10. Saludaga v. Far Eastern University

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 179337. April 30, 2008.]

JOSEPH SALUDAGA, petitioner , vs . FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS in his capacity as President of FEU, respondents .

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailsthe June 29, 2007 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87050nullifying and setting aside the November 10, 2004 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial

Court of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 98-89483 and dismissing the complaintfiled by petitioner; as well as its August 23, 2007 Resolution 4 denying the Motionfor Reconsideration. 5 cAEaSC

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far EasternUniversity (FEU) when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of thesecurity guards on duty at the school premises on August 18, 1996. Petitioner wasrushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation (FEU-NRMF) due to the wound

he sustained.6

Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where heexplained that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually released consideringthat no formal complaint was filed against him.

Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents on theground that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe andsecure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. Respondents, inturn, filed a Third-Party Complaint 7 against Galaxy Development and ManagementCorporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide securityservices within its premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxy's Presidentto indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner, if anyand to pay attorney's fees and cost of the suit. On the other hand, Galaxy andImperial filed a Fourth-Party Complaint against AFP General Insurance. 8 AECacS

On November 10, 2004, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, thedispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering:

1. FEU and Edilberto de Jesus, in his capacity as president of FEUto pay jointly and severally Joseph Saludaga the amount of



P35,298.25 for actual damages with 12% interest per annumfrom the filing of the complaint until fully paid; moral damages of P300,000.00, exemplary damages of P500,000.00, attorney'sfees of P100,000.00 and cost of the suit;

2. Galaxy Management and Development Corp. and its president,Col. Mariano Imperial to indemnify jointly and severally 3rd partyplaintiffs (FEU and Edilberto de Jesus in his capacity as President

of FEU) for the above-mentioned amounts;

3. And the 4th party complaint is dismissed for lack of cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs. cSEAHa

SO ORDERED. 9

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed Decisionthe decretal portion of which provides, viz :

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated November

10, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by JosephSaludaga against appellant Far Eastern University and its President in CivilCase No. 98-89483 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 10

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied; hence, the instantpetition based on the following grounds: DaTICc

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN MANNER CONTRARY TOLAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN RULING THAT:

5.1. THE SHOOTING INCIDENT IS A FORTUITOUS EVENT;

5.2. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR THE INJURYRESULTING FROM A GUNSHOT WOUND SUFFERED BY THE PETITIONERFROM THE HANDS OF NO LESS THAN THEIR OWN SECURITY GUARD INVIOLATION OF THEIR BUILT-IN CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TOPETITIONER, BEING THEIR LAW STUDENT AT THAT TIME, TO PROVIDE HIMWITH A SAFE AND SECURE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT;

5.3. SECURITY GUARD, ALEJANDRO ROSETE, WHO SHOT PETITIONER

WHILE HE WAS WALKING ON HIS WAY TO THE LAW LIBRARY OFRESPONDENT FEU IS NOT THEIR EMPLOYEE BY VIRTUE OF THE CONTRACTFOR SECURITY SERVICES BETWEEN GALAXY AND FEU NOTWITHSTANDING

THE FACT THAT PETITIONER, NOT BEING A PARTY TO IT, IS NOT BOUND BY THE SAME UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY OF CONTRACTS; and CTaSEI

5.4. RESPONDENT EXERCISED DUE DILIGENCE IN SELECTING GALAXYAS THE AGENCY WHICH WOULD PROVIDE SECURITY SERVICES WITHIN

THE PREMISES OF RESPONDENT FEU. 11

Petitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged breach of student-



school contract for a safe learning environment. The pertinent portions ofpetitioner's Complaint read:

6.0. At the time of plaintiff's confinement, the defendants or any of theirrepresentative did not bother to visit and inquire about his condition. Thisabject indifference on the part of the defendants continued even afterplaintiff was discharged from the hospital when not even a word of consolation was heard from them. Plaintiff waited for more than one (1) year

for the defendants to perform their moral obligation but the wait wasfruitless. This indifference and total lack of concern of defendants served toexacerbate plaintiff's miserable condition. SaCIDT

xxx xxx xxx

11.0. Defendants are responsible for ensuring the safety of its studentswhile the latter are within the University premises. And that should anythinguntoward happens to any of its students while they are within theUniversity's premises shall be the responsibility of the defendants. In thiscase, defendants, despite being legally and morally bound, miserably failed to

protect plaintiff from injury and thereafter, to mitigate and compensateplaintiff for said injury;

12.0. When plaintiff enrolled with defendant FEU, a contract was enteredinto between them. Under this contract, defendants are supposed to ensurethat adequate steps are taken to provide an atmosphere conducive to studyand ensure the safety of the plaintiff while inside defendant FEU's premises.In the instant case, the latter breached this contract when defendantallowed harm to befall upon the plaintiff when he was shot at by, of allpeople, their security guard who was tasked to maintain peace inside thecampus. 12

In Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals, 13 we held thatcCTAIE

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there isestablished a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations whichboth parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakesto provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice toequip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or aprofession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by theschool's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists inattaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, nostudent can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics orexplore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying orgrenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the schoolpremises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school mustensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the

campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. 14 ICASEH



It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law student inrespondent FEU. As such, there was created a contractual obligation between thetwo parties. On petitioner's part, he was obliged to comply with the rules andregulations of the school. On the other hand, respondent FEU, as a learninginstitution is mandated to impart knowledge and equip its students with thenecessary skills to pursue higher education or a profession. At the same time, it isobliged to ensure and take adequate steps to maintain peace and order within thecampus.

It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contractand the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief15 In the instant case, we find that, when petitioner was shot inside the campus byno less the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure thepremises, there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with itsobligation to provide a safe and secure environment to its students.

In order to avoid liability, however, respondents aver that the shooting incident wasa fortuitous event because they could not have reasonably foreseen nor avoided the

accident caused by Rosete as he was not their employee; 16 and that they compliedwith their obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for their students byhaving exercised due diligence in selecting the security services of Galaxy. EDCcaS

After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondents failed to dischargethe burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in providing a safe learningenvironment for their students. They failed to prove that they ensured that theguards assigned in the campus met the requirements stipulated in the SecurityService Agreement. Indeed, certain documents about Galaxy were presented duringtrial; however, no evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete as a security guard for

the university was offered.

Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and confirmthat the security guards assigned to them actually possess the qualificationsrequired in the Security Service Agreement. It was not proven that they examinedthe clearances, psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other vital documentsenumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on the security agency aboutthese matters or failure to check the papers stating the qualifications of the guardsis negligence on the part of respondents. A learning institution should not beallowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the

security agency it hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherentobligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students. aCATSI

Consequently, respondents' defense of force majeure must fail. In order for forcemajeure to be considered, respondents must show that no negligence or misconductwas committed that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invokedto protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverseconsequences of such a loss. One's negligence may have concurred with an act ofGod in producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the



immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous eventwould not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the resultof a person's participation — whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act— the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to actsof God. 17

Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in theperformance of their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for breach of

contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning environment, respondentFEU is liable to petitioner for damages. It is essential in the award of damages thatthe claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of thefactual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts. 18 SECATH

In the instant case, it was established that petitioner spent P35,298.25 for hishospitalization and other medical expenses. 19 While the trial court correctlyimposed interest on said amount, however, the case at bar involves an obligationarising from a contract and not a loan or forbearance of money. As such, the properrate of legal interest is six percent (6%) per annum of the amount demanded. Such

interest shall continue to run from the filing of the complaint until the finality ofthis Decision. 20 After this Decision becomes final and executory, the applicable rateshall be twelve percent (12%) per annum until its satisfaction.

The other expenses being claimed by petitioner, such as transportation expensesand those incurred in hiring a personal assistant while recuperating were howevernot duly supported by receipts. 21 In the absence thereof, no actual damages may beawarded. Nonetheless, temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code maybe recovered where it has been shown that the claimant suffered some pecuniaryloss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. Hence, the amount of

P20,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded to petitioner.HAICTD

As regards the award of moral damages, there is no hard and fast rule in thedetermination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each casemust be governed by its own peculiar circumstances. 22 The testimony of petitionerabout his physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, and morashock resulting from the shooting incident 23 justify the award of moral damagesHowever, moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensatethe claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on thewrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the

defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, oramusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone. It isaimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quoante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Trial courts must thenguard against the award of exorbitant damages; they should exercise balancedrestrained and measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passionprejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court. 24 We deem it just andreasonable under the circumstances to award petitioner moral damages in theamount of P100,000.00. HcISTE



Likewise, attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P50,000.00 aspart of damages is reasonable in view of Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 25 Howeverthe award of exemplary damages is deleted considering the absence of proof thatrespondents acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolentmanner.

We note that the trial court held respondent De Jesus solidarily liable withrespondent FEU. InPowton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol, 26 we held that:

[A] corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinctfrom those of the persons composing it, such that, save for certainexceptions, corporate officers who entered into contracts in behalf of thecorporation cannot be held personally liable for the liabilities of the latter.Personal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along (althoughnot necessarily) with the corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, onlywhen — (1) he assents to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, orwhen he is guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, orwhen there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation,

its stockholders or other persons; (2) he consents to the issuance of watered down stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, does not forthwithfile with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto; (3) he agreesto hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) heis made by a specific provision of law personally answerable for his

corporate action. 27 aDcEIH

None of the foregoing exceptions was established in the instant case; hencerespondent De Jesus should not be held solidarily liable with respondent FEU.

Incidentally, although the main cause of action in the instant case is the breach of

the school-student contract, petitioner, in the alternative, also holds respondentsvicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not onlyfor one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whomone is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees andhousehold helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even

though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the personsherein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good fatherof a family to prevent damage. CADSHI

We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents cannot be heldliable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code because respondents are notthe employers of Rosete. The latter was employed by Galaxy. The instructions



issued by respondents' Security Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards areordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for servicesentered into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as theelement of control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete. 28

As held in Mercury Drug Corporation v. Libunao : 29

In Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, 30 we held that where the security agency recruits,

hires and assigns the works of its watchmen or security guards to a client,the employer of such guards or watchmen is such agency, and not theclient, since the latter has no hand in selecting the security guards. Thus, theduty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family cannot bedemanded from the said client:

. . . [I]t is settled in our jurisdiction that where the security agency, ashere, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or securityguards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen.Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guardsattaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customersof such agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a securityagency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of securityguards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it;the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in theselection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, bedemanded from the client whose premises or property are protectedby the security guards. aETAHD

xxx xxx xxx

The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to thesecurity guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the clientresponsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable fortheir wrongful acts or omissions. 31

We now come to respondents' Third Party Claim against Galaxy. In Firestone Tireand Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Tempengko, 32 we held that: HTScEI

The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device whereby a 'thirdparty' who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of bythe plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the

defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any otherrelief, in respect of the plaintiff's claim. The third-party complaint is actuallyindependent of and separate and distinct from the plaintiff's complaint. Wereit not for this provision of the Rules of Court, it would have to be filedindependently and separately from the original complaint by the defendantagainst the third-party. But the Rules permit defendant to bring in a third-party defendant or so to speak, to litigate his separate cause of action inrespect of plaintiff's claim against a third-party in the original and principalcase with the object of avoiding circuitry of action and unnecessaryproliferation of law suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation the



entire subject matter arising from one particular set of facts. 33

Respondents and Galaxy were able to litigate their respective claims and defensesin the course of the trial of petitioner's complaint. Evidence duly supports thefindings of the trial court that Galaxy is negligent not only in the selection of itsemployees but also in their supervision. Indeed, no administrative sanction was

imposed against Rosete despite the shooting incident; moreover, he was evenallowed to go on leave of absence which led eventually to his disappearance. 34

Galaxy also failed to monitor petitioner's condition or extend the necessaryassistance, other than the P5,000.00 initially given to petitioner. Galaxy andImperial failed to make good their pledge to reimburse petitioner's medicaexpenses. aIcDCT

For these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with anunqualified security guard, which resulted to the latter's breach of obligation topetitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to respondent FEU for such damages

equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner.

Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily liable with Galaxy forbeing grossly negligent in directing the affairs of the security agency. It wasImperial who assured petitioner that his medical expenses will be shouldered byGalaxy but said representations were not fulfilled because they presumed thatpetitioner and his family were no longer interested in filing a formal complaintagainst them. 35

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 29, 2007 Decision of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87050 nullifying the Decision of the trial court anddismissing the complaint as well as the August 23, 2007 Resolution denying theMotion for Reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of theRegional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 98-89483 findingrespondent FEU liable for damages for breach of its obligation to provide studentswith a safe and secure learning atmosphere, is AFFIRMED with the followingMODIFICATIONS: cSTDIC

a. respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) is ORDERED to pay petitioneractual damages in the amount of P35,298.25, plus 6% interest perannum from the filing of the complaint until the finality of this Decision.

After this decision becomes final and executory, the applicable rateshall be twelve percent (12%) per annum until its satisfaction;

b. respondent FEU is also ORDERED to pay petitioner temperatedamages in the amount of P20,000.00; moral damages in the amountof P100,000.00; and attorney's fees and litigation expenses in theamount of P50,000.00;

c. the award of exemplary damages is DELETED.

The Complaint against respondent Edilberto C. De Jesus is DISMISSED. The



counterclaims of respondents are likewise DISMISSED.

Galaxy Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy) and its presidentMariano D. Imperial are ORDERED to jointly and severally pay respondent FEUdamages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner. ScAIaT

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 3-33. IAEcaH

2. Id. at 38-62; penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo and concurred inby Associate Justices Arcangelita Romilla Lontok and Romeo F. Barza.

3. Id. at 67-75; penned by Judge Alejandro G. Bijasa.

4. Id. at 64-65.

5. Id. at 160-177.

6. Id. at 188.

7. Records, Vol. I, pp. 136-139.

8. Id. at 287-290. TIaEDC

9. Rollo, pp. 74-75.

10. Id. at 61.

11. Id. at 13-14.

12. Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-6.

13. G.R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 729.

14. Id. at 733-734.

15. FGU Insurance Corporation v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation, 435 Phil

333, 341 (2002).

16. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 76-86. DTcACa

17. Mindex Resources Development v. Morillo, 428 Phil. 934, 944 (2002).

18. Roque, Jr. v. Torres, G.R. No. 157632, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 336, 348.

19. TSN, September 20, 1999, pp. 20-21; Records, Vol. I, pp. 316-322; Records, Vol.II, p. 597.



20. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994234 SCRA 78, 95-97.

21. TSN, September 27, 1999, pp. 5, 9.

22. Roque v. Torres, supra note 18 at 349. TAIcaD

23. TSN, September 20, 1999, pp. 10, 12-13; September 27, 1999, pp. 3, 5-9.

24. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 499, 529-530(1999).

25. CIVIL CODE, Art. 2208:

In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(2) when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff tolitigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

26. 448 Phil. 643 (2003).

27. Id. at 656. EAIaHD

28. Records, Vol. I, pp. 43-55 (FEU) and pp. 56-68 (Galaxy).

29. G.R. No. 144458, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 404.

30. G.R. No. 66207, May 18, 1992, 209 SCRA 47.

31. Mercury Drug Corporation v. Libunao, supra at 414-418.

32. 137 Phil. 239 (1969).

33. Id. at 243-244.

34. Rollo, p. 74.

35. Records, Vol. I, p. 330. ITSacC

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10. Saludaga v. Far Eastern University