113782298 Case Digest Bar Ops

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The RTC ruled in favor of the sugar corporations and held that paragraph G.1 of the Bidding

Rules contemplated delay in the arrival of imported sugar, not cancellation of sugar importation.

It concluded that the forfeiture provision did not apply to the sugar corporations which merelycancelled the sugar importation.

On 5 January 2007, the OSG received its copy of the RTC Decision. On 24 January 2007, thedeputized SRA counsel, Atty. Raul Labay, received his own copy of the Decision and filed a

notice of appeal on 7 February 2007.

The sugar corporations moved to expunge the notice of appeal on the ground that only the OSG,

as the principal counsel, can decide whether an appeal should be made. The sugar corporations

stressed that a lawyer deputized by the OSG has no authority to decide whether an appeal should be made.

The OSG filed its opposition to the motion to expunge the notice of appeal. The OSG pointed outthat in its notice of appearance

; it authorized SRA counsel Atty. Labay to assist the OSG in this

case.

The RTC granted the motion to expunge the notice of appeal. The OSG then moved for

reconsideration however it was denied.

A motion for execution was granted by the RTC.

Aggrieved, the SRA filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking

to set aside the orders issued by the RTC as well as the writ of execution.

The Court of Appeals held that the deputized SRA counsel had authority to file a notice of

appeal. The appellate court thus directed the RTC to give due course to the appeal that Atty.Labay timely filed.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether a deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of appeal;

(2) Whether the sugar corporations are entitled to reimbursement of P38,637,000.00 inconversion fee.

RULING:

As to the first issue, the SC held that the deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of appeal.

Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 198717

authorizes the

OSG to represent the SRA, a government agency established pursuant to Executive Order No.18, Series of 1986,

18 in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services

of lawyers.

In National Power Corporation v. Vine Development Corporation,19

this Court ruled that the

deputization by the OSG of NAPOCOR counsels in cases involving the NAPOCOR included the

authority to file a notice of appeal. The Court explained that the OSG could have withdrawn theappeal if it believed that the appeal would not advance the government‘s cause. The Court held

that even if the deputized NAPOCOR counsel had no authority to file a notice of appeal, the

defect was cured by the OSG‘s subsequent manifestation that the deputized NAPOCOR counselhad authority to file a notice of appeal.

In the present case, records show that both the OSG and the deputized SRA counsel were servedcopies of the RTC decision subject of the appeal. Thus, what applies is National Power

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALVIN DEL ROSARIO

(G.R. No. 189580 February 9, 2011)

FACTS:

In an Information, appellant Alvin Del Rosario was charged with murder.

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Angelita Gelua (Angelita) , Edwin Gelua‘s

(Edwin‘s) wife; Dr. Andrew A. de Castro (Dr. De Castro), Edwin‘s attending physician;

Salvador Gelua (Salvador); and Ruel Garlan (Ruel).

Angelita testified that, on December 20, 2004, at about 9:00 p.m., Edwin had a drinking spree

with Salvador and Samson Gepiga at their home in Barangay G. del Pilar, Bulan, Sorsogon. At

some point during the said spree, Edwin went out of the house to answer the call of nature.Angelita was standing by the main door while Edwin urinated when appellant suddenly appeared

and stabbed Edwin with a machete. She immediately brought Edwin to Bulan Municipal

Hospital; and then transferred him to Sorsogon Provincial Hospital, where Edwin died. Dr. DeCastro found the cause of death as "cardio-respiratory arrest, stab wound, and hypovolemic

shock." He explained that Edwin sustained a stab wound "on the right upper quadrant with

laceration, the part of the intestine coming out," and some abdominal organs.

Dr. De Castro opined that, based on the location of the stab wound, the victim was in front of theassailant – face to face with the latter when attacked. However, it was also possible that the

assailant was at the back of the victim by "hitting the anterior part from behind holding the

patient."

Salvador corroborated the testimony of Angelita.

Ruel, on the other hand, stated that Angelita informed him of the stabbing incident. He went tothe house of appellant after the incident. Initially, appellant denied that he stabbed Edwin; later,

however, appellant admitted that he was Edwin‘s assailant, and surrendered to him the bladed

weapon which was allegedly used in the stabbing. He then brought appellant to the Bulan PoliceStation.

For his part, appellant invoked his constitutional right to remain silent. He refused to present any

witness in support of his denial, despite numerous opportunities given him. He decided to simplyforego with the presentation of his evidence.

The RTC rendered a decision against the appellant.

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court.

Appellant insists that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He

asserts that the pieces of evidence of the prosecution, specifically, the testimonies of Angelitaand Salvador, do not bear the earmarks of truth, candor, and spontaneity. He argues that the trial

court should not have taken at face value the testimonies of these witnesses because they may be

impelled by improper motives, being the wife and the cousin of the victim. Appellant, therefore,faults the RTC and the CA for giving credence to the prosecution‘s evidence.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the witnesses presented by the prosecution are credible.

2. Whether or not there was treachery.



RULING:

As to the first issue, the age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the testimonies ofwitnesses and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms first-hand

impressions as witnesses testify before it. It is thus no surprise that findings and conclusions of

trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts havethe advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify.16

Further, factual findings

of the trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses‘ credibility are entitled to great weight

and respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms the said findings, and will not bedisturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances

which could substantially affect the outcome of the case.

In this case, we find no reason to depart from this rule. Appellant failed to convince us that the

RTC and the CA overlooked certain facts and circumstances which, if considered, might affect

the result of the case.

The witnesses for the People – Angelita and Salvador – were consistent in the identification ofappellant as Edwin‘s assailant. Appellant was directly identified by these witnesses as the one

who stabbed and killed Edwin.

Angelita saw the stabbing of Edwin, and was categorical and frank in her testimony. From herdirect and straightforward testimony, there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit (appellant),who suddenly emerged while Edwin was urinating and stabbed the latter.

The alleged improper motive on the part of Angelita and Salvador remains purely speculative, as

no evidence was offered to establish that such a relationship affected their objectivity. In People

v. Daraman, we had occasion to state that it would be unnatural for relatives of the victim, who

seek justice, to impute the crime to an innocent person, and thereby allow the real culprit toescape prosecution. Indubitably, the imputation of ill motive against Angelita and Salvador is not

a viable defense.

As against the positive identification by Angelita and Salvador, appellant‘s bare denial carries no

evidentiary weight or probative value, especially so because he opted not to present any evidence

to prove his defense. As explained by this Court in People v. Lovedorial.

It is a well-settled rule that positive identification of the accused, where categorical and

consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on thematter, prevails over alibi and denial which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence

are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.

Moreover, records show that, when Ruel testified on the alleged admission, appellant did not

raise any objection. It is a rule of evidence that any objection against the admission of any piece

of evidence must be made at the proper time, and that if not so made it will be understood tohave been waived. The proper time to make a protest or objection is when, from the question

addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the

inadmissibility of evidence is, or may be, inferred. Therefore, the RTC cannot be faulted foradmitting the testimony of Ruel.

As to the second issue, treachery or alevosia was present is incontrovertible. The essence of thisqualifying circumstance is the sudden and unexpected attack by the assailant on an unsuspecting

victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself. It is employed to ensure the

commission of the crime without the concomitant risk to the aggressor.

Concededly, appellant‘s attack, coming from behind, on the unarmed Edwin, was sudden,

unprovoked, unexpected, and deliberate. Edwin was in no position and without any means to

defend himself. By all indications, Edwin was left with no opportunity to evade the knife thrusts,to defend himself, or to retaliate. In sum, the finding of treachery stands.







PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSELLE SANTIAGO y PABALINAS

(G.R. No. 191061 February 9, 2011)

FACTS:

PO1 Esguerra testified that they received information that Roselle was selling illegal drugs at her

house in Makati City. Esguerra then conducted a test buy and received from her one heat-sealed

transparent plastic sachet that presumably contained shabu. When he returned to his office,Esguerra marked the sachet with "@ Tisay" then sent it to the laboratory for testing. Before

receiving the results of the test buy, an asset told the police that Roselle was going to leave her

house, prompting Esguerra‘s team to conduct a buy-bust operation.

Esguerra met Roselle again and told her that it was he who bought shabu from her earlier that

day. She thus let him enter the front yard of her house where he told her that he wanted to buyanother pack for P300.00. Roselle took his marked money and entered the house. While waitingand looking in, Esguerra spotted two women

6 inside using shabu with the asset by their side,

apparently waiting for his turn. Subsequently, Roselle returned with one heat-sealed transparent

plastic sachet presumably containing shabu. Upon receipt of the sachet, Esguerra signaled histeam. They arrested Roselle and appraised her of her rights. Esguerra immediately marked the

sachet with " RPS ".

After returning to the station, he turned over Roselle and the seized sachet to the investigator.

When the contents of the first and second sachets (with "@ Tisay" and "RPS" markings) were

examined, these were confirmed to be Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride ( shabu). A

confirmatory test also found Roselle positive for the use of shabu.

For her defense, Roselle denies that she sold shabu to Esguerra. She claims that the case was a product of a mistaken identity, as she was not known as Tisay in the area but Roselle. She

narrated how she was forcibly taken from her house and into custody.

The RTC found Roselle guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, and sentenced

her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. The RTC also sentenced her to

undergo rehabilitation for not less than six months at a government drug rehabilitation centersubject to the provisions of R.A. 9165 for her violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165.

An appeal was made by Roselle to the CA but the latter affimed the decision of the RTC.

Hence, these appeal.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the police conducted a valid arrest in Roselle‘s case;

2) Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC‘s finding that the prosecution evidenceestablished her guilt of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE: Roselle claims that the police did not make a valid arrest in her case since theyarrested her without proper warrant and did not apprise her of the rights of a person taken into

custody as the Constitution and R.A. 7438 provide.7 But Roselle raised this issue only during

appeal, not before she was arraigned. For this reason, she should be deemed to have waived any

question as to the legality of her arrest.










SECOND ISSUE: No.

Although the prosecution established through Esguerra the acts constituting the crime9 charged

in the drug-pushing case (Section 5), it failed to provide proper identity of the allegedly

prohibited substance that the police seized from Roselle.

What is more, the prosecution failed to account for the whereabouts of the seized specimen after

the crime laboratory conducted its tests. This omission is fatal since the chain of custody should

be established from the time the seized drugs were confiscated and eventually marked until thesame is presented during trial.

11

Taking into account the above reasons, the SC finds it difficult to sustain the conviction of

Roselle for violation of Section 5. The presumption of her innocence of the charge must prevail.

LYDELLE L. CONQUILLA vs. JUDGE LAURO G. BERNARDO

(A.M. No. MTJ-09-1737 February 9, 2011)

FACTS:











In a verified complaint complainant Conquilla charged respondent judge with usurpation of

authority, grave misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law.

Complainant alleged a criminal complaint for direct assault was filed against her before sala of

Judge Bernardo.

The respondent judge then conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause to

hold the complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault. Respondent judge then issued a

warrant of arrest with the bail fixed at P12,000.

Upon motion of complainant, respondent judge issued an order reducing the bail forcomplainant‘s provisional liberty to P6,000. The complainant then posted cash bail of P6,000 for

her provisional liberty.

Complainant then filed an administrative complaint, alleging that under A.M. No. 05-08-[2]6-SC, first level court judges no longer have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations.

Thus, complainant avers that respondent judge committed an illegal act constituting grossignorance of the law and procedure when he conducted the preliminary investigation and issuedthe warrant of arrest. Complainant claims that the hasty issuance of the warrant of arrest was

without legal basis and unjustly prejudiced complainant and deprived her of her liberty.

Complainant submits that respondent judge usurped the power of the prosecutor, who was noteven given the chance to comment on complainant‘s Motion to Reduce Bail. Furthermore,complainant alleges that when she learned about the warrant of arrest, she called respondent

judge‘s wife, who said "she would help in having the bail reduced to P6,000.00 and would have

the case for direct assault against herein complainant dismissed provided herein complainantcancel the wife‘s de bt of P35,000.00 and provided that herein complainant loan the wife an

additional amount of P50,000.00."

In his Comment, respondent judge states that he issued the warrant of arrest in good faith

because he was convinced that there was probable cause and that it was necessary to place the

complainant under immediate custody to prevent a frustration of justice. Although respondent judge knew that the Supreme Court already amended Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on

Criminal Procedure by removing the conduct of the preliminary investigation from judges of first

level courts, he argues that the power to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of awarrant of arrest cannot be revoked. Besides, even if such power to determine probable cause

was indeed revoked by the amendment, respondent judge submits that technical rules can be

relaxed if their implementation will result in injustice.

Respondent judge further states that he did not usurp the power of the prosecutor when he

reduced the bail considering that under Section 20 of Rule 114, the court may increase or

decrease the bail upon good cause.

Lastly, respondent judge denies any knowledge of the alleged conversation and transaction

between complainant and his wife.

The OCA found respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for his patent andunjustified violation of the provisions of the Resolution in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. The OCA

stated that the Resolution in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which took effect on 3 October 2005,

removed the conduct of investigation from the scope of authority of first level courts judges. Had

respondent judge been more prudent in understanding the pertinent provisions of the Resolutionin A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which are very clear and concise, no administrative complaint would

have been filed against him.

The OCA, however, found the charge of usurpation of authority without merit. The OCA agreed

with respondent judge that the power to determine the amount of bail is vested in the judge.



ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in conducting

the preliminary investigation.

RULING: YES

The conduct of preliminary investigation by respondent judge was in direct contravention ofA.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which took effect on 3 October 2005, amending Rules 112 and 114 of the

Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by removing the conduct of preliminary investigation from

judges of the first level courts. Thus, under Section 2 of Rule 112, only the following officers areauthorized to conduct preliminary investigations: (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their

assistants; (b) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (c) Other officers as may be

authorized by law. Furthermore, Section 5 of Rule 112 provides:

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. ‒

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. ‒ Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint

or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and itssupporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on records

clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a

warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the

judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from

notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filingof the complaint or information.

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court . ‒ When required pursuant to the second paragraph

of section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling under the

original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court inCities, Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court SHALL be

conducted by the prosecutor. The procedure for the issuance of a warrant of arrest by

the judge shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section. (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, MTC judges are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.

In this case, the crime charged against complainant was direct assault against a public school

teacher, who is a person in authority under Article 1523 of the Revised Penal Code.

4 Under

Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, when the assault is committed against a person inauthority while engaged in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion of such

performance, the imposable penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.The duration of the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods is 2

years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years. Thus, the offense charged against complainant requires theconduct of preliminary investigation as provided under Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of

Court, which reads:

SECTION 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. ‒ Preliminary investigation is aninquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should

be held for trial.

Except as provided in Section 6 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to beconducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty

prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and (1) day without regard to

the fine.

It was therefore incumbent upon respondent judge to forward the records of the case to the

Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, instead of conducting the preliminary investigation himself.

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When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything less

is gross ignorance of the law.7 Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with

the statutes and procedural rules,8and should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in

law and jurisprudence.

On the alleged promise of respondent judge‘s wife that the bail would be reduced providedher P35,000 debt will be cancelled and that complainant grant respondent judge‘s wife an

additional loan, we find that complainant did not substantiate her allegation. Nevertheless, the

Court notes that although respondent judge denies knowledge of such transaction between hiswife and complainant, respondent judge did not categorically deny his wife‘s debt to

complainant

Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct stresses the importance of propriety and the

appearance of propriety to the performance of all the activities of a judge. Respondent judge

should bear in mind that judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in

all of their activities.11

Furthermore, judges and members of their families are prohibited from

asking for or accepting any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be doneor omitted to be done by him in connection with the performance of judicial duties.

On respondent judge‘s issuance of the warrant of arrest and reduction of the amount of bail, we

find such acts void for want of jurisdiction. While Rule 114 of the Rules of Court allows a judge

to grant bail in bailable offenses and to increase or decrease bail, it assumes that the judge has jurisdiction over the case. In this case, respondent judge conducted the preliminary investigation

without authority and issued the warrant of arrest. Thus, these acts are void for want of

jurisdiction. The reduction of bail is also void because in the first place, respondent judge had no jurisdiction over the case itself.

Under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law or procedure isclassified as a serious charge, for which the imposable penalty is any of the following:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court maydetermine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,

including government-owned or controlled corporation: Provided, however, that the

forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but

not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.16

Considering that this is respondent judge‘s third offense, the second of which was also for gross

ignorance of the law, we hold that the penalty of six (6) months suspension from office without

salary and other benefits is in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONALDO MORALES y FLORES alias "Ronnie,"

and RODOLFO FLORES y MANGYAN alias "Roding.”

(G.R. No. 188608 February 9, 2011)

FACTS:


















Acting on a tip from an informant that there is rampant selling of illegal drugs in Mandaluyong

City, the Chief of the Metro South Narcotics Office in Taguig ordered a buy-bust operation

against appellants.

After the briefing, the team proceeded to the area. PO1 Alano and the informant was approached

by a man who identified himself as Roding, and the latter invited them to go inside the housewhere they were met by Ronnie. The informant then ordered one (1) kilo of marijuana from

Ronnie for P3,000.00. Ronnie ordered Roding to get the money from PO1 Alano while he went

inside a room. A few seconds later, Ronnie went out of the room and handed PO1 Alano a greentransparent plastic bag containing two (2) brown folded envelopes, the contents of which are

bricks of dried marijuana. Immediately after verifying the contents as marijuana, PO1 Alano

introduced himself as a police officer and arrested Ronnie. Roding was able to go out of the

house but he was later on arrested by PO1 Buenafe, who responded to the scene when he noticeda commotion outside the target house. The boodle money was seized from Roding.

While at the police station, PO1 Alano placed his initials on each of the brown envelopes

containing the marijuana before bringing it to the Philippine National Police (PNP) CrimeLaboratory. Police Senior Inspector Grace Eustaquio examined the specimens brought to her and

she confirmed that the specimens were found positive for marijuana.

The defense belied the allegations that there was a buy-bust operation conducted wherein they

were caught red-handed selling marijuana.

In finding appellant guilty, the RTC held that the prosecution clearly established that there was a

lawful buy-bust operation conducted by operatives of NARCOM and the appellants werelawfully arrested upon the consummation of the sale transaction of marijuana.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants are guilty of the crime charged.

RULING: YES

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identities of the

buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the

proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of

evidence of corpus delicti.

From the testimony of PO1 Alano, it can be culled that PO1 Alano gave P3,000.00 to Roding in

exchange for the green plastic sachet handed to PO1 Alano by Ronnie. His testimony wascorroborated by PO1 Buenafe, who in turn, was able to eventually recover the marked moneyfrom Roding. Upon examination by the forensic chemist, it was proven that the green plastic bag

bought from appellants contains marijuana. Verily, all the elements of the sale of illegal drugs

were established.

The inconsistencies or contradictions pointed by appellants relating to the time of surveillance

are not material to establish the elements of the crime committed. They are certainly notsufficient to overturn their conviction. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the witnesses'

testimonies need only to corroborate one another on material details surrounding the actual

commission of the crime.

The SC likewise sustains the findings of the trial court on the credibility of these prosecution

witnesses.

In recognition of the credibility of these witnesses, the presumption that police officers have

performed their duties in good faith is correctly applied in this case. Appellants failed to adduceany ill or improper motive on the part of the NARCOM operatives. In fact, Roding admitted that

it was his first time to meet them and neither does he have any misunderstanding with



them.27

Absent any clear and convincing evidence that the NARCOM operatives had ill or

improper motive to falsely testify against appellants, their testimonies regarding the facts and

circumstances surrounding the buy-bust operation must be accorded full faith and credit.

Appellants also assert that the police officers failed to establish the chain of custody of the

marijuana, considering that PO1 Alano categorically admitted that the marijuana was onlymarked at their office.

In People v. Resurreccion, this Court reiterates that failure to immediately mark seized drugs willnot automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody as long as the integrity and the

evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved, as these would be utilized in the

determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The prosecution indeed sufficiently proved that that the chain of custody of the marijuana was

never broken from the time PO1 Alano received the marijuana from Ronnie up to the moment itwas presented in court as evidence.

The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that appellants were caught in flagrantedelicto selling marijuana.

AURORA B. GO vs. ELMER SUNBANUN,* GEORGIE S. TAN, DORIS SUNBANUN and

RICHARD SUNBANUN.

(G.R. No. 168240 February 9, 2011)

FACTS:




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In November 2000, respondents filed a suit for damages against Aurora, her husband Yiu Wai

Sang (Sang), and Yiu-Go Employment Agency. The respondents claimed that the spouses

occupied the ground floor portion of their house in Cebu City under a one-year lease contract andhad used the premises as the business office of Yiu-Go Employment Agency. This allegedly

increased the risk of loss by fire, and thus a breach of warranty in the fire insurance policies that

the respondents made which described the property as residential type.

Aurora averred that they already left the premises sometime in 2001and that during the entirety

of their stay, they used the leased floor as a private residence and as a lodging house. She deniedthat their employment agency held office there. She also pointed out that the lease contract was

terminated when the one-year term expired in July 1996, and that she was not privy to the

contracts of insurance since she was not informed of the contracts‘ existence. To her, whether the

house was used as a business office or as a lodging house was immaterial as there was noincreased risk of fire either way. Aurora demanded actual damages as she claimed that she works

in Hong Kong on a no-work-no-pay basis and the suit would result in spending airfare and lost

earnings.

After the respondents concluded their presentation of evidence, Aurora moved on October 28,

2002 that her testimony be taken by deposition upon written interrogatories, as she was unsure asto when she could come home to the Philippines considering that her work schedule as a court

interpreter in Hong Kong is erratic. She averred that arrangements have already been made with

the Philippine consulate in Hong Kong to take her deposition. Over the objection of the

respondents, the RTC granted Auror a‘s motion on November 21, 2002. However, Aurora‘sdeposition was taken only on January 28, 2004 after her follow-up letter dated November 7,

2003 to the Philippine consulate.

Before this deposition was taken, the RTC in its December 1, 2003 Order already deemed the

defendants to have waived their right to present their evidence and considered the case submittedfor resolution since more than a year had elapsed from the date the RTC granted Aurora‘s motionto have her testimony be taken by deposition. Aurora moved for reconsideration and prayed that

the December 1, 2003 Order be recalled and instead admit the deposition. She attributed the

delay of her deposition-taking to the consulate‘s fault, as she was passed from one officer toanother or no officer was available.

On January 26, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding only Aurora liable and ordering her to

pay moral damages, attorney‘s fees, litigation expenses and costs. The trial court disregarded her

two-page transcript of deposition when it received the same on March 5, 2004.

Aurora‘s former counsel of record, Atty. Ycong belatedly discovered a bout this adverse

judgment when he received from respondents‘ counsel a Motion to Direct Issuance of Entry of

Judgment and Writ of Execution on March 16, 2004. It turned out that although he had already

previously informed the court of his new office address, the court mistakenly sent the January26, 2004 Decision to his former office address. He raised this in his opposition to the motion

filed by the respondents. Finding this point meritorious, the court denied respondents‘ motion,

ruling that the judgment against Aurora has not yet attained finality as the 15-day period toappeal, counted from March 16, 2004, has not yet lapsed.

Aurora filed her Motion for Reconsideration on March 31, 2004, the last day to file her appeal.The court in its April 27, 2004 Order

denied said motion.

Atty. Ycong received the notice of denial on May 6, 2004, thus giving his client a day left to fileher appeal. Explaining that Aurora has been busy campaigning for the local elections as she was

running for the position of town mayor and that he and his client have yet to discuss the pros and

cons of appealing the case, Atty. Ycong sought for the relaxation of the procedural rules by filingan extension of 15 days to file Aurora‘s notice of appeal.

Atty. Ycong thereafter filed the Notice of Appeal on May 11, 2004.



The RTC denied the notice of appeal. Aurora sought for reconsideration but it was denied by the

RTC on June 10, 2004.

Filing her petition for certiorari with the CA by way of registered mail on August 13, 2004,

Aurora claimed that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to relax the period for

filing the notice of appeal. She contended that her situation is enough reason to grant her prayer.She averred that she could not just leave the campaign trail just to discuss matters with her

lawyer about her case as she was busy in Leyte at the homestretch of the campaign period.

However, the CA on December 8, 2004, dismissed the petition for being procedurally flawed

viz:

1) The Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is signed by only one

petitioner without a Special Power of Attorney/Secretary‘s Certificate authorizing her to

represent the two (2) other petitioners;

2) The Affidavit of Service shows that respondents were personally served copies of the petition but lacks explanation why service of the petition with this Court was not done personally (Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court);

3) Counsel for petitioners failed to indicate his PTR and IBP numbers;

4) Certified true [sic] copies of the assailed decision dated January 26, 2004 attached tothe petition is a mere photocopy of a certified true copy;

5) The following copies of pleadings and other relevant documents referred to in the

petition which would support the allegations therein are not attached:

a) Complaint; and,

b) Answer.

Invoking the liberal construction of procedural rules, petitioner Aurora asked for reconsideration.

Finding Aurora‘s reasoning unacceptable, the CA insisted on a strict observance of the rules in

its April 8, 2005 Resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the formal deficiencies in the petition before the CA may be relaxed in

the interest of justice.

RULING:

1. The signatures/authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency in theverification and certification on non-forum shopping are not necessary.

In dismissing Aurora‘s petition, the CA cited as one of its grounds the lack of signatures or

authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency in the verification and certification of

non-forum shopping. Such signatures, however, may be dispensed with as these parties are notinvolved in the petition. Although the caption in Aurora‘s petition before the CA erroneously

included Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency as petitioners, its contents reveal that it is solelyAurora who is the ‗person aggrieved,‘ as she is the one who assailed before the CA the RTC‘s

Order that denied her notice of appeal and, hence, she should be the one who should sign the petition. Notably, Aurora is the only one held liable by the trial court for damages and thus is the

one interested in filing an appeal and in elevating the case to the CA. Moreover, only Aurora

filed her answer before the RTC while Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency did not file any.



The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 65 requires the submission of a certified true copy of

the judgment, order or resolution subject of the petition as well as the submission of copies of all

pleadings and documents relevant to the petition. We emphasize that not all pleadings and partsof case records are required to be attached, but only those which are material and pertinent that

they may provide the basis for a determination of a prima facie case for abuse of discretion.

2. Failure to indicate PTR and IBP Official Receipt Numbers not fatal.

The failure of petitioner‘s former counsel, Atty. Ycong, to indicate in the petition before the CAhis PTR and IBP numbers for the year 2004 was obviously an oversight. A perusal of the records

of the case would show that counsel had duly paid the required dues for that year and that his

PTR and IBP receipt numbers are indicated in the pleadings he had filed with theRTC.

31 Although he omitted to indicate the numbers on Aur ora‘s CA petition, the same numbers

were nevertheless stated on his Notice of Change of Address, around two months before the

appellate court issued the questioned December 8, 2004 Resolution.

3.

Whenever practicable, personal service and personal filing of pleadings are always the preferred modes of service. Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court should one

deviate from the general rule, it is mandatory for him/her to submit a written explanationwhy the pleading was not personally filed/served. Otherwise, the court has the discretion

to consider the paper as not filed. Petitioner should be aware that a court, in reasonably

exercising discretionary power to dismiss a petition that violated the rule on writtenexplanation for resorting to modes other than personal service, also has to take into

account another factor, i.e., the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged

for violation of Section 11. For this reason, we do not find any grave abuse on the part ofthe CA in exercising its discr etion to dismiss Aurora‘s petition.

In the case at bar, the reason behind the filing of an extension of time to file her notice of appealwas not per se, a compelling and a highly exceptional one. Just as it is the lawyer‘s duty tosafeguard her client‘s interest, it is the responsibility of the client to make herself available to her

counsel and open the lines of communication, even during the busy election period, for their

discussions of legal options. She is obliged to be vigilant in fighting for her cause and in protecting her rights. It is Aurora's duty, "as a client, to be in touch with [her] counsel so as to be

constantly posted about the case. [She] is mandated to inquire from [her] counsel about the status

and progress of the case from time to time and cannot expect that all [she] has to do is sit back,relax and await the outcome of the case." Additionally, "motions for extension are not granted as

a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presume that

their motions for extension or postponement will be granted or that they will be granted the

length of time they pray for."

In spite of petitioner‘s error, the ‗fresh period rule‘ amendment as held in Neypes v. Court of

Appeals will be applied to her benefit

In Neypes we held that a litigant is given another fresh period of 15 days to perfect an appealafter receipt of the order of denial of his/her motion for reconsideration/new trial before the RTC.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from theMunicipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the

Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies

to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The

new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of theorder denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any

final order or resolution.

"[P]rocedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the

time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure." Neypes, which we

rendered in September 2005, has been applied retroactively to a number of cases wherein the







original period to appeal had already lapsed subsequent to the denial of the motion for

reconsideration. Aurora‘s situation is no exception, and thus she is entitled to benefit from the

amendment of the procedural rules.

The denial of Aurora‘s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court‘s January 26, 2004 decision

was received by her former counsel on May 6, 2004. Sans her motion for extension to file anotice of appeal, with the fresh period rule under Neypes, she still has until May 21, 2004 to file

her notice of appeal and thus, had timely filed her notice of appeal on May 11, 2004.

Oano vs MCAA and MCIAA vs. Inocians

(G.R. No. 168770 and G.R. No. 168812)

FACTS:



In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA‘s predecessor agency, pursued a

program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators, NAC met

and negotiated with the owners of the properties situated around the airport. As the landownerswould later claim, the government negotiating team, as a sweetener, assured them that they could

repurchase their respective lands should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not push

through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport.Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and executed deeds of sale with a right ofrepurchase. Others, however, including the owners of the aforementioned lots, refused to sell

because the purchase price offered was viewed as way below market, forcing the hand of the

Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), as successor agencyof the NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation.

The CFI of Cebu rendered judgment allowing the expropriation on the said lots.

In view of the adverted buy-back assurance made by the government, the owners of the lots no

longer appealed the decision of the trial court.8 Following the finality of the judgment of

condemnation, certificates of title for the covered parcels of land were issued in the name of theRepublic which, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6958,9 were subsequently transferred to MCIAA.

At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of the aforesaid lots to MCIAA, Lahug Airport

completely ceased operations, Mactan Airport having opened to accommodate incoming and

outgoing commercial flights. On the ground, the expropriated lots were never utilized for the purpose they were taken as no expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken. This development

prompted the former lot owners to formally demand from the government that they be allowed to

exercise their promised right to repurchase. The demands went unheeded. Civil suits followed.

The Inocians filed a civil case for reconveyance of real properties and damages against the

MCIAA.

The RTC rendered a judgment directing the MCIAA to reconvey the properties to the Inocians.

The MCIAA went to the CA which affirmed the decision of the the RTC.

The CA, citing and reproducing excerpts from Heirs of Moreno,11

virtually held that the decision

in Civil Case No. R-1881 was conditional, stating "that the expropriation of [plaintiff-appellees‘]

lots for the proposed expansion of the Lahug Airport was ordered by the CFI of Cebu under the

impression that Lahug Airport would continue in operation."12

The condition, as may be deducedfrom the CFI‘s decision, was that should MCIAA, or its precursor agency, discontinue altogether

with the operation of Lahug Airport, then the owners of the lots expropriated may, if so minded,

demand of MCIAA to make good its verbal assurance to allow the repurchase of the properties.

To the CA, this assurance, a demandable agreement of repurchase by itself, has been adequatelyestablished.

Another civil case was filed by the Oanos for reconveyance aginst the MCIAA.

The RTC rendered a decision in favaor of the Oanos however acting on the Motion forReconsideration filed by the MCIAA, the RTC reversed its earlier decision and dismissed the

case.

Appeal was taken by the Oanos but it was denied by the CA.

Explaining its case disposition, the CA stated that the decision of the RTC did not state anycondition that Lot the Ouanos –– and all covered lots for that matter –– would be returned to them

or that they could repurchase the same property if it were to be used for purposes other than for

the Lahug Airport. The appellate court also went on to declare the inapplicability of the Court‘s pronouncement in MCIAA v. Court of Appeals, to support the Ouanos‘ cause, since the affected


















landowners in that case, unlike the Ouanos, parted with their property not through expropriation

but via a sale and purchase transaction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimonial evidence of the petitioners proving the promises, assurances andrepresentations by the airport officials and lawyers are inadmissbale under the Statute of Frauds.

RULING:

Respondents did not object during trial to the admissibility of petitioners‘ testimonial evidenceunder the Statute of Frauds and have thus waived such objection and are now barred from raising

the same. In any event, the Statute of Frauds is not applicable herein. Consequently, petitioners‘

evidence is admissible and should be duly given weight and credence, as initially held by the

trial court.

MCIAA would foist the theory that the judgment of condemnation in Civil Case No. R-1881 waswithout qualification and was unconditional. It would, in fact, draw attention to the fallo of theexpropriation court‘s decision to prove that there is nothing in the decision indicating that the

government gave assurance or undertook to reconvey the covered lots in case the Lahug airport

expansion project is aborted. Elaborating on this angle, MCIAA argues that the claim of theOuanos and the Inocians regarding the alleged verbal assurance of the NAC negotiating team

that they can reacquire their landholdings is barred by the Statute of Frauds.28

Under the rule on the Statute of Frauds, as expressed in Article 1403 of the Civil Code, a contract

for the sale or acquisition of real property shall be unenforceable unless the same or some note of

the contract be in writing and subscribed by the party charged. Subject to defined exceptions,

evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or secondary evidence of itscontents.

MCIAA‘s invocation of the Statute of Frauds is misplaced primarily because the statute applies

only to executory and not to completed, executed, or partially consummated contracts.

Analyzing the situation of the cases at bar, there can be no serious objection to the proposition

that the agreement package between the government and the private lot owners was already

partially performed by the government through the acquisition of the lots for the expansion of theLahug airport. The parties, however, failed to accomplish the more important condition in the

CFI decision decreeing the expropriation of the lots litigated upon: the expansion of the Lahug

Airport. The project –– the public purpose behind the forced property taking –– was, in fact, never pursued and, as a consequence, the lots expropriated were abandoned. Be that as it may, the twogroups of landowners can, in an action to compel MCIAA to make good its oral undertaking to

allow repurchase, adduce parol evidence to prove the transaction.

At any rate, the objection on the admissibility of evidence on the basis of the Statute of Frauds

may be waived if not timely raised. Records tend to support the conclusion that MCIAA did not,

as the Ouanos and the Inocians posit, object to the introduction of parol evidence to prove itscommitment to allow the former landowners to repurchase their respective properties upon the

occurrence of certain events.

As for the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding, it cannot now be doubted. Although

Mactan Airport is being constructed, it does not take away the actual usefulness and importance

of the Lahug Airport: it is handling the air traffic of both civilian and military. From it aircraftsfly to Mindanao and Visayas and pass thru it on their flights to the North and Manila. Then, noevidence was adduced to show how soon is the Mactan Airport to be placed in operation and

whether the Lahug Airport will be closed immediately thereafter. It is up to the other departments

of the Government to determine said matters. The Court cannot substitute its judgments for those







of the said departments or agencies. In the absence of such showing, the court will presume that

the Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Oanos can repurchase the subject properties.

RULING:

Providing added support to the Ouanos right to repurchase is what in Heirs of Moreno wasreferred to as constructive trust, one that is akin to the implied trust expressed in Art. 1454 of the

Civil Code,37

the purpose of which is to prevent unjust enrichment.38

In the case at bench, the

Ouanos and the Inocians parted with their respective lots in favor of the MCIAA, the latterobliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its end of the

bargain, MCIAA can be compelled by the former landowners to reconvey the parcels of land to

them, otherwise, they would be denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was

not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized. In effect, thegovernment merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed public use or

purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the government. Sincethe government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the property,

then the lot owners Ouanos and Inocians can demand the reconveyance of their old propertiesafter the payment of the condemnation price.

Constructive trusts are fictions of equity that courts use as devices to remedy any situation inwhich the holder of the legal title, MCIAA in this case, may not, in good conscience, retain the

beneficial interest.

More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to

use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing

which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon theexpropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the

same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one

indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private

property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property

owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.

In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent

to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the conditionthat the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if

this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily

abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property,

subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise ofthe power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.

A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition forexpropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it

behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires.

The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and,in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of

fair play.

Equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in question to the

Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and

Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of their

respective properties plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case shouldrun from the time MCIAA complies with the reconveyance obligation.

43 They must likewise pay

MCIAA the necessary expenses it might have incurred in sustaining their respective lots and the















monetary value of its services in managing the lots in question to the extent that they, as private

owners, were benefited thereby.

In accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on mutual compensation, MCIAA may keep

whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of land expropriated. In turn, the

Ouanos and Inocians need not require the accounting of interests earned by the amounts theyreceived as just compensation.44

Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code providing that "[i]f the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor x x x," the Ouanos and

Inocians do not have to settle the appreciation of the values of their respective lots as part of the

reconveyance process, since the value increase is merely the natural effect of nature and time.







SAMUEL U. LEE and PAULINE LEE and ASIATRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK, INC., vs.

BANGKOK BANK PUBLIC COMPANY, LIMITED

(G.R. No. 173349 February 9, 2011)

FACTS:

Midas Diversified Export Corporation (MDEC) and Manila Home Textile, Inc. (MHI) enteredinto two separate Credit Line Agreements (CLAs) with Respondent Bangkok Bank Public

Company, Limited (Bangkok Bank). MDEC and MHI are owned and controlled by the Lee

family. Both corporations have interlocking directors and management led by the Lee family;

and engaged in the manufacturing and export of garments, ladies‘ bags and apparel.

Bangkok Bank required guarantees from the Lee family for the two CLAs. Consequently, theLee family executed guarantees in favor of Bangkok Bank for MDEC and for the CLA of MHI.Under the guarantees, the Lee family irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed, as principal

debtors, the payment of any and all indebtedness of MDEC and MHI with Bangkok

Bank. Subsequently, MDEC and MHI made several availments from the CLAs.

MDEC was likewise granted a loan facility by Asiatrust Development Bank, Inc. In themeantime, Samuel Lee bought several parcels of land in Cupang, Antipolo, and later entered into

a joint venture with Louisville Realty and Development Corporation to develop the properties

into a residential subdivision, called Louisville Subdivision. These properties in Cupang,

Antipolo are the subject properties in the instant case (Antipolo properties).

MDEC availed itself of the omnibus credit line granted by Asiatrust on three occasions and when

MDEC had defaulted in the payment of its loan that already matured, Asiatrust initiatednegotiations with MDEC and required the Lee family to provide additional collateral that would

secure the loan. The negotiation was concluded when Asiatrust had agreed to Samuel‘s

proposition that he would mortgage the subject Antipolo properties to secure the loan, andtherefore execute a REM over the properties.

Similarly, MDEC and MHI initially had made payments with their CLAs until they defaulted.Similarly, the Lee corporations defaulted in their obligations with other creditors. The RTC in a

civil case filed by SBC against the Lee corporations issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment in

favor of SBC, granting attachment of the defendants‘ real and personal properties. The writ,however, was neither registered nor annotated on the titles of the subject Antipolo properties atthe RD.

MDEC, MHI, and three other corporations owned by the Lee family filed before the Securities

and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Consolidated Petition for the Declaration of a State of

Suspension of Payments and for Appointment of a Management Committee/Rehabilitation

Receiver. Said petition acknowledged, among others, MDEC and MHI‘s indebtedness withBangkok Bank, and admitted that matured and maturing obligations could not be met due to

liquidity problems. The petition likewise had a list of creditors to whom the corporations remain

indebted, which included Asiatrust. The petition stated that the Lee family and their corporationshad more than sufficient properties to cover all liabilities to their creditors; and presented a list of

all their properties including the subject properties located in Antipolo, Rizal. Notably, the list of

properties attached to the petition indicated that the subject Antipolo properties of the spouses

Lee had already been ear marked, or that they had already served as security, for MDEC‘s unpaidobligation with Asiatrust.



The SEC issued a Suspension Order enjoining the Lee corporations from disposing of their

property in any manner except in the ordinary course of business, and from making any

payments outside the legitimate expenses of their business during the pendency of the petition.

The Bangkok Bank instituted an action tom recover the loans extended to MDEC and MHI under

the guarantees. Bangkok Bank‘s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachmentwas granted covering the properties of the Lee family in Antipolo, Cavite, Quezon City, and

Baguio, among others.

While enforcing the writs of preliminary attachment, Bangkok Bank discovered that the spouses

Lee had executed a REM over the subject Antipolo properties in favor of Asiatrust; and that the

REM had previously been annotated on the titles. Thus, the writs of preliminary attachment werealso inscribed at the back of the TCTs covering the subject Antipolo properties, next to the

annotation of the REM.

With MDEC still unable to make payments on its defaulting loans with Asiatrust, the latter

foreclosed the subject mortgaged Antipolo properties. Asiatrust won as the highest bidder at theauction sale but since there is still deficiency Asiatrust filed an action against MDEC and the

spouses Lee to collect the said deficiency

Subsequently, the sale was registered. Believing the REM and the foreclosure sale to befraudulent, Bangkok Bank did not redeem the subject properties. As there had been no effort toredeem the properties, consequently, the TCTs covering the subject properties were consolidated

in the name of Asiatrust and 120 new titles were issued in the name of Asiatrust without the

annotation of the writs of preliminary attachment, which were deemed canceled.

Bangkok Bank then filed the instant case for the rescission of the REM over the subject

properties, annulment of the foreclosure sale, cancellation of the new TCTs issued in favor ofAsiatrust, and damages. In its action, Bangkok Bank alleged, among others, that the presumption

of fraud under Article 1387 of the Civil Code applies. It also claimed that collusion and fraud

transpired between the spouses Lee and Asiatrust in the execution of the REM. Bangkok Bankamended its complaint to implead the RD.

Meanwhile the RTC rendered a Partial Decision in favor of Bangkok Bank, ordering the Leefamily, pursuant to the guarantees, to pay with interest. The levied properties were insufficient to

satisfy the said partial judgment.

ISSUE 1:

Whether or not properties owned by private individuals should be covered by a suspension orderissued by the SEC in an action for suspension of payments.

RULING:

NO. The subject properties are not under the purview of the SEC Suspension Order.

A review of the applicable laws and existing jurisprudence would show that the subject

properties owned by the spouses Lee were not subject to the February 20, 1998 SEC SuspensionOrder.

PD 902-A vested the SEC with jurisdiction on petitions for suspension of payments only oncorporations, partnerships and associations; not on individual persons.

It can be clearly gleaned from the provisions of the law that in cases of petitions for thesuspension of payments, the SEC has jurisdiction over corporations, partnerships and

associations, which are grantees of primary franchise or license or permit issued by the

government to operate in the Philippines, and their properties. And it is indubitably clear from



the aforequoted Sec. 5(d) that only corporations, partnerships and associations — NOT private

individuals — can file with the SEC, petitions for declaration in a state of suspension of payments.

Thus, it logically follows that the SEC does not have jurisdiction to entertain petitions forsuspension of payments filed by parties other than corporations, partnerships or associations.

Indeed, settled is the rule that it is axiomatic that jurisdiction is the authority to hear and

determine a cause, which is conferred by law and not by the policy of any court or agency.

Private individuals and their privately owned properties cannot be placed under the jurisdiction

of the SEC in a petition for suspension of payments

Here, it is undisputed that the petition for suspension of payments was collectively filed by the

five corporations owned by the Lee family. It is likewise undisputed that together with theconsolidated petition is a list of properties, which included the subject Antipolo properties owned

by Samuel and Pauline Lee. The fact, however, that the subject properties were included in the

list submitted to the SEC does not confer jurisdiction on the SEC over such properties. It is

apparent that even if the members of the Lee family are joined as co-petitioners with the five

corporations, still, this could not confer jurisdiction on the SEC over the Lee family members — as private individuals — nor could this affect their privately owned properties.

Further, the fact that the debts of MDEC and MHI to Bangkok Bank are secured by the Lee

family through the guarantees will not likewise put the Lee family and their privately owned

properties under the jurisdiction of the SEC through the consolidated petition for suspension of payments.

Therefore, the February 20, 1998 Suspension Order issued by the SEC did not and could nothave included the subject properties. The RTC correctly grasped this point that the disposition of

the subject properties did not violate the suspension order.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not a surety or guarantor is guilty of defrauding creditors for executing a

REM in favor of one creditor prior to the filing of a Petition for Suspension of Payments.

RULING:

The presumption of fraud under Art. 1387 of the Civil Code does not apply in the present case

Under Art. 1381(3) of the Civil Code, contracts, which were "undertaken in fraud of creditorswhen the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims due them," are rescissible. Art.

1387 of the Code states when an act is presumed to be fraudulent, thus:

Art. 1387. All contracts by virtue of which the debtor alienates property by gratuitous title are

presumed to have been entered in fraud of creditors, when the donor did not reserve sufficient

property to pay all debts contracted before the donation.

Alienations by onerous title are also presumed fraudulent when made by persons against whom

some judgment has been rendered in any instance or some writ of attachment has been issued.The decision or attachment need not refer to the property alienated, and need not have been

obtained by the party seeking the rescission.

In addition to these presumptions, the design to defraud creditors may be proved in any other

manner recognized by the law of evidence.

The presumption of fraud established under Art. 1387 does not apply to registered lands IF "the

judgment or attachment made is not also registered‖.

Considering that the earlier SBC judgment or attachment was not, and in fact never was,

annotated on the titles of the subject Antipolo properties, prior to the execution of the REM, the

presumption of fraud under Art. 1387 of the Code clearly cannot apply.



Even assuming that Art. 1387 of the Code applies, the execution of a mortgage is not

contemplated within the meaning of alienation by onerous title under the said provision

Under Art. 1387 of the Code, fraud is presumed only in alienations by onerous title of a person

against whom a judgment or attachment has been issued. The term, alienation, connotes the

"transfer of the property and possession of lands, tenements, or other things, from one person toanother." This term is "particularly applied to absolute conveyances of real property" and must

involve a "complete transfer from one person to another." A mortgage does not contemplate a

transfer or an absolute conveyance of a real property. It is "an interest in land created by a written

instrument

t providing security for the performance of a duty or the payment of a debt." When a debtormortgages his property, he "merely subjects it to a lien but ownership thereof is not parted

with." It is merely a lien that neither creates a title nor an estate. It is, therefore, certainly not the

alienation by onerous title that is contemplated in Art. 1387 where fraud is to be presumed.

In any case, the application of the presumption of fraud under Art. 1387, if applicable, could only be made to apply to the spouses Lee as the person against whom a judgment or writ of

attachment has been issued; not to Asiatrust

A careful reading of Art. 1387 of the Code vis-à-vis its Art. 1385 would plainly show that the presumption of fraud in case of alienations by onerous title only applies to the person who madesuch alienation, and against whom some judgment has been rendered in any instance or some

writ of attachment has been issued. A third person is not and should not be automatically

presumed to be in fraud or in collusion with the judgment debtor. In allowing rescission in caseof an alienation by onerous title, the third person who received the property conveyed should

likewise be a party to the fraud.57

As clarified by Art. 1385(2) of the Code, so long as the person

who is in legal possession of the property did not act in bad faith, rescission cannot take place.Thus, in all instances, as to the third person in legal possession of the questioned property, goodfaith is presumed. Accordingly, it is upon the person who alleges bad faith or fraud that rests the

burden of proof.

Asiatrust, being a third person in good faith, should not be automatically presumed to have acted

fraudulently by the mere execution of the REM over the subject Antipolo properties, there beingno evidence of fraud or bad faith.

The alleged fraud on the part of the spouses Lee was not proved and substantiated.

It appears that the argument of Bangkok Bank on the existence of fraud on the part of the

spouses Lee evolves around the application of the presumption of fraud under Art. 1387 of the

Code. Bangkok Bank failed to substantiate its allegations by presenting clear and convincing proof that the spouses Lee indeed committed fraud in mortgaging the subject properties to

Asiatrust, and instead anchored its existence of the presumption under Art. 1387.

On the contrary, the spouses Lee proved the absence of fraud on their part.

No deception could have been used by the spouses Lee in including in the list of properties,

which they submitted to the SEC, the subject Antipolo properties. First, it is undisputed that the

list of properties submitted by the Lee corporations to the SEC clearly indicated that the subjectAntipolo properties have already been earmarked, or have already been serving as security, for

its loan obligations with Asiatrust. Second, MDEC, through its counsel, truly believed in good

faith that the inclusion of the spouses Lee‘s private properties in the list submitted to the SEC is

valid and regular. As can be seen in the letter sent by the counsel of the Midas Group ofCompanies to the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Antipolo RTC on

April 4, 1998, at the time when the subject Antipolo properties were being foreclosed by

Asiatrust, its counsel vigorously countered the actions of Asiatrust and stated that the subjectAntipolo properties cannot be foreclosed pursuant to the SEC Suspension Order. And as







discussed infra, the alleged collusion between the spouses Lee and Asiatrust appears to be a mere

figment of imagination.

In any case, the facts show no presence of fraud on the part of Asiatrust; therefore, the REM was

not a sham

Even pushing further to say that the REM was executed by the spouses Lee to defraud creditors,

the REM cannot be rescinded and shall, therefore, stand, as Asiatrust — the third party, in favor of

which the REM was executed, and which subsequently foreclosed the subject properties — actedin good faith and without any badge of fraud. As a general rule, whether the person, against

whom a judgment was made or some writ of attachment was issued, acted with or without fraud,

so long as the third person who is in legal possession of the property in question did not act withfraud and in bad faith, an action for rescission cannot prosper. Art. 1385 of the Civil Code

explicitly states this.

As to who or which entity is in legal possession of a property, the registration in the Registry of

Deeds of the subject property under the name of a third person indicates the legal possession ofthat person. In this case, Asiatrust is in the legal possession of the subject Antipolo properties

after the titles under the name of Spouses Lee have been canceled, and new TCTs have beenissued on April 20, 1999, under the name of Asiatrust. What is more, 12 title out of the 120 titles

in the Antipolo properties in question have already been sold to different persons, which make

them in legal possession of the properties. It is, thus, established that Asiatrust and the 12 otherunnamed persons are in legal possession of the subject Antipolo properties; and it is imperative

to prove that they legally took possession of them in good faith and without any badge of fraud.

The requisite (1) good faith on the part of the third person and (2) fraud, necessary for an action

to rescind under Art. 1381 of the Civil Code, were not complied with.

The action to rescind contracts in fraud of creditors is known as accion pauliana. For this action

to prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) the plaintiff asking for rescission has a

credit prior to the alienation, although demandable later; (2) the debtor has made a subsequentcontract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third person; (3) the creditor has no other legal

remedy to satisfy his claim; (4) the act being impugned is fraudulent; (5) the third person who

received the property conveyed, if it is by onerous title, has been an accomplice in the fraud.

As between Asiatrust and Bangkok Bank, the former has a better right over the subject Antipolo

properties, it being the first to annotate its lien on the titles of the properties

It is evidently a well-settled and elementary principle that the rights of the first mortgage creditor

or mortgagee over the mortgaged properties are superior to those of a subsequent attaching

creditor and other junior mortgagees.

In this case, it is a fact that the REM was annotated on the titles of the subject Antipolo properties ahead of the writs of preliminary attachment issued in favor of Bangkok Bank. In fact,

it was admitted by Bangkok Bank that it only knew of the existing mortgage that has already

been annotated at the back of the subject titles when it sought the annotation of the writs of preliminary attachment. Therefore, as between Asiatrust as mortgage creditor and Bangkok Bank

as attaching creditor, it is apparent that the former has a superior right over the latter.

ISSUE 3: Whether or not Asiatrust is in bad faith.

RULING:

No. Bangkok Bank failed to present any clear and convincing evidence that would ascertain its

existence.



Contracts in fraud of creditors are those executed with the intention to prejudice the rights of

creditors. They should not be confused with those entered into without such mal-intent, even if,

as a direct consequence, a creditor may suffer some damage. More so it is, when the allegationinvolves not only fraud on the part of the debtor, but also that of another creditor. In determining

whether or not a certain conveying contract is fraudulent, what comes to mind first is the

question of whether the conveyance was a bona fide transaction or a trick and contrivance todefeat creditors.64

Haste alone in the foreclosure of the mortgage does not constitute theexistence of fraud. Considering that the totality of circumstances clearly manifests the want of

fraud and bad faith on the part of the parties to the REM in question, consequently, the REM

cannot be rescinded.

In this case, it is clearly established that there was a bona fide transaction between the spouses

Lee and Asiatrust that necessitated the negotiations resulting from the former‘s default in the payment of its obligations; and which brought about the execution of the REM to secure their

pre-existing obligations.

ISSUE 4: Whether or not Asiatrust slept on its rights to foreclose the property.

RULING:

Asiatrust did not sleep on its rights as a mortgage creditor of MDEC by foreclosing the mortgageon the spouses Lee‘s Antipolo properties. On the contrary, it is odd but worth noting thatBangkok Bank never acted on its rights as creditor at the soonest possible time. It could have

asserted it rights as creditor at the time when the Lee family‘s corporations started to default in

their payments of the loans as early as October 1997.When Bangkok Bank finally instituted anaction against the Lee family on March 12, 1998 to collect the outstanding obligations of MDEC

and MHI, a writ of preliminary attachment was issued by the Makati RTC in the same month

covering the properties of the Lee family, including the subject Antipolo properties. And whileenforcing the said writ, Bangkok Bank discovered the existing REM that had already beenannotated on the titles of the subject Antipolo properties. But Bangkok Bank did nothing upon its

knowledge and discovery. Worse, even at the time of the foreclosure and the redemption period,

or until April 30, 1999, Bangkok Bank likewise did not act on the alleged fraudulent execution ofthe REM; nor did it redeem the subject properties. Rather, it was only on July 20, 1999 that

Bangkok Bank seems to have belatedly realized that the subject Antipolo properties could

properly be another means by which it could be paid of the defaulting obligations of MDEC andMHI. Interestingly, even on the elevation of this case to Us, Bangkok Bank‘s counsel had to

move for four extensions, totaling to 52 days within which to file a comment on the instant

petition, and has been warned for it. Asiatrust cannot be faulted for acting with prudence, in good

faith, and without any badge of fraud in the creation of the REM and in the foreclosure of themortgage to ensure the satisfaction of the debts owed to it by MDEC. Bangkok Bank should

have likewise done so at the earliest possible opportunity.

ISSUE 5: Whether or not the Bangkok Bank can redeem the property.

RULING:

Yes. However the redemption period has already lapsed

Sec. 27, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states the persons who may redeem a real property sold,

thus:

Sec. 27. Who may redeem real property so sold.

Real property sold as provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately,

may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the following persons:







(a) The judgment obligor, or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the

property;

(b) A creditor having a lien by virtue of an attachment, judgment or mortgage on the

property sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to the lien under which the property

was sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed a redemptioner.

From the foregoing rule, it is clear that Bangkok Bank, as an attaching creditor, has the right to

redeem the subject Antipolo properties that were foreclosed by Asiatrust.

In determining the period within which to redeem the foreclosed Antipolo properties in the present case, RA 337 or the General Banking Act

finds application.

In this case, the auction sale took place on April 15, 1998 and was registered with the RD on

April 21, 1998. Subsequently, on April 30, 1999, a date already and certainly beyond the one-year redemption period provided by law, new titles were issued in favor of Asiatrust. Apparently,

Bangkok Bank chose not to exercise its right of redemption over the subject Antipolo properties.

AGUSTIN P. DELA TORRE vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

CRISOSTOMO G. CONCEPCION, RAMON “BOY” LARRAZABAL, PHILIPPINE

TRIGON SHIPYARD CORPORATION, and ROLAND G. DELA TORRE.

(G.R. No. 160565)



FACTS:

Respondent Crisostomo G. Concepcion owned LCT-Josephine, a vessel registered with

the Philippine Coast Guard. Concepcion entered into a ―Preliminary Agreement‖ with Roland dela Torre for the dry-docking and repairs of the said vessel as well as for its charter

afterwards. Under this agreement, Concepcion agreed that after the dry-docking and repair

of LCT-Josephine, it ―should‖ be chartered for ₱10,000.00 per month and some other conditions.

Concepcion and the Philippine Trigon Shipyard Corporation (PTSC), represented by

Roland, entered into a ―Contract of Agreement,‖ wherein the latter would charter LCT-Josephine

under some conditions.

PTSC/Roland sub-chartered LCT-Josephine to Trigon Shipping Lines (TSL), a single proprietorship owned by Roland‘s father, Agustin de la Torre.

TSL, this time represented by Roland per Agustin‘s Special Power of Attorney, sub -

chartered LCT-Josephine to Ramon Larrazabal for the transport of cargo consisting of sand and

gravel to Leyte.

The LCT-Josephine with its cargo of sand and gravel arrived at Philpos, Isabel, Leyte.

The vessel was beached near the NDC Wharf. With the vessel‘s ramp already lowered, the

unloading of the vessel‘s cargo began with the use of Larrazabal‘s payloader. While the payloader was on the deck of the LCT-Josephine scooping a load of the cargo, the vessel‘s ramp

started to move downward, the vessel tilted and sea water rushed in. Shortly thereafter, LCT-

Josephine sank.

Concepcion demanded that PTSC/ Roland refloat LCT-Josephine. The latter assured

Concepcion that negotiations were underway for the refloating of his vessel. Unfortunately, this

did not materialize.

For this reason, Concepcion was constrained to institute a complaint for ―Sum of Money

and Damages‖ against PTSC and Roland before the RTC. PTSC and Roland filed their answer

together with a third-party complaint against Agustin. Agustin, in turn, filed his answer plus a

fourth-party complaint against Larrazabal. The latter filed his answer and counterclaim but was

subsequently declared in default by the RTC. Eventually, the fourth-party complaint against

Larrazabal was dismissed when the RTC rendered its decision in favor of Concepcion.

Hubart Sungayan, who was the chiefmate of LCT-Josephine and under the employ of

TSL/Agustin, also admitted at the trial that it was TSL/Agustin, through its crew, who was in-

charge of LCT- Josephine’s operations although the responsibility of loading and unloading the

cargo was under Larrazabal. Thus, the RTC declared that the ―efficient cause of the sinking of

the LCT-JOSEPHINE was the improper lowering or positioning of the ramp,‖ which was well

within the charge or responsibility of the captain and crew of the vessel.

Agustin, PTSC and Roland went to the CA on appeal. The appellate court, in

agreement with the findings of the RTC, affirmed its decision in toto.



Still not in conformity with the CA findings against them, Agustin, PTSC and Roland

came to this Court through these petitions for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the limited liability rule shall apply.

RULING:

NO.

The said rule has been explained to be that of the real and hypothecary doctrine in maritime law

where the shipowner or ship agent‘s liability is held as merely co-extensive with his interest in

the vessel such that a total loss thereof results in its extinction. In this jurisdiction, this rule is

provided in three articles of the Code of Commerce. These are:

Art. 587. The ship agent shall also be civilly liable for the indemnities infavor of third persons which may arise from the conduct of the captain in the care

of the goods which he loaded on the vessel; but he may exempt himself therefrom

by abandoning the vessel with all her equipment and the freight it may haveearned during the voyage.

---

Art. 590. The co-owners of the vessel shall be civilly liable in the

proportion of their interests in the common fund for the results of the acts of the

captain referred to in Art. 587.

Each co-owner may exempt himself from this liability by the

abandonment, before a notary, of the part of the vessel belonging to him.

---

Art. 837. The civil liability incurred by shipowners in the case prescribed

in this section, shall be understood as limited to the value of the vessel with all itsappurtenances and freightage served during the voyage.

Article 837 specifically applies to cases involving collision which is a necessary

consequence of the right to abandon the vessel given to the shipowner or ship agent under the

first provision – Article 587. Similarly, Article 590 is a reiteration of Article 587, only this time

the situation is that the vessel is co-owned by several persons. Obviously, the forerunner of the

Limited Liability Rule under the Code of Commerce is Article 587. Now, the latter is quite clear

on which indemnities may be confined or restricted to the value of the vessel pursuant to the said

Rule, and these are the – ―indemnities in favor of third persons which may arise from the conduct

of the captain in the care of the goods which he loaded on the vessel.‖ Thus, what is

contemplated is the liability to third persons who may have dealt with the shipowner, the agent

or even the charterer in case of demise or bareboat charter.

The only person who could avail of this is the shipowner, Concepcion. He is the very person

whom the Limited Liability Rule has been conceived to protect. The petitioners cannot invoke

this as a defense. In the case of in the case of Monarch Insurance Co., Inc. v. CA, the SC held

that ‗No vessel, no liability,‘ expresses in a nutshell the limited liability rule. The shipowner‘s or



agent‘s liability is merely coextensive with his interest in the vessel such that a total loss thereof

results in its extinction. The total destruction of the vessel extinguishes maritime liens because

there is no longer any res to which it can attach. This doctrine is based on the real and

hypothecary nature of maritime law which has its origin in the prevailing conditions of the

maritime trade and sea voyages during the medieval ages, attended by innumerable hazards and perils. To offset against these adverse conditions and to encourage shipbuilding and maritime

commerce, it was deemed necessary to confine the liability of the owner or agent arising from

the operation of a ship to the vessel, equipment, and freight, or insurance, if any.

In view of the foregoing, Concepcion as the real shipowner is the one who is supposed to be

supported and encouraged to pursue maritime commerce. Thus, it would be absurd to apply the

Limited Liability Rule against him who, in the first place, should be the one benefitting from the

said rule.

As to the issue of the liability of the charterer and the sub-charterer, the charterer and the sub-

charterer through their respective contracts of agreement/charter parties, obtained the use and

service of the entire LCT-Josephine. The vessel was likewise manned by the charterer and later

by the sub-charterer‘s people. With the complete and exclusive relinquishment of possession,

command and navigation of the vessel, the charterer and later the sub-charterer became the

vessel‘s owner pro hac vice. Now, and in the absence of any showing that the vessel or any part

thereof was commercially offered for use to the public, the above agreements/charter parties are

that of a private carriage where the rights of the contracting parties are primarily defined and

governed by the stipulations in their contract.

Thus, Roland, who, in his personal capacity, entered into the Preliminary Agreement with

Concepcion for the dry-docking and repair of LCT-Josephine, is liable under Article 1189 of the

New Civil Code. There is no denying that the vessel was not returned to Concepcion after the

repairs because of the provision in the Preliminary Agreement that the same ―should‖ be used by

Roland for the first two years. Before the vessel could be returned, it was lost due to the

negligence of Agustin to whom Roland chose to sub-charter or sublet the vessel.

PTSC is liable to Concepcion under Articles 1665 and 1667 of the New Civil Code. As the

charterer or lessee under the Contract of Agreement dated June 20, 1984, PTSC was contract-

bound to return the thing leased and it was liable for the deterioration or loss of the same.

Agustin, on the other hand, who was the sub-charterer or sub-lessee of LCT-Josephine, is liable

under Article 1651 of the New Civil Code. Although he was never privy to the contract between

PTSC and Concepcion, he remained bound to preserve the chartered vessel for the latter. Despite

his non-inclusion in the complaint of Concepcion, it was deemed amended so as to include him

because, despite or in the absence of that formality of amending the complaint to include him, he

still had his day in court as he was in fact impleaded as a third-party defendant by his own son,

Roland – the very same person who represented him in the Contract of Agreement withLarrazabal.

Clearly, the petitioners, to whom the possession of LCT Josephine had been entrusted as early as

the time when it was dry-docked for repairs, were obliged to insure the same. Unfortunately, they

failed to do so in clear contravention of their respective agreements. Certainly, they should now

all answer for the loss of the vessel.

Documents

113782298 Case Digest Bar Ops