ribs in the PocahontasNo.4 coal bed becomescontaminatedwith methane" Becauseof the relativelyhigh percentage of methanein the immediatereturn and the contaminatingof the intake air with methanebefore it reached the first workingface,the Fede;r:alinspector recommendedverbally and in his report of the inspec-tion that the 'Q left airways section should be ventilated with two splitsof intake air. The inspector suggested that intake air be coursed throughthe three center entries, split right ano.left near the workingfaces, andreturned through the outside entries II Several days atter the inspectionwas completed, the Q left airways section was abaudonedand the face elec--tric equipmentwas removed,and workhad not been resumedin the Q leftairways section whenthe minewas examinedby a Federal inspector in Juneand October 1957.

16

The analytical results of an air sample collected during theMarchinspection in intake air in No. 7 entry before the air reached thefirst 'Workingface contained 0.21 percent methane, indicating that theintake air wasbeing contaminatedwitb metbanebefore it reached 1ihefirstworkin~face. Anair sample collected in the 1mInediatereturn of thesplit (No.1 entry) during tlle aameinspection contained 0.94 percentmethanein 15,,000cubic feet of air So minute. The analytical results ofthese air sampleswere received.after tbe section was tempo:J."arilyabandoned.

OnDecember5" 1957, coal production with a continuous miner wasresumedin the section., Additional airways had.been provided and afterseveral days operation the quantity of air ventilating the section wasincreased from 15,000 to 32,,500cubic feet a minute, but coursing of theair through the face regions 'Wasthe sameas in Marchwhenthe section wasabandonedtemporarily. Onthe day of the explosion" 9 permanentstoppingshad been erected betweenNos. 5 and 6 entries, an additional stopping hadbeen partly completed"and cinder blocks had been placed in 2 additionalcrosscuts. Completionof the 3 aforementioned stoppings and minor changesin check curtains and line brattice 'Wouldhave permitted the Q ;Left airwayssection to be ventilated with 2 air splits. Local managementofficialsstated during the investigation that the Secondsplit in the section wasbeing provided because theY planned to movea second contdnuousminer intothe section as soon as the second split of ~r was provided.

Face employeesin the Q left airways section testified duringthe investigation that the workipgfaces had not been ventilated adequatelyfrom the time the section resumedoperations until the explosion·and tbatgas was encountered daily fromDecember5 until the day of the explosion,December27. These employeesstated further that on several occasionssufficient gas had been encountered to neces~itate sbutting downthe faceelectric equipmentfor as much8S a balf-hour. Compressedair was usedon at least two occasions to removegas from a workingface. The under-groundofficials differed somewith face emplo;lees on the adequacyofface ventilation in the Q left airways section" but these foremenagreedthat gas had been encountered in the workingplaces frequently and on sev-eral occasions in sufficient quantities to necessitate shutting down~ectricequipment. Officials and employeesstated that it was necessary to tightenand/or repair check curtains and/or line brattice before tbe gas could becleared from the workingface on each occasion.

The e:x:plodondestroyed approximately 7), Goncrete-block stoppings"1 overcast" 1 regulator" and·5 canvas check curtains. Trolley wire, tele-phone lines, and a compressedair pipe line were blowndownat seve;-allocations. Ametal cover was 'QlovlP.off the locomotive and a reel of' feederwire wasblownoutward for appro~tely JoSO feet in the Q left airways.Damageto equipmentwas I+egligible. .

17

The explosion resulted. in loss of production from the entireIDinefrom December'Z7until January 6, when3 worltingsections resumedoperations. Seven other working sections were ready for operation onJanuary 6, but market conditions did not permit operation of these sections.Permanentventilation was restored in the 2 affected sections, Q leftairways and Q left beadings, January 13, 1958, and tbese sections werecleaned up and rock-dusted .• the electric face equipmentwas restored topermissible condition, and the sections resumednormal coal-producingoperations January 23, 1958.

RecoveryOperations• Immediatelyafter being notified of theexplosion Paul R. WIlliams, mine superintendent, advised higher companyofficials of the occurrence and then proceeded to the man-shaft opem.Dgs.Uponarriving at the manshaft I Williams had the ventilating fans ~xaminedithe examination revealed that the fans were apparently not damaged.and wereoperati~ sa.tisfactorily. t-lhenWiUiamsreceived the information regardingventilation in the Q left airways and Q left headings, he inS'tructed there.covery crew to explore the area leading to the. Q left he.adinss. Explora-tion in this area quickly revealed stoppings blown out.. tp.e first suchstoppings were out on the right side of the Q left headings at the inter-section of Q left airways. This crew of menerected temporarybrattice-cloth stoppings in the crosscuts to restore ventilation and permit traveland exploration into the 'Q left headings. This procedure was followed andpermitted rapid advance into the area. where the 14 menwere barricaded.After the 14 barricaded. menwere rescued and sent to the surface, therecovery crewwas instructed to proceed ~nto the Q left ~i:rwa.yssectionand to reestabJ,ish ventilation by meansof temporarybrattice-cloth stoppingsif they found stopp:1ngsblownout. The recovery crews were supplementedbyh:1ghercompanyofficials and representatives of the WestV;i.rginiaDepartll1entof Mines, Un!ted MineWorkersof America.,and the Bu,reauof Mines, each ofwhompro~eded undergroundsbortly after his arrival at the mine. Atterthe necessary teats were madein the returns at the mouthof the entries,the recovery creWSaccompanied.by 2 mine-rescue teams.advancedinto the Qleft airways. '!'his recovery crew replaced several blown-out stoppings withtemporary brattice-cloth stoppings to restore ventilation, permit tra.veJ.,and establishment of a fresh..air base in No.3 entry, directly oppositethe overcast (see AppendixD). Amine-rescue team, weanng oJCYgen-breathingapparatuliI, explored each intake and return entry and cX'Osscutfor a distanceof about 450 feet inby the fresh-a1r base. '!'heteam then returned to thefresh-air base and reported their· findings to the men.directing the recoverywork. As fires were no'l;encountered, tbe explO1'edarea was cleared of gasby installing check curtains across the Nos. 4, 5, and.6 entries. '!'hisprocedure was followed as the party advancedtoward the faces of the Qleft airways. Fresh.•.air bases were movedinbyas rapidly as the areaswere explored and cleared of methane. The procedure of reestablish:1ngventilat:i.on only in the explored parts of the Q, left airways section lessenedthe possibility of forcing an explosive'm1xtl.n"eof methane-air ove:ran un-discovered fire or fires. Ventilat:Lonto· the faces of the Q left airways

18

entriee was reestablished and the areas near the faces were examined by6:00 a.m., December 28. The bodies of the 11 victims were located andremoved from the face areas by 7:00 a.m.

Recovery operations in and exploration of the Q left headingswere similar to those followed in the Q left airways. Fresh-air baseswere established and oxygen-breathing apparatus crews explored each entryand crosscut for a distance of about 450 feet inby the fresh-air basebefore ventilation was restored in the area.

CompanY and union representatives and state and Federal inspectorsexplored the Q left airways and the Q left headings as ventilation wasreestablished. Restoring ventilation in these entries was relativelysimple, as blown-out stoppings were replaced rapidly with temporary stop-pings constructed of brattice cloth.

A crew of men began replacing an overcast and permanent stoppings1n the Q left airways and per.man~nt stoppings in Q left headings onDecember 20, 1957. Additional men began cleaning up and rock.dusting theaffected sections January 4, 1958.

On January 13, 1958, 17 days after the explosion, and afterventilation was reestablished essentially as it had been prior to theexplosion, an air sample was collected in air returning from the facesin each of the Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 entries of Q left airways. Themethane content of the air samples collected in these 6 entries rangedfrom 0.11 to 0.25 percent in 6,100 to 10,900 cubic feet of air a minute,even though coal had not been produced in the area for 17 days, new checkcurtains and line brattice had been installed, equipment had not passedthrough checks or line brattice, and more air was reaching the workingfaces than normally. An air sample was also collected in the immediatesplit return in No. 1ent1'Y, and the methane content of this sample was0.18 percent in 26,000 cubic feet of air a minute (see Table 1). Theseair samples show clearly that large amounts of methane are liberating inthe area and the working faces can be kept reasonably clear of gas onlywhen continuous and large volumes of air are sweeping the work;Lng faces.

After the aforementioned air samples were collected, two separatesplits of intake air were prOVided to ventilate the Q left airways section.Intake air was coursed through the center entries, split right and leftnear the faces, and returned thrOUgh the outside entries. At that time,21,600 cubic feet of air a minute was measured in the right split, No.7entry and 17,300 cubic feet of air am:f,nute was measured in the left split,No. 1 entry. Air samples were collected in the innnediate returns; the leftand right splits contained 0 •.08 and 0.10 percent methane, respectively.

INVESTIGATION OF CAUSE OF EXPlQSIONInvestigation Committee. The underground investigation of the

cause of the expl.osionwas·conducted on December 28, 1957, and January 2,1958. Members of 1ihe official invest+gation committee were:

19

West Virginia l?e}?artmentof Mines

CrawfordL. Wilsonr- W.C. SturgillD. J. LeeJ. A. PhilpottNormanRatliff

ChiefAssistant to the ChiefInspector-at-LargeInspector-at-LargeDistrict Inspector

Pocahontas .Fuel CopwS, Incorporated

P. P. FerrettiJ. W. PeroI. M. SampsonM. E. HallLouis RoncaglicneG. L. AsburyP. R. WilliamsR. J. BaUgh

Vice PresidentAssistant Vice PresidentGeneral SuperintendentAssistaJlt General SuperintendentDirector of Safety and MineInspectionDivision SuperintendentSuperintendentVentilation Engineer

Un!ted MineWorkersof America

J8.lJleSLeeberI Jr.C. H. PhillipsThomasVernonWalter BeaversWilliam Duty

Safety Engineer, District 29Field Representative, District 29Safety CommitteemanSafety CommitteemanSafety Committeeman

United States Bureau of Mines• e~ I ~

M. J. AnkenyJamesWestfieldW.R. ParkJohn ZeleskeyFrank FurinElwoodMentaGeorgeNoeE. M. Lewis

DirectorAssistant Director--Health and SafetyDistrict SupervisorFederal Coal-MineInspectorFederal Coal-MineInspectorFederal Coal-MineInspectorFederal Coal-MineInspectorFederal Coal-MineInspector

Man1other representatives of the aforementioned organizationsparticipated in the different phases of the underground investigation ofthe disaster. Bureau of Mines representatives included: Messrs. Vickers,McGinity, Ulshafer, Puskas, Fumich, J. D. Micheal, and W.•B. Michael.

CrawfordL. Wilson, chief of the WestVirginia DepartmentofMines, conducted an official inqu:f,ryand investigation of the explosionby interrogating a numberof officials al1demployeesof the companyinthe mine offices at Amonate,Virginia, December31, 1957• The purposeof the inquiry was to hear and record all testimony relevant to concUtions

20

and practices in the mineprior to and on December27, and to determinetherefrom, if possible, the cause Of the explosion. Someof the informa-tion thus obtained is included in this report. Representatives of theoperating compaIlY,United MineWorkersof America,WestVirginia Departmentof Mines, and Bureau of Mipes qu~stioned the officials and employeesduringthe inquiry. The fo~lowingmenrepresented the several organi~tions duringthe inquiry.

CraWfordL. WilsonL. M.Morris

WeetVirg1nia Deertment of Minest -, - , -. _ i _ .j .

ChiefAssistant Chief

P. P. FerrettiJ. W.Pero

Pocah0l\tasFue:l.C05!!&, Xncoliorated

Vice P:t"esidentAssistant Vice President

United MineWorke:rsof AJner~cai

Charles Ferguson Safety Director

United states Bureau of Mines

W.R. Park District Supe7;"visor

Methaneas a Factor in the Explosion. Themine is classed gassyby the West'Virginia Depart:tnentof Minesand by the Bureau of Mines, andmethanebas 'beendetected in the mine on numerousoccasions. During thethree Federal inspections completed in March, June, and October of 1957,the minewas liberating methaneat a calculated rate of 2,209,248, 4,1l4,984,and 2,824,416 cubic feet, respectively, in .24 hours. During the March1957 inspection, the immediatereturn air from the Q left airwaYs sectioncontained 0.94 percent methanein 15,000 cubic feet of air a minute. InMarch, coal wasmined in the Q left airways section with a conventionalloading machineand accessories, but the section was abandonedtemporarilyseveral days after· the inspection was completed. During the October 1957Federal inspection, the immediatereturn air trom the Q left headings con-tained 0.87 percent methanein 31,000 cubic feet of air a minute.

The idle Q left airways were react! vated December5, 1957, andthe seven entries were developed with a continuous miner. Theplan ofdeveloping the section with the continuous miner consisted of: First,advancing No.1 entry for a distance of 80 feet; next, advancingNo.2entry 80 feet; and then in turn, advancing Nos. 3, 7, 6, 5•• and 4 entriesa distance of 80 feet. After each entry, exc;:eptNo.4, was advanced80feet, it was stopped temporarilY, and crosscuts were not provided at thefaces to connect the entries. Wbet\No.4 entry was advanced80 feet, the

ai

continuous miner was turned left and connecting crosscuts weremadefromNo.4 to No.1 entry; thereafter" the miner was returned to the faae ofNo. 4 entry" turned right" and connecting crosscuts were driven fromNOtt 4 to No.7 entries (see Appendi~'F) 0' This methodof advancingentriesrequired that each.temporarilY idle entry be ventilated with line cur'l;aineJttending80 to 90 feet from the last open crosscut to near the faceoAnalyses of air samples collected December11 and 18" 1957"by comp~officials in the immediatereturn of the Q left airways section showed0.24 and 0.29 percent methanein 24,,600and 32,,400cubic feet of air aminute, respectivelyp

Testimonyof companyofficials and employees.during the investiga-tion indicated tha.t gas was encountered il).the workingplaces in Q leftairways daily after December5, and on several occasions sufficient gas wasencountered to necessitate shutting downthe electric equipment. Officialsand face employeesin Q left airways differed on the adequacyof face ven-tilation in the section in December,but all concernedagreed that it wasnecessary to keep measura'blevolumesof air sweepingthe workingfaces tokeep tbe faces reasonably clear of methane, and any interruption of fa.ceventilation resulted in gas accumulatingat the faces.

It is believed that the air current was short-circui ted from theface regions of Nos. 3" 4, 5" 6" and 7 entl"ies of Qleft airways shortlybefore the explosion occurred while normalmining operations were beingperformedin the sectdons Lack of adequate ventilation wou;Ldpermit methaneto accumulatepromptly in these entries. It is conceivable that methaneaccumulatedin these entries with the ventilation facilities (checks and/orline curtain) in need of tightening or repair" and the accumulatingmethanewas ignited before it was detected. However,the morelogical conclusionis that the methaneaccumulationresulted from a direct interruption of theair current, such as a short-circuit caused by the opening, raising" ordestroying of a check curtain. It is believeci that the short-circuit ofthe ventilating c1.ttTentoccurred whenseveral of the face employeestraveledwith a shuttle car fromNo. 4 entry through the inby crosscut to No. 3 entryand thence through two check curtains to the haulage track to procure suppliesneeded in No.4 entryo It is possible that the check curtains in No.3 entrywere openedor raised and fastened by the mento permit the shuttle carpassage or the canvas checks were destroyed by the shuttle car in travelingthrough the curtains. Opening, raising, or destroying these check curtains"morethan momentarily"would immediatelyshort-circuit the air fromthe faceregions of Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 entries and.cause gas to accumulatetherein;particularly in Nos. 6 snit 7 entries. Closing or repairing the check curtainsafter a ventilation interruption wouldcause the air current to again flowin its normal course" into No"7 entry" thence to the faces of Nos. 6, 5" 4,3, 2, and I entries, and methanetl;lat had accumulatedin Noso7" 6, and 5entries wouldbe forced through No.4 entry where it was ignitedo Theaforementionedcircumstances wouldeasily permit methanemovingin the air

current to be ignited by eJ.ectric equipmentbefore it could be detectedwith a flame safety lamphanging on the equipment. Supplies had beenprocured from the storage pile near the haulage tracks and were in theshuttle car in the last open crosscut betweenNos. 3 and 4 entries whenthe explosion occurred.

The extensive accumulationof methanein the Q left airways andin the Q left headings foUow1ngthe short-circu1 ting of ventilation inthese sections atter the expJ.osionproves eJ.earJ,ythat large amountsofmethaneare liberated in the face reg10ns and from the coal ribs. Sixhours after the explosion., 2 to 5 percent ot methanewas present in allseven of the Q lef"t airways entr:i,.es~out 1,100 feet outby the faces. About56 hours after the explosion, 2·to morethan 5 percent of metllal+ewaspresentin all seven of the Q left headings.entries about 1,750 feet outby the faces.

Fragile, globular coke clroplets adbenng to the roof anc1ribs I

indicative of slowburning gasI were found in nearly every part of theseven Q left airway entries fro~ the loop to the faces. Soot streamerswere fo~d on the roof in the inby end of Nos. 1 a.nd2 entries. The 1:U'0re-mentionedeVidencesof burniJ;lggas were not found anywhereelse in theexplosion area (see AppendixD).

Flame. Evidenceof heat or flame, in the torm of ashes, coke,soot, or partly burned paperI canvas, and wood,was observed throughoutthe seven Q left airway entries from the face regions for a distance ofapproximately 1,400 feet outby. ~e victimS of th~ explosion, all foundwithin 300 feet of the face of No.4 entry Q left airways, were burnedseverelY. Evidence.of flame was not found a~here in the affected areasexcept in Q lett airways.

Explosives were not used to bl~st coal in the Q left airwayssection, and evidence of explosives having been discharged by forces orflame was not found anywherein the areas affected by the explosion.

A total of 119 mine dust sampleswas collected atter the explosionin the affected areas (see Table 2 and AppendixD). The results of analysisfor incombusti1;>lecontent and tests tor coke in the mine dust samplesaresho~in Table 2. Thepresence of coke in the minedust samples is one ofthe criteria by which extent of the flame was fixed, even though it ispossible that such coke ~n the outby end of the Q left airways mayhavebeen blownthere. Twenty-eight of the 35 saInplescollected ill the Q lettairways contained coke ranging in quantities from traces to very largeparticles. Noneof the other 84 samples collected in ~he affected areascontaine<J,coke. Cokethat ranged f;t-oma f;-action of an inch to morethanan inch in thickness wasplasterea. on rOQfbolts, lips of cuts in the roof,on roof-bolted cap pieces, and on other uaterial at manylocations in theQ left airwaYI? .

23

Forces. Nodifficulty was experienced in discerning the directionof forces • Extensive coking and considerable eVidenceof slowburn1ng gaswere on the roof, ribs, and noor in the face regions of Q left airwayentries, and the emanation of forces was from these face regions outwardto the junction of Q left airways and Qlef't headings, a distance of about1,400 feet, then northeast ~to Q left beadings for a distance of about2,500 feet, and southwest into Q entries for a distance of about 4,000teet. The covers on the trolley locomotive in the haulage loop in Q leftairways were blown south; a reel ot feeder wire was canied. about 150 feetsouth of the overcast; il.ud pieces of canvas and other materiaJ. in the faceregions of Q left airways were blownoutward (soutn).

Three concrete-block stoppings installed about 300 feet ou~bythe faces and across Nos. 2, 3, and 6 entries of Q lett airways were blownoutward (south). All stoppings destroyed between Nos. 1 and 2 and Nos. 3and.4 entries of Q left airways, except one, were b).ownwest, and allstoppings destroyed, except one, between Nos. 6 and 7 and NOSe4 and 5were blown east. Stoppings:l.n the Q lett headings were blown south towar4the No. 7 entry. Twostoppings installed across tbe Nos. 1 and 2 Q entrieswere blownwest.

Forces of the explosion dissipated ~pidly atter reaching thejunction of· Q left airways and Q left headings. Evidence of e~reme violencewas not observed at a:tJ'3location in the explosion area.

Factors Preventi S read of E losion. The areas af'f'ected bythe explosion are shownon the mi~ map Appen1x C). Forces of the ex•.•plos:l.onextended throughout the Q left airways, into and throughout thegreater part of the Q left headings, and into the Q and P entries for adistance of 4,000 feet. Forces subsided rapidly as t~1. spread east andwest at the junction of the Q left airways and Q left head1~gs. Ev1denceof flame was observed,only in the Q left airways of the affected. areaS.The diluti~ and quenching effect of the rock dust applied wa.sthe principalfactor in preventing further spread of this explosion. other factors actingin combination that helped limit the explosion were: The cooling ef'fect ofthe extensive rib, roof', and floor surfaces of the nw:nerousentries in thepath of' the explosion; and ample open areas for expansion of' forces, re.sulting in a reduction of flame speed and temperature.

S~ of E'rtdence. Conditions obse:rvedin the mine duringrecovery opmtOtis ana: tile !:nvestigation following the disal5ter, togetherwith informat:l..onavailable from previous Fede~al coal-m:l.J:leinspectionreports and.that obtained. from companyofficials, worlanen,and mine records,

10. Themethodof advancingthe sevenQ left airway entries,progressively driving Nos. 1, 2, 3, 1, 6, 5, and then 4 without connectingcrosscuts until No.4 entry was driven, required the use of morethan 500feet of canvas line curtail1 to ventilate the faces. Maintaining thisamountof line curtain and necessary check curtains reasonably airtight,whichwasnecessary to keep the faces free of methane, required constantvigilance, examination, and repair.

11. Thehaulage loop in the Q left airways section extended:tromNo. 4 entry left to No. 2 entry and then right to No. 6 entry {adistance (}fabout 300 feet ) and then back to No. 4 entry. Installationof the haulage loop crosl;lwisefromNo. 2 to No. 6 entries because of ex-cessive grades, rath,er than in the adjacent Nos. 3 and 5 entries parallelingthe haulage entry, restricted the l1umberof return entries to one andnecessitated the use of two additional temporarycheck curtains to controlthe main air current. . .

12. Dangerousaccumulationsof' coal dust were present at severallocations in the face regions of Q left airways, and excessive amountsoffine coal dust were present on the floor inby the overcast in the Nos. 5,6, and 1 entries of Q left airways after the explosion.

13. Sufficient rock dust wa.snot applied in the face regionsinby the loading points in the explosion areas, but rock-dusting outbythe loading points was generally ad,.equate,as exp~osionpropagation wasstopped by the rock-dust applications.

. 14. Menwhosenameswere listed on the layoff notice postedabout 1-1/2 hours before the exp].osionoccurred were generally aware thatthey wereworkingtheir last shift, and the worry and demoralizing effectof their being without worklikely caused less alertness Ontheir part toeverydayworkingconditions, practices, and hazards•

.Causeof the Explosion. TheFederal investigators are of theopinion that the disaster was causedby the ignition of a large quantityof methanethat had accumulatedin the Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 1 entries ofQ left airways during normalmining operations. Gas.had accumulatedinthese workingplaces asa result of short-circuiting of the ventilatingcurrent, whichoccurred whencheck curtains in No. 3 entry were openedorraised and fastened or destroyed While supplies wereQeingprocured froman outby location. The gas was ignited by an electric arc or spark froma piece of face electric equipmentin No. 4 entry or from a trailing cab,leto this equipment. Coal dust in the immediatliface areas en.tered into theexplosion and aid,ed in its propagation.

26

~OMMENDATIONS

The following recommendationsare madeto prevent similar'disasters:

1. In mines that liberate gas freely, each mechanically loadingsection being developed in virgin coal with morethan four parallel entriesshouJ.dbe ventilated with a current of intake air coursed through thecenter entries, split rigl:lt and.lett near the face regions, and returnedthrough the outside entries.

2. The use of check curtains to control mainventilating cur•.rents should be held to the absolute minimum,and check curtains in useshould be installed and maintained as reasonably airtight as possible 0

3. Checkcurtains should not be deliberately. openedor raisedand fastened in place under any circ~tanceso If it is necessary to openor raise a check curtain to permit equipmentto pass through, the checkcurtain should be put back in place as soon as the equipmenthas passed.

4. Whencheck curtains are torn, destroyed, or impaired to theextent that ventilation to workingfaces is intenupted, electric powertoface electric equipmentshould be "cut offlt immediately; then.all workingfaces and the atmospherein the open crosscuts nearest the faces shouldbe examinedtor methaneo If gas is detecteq., the face electric equipmentshould not be energized until the gas is removedand ventilation restored.

5. Eachworkingface should be ventilated with a current ofair that is sufficient in velocity and volumeto keepmethanetrom ac-cumulating at the face.

6. Employeesshould not use compressed.air to removegas fromworking faces under any circumstances, and officials should not use orpermit employeesto use compressedair to removegas fromworkingfaces.

7. The company'smaintenanceprogramfor face electric eqUip-ment should be implementedto the extent that such equipmentwill be keptin permissible condition.

8. Splices in trai,ling cables should be well insulated, and aprogramshould be established to require that tra.iling cables containinga fixed uumberof temporarysplices will. be removedfrom the equipmentand service until such splices have been vu!C£:\nized.

provided evidence as to the cause and the origin of the explosion. Theevidence fromwhich the conclusions of the Federal investigators are drawnis summarizedas follows:

1. Recordsof the fire-boss examinationsof all workingsectionslist no unusuaJ.condition observed during the examinationsmadeseveralhours before the explosion.

2. ThePocahontasNo.4 coal bed in the area is extremely "gassy,"and normalmining operations cause large liberations of methaneat workingfaces. Anyinterruption of face ventilation during normal coal-producingoperations will cause gas to accumulateat the workingfaces.

30 Thecrew in the Q left airways section was engagedin thenormalproduction of coal whenthe explosion occurred.

4. All forces emanatedfromthe face area of No.4 entry of theQ lef't airwayso

5. TheQ left airways section was ventilated with a split ofintake air, whichwas coursed to the face of No.1 entry and thence pro-gressively through the last open crosscuts to the faces of Nos. 6, 5, 4, 3,2, and 1entries and then returned through Noo1entryo

6. Evidenceof a large quantity of gas having burned in theface regions of the Q left airways proves unquestionably that gas hadaccumulatedin most of these entries (I This gas accumulationcould haveoccurred only as a result of short-circUiting the air current fromtheseplaces 0 Themethodof ventilating the area and.examinationafter theexplosion indicate that the most logio&l explanation for such short-circui tine; is that the check cux-tains in the No(I 3 headingwere openedorraised and fastened or were destroyed for sometime previous to the explosion.

1(I Thebodies of the 11menin the Q left airways crewwere foundwithin 35 to 300 feet of the face of Wo.4 entry (I It is extremely doubtfulthat any of these menmovedmorethan a few feet after the explosion, andall were apparently performing normalduties in connection·w:l.thproductionof coalo

8. All of the face electric equipmentin the Q left airwayssection was in nonpermissible condition whenexaminedafter the explosion.Air coursed throUghthree of the temporarily idle entries, of necessity,flowed directly by and over the face elec~ric equipment••

90 Eachone of the four pieces of' face electric equipment,inclUding two trailing cables, was capable of igui ting gas, and no otherlikely source of ;ignition was found at or near the point of origin.

25

9. Whereworkingplaces in mines that liberate gas freel7 areadvancedwith a continuousminer and are then temporarily idled withoutconnecting crosscuts at the faces, such places should be ventilated withan air current that is coursed through the active workingplace, thenthrough the idled places, and thence directly into the return airways.

10. Examinationsfor gas :in face workingsshould be madeatintervals sufficiently frequent to detect the presence of methanebefor~it reaches dangerous·proportions.

ll. Foremenshould record clearly, in a daily report bookpro-vided for that purpose, the location and nature of any danger observedbythemor reported to themduring the workshift. The report should showwhat action, if any, was taken to remedythe danger and should also in-clude any action t~en to correct hazards reported by fire bosses. Frequentreporting of gas in an area should be investigated by higher officials andremedial action should be taken immediately.

12. Coal dust and loose coak should not be permitted to accumulatein dangerousquantities in any active undergroundworkings.

13. Rockdust should be distributed unifol'lDlyon the roof, ribs,and floor and maintained in such quantity that the incombustible contentof the combinedcoal dust, rock dust, and other dust will not be less than65 percent, plus 1 percent for each 0.1 percent of methanepresent in theventi1ating current.

14. A programandmethodswherebyadequate rock-dusting can bedone in the face regions should be adopted and put into effect immediately.

15. Dust samples should be collected and analyzed periodical.lyto determine the effectiveness of rock-dust app1ications.

16. Consideration should be given to installing only standardtrack loops in workingsections. Preferably, such loops should be installedin a maximumof three entries I the haulage entry and the adjacent p~elentry on each side of the haulage entry.

17. A selt-rescuer should be provided for each person underground,whoshouldbe thoroughly instructed as to its safe maintenance,useI and1im1tations.

28

ACKNOWLEOOMENT

The writers acknowledge gratef'ully the courtesies extended limdthe help given by officials and other members of the United MineWorkersof America, officials and employees of the operating company, andrepresentatives of the West Virginia De:;.>artmentof Mines and the UnitedStates Bureau of Mineso

Respectfully sUbmitted,

/ s/ William RetPark

William Re ParkDistrict Supervisor

lsi Edward Mo Lewis

Edwa.rdM. LewisFederal Co~ .•Mine Inspector

lsi John ZeleSkey

John ZeleskeyFederal Coal-Mine Inspector

ApproVedby:

/s/ James Westfield

James WestfieldAssistant Director--Health and Safety

/ e,f Marling J. Ankeny

Marling J. AnkenyDirec'tor

APPENDIX B

NAMES OF BARRICADED MEN" NO. 31 MINE

POC.AHONTAS FUEL COUPANYi INcORPORATED

December 27, 1957

APPENDIXA

VICTOO OF EXPLOSION,NO. 31 MINE

POCAHONTASFUEL COMPANY1 INCORPORATED

December ei, 1957

Number ofName Age ~2E!tion Marital Sta'tus ~pendents-- -Archie Reece Alicie 32 Brakeman Married 4William R. Amos 50 Fire Boss Married 8James Chiles 51 Boom Man Married 3Howard Fields 37 Section Foreman Married 3Main B. Harrison 43 Loading-Machine Married 6

Operator

Gilmer Eugene Monk 26 Electrician Married 3John Edmon Nunley 30 Roof Bolter Married 5Herman Boyd Perry 50 Motorman Married 2

James R. Rutherford 28 Loading-Machine Married 3Operatorts Helper

Lloyd E. Vest 36 Miner Operator Married 4Arnold W. Young 30 Roof Bolter Married 6

46

72

3MINER

11

~,

COALBED

II

,,

II

,TH

IO<N

ESS

I,

II

•,

r;

6"10-,

II

II

,I

,LO

ADER

II

II

I.',

I,

I•

,I

,i

C

I

II

•I

•

J

,I

I

I•

II

II

I

II

•a,C::U'ITTI

rI

II

IN

II

5HUTTL.5

CAR••••

CAR\.

lI

\;

1

BELT

r1

LEGEND

•

lLIN

EBRATTrC

ECHECK

CURTA

INS

~""""'"'

BLO

CK

STOP

PING

S

( AIR

CURRENTS

TRACKB

OD

IES

MAP

OF

QLE

FTAP.W

AYS

NEAR

FACES

,IJ

,,

•'-'1

••

•o

50'00

e-s-ijiii.---'

ISC

ALE-FEET

(,~

APPENDIX

E

JOY I JCMCONTINUOUS MINER__ -...a.

-"14BU JOY LOADER--

LORD VEST MINER OPERAlOR- •

ARNOLD 'YOUNG BOLTER""

JA MES ROTTERFORDSHUTTLE CAR OPERATOR

~---.L----. \........ ~---J •

escSHUTTLE CAR

-----------..JOHN NUNLEY BOLTER/

T_Ir- --CONTROLS,,,

\

~_ - REPORTED LINE BRATTICE,\I,I.+ - MAIN HARRISON J(J( OPERATORI,I,I,,,IIIIIIIII,,I•

APPENDIX F

COAL BED THICKNESS6' 10"

DETAIL DRAWING OF N04ENTRY Q LEFT AIRWAYSSHOWING LOCATIONS OFBODIES AND EQUIPMENTFOLLOWING EXPLOSON ONDECEMBER 27 1957

. ~ ,SCALE 1-10

9 SCSHUTTLE CAR

Tab~e~

ANALY

SESOFA

IRSAMPLE

S

MINE

~.31

COMPA

NYPocahontas

Fuel

Company,Inco;r:Porated

CoUected

Jan\18rY

1958

COLL

ECTE

D BYJohn

Ze1eskey

!--

~I..-__-

-'l--.'.----'-,J:lmc~m.YOL

t.~.,.

...,---J

1

ICubic

FeetICubic

Feet

BottleIL

aborato

ryl

Location

inMine

arbon

fOx

ygen'.Meth

anejCarbon

.1N.itrogen

lAirPer

~Meth

anein

No.

No.

.Dioxide

I~,

tMonoxideL,

iMinute

I24Ho

urs

----~i

".----

-T---

Ii!I

!i

J-------1

0-45981

317411

lAir

65ft.

from

face

No.4

II

iI

[I:

:Iheading

Q~eft

airways

between'

I!

/line

brattice

andrib,

return

,I

II

Iside.

I0.10

I20.84

;0,,25

II

'317478

!Air

72ft.

from

face

No.31

II

heading

Qleft

airways

betweenI

,I

line

brattice

andribs,

returnI

II'

side.

,0.09

.20.85

0.18

!I

II

317479

IImmediatereturn

airfrom

splitl

Ifrom

sevenbeadings

inNo

.1!I

"heading

Qleft

airways,

97ft.

II

Ifrom

face.

10.06

20.82

10.1

8

P-3323I'

317480

I'Air68

fee1::from

:face

No.5

III

heading

Qleft

airways

betweenI

Iline

brattice

andrib,

return

I.

I

side.

0.06I20.87

0.21

I0.1

0120.7

910.1

2

0-4602

0-4610

p·3325

317481

Air60

feet

from

face

No.6

heading

Qleft

airways

between

line

brattice

andrib,

return

side.

78.81

78.88

78.94

78.86

78.99

8,400

10,92

0

6,090

26,00

0

7,280

30,24

0

28,30

5

67,39

2

22,01

5

10,52

4

Table

1Cont.

ANALY

SESOF

Am

SAMPLE

SCollected

January

1958

MINE

No.31

COMPA

NYPocahontas

Fuel

Company,Incorporated

COLL

ECTE

DBYJohn

Zeleskey

Bottle!

Laboratoryl

No.I

No.

II

Location

inMine

~='arb?n-'io~~enl--'-:::r~~~~~~l-;~~en

i--lC~;Cp~;etl~~~e~:

Diox1de

I!

1MonoX

ide

!!Minute

I24

Hours

II,

.•

--·~·~-

1

P-3334!

317482IAir

66feet

from

face

No.2

heading

Qleft

airways,

betwee

l:ne

brattice

andrib,

return

Is1de.

j0008

317483

IAir

53feet

from

face

No.7

If

heading

Qleft

airways

between

line

brattice

andrib,

returnI

side.

0.09

IImmediatereturn

airfrom

split!

after

ventilation

wassplit

No~

7heading

right

side

Qleft

a1r-t

ways

(three

places).

;0.06

I iImmediatereturn

airfrom

split4

from

four

places

right

side

No.1

7heading

Qheadings.

[0.07

IImmediatereturn

airfrom

split{

(three

places)

No.1heading

Qi

headings.

I0.07

Immediatereturn

airfrom

SPli~

after

ventilation

wassplit

No~

1heading

left

sideQleft

air-i

ways

(four

places).

I0.05

I !

I

P-7950

1 I

0-45961

317679

0-46071

317680

p-33281

317681

P-3345I

317682

I20.851

20.84

20.90

20.83

20.69

20.83

0.20

0.11

0.10

0.22

0.11

0.08

78.87

78.96

78.94

18.88

79.13

79.04

9,100

8,470

22,000

18,000

17,000

17,000

26,208

13,416

31,680

57.•024

I26,928

19,584

LAB,NOS.

F-65722

toF-65743

Sheet

No.

1

TA

BL

Eg

ANALY

SESOF

DUST

SA

MP

LE

SCO

LLEC

TED

Decem

ber1957

MINE

No.

31CO

MPA

NY

Pocahontas

Fuel

Comp~,Incorporated

.COLL

ECTE

DBYElwoodMenta

ISampleNo.

ISampleof

DustFrom

Location

inMine

Alcohol

Coke

Test

Amountof

Particles

As-Received

Percent

Incombustible

14-1

M-2

M-3

M-4

M••5

M-6

1(••7

M..8

M-9

N•.10

M•.ll

M•.12

M-l3

Band

Band

Band

Band

Band

Band

Band

Band

Band

Band

Band

Band

Band

QMAINS

No.

1"back"

entry,

125feet

tnby

station

No.

285C1

No.

2"back"

entrY

,50

teet

inby

station

No.1089.

No.3

entry,

haulage

road,

62feet

inby

station

No.1112.

No~

4ttparal1ellt

entry,

62teet

1nbystation

No.

llll"

NoIt

5"back"

entry,

45feet

inby

station

No.

1027.

No.6

"back"

entry,

36feet

inby

station

No.

1070.

No.

4"back"

entry,

45teet

outby

station

No.

137711

No.

3"back"

entry,

130feet

inby

station

No.

1307"

No.

2entr'J,

haulage

road,

30feet

inby

station

No.

1324.

Noc

1"parallel"

entry,

108teet

iriby

station

No.

1325.

No.

2"baek"

entry,

25teet

inby

station

No.

2025.

No.3

"parallellt

entry

.•70

feet

inby

station

10.2016.

No•••

"parallel"

entry

.•135feet

1nby

station

No.

1431.

Trace

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

22.2

31.1

77.9

76.1

73.8

38.9

66.6

58.9

69.8

49.0

38.3

33.7

46.5

LAB.

NOS.

F-65722

toF-65743

SheetNo.

2

TABL

Eg

ANALY

SESOFDUSTSA

MPLES

COLL

ECTE

DDecem

ber1957

MINE

No.

31CO

MPA

NY

Pocahontas

Fuel

Company,Incorporated

COLL

ECTE

DBY__

~E,;;;;lw.;;.o.;..o;;,;;d~M

;.;.en;;;.t_a;;....

_

SampleNoo

Sampleof

DustFrom

Location

inMine

Alcohol

Coke

Test

AmOUntof

Particles

As-Received

Percent

Incombustible

M-14

IBand

INo.5

entry,

haulage

road,

20feet

inby

station

INone

I58.0

No.

2091

0

M-15

IBand

INo.

6"back"

entry,

15feet

inby

station

INone

I55.4

INo.

2092.

IM..•16

Band

INo.7"back"

entry

,70

feet

inby

station

None

I68.6

No.

2093.

ii

M-11

IBand

INo.

7"beck"

entry,

36feet

inby

station

None

35.4

No.

2284

ca

II

M-18

IBand

INo.

6"back"

entry,

24feet

outby

station

None

45.2

No.

2214.

IM-19

IBand

INo.

5entry,

haulage

road,

25feet

outby

NOJle

I46.8

station

No.

2213.

I!

M-20

IBand

INo.4

"parallel"

entry.,

30feet

outby

station

None

63.3

No.

2212.

M-21

IBand

INo.3

"parallel"

entry,

25feet

outby

station

INone

I36.9

No.

~2l1.

IM-22

IBand

INo.

2"back"

entry,

50feet

outby

station

None

I28.8

No.

2210.

QMAINS

LAB.

NOS.

'.657

90to

F.65

824

TABL

Eg

ANAL

YSESO

FDU

STSA

MPL

EB

Shee

tNo

.1

COLL

ECTE

DDe

cem

ber1

951

MIN

ENo

.31

COM

PANY

Poca

hont

asFu

elCo

mpa

nyJ

Tnco

rpor

ated.

COLL

ECTE

DBYGe

orge

Noe

Sam

ple

No. I

Sam

ple

of,

Dust

From

Loca

tion

inM

ine

Q,L

EFTA

IRW

AYS

Alco

hol

Coke

Test

Amou

ntof

Parti

cles

As-R

eceiv

edPe

rcen

tIn

com

busti

ble

N-l

IBa

ndI

25tee

tou

tby

statio

nNo

.14

31,

No.

1en

tryt

None

I38

.4(in

take

airwa

y).

II

48.0

B-2

IBa

ndi

25fe

etou

tby

statio

nNo

.14

30,

No.

6en

tryNo

ne(in

take

airwa

y).

IJ

36.5

N-3

iBa

ndI

25tee

tou

tby

statio

nNo

.14

29,

No.5

entry

None

II

(intak

eair

way)

.m

-4Ba

nd25

feet

outb

ysta

tion

No.

1428

,No

.4

entry

INo

neI

51.9

(trac

k)•

If

56.9

N-5

IBa

ndI

25tee

tou

tby

statio

nNo

.14

27,

No.

3en

tryTr

ace

N-6

!I

(retu

rnair

way)

.I

I41

.1Ba

nd12

0fe

etin

bysta

tion

No.

2813

,No

.2

entry

tTr

ace

(retu

rnair

way)

.I

I46

.4N-

7I

Band

!25

teet

outb

ysta

tion

No.

1591

,No

.1

entry

Trac

e

Ii

(retu

rnair

way)

.1-

8Ba

nd25

feet

inby

statio

nNo

.15

58,

No.

1en

tryI

Small

I53

.1(re

turn

airwa

y).

N-9

IBa

ndI2

5tee

tin

bysta

tion

No.

1606

,No

.2

entry

I8m

a1l

I30

.1(re

turn

airwa

y).

II

44.0

N-10

IBa

ndI

25fe

etin

bysta

tion

No.

1516

,NO

e3

entry

Trac

e(re

turn

airwa

y).

fI

58.0

N-ll

IBa

ndI

25fe

etin

bysta

tion

No.

1605

,No

.4

entry

None

(trac

k).

N-12

IBa

ndI

25tee

t1n

bysta

tion

No.

1604

,No

.5

entry

INo

neI

35.3

I(in

take

airwa

y).

II

46.1

N-13

IBa

nd25

feet

inby

statio

nNo

.16

03,

Ho.

6en

tryNo

ne(in

take

airwa

y).

LAB.

NOS.

F-65790

toF-65824

TABL

E2

ANAL

YSmO

FDU

STSA

MPLES

-

SheetNo

.2

COLL

ECTE

DDecember1957

MINE

No.31

COMPA

NYPocahonta.s

Fuel

Company,Incorporated

COLL

ECTE

DBYGeorse

Noe

_

SampleNo

,Sampleof

Dust

From

-I

Alcohol

IAs-Receiv

ed!

Coke

Test

IPercent

Location

inMine

IAm

ountof

jIncombustible

.Particles

QLE

FTAm

WAY

S

N-.l4

IB

and.

I25

feet

inby

station

No.1602,No

.7entry

jNo

neI

41.4

(intak

eairway).

N-15

IBand

I25

feet

outby

sta.tion

No;'1827,No

.7entry

ISm

allt

51.2

(intak

eairway).

IN-16

IBand

I110feet

outbystation

No.1857,No

.6entry

i-Sm

allI

55.6

(int~e

airway).

IN-17

IBand

I25feet

outby

station

No.1828,No

.5entry

tTrace

58.3

(intak

eairway).

N-18

IBand

I25

feet

outby

sta.tion

Ho.1826,No

.4entry

ITrace

I35.1

(tra.ck)1J

N-19

IFloor

&Ribs

'25feet

outby

sta.tion

No.1853,No

.3entry

ITrace

I3

5.

0I

(return

airway).

IN-20

Floor

&Ribs

I260

feet

outby

station

lIo.1954,

No.2entry

ILarge

48.3

I(return

airway).

I58.6

N-21

IBand

337feet

outby

station

No.1986,No

.1entry

ILarge

(return

airway).

IN-22

IBand.

I25

feet

inby

station

No.1986,No

.1entry

IVery

Large

22.6

(return

airway).

N-23

IBand

I25

feet

inby

station

No.1955,No

.2entry

ILarge

I3

1.

0(intak

eairway.).

N-24

IBand

i25

feet

inby

station

No.1983,lora.3

entry

ILarge

I39.7

(intak

eairway).

I41.6

N-25

IBand

I25

feet

inby

station

No.1984,No

.4entry

ILarge

(intak

e,oonveYOr

belt

line).

I24.4

N•..26

!Band

I25

feet

inby

station

No.1938,No

.5entry

ILarge

I(intak

eairway).

LABNO

S.F=

.2.5

790

toF-

6582

4

TABL

E2

ANAL

YSESO

FDU

STSA

MPLE

S

MINE

No.31

COMP

ANY

Poca

.hon

tas

FuelCo

mpan

y,Inc

orpo

rate

d

i!

Sam

ple

No.

ISa

mpl

eof

IA

lcoh

olI'

DustFr

omLo

cati

oninMi

neI

CokeTe

stAs

-Bec

eived

IAm

ountof

IPe

rcen

t_

___

'~

Part

icle

sI

Inco

mbus

tibl

e

No.

6en

trYI

N-27

Band

N-28

iBa

nd

N-29

Band

N-30

Band

N-3l

IBa

nd

N-32

IBa

nd

N-33

IBa

ndI

N-34

IBa

nd

N-35

IBa

nd.

QLE

FTAI

RWAY

S

25fe

etin

byst

atio

nNo.1

939,

(int

akeai

rway

).'

25fe

etin

byf?

tati

onNo.1

940,No

.7en

try

(int

akeai

rway

).,

50fe

etou

tbyfa

ce,No.

7en

try.

50fe

etcu

tbyfac

e,~r

o.6en

try.

50fe

etou

tbyfac

e,No

.5en

try.

50fe

etou

tbyfac

e,No

.4en

try.

50fe

etou

tbyfac

e,No

ot3en

try.

50fe

etou

tbyfac

e,No

.2en

try.

50fe

etou

tbyfac

e,No

.1en

try~

Shee

tNo.

3

COLL

ECTE

DDe

cemb

er195

7

COLL

ECTE

D BYGe

ore;

eNoe·

,'

Larg

e

28.1

Trac

e

34.5

49.8

Trac

e

24.2

Trac

e

34.5

Trac

e37

.3

29.5

34.5

Smal

l

Smal

l

Smal

l30

.3

Smal

l

LAB.

NOS.

F-65765

toF-65789

Sheet

No.1

TABLE

gANALYSESOFDU

STSAMPLES

Decemb

er1957

COLL

ECTE

DJanuary

1958

MINE

No.31

COMPA

NYPocahonta

sFuel

COlllpany,Incorporated

COLL

ECTE

DBY

Jame

sD.

Mich

eal

III

'As-Receiv

edI

IPerce

ntI

Samp

leof

Location

inMine

IIncomb

ustible

Samp

leNo

.Du

stFrom

i

J-liRibs

&Floor

J-2IRi

bs&F1.oor

J-3Ribs

&Floor

J-4IRibs

&Floor

J..5

IRibs

&Floor

No,4entry

(haulag

eroad)

IQma

ins.

50fee

toutby

station

No.2842.

No.3

(para

llel

entry)

IQma

insl100

feet

outby

station

No.976.

No"3(para

llel

entry),

Qma

ins,

50fee

toutby

station

No.774.

No.4

entry

(haulag

eroad),

50fee

toutby

station

No.773.

No.4entry

(haulag

eroad),

50fee

toutby

station

No.14895.

56.3

54.7

52.4

5304

68.2

QMAINS

J.•6

IRibs

&Floor

INo.

3(para

llel

entry)"

100

feet

outby

station

No.14923.

61.5

J-1

Ribs

&Floor

No.3

entry

(haulag

eroad),

50f~et

outby

station

No.14810.

8108

J-8Ribs

&Floor

No.4

entry

(haulag

eroad)1

60fee

toutby

station

No.148090

85.0

J.•9

IRibs

&Floor

INo.5

(para

llel

entry),

60fee

toutby

station

No.14807.

75.9

J-10

IRibs

&Floor

INo.6

(para

llel

entry),

30fee

tinb

ystation

No.14808.

35.5

J-ll

IRibs

&Floor

!No

.5entry

(haulag

eroad),

50fee

toutby

station

No.2338.

53.1

J.•12

IRibs

&Floo

riNo

.4(para

llel

entry)"

50fee

toutby

station

No.2337.

56••1

J-13

iRibs

&Floor

INo

.3(para

llel

entry),

50fee

toutby

station

No,2336.

56.6

I

LAB.

NOS.

F-65

765

toF-

6578

9Sh

eet

No.2

TA

BLE

2AN

ALYS

ESOF

DU

STSA

MPL

ESDe

cem

ber

1957

CO

LLECTED

Janu

ary

1958

MIN

ENo

.31

COM

PANY

Poca

hont

asFu

elCo

mpa

Illz

Inco

rpor

ated

CO

LLECTEDB

YJa

mes

D.M

ichea

1

Sam

pJ.eN

o'l

flam

pJ.eof

Dust

From

J-14

Ribs

&Fl

oor

I iJ-1

5!R

ibs

&Fl

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,

J-16

IRib

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Floo

r

J-17

IRib

s&

Floo

r

J-18

IRib

s&

Floo

r

J-19

IRibs

&F1

.oor

J••20

Ribs

&Fl

oor

J-21

Ribs

&Fl

oor

J-22

Ribs

&Fl

oor

J-23

Ribs

&Fl

oor

J-24

Ribs

&Fl

oor

J-25

Ribs

&Fl

oor

Loca

tion

inM

ine

As-R

eceiv

edPe

rcen

tIn

coin

busti

ble

No.3

(par

allel

entry

),50

feet

outb

ysta

tion

No.

2493

.

No.4

(par

allel

entry

)"50

feet

outb

ysta

tion

No.

2492

.

No.5

entry

(hau

lage

road

),50

feet

outb

ysta

tion

No.

2491

No.5

entry

{hau

lage

road

},50

feet

outb

ysta

tion

No.

2641

.

No.4

(par

allel

entry

),50

feet

outb

ysta

tion

No.

2642

.

No.3

(par

allel

entry

),50

feet

outb

ysta

tion

No.

2643

.

No.5

entry

(shut

tle-c

arro

adwa

y),

50fe

etin

bysta

tion

No.

2891

.

No.

4en

try(sh

uttle

-car

road

way)

,50

feet

inby

statio

nNo

.28

90.

No.

3en

try(sh

uttle

-car

road

way)

,50

feet

inby

statio

nNo

.28

89.

No.

5en

try(sh

uttle

-car

road

way)

"80

feet

outb

yfa

ce.

No.

6en

try(sh

uttle

-car

road

way)

"80

feet·

outb

yfa

ce.

No.

7en

try(re

turn

airwa

y),

50fe

etin

bysta

tion

No.

2893

.

NOTE

:AL

COHO

LCOK

ETEST

REVE

ALED

NOCO

KEDP

ARTI

CLES

PRES

ENTI

NAN

YOF

THES

ESA

MPL

ES(N

OS.a-

iTH

ROUG

HJ-25

).

51.9

76.5

68.6

49.7

17.2

55.3

33.9

29.8

30.8

26.5

35.3

32.9

MINENo.

31

LAB.

NOS.

F.-66460

toF-66475

SheetNo.

1

TABL

E 2ANALY

SESOFDUSTSA

MPLES

-CO

LLEC

TED

January

1958

COMPA

NY

Pocahontas

Fuel

Company,Incorporated

COLL

ECTE

DBYAnthony

Puskas

!SampleNO.1 I

Sampleof

:DustFrom

Location

inMine

As-Received

Percent

Incombustible

Tool

T-2

Band

Band

T-3

IBand

I

T-4

Band

T-5

Band

T-6

IBand

T••7

Band

T-8

IBand

T-9

1Band

T-10

T-ll

T-12

Band

Band

Band

No.6

entry,

Qmains

(return

airway),

50feet

outby

station

No.

No••7

entry,

Qma.ins

(return

airway),

50feet

outby

station

No.

2RIGHTO

FFQMAINS

No.

1entry

(intalte

a11'1

-1ay),220

feet

outby

face"

NoII

2entry

(intake

airway),

300feet

outby

face.

No.3

entry

(shuttle-car

roadway),

60feet

Qutby

station

No.

2732.

lifo"4entry

(parallel),

60feet

outby

station

Noo

27330

Noo

5entry

(parallel),

60feet

ou-tbystation

No~

2734

0

No.

6entry

(return

airway),

60feet

outby

station

No0

27350

No.7

entry

(return

airway),

60feet

outby

ata"tion

No.

2736.

QMAINS

No.7

entry

(return

airway),

llOfeet

inby

station

Noo

2489.

No.6

entI"'J(return

a.irway),

30feet

inby

station

No.

2490.

No.

6entry

(return

airway),

40feet

outby

station

No.

2339.

26401»

i I26390I I I .

7708

6602

46.6

43.9

46eo

5104

51.2

66.8

45~6

68.5

5304

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460toF-

6641

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o.2

TABL

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YSESOF

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SAMP

LES

COLL

ECTE

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nuar

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corp

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1.I

48••8

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51.3

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49,N

o.1

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.7

V-2

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6,No\)2en

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66,,

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801,

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nNo.

2797

,No.

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)9

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o••1

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2512

,No•

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.586

,No.

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1

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.4

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09,No.

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try.

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ne

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oor

I35

feet

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ysta

tionNo

.23

34,No.

1en

try.

None

39.1

v-ia

iRib

&Fl

oor

I30

feet

out.byst

atio

nNo.

2335

,No.

2en

try.

None

50.4

V-12

IRib

&Fl

oor

I30

feet

inby

stat

ionNo.

2494

,No0

2en

try.

None

I49

,,6

V-13

IRib

&Fl

oor

I30

feet

inby

sta.

tionNo.

2495

,No.

1en

try,

INo

neI

52.1

LAB.

NOS.

F-65744

toF-65764

TABLE2

ANALYSESOF

DUSTSAMPLES

MINE

No.31

COMPANY

Pocahontas

Fuel

Company,Incorporated

Sheet

No.2

December1957

COLLECTED

Janua,:r.y

1958

COLLECTED BY

WardRQ

Vickers

ii

-----

----

SampleNo.1

Sampleof

I'"

Alcohol

iI

Duol;From

•LocaUon

inMine

Coke

Teol;

iAs-Received

____

-+~

-__I

IJiiOO'unl;of

IPercent

~1--

Particles

JIncombustible

v-14

V-15

v-16 V..•17

v-18

V-19

V-20

V-21

Rib

&Floor

Rib

&Floor

Rib

&Floor

Rib

&Floor

Rib

&Floor

Rib

&Floor

Rib&F

loor

Rib

&Floor

QHEADINGS

30feet

inby

station

No

02645,No.1entry.

120feet

inby

station

No.2604,No.2en·try••

30feet

inby

station

No.2888,No.2

entry.

125feet

inby

station

No.2887,No.1

entry

•.

115feet

inby

station

No.2889,No.3entry.

120feet

inby

station

No.2890,No.4entry.

135feet

inby

station

No.2893,No.7entry.

25feet

inby

station

No.2892,No.6entry.

None

53••9

42.

None

None

3101

None

2501

None

28.

33.9

32.0

None

None

29.0

None