11 th International Pragmatics Conference Melbourne, 12-17 July 2009 Speaking about Time: Contextual Inferences and Pragmatic Defaults Kasia M. Jaszczolt

1111thth International Pragmatics Conference International Pragmatics ConferenceMelbourne, 12-17 July 2009Melbourne, 12-17 July 2009

Speaking about Time:Speaking about Time:

Contextual Inferences and Pragmatic DefaultsContextual Inferences and Pragmatic Defaults

Kasia M. JaszczoltKasia M. JaszczoltUniversity of Cambridge, U. K.University of Cambridge, U. K.

http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21

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DiversityDiversity

ContextContext

StructureStructure

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(1)(1) mm33ae:rae:r33i:i:II khkh22ianian nn33iyiy33ai:ai:

MaryMary writewrite novelnovel

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(1)(1)(a)(a) Mary wrote a novel.Mary wrote a novel.(b)(b) Mary was writing a novel.Mary was writing a novel.(c)(c) Mary started writing a novel but did not finish it.Mary started writing a novel but did not finish it.(d)(d) Mary has written a novel.Mary has written a novel.(e)(e) Mary has been writing a novel.Mary has been writing a novel.(f)(f) Mary writes novels. / Mary is a novelist.Mary writes novels. / Mary is a novelist.(g)(g) Mary is writing a novel.Mary is writing a novel.(h)(h) Mary will write a novel.Mary will write a novel.(i)(i) Mary will be writing a novel.Mary will be writing a novel.

from Srioutai (2006: 45)from Srioutai (2006: 45)

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(2)(2) ff33onon tt11okok

rain rain fallfall

(a)(a) It is raining. (default meaning)It is raining. (default meaning)(b)(b) It was raining. (possible intended meaning)It was raining. (possible intended meaning)

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‘…‘…I shall speak of the series of positions running from the I shall speak of the series of positions running from the far past through the near past to the present, and then far past through the near past to the present, and then from the present to the near future and the far future, as from the present to the near future and the far future, as the the A seriesA series. The series of positions which runs from . The series of positions which runs from earlier to later I shall call the earlier to later I shall call the B seriesB series. The contents of a . The contents of a position in time are called events.’ position in time are called events.’

McTaggart (1908: 111)McTaggart (1908: 111)

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Philosophical Foundations: Philosophical Foundations: SupervenienceSupervenience

(i)(i) supervenience of the supervenience of the concept of timeconcept of time on the on the concept of concept of epistemic detachment (temporal properties epistemic detachment (temporal properties onon modal modal properties in semantics)properties in semantics)

(ii)(ii) supervenience of the supervenience of the concept of timeconcept of time on on space-time space-time (properties of the concept of time on properties of (properties of the concept of time on properties of space-time)space-time). .

These two relations are closely connected. Just as the These two relations are closely connected. Just as the concept of time is founded on a more primitive concept of time is founded on a more primitive concepts of uncertainty, probability and detachment, so concepts of uncertainty, probability and detachment, so it is founded on the probability and relativity of real it is founded on the probability and relativity of real time. It is not just the time. It is not just the construal of realityconstrual of reality that requires that requires modality; it is modality; it is realityreality itself. itself.

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‘‘Why do we believe that events are to be distinguished Why do we believe that events are to be distinguished as past, present, and future? I conceive that the belief as past, present, and future? I conceive that the belief arises from distinctions in our own experience.arises from distinctions in our own experience.

At any moment I have certain perceptions, I have At any moment I have certain perceptions, I have also the memory of certain other perceptions, and the also the memory of certain other perceptions, and the anticipation of others again. The direct perception itself is anticipation of others again. The direct perception itself is a mental state qualitatively different from the memory or a mental state qualitatively different from the memory or the anticipation of perceptions.’the anticipation of perceptions.’

McTaggart (1908: 127)McTaggart (1908: 127)

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OutlineOutline

Contextualism in the truth-conditional approach to Contextualism in the truth-conditional approach to meaningmeaning

Default Semantics (Jaszczolt, e.g. 2005, 2009, Default Semantics (Jaszczolt, e.g. 2005, 2009, forthcoming) forthcoming) Unit of analysisUnit of analysis Sources of information contributing to the unitSources of information contributing to the unit Pragmatic compositionalityPragmatic compositionality Merger representations: towards a formalizationMerger representations: towards a formalization

Representing time in DSRepresenting time in DS

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Post-Gricean theory of utterance/ discoursePost-Gricean theory of utterance/ discourse

meaningmeaning

radical pragmaticsradical pragmatics

sense-generalitysense-generality

contextualismcontextualism

1111

(3)(3) Some British people like cricket.Some British people like cricket.(3a)(3a) Some Some but not allbut not all British people like cricket. British people like cricket.

(4)(4) Tom dropped a camera and it broke.Tom dropped a camera and it broke.(4a)(4a) Tom dropped a camera Tom dropped a camera and as a resultand as a result it broke. it broke.

(5)(5) Everybody read Frege.Everybody read Frege.(5a)(5a) Every member of the research group Every member of the research group read read

Frege.Frege.

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Semantic analysis takes us only part of the way Semantic analysis takes us only part of the way towards the recovery of utterance meaning. towards the recovery of utterance meaning. Pragmatic enrichment completes the process.Pragmatic enrichment completes the process.

Enrichment: Enrichment:

andand +> and then, and as a result+> and then, and as a result

somesome +> some but not all+> some but not all

everybodyeverybody +> everybody in the room, every +> everybody in the room, every acquaintance of the speaker, etc.acquaintance of the speaker, etc.

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Modulation (Recanati 2004, 2005):Modulation (Recanati 2004, 2005):

The logical form becomes enriched/modulated as a The logical form becomes enriched/modulated as a result of pragmatic inference and the entire result of pragmatic inference and the entire semantic/pragmatic product becomes subjected to the semantic/pragmatic product becomes subjected to the truth-conditional analysis.truth-conditional analysis.

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what is saidwhat is said (Recanati) (Recanati) primary meaningprimary meaning (Jaszczolt) (Jaszczolt)

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what is saidwhat is said (Recanati) (Recanati) primary meaningprimary meaning (Jaszczolt) (Jaszczolt)

?? Question:Question:

How far can the logical form be extended? ‘How much How far can the logical form be extended? ‘How much pragmatics’ is allowed in the semantic representation?pragmatics’ is allowed in the semantic representation?

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The logical form of the sentence can not only be The logical form of the sentence can not only be extended but also replaced by a new semantic extended but also replaced by a new semantic representation when the primary, intended meaning representation when the primary, intended meaning demands it. Such extensions or substitutions are demands it. Such extensions or substitutions are primary primary meaningsmeanings and their representations are and their representations are merger merger representationsrepresentations in in Default SemanticsDefault Semantics.. There is no There is no syntactic constraint on merger representationssyntactic constraint on merger representations..

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Object of study of the theory of meaning:Object of study of the theory of meaning:

Discourse meaning intended by Model Speaker and Discourse meaning intended by Model Speaker and recovered by Model Addressee (recovered by Model Addressee (primary meaningprimary meaning))

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(6)(6) You are not going to die, Peter.You are not going to die, Peter.

(6a)(6a) There is no future time at which you will die, There is no future time at which you will die, Peter.Peter.

(6b)(6b) You are not going to die from this cut, Peter.You are not going to die from this cut, Peter.(6c)(6c) There is nothing to worry about, Peter.There is nothing to worry about, Peter.

Default Semantics: Default Semantics: (6c)(6c) – substituted proposition – substituted proposition (primary meaning)(primary meaning)

1919

(7)(7) Everybody is going to Egypt this spring.Everybody is going to Egypt this spring.

(7a)(7a) All of the speaker’s close friends and family are going All of the speaker’s close friends and family are going to Egypt this spring.to Egypt this spring.

(7b)(7b) Egypt seems to be a popular holiday destination Egypt seems to be a popular holiday destination among the people the speaker knows.among the people the speaker knows.

(7c)(7c) The interlocutors should consider going on holiday to The interlocutors should consider going on holiday to Egypt this spring.Egypt this spring.

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Summary so farSummary so far

The output of syntactic processing often leaves the The output of syntactic processing often leaves the meaning underdetermined.meaning underdetermined.

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The object of study of a theory of meaning is a The object of study of a theory of meaning is a pragmatically modified representation. (Default pragmatically modified representation. (Default Semantics is a radical contextualist theory.)Semantics is a radical contextualist theory.)

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This pragmatically modified representation is an object of This pragmatically modified representation is an object of study of a theory of meaning (Default Semantics is a study of a theory of meaning (Default Semantics is a radical contextualist theory).radical contextualist theory).

There is no syntactic constraint on the object of study. There is no syntactic constraint on the object of study.

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This pragmatically modified representation is an object of This pragmatically modified representation is an object of study of a theory of meaning (Default Semantics is a study of a theory of meaning (Default Semantics is a radical contextualist theory).radical contextualist theory).

There is no syntactic constraint on the object of study. There is no syntactic constraint on the object of study.

Discourse meaning is construed as meaning intended by Discourse meaning is construed as meaning intended by the Model Speaker and recovered by Model Addressee.the Model Speaker and recovered by Model Addressee.

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Going beyond contextualism: Going beyond contextualism:

DS does not recognize the level of meaning at DS does not recognize the level of meaning at which the logical form is pragmatically which the logical form is pragmatically developed/modulated as a real, interesting, and developed/modulated as a real, interesting, and cognitively justified construct. cognitively justified construct.

To do so would be to assume that syntax plays To do so would be to assume that syntax plays a privileged role among various carriers of a privileged role among various carriers of information (contextualists’ mistake).information (contextualists’ mistake).

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(8)(8) Child: Can I go punting?Child: Can I go punting?

Mother: You are too small.Mother: You are too small.

(A) The child is too small to go punting.(A) The child is too small to go punting.

(B) The child can’t go punting. (B) The child can’t go punting.

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(8)(8) Child: Can I go punting?Child: Can I go punting?Mother: You are too small.Mother: You are too small.

(A) The child is too small to go punting.(A) The child is too small to go punting.(B) The child can’t go punting. (B) The child can’t go punting.

(6)(6) Situation: A little boy cuts his finger and cries.Situation: A little boy cuts his finger and cries.Mother: You are not going to die.Mother: You are not going to die.

(A) The boy is not going to die from the cut.(A) The boy is not going to die from the cut.(B1) There is nothing to worry about.(B1) There is nothing to worry about.(B2) It’s not a big deal. (B2) It’s not a big deal.

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(8)(8) Child: Can I go punting?Child: Can I go punting?Mother: You are too small.Mother: You are too small.

(A)(A) The child is too small to go punting.The child is too small to go punting.(B) The child can’t go punting. (B) The child can’t go punting.

(6)(6) Situation: A little boy cuts his finger and cries.Situation: A little boy cuts his finger and cries.Mother: You are not going to die.Mother: You are not going to die.

(A) The boy is not going to die from the cut.(A) The boy is not going to die from the cut.(B1) There is nothing to worry about.(B1) There is nothing to worry about.(B2) It’s not a big deal. (B2) It’s not a big deal.

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Interlocutors frequently communicate their main intended Interlocutors frequently communicate their main intended content through a proposition which is not syntactically content through a proposition which is not syntactically restricted.restricted.

Experimental evidence:Experimental evidence:

Nicolle and Clark 1999Nicolle and Clark 1999

Pitts 2005Pitts 2005

Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007 Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007

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Merger Representation Merger Representation

Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger merger

representationsrepresentations..

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Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called Primary meanings are modelled as the so-called merger merger representationsrepresentations. .

The outputs of sources of information about meaning The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. footing.

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The outputs of sources of information about meaning The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned. footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned.

Merger representations have the status of mental Merger representations have the status of mental representations. representations.

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The outputs of sources of information about meaning The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned. footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned.

Merger representations have the status of mental Merger representations have the status of mental representations. representations.

They have a compositional structure: they are They have a compositional structure: they are proposition-like, truth-conditionally evaluable constructs, proposition-like, truth-conditionally evaluable constructs, integrating information coming from various sources integrating information coming from various sources that interacts according to the principles established by that interacts according to the principles established by the intentional character of discourse. the intentional character of discourse.

3333

Sources of information for Sources of information for ::

(i)(i) world knowledge (WK);world knowledge (WK);

(ii)(ii) word meaning and sentence structure (WS);word meaning and sentence structure (WS);

(iii)(iii) situation of discourse (SD);situation of discourse (SD);

(iv)(iv) properties of the human inferential system (IS);properties of the human inferential system (IS);

(v)(v) stereotypes and presumptions about society and stereotypes and presumptions about society and culture (SC). culture (SC).

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SCSC

(9)(9) A Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi last week.A Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi last week.

(9a)(9a) A painting by BotticelliA painting by Botticelli was stolen from was stolen from the Uffizi the Uffizi Gallery in FlorenceGallery in Florence last week. last week.

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WKWK

(10)(10) The temperature fell below -10 The temperature fell below -10 degrees degrees Celsius and the lake froze.Celsius and the lake froze.

(10a)(10a) The temperature fell below -10 The temperature fell below -10 degrees degrees Celsius Celsius and as a resultand as a result the lake froze. the lake froze.

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ISIS

(11)(11) The author of The author of Cloud AtlasCloud Atlas has breathtaking has breathtaking sensitivity and imagination.sensitivity and imagination.

(11a)(11a) David MitchellDavid Mitchell has breathtaking sensitivity and has breathtaking sensitivity and imagination.imagination.

world knowledge (WK)

word meaning and sentence structure (WS)

situation of discourse (SD)

stereotypes and presumptions properties of human inferential system (IS) about society and culture (SC)

Fig. 1: Sources of information contributing to a merger representation Σ

merger representation Σ

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The model of sources of information can be mapped The model of sources of information can be mapped onto onto types of processestypes of processes that produce the merger that produce the merger representation representation of the primary meaning and the of the primary meaning and the additional (secondary) meanings. additional (secondary) meanings.

Primary meaning:

combination of word meaning and sentence structure (WS)

conscious pragmatic inferencepm (from situation of discourse, social and

social, cultural and cognitive defaults (CD) cultural assumptions, and world world-knowledge defaultspm (SCWDpm) knowledge) (CPIpm) Secondary meanings:

Social, cultural and world-knowledge defaultssm (SCWDsm) conscious pragmatic inferencesm (CPIsm)

Fig. 2: Utterance interpretation according to the processing model of the revised version of Default Semantics

merger representation Σ

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Mapping between sources and processesMapping between sources and processes

WK WK SCWD or CPISCWD or CPI

SC SC SCWD or CPISCWD or CPIWS WS WS WS (logical form)(logical form)SD SD CPICPIIS IS CDCD

In building merger representations DS makes use of the In building merger representations DS makes use of the processing model and it indexes the components of processing model and it indexes the components of with a subscript standing for the type of processing.with a subscript standing for the type of processing.

4141

There is a need to distinguish the two kinds of There is a need to distinguish the two kinds of processes: the conscious, inferential one and the processes: the conscious, inferential one and the automatic, subdoxastic one.automatic, subdoxastic one.

Cf.: Levinson (2000) & Recanati (2002, 2004) – w.r.t. Cf.: Levinson (2000) & Recanati (2002, 2004) – w.r.t. primary meaningsprimary meanings

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Compositionality of Primary MeaningsCompositionality of Primary Meanings Schiffer (e. g. 1991, 1994, 2003): composition of Schiffer (e. g. 1991, 1994, 2003): composition of

meaning reflects compositional reality. Meaning meaning reflects compositional reality. Meaning supervenes on the structure of the world. supervenes on the structure of the world.

Recanati (2004): compositionality belongs to modulated Recanati (2004): compositionality belongs to modulated propositions. ‘Interactionist’, ‘Gestaltist’ compositionality.propositions. ‘Interactionist’, ‘Gestaltist’ compositionality.

DS: compositionality of DS: compositionality of utteranceutterance meaning rather than meaning rather than sentencesentence meaning. meaning.

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Merger representations are Merger representations are compositional structures.compositional structures.

4444

Compositionality is a methodological principle:Compositionality is a methodological principle:

‘…‘…it is always possible to satisfy compositionality by simply it is always possible to satisfy compositionality by simply adjusting the syntactic and/or semantic tools one uses, adjusting the syntactic and/or semantic tools one uses, unless that is, the latter are constrained on independent unless that is, the latter are constrained on independent grounds.’grounds.’

Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991: 93)Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991: 93)

4545

Selected applications of DSSelected applications of DS

Origins: Jaszczolt 1992, 1999. Origins: Jaszczolt 1992, 1999. Parsimony of Levels Parsimony of Levels (POL) Principle(POL) Principle: Levels of senses are not to be multiplied : Levels of senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. beyond necessity.

First applications: definite descriptions, proper names, First applications: definite descriptions, proper names, and belief reports (Jaszczolt 1997, 1999); negation and and belief reports (Jaszczolt 1997, 1999); negation and discourse connectives (Lee 2002). discourse connectives (Lee 2002).

Recent applications: presupposition, sentential Recent applications: presupposition, sentential connectives, number terms, temporality, and modality connectives, number terms, temporality, and modality (Jaszczolt 2005; 2009; Srioutai 2004, 2006; Jaszczolt (Jaszczolt 2005; 2009; Srioutai 2004, 2006; Jaszczolt and Srioutai forthcoming; Engemann 2008); syntactic and Srioutai forthcoming; Engemann 2008); syntactic constraint on primary meaning (Sysoeva and Jaszczolt constraint on primary meaning (Sysoeva and Jaszczolt 2007). 2007).

4646

Languages:Languages:

English, Korean, Thai, Russian, French, GermanEnglish, Korean, Thai, Russian, French, German

4747

Representing TimeRepresenting Time

4848

4949

Merger Representations for the PastMerger Representations for the Past

(12)(12) Lidia went to a concert yesterday.Lidia went to a concert yesterday.((regular pastregular past))

(13)(13) This is what happened yesterday. Lidia goes to a This is what happened yesterday. Lidia goes to a concert, meets her school friend and tells her…concert, meets her school friend and tells her…((past of narrationpast of narration))

(14)(14) Lidia would have gone to a concert (then).Lidia would have gone to a concert (then).((epistemic necessity pastepistemic necessity past))

(15)(15) Lidia must have gone to a concert (yesterday). Lidia must have gone to a concert (yesterday). ((epistemic necessity pastepistemic necessity past))

(16)(16) Lidia may have gone to a concert (yesterday).Lidia may have gone to a concert (yesterday).((epistemic possibility pastepistemic possibility past))

(17)(17) Lidia might have gone to a concert (yesterday).Lidia might have gone to a concert (yesterday).((epistemic possibility pastepistemic possibility past))

5050

a cline of decreasing epistemic commitmenta cline of decreasing epistemic commitment

Fig. 3: Degree of epistemic commitment for selected expressions with past-time reference

rp, pn enp epp

1 0

5252

AccAcc ├ ├ pp ‘it is acceptable that it is the case that ‘it is acceptable that it is the case that pp’’

Grice (2001)Grice (2001)

5353

ACCACCΔΔ ├ Σ ├ Σ

‘‘it is acceptable to the degree Δ that Σ is true’it is acceptable to the degree Δ that Σ is true’

Fig. 4: Σ for example (12) ‘Lidia went to a concert yesterday.’ (regular past)

x t Σ' [Lidia]CD (x) yesterday (t) [ACC

rp ├ Σ']WS Σ' [x go to a concert]WS

Σ

Fig. 5: Σ for example (16) ‘Lidia may have gone to a concert yesterday.’ (epistemic possibility past)

x t Σ' [Lidia]CD (x) yesterday (t) [ACC

epp may+pple ├ Σ']WS Σ' [x go to a concert]WS

Σ

5656

Merger Representations for the PresentMerger Representations for the Present

(18)(18) Lidia is at a concert now.Lidia is at a concert now.

(regular present)(regular present)

(19)(19) Lidia will be at a concert now.Lidia will be at a concert now.

(epistemic necessity present)(epistemic necessity present)

(20)(20) Lidia must be at a concert now.Lidia must be at a concert now.

(epistemic necessity present)(epistemic necessity present)

(21)(21) Lidia may be at a concert now.Lidia may be at a concert now.

(epistemic possibility present)(epistemic possibility present)

(22)(22) Lidia might be at a concert now.Lidia might be at a concert now.

(epistemic possibility present)(epistemic possibility present)

Fig. 6: Degree of epistemic commitment for expressions with present-time reference

rn enn epn

1 0

5858

(23)(23) Lidia will often sing in the shower.Lidia will often sing in the shower.

(dispositional necessity present)(dispositional necessity present)

Fig. 7: Σ for example (18) ‘Lidia is at a concert now.’ (regular present)

.

x Σ' [Lidia]CD (x) [ACC

rn ├ Σ']WS,CD Σ' [x be at a concert]WS Σ

Fig. 8: Σ for example (19) ‘Lidia will be at a concert now’ (epistemic necessity present)

x t Σ' [Lidia]CD (x) now (t) [ACC

enn will ├ Σ']WS,CPIpm Σ' [x be at a concert]WS

Σ

Fig. 9: Σ for example (23) ‘Lidia will often sing in the shower’ (dispositional necessity present)

.

x t Σ' [Lidia]CD (x) often (t) [ACC

dnn will ├ Σ']WS,CPIpm Σ' [x sing in the shower]WS

Σ

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Merger Representations for the FutureMerger Representations for the Future (24)(24) Lidia goes to a concert tomorrow evening.Lidia goes to a concert tomorrow evening.

((‘tenseless’ future‘tenseless’ future))

(25)(25) Lidia is going to a concert tomorrow evening.Lidia is going to a concert tomorrow evening.

((futurate progressivefuturate progressive))

(26)(26) Lidia is going to go to a concert tomorrow evening.Lidia is going to go to a concert tomorrow evening. ((periphrastic periphrastic futurefuture))

(27)(27) Lidia will go to a concert tomorrow evening.Lidia will go to a concert tomorrow evening. ((regular futureregular future))

(28)(28) Lidia must be going to a concert tomorrow evening. Lidia must be going to a concert tomorrow evening. ((epistemic epistemic necessity futurenecessity future))

(29)(29) Lidia may go to a concert tomorrow evening.Lidia may go to a concert tomorrow evening. ((epistemic possibility epistemic possibility futurefuture))

(30)(30) Lidia might go to a concert tomorrow evening.Lidia might go to a concert tomorrow evening. ((epistemic possibility epistemic possibility futurefuture))

Fig. 10: Degree of modal detachment for selected

expressions with future-time reference

epf enf rf pf fp tf

1 0

Fig. 11: Σ for example (27) ‘Lidia will go to a concert tomorrow

evening’ (regular future)

x t Σ' [Lidia]CD (x) tomorrow evening (t) [ACC

rf ├ Σ']WS,CD Σ' [x go to a concert]WS

Fig. 12: Σ for example (25) ‘Lidia is going to a concert tomorrow evening.’ (futurative progressive)

x t Σ'

[Lidia]CD (x) tomorrow evening (t) [ACC

fp ├ Σ']WS, CPIpm Σ' [x go to a concert]WS

x t Σ' [Lidia]CD (x) tomorrow evening (t) [ACC

epf may ├ Σ']WS, CD Σ' [x go to a concert]WS

Fig. 13: Σ for example (29) ‘Lidia may go to a concert tomorrow evening’ (epistemic possibility future)

future may, default reading

6767

(31)(31) kk11rr33emleml33in in cc11a a cc11ap ap ngng33u:u:

GremlinGremlin cc11aa catch snakecatch snake

(31a)(31a) Gremlin will catch a snake (default meaning)Gremlin will catch a snake (default meaning)

(31b)(31b) Gremlin would have caught a snake Gremlin would have caught a snake (contextually (contextually inferred meaning)inferred meaning)

from Srioutai (2006: 242-4)from Srioutai (2006: 242-4)

Fig. 14: Σ for example (31) ‘Gremlin will catch a snake.’ (default reading 31a)

x y t n e

[k1r3eml3in]CD (x) [ng3u:]CD (y) ' [x c1ap y]WS

[ACCrf ├ ']WS, CD

Fig. 15: Σ for example (31) ‘Gremlin would have caught a snake.’ (non-default reading 31b)

x y '

[k1r3eml3in]CD (x) [ng3u:]CD (y) ' [x c1ap y]WS

[ACCcf c1a ├ ']WS, CPIpm

7070

(1)(1) mm33ae:rae:r33i:i:II khkh22ianian nn33iyiy33ai:ai:

MaryMary writewrite novelnovel

x y '

[m3ae:r3i:I]CD (x)

[n3iy3ai:]CD (y) ' [x kh2ian y]WS [ACC

rp ├ ']WS, CPIpm

Fig. 16: for example (1) ‘Mary wrote a novel’ (regular past)

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Application to contrastive studies and translation:Application to contrastive studies and translation:

H1H1

Semantic equivalence is the equivalence of Semantic equivalence is the equivalence of what is saidwhat is said..

adequate, contextualist definition of adequate, contextualist definition of what is said: what is said: primary primary meaning of Default Semanticsmeaning of Default Semantics

7373

H1H1Semantic equivalence is the equivalence of Semantic equivalence is the equivalence of what is saidwhat is said..

adequate, contextualist definition of adequate, contextualist definition of what is said: what is said: primary primary meaning of Default Semanticsmeaning of Default Semantics

H2H2Pragmatic equivalence is the equivalence of what is Pragmatic equivalence is the equivalence of what is implicitly communicated. implicitly communicated.

Pragmatic equivalence is the equivalence of both Pragmatic equivalence is the equivalence of both primary and secondary meanings.primary and secondary meanings.

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ConclusionsConclusions

Merger representations of Default Semantics can represent Merger representations of Default Semantics can represent temporal reference which is achieved in discourse in a variety of temporal reference which is achieved in discourse in a variety of ways, not only through grammatical tenses and adverbials. ways, not only through grammatical tenses and adverbials.

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Merger representations can represent cross-linguistic differences in Merger representations can represent cross-linguistic differences in referring to past, present and future eventualities. referring to past, present and future eventualities.

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Compositionality is best understood as pragmatic compositionality, Compositionality is best understood as pragmatic compositionality, sought at the level of sought at the level of ΣΣs rather than WS.s rather than WS.

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Compositionality is best understood as pragmatic compositionality, Compositionality is best understood as pragmatic compositionality, sought at the level of sought at the level of ΣΣs rather than WS.s rather than WS.

Temporality is not a primitive concept. It supervenes on the concept Temporality is not a primitive concept. It supervenes on the concept of epistemic detachment (of epistemic detachment (ACCACCΔΔ ├ Σ’) ├ Σ’) from the truth of the merged from the truth of the merged

proposition (proposition (Σ’).Σ’).

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Thank you!

7979

Select ReferencesSelect References Clapp, L. 2007. ‘Minimal (disagreement about) semantics’. In: G. Preyer and G. Clapp, L. 2007. ‘Minimal (disagreement about) semantics’. In: G. Preyer and G.

Peter (eds). Peter (eds). Context-Sensitivity and Semantic MinimalismContext-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford: Oxford . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 251-277.University Press. 251-277.

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11 th International Pragmatics Conference Melbourne, 12-17 July 2009 Speaking about Time: Contextual Inferences and Pragmatic Defaults Kasia M. Jaszczolt