10 The Politics of an Apolitical Public Service228703/... · THE POLITICS OF AN APOLITICAL PUBLIC SERVICE 3 encompassed only one-third to one-half of the public sector, except under

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The Politics of an Apolitical Public Service

Linda Colley (Griffith Business School)

Abstract

This chapter considers the Queensland experience of public service employment. Public sector employment relations differ from the private sector due to the political environment. Under the career service model, a politically neutral public service was recruited on merit, and given tenure to encourage frank and fearless advice and protect it from electoral whims, thus enabling it to serve a government of any political persuasion. However, implementing this model is complex. Governments have often demonstrated reluctance to maintain this separation by politicising employment decisions and using the public service for political purposes. The Queensland experience has similarities to other Australian States, although the tensions are arguably greater in Queensland’s unicameral system where politicians are accustomed to direct control with minimal review. This chapter finds that the “apolitical” career service has an unavoidably political context.

Introduction In the late 1980s, a Commission of Inquiry into corruption and misconduct in the Queensland police force stated:

A system which provides the Executive Government with control over the careers of public officials adds enormously to the pressures upon those who are even moderately ambitious. Merit can be ignored, perceived disloyalty punished, and personal or political loyalties rewarded … One of the first casualties in such circumstances is the general quality of public administration … The process of giving advice becomes incestuous. It is more about confirming opinions than challenging them … Cabinet Ministers should not be concerned with public service appointments, promotions, transfers and discipline … The more important the office, the more imperative that appointments be made with scrupulous propriety … it would be wrong for

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those who know politicians and senior bureaucrats to be preferred, while a pool of talent is ignored or disqualified for no good reason.1

This statement re-affirmed the central tenets of public employment established in the 1853 Northcote-Trevelyan Report into the British public service. That report found that British politicians handing out public sector jobs to friends and supporters led to corruption, favouritism, politicisation and inefficiency. It prescribed a career service model administered by an independent personnel agency, with standardised employment conditions, tenure and recruitment and promotion based on merit.2 A secure, merit-selected and politically neutral public service would be more efficient and able to provide frank and fearless advice to a government of any political persuasion. Implementing this ideal career service model is complex. The perennial problem of public services is to balance respect for the independent public service with ensuring their responsiveness to government priorities.3 But tensions arise from the deliberate separation of powers that puts the executive at arms-length from its workforce. Governments have often demonstrated reluctance to maintain this separation by politicising employment decisions and using the public service for political purposes (to model social values, or economic and industrial relations philosophies). In the late 20th century, many government reforms weakened the career service conventions and tipped the balance in favour of responsiveness over independence. The Queensland experience has similarities to other Australian States, although the tensions are arguably greater in Queensland’s unicameral system where politicians are accustomed to direct control over matters with minimal review. This chapter considers the extent to which Queensland governments have politicised or depoliticised their workforce, by enshrining or evading the career service conventions – merit, tenure, political neutrality, a unified service and an independent central personnel agency – or using the workforce to support their political philosophies. It is structured chronologically around significant periods of change. The chapter finds that the “apolitical” career service has an unavoidably political context. There is a strong correlation between the career service conventions and the philosophy of the governing political party: new conservative governments generally weakened the conventions; and new Labor governments strengthened them, often after a major public inquiry calling for reform. The chapter focuses on the majority of departments in the “core” Queensland public service regulated by a public service employment Act. The core service has changed over time – some agencies were excluded to provide independence (such as police and judicial officers) while others were excluded to remove them from central regulation of employment or remuneration (such as railways, education, and more recently, commercialised and corporatised agencies). The core public service often

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encompassed only one-third to one-half of the public sector, except under the Goss Government when career service principles were extended to the majority of the public sector.

1859-1915: The early years From early times, Queensland had a distinct political and economic culture that differed from other colonies/States. The strong population and economic power in regional areas, away from the capital, focused Queensland governments on economic progress rather than people and ideas. Queensland’s disrespect for parliament, with few parliamentary sitting days and ministerial pre-occupation with their own interests, meant an under-developed legislature and many decisions left to public servants. In the first 56 years, there were 26 conservative government coalitions led by 18 Premiers.4 The Queensland Civil Service was established with the colony in 1859 and the government enacted the first legislation for public employment in 1863. This Act made tentative progress towards the career service conventions with competitive examinations for entry, appeal rights, a standard classification scheme, tenure and superannuation. However, the Act provisions were optional and often ignored. Ministers continued to make appointments outside of the examination system, and promotions and salary increases were automatic rather than merit-based. The 1863 Act was ineffective and repealed in 1869. Existing employees retained their rights but new employees were left without protections or superannuation. Politicisation thrived and the quality of the public service declined. By the late 1880s there was pressure in all Australian colonies to replace patronage with a “proper system of recruitment, promotion and remuneration”, and a campaign by Queensland public servants led to an 1889 Royal Commission.5 The resulting Civil Service Act 1889 made better progress toward the career service conventions. The first personnel agency – the Civil Service Board – was expected to make fairer and more transparent personnel decisions, manage examinations and the order of merit and clear out those unfit for service. However, these legislative intentions were undermined by regulations and practices that favoured the recruitment of select social groups. Rather than open competitive merit, various restrictions – narrow age limits, exclusion of all women, large examination fees, subjects not offered in state schools and the requirement for a certificate of health – meant only healthy, wealthy young men tended to be eligible to sit the examination and gain appointments. Further, the Civil Service Board could bypass the examination process and appoint anybody if it issued a special certificate that nobody in the service was qualified. These special certificates were used sparingly from 1889 to 1896. The Civil Service Board chose the next qualified officer on the list for promotion, with no other test of merit.


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Tenure was affected during the economic depression of the early 1890s, when the government discharged 16 per cent of the public workforce and reduced salaries by up to 10 per cent. Some employees were reappointed as the economy improved and vacancies arose.6 This moderate progress towards the career service ideal from 1889 was weakened by political interference from 1896. The government replaced the Civil Service Board with a new Public Service Board, and rendered it ineffective by over-ruling it on appointments. The Premier believed that individuals who had supported his government should have first call on public service vacancies. Merit was bypassed through a ten-fold increase in the use of special certificates and excessive use of temporary appointments. This political interference became formal political control in 1901 when the Public Service Board was abolished and its powers vested in a Ministerial Board. Women achieved moderately greater access to public service positions. The Ministerial Board allowed women to compete at the 1903 clerical examinations for entrance to the service. However, women’s unexpected success led to restrictions on the number of positions available to them in future years, resulting in the appointment of men with lower examination results. From 1908, women who had failed to gain a clerical position were offered typist positions, leading to occupational segregation. Tenure was again affected by adverse economic circumstances in the new century. The government retrenched more than 16 per cent of the workforce from 1902 to 1904 and legislated wage reductions of up to 15 per cent which were not regained until 1908.7 From 18591915, Queensland conservative governments made limited attempts to legislate for the career service conventions, but this legislation was undermined by political interference and economic downturns. A change of government in 1915 led to a new approach.

Public Service Commissioner: 1915-1968 Labor governments held power through most of the period 1915 to 1968 and encountered major challenges including two World Wars and the Great Depression of the 1930s. Queensland abolished the upper house in 1922 and remains the only Australian State to operate a unicameral system. While the unicameral system raised initial concerns about the potential to intimidate public servants, the career service conventions were enhanced during this period through more robust legislation and the strong leadership of the first Public Service Commissioner, JD Story.8 The Ryan Government actively implemented its Laborist policies. It introduced many State enterprises to improve working conditions and manage market forces. It removed restrictions on government employees forming trade unions and removed threats of dismissal or exclusion from promotion for union participation. Moderate public sector unions grew rapidly. However, in 1918 the


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government bypassed collective employment relations and removed higher paid public servants from the jurisdiction of the industrial relations tribunal.9

Public Service Act 1922: A giant step towards the career service Public sector unions remained dissatisfied with the political and departmental influence in appointments and protested against a new classification structure in 1918.10 In the resulting 1918 Royal Commission, Story proposed a new central authority to guard against the indiscriminate creation of positions and a new classification scheme with equitable remuneration and career paths (except for women).11 The government implemented these proposals in legislation in 1920. When it became obvious that greater measures were needed, the government introduced stronger legislation in 1922 that supported each career service convention. The government established a strong independent central personnel agency and appointed Story as Public Service Commissioner with expanded powers. Story was a strong leader who addressed discontent and inequities and offered his department as the clearing house for grievances. Unions were pleased that employment decisions were removed from Ministers and departmental heads but remained concerned that these decisions were concentrated in the hands of one commissioner. The Commissioner’s control over employment was gradually eroded over the following years as Ministers gained power over lower level staffing matters.12 Under the 1922 Act, the government had provided for a relatively unified core service with standardised conditions. But this core declined as departments and agencies were gradually excluded from the Act’s coverage in the ensuing years. Unions gained concessions in non-core agencies and pursued similar concessions from core departments. In response, the government vested Story with coordination of industrial claims for all Crown employees (except railways).13 The commissioner had little independence in wage matters, which depended on government policy and economic circumstances. The government returned higher paid public servants to the jurisdiction of industrial tribunals from 1924. Salaries could be determined through administrative means by the government or through wage fixation by tribunals.14 The government stopped short of full competitive merit and merit protection in the 1922 Act. Most employees were required to enter the service through competitive examinations, but the government continued to make special certificate appointments. The Act requirement to advertise vacancies in the gazette ensured more officers were aware of promotion opportunities. The Act enhanced merit in promotion, at least in principle, with seniority only to be considered in cases of equal efficiency. Appeal


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rights were introduced, but rendered ineffective due to limitations on who was eligible to appeal and the continuation of seniority considerations in promotions. Merit opportunities were not available to women, as they were excluded from holding professional or clerical positions and from employment after marriage.15 The 1922 Act improved tenure. The government transferred power over temporary employment to the commissioner and reduced the opportunity for departmental patronage. However, there was a loophole allowing long-term temporary employees, who had not been appointed through merit processes, to convert to permanent status. The Act contained redundancy provisions, and economic difficulties led to further retrenchments and wage reductions from 1922.16 Government intervention in employment was prominent during elections. In 1924, the Theodore Labor Government was re-elected on a promise to lower working hours to 44 hours per week, and implemented this through legislation rather than the industrial tribunal. The McCormack Labor Government won a major railway dispute in 1927 to demonstrate that it would not be dictated to by unions, but it was never forgiven and lost the 1929 election.17

Changes of government: 1929-1968 In 1929 Labor lost office and the conservative Moore Government came to power during a severe economic crisis. While it did not politicise public sector employment arrangements, it did intervene extensively in public service employment conditions. It supported a 1930 Industrial Court decision to increase working hours for crown employees from 44 to 48 hours per week. However, the government was dissatisfied with the court’s proposal for salary reductions of only 6 per cent and went beyond the tribunal to legislate for salary reductions of 15 to 20 per cent. In 1931 it removed public servants from the industrial tribunal’s jurisdiction and rendered all public service awards inoperative. It also closed all remaining State enterprises.18 The Moore Government did strengthen merit with its condemnation of seniority and removal of compulsory retirement age limits.19 Public service unions campaigned heavily against the Moore Government and a Labor Government was re-elected in 1932. Labor reversed some of the previous government’s actions. It returned public servants to the Industrial Court’s jurisdiction in 1932, and salaries were gradually restored to their previous levels by 1941.20 Labor governments strengthened uniformity when various authorities and employees were brought back under the Act (including water, forestry, main roads, electricity and transport workers). Otherwise, Labor governments made few changes to public service legislation in this period. In 1932 the government further restricted women’s employment to clerk-typists rather than clerks,


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exacerbating occupational segregation with no disagreement from public sector unions. Appeal processes continued to defend seniority albeit not for women.21 Governments struggled to sustain the public service workforce during this period. When World War II created staffing difficulties, the Public Service Commissioner relaxed public service entry and retirement ages, and provided opportunities for women in more interesting clerical work. When staffing difficulties continued in the 1950s, the government introduced a new classification scheme with higher salaries comparable to inter-State public servants’ salaries.22 The Coalition parties won the 1957 election and held government until 1983. Counter to pre-election promises, the government did not introduce a Public Service Board. Premier Nicklin streamlined the classification structure and provided substantial salary increases in an effort to secure the confidence of the public service. Contrary to the career service conventions, Ministers gained political control over staff at lower levels including appointments, transfers, promotions, reductions, and dismissals. Tenure was largely unaffected for male officers during this period of prosperity. Tenure did not improve for women as the marriage bar and occupational segregation continued. Less than 1 per cent of women held clerical positions by 1958 compared to 48 per cent in the early 1900s. By 1965 public service expertise had deteriorated as the retirement of many senior officers resulted in relatively inexperienced junior officers filling positions of responsibility.23 Summing up, in the period between 1929 and the mid-1960s Labor and Coalition governments took different approaches to the career service conventions. Labor governments generally enhanced the conventions, albeit overlaid with social values such as gender discrimination. Coalition governments generally put personnel decisions back into political hands, and removed public servants from the industrial jurisdiction to gain control over salaries. The career service deteriorated further under new institutional arrangements from 1968,

Radical changes under conservative governments: 1968-1989 1968–1989: Public Service Board and beyond From 1968 to 1989, conservative governments intervened in public employment matters to implement their political philosophies. They weakened the career service conventions to the lowest point in Queensland’s history. The government replaced the Public Service Commissioner with a Public Service Board that had limited powers or independence, and political interference became rife. When faced with major industrial disputes with


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power workers in 1979, the government vested Cabinet with jurisdiction over strikes in essential services. The Police Commissioner resigned due to disagreements with the Premier about the qualifications of police officers and concerns about civil liberties. The government required the Public Service Board to impose central controls: first, over staff establishments to prevent growth of departmental staff numbers; and second over wages and conditions to prevent wage precedents in new non-core agencies. The government also sought greater control and less transparency in the employment of senior officers. It removed senior officers from the jurisdiction of tribunals and ceased notifying their promotions and reclassifications in the gazette.24 The Coalition Government did not enhance merit. The Act strengthened merit in principle, with new promotion criteria of superior efficiency or equal efficiency and merit. But in practice permanent heads gained control of most promotion decisions and largely ignored these new criteria in favour of the traditional seniority considerations. The government transferred appeal hearings from magistrates to the Public Service Board, making them less formal and less independent. It broadened appeal rights to apply across departments, but continually increased the number of exemptions of positions against which employees could appeal. Opportunities for women to compete on their merits increased greatly with the removal of the marriage bar in 1969 and access to jobs as clerks (rather than just clerk-typists) in 1972 – but still with no equal pay.25

1983-1989: National Party control The National Party governed in its own right from 1983 and the Bjelke-Petersen Government escalated interference in employment relations. It increased intervention in personnel decisions and further weakened the Public Service Board and career service conventions. It devolved most recruitment and selection decisions, up to senior levels, from the board to departments. It removed appeal rights for senior officers, which further reduced the transparency of personnel decisions. It pursued privatisation and other new organisational structures that were outside the core public service and exempt from the career service ideals. Departments weakened tenure through increased use of casual employment and consultants. In 1986 the government offered employment contracts to executive and senior officers, with large bonuses for relinquishing tenure. Unions complained that the government’s excessive intervention in personnel decisions had politicised the public service and engendered fear in public servants.26 This government also escalated intervention in industrial matters from 1983 to 1987. It refused to negotiate pay claims, but cut conditions such as leave loading and flexible working hours. It removed union preference for public employees and refused payroll deductions for union membership fees. The government established the Hanger Inquiry into industrial


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relations, but ignored its recommendations for conciliation and arbitration and less SEQEB (South East Queensland Electricity Board) ministerial intervention. Instead, it continued to use essential services legislation in the renowned dispute. It also sought to bypass unions and tribunals through use of non-union voluntary employment agreements (VEAs) across the public sector, although this did not proceed.27 In 1986 the government established the Savage Committee to review the public service, many years after similar inquiries in other Australian governments. Savage’s private sector-style recommendations gave unfettered autonomy to Ministers and permanent heads and weakened the career service conventions. Unions campaigned heavily against the new legislation’s attack on Westminster principles and political control of the public service, to no avail. The government replaced the Public Service Board with a significantly less powerful Office of Public Service Personnel Management (OPSPM) and transferred industrial relations to a separate agency. It put merit into political hands by giving Ministers control over senior appointments and chief executive contracts. It weakened merit and tenure by delegating all other recruitment and dismissal decisions to departmental chief executives, and making temporary/contract employment and redundancy provisions more accessible. Departmental control over salaries led to fragmented wages and conditions and industrial anarchy as departments went into competition for staff.28 By 1988, the government’s disregard for any control over its actions led to a groundswell against the prevailing Queensland way. Bjelke-Petersen’s Premiership crumbled in the political and industrial turmoil, and three Premiers held office from 1988–1989. The Fitzgerald Report, released on 3 July 1989, provided overwhelming evidence of politicisation and corruption in the Queensland police force. The report provided extensive comment on appropriate personnel administration in accordance with the career service ideals – as highlighted in the opening paragraph of this chapter – and the consequences of undermining these ideals. Fitzgerald’s recommendations had broad support and were a key issue in the 1989 election campaign. Unions took a highly political stance in support of Labor’s platform of Fitzgerald reforms.29

Public Sector Management Commission and Beyond: 1989-2009 The Goss Labor Government was elected in 1989 and introduced extensive social, political and administrative reform in Queensland. Goss endeavoured to restore the career service conventions by re-balancing respect for the independent and expert public service with ensuring its responsiveness.30 Goss removed political interference in the industrial environment. His new industrial legislation established a stronger industrial tribunal. He


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abolished VEAs and restored payroll deductions and union preference in public employment. He repealed essential services legislation after he negotiated for continuous electricity supply and payment of entitlements to sacked SEQEB workers.31 The Goss Government quickly established the Public Sector Management Commission (PSMC) to align Queensland with mainstream Australian public sector management. The PSMC commissioners were highly independent and challenged the Premier when he sought to deviate from the clear mandate. They re-established the importance of personnel functions and the PSMC as an equal partner to Treasury, albeit all agencies were more responsive to political direction than in earlier eras.32 The PSMC reduced the fragmentation of the 1980s. It centralised many chief executive powers (to the dismay of some) and created uniform employment relations across the sector. The government maintained the separation of industrial relations and human resources functions across two departments, to help keep its personnel reform agenda out of the traditional industrial relations arena. The PSMC negotiated with unions on most of a new Classification and Remuneration System (CRS). But when negotiations stalled over issues such as the link between performance reviews and salary increments, the PSMC issued the performance and recruitment Standards without union agreement. Unions responded with a major political and industrial campaign, but the industrial tribunal confirmed that these issues were within managerial prerogative.33 The government’s general support for a unified service was contradicted by its de-centralised approach to enterprise bargaining. By June 1995 there were 22 separate agreements in operation, and 18 agency-level agreements under the core agreement. These agreements weakened merit and tenure, and created extensive fragmentation.34 The Goss Government implemented merit reforms consistent with the traditional principles but through modernised processes that would break down the “closed shop” of Queensland public employment. The PSMC introduced a transparent recruitment and selection process that included advertising of all vacancies, clear role descriptions, relevant selection criteria and valid short-listing and selection techniques that measured all applicants against these criteria. This process addressed the Fitzgerald criticisms and supported equity and fairness with no surprises. The PSMC ensured that temporary employment could no longer be used as a side-door for entry, and required full merit selection processes for long-term temporary positions and at least internal competition for short-term positions. It linked merit and equity and introduced Queensland’s first equity legislation. The merit reforms were a significant culture change, and the public service struggled to understand them. Many selection panels focused on rigid adherence to process rather than on fair treatment and outcomes. Employees were suspicious, as they were accustomed to merit being equated to


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experience and seniority, and their career paths were affected by the potential for external appointments.35 As part of its equity and fairness reforms, the government re-invigorated appeal rights at a time when they were being questioned elsewhere. Promotion appeals were re-focused on breaches of the merit principle rather than mechanical application of process or seniority. Appeal rights were extended but not so far as the Senior Executive Service (SES). The PSMC granted significant powers to its appeals tribunal, including the power to make substitute appointments. However, it did not implement general monitoring to make selection panels accountable, and merit protection was only available to those who lodged appeals.36 The government reforms strengthened and weakened tenure for different groups. It replaced contracts with tenure for all staff below SES level. It promised employment security, but departmental restructuring led to many positions being “spilled” and employees having to re-apply for their own jobs. The PSMC commissioners later reflected that more internal competition for jobs, balancing merit with tenure, would have been preferable to avoid this disruption. In its second term, the government sought to calm stressed and angry employees. In 1994, it introduced a new Standard for managing organisational change. Following its narrow election win in 1995, it had practical and political motives to promise no further job losses. Comparatively, the government avoided the large scale redundancies experienced in other States, due to its strong economic position and a growing population that required expanded services. Enterprise agreement provisions encouraged non-tenured employment for flexibility. The PSMC was controlling permanent staff numbers, and departments used non-permanent forms of employment to bypass this control. Tenure remained a highly political issue from this point forward.37 The Goss Government established a Senior Executive Service (SES) to provide a highly skilled, responsive and mobile group. While merit for the SES was generic rather than specific to a particular job, the PSMC emphasised management and policy skills to avoid managers becoming content-free. The PSMC understood that SES schemes were criticised elsewhere for politicisation, and endeavoured to reduce political influence through its central management of the SES and involvement in SES selection panels. Appeal processes were therefore deemed unnecessary.38 The government faced protests when it opened executive vacancies to national competition, even though the majority (84 per cent) were filled by Queensland applicants. Most stakeholders – unions, senior bureaucrats and academics – considered that there was generally little politicisation of public service appointments in this period due to these protections.39 Nonetheless, Wanna notes the potential that managerial reforms can force public officials into a “more ‘politically responsive’ position based on greater individual calculation and contractual relationships”.40


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Chief executive employment remained precarious. The government retained only four of the existing chief executives after the 1989 election. Many previous chief executives were placed in a “gulag” until they pursued alternative options. The government maintained contract, rather than tenured, employment for chief executives. Contracts at this level seemed to be accepted in Australian jurisdictions due to the chief executive being at the political/administrative interface but were contrary to Westminster and career service principles.41 PSMC Commissioner Davis suggested that the real risk was making it too simple to terminate a contract without sound reasons. He considered that the PSMC had that balance right and the government was getting “very good fields” by its second term. Several stakeholders highlighted the appointment of Bob Marshman from the Commonwealth public service as evidence that the system worked. He was unheard of, and not expected to be successful over a promising internal candidate, but was a “fantastic appointment”. On the advice of the PSMC commissioners, the Premier generally resisted ministerial attempts to interfere in appointments or termination of chief executives.42 The Goss Government reforms were the closest Queensland came to the career service ideals. However, the removal of certain traditions (such as seniority and a closed shop) and the extensive restructuring and displacement of staff led major unions to abandon Labor by 1996.43

Beyond the Public Sector Management Committee 1996-1998: Borbidge Government Queensland governments were not accustomed to sharing power, until the conservative parties formed a minority government in 1996. The government had to address controversial elements of the 1996 Public Service Bill that it might have ignored in other circumstances. Nonetheless, its new Act dismantled the PSMCs progress toward the career service principles.44 First, the Borbidge Government weakened the central personnel agency. It replaced the PSMC with the Office of the Public Service (OPS), which had reduced standing and independence as a division of the Premier’s Department headed by a political appointee, Commissioner Kevin Wolff. The OPS progressively replaced the comprehensive PSMC standards with brief directives. Industrial relations functions were concentrated in the OPS, leading to confusion as directives were issued by the Public Service Commissioner, the Minister for Industrial Relations, or both.45 The OPS also weakened merit. It reduced comprehensive recruitment and selection processes to two brief directives. It defined merit to include the subjective criteria of experience and personal qualities. This was hazardous for a service that loved seniority and was struggling with new merit and fairness processes. Other directives allowed exemptions from merit and


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removed the merit selection requirement for longer-term temporary employment. The OPS narrowed the subject matter of appeals and the potential remedies. The government boasted that this was the first time chief executives had control over all staffing, including appointments, secondments and the number and classification of employees.46 Another effect of the OPS was that it undermined the unified service. The 1996 Act covered just the public service rather than the public sector. Enterprise bargaining continued to create fragmentation by allowing sub-agreements at agency level. The Treasurer and Minister for Industrial Relations attempted to model Liberal Party philosophy by implementing non-union sub-agreements in their departments, without success.47 Finally, the government undermined tenure. It made many jobs redundant, leading to extensive job losses. In response to union lobbying, the government developed an employment security policy while the Liberal Treasurer was overseas. This was soon contradicted by organisational change guidelines issued by Treasury. Employment security was a key issue in the 1998 election.48 The government politicised senior appointments. It created chief executive contracts for the term of its government, making a definite link between politics and administrative positions. Chief executives could be dismissed without reason on one month's notice. In 1996, the government advertised 15 chief executive jobs and made quick and dubious appointments. It gave chief executives the power to appoint and dismiss SES officers, and many were dismissed. One officer challenged her dismissal, without success – the court upheld the importance of compatibility and alignment over frank and fearless advice, and changed the understanding of merit at SES level. Lower level SES officers were converted to a tenured Senior Officer classification, with neither the benefits of the SES nor the rights and protections of other employees.49 The Borbidge Government unwound the PSMC’s progress towards the career service ideals. Unions had resented the PSMC approach, but felt under more attack from the Borbidge “reforms”, and supported a change of government.50

1998-2008: Beattie and Bligh Labor Governments The Beattie Government promised stability, and set about mending relationships. It legislated for a stronger Industrial Commission and fairer employment conditions, and brought public sector employment back under the industrial jurisdiction where possible. It enhanced the career service conventions in enterprise bargaining with a standard salary outcome and a union partnership package including union recognition, employment security, and work and family policies. This approach also enhanced government-union relations.51


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In 2000, Beattie replaced the OPS with the Office of Public Service Merit and Equity (OPSME). It accepted arguments from the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) that human resources policy had largely been removed from the industrial agenda, and gave DIR control not only of industrial relations but also many human resource functions. Neither DIR nor OPSME had a clear mandate to regulate merit or pursue a dynamic human resource agenda. It was not until 2006 that human resource functions were re-united in the new Office for the Public Service Commissioner (OPSC).52 Merit and appeal processes were largely unchanged in this period. The Beattie Government strengthened tenure through enterprise agreement commitments to employment security and a review of temporary employment. However, the rationale was political and industrial rather than the career service ideal of independence. SES officers remained on contract, but few contracts were not renewed and a change of government remained the bigger threat to tenure. Tenure had traditionally compensated for lower public service remuneration, and reduced tenure would potentially inhibit the attraction of long-term public servants.53 Chief executive employment remained precarious. Borbidge’s appointment of chief executives for the term of his government allowed Beattie to start with a clean slate. Beattie exempted chief executive positions from advertising and selection processes and then appointed several people who had been merit selected in the early 1990s but sacked by Borbidge in 1996. Davis (previously PSMC commissioner and later director general of the Premier’s Department) advised the Premier to break this cycle of wholesale renewal after each election. Beattie implemented contracts up to five years – long enough to demonstrate performance but not so long that a bad performer caused damage.54 Beattie observed the disastrous electoral effect of the Goss Government’s reforms, and did little to undo the Borbidge Government changes and restore the Goss agenda. Bligh took over the Labor leadership in late 2007 and soon announced a new direction for her public service. In mid-2008 she created a new Public Service Commission (PSC), with a higher level Chief Commission Executive supported by a board of commissioners. While it is early days, the PSC aims of flexibility and innovation, and the inclusion of influential private sector advice on the board suggests that the PSC is unlikely to strengthen the career service ideals of merit, tenure and independence. The PSMCs restoration of the career service ideals was undone by the Borbidge Government, with only partial restoration under subsequent Labor governments.

Conclusion This chapter traced the extent to which Queensland governments politicised or depoliticised employment relations or used the workforce for their


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political agenda. The nature of the central personnel agency and the level of uniformity correlated to the political party in power. Labor Governments established the most independent and transparent institutions with the strongest decision-making powers, and tended toward standardisation and inclusion under public service regulation. Conservative governments favoured decentralisation and departmental autonomy, which reduced uniformity and provided more scope for political influence in decisions and blurred the separation of politics from administration. Generally governments only covered about one-third to one-half of the Queensland public sector workforce in public employment legislation, and the discussion about merit, tenure and independence applied to a minority of employees in core agencies (except under the PSMC when 90 per cent of the public sector was included). It is difficult to defend why any agency should be excluded from the career service conventions. Ironically, central personnel agencies are tasked with maintaining an apolitical public service but have featured heavily in all political parties’ election platforms in the past 20 years. Merit was the cornerstone of the career service model. It was an economic consideration which emphasised efficiency over more personal considerations. But departments often resented open competitive merit processes for reasons including a preference for their favourites or a short-sighted focus on process efficiency rather than on the effectiveness of well-considered outcomes. Merit proved to be an elastic concept, which governments re-emphasised to overcome corruption, inefficiency and politicisation, and de-emphasised to accommodate process efficiency, flexibility or other social values. Interestingly, many of the criticisms of public employment – seniority, discrimination against women, and curtailing promotion across departments – do not stem from the original model nor from government legislation, but from subsequent regulations and practices. Merit was also correlated to political party, with the greatest rejuvenation of merit under Labor governments in the 1920s and 1990s, as a result of inquiries condemning politicisation under conservative governments. Tenure was another important career service convention, to create a secure environment in which to provide frank and fearless advice. Governments generally legislated to protect against political dismissals or employment decisions, but undermined this by giving departments increasing control over staffing decisions. However, other provisions dispel the myth of public servants’ tenure. Governments allowed departments to control temporary employment and it was used to excess to bypass merit selection processes and other central controls on recruitment. All governments have legislated for redundancy provisions, with the only change being how they used them. In earlier times, redundancy was used only to survive economic crises, but more recently has been used as a pro-active economic tool to improve efficiency. All recent governments have reduced tenure for senior employees, with Labor governments providing


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marginally greater security. Tenure seems less influenced by political party than economic circumstances and changing ideology, but employment security seems entrenched as a political/election issue. Governments gave public personnel agencies little or no independence over wage matters. Despite devolution of human resource decisions to departments, governments maintained strong central control over wages and bargained matters. Conservative governments tended to move public servants out of the industrial jurisdiction to gain greater control. Public sector pay was used as an economic and political tool, and often modelled greater restraint and larger wage cuts than the private sector. While it had often lagged behind in reforms, by the 1990s Queensland had caught up to other Australian public services. Due to real or perceived problems of unresponsiveness, all Australian governments have reduced the focus on career service conventions and diminished the public service as a profession. They rarely consider whether this is leading to a recurrence of the politicisation, inefficiency and corruption that arose in earlier times as a result of employees not having secure well-paid positions in a service based on values of ethics and accountability. A balance is needed between flexibility and continuity, between responsiveness and independence and between agency autonomy and central oversight. Ideally, governments would develop greater respect for the appropriateness of a genuinely independent public service commissioner with the power to make independent appointments and the security to endure through changes of government when continuity is most needed.

Notes 1 Fitzgerald, GE, 1989, Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and

Associated Police Misconduct, Government Printer, Brisbane, pp 130-131. 2 Northcote, S, and Trevelyan, G, 1853, Report on the Organisation of the Permanent

Civil Service, 23 November 1853. Submitted to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty in February 1854 (Paper 1713).

3 Davis, G, 1993, “Executive and Policy Coordination”, in B Stevens and J Wanna (eds), The Goss Government – Promise and Performance of Labor in Queensland, Macmillan, Melbourne, pp 44-45; Davis, G, 1995, A Government of Routines, Macmillan, Melbourne, p 99.

4 Colley, L, 2005, Myth, Monolith or normative Model – Evolution of the career service model of employment in the Queensland Public Service 1859-2000, unpublished PhD Thesis, Griffith University, p 18; Head, B, 1986, “Queensland Political Culture: A Critical note on an Enduring Legend”, Social Alternatives, vol 5, no 4, pp 46-47; Hughes, Colin A, 1980, The Government of Queensland, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, pp 2-3; initial? Cohen chapter title or number? in J Scott, R Laurie, B Stevens, and P Weller, 2001, The Engine Room of Government – The Queensland Premier’s Department 1859–2001, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, p 23.


17

5 Caiden, GE, 1965, Career Service, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne,

pp 40, 48; Civil Service Act 1863; Civil Service Repeal Act 1869; Queensland Parliamentary Debates (QPD), 15 June 1869, p 338; “Minutes of Evidence”, Second Progress Report of the Royal Commission into the General Working of the Civil Service and the Mode of Keeping the Public Accounts of the Colony, 1889, Queensland Legislative Assembly, 1889, p 24; Progress Report of the Select Committee on the Working and Organisation of the Civil Service, 1866, Queensland Legislative Assembly.

6 “Civil Service Act of 1889 – Regulation for the Examination of Candidates for Admission to the Ordinary Division of the Civil Service”, Queensland Government Gazette (QGG), 29 March 1890, pp 1121-1123; Civil Service Board annual reports 1890-1896; QPD, 27 August 1889, pp 138, 141; 22 October 1896, p 1264; The Special Retrenchment Act of 1893.

7 Caiden, Career Service, above n 5, p 48; Coulter, A, 1962, Women in the Public Service in Queensland, unpublished Masters Thesis, Queensland State Archives, PRV 14645, pp 13-14; Public Service Act Amendment Act 1901 and Regulations, 1904 and 1910; Public Service Board Annual Reports, 1896-1900, 1902, 1904, 1906-908, 1959; Special Retrenchment Act 1902 (Qld) [assume all Acts mentioned are Queensland legislation, suggest delete or add to all other Acts?]; Scott, Laurie, Stevens and Weller, Engine Room of Government, above n 4, p 55.

8 Bernays, CA, 1919, Queensland Politics During 60 years 1859 – 1919, Government Printer Brisbane, pp 225-227; Coaldrake, P, 1989, Working the System, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, p 57.

9 Fitzgerald, R, and Thornton, H, 1989, Labor in Queensland from 1880s to 1988, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, pp 24-25, 32-35, 69-78; Industrial Arbitration Act 1916; Murphy, DJ, 1983, “North Queensland Railway Strike, 1917”, in DJ Murphy (ed) The Big Strikes – Queensland 1889 – 1965, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, pp 35-36, 39-40; Murphy, DJ, 1983, “Trade unions” in Murphy (ed), Big Strikes, pp 132-143; Public Service Board, 1918, Report of the Public Service Board for the year 1917 and 1918 (Qld), p 1.

10 General Officers Association (GOA), Newsletter, May 1917, p 1; April 1918, p 1. Also Professional Officers Association (POA), The Echo, January 1918, pp 2-4.

11 Report with Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on the Classification of Officers of the Queensland Public Service, Queensland State Archives, PRV 11378.

12 GOA, Newsletter, November 1921, p 6; Howatson, RJ, 1988, Queensland Public Service – A Short History of Legislation from 1922 to 1987, Royal Australian Institute of Public Administration (Queensland Division), Monograph no 11, p 19; POA, Echo, April 1920, p 76; October 1922, p 77; Public Service Commissioner Annual Reports,1921, pp 15, 24; 1923, pp 3-4.

13 Public Service Commissioner Annual Reports, 1923 p 3; 1926, pp 3, 12; 1959, p 7. 14 Fraser, DW, 1981, “The Public Service of Queensland”, in DW Fraser (ed), The

Public Service of Queensland 1859–1959: Selected Papers, Australian Institute of Public Administration, Queensland Regional Group Monograph 4, p 20; Howatson, Queensland Public Service, above n 12, p 10; Public Service Act Amendment Act, 1924 (Queensland), s 3.

15 Coulter, Women in the Public Service, above n 7, pp 41-43; GOA, Newsletter. May 1921, pp 12-14; Howatson, Queensland Public Service, above n 12, pp 10-11; Public Service Act 1922 (Qld), s 18(3)(iv); Public Service Act 1922 Regulations 1922-24, regs 79, 109; Public Service Commissioner Annual Reports, 1921, p 15; 1924, p 32; 1926, p 27; 1940, p 4; 1950, p 3.


18

16 Scott, Laurie, Stevens and Weller, Engine Room of Government, above n 4, p 88;

Salaries Act of 1922; Howatson, Queensland Public Service, above n 12,p 20. 17 Fitzgerald and Thornton, Labor in Queensland, pp 36-39, 43-47; Lack, C, 1961,

Three Decades of Queensland Political History 1929–1960, Government Printer, Brisbane, pp 87-88.

18 Lack, Queensland Political History, ibid, pp 99, 109; Salaries Act of 1930 (Queensland), s 3; Public Service Commissioner Annual Reports?, 1931 p 4; Fraser, D, 1986, “JD Story: His contribution to Public Service Administration”, in D Fraser, M Thomis, C Clark and D Conroy (eds), Administrative History in Queensland, Royal Australian Institute of Public Administration, Queensland Division, Monograph no 8, p 8.

19 Bernays, CA, 1931, Queensland Our Seventh Political Decade 1920-1930, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, pp 62, 64.

20 Lack, Queensland Political History, above n 17, pp 124, 128, 148, 761, 768; Public Service Commissioner Annual Reports, 1933, pp 5; 1934, pp 4-5; 1935, p 5; 1937, p 5; Queensland State Service Union (QSSU), The State Service, January 1956, p 3; March 1956, p 1; Whitehouse, G and Wiltshire, K, 1987, The History of the Queensland Professional Officers’ Association, Royal Australian Institute of Public Administration (Queensland Division) in association with the Queensland Professional Officers Association, pp 61, 81-85, 89.

21 Coulter, Women in the Public Service, above n 7, pp 21, 41-43, 60, 72-74; Lack, Queensland Political History, above n 17, p 765; Public Service Acts Amendment Act 1950 (Queensland), s 5; Public Service Commissioner Annual Report, 1950, p 3.

22 Howatson, Queensland Public Service, above n 12, p 9; Lack, Queensland Political History, above n 17, p 768; Public Service Commissioner Annual Reports, 1942, p 3; 1943, p 5; 1944, pp 2-3; 1945, p 2; 1955, p 3.

23 Coulter, Women in the Public Service, above n 7, p 47; Fleming, J, 1998, New Governments in Queensland: Industrial Relations, 1957-1961, 1989-1990, unpublished PhD Thesis, Griffith University, pp 44-45; Lack, Queensland Political History, above n 17, p 761; Public Service Commissioner Annual Reports, 1958, pp 2, 12-13; 1959, p 31; 1965, p 4; QSSU, The State Service, May 1968, June 1968, July 1968.

24 Interview, Col Brennan, 11 March 2004; Interview, Laurie Gillespie, 23 February 2004; Hall, DR, 1983, “Strike Law in Queensland”, in Murphy (ed), The Big Strikes, above n 9, pp 27-29; Hughes, Government of Queensland, above n 4, pp 168-171; Public Service Act Amendment Act 1968; Public Service Board Annual Reports 1974; 1978, p 5; 1979 p 16; 1980 pp 15-17; QPD, 1968, 20 November 1968; QSSU, The State Service, various; Whitehouse and Wiltshire, Queensland Professional Officers’ Association, above n 20, pp 98-100.

25 Public Service Board Annual Reports, 1969, p 5; 1971, pp 6-7; 1981, p 27; 1983, pp 3, 5; 1987, pp 14, 15, 17; QPD, 20 November 1968, pp 1647-8.

26 Interview, Barry Dittmer, 24 November 2003; Public Service Board Annual Reports,1986 p 11; 1987, pp 11, 14, 15, 17, 99-100; reg 127; QSSU, The State Service, various 1984-1988; Whitehouse and Wiltshire, Queensland Professional Officers’ Association, above n 20, pp 47,103.

27 Fleming, New Governments in Queensland, above n 23, pp 139-140; QSSU, The State Service, various 1984-1987.

28 Ahern, M, (Queensland Premier) 1988, Report on Public Sector Reform, Laid upon the table of the Legislative Assembly, pp 5-6; Public Service Management and Employment Act 1988 (Qld); QPD, 19 April 1988, p 5983; 20 April 1988, pp 6236,


19

6238, 6242; 21 April 1988 pp 6276-90; QSSU, The State Service, various 1988; Savage, E, 1987, Report on the Review of the Public Sector in Queensland, Queensland Government Printer, Brisbane.

29 Interview, Barry Dittmer, 24 November 2003. 30 Coaldrake, P, 1991, “Changing Employment Relations in Government”,

Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol 50, no 3, September 1991, p 249; Goss, W, 1989, Making Government Work: Public Sector Reform Under a Goss Government, Policy Paper prepared by the Transition to Government Committee of the State Parliamentary Labor Party, August 1989.

31 Boreham, P, 1991, “Industrial Relations: The restoration of order and process”, in R Whip and C Hughes (eds), Political Crossroads – the 1989 Queensland Election, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane; p 254; Fleming, New Governments in Queensland, above n 23, p 177; QSSU, The State Service, various 1989-1990.

32 Interview, Peter Coaldrake, 24 March 2004; Interview, Glyn Davis, 10 May 2004; Interview, Peter Henneken, 5 May 2004; Davis, A Government of Routines, above n 3, p 107; Public Sector Management Commission Act 1990.

33 Interview, Glyn Davis, 10 May 2004; Davis, G, 1993, “Introduction”, in Public Sector Reform Under the First Goss Government, Griffith University, Brisbane, pp ii, 103; Public Sector Management Commission (PSMC), 1991, Standard for Recruitment and Selection (No 1); PSMC, 1991, Standard for Performance Planning and Review, (No 2), First edition; QSSU, The State Service, February 1991, p 1; April 1991; Selth, P, 1991, “The Queensland Public Sector Management Commission: An Agent of Change”, Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol 50, no 4, December 1991, p 423.

34 Colley, L, 1996, The Impact of Enterprise Bargaining on the Changing Nature of Public Sector Employment Relations, Unpublished Honours Thesis, Griffith University, pp 30-31; Public Sector Management Commission (1995) Annual Report 1994/95, Brisbane, p 27.

35 Coaldrake, P, 1992, “Current Issues in the Queensland Public Sector: Merit, ‘Mexicans’ and the Training Agenda”, in G Davis (ed), 1993, Public Sector Reform Under the First Goss Government, Royal Institute of Public Administration Australia and Centre for Australian Public Sector Management, Griffith University, Brisbane, pp 214-215; Interview, Glyn Davis, 10 May 2004; Equal Opportunity in Public Employment (EOPE) Act 1992; Hede, A, 1993, “Managerial and Equity Reform of the Public Sector”, in B Stevens and J Wanna (eds), The Goss Government: Promise and Performance of Labor in Queensland, Macmillan, Melbourne, p 96; PSMC, 1991, Standard for Recruitment and Selection (No 1, 1991).

36 McGaw, I and Hunt, D, 1993, “Merit Protection Measures in a Context of Enterprise Bargaining, Corporatisation and User Pays”, in National Conference on the Future of Merit Protection Systems in Public Sector Employment, Griffith University, pp 19-20; Public Sector Management Commission Act 1990 (Qld), s 5.3(1)(2); PSMC, 1990, A Discussion Paper on Appeal Rights in Queensland Public Sector Employment; December 1990; QPD, 1991, 5 September 1991, p 868; Public Sector Management Commission Regulation 1991, reg 14; PSMC, 1995, Annual Report 1994/95, p 18; Sherman, T, 1991, “Cronyism or Professionalism”, in G Davis (ed), 1993, Public Sector Reform Under the First Goss Government, Royal Institute of Public Administration Australia and Centre for Australian Public Sector Management, Griffith University, Brisbane, p 204.


20

37 Interview, Peter Coaldrake, 24 March 2004; Colley, Enterprise Bargaining, above

n 34, p 41; Interview, Glyn Davis, 10 May 2004; Davis, Government of Routines, above n 3, p 126; Goss, 1989, Making Government Work, above n 30; Interview, Brian Head, 15 April 2004; Public Sector Legislation Amendment Act 1991 (Qld); PSMC, 1992, Annual Report 1991/92, p 8; PSMC, 1994, Standard for Staffing Options to Manage Organisational Change in the Queensland Public Sector (No 9, January 1994); QPD, 18 April 1991, p 7509; 22 May 1991, pp.7752-3, 8094; 23 May 1991, pp 7802-7; State Public Service Federation of Queensland (SPSFQ), Public Sector Voice, May 1992 p 2; August 1995, p 4.

38 Conroy, D and Blackmur, D, 1991, “Reforming the Public Service”, in R Whip. and Hughes, C (eds) Political Crossroads – the 1989 Queensland Election, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, above n 31, p 235; PSMC, 1990, A Green Paper on Senior Executive Service Queensland, Brisbane, p 3; Public Sector Legislation Amendment Act 1991; QPD, 29 May 1991, pp 8084-8089.

39 Interviews with Peter Coaldrake, 24 March 2004; Glyn Davis, 10 May 2004; Peter Henneken, 10 May 2004; John Merrell, 16 April 2004; Laurie Gillespie, 23 February 2004. Also, Davis, Government of Routines, above n 3, p 114; Hede, A, Managerial and Equity Reform, p 99; PSMC, 1990, A Green Paper on Senior Executive Service Queensland, pp 2-3; QPD, 22 May 1991, p 7753.

40 Wanna, J, 1992, “Trust, Distrust and Public Sector Reform: Labor’s Managerialism in Queensland”, Policy Organisation and Society, Winter, p 77.

41 Interview, Glyn Davis, 10 May 2004; Davis, Government of Routines, above n 3, p 114; PSMC, Green Paper, above n 39, p 8; QPD, 22 May 1991, p 7753.

42 Interview, Glyn Davis, 10 May 2004. 43 SPSFQ, Public Sector Voice, various 1995. 44 Preston, N, 1996, “Parliament Rediscovered? Parliament under Minority

Government in Queensland”, Paper to the Australasian Study of Parliament Group, 25 October 1996, pp 1-11; QPD, 25 July 1996, 8 August 1996, 4-5 September 1996, 9-11 October 1996, 30 October 1996.

45 Public Service Act 1996; QPD, 28 March 1996, p 212; 25 July 1996 p.1955; 5 September 1996 p 2553; 11 October 1996, p 3381.

46 Interview, John Merrell, 16 April 2004; Public Service Act 1996; Office of the Public Service directives – various; QPD, August 1996, p 2238, 30 October 1996, p 3652; 30 January 1997, pp 265-266; SPSFQ, Public Sector Voice, various 1996-1997.

47 Public Service Act 1996; Queensland Government Departments Certified Agreement 1997; SPSFQ, Public Sector Voice, June 1997, pp 3, 6; August 1997, pp 3, 5, 11.

48 QPD, 1996, 21 April 1998, p.640; SPSFQ, Public Sector Voice, December 1996 p 2; February 1998, p 3.

49 Interview, Brian Head, 15 April 2004; Interview, Alex Scott, 26 May 2004; QPD, 5 September 1996, pp 520-21, 2528; 26 November 1996, p 266; SPSFQ, Public Sector Voice, December 1996, p 9.

50 SPSFQ, Public Sector Voice, May 1996, p 5; December 1996, pp 2-3. 51 Department of Employment, Training and Industrial Relations (DETIR), 1999,

Annual Report 1989-1999, p 42; QPD, 25 May 1999, p 1838; SPSFQ, 1999, Bargaining 2000 – A new model for a new millennium, SPSFQ Council, 27 July 1999.

52 Interview, Glyn Davis, 10 May 2004; Interview, Brian Head, 15 April 2004; Interview, Peter Henneken, 5 May 2004.


21

53 Interview, Peter Henneken, 5 May 2004; Interview Alex Scott, 26 May 2004;

Memorandum of Agreement – State Government Departments – 1 January 2000 – 30 April 2000; State Government Departments Certified Agreement 2000.

54 Interview Glyn Davis, 10 May 2004; Interview, Brian Head 15 April 2004; QPD, 4 August 1998, pp 1529-1530; 5 August 1998, pp 1608-1609; 6 August 1998, pp 1705.16 September 1998, pp 2256, 2276-77.

Documents

10 The Politics of an Apolitical Public Service228703/... · THE POLITICS OF AN APOLITICAL PUBLIC SERVICE 3 encompassed only one-third to one-half of the public sector, except under