10 Global Geopolitical Predictions

8/10/2019 10 Global Geopolitical Predictions

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1. The collapse of Western hegemony accelerates.

While the 2008 Financial Crisis and the rise of several non-Western powers

throughout the past decade highlighted the decline of Western power, thisgeopolitical trend has deeper foundations. Following the collapse of the

Soviet Union, Westerners, and Europeans in particular, became

strategically lazy and complacent as they basked in hegemony,

subsequently losing their will to power. Consequentially, the post-war

baby-boomer generation, who rose to power during this period, slashed

military spending and came to believe in all sorts of internationalistfantasies. The reduction of Western power over the last few years may

therefore represent not only the most significant event of the past decade,

but possibly of the last four centuries.


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2. Chinas national consolidationintensifies Spearheaded by strong

economic growth, China has, over the last

decade, consolidated internally and adopted

an increasingly assertive foreign policy.

Chinese railway and motorway networks

have been progressively extended to link

more of the Chinese periphery with the

densely populated and industrialised Chinese

seaboard. The completion of the QingzangRailwayin 2006 is symbolic of the extension

of Beijings sovereigntyover its Wild West,

as well as surrounding countries, particularly

in South and Central Asia. In short, Chinas

national consolidation is leading rapidly to the

emergence of an independent national power

base (i.e. an integrated fighting unit), with the

means to project itself across land and sea.

To this end, Beijings increasingly assertive

diplomacy (i.e. in the Indian Ocean, the

Middle East, Africa and Central Asia) and

military build up (and that of the Chinese

navy in particular) suggest that China is not

content with the geopolitical status quo.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/5140514.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/5140514.stmhttp://www.idsa.in/jds/2_2_2008_TheTraintoLhasa_SAryahttp://www.idsa.in/jds/2_2_2008_TheTraintoLhasa_SAryahttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/5140514.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/5140514.stm


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3. India confirms its maritime destinyThe completionand further

expansionof the Karwar naval stationthe biggest naval facility in South

Asiain 2005 and 2010 respectively, represents Indias long-term

geopolitical intent: dominance over the Indian Ocean. The expansion of the

Indian Navy and the consolidation of closer relationswith the United States

(and, to a lesser degree, France, the United Kingdom and Japan)emphasises this trend. The geopolitical rise of China is not the only game in

town. Indias emergence as a major power means that the geopolitical

situation in Eurasia is going to be highly dynamic during the twenty-first

century.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4596581.stmhttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/After-long-delay-India-moves-to-expand-strategic-Karwar-naval-base/articleshow/5804347.cmshttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/After-long-delay-India-moves-to-expand-strategic-Karwar-naval-base/articleshow/5804347.cmshttp://www.cfr.org/publication/23332/closer_usindia_embrace.htmlhttp://www.defencetalk.com/india-france-to-intensify-defense-relations-30493/http://www.defencetalk.com/india-france-to-intensify-defense-relations-30493/http://www.cfr.org/publication/23332/closer_usindia_embrace.htmlhttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/After-long-delay-India-moves-to-expand-strategic-Karwar-naval-base/articleshow/5804347.cmshttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/After-long-delay-India-moves-to-expand-strategic-Karwar-naval-base/articleshow/5804347.cmshttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4596581.stm


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4. The United States places the Pacific Ocean at the heart of its geostrategy The attacks of the

11th September 2001 signified a substantial acceleration of Washingtons geostrategic reorientation

away from Western and Central Europeand towards the Middle East and Central Asia. But thisMiddle Eastern focus will be short-lived; for in the late 2000s, the key American geostrategic

development was the decision to spend multiple billions of dollarson upgrading naval, air and ground

facilities in Guam. This, as well as the formation of closer alliances with its East Asian partners, is

symbolic of the United States decision during the late 2000s to shift its power into the Pacific Ocean

and East Asia to hedge against China.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/guam/8085749/US-to-build-8bn-super-base-on-Pacific-island-of-Guam.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/guam/8085749/US-to-build-8bn-super-base-on-Pacific-island-of-Guam.html


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5. The Korean Peninsula heats up.The Korean War seemed

increasingly distant by 2000. What a difference a decade makes! In

2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test. And byNovember 2010, North Korean shells were raining downon Southern

territory, and the two sides came perilously close to an all-out war. The

Korean peninsula is a place to watch: the South is an increasingly

powerful and affluent state with a first-rate industrial and manufacturing

base. The collapse of the North could lead to reunification andafter

adjustmentthe emergence of an increasingly confident and powerfulnation, which will undoubtedly further complicate the geopolitical

situation in East Asia.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11818005http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11818005


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6. Japan re-emerges as a more normal country. When analysts began to

argue that Japan was undergoing a geostrategic transformation in the earlier

part of the decade, some sniggered. But the trajectory is increasingly

plainfor all to see: the creation of a full-scale Ministry of Defence, large

helicopter carriers, and naval modernisation, as well as an increasingassertiveness on Tokyos part to defend its interests against Chinese

encroachments. In sum, Japan is returning as a more normal country after

several decades of quietism.
http://www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi-papers/adelphi-papers-archive/ap-368-9-japans-re-emergence/http://www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi-papers/adelphi-papers-archive/ap-368-9-japans-re-emergence/http://www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi-papers/adelphi-papers-archive/ap-368-9-japans-re-emergence/http://www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi-papers/adelphi-papers-archive/ap-368-9-japans-re-emergence/


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7. The old European order begins to break down. With the retreat of

American power, Europeans have witnessed the resurfacing of older

geopolitical divisions. Animated by Europes Eastern enlargement and the

fading away of the apologetic post-war generation, Germany has began to

assert itself again. As the financial crisis took hold in 2008, Berlin used its

economic muscle and industrial might to refashion the European Unions

spendthrift states along German lines (and rightly so). German power has

been further amplified by the Euro crisis. But the re-kindlingof the

entente between France and the United Kingdom in 2010 places

constraints on German power. Given the magnitude of their combinedpower, it is likelyif they play their cards rightthat it will be Britain and

France, and not Germany, who re-emerge as the European Unions

leaders, ushering in a new era of European integration based on military

collaboration.
http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/2010/06/30/the-return-of-european-geopolitics/http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/2010/11/03/towards-a-neo-norman-euro-core/http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/2010/11/03/towards-a-neo-norman-euro-core/http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/2010/11/03/towards-a-neo-norman-euro-core/http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/2010/11/03/towards-a-neo-norman-euro-core/http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/2010/06/30/the-return-of-european-geopolitics/


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8. Russia becomes an American

partnerand a European competitor.

Ten years ago, the fear was of a new

axis between Moscow and Berlin (and

with Brussels more generally). But in

recent years, German/European and

Russian interests have started to collide,

especially over the control of energy

transmission pipelines and the

diversification on the part of Germany

and the European Union with regard tonatural gas supplies. The Russian

invasion of Georgia, meddling in Ukraine

and the Kremlins progressively rougher

treatment of political opponents has also

raised European eyebrows. At the same

time, the United States has started to

see in Russia a potential allyin

containing pariah states in the Middle

East and, in the longer term, an

ascendant China.
http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/2009/08/21/russia-america-europe/http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/2009/08/21/russia-america-europe/


10/22

9. Turkey repositions itself in the Middle East. The victory of the

Justice and Development Party in Turkey in 2002 accelerated Ankaras

shift away from a near-exclusive focus on the European Union and theAtlantic Alliance. The country has an increasingly multi-vector

approachto foreign policy, looking east and south as well as west. With

seventy-eight million people and a rapidly growing population, the last

decade saw Turkey put in place the foundations on which to build up its

power in the Middle East.
http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/october/turkeys-bid-to-raise-influence-in-middle-east/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/october/turkeys-bid-to-raise-influence-in-middle-east/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/october/turkeys-bid-to-raise-influence-in-middle-east/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/october/turkeys-bid-to-raise-influence-in-middle-east/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/october/turkeys-bid-to-raise-influence-in-middle-east/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/october/turkeys-bid-to-raise-influence-in-middle-east/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/october/turkeys-bid-to-raise-influence-in-middle-east/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/october/turkeys-bid-to-raise-influence-in-middle-east/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/october/turkeys-bid-to-raise-influence-in-middle-east/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/october/turkeys-bid-to-raise-influence-in-middle-east/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/october/turkeys-bid-to-raise-influence-in-middle-east/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/october/turkeys-bid-to-raise-influence-in-middle-east/


11/22

10. Iran pursues regional primacy. Irans pursuit of nuclear weapons

has continuedthroughout the last decade, making European and

American policy-makers increasingly nervous. Iran has also grown bolder,capturing British military unitsin the Persian Gulf, before parading them

on television and then letting them go. Will Iran submit to Western

pressure, or will its nuclear ambitions suck in the great powers (i.e.

France inAbu Dhabi), destabilise the Middle East and/or lead to war?

(President Nicolas Sarkozy has gone beyond France's traditional policy of

selling arms to Gulf states by signing a deal with Abu Dhabi for apermanent French naval base in 2008).
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11709428http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C46080D68E3CB6/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7189481.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7189481.stmhttp://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C46080D68E3CB6/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11709428


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10 Global Geopolitical

Predictions

EconomyWatch.com

25 February 2010


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1. The decline in Western asset values will likely continue in the broad

sense through 2010, which will automatically lead to a compounded

reduction in the asset-based credit available. In other words, Western

economies will be forcibly de-levered, quite apart from the fiscal prudence

which will cause a reduction in risk investment;


14/22

2. The West will demonstrably not contest dominance of the major oiland gasfields of Iraq, Iran, Nigeria(and elsewhere in the Gulf of Guinea)against competition from the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and, toa lesser extent, India.This will force moves in the US toward natural gasexploitation and as Obama and the green left depart possibleexploitation of US oilfields and new nuclear energy approaches. This would

in turn imply a renewed look at nuclear waste disposal. But none of thisWestern search for alternatives will occur in 2010.

THE NEW YORK TIMES,March 19, 2010:The recession precipitated a milestone for

Saudi Arabia and the global energy market. While Chinas successful economic

policies paved the way for a quick rebound there, the recession caused a deeper

slowdown in the United States, slashing oil consumption by 10 percent from its 2005-7 peak. As a result, Saudi Arabia exported more oil to China than to the United States

last year. While exports to the United States might rebound this year, in the long run

the decline in American demand and the growing importance of China represent a

fundamental shift in the geopolitics of oil.
http://www.oilprice.com/articles-crude-oil.phphttp://www.oilprice.com/articles-crude-oil.phphttp://www.oilprice.com/articles-natural-gas.phphttp://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/china/index.html?inline=nyt-geohttp://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/china/index.html?inline=nyt-geohttp://www.oilprice.com/articles-natural-gas.phphttp://www.oilprice.com/articles-crude-oil.phphttp://www.oilprice.com/articles-crude-oil.php


15/22

3. The conflict in Afghanistan willbecome increasingly strained as the USsends out, literally, signals of surrenderto the Taliban, who take all calls from theUS for a negotiated settlement in the wakeof a pronouncement of US imminentwithdrawal as a sign of weakness anddefeat. It is, in fact, such a signal. And whilesenior US military and security officials

reassure regional states, such as Pakistan,that the US would, in fact, remain in the areabeyond the Obama withdrawal deadline of2011, the reality is that absent theremoval of Obama from office this will nothappen. Once again, the long-timers in theUS bureaucracy, including those in Defenseand State, believe that they can outwait andoutwit the short-timers. But the determined

short-timer, such as Pres. Obama, can andwill wreak havoc and destroy the pillars ofthe system before he leaves. And whenObama leaves, the money, in any event, willbe also gone, and with it the capability andviability for the US to remain in or nearAfghanistan. Indeed, the destruction of keyelements of the US economic and politicalframework has already occurred.


16/22

4. Quite apart from the US ability tosustain South Asian operations inthe manner which the Washingtoninsiders have assured thePakistanis(and others, such as the

Australians), the reality is that India which the US has been courting as astrategic partner will of necessityhave to re-align with Russia if it is togain any access to the Eurasianheartland. If it does not, it will never beable to compete strategically in thenear future with the PRC, which ispushing ahead with the construction ofmore efficient overland links to theIndian Ocean through Myanmar and

through Pakistan (from the KarakoramHighway down to the Baluchistan

Arabian Sea port of Gwadar, whichhad been offered twice by Pakistan tothe US, which refused it).


17/22

5. A strategic opportunity isemerging for the West andpossibly for India in thetransformation now occurring inMyanmar as the ruling military leaderstake very seriously their approach toelections later in 2010. This could could, not necessarily will mean thatMyanmar opens to a more Westernorientation to the detriment of thePRC, but only if the US can supportthe notion of providing some measureof post-election security, ideally withinMyanmar, for the retiring militaryleaders. The US lost massivecredibility in this kind of undertaking

when it lured Liberian Pres. CharlesTaylor into exile in Nigeria in 2003 andthen broke promises of safe-haven forhim, and organized his subsequentextradition to the UNs InternationalCriminal Court (ICC), to which the USdoes not even subscribe.


18/22

6. By 2030, the world will be more complicated, divided between a broad American

sphere of influence in Europe, the Middle East and south Asia, and a Chinese sphere

in east Asia and Africa. Even within its own sphere, the US will face new challenges

from former peripheries. The large, educated populations of Poland, Turkey, Brazil

and their neighbours will come into their own and Russia will continue its revival.

Nevertheless, America will probably remain the world's major power. The critics who

wrote off the US during the depression of the 1930s and the stagflation of the 1970s

lived to see it bounce back to defeat the Nazis in the 1940s and the Soviets in the

1980s. America's financial problems will surely deepen through the 2010s, but the

2020s could bring another Roosevelt or Reagan. A hundred years ago, as Britain's

dominance eroded, rivals, particularly Germany, were emboldened to take ever-greater risks. The same will happen as American power erodes in the 2010s-20s. In

1999, for instance, Russia would never have dared attack a neighbour such as

Georgia but in 2009 it took just such a chance. The danger of such an adventure

sparking a great power war in the 2010s is probably low; in the 2020s, it will be much

greater. The most serious threats will arise in the vortex of instability that stretches

from Africa to central Asia. Most of the world's poorest people live here; climate

change is wreaking its worst damage here; nuclear weapons are proliferating fastesthere; and even in 2030, the great powers will still seek much of their energy here.

Here, the risk of Sino-American conflict will be greatest and here the balance of

power will be decided.


19/22

7. The unease and conflict in the ArabianPeninsula will continue apace, withstrong Iranian support and some Russianinterest, merely because there is nothingto stop it.Only a total compromise ofYemen Pres. Ali Abdullah Saleh to Iran something which would greatly antagonizeSaudi Arabia can bring the fighting in thearea to a more contained level, and even

that would signify an Iranian victory. Inter-governmental talks on the security andstability of Yemen, held in London onJanuary 27, 2010, were essentiallycosmetic, and signified the lack of Westerncommitment to addressing the problem inthe Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea.The most significant unknown factor is thedegree to which Oman can stop the spread

of unrest into its country, which controls thesouthern littoral of the Strait of Hormuz.Equally, Omans unique culture, and thestrength of its leader, Sultan Qaboos binSaid al-Said, is its best safeguard, as wellas the Wests best hope for security at theStrait.


20/22

8. It is in a climate of profoundinternational distrust in anyWestern support or ability toprotect that we will see thetransition of power occurring inplaces such as Egypt and Nigeria in2010. Both states are critical to theWest, both geopoliticallyand in energyterms. France has offered a strongdegree of support for a stable Egyptiantransition, but the rest of the West hasbeen fairly impotent. Similarly,Pakistan is undergoing a constitutionalcrisis which may see Pres. Asif AliZardari removed by the SupremeCourt which he, essentially, helped

reinstate after the end of theMusharraf Administration. Even ifPres. Zardari can circumvent themounting constitutional legal casebeing mounted against him, hispowers are being eroded by theNational Assembly.
http://www.oilprice.com/articles-geopolitics.phphttp://www.oilprice.com/articles-geopolitics.php


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9. It is profoundly unlikely that Israel willmilitarily attack Iran in 2010, or in theforeseeable future.As a result, the clericalleadership in Iran will move inexorably towardgreater consolidation, a process which will occur indiametric contrast to the rising shrillness of UScondemnation of Irans nuclear position. The realityis that (a) international embargoes against Iranhave already failed, and new embargoes cannot beimplemented as long asRussia and the PRC

guarantee Iranian trade, (b) the US (and Israel)cannot militarily attack Iran with any hope of apositive strategic outcome because the nuclear andNational Command Authority targets are too diffuseand there is no capability of a ground-force follow-up, and (c) the Iranian population would, as theyhave always done, react with great hostility to anyforeign attack, rallying around the government ofthe day, even if they have despised it. The onlyhope of what the US calls regime change in Irancan come if it is at the hands of the Iranian

population, and Russian and PRC support for theAdministration of Pres. Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejadssecurity services has ensured that the Iranian publiccannot effectively combine to remove him. Still,mounting internal frustration in Iran could result in acoup by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps(IRGC: Pasdaran).
http://www.economywatch.com/economy-business-and-finance-news/geopolitics-10-global-geopolitical-predictions-25-02.htmlhttp://www.economywatch.com/economy-business-and-finance-news/geopolitics-10-global-geopolitical-predictions-25-02.htmlhttp://www.economywatch.com/economy-business-and-finance-news/geopolitics-10-global-geopolitical-predictions-25-02.html


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10. The Peoples Republic of Chinawill continue to manage the greatinternal disparities through 2010,but there is no guarantee thatBeijing will not face major hurdlesin the year. Moreover, the continuingpoor economic performance in Japan

and the US will continue to constrainPRC exports and dampen PRCeconomic options given the extent ofChinese holdings of US securitieswhich grow less attractive by the day.

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10 Global Geopolitical Predictions