WHO MAY ISSUE A SEARCH WARRANT?

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, vs.HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.

Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

 

SARMIENTO, J.:

This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.

The facts are as follows:

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1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:

04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito atnagbibigay ng salaysay.

S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. — Horty Salazar — 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.

05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?

S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.

06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?

S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ayhindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card ko.

2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:

YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.

4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:

HORTY SALAZARNo. 615 R.O. Santos St.Mandaluyong, Metro Manila

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have —

(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.

Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.

5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce

any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:

Gentlemen:

On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following:

1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.

2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."

3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.

Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to protect our client's interests.

We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.

7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1

On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are alreadyfait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.

The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution.

Under the new Constitution, which states:

. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2

it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared that mayors may not exercise this power:

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But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered  functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4

Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:

We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that

extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5

Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers:

(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment. 6

On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:

(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 7

On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:

(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so.8

The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.

The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments.

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an

undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11

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The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).

The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12

The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have —

(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. 13

We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void, thus:

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Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/ recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and

3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,

1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;

3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;

4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and

5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode

would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security. 14

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and managed by GEMMA DEMORAL-SAVAGE, petitioners, vs. JUDGE APRONIANO B. TAYPIN, Presiding Judge, RTC-BR. 12, Cebu City, CEBU PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Region VII, Cebu City, JUANITA NG MENDOZA, MENDCO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ALFREDO SABJON and DANTE SOSMEÑA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.: Supremeä

Petitioners KENNETH ROY SAVAGE and K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and managed by GEMMA DEMORAL-SAVAGE, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure of certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu. Their motion to quash the search warrant was denied by respondent Judge as well as their motion to reconsider the denial. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

The antecedent facts: Acting on a complaint lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, president and general manager of Mendco Development Corporation (MENDCO),[1] Supervising Agent Jose Ermie Monsanto of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed an application for search warrant with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.[2] The application sought the authorization to search the premises of K Angelin Export International located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, and to seize the pieces of wrought iron furniture found therein which were allegedly the object of unfair competition involving design patents, punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. The assailed Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 was issued by respondent Judge on 16 October 1997 and executed in the afternoon of the following day by NBI agents.[3] Seized from the factory were several pieces of furniture, indicated in

the Inventory Sheet attached to the Return of Search Warrant, and all items seized have remained in NBI custody up to the present.[4]

On 30 October 1997 petitioners moved to quash the search warrant alleging that: (a) the crime they were accused of did not exist; (b) the issuance of the warrant was not based on probable cause; (c) the judge failed to ask the witnesses searching questions; and, (d) the warrant did not particularly describe the things to be seized.[5]

On 10 November 1997 petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash where they additionally alleged that the assailed warrant was applied for without a certification against forum shopping.[6] On 30 January 1998 respondent Judge denied the Motion to Quash and the Supplemental Motion to Quash.[7] On 2 March 1998 petitioners moved to reconsider the denial of their motion to quash and alleged substantially the same grounds found in their original Motion to Quash but adding thereto two (2) new grounds, namely: (a) respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter; and, (b) respondent court failed to "substantiate" the order sought to be reconsidered.[8] The denial of their last motion[9] prompted petitioners to come to this Court. Courtä

The principal issues that must be addressed in this petition are: (a) questions involving jurisdiction over the offense; (b) the need for a certification of non-forum shopping; and, (c) the existence of the crime.

Petitioners claim that respondent trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense since it was not designated as a special court for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), citing in support thereof Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 113-95 designating certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts in Cities as Special Courts for IPR. The courts enumerated therein are mandated to try and decide violations of IPR including Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The sala of Judge Benigno G. Gaviola of the RTC-Br. 9, Cebu City, was designated Special Court for IPR for the 7th Judicial Region.[10] Subsequently Supreme Court Administrative Order No.104-96 was issued providing that jurisdiction over all violations of IPR was thereafter confined to the Regional Trial Courts.[11]

The authority to issue search warrants was not among those mentioned in the administrative orders. But the Court has consistently ruled that a search warrant is merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may entertain pursuant to its original jurisdiction.[12] The authority to issue search warrants is inherent in all courts and may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction.[13] In the instant case, the premises searched located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, are well within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent court.[14]

Petitioners apparently misconstrued the import of the designation of Special Courts for IPR. Administrative Order No. 113-95 merely specified which court could "try and decide" cases involving violations of IPR. It did not, and could not, vest exclusive jurisdiction with regard to all matters (including the issuance of search warrants and other judicial processes) in any one court. Jurisdiction is conferred upon courts by substantive law; in this case, BP Blg.129, and not by a procedural rule, much less by an administrative order.[15] The power to issue search warrants for violations of IPR has not been exclusively vested in the courts enumerated in Supreme Court Administrative Order No.113-95. Jä lexj

Petitioners next allege that the application for a search warrant should have been dismissed outright since it was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping, citing as authority therefor Washington Distillers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[16]  In that case, we sustained the quashal of the search warrant because the applicant had been guilty of forum shopping as private respondent sought a search warrant from the Manila Regional Trial Court only after he was denied by the courts of Pampanga. The instant case differs significantly, for here there is no allegation of forum-shopping, only failure to acquire a certification against forum-shopping. The Rules of Court as amended requires such certification only from initiatory pleadings, omitting any mention of "applications."[17] In contrast, Supreme Court Circular 04-94, the old rule on the matter, required such certification even from "applications." Our ruling in Washington Distillers required no such certification from applications for search warrants. Hence, the absence of such certification will not result in the dismissal of an application for search warrant.

The last question to be resolved is whether unfair competition involving design patents punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code exists in this case. Prosecutor Ivan Herrero seems to agree as he filed the corresponding Information against petitioners on 17 March 1998.[18] However, since the IPR Code  took effect on 1 January 1998 any discussion contrary to the view herein expressed would be pointless. The repealing clause of the Code provides -

All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more particularly, Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby repealed (italics ours).[19]

The issue involving the existence of "unfair competition" as a felony involving design patents, referred to in Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code, has been rendered moot and academic by the repeal of the article.

The search warrant cannot even be issued by virtue of a possible violation of the IPR Code. The assailed acts specifically alleged were the manufacture and fabrication of wrought iron furniture similar to that patented by MENDCO, without securing any license or patent for the same, for the purpose of deceiving or defrauding Mendco and the buying public.[20] The Code defines "unfair competition" thus - LexjÓ uris

168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.

168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:

(a) Any person who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance which would

be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;

(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the services of another who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or

(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit goods, businesses or services of another.[21]

There is evidently no mention of any crime of "unfair competition" involving design patents in the controlling provisions on Unfair Competition. It is therefore unclear whether the crime exists at all, for the enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment of Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code.  In the face of this ambiguity, we must strictly construe the statute against the State and liberally in favor of the accused,[22] for penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication or any equitable consideration.[23] Respondents invoke jurisprudence to support their contention that "unfair competition" exists in this case.[24] However, we are prevented from applying these principles, along with the new provisions on Unfair Competition found in the IPR Code,  to the alleged acts of the petitioners, for such acts constitute patent infringement as defined by the same Code-JuriÓ smis

Sec. 76. Civil Action for Infringement. - 76.1. The making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing a patented product or a product obtained directly or indirectly from a patented process, or the use of a patented process without authorization of the patentee constitutes patent infringement.[25]

Although this case traces its origins to the year 1997 or before the enactment of the IPR Code, we are constrained to invoke the provisions of the Code. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall be applied retrospectively, if such application would be beneficial to the accused.[26] Since the IPR Code effectively obliterates the possibility of any criminal liability attaching to the acts alleged, then that Code must be applied here.

In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense  to be determined personally by the judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.[27] Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is therefore defective on its face. The nullity of the warrant renders moot and academic the other issues raised in petitioners' Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration. Since the assailed search warrant is null and void, all property seized by virtue thereof should be returned to petitioners in accordance with established jurisprudence.[28]

In petitioners' Reply with Additional Information  they allege that the trial court denied their motion to transfer their case to a Special Court for IPR. We have gone through the records and we fail to find any trace of such motion or even a copy of the order denying it. All that appears in the records is a copy of an order granting a similar motion filed by a certain Minnie Dayon with regard to Search Warrant No. 639-10-1697-12.[29] This attachment being immaterial we shall give it no further attention. Jjjä uris

WHEREFORE, the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12, Cebu City, dated 30 January 1998, denying the Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 dated 30 October 1997 and the Supplemental Motion to Quash dated 10 November 1997 filed by petitioners, as well as the Order dated 8 April 1998 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration dated 2 March 1998, is SET ASIDE. Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 issued on 16 October 1997 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and respondents are ordered to return to petitioners the property seized by virtue of the illegal search warrant.

SO ORDERED.

SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT, INC., Petitioner, vs.SUPERGREEN, INCORPORATED, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated June 30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67612 and the Resolution2 dated January 16, 2004, denying reconsideration. The Court of Appeals had denied the petition for certiorari assailing the trial court’s quashal of the search warrant.

The case stemmed from the complaint filed with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) by petitioner Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc., against respondent Supergreen, Incorporated. The NBI found that respondent engaged in the reproduction and distribution of counterfeit "PlayStation" game software, consoles and accessories in violation of Sony Computer’s intellectual property rights. Thus, NBI applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 1 for warrants to search respondent’s premises in Parañaque City and Cavite. On April 24, 2001, the RTC of Manila issued Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 covering respondent’s premises at Trece-Tanza Road, Purok 7, Barangay de Ocampo, Trece Martires City, Cavite, and Search Warrants Nos. 01-1989 to 01-1991 covering respondent’s premises at Room 302, 3rd Floor Chateau de Baie Condominium, 149 Roxas Boulevard corner Airport Road, Parañaque City. The NBI simultaneously served the search warrants on the subject premises and seized a replicating machine and several units of counterfeit "PlayStation" consoles, joy pads, housing, labels and game software.

On June 11, 2001, respondent filed a motion to quash Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 and/or release of seized properties on the ground that the search warrant failed to particularly describe the properties to be seized. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit.

On August 4, 2001, respondent filed another motion to quash, this time, questioning the propriety of the venue. Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that it violated the omnibus motion rule wherein all objections not included shall be deemed waived. In an Order3 dated October 5, 2001, the trial court affirmed the validity of Search Warrants Nos. 01-1989 to 01-1991 covering respondent’s premises in Parañaque City, but quashed Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 covering respondent’s premises in Cavite. The trial court held that lack of jurisdiction is an exception to the omnibus motion rule and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The dispositive portion of the order read,

Accordingly, Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986, 01-1987 and 01-1988 are hereby ordered quashed and set aside.

The National Bureau of Investigation and/or any other person in actual custody of the goods seized pursuant thereto are hereby directed to return the same to the respondents.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition for certiorari. The appellate court ruled that under Section 2,5 Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the RTC of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue a search warrant enforceable in Cavite, and that lack of jurisdiction was not deemed waived. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. The Court of Appeals disposed, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby denied and accordingly DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner now comes before us raising the following issues:

I

WHETHER OR NOT VENUE IN SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATIONS INVOLVES TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE CORRECTNESS OF VENUE IN AN APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT IS DEEMED WAIVED IF NOT RAISED BY THE RESPONDENT IN ITS MOTION TO QUASH.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE OFFENSES INVOLVED IN THE SUBJECT SEARCH WARRANTS ARE "CONTINUING CRIMES" WHICH MAY BE VALIDLY TRIED IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION WHERE THE OFFENSE WAS PARTLY COMMITTED.7

In sum, we are asked to resolve whether the quashal of Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 was valid.

Citing Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,8 where this Court clarified that a search warrant application is only a special criminal process and not a criminal action, petitioner contends that the rule on venue for search warrant application is not jurisdictional. Hence, failure to raise the objection waived it. Moreover, petitioner maintains that applying for search warrants in different courts increases the possibility of leakage and contradictory outcomes that could defeat the purpose for which the warrants were issued.

Petitioner further asserts that even granting that the rules on search warrant applications are jurisdictional, the application filed either in the courts of the National Capital Region or Fourth Judicial Region is still proper because the crime was continuing and committed in both Parañaque City and Cavite.

Respondent counters that Section 2 is explicit on where applications should be filed and provided the territorial limitations on search warrants. Respondent claims that Malaloan  is no longer applicable jurisprudence with the promulgation of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Even granting that petitioner has compelling reasons, respondent maintains that petitioner cannot file the application with the RTC of Manila because Cavite belongs to another judicial region. Respondent also argues that the doctrine on continuing crime is applicable only to the institution of a criminal action, not to search warrant applications which is governed by Rule 126, and in this case Section 2.

To start, we cautioned that our pronouncement in Malaloan should be read into the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 19809 conferring on the regional trial courts and their judges a territorial jurisdiction, regional in scope. Both the main decision and the dissent in Malaloan recognized this.

Now, in the present case, respondent’s premises in Cavite, within the Fourth Judicial Region, is definitely beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Manila, in the National Capital Region. Thus, the RTC of Manila does not have the authority to issue a search warrant for offenses committed in Cavite. Hence, petitioner’s reliance inMalaloan is misplaced. Malaloan  involved a court in the same judicial region where the crime was committed. The instant case involves a court in another region. Any other interpretation re-defining territorial jurisdiction would amount to judicial legislation.10

Nonetheless, we agree with petitioner that this case involves a transitory or continuing offense of unfair competition under Section 168 of Republic Act No. 8293,11 which provides,

SEC. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies. – …

168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.

168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:

(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the

wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;

(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the services of another who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or

(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another.

Pertinent too is Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code that enumerates the elements of unfair competition, to wit:

(a) That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of another manufacturer or dealer;

(b) That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in the (2) wrapping of their packages, or in the (3) device or words therein, or in (4) any other feature of their appearance;

(c) That the offender offers to sell or sells those goods or gives other persons a chance or opportunity to do the same with a like purpose; and

(d) That there is actual intent to deceive the public or defraud a competitor.12

Respondent’s imitation of the general appearance of petitioner’s goods was done allegedly in Cavite. It sold the goods allegedly in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila. The alleged acts would constitute a transitory or continuing offense. Thus, clearly, under Section 2 (b) of Rule 126, Section 168 of Rep. Act No. 8293 and Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner may apply for a search warrant in any court where any element of the alleged offense was committed, including any of the courts within the National Capital Region (Metro Manila).13

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated January 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67612 are SET ASIDE. The Order dated October 5, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, is PARTLY MODIFIED. Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 are hereby declared valid.

SO ORDERED.

REQUIREMENTS FOR SEARCH WARRANTS TO ISSUE

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs.HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in

due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusively  to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does notextend to the personal defendants but

embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution13 provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specificoffense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed wereabstract. As a consequence, it was impossible  for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not

difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered,"16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to

compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible  for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof,

has Been Advanced, not  in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:

1. All  the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;

2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were consequently illegal;

3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;

4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made

are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made permanent; and

5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains  from expresslydeclaring as null and void the such warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All  the search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.

Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim  from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.

The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn

application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."

An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.

Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:

Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies upon when heplaces himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers inGouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.

In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:

The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).

Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree

he is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."

Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First — he had a sufficient interest in the property seized, and second — he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:

Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villanoconsidered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.

In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding that

Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person gives "standing."

The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return ofall the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that

It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)

Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)

If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell  is strikingly similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell,  the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.

Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners all personal andprivate papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.

If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things arepersonal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.

And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

PROBABLE CAUSE

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVARISTO M. NARVAEZ JR., RICARDO G. SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A. DORMENDO, REYDANDE D. AZUCENA, NICEFORO V. AVILA, FLORENTINO M. MULA, FELIX O. BAITO, HAROLD B. CELESTIAL, ELMEDENCIO C. CALIXTRO, CARLITO S. LEGACION, ALBINO T. LUBANG, JEREMIAS I. ABAD and HERMINIO V. VILLAMIL, petitioners, vs. JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III; and the SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT OF THE PNP TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be followed strictly.  Where the judge fails to personally examine the applicant for a search warrant and the latter’s witnesses, or where the witnesses testify on matters not of their own personal knowledge, the search warrant must be struck down.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[1] praying for (1) the nullification of Search Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995, issued

by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City;[2] and (2) the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him to desist from proceeding with IS No. 95-167.

In its October 23, 1995 Resolution,[3] this Court issued the TRO prayed for and required the respondents to comment on the said Petition.  On December 20, 1995, Respondent PNP Traffic Management Command filed its 31-page Opposition[4] to the Petition, together with 90 pages of annexes.[5] On February 22, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment[6] agreeing with petitioners that the writs prayed for must be granted.  After petitioners filed a Reply to the Opposition, the Court gave due course to the Petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

In view of the contrary opinion of the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court, in its February 5, 1997 Resolution,[7] required State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera to prepare the memorandum for the public respondents.  After issuing a show-cause order to Dacera on June 23, 1997,[8] the Court in its September 24, 1997 Resolution gave him a non-extendible period ending on October 31, 1997 within which to file the required memorandum.  In view of Dacera’s manifestation that he was only a nominal party and that he had yet to receive the records of the case from the PNP, the Court, in its December 8, 1999 Resolution, ordered the Special Operations Unit (SOU) of the PNP Traffic Management Command to file its memorandum within thirty days from notice; “otherwise, the petition will be deemed submitted for decision.” [9] Even after the expiration of the said period, the required pleading was not yet received by this Court.

Hence, this Court considered Respondent SOU’s refusal/failure to submit its memorandum as a waiver of its privilege to do so.

The Facts

On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the said RTC of Quezon City, stating:[10]

“1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G[.] Santiago, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which xxx are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises herein described.

“2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties:

'Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal.40mm, ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal.38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and ten (10) handgrenades.'

Attached to the application[11] were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito,[12] as well as a summary of the information and the supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.

After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant,[13] the pertinent portion of which reads:

“It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath, SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, that there is probable cause to believe that the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G. Santiago, has in its possession or control the following:

Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56Ten (10) M14 US riflesTwo (2) AK-47 rifle[s]Two (2) UZI submachinegun[s]Two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm.Ten (10) cal 45 pistol[s]Ten (10) cal 38 revolver[s]Two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s]Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearmsTen (10) handgrenades

in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives), and the same should be seized and brought before this Court.

“NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby authorized to make an immediate search daytime between 8:00 a.m. [and] 4:00 p.m. of the aforementioned premises and to seize and bring the articles above-described and make an immediate return there[of]”[14]

On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized the following:[15]

               MAKE/TYPE  CALIBER                         SERIAL NUMBER                                                             BRAND

01             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP 175636                                Elisco02             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP 175636 (Tampered)             Elisco03             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP 171702                                Elisco04             M16 Rifle         5.56                  Defaced                                   Elisco05             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP174253 (Tampered)              Elisco06             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP173627 (Tampered)              Elisco07             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP171337                                 Elisco08             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP171114                                 Elisco09             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP171114 (Tampered)              Elisco10             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP171167 (Tampered)              Elisco11             M16 Rifle         5.56                  170881 (Tampered)                   Elisco12             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP170897                                 Elisco13             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP171509                                 Elisco                                                                                      (With pending                                                                                      case-Casaway Case)14             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP 171754                                Elisco15             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP170881 (Tampered)              Elisco16             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP174637                                 Elisco

17             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP171366                                 Elisco18             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP174637 (Tampered)              Elisco19             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP174610                                 Elisco20             M16 Rifle         5.56                  RP171367 (Tampered)              Elisco

01             M14Rifle          7.62                  1499694                                                Elisco02             M14Rifle          7.62                  889163                                      Elisco

01             BAR             Cal. 30                 865975                                      Royal01             Carbine M1   Cal. 30                 384181                                      US Carbin02             Carbine M1   Cal. 30                 998201                                      US Carbin01             Garand M1    Cal. 30                 1194008                                                Springfield02             Garand M1    Cal. 30                 3123784                                                Springfield01             Shotgun                     12 Gauge             H359704                                   Omega02             Shotgun         12 Gauge             9211                                         Homemade                                                                                                                                                      (Paltik)

      MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY                    QTY.

01             M16 (long)                    29 pcs.02             M16 (short)                   48 pcs.03             Carbine M1                   171 pcs.04             BAR                              19 pcs.

      LIVE AMMUNITION                                  QTY.

01             M16                             2,023 rounds03             Carbine M1                     276 rounds04             M-60 Cal. 7.62              1,800 rounds05             M1 Garand                   1,278 rounds06             Rifle Grenade                    11 rounds07             Hand Grenade                     4 pcs.

AMMO DAM POST NO. 24

      MAKE/TYPE                               CALIBER                 SERIAL NUMBER             BRAND

01.  M16 Rifle                    5.56                  171425 (Tampered)       Gyno Corp.02.  Machine Pistol               .22                  651 (Tampered)                        Landmann

      MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY                 QTY.

01.  M16 (short)                             3 pcs.02.  M16 (long)                              1 pc.03.  M14                                        8 pcs.04.  Clip M1 Garand                       3 pcs.05.  Mag Assy. Cal .22                   1 pc.

      LIVE AMMUNITION                                 QTY.

01.  M16                                        73 rounds02.  M14                                        160 rounds03.  M1 Garand Cal .30                    30 rounds04.  Rifle Grenade                              1 round

MANAGEMENT INTEL/INVEST UNIT

      MAKE/TYPE       CALIBER                   SERIAL NUMBER         BRAND

01.  M16 Rifle        5.56                  RP 171725                    Elisco02.  M16 Rifle        5.56                  RP 170799 (Tampered) Elisco03.  M16 Rifle        5.56                  RP 132320                    Elisco04.  Machine          9 MM               54887                           Intratec        Pistol05.  Three (3)        12 Gauge                                              Surit-Surit (H)        Shotguns

      MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY                                         QTY.

01.  M16 (long)                                          3 pcs.02.  M16 (short)                                         4 pcs.03.  Intratec                                               1 pc.04.  US Carbine (defective)                        2 pcs.

      LIVE AMMUNITION                                                        QTY.

01.  M16                                                   147 rds.02.  Cal. 30                                                  5 rounds03.  12 gauge Shotgun                                  7 rounds04.  Carbine                                                 5 rounds05.  Rifle grenade (AVA-0051-84/0056-84)   2 rounds06.  9MM                                                  30 rounds

NEW ARMORY POST NO. 16

      MAKE/TYPE                               CALIBER                 SERIAL NUMBER             BRAND

01.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          A359910                       Armscor02.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          A359716                       Armscor03.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          A359706                       Armscor04.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          A359707                       Armscor05.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          1036847                        Armscor06.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          A359702                       Armscor07.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          A359732                       Armscor08.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          A359728                       Armscor09.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          A359708                       Armscor10.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          A359711                       Armscor11.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          A359723                       Armscor

12.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          A359713                       Armscor13.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          1031271                        Armscor14.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          A262338                           SB15.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          A261619                           SB16.  Shotgun                       12 Gauge          Defaced                       Not Indicated

      LIVE AMMUNITION                             QTY.

01.  12 GAUGE shotgun                 306 rds.02.  M16                                      2,349 rds.

      MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY                                         QTY.

01.  Carbine (defective)                              76 pcs.02.  Cal. 22     -do-                                     16 pcs.03.  M16 (long-defective)                            2 pcs.04.  M16 (short-defective)                            2 pcs.05.  Thompson (defective)                            8 pcs.06.  Shotgun 12 Gauge (defective)               17 pcs.07.  BAR (defective)                                    2 pcs.

Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a “Motion to Quash”[16] before the trial court.  Subsequently, they also filed a “Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash” and a “Motion to Suppress Evidence.”[17]

On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners’ motions.[18] On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order [19] denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.[20]

Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law.

Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following grounds in support of their cause:[21]

 “I

Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No. 799(95).  Probable cause [has] not xxx been sufficiently established and partaking as it does of the nature of a general warrant.

“II

Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No. 799(95) on the ground that it was unlawfully served or implemented.

“III

Petitioners respectfully submit that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting with grave abuse of discretion or exceeding his jurisdiction in continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-167 on the basis of illegally seized evidence.”

In the main, petitioners question the validity of the search warrant.  As a preliminary matter, we shall also discuss respondents’ argument that the Petition should be dismissed for raising factual questions.

This Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Preliminary Issue:

Alleged Factual Questions

In their Opposition, respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact, which are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.  They maintain that the Petition merely assails the “factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and the regularity of its implementation.”[22]

This argument is not convincing.  It is settled that “there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts.” [23] In the present case, petitioners do not question the truth of the facts as found by the judge; rather, they are assailing the way in which those findings were arrived at, a procedure which they contend was violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.  We agree that the Petition raises only questions of law, which may be resolved  in the present case.

Main Issue:

Validity of the Search Warrant

The fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the basic conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”   (Emphasis  supplied)

Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,[24] detail the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant as follows:

“SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. -- A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.”

“SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.”

More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are:  (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.[25] In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity.

No Personal Examination of the Witnesses

In his Order dated March 23, 1995, the trial judge insisted that the search warrant was valid, stating that “before issuing the subject warrant, the court propounded searching questions to the applicant and the witnesses in order to determine whether there was probable cause x x x.”[26] (Emphasis supplied.)  This was supported by the Opposition to the Motion to Quash, which argued that “it is erroneous for PICOP to allege that the Honorable Court did not propound searching questions upon applicant P/Chief Inspector Napoleon Pascua and the witnesses he produced.”[27] The records, however, proclaim otherwise.

As earlier stated, Chief Inspector Pascua’s application for a search warrant was supported by (1) the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, (2) a summary of information and (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.  Except for Pascua and Bacolod, however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial court.  Moreover, the applicant’s participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod:[28]

“COURT:

          Where is the witness for this application for search warrant?

P/Chief Insp. NAPOLEON PASCUA:

          SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, Your Honor.

COURT:

          Swear the witness.

STENOGRAPHER: (To the witness)

          Please raise your right hand, sir.  Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth before this Court?

WITNESS:

          Yes Ma’am.

STENOGRAPHER:

          Please state your name, age, civil status, occupation, address and other personal circumstances.

WITNESS:

          SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, 42 years old, married, policeman, c/o Camp Crame, Quezon City, SOU, TMC.

x x x                                         x x x                                  x x x”

Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing more.  In fact, he failed even to affirm his application.  Contrary to his statement, the trial judge failed to propound questions, let alone probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod (whose testimony, as will later be shown, is also improper).  Obviously, His Honor relied mainly on their affidavits.  This Court has frowned on this practice in this language:

“Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.  The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record.  Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

x x x                                         x x x                                  x x x

“It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established.  The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.”[29]

Bacolod’s Testimony Pertained Not to Facts Personally Known to Him

Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge.  But his testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation of PD 1866, were not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives.  In his Deposition, he stated:

“Q   How do you know that said properties were subject of the offense?

A     Sir, as a result of our intensified surveillance and case build up for several days, we gathered informations from reliable sources that subject properties [which] are in their possession and control [are] the herein described properties subject of the offense.  (Summary of Information dtd Oct ‘94, SS’s of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno both dtd 30 Nov ‘94 are hereto attached).”[30]

When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP security guards had no license to possess the subject firearms.  This, however, does not meet the requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief.  He declared:

“Q   This is an application for Search Warrant against Paper Industries Corporation located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur.  How come that you have knowledge that there are illegal firearms in that place?

A     At Camp Crame, Quezon City, I was dispatched by our Commander to investigate the alleged assassination plot of Congressman Amante.

Q     In the course of your investigation, what happened?

A     We found out that some of the suspects in the alleged assassination plot are employees of PICOP.

Q     Know[ing] that the suspects are employees of PICOP, what did you do?

A     We conducted the surveillance in that area inside the compound of PICOP in Tabon.

Q     What did you find xxx?

A     I found xxx several high-powered firearms.

Q     How were you able to investigate the compound of PICOP?

A     I exerted effort to enter the said compound.

Q     By what means?

A     By pretending to have some official business with the company.

Q     So, in that aspect, you were able to investigate the compound of PICOP?

A     Yes, sir.

Q     What did you f[i]nd xxxt?

A     I found xxx several high-powered firearms being kept in the compound of PICOP.

Q     Where are those located?

A     Sir, there are firearms kept inside the ammo dam.

Q     Inside the compound?

A     Located inside the compound.

Q     Then what?

A     Others, sir, were kept in the security headquarters or office.

Q     You mean to say that this Paper Industries Corporation has its own security guards?

A     Yes, they call it Blue Guards.

Q     You mean to say that their own security guards guarded the PICOP?

A     Yes, sir.

Q     So, it is possible that the firearms used by the security guards are illegally obtained?

A     I believe they have no license to possess high-powered firearms.   As far as the verification at FEU, Camp Crame, [is concerned,] they have no license. (Emphasis supplied.)

Q     Have you investigated the Blue Guards Security Agency?

A     I conducted the inquiry.

Q     What did you find out?

A     They are using firearms owned by PICOP.

Q     Using firearms owned by PICOP?

A     Yes, sir.

Q     You mean to say that this Blue Guard Security Agency has no firearms of  their own?

A     No high-powered firearms.

Q     By the way, Mr. Witness, what kind of firearms have you seen inside the compound of PICOP?

A     There are M-16 armalite rifles.

Q     What else?

A     AK-47, armalites, M-203 Grenade Launcher, M-14 US rifles, .38 caliber revolvers, .45 caliber pistols, several handgrenades and ammos.”[31] (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound was licensed.  Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its guards were not licensed.  He also said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP.  Yet, he made no statement before the trial court that PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no license to possess those firearms.  Worse, the applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy of the aforementioned “no license” certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP, or to present it during the hearing.  Such certification could have been easily obtained, considering that the FEO was located in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also based.  In People v. Judge Estrada,[32] the Court held:

“The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances.  The introduction of such evidence is necessary in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged – for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case – and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same.  But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of the application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge.”

Particularity of the Place to Be Searched

In view of the manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable search, the Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only to those described in the warrant.[33] Thus, this Court has held that “this constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its

constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.”[34] Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items are to be found in a particular place.[35]

In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to describe the place with particularity.  It simply authorizes a search of “the aforementioned premises,” but it did not specify such premises.  The warrant identifies only one place, and that is the “Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur.”  The PICOP compound, however, is made up of “200 offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares.”[36] Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound.[37]

In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with the constitutional requirement, because they submitted sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied for the warrant.  They add that not one of the PICOP Compound housing units was searched, because they were not among those identified during the hearing.[38]

These arguments are not convincing.  The sketches allegedly submitted by the police were not made integral parts of the search warrant issued by Judge Asuncion.  Moreover, the fact that the raiding police team knew which of the buildings or structures in the PICOP Compound housed firearms and ammunitions did not justify the lack of particulars of the place to be searched.[39] Otherwise, confusion would arise regarding the subject of the warrant – the place indicated in the warrant or the place identified by the police.  Such conflict invites uncalled for mischief or abuse of discretion on the part of law enforcers.

Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals,[40] this Court ruled that the police had no authority to search the apartment behind the store, which was the place indicated in the warrant, even if they really intended  it to be the subject of their application.  Indeed, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.:

“x x x.  In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant.  The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind.  This should not have been done.  It [was] neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched – although not that specified in the warrant – [was] exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence.  What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers’ theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.

“The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers’ own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires

inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized.  It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant.  It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them.  The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.”  (Emphasis supplied.)

Seized Firearms and Explosives Inadmissible in Evidence

As a result of the seizure of the firearms, effected pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95) issued by the respondent judge, the PNP filed with the Department of Justice a complaint docketed as IS No. 95-167 against herein petitioners for illegal possession of firearms.  State Prosecutor Dacera, to whom the Complaint was assigned for preliminary investigation, issued a subpoena requiring petitioners to file their counter-affidavits.

Instead of complying with the subpoena, petitioners asked for the suspension of the preliminary investigation, pending the resolution of their motion to quash the search warrant.  They argued, as they do now, that the illegally obtained firearms could not be the basis of the criminal Complaint.  Their motion was denied.  A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration met the same fate.  In the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners assert that “State Prosecutor Dacera cannot have any tenable basis for continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-167.”[41]

Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were “inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”[42] As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable  searches  and  seizures.”[43] Verily, they are the “fruits of the poisonous tree.”  Without this exclusionary rule, the constitutional right “would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence xxx.”[44]

In the present case, the complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on the firearms and other materials seized pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95). Since these illegally obtained pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the Complaint and the proceedings before State Prosecutor Dacera have no more leg to stand on.

This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to maintain peace and order in the country;  however, it reminds the law enforcement authorities that they must do so only upon strict observance of the constitutional and statutory rights of our people.  Indeed, “there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason.”[45]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and Search Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly declared NULL andVOID.  The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT.  No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 83, QUEZON CITY; and AIDEN LANUZA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MARTINEZ, J.:

The People of the Philippines, through this petition for review, seeks the reversal of the order of respondent Judge Estrella T. Estrada, dated December 7, 1995, which granted private respondent Aiden Lanuza’s motion to quash Search Warrant No. 958 (95), as well as the order dated April 1, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the earlier order.

On June 27, 1995, Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, an application for the issuance of a search warrant against “Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City,” for violation of Article 40 (k) of Republic Act 7394 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines).

In her application for search warrant, Atty. Cabanlas alleged, among others, as follows:

“1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of LICD, I received reports from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence Command of the PNP that certain –

1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City sold to said Officer Cabiles various drug products amounting to Seven Thousand Two Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (P 7,232.00) on May 29, 1995;

1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City has no license to operate, distribute, sell or transfer drug products from the BFAD;

1.c. Distribution, sale or offer for sale or transfer of drug products without license to operate from BFAD is in violation of Art. 40 (k) of RA 7394 (or ‘the Consumer Act’).

“2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report and the various drug products sold and purchased contained in a (sic) plastic bags marked ‘Lanuza Bag 1 of 1’ and ‘Lanuza Bag 2 of 2’ were enclosed; and the same are likewise submitted herewith. 

xxx                   xxx                     xxx.” [1] (Emphasis supplied)

The application, however, ended with the statement that the warrant is to search the premises of another person at a different address:

“3. This is executed to support affiant’s application for a search warrant on the premises of Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay Cebu.”[2] (Emphasis supplied)

In support of the application, the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles, a member of the Regional Intelligence Group IV of the PNP Intelligence Command, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, was attached thereto, wherein he declared that:

“1. Upon the request for assistance by BFAD, he conducted surveillance for persons distributing, selling or transferring drug products without license to operate from BFAD.

“2. On May 29, 1995, a certain Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City sold to him various drug products amounting to P7,232.00 and

“3. Upon further verification in the BFAD registry of licensed persons or premises, the said person and place have in fact no license to operate.

“4. Earlier than May 29, 1995, affiant saw a delivery of drug products from the residence of Mrs. Lanuza in 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City to another person.

“5. Accompanying this affidavit are the various products sold to/and purchased by the affiant contained in two (2) plastic bags marked ‘Lanuza Bag 1 of 1’ and ‘Lanuza Bag 2 of 2.’

“This is executed in support of the affiant’s report to BFAD and for whatever legitimate purpose this may serve.” [3] (Emphasis supplied)

The BFAD also submitted with the application a copy of the sketch[4] of the location of Aiden Lanuza’s residence at her stated address.

On the same day the application was filed, the respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 958 (95), which reads in full:

“REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESREGIONAL TRIAL COURT

NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGIONBRANCH 83 – QUEZON CITY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,

- versus -                                              SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)

AIDEN LANUZA,

                                  Defendant.

X---------------------------X

SEARCH   WARRANT

“It appears to the satisfaction of this Court, after examining under oath Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) and her witness, Manuel P. Cabiles, member of the Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence Command, PNP, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of Article 40(k) in relation to Article 41 of Republic Act No. 7394 (Consumer Act) has been committed or about to be committed and there are good and

sufficient reasons to believe that Ms. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose dela Montana Street, Cebu City has in her possession and control at said address the following described properties:

medicines and drugs of undetermined quantity among which are Bricanyl Tablet, Bisolvon Tablet, Buscopan Tablet, Buscopan Ampoule, Mucosolvan Ampoule, Persantin Tablet, Tegretol Tablet, PZA-Ciba Tablet, Voltaren Tablet, Zantac Ampoule, Ventolin Tablet, Ventolin Inhaler, Dermovate Cream, Fortum Vial, Zinacef Vial, Feldene 1M Ampoule, Norvasoc Tablet, Bactrim Forte Tablet, Rochephin Vial, Tilcotil Tablet, Librax Tablet, Methergin Tablet and Tagamet Tablet

which she is selling, distributing and transferring without the necessary license from the Department of Health.

“You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the DAY or NIGHT of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the undetermined amount of drugs and medicines subject of the offense and to bring the same to this Court to be dealt with as the law directs.

“You are further directed to submit a return of this Search Warrant within ten (10) days from today.

“This Search Warrant is valid within a period of ten (10) days from the date of issue.

“GIVEN UNDER THE HAND AND SEAL of this Court this 27th day of June 1995 at Quezon City.

(Sgd.)ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA Second Vice Executive Judge”[5]

(Emphasis supplied)

On June 28, 1995, the search warrant was served at private respondent Lanuza’s residence at the indicated address by a composite team of policemen from the PNP 7th Criminal Investigation Command, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City.

How the search warrant was implemented was briefly narrated in the Joint Affidavit, [6] dated June 29, 1995, of SPO2 Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Marckbilly Capalungan, both members of the search and seizure team.  They stated in their affidavit that their team, armed with the search warrant, “conducted a raid at the premises of one AIDEN LANUZA of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City x x x;” that “the raid was witnessed by Luis Rivera, Demetrio Panimdim and Francisco Ojales, both (sic) Brgy. Tanod of Kasambagan, Cebu City;” that “the service of the (search) warrant resulted in the confiscation of fifty-two (52) cartoons (sic) of assorted medicines from the possession and control of AIDEN LANUZA;” and that the “said items were brought to the 7CICRO office for detailed inventory headed by Atty. Lorna F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal Information and Compliance Division of the BFAD, Manila.”[7] (Emphasis supplied)

The present petition, however, narrates a different account of what actually happened during the implementation of the search warrant.  Paragraph 5 of the petition states: “At the commencement of the search, the members of the team discovered that the premises described as 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City was actually a five thousand (5,000) square meter compound containing at least fifteen (15) structures which are either leased residences, offices, factories, workshops or warehouse.  The policemen proceeded to search

the residence of private respondent Lanuza at Lot No. 41 of said address.  Finding no drug products thereat, they proceeded to search a nearby warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound and address above stated.  This search yielded fifty-two (52) cartons of assorted drug products which were then inventoried in due course. x  x x.”[8] (Emphasis supplied)

In an order[9] dated July 3, 1995, the respondent Judge noted the inventory of the seized drugs and authorized the BFAD to retain custody of the same, to have samples of the drugs analyzed and be brought to the registered drug manufacturers for parallel testing.

On August 22, 1995, private respondent Aiden Lanuza filed a verified motion [10] praying that Search Warrant  No. 958 (95) be quashed and that the seized articles be declared inadmissible in any proceeding and ordered returned to the warehouse owned by Folk Arts Export & Import Company located at Lot No. 38 inside the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City.  The motion is based on the grounds that the search warrant is illegal and null and void because:  (1)  it was applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City;  (2)  it was issued for a non-existing offense;  (3)  Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas was not duly authorized by applicant BFAD to apply therefor;  (4)  it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized;  (5)  the applicant's witnesses had no personal knowledge of the facts upon which it was issued;  and (6)  its implementation was unreasonable as it was enforced on a different or wrong place which was lawfully occupied by a different or wrong person.[11]

Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas, who appeared for the BFAD, opposed [12] the motion to quash the search warrant, to which the private respondent countered with a reply.

After the contending parties had submitted their respective positions without further oral arguments, the respondent Judge issued the assailed order[13] dated December 7, 1995, quashing Search Warrant No. 958 (95).  Accordingly, the order dated July 3, 1995 was revoked and  all the articles seized were declared inadmissible in any and all proceedings against private respondent Aiden Lanuza.  Also, the BFAD was ordered to return at its expense all the seized items to the warehouse of Folk Arts Import & Export Company at Lot No. 38, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice of the said order.[14]

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the December 7, 1995 order was denied in an order[15] dated April 1, 1996, impelling petitioner to file the present petition asserting that the respondent Judge erred:

a)  In holding that the defect appearing in BFAD's application for a search warrant is so "grave" in nature as to warrant quashal of the search warrant issued thereunder, considering that such variance is actually a harmless clerical error.

b)  In holding that Atty. Cabanlas was not authorized  by the BFAD to apply for a search warrant concerning the unlicensed distribution of drugs, considering that the grant of BFAD authorization upon her to investigate fake, misbranded, adulterated or unregistered drugs necessarily contemplates the authority to investigate the unlicensed activities above noted.

c)  In holding that applicant BFAD had failed to discharge the burden of proving probable cause for issuance of a search warrant, by failing to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent had no license to sell or distribute drug products, considering that under the authority ofCarillo v. People (229 SCRA 386) the BFAD only had the burden of proving the negative

ingredient of the offense charged on the basis of the best evidence procurable under the circumstances.

d)  In holding that the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in SW No. 958 (95), considering that Aiden Lanuza's residence at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City was not so conspicuously or notoriously represented to the public as such by her as to contradict the investigating and serving officers' perception of the outward appearance of her dwelling, which led them to believe that the more general address of 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City referred to her dwelling.

e)   In ordering the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.[16]

We granted the petitioner’s application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in a resolution[17] dated June 26, 1996 and restrained the implementation of the assailed orders, effective immediately and until further orders from this Court.

Private respondent Aiden Lanuza later filed her comment [18] on the petition, but petitioner's reply thereto was not admitted by this Court in a resolution[19] dated January 13, 1997, for failure by the Solicitor General to file the same within his first extension of thirty (30) days, that  was granted, but with a warning that no further extension would be given.  Instead of filing his reply, the Solicitor General asked for two (2) more extensions of time, which were denied.

Now to the assigned errors of the respondent Judge raised by petitioner.

The requirements for the issuance of a search warrant are inscribed in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

"SEC. 2.  THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS, AND EFFECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF WHATEVER NATURE AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE, AND NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE, ANDPARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED." (Emphasis supplied)

In quashing the subject search warrant, it is the finding of the respondent Judge that the application for its issuance suffered from a “grave” defect, "which escaped (her) attention," considering that it was applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of herein private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Cebu City.[20]

We nonetheless find such error in the application for search warrant a negligible defect.

The title of the questioned application, which reads:

"PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,

                     - versus  -                             SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)

           AIDEN LANUZA,                                        For:  Violation of Article           516 San Jose de la                                                 40 (k) in relation to

           Montana Street, Mabolo,                                        Article 41 of Republic           Cebu City,                                                           Act No. 7394 (or the                                                 Defendant.                            Consumer Act).x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -x"[21] (Emphasis supplied)

and the allegations contained therein, pertinent portions of which we quote:

“1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of LICD, I received reports from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence Command of the PNP that certain –

1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City sold to said Officer Cabiles various drug products amounting to Seven Thousand Two Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (P 7,232.00) on May 29, 1995;

1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City has no license to operate, distribute, sell or transfer drug products from the BFAD;

x x x    x x x                         x x x

“2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report and the various drug products sold and purchased contained in a (sic) plastic bags marked ‘Lanuza Bag 1 of 1’ and ‘Lanuza Bag 2 of 2’ were enclosed; and the same are likewise submitted herewith.

x x x                                    x x x          x x x.” [22] (Emphasis supplied)

unmistakably reveal that the said application was specifically intended against private respondent Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.  She has been the only one identified in the application, as well as in the aforequoted affidavit of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles upon which the application was based, as having allegedly sold to said SPO4 Cabiles various drugs amounting to P7,232.00 on May 29, 1995, without any license to do so, in alleged violation of Article 40 (k) of R.A. 7394.  It is noteworthy that, as stated in the above-quoted paragraph 2 of the application, the plastic bags which contained the seized drugs and which were submitted together with the application, were marked as "Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2."  These markings with the name "Lanuza" obviously refer to no other than the herein private respondent.  And when the respondent Judge issued the search warrant, it was directed solely against private respondent Aiden Lanuza at her address: 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.

The Solicitor General explained the error in the application by saying that on the same day applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas filed the questioned application on June 27, 1995, another application for search warrant was also filed against one Belen Cabanero at her residence at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu City.  This can be deduced from the following examination conducted by respondent Judge on Atty. Cabanlas:

"(COURT)

Q.    And who is your respondent?

A.   Mrs. Aiden Lanuza and the other one is Belen Cabanero.

Q.    Where are they situated?

A.   Mrs. Lanuza is situated in No. 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.

Q.    About the other?

A.   New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu.

Q.    Do you have any specific address at New Frontier Village?

A.   It was reported by Mr. Manuel Cabiles.

Q.    Will he be testifying?

A.   Yes Ma'am.  Your Honor, this is the vicinity of the New Frontier Village, Cebu (witness presenting a sketch) (sic)

Q.    How about this San Jose de la Montana.  This is just in Cebu City?

A.   At 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City."[23]

From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the name and address of one Belen Cabanero were erroneously copied in paragraph 3 of the application in question.  Such defect, as intimated earlier, is not of such a gravity as to call for the invalidation of the search warrant.

There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant.

Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was not convinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the applicant to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs.

It must be noted that in the application for search warrant, private respondent is charged with the specific offense of selling drugs without the required license from the Department of Health, which is in violation of Article 40 (k) of R. A. 7394, and penalized under Article 41 thereof.  The said application was supported by the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles where, in paragraph 3 thereof, he declared that he made a "verification in the BFAD registry of licensed persons or premises" and discovered that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had "no license" to sell drugs.

We agree with the respondent Judge that applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas should have submitted documentary proof that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no such license.  Although no explanation was offered by respondent Judge to support her posture, we hold that to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant, the applicant must show facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched."[24]

The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances.  The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged - for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case - and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same.  But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge.  The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and personalties.  As well stated by this Court through former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Villanueva vs. Querubin:[25]

“It is deference to one’s personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one’s home but not necessarily thereto confined (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 [1966]).  What is sought to be guarded is a man’s prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence.  In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him.  There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle.  Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757, Brennam, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630).  In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court (1966), could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards (Ibid, p. 47).”  (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that effect from the Department of Health.  SPO4 Manuel could have easily procured such certification when he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed persons or entity.  No justifiable reason was introduced why such certification could not be secured.   Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a license by private respondent is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant.  The presumption of regularity cannot be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.[26] We apply by analogy our ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.:[27]

“The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films.  The petitioner’s argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious.  The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.

“The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.

“The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work.  Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former.  This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause.  Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.” (Emphasis supplied)

Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden

Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound.  The said warehouse is owned by a different person.  Again, the respondent Judge is correct on this point.

This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.[28] In the present case, it must be noted that the application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch [29]of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City.  The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square.  Within the same compound are residences of other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse.  With this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound.  But the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City.  This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement.

While the questioned search warrant had all the characteristic of a general warrant, it was correctly implemented.  For, the searching team went directly to the house of private respondent Aiden Lanuza located at Lot No. 41 inside the compound known as 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.  However, the team did not find any of the drug products which were the object of the search.  Frustrated, and apparently disappointed, the team then proceeded to search a nearby warehouse of Folk Arts Export & Import Company owned by one David Po located at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. It was in the warehouse that drug products were found and seized which were duly receipted. In the Joint Affidavit of SPO2 Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Markbilly Capalungan, members of the searching team, is a statement that the confiscated 52 cartons of assorted medicines were found in the possession and control of private respondent Aiden Lanuza. This is a blatant falsehood and is aggravated by the fact that this was committed by officers sworn to uphold the law.  In searching the warehouse of Folk Arts Export & Import Company owned by one David Po, the searching team went beyond the scope of the search warrant. As the trial court aptly observed:

“x x x.  The verified motion to quash and reply also show that the search at the house of defendant-movant yielded negative result and the confiscated articles were taken from another place which is the warehouse of Folk Arts Import and Export Company owned by another person.  In the return of the search warrant, it is stated that Search Warrant No. 958 (95) was served at the premises of 516 San Jose dela Montana St., Cebu City and that during the search, drug products were found and seized therefrom which were duly receipted.  Accompanying said return is the Joint Affidavit of two (2) members of the searching team, namely: SPO2 Froctuoso Bete and SPO2 Markbilly Capalingan, both of the 7th Criminal Investigation Command, PNP, with station at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gerardo Avenue, Cebu City which also mentioned only the address as 516 San Jose dela Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City and the confiscation of 52 cartoons(sic) of assorted medicines purportedly from the possession and control of defendant-movant.  However, as indicated in the sketch attached to the application for search warrant, said Folk Arts Import and Export Company is owned by one David Po, which is a concrete proof that the searching team exceeded their authority by conducting a search not only in the residence of defendant-movant Lanuza but also in another place which the applicant itself has identified as belonging to another person, David Po.  The

foregoing are strong reasons to support the conclusion that there has been an unreasonable search and seizure which would warrant the quashal of the search warrant.”[30]

The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the motion to quash the search warrant.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.  The Temporary Restraining Order issued in a resolution dated June 26, 1996 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

COCA-COLA VS GOMEZ

D E C I S I O N 

BRION, J.: 

Is the hoarding of a competitor’s product containers punishable as unfair competition

under the Intellectual Property Code (IP Code, Republic Act No. 8293) that would entitle the

aggrieved party to a search warrant against the hoarder?  This is the issue we grapple with in

this petition for review on certiorari involving two rival multinational softdrink giants; petitioner

Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. (Coca-Cola) accuses Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. (Pepsi),

represented by the respondents, of hoarding empty Coke bottles in bad faith to discredit its

business and to sabotage its operation in Bicolandia.

 

BACKGROUND

 

The facts, as culled from the records, are summarized below.

 

          On July 2, 2001, Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for hoarding Coke

empty bottles in Pepsi’s yard in Concepcion Grande, Naga City, an act allegedly penalized as

unfair competition under the IP Code.  Coca-Cola claimed that the bottles must be confiscated

to preclude their illegal use, destruction or concealment by the respondents.[1]  In support of the

application, Coca-Cola submitted the sworn statements of three witnesses: Naga plant

representative Arnel John Ponce said he was informed that one of their plant security guards

had gained access into the Pepsi compound and had seen empty Coke bottles; acting plant

security officer Ylano A. Regaspisaid he investigated reports that Pepsi was hoarding large

quantities of Coke bottles by requesting their security guard to enter the Pepsi plant and he was

informed by the security guard that Pepsi hoarded several Coke bottles; security guard Edwin

Lirio stated that he entered Pepsi’s yard on July 2, 2001 at 4 p.m. and saw empty Coke bottles

inside Pepsi shells or cases.[2]

 

          Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Executive Judge Julian C. Ocampo of Naga City, after taking

the joint deposition of the witnesses, issued Search Warrant No. 2001-01[3] to seize 2,500 Litro

and 3,000 eight and 12 ounces empty Coke bottles at Pepsi’s Naga yard for violation of Section

168.3 (c) of the IP Code.[4]  The local police seized and brought to the MTC’s custody 2,464

Litro and 4,036 eight and 12 ounces empty Coke bottles, 205 Pepsi shells for Litro, and 168

Pepsi shells for smaller (eight and 12 ounces) empty Coke bottles, and later filed with the Office

of the City Prosecutor of Naga a complaint against two Pepsi officers for violation of Section

168.3 (c) in relation to Section 170 of the IP Code.[5]  The named respondents, also the

respondents in this petition, were Pepsi regional sales manager Danilo E. Galicia (Galicia)and

its Naga general manager Quintin J. Gomez, Jr. (Gomez).

 

In their counter-affidavits, Galicia and Gomez claimed that the bottles came from various

Pepsi retailers and wholesalers who included them in their return to make up for shortages of

empty Pepsi bottles; they had no way of ascertaining beforehand the return of empty Coke

bottles as they simply  received what had been delivered; the presence of the bottles in their

yard was not intentional nor deliberate; Ponce and Regaspi’s statements are hearsay as they

had no personal knowledge of the alleged crime; there is no mention in the IP Code of the crime

of possession of empty bottles; and that the ambiguity of the law, which has a penal nature,

must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in their favor.  Pepsi security guards

Eduardo E. Miral and Rene Acebuche executed a joint affidavit stating that per their logbook,

Lirio did not visit or enter the plant premises in the afternoon of July 2, 2001. 

 

The respondents also filed motions for the return of their shells and to quash the search

warrant.  They contended that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search

warrant; the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and their Naga plant was in urgent need

of the shells. 

 

Coca-Cola opposed the motions as the shells were part of the evidence of the crime,

arguing that Pepsi used the shells in hoarding the bottles.  It insisted that the issuance of

warrant was based on probable cause for unfair competition under the IP Code, and that the

respondents violated R.A. 623, the law regulating the use of stamped or marked bottles, boxes,

and other similar containers. 

 

THE MTC RULINGS

 

On September 19, 2001, the MTC issued the first assailed order[6] denying the twin

motions.  It explained there was an exhaustive examination of the applicant and its witnesses

through searching questions and that the Pepsi shells are prima facie evidence that the bottles

were placed there by the respondents.

         

In their motion for reconsideration, the respondents argued for the quashal of the

warrant as the MTC did not conduct a probing and exhaustive examination; the applicant and its

witnesses had no personal knowledge of facts surrounding the hoarding; the court failed to

order the return of the “borrowed” shells; there was no crime involved; the warrant was issued

based on hearsay evidence; and the seizure of the shells was illegal because they were not

included in the warrant.

 

On November 14, 2001, the MTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the second

assailed order,[7] explaining that the issue of whether there was unfair competition can only be

resolved during trial.   

         

The respondents responded by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the

Revised Rules of Court before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City on the ground that

the subject search warrant was issued without  probable cause and that the empty shells were

neither mentioned in the warrant nor the objects of the perceived crime.

 

 

 

THE RTC RULINGS

 

On May 8, 2002, the RTC voided the warrant for lack of probable cause and the non-

commission of the crime of unfair competition, even as it implied that other laws may have been

violated by the respondents.  The RTC, though, found no grave abuse of discretion on the part

of the issuing MTC judge.[8]  Thus,

 Accordingly, as prayed for, Search Warrant No. 2001-02 issued by the

Honorable Judge Julian C. Ocampo III on July 2, 2001 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.  The Orders issued by the Pairing Judge of Br. 1, MTCC of Naga City dated September 19, 2001 and November 14, 2001 are also declared VOID and SET ASIDE.  The City Prosecutor of Naga City and SPO1 Ernesto Paredes are directed to return to the Petitioner the properties seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 2001-02.  No costs.

 

SO ORDERED.[9]

 

In a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on July 12, 2002, the

petitioner stressed that the decision of the RTC was contradictory because it absolved Judge

Ocampo of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search warrant, but at the same time

nullified the issued warrant.  The MTC should have dismissed the petition when it found out that

Judge Ocampo did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.  

    

Bypassing the Court of Appeals, the petitioner asks us through this petition for review

on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to reverse the decision of the

RTC.  Essentially, the petition raises questions against the RTC’s nullification of the warrant

when it found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the issuing judge.

 

 

 

 

 THE PETITION and

THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

  

In its petition, the petitioner insists the RTC should have dismissed the respondents’

petition for certiorari because it found no grave abuse of discretion by the MTC in issuing the

search warrant.  The petitioner further argues that the IP Code was enacted into law to remedy

various forms of unfair competition accompanying globalization as well as to replace the inutile

provision of unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.  Section 168.3(c) of

the IP Code does not limit the scope of protection on the particular acts enumerated as it

expands the meaning of unfair competition to include “other acts contrary to good faith of a

nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another.”  The inherent element

of unfair competition is fraud or deceit, and that hoarding of large quantities of a competitor’s

empty bottles is necessarily characterized by bad faith.  It claims that its Bicol bottling operation

was prejudiced by the respondents’ hoarding and destruction of its empty bottles. 

 

The petitioner also argues that the quashal of the search warrant was improper because

it complied with all the essential requisites of a valid warrant.  The empty bottles were concealed

in Pepsi shells to prevent discovery while they were systematically being destroyed to hamper

the petitioner’s bottling operation and to undermine the capability of its bottling operations in

Bicol.   

    

The respondents counter-argue that although Judge Ocampo conducted his own

examination, he gravely erred and abused his discretion when he ignored the rule on the need

of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause; satisfactory and convincing evidence is

essential to hold them guilty of unfair competition;  the hoarding of empty Coke bottles did not

cause actual or probable deception and confusion on the part of the general public; the alleged

criminal acts do not show conduct aimed at deceiving the public; there was no attempt to use

the empty bottles or pass them off as the respondents’ goods.

    

The respondents also argue that the IP Code does not criminalize bottle hoarding, as the

acts penalized must always involve fraud and deceit.  The hoarding does not make them liable

for unfair competition as there was no deception or fraud on the end-users.

 

THE ISSUE

 

Based on the parties’ positions, the basic issue submitted to us for resolution is whether

the Naga MTC was correct in issuing Search Warrant No. 2001-01 for the seizure of the empty

Coke bottles from Pepsi’s yard for probable violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. This

basic issue involves two sub-issues, namely, the substantive issue of whether the application for

search warrant effectively charged an offense, i.e., a violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP

Code; and the procedural issue of whether the MTC observed the procedures required by the

Rules of Court in the issuance of search warrants.

 

OUR RULING

 

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.

 

We clarify at the outset that while we agree with the RTC decision, our agreement is

more in the result than in the reasons that supported it.  The decision is correct in nullifying the

search warrant because it was issued on an invalid  substantive basis – the acts imputed on the

respondents do not violate  Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code.  For this reason, we deny the

present petition. 

 

The issuance of a search warrant[10] against a personal property[11] is governed by Rule

126 of the Revised Rules of Court whose relevant sections  state:Section 4.  Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant

shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

 Section 5.         Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must,

before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with the affidavits submitted.

     Section 6.           Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is

satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. [Emphasis supplied]

 

To paraphrase this rule, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause

in connection with a specific offense alleged in an application based on the personal knowledge

of the applicant and his or her witnesses. This is the substantive requirement in the issuance of

a search warrant.  Procedurally, the determination of probable cause is a personal task of the

judge before whom the application for search warrant is filed, as he has to examine under oath

or affirmation the applicant and his or her witnesses in the form of “searching questions and

answers” in writing and under oath. The warrant, if issued, must particularly describe the place

to be searched and the things to be seized. 

 

We paraphrase these requirements to stress that they have substantive and procedural

aspects.  Apparently, the RTC recognized this dual nature of the requirements and, hence,

treated them separately; it approved of the way the MTC handled the procedural aspects of the

issuance of the search warrant but found its action on the substantive aspect wanting.  It

therefore resolved to nullify the warrant, without however expressly declaring that the MTC

gravely abused its discretion when it issued the warrant applied for.  The RTC’s error, however,

is in the form rather than the substance of the decision as the nullification of the issued warrant

for the reason the RTC gave was equivalent to the declaration that grave abuse of discretion

was committed.  In fact, we so rule as the discussions below will show.  

 

Jurisprudence teaches us that probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a

search warrant, is such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a

cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just

and proper. Probable cause requires facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably

prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in

connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. [12]  Implicit in this statement is the

recognition that an underlying offense must, in the first place, exist. In other words, the acts

alleged, taken together, must constitute an offense and that these acts are imputable to an

offender in relation with whom a search warrant is applied for.  

 

In the context of the present case, the question is whether the act charged – alleged to

be hoarding of empty Coke bottles – constitutes an offense under Section 168.3 (c) of the IP

Code.  Section 168 in its entirety states: 

SECTION 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies. — 168.1. A person who has identified in the mind of the public the goods he

manufactures or deals in, his business or services from those of others, whether or not a registered mark is employed, has a property right in the goodwill of the said goods, business or services so identified, which will be protected in the same manner as other property rights. 

168.2.  Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.

 168.3.  In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of

protection against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition: (a)        Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose; 

(b)        Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the services of another who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or (c)        Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another. 

168.4.  The remedies provided by Sections 156, 157 and 161 shall apply mutatis mutandis. (Sec. 29, R.A. No. 166a)

 

The petitioner theorizes that the above section does not limit the scope of protection on

the particular acts enumerated as it expands the meaning of unfair competition to include “other

acts contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of

another.”  Allegedly, the respondents’ hoarding of Coca Cola empty bottles is one such act.

 

          We do not agree with the petitioner’s expansive interpretation of Section 168.3 (c).

 

“Unfair competition,” previously defined in Philippine jurisprudence in relation with R.A.

No. 166 and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code, is now covered by Section 168 of

the IP Code as this Code has expressly repealed R.A. No. 165 and R.A. No. 166, and Articles

188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code.

 

Articles 168.1 and 168.2, as quoted above, provide the concept and  general rule on the

definition of unfair competition.  The law does not thereby cover every unfair act committed in

the course of business; it covers only acts characterized by “deception or any other means

contrary to good faith” in the passing off of goods and services as those of another who has

established goodwill in relation with these goods or services, or any other act calculated to

produce the same result. 

 

What unfair competition is, is further particularized under Section 168.3 when it provides

specifics of what unfair competition is “without in any way limiting the scope of protection

against unfair competition.”  Part of these particulars is provided under Section 168.3(c) which

provides the general “catch-all” phrase that the petitioner cites.  Under this phrase, a person

shall be guilty of unfair competition “who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a

nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another.”

 

From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the passing off (or palming

off) or attempting to pass off upon the public the goods or business of one person as the goods

or business of another with the end and probable effect of deceiving the public.  It formulated

the “true test” of unfair competition: whether the acts of defendant are such as are calculated to

deceive the ordinary buyer making his purchases under the ordinary conditions which prevail in

the particular trade to which the controversy relates.[13]  One of the essential requisites in an

action to restrain unfair competition is proof of fraud; the intent to deceive must be shown before

the right to recover can exist.[14]  The advent of the IP Code has not significantly changed these

rulings as they are fully in accord with what Section 168 of the Code in its entirety

provides. Deception, passing off and fraud upon the public are still the key elements that must

be present for unfair competition to exist.

 

The act alleged to violate the petitioner’s rights under Section 168.3 (c) is hoarding

which we gather to be the collection of the petitioner’s empty bottles so that they can be

withdrawn from circulation and thus impede the circulation of the petitioner’s bottled

products. This, according to the petitioner, is an act contrary to good faith – a conclusion that, if

true, is indeed an unfair act on the part of the respondents.  The critical question, however,

is not the intrinsic unfairness of the act of hoarding; what is critical for purposes of Section 168.3

(c) is to determine if the hoarding, as charged, “is of a nature calculated to discredit the goods,

business or services” of the petitioner.

 

We hold that it is not.  Hoarding as defined by the petitioner is not even an act within the

contemplation of the IP Code. 

 

The petitioner’s cited basis is a provision of the IP Code, a set of rules that refer to a

very specific subject – intellectual property.  Aside from the IP Code’s actual substantive

contents (which relate specifically to patents, licensing, trademarks, trade names, service

marks, copyrights, and the protection and infringement of the intellectual properties that these

protective measures embody), the coverage and intent of the Code is expressly reflected in its

“Declaration of State Policy” which states:         

Section 2.  Declaration of State Policy. — The State recognizes that an effective intellectual and industrial property system is vital to the development of domestic and creative activity, facilitates transfer of technology, attracts foreign investments, and ensures market access for our products. It shall protect and secure the exclusive rights of scientists, inventors, artists and other gifted citizens to their intellectual property and creations, particularly when beneficial to the people, for such periods as provided in this Act. 

 The use of intellectual property bears a social function. To this end, the

State shall promote the diffusion of knowledge and information for the promotion of national development and progress and the common good.  

It is also the policy of the State to streamline administrative procedures of registering patents, trademarks and copyright, to liberalize the registration on the transfer of technology, and to enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the Philippines. (n)

 

“Intellectual property rights” have furthermore been defined under Section 4 of the Code to

consist of: a) Copyright and Related Rights; b) Trademarks and Service Marks; c)    Geographic

Indications; d) IndustrialDesigns; e) Patents; f) Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated

Circuits; and g)Protection of Undisclosed Information.

 

Given the IP Code’s specific focus, a first test that should be made when a question

arises on whether a matter is covered by the Code is to ask if it refers to an intellectual property

as defined in the Code.  If it does not, then coverage by the Code may be negated.

 

A second test, if a disputed matter does not expressly refer to an  intellectual property

right as defined above, is whether it falls under the general “unfair competition” concept and

definition under Sections 168.1 and 168.2 of the Code.  The question then is whether there is

“deception” or any other similar act in “passing off” of goods or services to be those of another

who enjoys established goodwill. 

 

Separately from these tests is the application of the principles of statutory construction

giving particular attention, not so much to the focus of the IP Code generally, but to the terms of

Section 168 in particular.  Under the principle of “noscitur a sociis,”  when a particular word or

phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct

construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is

found or with which it is associated.[15]   

 

As basis for this interpretative analysis, we note that Section 168.1 speaks of a person

who has earned goodwill with respect to his goods and services and who is entitled to protection

under the Code, with or without a registered mark.  Section 168.2, as previously discussed,

refers to the general definition of unfair competition. Section 168.3, on the other hand, refers to

the specific instances of unfair competition, with Section 168.1 referring to the sale of goods

given the appearance of the goods of another; Section 168.2, to the inducement of belief that

his or her goods or services are that of another who has earned goodwill; while the

disputed Section 168.3 being a “catch all” clause whose coverage the parties now dispute.

 

Under all the above approaches, we conclude that the “hoarding” - as defined and

charged by the petitioner – does not fall within the coverage of the IP Code and of Section 168

in particular.  It does not relate to any patent, trademark, trade name or service mark that the

respondents have invaded, intruded into or used without proper authority from the

petitioner.  Nor are the respondents alleged to be fraudulently “passing off” their products or

services as those of the petitioner. The respondents are not also alleged to be undertaking any

representation or misrepresentation that would confuse or tend to confuse the goods of the

petitioner with those of the respondents, or vice versa.  What in fact the petitioner alleges is an

act foreign to the Code, to the concepts it embodies and to the acts it regulates; as alleged,

hoarding inflicts unfairness by seeking to limit the opposition’s sales by depriving it of the bottles

it can use for these sales. 

 

In this light, hoarding for purposes of destruction is closer to what another law - R.A. No.

623 – covers, to wit: SECTION 1.   Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the

manufacture, bottling or selling of soda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream, or other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels, and other similar containers, with their names or the names of their principals or products, or other marks of ownership stamped or marked thereon, may register with the Philippine Patent Office a description of the names or are used by them, under the same conditions, rules, and regulations, made applicable by law or regulation to the issuance of trademarks.   

SECTION 2.   It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the manufacturer, bottler or seller who has successfully registered the marks of ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section, to fill such bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, or other similar containers so marked or stamped, for the purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of, buy, or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or not, or to use the same for drinking vessels or glasses or for any other purpose than that registered by the manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this section shall be punished by a fine or not more than one hundred pesos or imprisonment of not more than thirty days or both.  

 

As its coverage is defined under Section 1, the Act appears to be a measure that may

overlap or be affected by the provisions of Part II of the IP Code on “The Law on Trademarks,

Service Marks and Trade Names.”  What is certain is that the IP Code has not expressly

repealed this Act.  The Act appears, too, to have specific reference to a special type of

registrants – the manufacturers, bottlers or sellers of soda water, mineral or aerated waters,

cider, milk, cream, or other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels, and other

similar containers – who are given special protection with respect to the containers they use. In

this sense, it is in fact a law of specific coverage and application, compared with the general

terms and application of the IP Code. Thus, under its Section 2, it speaks specifically of unlawful

use of containers and even of the unlawfulness of their wanton destruction – a matter that

escapes the IP Code’s generalities unless linked with the concepts of “deception” and “passing

off” as discussed above.    

 

Unfortunately, the Act is not the law in issue in the present case and one that the parties

did not consider at all in the search warrant application.  The petitioner in fact could not have

cited it in its search warrant application since the “one specific offense” that the law allows and

which the petitioner used was Section 168.3 (c).  If it serves any purpose at all in our

discussions, it is to show that the underlying factual situation of the present case is in fact

covered by another law, not by the IP Code that the petitioner cites. Viewed in this light, the lack

of probable cause to support the disputed search warrant at once becomes apparent.

 

Where, as in this case, the imputed acts do not violate the cited offense, the ruling of this

Court penned by Mr. Justice Bellosillo is particularly instructive: In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding

of probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.  Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is therefore defective on its face.  The nullity of the warrant renders moot and academic the other issues raised in petitioners’ Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration.  Since the assailed search warrant is null and void, all property seized by virtue thereof should be returned to petitioners in accordance with established jurisprudence.[16]  

 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the RTC correctly ruled that the petitioner’s

search warrant should properly be quashed for the petitioner’s failure to show that the acts

imputed to the respondents do not violate the cited offense.  There could not have been any

probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant because no crime in the first place

was effectively charged.   This conclusion renders unnecessary any further discussion on

whether the search warrant application properly alleged that the imputed act of holding Coke

empties was in fact a “hoarding” in bad faith aimed to prejudice the petitioner’s operations, or

whether the MTC duly complied with the procedural requirements for the issuance of a search

warrant under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 

         

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit.  Accordingly, we confirm

that Search Warrant No. 2001-01, issued by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Naga City,

is NULL and VOID.  Costs against the petitioner.

         

SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of §16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months ofarresto mayor, as minimum,  to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of §8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua   and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.

Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December 28, 1995.  In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:

That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:

That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[4] whereupon he was tried.

Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution:  P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic chemist and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative.  The prosecution evidence established the following:

On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant [5] in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City.  He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu  from accused-appellant.  The sale took place in accused-appellant’s room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room.  The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Español.

At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.[6]

The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant’s door, but nobody opened it.  They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking.  The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house.[7]

After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house.[8] They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint[9] having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams.[10] A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.[11]

After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.[12]

PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. [13] The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.  On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana.[14]

For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf.  His testimony was corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.

Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house.  Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in the roof.[15]

When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was waved in front of him.  As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.[16]

Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods.[17]

The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-appellant was detained.[18]

Accused-appellant’s mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony.  Arcano testified that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods and other valuables.[19]

After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.  In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months ofarresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional; and,

2.  In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.

The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.

The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana bricks are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to law.  The evidence custodian of this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to law.

SO ORDERED.[20]

Hence this appeal.  Accused-appellant contends that -

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE (SHABU)

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION §8, R.A. NO. 6425

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF MARIJUANA

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.

Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds.  First, the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.  Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the “plain view” doctrine.  Third, the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.

First.     Rule 126, §4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[21] provides that a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure.  No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance. [22] Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled. 

In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:

SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160

For:  Violation of RA 6425

SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

G R E E T I N G S :

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex “A”, the properties to wit:

UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA

which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

GIVEN  UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.

(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAÑOLJ u d g e

Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity.

Existence of Probable Cause

The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.”  Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search warrant issued is void because no evidence was presented showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should not have been ordered to be seized by the trial court.[23]

The contention has no merit.  To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on anything about drug paraphernalia.  He stated:

Q     -            Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?

A     -            Yes, sir.

Q     -            Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance?

A     -            Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, sir.

Q     -            Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?

A     -            Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.

Q     -            Are you familiar with that place?

A     -            Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and established contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who introduced me to the former.

Q     -            In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?

A     -            When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir.

Q     -            Were you able to buy at that time?

A     -            Yes, sir.

Q     -            How much if you can still remember the amount involved?

A     -            I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir.

Q     -            Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where the stuff (shabu) were being kept?

A     -            Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.

Q     -            How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?

A     -            When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I saw that the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.

Q     -            Do you know who is in control of the premises?

A     -            Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.

Q     -            How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is genuine shabu?

A     -            After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office and reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12 grams of shabu I bought from the subject.  Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested the Chief PNP Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which yielded positive result for shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-95 dated 19 Dec. 95.

Q     -            Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?

A     -            Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to buy bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of One Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.

Q     -            Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?

A     -            Yes, sir.[24]

However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void.  This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police.  The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued.  If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence.  Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court,[25] the warrant properly described two obscene books but improperly described other articles.  It was held:

Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole.  Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other articles.  The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of obscenity.  The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles. . . .  In so holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions of a warrant will be treated as severable under all circumstances.  We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified.  Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.

It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence.[26] Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant’s house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.

Specificity of the Offense Charged

Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425. [27] It will suffice to quote what this Court said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:

While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with “Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” it is clearly recited in the text thereof that “There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias ‘Debie’ and alias ‘Baby’ of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above.” Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause.  The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the “place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” [28]

Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29]  the search warrant was also for “Violation of R.A. 6425,” without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of “dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic).” This Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:

Appellant’s contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive.  He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia.  This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated” drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[30]

Similarly, in another case,[31] the search warrant was captioned: “For Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.).” The validity of the warrant was questioned on the ground that it was issued without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No. 1866, which punished several offenses.  We held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under §1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under §3 thereof, the decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866.  Thus, only one warrant was necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law.

Particularity of the Place

Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.

This contention is without merit.  As the Solicitor General states:

. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely “Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City,” the trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No. 160 contained several documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit:  1)  the application for search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was located in between No. 7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which described the premises as “a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be searched.  In fact, the police officers who raided appellant’s house under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact Aguilar’s place is at the end of appellant’s place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by Aguilar’s team is undeniably appellant’s house and it was really appellant who was the target.  The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their operation.[32]

The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.[33] For example, a search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts.  As it turned out, there were five apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor.  However, the description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by the accused “Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass.” [34] In this case, the location of accused-appellant’s house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.

In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of  shabu  from accused-appellant’s residence, Search Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Second.   The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana.  However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug was seized within the “plain view” of the searching party.  This is contested by accused-appellant.

Under the “plain view doctrine,” unlawful objects within the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence.[35] For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.[36] The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.

Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence

Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu  first.  Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the “plain view doctrine” can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found.  As has been explained:

What the ‘plain view’ cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.  The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification ¾ whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused ¾ and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.[37]

The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search pursuant to accused-appellant’s lawful arrest for possession ofshabu.  However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control.[38] The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it. 

The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-appellant’s person or in an area within his immediate control.  Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.

Apparent Illegality of the Evidence

The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint.  There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure.  This case is similar to People. v. Musa[39]  in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents.  We explained:

Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents.  They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained.  When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer’s eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it.  Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their “plain view,” what may be said to be the object in their “plain view” was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the “plain view” of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer.[40]

No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.[41] In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint.  Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana.  Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the “plain view doctrine,” we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.  However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.

Third.  Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the searching party in effecting the raid.

Rule 126, §7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[42] provides:

Right to break door or window to effect search. ¾ The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.

Accused-appellant’s claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and competent proof.  No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.

In contrast, Aguilar and Duano’s claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry cannot be doubted.  The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times.  Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the house.  These circumstances justified the searching party’s forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they do so.

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs under §16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is  AFFIRMED.

In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under §8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.  However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

EXAMINATION OF APPLICANT

NICOMEDES SILVA @ " Comedes", MARLON SILVA, @ "Tama" and ANTONIETA SILVA, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, BRANCH XXXIII, DUMAGUETE CITY, respondent.

Marcelo G. Flores for petitioners.

 

FERNAN, C.J.:p

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioners seek the nullification of Search Warrant No. 1 issued by respondent Judge as well as the return of the money in the amount of P1,231.00 seized from petitioner Antonieta Silva.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On June 13, 1986, M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr., as chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, filed an "Application for Search Warrant" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City against petitioners Nicomedes Silva and Marlon Silva. 1 This application was accompanied by a "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo, also dated June 13, 1986. 2

On the same day. Judge Nickarter A. Ontal, then Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City, pursuant to the said "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", issued Search Warrant No. 1, directing the aforesaid police officers to search the room of Marlon Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. as amended. Pertinent portions of Search Warrant No. 1 read as follows:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining oath (sic) MSGT. Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr. and his witnesses (sic) Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo  that there is probable cause to believe that possession and control of Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has been committed or is about to be committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has in possession and/or control at Tama's Room (Rgt. side lst Floor)  located at Nono-Limbaga Drive, Tanjay, Neg. Or. which is/are:

X (Subject of the offense stated above

(Stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense;

X (Used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the day (night) of the  room of Tama Silva residence of his father Comedes Silva to open (sic) aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartoons, containers, forthwith seize and take possession of the following property Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint and bring the said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs. 3

In the course of the search, the serving officers also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40.

On June 16, 1986, Antonieta Silva filed a motion for the return of the said amount on the grounds that the search warrant only authorized the serving officers to seize marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and joint, and that said officers failed or refused to make a return of the said search warrant in gross violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 4

Acting on said motion, Judge Ontal issued an Order dated July 1, 1986, stating that the court "holds in abeyance the disposition of the said amount of P1,231.40 pending the filing of appropriate charges in connection with the search warrant." 5

On July 28, 1987, petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on the grounds that (1) it was issued on the sole basis of a mimeographed "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", which were accomplished by merely filling in the blanks and (2) the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witnesses by searching questions and answers in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 6

On August 11, 1987, respondent trial court, through Judge Eugenio M. Cruz, who, by then, had replaced retired Judge Ontal, issued an Order denying the motion for lack of merit, finding the requisites necessary for the issuance of a valid search warrant duly complied with. 7

A motion for reconsideration dated September 1, 1987 filed by petitioners was likewise denied by Judge Cruz in an order dated October 19, 1987.

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari.

Petitioners allege that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 1 was tainted with illegality and that respondent Judge should be viewed to have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the Order dated August 11, 1987, denying their motion to quash Search Warrant No, 1.

We rule for petitioners.

Section 2, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to personal liberty and security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures. This section provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he

may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. 8

Thus, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:

SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

Based on the aforecited constitutional and statutory provisions, the judge must, before issuing a search warrant, determine whether there is probable cause by examining the complainant and witnesses through searching questions and answers.

In the case of Prudente vs. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870, December 14, 1989, 180 SCRA 69, 767 this Court defined "probable cause" as follows:

The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched". This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.

In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the questioned search warrant as well as the "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause. The joint "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which was submitted together with the "Application for Search Warrant" contained, for the most part suggestive questions answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided thereon. In fact there were only four (4) questions asked, to wit:

Q Do you personally know M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr. the applicant for a search warrant?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you have personal knowledge that the said premises subject of the offense stated above, and other proceeds of fruit of the offense, used or obtain (sic) or intended to be used as means of committing an offense?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you know personally who is/are the person who has/have the property in his/their possession and control?

A Yes, sir.

Q How did you know all this (sic) things?

A Through discreet surveillance. 9

The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was also very broad. The questions propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition was already mimeogragphed and all that the witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided.

In the case of Nolasco vs. Paño, G.R. No. 69803, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 152, 163, this Court held:

The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized, which is identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements or probable cause upon which a warrant may issue.

Likewise, in the Prudente case cited earlier, this Court declared the search warrant issued as invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness in the form of searching questions and answers. Pertinent portion of the decision reads:

Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florencio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers". On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held inQuintero vs. NBI, "the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness' are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant. 10

Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, "the capricious disregard by the judge in not complying with the requirements before issuance of search warrants constitutes abuse of discretion".

The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even named as one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that the search warrant was issued for the seizure of personal property (a) subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense and NOT for personal property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense. Thus, the then presiding Judge Ontal likewise abused his discretion when he rejected the motion of petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her seized money.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. Search Warrant No. 1 is hereby declared null and void. Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch XXXIII is directed to order the return to petitioner Antonieta Silva of the amount of P1,231.40 which had earlier been seized from her by virtue of the illegal search warrant. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, petitioner, vs.THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC Manila, Branch 33 and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Francisco SB Acejas III, Oscar S. Atencio, Rodolfo M. Capocyan, Ernesto P. Fernandez, Romulo B. Macalintal, Rodrigo H. Melchor, Rudegelio D. Tacorda Virgilio L. Valle and Luciano D. Valencia for petitioner.

 

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge dated 9 March 1988 which denied the petitioner's motion to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14, as well as his order dated 20 April 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the earlier order.

It appears that on 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. an application 1 for the issuance of a search warrant, docketed therein as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Nemesis E.

Prudente, Defendant." In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw alleged, among others, as follows:

1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Anonas St. Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives handgrenades and ammunition which are illegally possessed or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense which the said NEMESIO PRUDENTE is keeping and concealing at the following premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, to wit:

a. Offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor;

b. Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor;

2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact, and therefore, believes that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable the undersigned or any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties:

a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;

b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;

c. explosives and handgrenades; and,

d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.

In support of the application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, OIC of the Intelligence Section of (ISAD) executed a "Deposition of Witness" dated 31 October 1987, subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge. In his deposition, P/Lt. Florenio Angeles declared, inter alia, as follows:

Q: Do you know P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, the applicant for a Search Warrant?

A: Yes, sir, he is the Chief, Intelligence and Special Action Division, Western Police District.

Q: Do you know the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila

A: Yes, sir, the said place has been the subject of our surveillance and observation during the past few days.

Q: Do you have personal knowledge that in the said premises is kept the following properties subject of the offense of violation of

PD No. 1866 or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense:

a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;

b. .38 and 45 Caliber handguns and pistols;

c. explosives and handgrenades; and d. Assorted weapons with ammunitions?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Do you know who is or who are the person or persons who has or have control of the above-described premises?

A: Yes sir, it is Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines.

Q: How do you know that said property is subject of the offense of violation of Pres. Decree No. 1866 or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense?

A: Sir, as a result of our continuous surveillance conducted for several days, we gathered information from verified sources that the holder of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions aren't licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the holders of these firearms are not students who were not supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunition.

On the same day, 31 October 1987, respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 87-14, 3 the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath applicant ALLADIN M. DIMAGMALIW and his witness FLORENIO C. ANGELES that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe (probable cause) that NEMESIO PRUDENTE has in his control in the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, properties which are subject of the above offense or intended to be used as the means of committing the said offense.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day or night of the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more particularly (a) offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor; (b) office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith seize and take possession of the following personal properties, to wit:

a. M 16 Armalites with ammunition;

b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;

c. explosives and hand grenades; and

d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.

and bring the above described properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander.

In his affidavit, 4 dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the searching team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers, classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows (a) one (1) pc.—M33 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); (b) one (11) pc.—M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1) pc.—PRB—423 Fragmentation hand grenade (live).

On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. 5

The applicant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw thru the Chief, Inspectorate and Legal Affairs Division, WPD, opposed the motion. 6 After petitioner had filed his reply 7 to the opposition, he filed a supplemental motion to quash. 8

Thereafter, on 9 March 1988, respondent Judge issued an order, 9denying the petitioner's motion and supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 10 was likewise denied in the order 11 dated 20 April 1988.

Hence, the present recourse, petitioner alleging that respondent Judge has decided a question of substance in a manner not in accord with law or applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, or that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the disputed orders.

For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 12 The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense 13 and the judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. 14

The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet arid prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." 15 This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. 16

Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground that it was issued on the basis of facts and circumstances which were not within the personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness but based on hearsay evidence. In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact." On the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for several days, they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of the said fire arms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information from other sources or persons.

While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated that he verified the information he had earlier received  that petitioner had in his possession and custody the t there is nothing in the record to show or indicate how and when said applicant verified the earlier information acquired by him as to justify his conclusion that he found such information to be a fact. He might have clarified this point if there had been searching questions and answers, but there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant.

What the records show is the deposition of witness, P/Lt. Angeles, as the only support to P/Major Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is based on hearsay. For, it avers that they (presumably, the police authorities) had conducted continuous surveillance for several days of the suspected premises and, as a result thereof, they "gathered information from verified sources"  that the holders of the subject firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess them.

In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 17 this Court laid the following test in determining whether the allegations in an application for search warrant or in a supporting deposition, are based on personal knowledge or not—

The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable.

Tested by the above standard, the allegations of the witness, P/Lt. Angeles, in his deposition, do not come up to the level of facts of his personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the questioned search warrant.

In the same Alvarez case, 18 the applicant stated that his purpose for applying for a search warrant was that: "It had been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money lender, challenging usurious rate of interests, in violation of law." The Court held that this was insufficient for the purpose of issuing a search warrant.

In People vs. Sy Juco, 19 where the affidavit contained an allegation that there had been a report to the affiant by a person whom lie considered reliable that in said premises were "fraudulent books, correspondence and records," this was likewise held as not sufficient for the purpose of issuing a search warrant. Evidently, the allegations contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were insufficient basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant. As held in the Alvarez case:

The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.

Besides, respondent Judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as required by the Rules of Court. As held inRoan v. Gonzales, 20 "(m)ere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record."

Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers." On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI," 21 the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant."

Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The Court also notes post facto that the search in question yielded, no armalites, handguns, pistols, assorted weapons or ammunitions as stated in the application for search warrant, the supporting deposition, and the search warrant the supporting hand grenades were itself Only three (3) live fragmentation found in the searched premises of the PUP, according to the affidavit of an alleged member of the searching party.

The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for determination of "probable cause" in the valid issuance of a search warrant, as enunciated in earlier cases. True, these requirements are stringent but the purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the individual against unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective.

Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there were several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the PUP.

The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place intended . 22 In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.

Petitioner next attacks the validity of the questioned warrant, on the ground that it was issued in violation of the rule that a search warrant can be issued only in connection with one specific offense. The search warrant issued by respondent judge, according to petitioner, was issued without any reference to any particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated when allegedly P.D. No. 1866 punishes several offenses.

In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 23 Where the warrants involved were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code," the Court held that no specific offense had been alleged in the applications for a search warrant, and that it would be a legal hearsay of the highest order to convict anybody of a "Violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code" without reference to any determinate provision of said laws and codes.

In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) While the said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc." As explained by respondent Judge, the term "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant to mention the particular provision of PD No. 1-866 that was violated is not of such a gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score. Besides, while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; such illegal possession of items destructive of life and property are related offenses or belong to the same species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. As observed by respondent Judge: 24

The grammatical syntax of the phraseology comparative with the title of PD 1866 can only mean that illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, have been codified under Section 1 of said Presidential Decree so much so that the second and third are forthrightly species of illegal possession of firearms under Section (1) thereof It has long been a practice in the investigative and prosecution arm of the government, to designate the crime of illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives as 'illegal possession of firearms, etc.' The Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not recognize the issuance of one search warrant for illegal possession of firearms, one warrant for illegal possession of ammunitions, and another for illegal possession of

explosives. Neither is the filing of three different informations for each of the above offenses sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The usual practice adopted by the courts is to file a single information for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. This practice is considered to be in accordance with Section 13, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that: 'A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Describably, the servers did not search for articles other than firearms, ammunitions and explosives. The issuance of Search Warrant No. 87-14 is deemed profoundly consistent with said rule and is therefore valid and enforceable. (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, in connection with the petitioner's contention that the failure of the applicant to state, under oath, the urgent need for the issuance of the search warrant, his application having been filed on a Saturday, rendered the questioned warrant invalid for being violative of this Court's Circular No. 19, dated 14 August 1987, which reads:

3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the court having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that the issuance is urgent.

it would suffice to state that the above section of the circular merely provides for a guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of an otherwise valid search warrant.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders dated 9 March 1988 and 20 April 1988 as well as Search Warrant No. 87-14 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades which, according to Ricardo Y. Abando, a member of the searching team, were seized in the washroom of petitioner's office at the PUP, are ordered delivered to the Chief, Philippine Constabulary for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENHUR MAMARIL, appellant.

D E C I S I O N

AZCUNA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. L-5963, finding appellant Benhur Mamaril guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8[1] of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as amended by RA No. 7659.

The Information filed against appellant reads:

That on or about the 1st day of February, 1999 and sometime prior thereto, in the municipality of Lingayen, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, willfully, unlawfully and criminally [did] keep and possess crushed marijuana leaves contained in seventy eight (78) sachets with a total weight of two hundred thirty six and eighty three hundredth (236.83) grams and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops weighing one thousand six hundred grams, each brick weighing eight hundred (800) grams, with a total weight of one thousand eight hundred thirty six and eighty three hundredth (1,836.83) grams, a prohibited drug, without authority to possess the same.

CONTRARY to Sec. 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[2]

When arraigned on October 8, 1999, appellant pleaded not guilty. [3]  At the pre-trial conference held on October 18, 1999, the parties admitted the following facts:

1.       That the search was made in the house and premises of the parents of the accused where he (accused) also lives, at Ramos St., Lingayen, Pangasinan, on February 1, 1999 at about 2:30 o’ clock in the afternoon;

2.       That the search was conducted by the elements of the PNP particularly SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, SPO1 Alfredo Rico and others;

3.       That the policemen brought along with them a camera;

4.       That the accused was in the balcony of the house when it was searched;

5.       The existence of the report of physical science report No. (DT-077-99) issued by the PNP Crime Laboratory through Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid;

6.       That accused was subjected to urine sample laboratory on February 2, 1999.[4]

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Prosecution’s Evidence

On January 25, 1999, the Intelligence Section PNCO of the Lingayen Police Station, represented by SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda, applied[5] before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, for a search warrant  authorizing the search for marijuana, a prohibited drug, at the family residence of  appellant Benhur Mamaril, situated at Ramos Street, Poblacion, Lingayen, Pangasinan.  On said date,  then presiding Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos (now retired) issued Search Warrant No. 99-51.[6]

On February 1, 1999, at about 2:30 p.m., the Chief of Police of the Lingayen Police Station, SPO3 Alfredo Rico, SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. and other police officers went to the residence of appellant and implemented Search Warrant No. 99-51.  When they arrived at appellant’s house, they saw appellant’s mother under the house.  They asked her where appellant was, and she told them that appellant was in the house, upstairs.  When they went upstairs, they saw appellant coming out of the room.  Upon seeing the policemen, appellant turned back and tried

to run towards the back door. SPO3 Rico told appellant to stop, which appellant did.  SPO3 Rico informed appellant that they had a search warrant to search the house premises. They showed appellant and his mother the search warrant.  Appellant looked at the search warrant and did not say anything.  Thereafter, the policemen searched the house.  The search was witnessed by two members of the barangay council in said area, namely, Barangay Kagawad Leonardo Ramos and Barangay Tanod Valentino Quintos, whom the police brought with them.[7]

The searching team  confiscated the following: (1) fifty-five (55) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves,  which were found in a buri bag (“bayong”) under appellant’s house; (2) three heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds contained in an eye-glass case;  (3) twenty-two (22) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds taken under a pillow placed on a monobloc chair; and (4) two (2) bricks of suspected marijuana contained inside a white and gray bag found inside the closet of appellant’s room. SPO3 Alfredo Rico took pictures [8] of the confiscated items and prepared a receipt[9] of the property seized. SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. prepared a certification[10] that the house was properly searched, which was signed by appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. After the search, the police officers brought appellant and the confiscated articles to the Lingayen Police Station and turned them over to the desk officer.[11]

The next day, on February 2, 1999, police officers Alfredo Rico, Alberto Santiago and Rodolfo Madrid brought the confiscated articles to the Crime Laboratory at Camp Florendo, San Fernando, La Union for examination.   Appellant was also brought there for a drug test.[12]

Police Superintendent Ma. Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid, forensic chemist and head of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Regional Office I, Camp Florendo, Parian, San Fernando City, La Union, testified that on February 2, 1999, she received from the Chief of Police of Lingayen, Pangasinan, a request[13] for a drug test on the person of appellant Benhur Mamaril and a laboratory examination of the confiscated specimens.[14] After weighing the specimens and testing the same, Police Superintendent Cid issued a report[15] finding the specimens[16] to be “POSITIVE to the test for the presence of marijuana x x x.”[17]

Moreover, Police Superintendent Cid affirmed the findings in her report [18]  that the examination conducted on the urine sample of appellant was positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as “shabu.”[19]

After the prosecution formally offered its testimonial and documentary exhibits on March 5, 2000, appellant, through his counsel, filed a motion with memorandum[20] contending that: (1) the exhibits of the prosecution are inadmissible in evidence under Section 2 and Section  3 (2)  of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution  as the search warrant, by virtue of which said exhibits  were seized, was illegally issued, considering that the judge’s examination of the complainant and his two witnesses was not in writing; and (2) said search warrant was illegally or improperly implemented. Appellant prayed that all the exhibits of the prosecution be excluded as evidence or in the alternative, that the resolution of the admissibility of the same be deferred until such time that he has completed the presentation of his evidence in chief. On August 25, 2000, the prosecution opposed the motion, and the trial court denied appellant’s motion.[21]

The Defense’s Evidence

Appellant Benhur Mamaril, 31, single, laborer, denied that he was residing at his parents’ house at Ramos Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan since he has been residing at a rented house at Barangay Matic-matic, Sta. Barabara, Pangasinan since December 18, 1998.  Appellant declared that on February 1, 1999, it was his brother and the latter’s family who were residing with his mother at Ramos Street, but on said day, his brother and family were not in the house since they were at the fishpond.[22]

Appellant testified that on February 1, 1999, he was at his parents’ house at Ramos Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan, because he and his live-in partner visited his mother on said day and arrived there at 10:00 a.m. At about 2:00 p.m. of February 1, 1999, while appellant was at the back of his parents’ house, about seven to nine policemen, in civilian clothes, arrived. The policemen asked appellant to go upstairs and they immediately handcuffed him and brought him to the balcony of the house. He stayed at the balcony until the search was finished after more than 30 minutes. Thereafter, he was brought to the clinic of one Dr. Felix and a medical examination was conducted on him.  Then he was brought to the municipal hall.[23]

Appellant testified that he saw the buri bag, the eye-glass case, and the gray and white bag containing suspected marijuana for the first time on the day of the search when he was at the balcony of their house. He also testified that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time while he was testifying in court.  He admitted that the signature on the certification that the house was properly searched   was his.[24]

Moreover, appellant testified that in the early morning of February 2, 1999, he was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, La Union where he gave his urine sample. Appellant insinuated that the confiscated items were only planted because he had a misunderstanding with some policemen in Lingayen. However, he admitted that the policemen who searched his parents’ house did not threaten or harm him in any way and he had no misunderstanding with SPO3 Alfredo Rico.[25]

Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39, Lingayen, Pangasinan, was requested to testify on the available records regarding Search Warrant No. 99-51 on file in the trial court and to identify said documents. Atty. Castillo testified   that he only had with him the application for search warrant, the supporting affidavits of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado Fernandez and the return of the search warrant.[26]

Atty. Enrico declared that before he assumed office as Branch Clerk of Court, the person supposed to be in custody of any transcript of the searching questions and answers made by Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos in connection with the application for Search Warrant No. 99-51 was Mrs. Liberata Ariston, who was then a legal researcher and at the same time OIC-Branch Clerk of Court. However, during the trial of this case, Mrs. Liberata Ariston was in the United States of America. Atty. Enrico averred that he asked Mrs. Liberata Ariston’s daughter, Catherine Ramirez, who is a court stenographer, about said transcript, but it has not been found.   Atty. Enrico testified that based on the records, there is no stenographic notes. He added that they tried their best to locate the subject transcript, but they could not find it.[27]

The Trial Court’s Decision

On January 23, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused of the crime of possession of marijuana defined and penalized under Section 8 of RA 6425, as amended, this Court in the absence of any modifying circumstances, hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000), plus costs of this suit.

The period of preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused shall be credited in full in service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[28]

The Appeal

Appellant contends that the trial court made the following errors:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE ARTICLES ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSIDERING THAT SEARCH WARRANT NO. 99-51 WAS ILLEGALLY ISSUED.

II

THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS TOTALLY INADMISSIBLE THE INVENTORIED ARTICLES IN THE RECEIPT OF SEIZED PROPERTY AND THE CORRESPONDING CERTIFICATION ISSUED THERETO (EXHS. “J” AND “I”) SINCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT ASSISTED BY COUNSEL WHEN HE SIGNED THE SAME.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[29]

Appellant prays for his acquittal on the ground that Search Warrant No. 99-51 was illegally issued considering that there was no evidence showing that the required searching questions and answers were made anent the application for said search warrant. Appellant pointed out that Branch Clerk of Court Enrico O. Castillo testified that based on the records, there was no transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings in connection with the application for said search warrant.  Appellant thus asserts that it cannot be said that the judge made searching questions upon the alleged applicant and his witnesses, which is in violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

Our Ruling

Appellant’s contention is meritorious.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, thus:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Said Constitutional provision is implemented under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, thus:

Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and  under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

Under the above provisions, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause.  Probable cause for a search  has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would  lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.[30] In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers.[31]

Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39 of Lingayen, Pangasinan,  who was requested to testify on the available records kept in their office regarding Search Warrant No. 99-51, presented before the court only the application for search warrant[32] and the supporting affidavits[33] of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado Fernandez. Atty. Castillo could not produce the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in writing as required by law. Atty. Castillo testified, thus:

xxx                                                                          xxx                                                                   xxx

Q    Would you admit that from the records available there is no transcript of the proceedings of a searching questions and answers made by the Executive Judge upon the complainant as well as the two (2) witnesses not only in connection with application for Search Warrant 99-51 but in all of those application covered by that record namely, 99-49, 99-50, 99-51, 99-52, 99-53 and 99-54?

A     Sir, based on the records there is no transcript of [s]tenographic notes.

Q    Did you not ask Catherine Ramirez, the daughter of then OIC-Mrs. Liberata Ariston about said transcript?

A     I asked her for several times, sir, and in fact I asked her again yesterday and she told me that she will try to find on (sic) the said transcript.

Q    But until now there is no transcript yet?

A     Yes, sir.

Q    Because according to the rules the transcript must be attached to the records of this case together with the application for search warrant as well as the supporting affidavit of the said application, but there is no records available to have it with you and there is no proof with you?

A     Because during the time I assumed the office, sir, the records in the store room which they placed is topsy turvy and all the records are scattered.  So, we are having a hard time in scanning the records, sir.

Q    But did you not try your very best assisted by the Court personnel to locate said transcript, Mr. Witness?

A     Sir, we tried our best but based on the transcript I can not just read the said transcript.

Q    You mean to say you were able to [find] the stenographic notes?

A     No, sir. There are stenographic notes but they are not yet transcribed, sir.

Q    That is by a machine steno?

A     Yes, sir.

Q    Did you not ask the assistance of the co-stenographers in your sala who are using the machine steno to identify what cases does that stenographic notes (sic)?

A     Sir, I was assisted by some stenographers but we can (sic) not find the transcript of stenographic notes concerning Search Warrant No. 99-49 to 99-54.[34]  (Underscoring ours)

Based on the above testimony and the other evidence on record, the prosecution failed to prove that Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos put into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant.  The records only show the existence of an application[35] for a search warrant and the affidavits[36] of the complainant’s witnesses. In Mata v. Bayona,[37] we held:

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record.  Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

We cannot give credit to the argument of the Solicitor General that the issuing judge examined under oath, in the form of searching questions and answers, the applicant SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda and his witnesses on January 25, 1999 as it is so stated in   Search Warrant No. 99-51. Although it is possible that Judge Ramos examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, the fact remains that there is no evidence that the examination was put into writing as required by law. Otherwise, the depositions in writing of the complainant and his witnesses would have been attached to the record, together with the affidavits that the witnesses submitted, as required by Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, we find untenable the assertion of the Solicitor General that the subject stenographic notes could not be found at the time Branch Clerk of Court Enrico Castillo testified before the trial court because of the confused state of the records in the latter’s branch when he assumed office. 

The Solicitor General also argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right to question the legality of the search because he did not protest against it, and even admitted during his testimony that he was neither threatened nor maltreated by the policemen who searched their residence.

We disagree.  The cases[38] cited by the Solicitor General involved a warrantless search.  In this case, the police authorities presented a search warrant to appellant before his residence was searched.  At that time, appellant could not determine if the search warrant was issued in accordance with the law. It was only during the trial of this case that appellant, through his counsel, had reason to believe that the search warrant was illegally issued causing appellant to file a motion with memorandum objecting to the admissibility of the evidence formally offered by the prosecution.  In People v. Burgos,[39] we ruled:

Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object.  To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689).  The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770).  As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):

x x x                                                                        x x x                                                                 x x x

“x x x  As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent, or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp.1180, 1181).”

We apply the rule that: “courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.” (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304  U.S. 458).

In this case, we construe the silence of appellant at the time the policemen showed him the search warrant as a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Moreover, appellant seasonably objected[40] on constitutional grounds to the admissibility of the evidence seized

pursuant to said warrant during the trial of the case, [41] after the prosecution formally offered its evidence.[42] Under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred from his conduct before or during the trial.

No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant.[43]  In Mata v. Bayona,[44] we ruled:

….[N]othing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites.  It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera:

‘It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others.  While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.’

Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.

We, therefore, find that the requirement mandated by the law that the examination of the complainant and his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers was not complied with, rendering the search warrant invalid. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against appellant in accordance with Section 3 (2),[45] Article III of the Constitution. 

It is unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by appellant in seeking to exclude the evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant.

Without the aforesaid illegally obtained evidence, there is no sufficient basis to sustain the conviction of appellant.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. L-5963, is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered declaring Search Warrant No. 99-51 NULL and VOID and the search and seizure made at appellant’s residence illegal.  For lack of evidence to establish appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant BENHUR MAMARIL is hereby ACQUITTEDand ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal grounds.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to IMPLEMENT without delay this Decision and to INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from confinement.

The confiscated marijuana is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State and the trial court is hereby directed to deliver or cause its delivery to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.