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1 Securing Mobile Networks in an Operational Setting Will Ivancic [email protected] (216) 433-3494

1 Securing Mobile Networks in an Operational Setting Will Ivancic [email protected] (216) 433-3494

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Page 1: 1 Securing Mobile Networks in an Operational Setting Will Ivancic wivancic@grc.nasa.gov (216) 433-3494

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Securing Mobile Networks in an Operational Setting

Will [email protected]

(216) 433-3494

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Outline Security Considerations Neah Bay Project Cost of Connectivity NASA’s Mobile Network Needs

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Security Considerations

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Securing Networks Constraints/Tools

Policy Security Policy Education Enforcement

Architecture Protocols

Must be done up front to be done well

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PublicInternet

FA

MR

US Coast GuardMobile Network

HA

US Coast GuardOperational Network

(Private Address Space)

CN

IPv4 Utopian Operation

Triangular Routing

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PublicInternet

FA

MR

US Coast GuardMobile Network

HA

US Coast GuardOperational Network

(Private Address Space)

CN

IPv4 “Real World” Operation

PROXy

Proxy had not originated the request; therefore, the response is squelched.Peer-to-peer networking becomes problematic at best.

Glenn Research Center Policy:No UDP, No IPSec, etc…Mobile-IP stopped in its tracks.What’s your policy?

Ingress or Egress Filtering stopsTransmission due to topologicallyIncorrect source address. IPv6 Corrects this problem.

USCG Requires 3DES encryption.WEP is not acceptable due to known deficiencies.

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PublicInternet

FA

MR

US Coast GuardMobile Network

HA

US Coast GuardOperational Network

(Private Address Space)

CN

Current Solution – Reverse Tunneling

PROXy

Anticipate similar problems for IPv6.

Adds Overhead and kills route optimization.

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Security• Security Bandwidth Utilization • Security Performance • Tunnels Tunnels Tunnels and more Tunnels• Performance Security

User turns OFF Security to make system usable!• Thus, we need more bandwidth to ensure

security.

PAYLOADHEADER

ORIGINAL PACKET

HEADER

VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK

HEADER

ENCRYPTION AT THE NETWORK LAYER

HEADER

ENCRYPTION ON THE RF LINK

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Conclusions Regarding Security

Security Breaks Everything At least it sometimes feels like that. “The Ultimate Denial of Service Attack” – D.S.

Need to change policy where appropriate. Need to develop good architectures that

consider how the wireless systems and protocols operate.

Possible solutions that should be investigated: Dynamic, protocol-aware firewalls and proxies.

Possibly incorporated with Authentication and Authorization.

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Neah Bay / Mobile Router Project

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Neah Bay / Mobile Router ProjectNeah Bay / Mobile Router Project

Cleveland

Detroit

Foreign-Agent

Globalstar G/TSmiths Falls, Canada

Foreign-Agent

Home-AgentAnywhere, USA

Internet

Neah BayOutside of wireless LAN range, connected via Globalstar using Collocated Care-of-Address.

Neah BayConnected to FA via wireless LAN at Cleveland harbor

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Why NASA/USCG/Industry Real world deployment issues can only be

addressed in an operational network. USCG has immediate needs, therefore

willingness to work the problem. USCG has military network requirements. USCG is large enough network to force us to

investigate full scale deployment issues USCG is small enough to work with. NASA has same network issues regarding

mobility, security, network management and scalability.

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Mobile-Router Advantages Share wireless and network resources with

other organizations $$$ savings

Set and forget No onsite expertise required However, you still have to engineer the network

Continuous Connectivity (May or may not be important to your

organization) Robust

Secondary Home Agent (Dynamic HA)

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Mobile Network Design Goals Secure Scalable Manageable Ability to sharing network

infrastructure Robust

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PublicInternet

FA

FA

MR

MR

MR

US Coast Guard

Canadian Coast Guard ACME Shipping

HA

HA

HA

HA

ACMESHIPPING

MR

US Navy

Shared Network Infrastructure

Encrypting wireless links makes it very difficult to share infrastructure.This is a policy issue.

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Secondary Home Agent(Dynamic HA)

PrimaryHome Agent

SecondaryHome Agent

Reparenting Home AgentHelps resolve triangular routingProblem over long distances

X

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Emergency Backup(Hub / Spoke Network)

If primary control site becomesphysically inaccessible but can be electronically connected, asecondary site can be established.

If primary control site is physically incapacitated, there is no backup capability.

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Secondary Home Agent(Fully Meshed Network)

1

2

3

4

5

If primary control site is physically incapacitated, a second or third or forth site take over automatically.

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We Are Running with Reverse Tunneling Pros

Ensures topologically correct addresses on foreign networks

Required as requests from MR LAN hosts must pass through Proxy inside main firewall

Greatly simplifies setup and management of security associations in encryptors

Greatly simplifies multicast – HA makes for an excellent rendezvous point.

Mobile Router does NOT have to be in public address space so long as the Collocated Care-of-Address is.

Cons Uses additional bandwidth Destroys route optimization

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Internet

WB

WB

WB

WB

WB

Globalstar link usesCollocated COA

FA - CLEVELAND

HA

FA - DETROIT

Open Internet to HA

Satellite AntennaSystem

VOIP

VOIP

Encr

Encr

USCGIntranet

AmeritechDSL / with Subnet

GlobalStarNetwork

(NATing from Public to Private)

HA(Loopback has Public Address)

Public Address

MR(Loopback has Public Address)

Neah Bay(Protected LAN)

APKnetDSL / with Subnet

MR does not have to be in public address spacewhen using reverse tunneling, However, the FA or CCoA doesIn order to transition the Internet

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MobileLAN

10.x.x.x

INTERNET USCGINTRANET

10.x.x.x

FA - Detroit

FA Cleveland

HA

Encryption

PR

OX

Y

En

cryp

tio

n

802.11b link

FIR

EW

AL

LPublic Address

USCG Officer’s Club

EAST

WEST

Dock

EAST

WEST

Dock

Encrypted NetworkData Transfers

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Use and Deployments 1st Demonstrated August 23 & November

6, 2002 Used in operational setting July – Sept

2003 New York and Boston Harbor

NY had no land line Boston land line was poor – switched to satellite

Used Oct – Nov 2003 at shipyard during maintenance 802.11b at 11 Mbps

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MRPublic

MobileLAN

10.x.x.x

INTERNET

INTRANET10.x.x.x

FA – ClevelandPrivate

HAPublic

PR

OX

Y

PIX-506

802.11b link

FA - Detroit

Operational SystemHome Agent is incorporatedwith the firewall and proxy

With Acceptabl

eEncryption

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Goal – Have mobile utilizeboth Public and Privateinfrastructure.

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HA

Encryptor

Internet

PrivateLeased Line

USCGIntranet

Encryptor

Fed BldgRouter

MR

Neah Bay LAN

DocksideRouter

Umbilical Cord(Connected When

Docked)

RIPv2

Maintaining Two Networks(Routing over Layer-3 Encryptors)

ENCRYPTOR

ENCRYPTOR

Mobile Router

ForeignAgent

ICMPRouter

Discovery

Decrementing TTL in Layer-3 encryptorsdisables routing protocols.

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Globalstar/Sea Tel MCM-8 Initial market addresses maritime and

pleasure boaters. Client / Server architecture – a common

architecture Current implementation requires call to be

initiated by client (ship). Multiplexes eight channels to obtain 56 kbps

total data throughput. Full bandwidth-on-demand.

Requires use of Collocated Care-of-Address

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Satellite Coverage

Globalstar

From SaVi

INMARSAT

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Link Performance Considerations

11Mbps 128 kbps 11Mbps

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Cost of Connectivity (Examples)

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Deployment issues (mobile) Equipment Costs Service Cost Network Peculiarities

Network Address Translators Performance Enhancing Proxies Security Mechanisms

Packet Filtering Connection Mechanisms

Smart Card Authentication MAC and/or Static Key (manual login is unacceptable)

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NASA’s Mobile Network Needs Space-based systems Aeronautics (in partnership with

FAA) Weather Dissemination Air Traffic Management Free Flight

Terrestrial (surface) Systems Rovers Astronauts

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Earth Observation

T1T2?

T3

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Sensor Web

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Pick “Papers and Presentations” at http://roland.grc.nasa.gov/~ivancic/

Neah Bay

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Backup Slides

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Networks in Motion (NEMO) Experiments

IPv4&

IPv6

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PublicInternet

PrivateIntranet

PROXY

ENCRYPTOR

ENCRYPTOR

Secure Mobile LAN

Mobile Router

CorrespondingPublic Node

CorrespondingPrivate Node

HomeAgent

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PublicInternet

PrivateIntranet

PROXY

ENCRYPTOR

ENCRYPTOR

Secure Mobile LAN

Mobile Router

CorrespondingPublic Node

CorrespondingPrivate Node

HomeAgent

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PublicInternet

PrivateIntranet

PROXY

ENCRYPTOR

ENCRYPTOR

Secure Mobile LAN Mobile Router

CorrespondingPublic Node

CorrespondingPrivate Node

HomeAgent

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PublicInternet

PrivateIntranet

PROXY

ENCRYPTOR

ENCRYPTOR

Secure Mobile LAN Mobile Router

CorrespondingPublic Node

CorrespondingPrivate Node

HomeAgent

xProxy blocks

Communication Initiated outside the

Firewall

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PublicInternet

PrivateIntranet

PROXY

ENCRYPTOR

ENCRYPTOR

Secure Mobile LAN Mobile Router

CorrespondingPublic Node

CorrespondingPrivate Node

HomeAgent

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ENCRYPTORENCRYPTOR

Mobile Router

ForeignAgent

Ouch!

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Layer 2 Technology

GlobalstarMCM-8

Hypergain802.11b

Flat Panel

8 dBiDipole

L3-Comm15 dBic

Tracking Antenna

Sea Tel Tracking Antenna

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MobileLAN

10.x.x.x

INTERNET USCGINTRANET

10.x.x.x

FA - Detroit

FA – Cleveland

HA

Encryption

PR

OX

Y

En

cryp

tio

n

802.11b link

FIR

EW

AL

LPublic Address

MRTunnel

Endpoint(Public Space)

HATunnel Endpoint(Public Space)

MR does not have to be in public address spacewhen using reverse tunneling, However, the FA or CCoA do.

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MobileLAN

10.x.x.x

INTERNET USCGINTRANET

10.x.x.x

FA - Detroit

FA Cleveland

HA

Encryption

PR

OX

Y

En

cryp

tio

n

802.11b link

FIR

EW

AL

LPublic Address

USCG Officer’s Club

EAST

WEST

Dock

EAST

WEST

Dock

Open NetworkData Transfers

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MobileLAN

10.x.x.x

En

cryp

tio

n

EAST

WEST

Dock

RF Bandwidth

1.0 Mbps (manually set)

1.0 Mbps (manually set)

11.0 Mbps (auto-negotiated and shared with Officer’s Club)

7 Kbps to 56 Kbps in 7 Kbps chunks (1 to 2.5 seconds delay)

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Wireless Only? Wireless can be jammed (intentionally

or unintentionally) Particularly unlicensed spectrum such as

802.11 Satellites is a bit harder Solution is to find interferer and make

them stop. You may still want land line connections

Mobile Routing can be used over land lines.