-
competing memories
Andreas KappelerUniversity of Vienna, Austria
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:Received 2 January 2014Accepted 3 March 2014
which is of crucialof Eastern Europe.sity. Production and. All
rights reserved.
The conclusion of an Association and Free-tradeAgreement between
the European Union (EU) andUkraine was on the agenda of the Eastern
PartnershipSummit of November 28/29th 2013 in Vilnius. The
Ukrai-nian government apparently had made his choice in favourof a
strategic rapprochement of Ukraine with the EU andagainst its
integration into the strategic and economicsphere of Russia. The
outcome of this event was consideredbeing of crucial importance for
the future development of
E-mail address: [email protected].
Peer review under responsibility of Asia-Pacic Research Center,
HanyangUniversity
Production and hosting by Elsevier
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Eura
journal homepage: www.el
Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 107115struggle over the
geopolitical and cultural orientation of Ukraineimportance for the
future development of the post-Soviet space and
Copyright 2014, Asia-Pacic Research Center, Hanyang
Univerhosting by Elsevier Ltdthe controversies about the heritage
of Kievan Rus, the interpretation of Mazepa, theHolodomor and WW II
are not only academic, but also political issues. They reect
thehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2014.05.0051879-3665/Copyright
2014, Asia-Pacic Research Cea b s t r a c t
The legacy of the tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union is one of
the crucial factors for anunderstanding and an explanation of
current affairs in the post-Soviet space. This isespecially true
for Ukraine and for RussianUkrainian relations. Russia regards
Ukraine as apart of its own strategic orbit, while many Ukrainians
want to liberate themselves from theRussian hegemony and advocate a
closer cooperation with the European Union. Thiscontroversy
culminated in late 2013, when Russian pressure led to a
re-orientation ofUkrainian policy and a rapprochement with Russia.
In this paper I present some reectionson the signicance of the
imperial heritage for the RussianUkrainian relationship. Ianalyse
the different discourses and the Ukrainian and Russian historical
narratives, pol-itics of history and competing memories. The
RussianUkrainian relationship was and isstill characterized by an
obvious asymmetry, a hegemony of Russia over Ukraine. Russiauses
the Orthodox Church and the traditional dominance of the Russian
language as in-struments for its policy. Not only Russian
historians, but also politicians and even theRussian President try
to impose the imperial narrative on Ukraine. They are supported by
asignicant part of Ukrainians, who adhere to the ideal of a common
Russia-led OrthodoxEast Slavic world. Other Ukrainian historians
and politicians use the Ukrainian languageand the Ukrainian
historical narrative with its national myths of liberty and of
Ukrainescloseness to Europe in their struggle against the Russian
hegemony. The on-going War ofmemories is of special interest. Both
sides use and abuse history as a political weapon, andUkraine and
Russia: L cies of the imperial past andeganter, Hanyang University.
Prodsian Studies
sevier .com/locate/eurasuction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All
rights reserved.
-
Russian Soviet Republic until 1954, when NikitaKhrushchev
decided that Crimea should be a part of the
A. Kappeler / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 107115108the
post-Soviet space. Although Ukraine did not full allconditions for
an agreement, among them the release fromprison of Yulia
Tymoshenko, the former PrimeMinister andrival of Viktor Yanukovych
in the presidential elections,both sides seemed to be ready for
signing the agreement.
However, on November 21st the Ukrainian cabinetdeclared that it
would suspend its preparations for signingthe Agreement. President
Yanukovych justied the deci-sion with serious economic problems of
Ukraine, whichwas not ready to be integrated into a common
Europeanmarket. Prime Minister Mykola Azarov explicitlymentioned
the decreasing trade with Russia and differ-ences of opinion
between Ukraine and Russia which had tobe settled immediately. For
this purpose the Ukrainiangovernment proposed
three-way-negotiations betweenUkraine, the EU and Russia (Malygina,
2013: 10, 1213).
Obviously, the Ukrainian government yielded to heavypressures
from Russia which opposed the agreement ofUkraine with the EU and
instead invited Ukraine to join theRussian-led Customs Union with
Belarus and Kazakhstan.The Russian government, Russian media and
PresidentVladimir Putin himself warned of the disastrous
economicconsequences an Association Agreement with the EUwould have
for Ukraine. Since July 2013 Russia declaredimport restrictions on
several Ukrainian goods andthreatened Ukraine with a cut off of
gas. In two non-ofcialmeetings of Yanukovych with Putin and in a
meeting ofAzarov with Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev inSt.
Petersburg on November 20, just one day before theunexpected
declaration, the deal was settled. The Russiangovernment promised
to offer cheap gas and credits (whatwas ofcially conrmed on
December 17th), and bothcountries agreed on a renewal of
negotiations about astrategic partnership agreement. So, the
Ukrainian gov-ernment changed its strategic priorities in favour of
Russia,at least temporarily.
The manoeuvres of the Ukrainian government and itsturning away
from an Association Agreement with the EUwere answered by massive
protests in Ukraine. Severalhundred thousands of Ukrainians
demonstrated in thecentre of Kyiv and called for the resignation of
Yanukovychand the cabinet of ministers.
Whatever the outcome of this conict will be, the eventsof
November and December 2013 demonstrated that Rus-sias policy
towards Ukraine followed the traditional im-perial model. Russia
exerted heavy political and economicpressure also on other
post-Soviet states, especially onGeorgia, Moldova and Armenia.
While Armenia inSeptember 2013 withdraw his willingness to sign a
pre-liminary Association Agreement with the EU and put itspriority
on the Russian-led Customs union, Georgia andMoldova signed in
Vilnius the respective documents.
So, the imperial past is alive and represents an
importantpolitical factor in the post-Soviet space. Russias
relation-ship with Ukraine is of special relevance. Ukraine is
thesecond largest country in Europe by territory (after Russia),it
has great geo-strategic and economic importance. By itshistory,
culture and religionUkrainians are closer connectedwith Russia than
the other former Soviet nationalities (withthe exception of
theBelarusians). On the otherhandUkraineand its history are
intertwined with Central Europe.Ukrainian Soviet Republic, though
the majority of itsinhabitants are ethnic Russians. This had little
impor-tance in Soviet times, but became important after 1991,when
borderlines separated the independent states. Theformer Autonomous
Soviet Republic Crimea in 1992 wasrenamed Republic of Crimea and is
the only autonomousterritory inside Ukraine. The political leaders
of the re-public usually support a pro-Russian policy, so
recentlyin the conict of late 2013.
2. The question of the Russian Black Sea eet which isclosely
connected with the question of Crimea. After1991 the Soviet Black
Sea navy was divided betweenRussia and Ukraine and Russia had to
recognizeIn this article I present some reections on the
signi-cance of the imperial heritage for the
RussianUkrainianrelationship. In the beginning I give an overview
of therelations between the two independent states since
1991,secondly I discuss the position of Ukraine in the tsarist
andSoviet empires, thirdly I present the most important factorsof
the imperial legacy and their signicance for RussianUkrainian
relations, and nally I analyse the Ukrainian andRussian historical
narratives, politics of history andcompeting memories which are
important issues of theRussianUkrainians relations. This article
has the characterof an essay and does not give an exhaustive
treatment ofthe complex problems.
1. RussianUkrainian relations since 1991
23 years ago Ukraine and Russia became independentstates after
being Soviet republics for 70 years. The sepa-ration of the
Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic underLeonid Kravchuk and of the
Russian Socialist FederativeSoviet Republic under Boris Yeltsin
from the Soviet Unionand their common alliance against the Soviet
PresidentGorbachev were the decisive factors for the dissolution
ofthe Soviet state in December 1991. Moscow (the presidentof
Russia) fought together with Kiev (the president ofUkraine) against
another Moscow (the president of theSoviet Union).
However, the Russian society and the Russian politicianswere
shocked, when they realized that the Commonwealthof Independent
States did not become, as expected, thesuccessor of the Soviet
Union, headed by Russia. They weresurprised by the fact that
Ukraine nowwas an independentstate in reality and not only formally
(as the formerUkrainian Soviet Republic). They were not prepared
andunwilling to recognize Ukraine as an equal state and as
aseparate nation. On the other hand the Ukrainian govern-ment aimed
at the maintenance and extension of statessovereignty and at
relations with Russia on the basis ofequality (Burkovskyj &
Haran, 2010; Smolii, 2004).
The relations between the two independent states werefrom the
very beginning difcult. Almost all issues havetheir roots in the
imperial past.
Among the multiple problems I mention
1. The question of Crimea, which had belonged to the
-
8. The problem is complicated by the fact that many citi-
A. Kappeler / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 107115
109Ukrainian sovereignty over the naval base Sevastopol.However, in
1997 Ukraine yielded the naval base toRussia on the terms of a
20-year renewable lease. Afterpolitical disputes with Russia and
inside Ukraine in 2010the Russian Navys lease of the Sevastopol
base wasextended through 2042. Sevastopol is an importantsymbol of
the Russian nation, a hero-city of the SecondWorldWar and a
national site of memory of the CrimeanWar. Many Russians, among
them several politicians,have never fully accepted that Sevastopol
now is part ofUkraine.
3. The question of the approximately 8 millions ethnicRussians
living in Ukraine (17% of its population) and ofthe about 50% of
Ukrainian citizens with Russian as theirrst language. The Russian
speaking population isconcentrated in the cities of Eastern and
SouthernUkraine. About 3 millions Ukrainians live in Russia,being
the second largest ethnic minority after the Tatars.The Russian
government tried to instrumentalize theethnic Russians and the
Russian-speaking Ukrainians forpolitical purposes, while the
Ukrainian governmentrarely mentions the Ukrainian minority in
Russia.
4. The question of the regional diversity of Ukraine whichreects
different histories. Roughly speaking there arefour regions. 1. In
the West there are the territorieswhich belonged to the Habsburg
Monarchy during the19th century, namely Galicia with its mostly
Ukrainian-Catholic population and its Polish past, Bukovyna
andSubcarpathian Ukraine which have a long Romanian andOttoman
resp. Hungarian background. 2. Central Ukrainebelonged for
centuries to the kingdom of PolandLithuania, from the 16th to the
18th century it was thehomeland of the Ukrainian Cossacks. It
became part ofthe Russian empire in the middle of the 17th and in
theend of the 18th centuries. 3. The steppes of SouthernUkraine
north of the Black Seawere populated only sincethe end of the 18th
century mostly by Ukrainian andRussian peasants. 4. Eastern Ukraine
since the 19thcentury became an important centre of mining andheavy
industry and attracted many Russian workers.Until today the
political orientations of the populationreect the history, the
ethno-linguistic composition andthe geographical location of their
regions.
5. The question of energy supplies (especially gas) deliv-ered
or not delivered by Russia to Ukraine and throughUkraine to Central
Europe. Ukraine is dependent on gasfrom Russia and a signicant part
of Russian gas istransported through Ukraine to Central Europe.
Since2005 there were regular disputes about the price of gasand of
the costs for transit and Russia used gas prices aspolitical
instrument.
6. The question of the place of Ukraine between the Eu-ropean
Union and the NATO on the one hand and Russiaand its political and
economic allies on the other hand.This position reects the history
of Ukraine betweenOrthodox Russia and Catholic Central Europe.
OfcialRussia harshly criticized the cooperation of Ukraine withthe
NATO and plans of a possible entering the NATO byUkraine. In the
presidential elections of 2004 PresidentPutin openly supported the
pro-Russian candidate Vik-tor Yanukovych. As already mentioned,
this problemzens of Ukraine do share these views at least in part.
Thelack of a long state tradition, the belonging to statesdominated
by other peoples and high cultures, caused asort of minority
complex of many Ukrainians in regard toRussia. Not only parts of
Ukrainians, but also many for-eigners are thinking Ukraine to be a
part of Russia, theUkrainian language being a Russian dialect and
Ukrai-nian history merging with Russian history. So, Ukraineand the
Ukrainians dont have a rm place on the mentalmap of Europe until
today.
The RussianUkrainian relations were especially dif-cult during
the rst years of independence until 1997, whena treaty about
friendship, cooperation and partnership wasconcluded, and again
during the presidency of ViktorYushchenko from 2005 to 2010. Since
Viktor Yanukovychwas elected as the newpresident in 2010, the
tensions werereduced, though not eliminated.
2. Ukraine in the Russian and the Soviet Empire
Russia has a long imperial past (Kappeler, 2001; Smolii,2004).
The Muscovite state became an empire in the mid-dle of the 16th
century, when Ivan IV conquered theKhanate of Kazan with its
polyethnic and multireligiouspopulation. In the 17th century
Siberia and the Eastern partof Ukraine were added, and in the
beginning of the 18thcentury Peter the Great declared Russia being
an Empire(Rossiiskaia Imperiia), what remained the ofcial name
ofthe Russian state until the Russian Revolution.
At the end of the 19th century the huge territory of theRussian
Empire extended from Poland in the West to theKorean border in the
East, from the coast of the Arctic Sea tothe oases and deserts of
Central Asia and to the Caucasus inthe South. Its population of 140
millions was composed of44% ethnic Russians, 18%
Ukrainians,11%Muslims, 7% Poles,5% Belorussians, 4% Jews and 11%
other groups.
The Russian Empire was a centralized state, based onthe concepts
of dynasty and of ascription to an estate. Itrecently was of
immediate importance, when Russiaexerted strong political and
economic pressure onUkraine, while the EU demanded from Ukraine
politicaland legal reforms.
7. In general there is an obvious asymmetry in the
relationsbetween the two countries and peoples (Kappeler,
2011).Russia is a great power claiming to the heritage of
theRussian Empire and the Soviet Union, having large re-sources and
a relative prosperous economy. Ukraine is asecond-rate power
without a continuous state-tradition,having few resources and
considerable economic prob-lems. Although ofcial Russia recognizes
the indepen-dent Ukrainian state, the majority of Russians does
notrecognize Ukraine as an equal partner and does notconsider the
Ukrainians as a full and equal nation. Theindependent Ukrainian
national state is regarded assomething provisional, articial which
will hopefullyreunite soonwith Russia. Russia looks at Ukraine as a
partof its own strategic orbit, while Ukraine has no ambitionsto
dominate Russia a typical asymmetric relationship.
-
3.1. Russia and the post-imperial space
A. Kappeler / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014)
107115110widely applied cooperation with loyal non-Russian
eliteswho often were coopted into the imperial nobility.Although
Russian was the dominant language and Ortho-doxy the state
religion, language and religion were not thedecisive factors for
the coherence of the empire. Its elitewas polyethnic and
multiconfessional. Non-Russian lan-guages and non-Orthodox
confessions were tolerated, atleast until the last third of the
19th century.
Among the more than 100 ethnic minorities the Ukrai-nians were a
special case (Kappeler, 2008). They were themost numerous group
after ethnic Russians with 13percent of the total population at the
beginning of the 18thcentury and 18 percent at the end of the 19th
century.Before the middle of the 17th Century almost all
Ukrainianshad belonged to the Kingdom of PolandLithuania, by
thattime one of themajor players in Central Europe. Since
1654,however, parts of Ukraine were under the protection of
theRussian Tsar. The Ukrainian so-called Cossack Hetmanatehad a
wide autonomy inside Russia until the second half ofthe 18th
century, when it was abolished. Since the end ofthe 18th century
the vast majority of Ukrainians lived in astate dominated by
Russians the Russian Empire and laterthe Soviet Union. Only the
West Ukrainians of Galicia,Bukovyna and Subcarpathia, the so-called
Ruthenians,became subjects of the Austrian emperor, and their
historytook its own path, separated from Russia until WW II.
In the 19th century the so-called Little Russians wereregarded
integral parts of the Russian or all-Russian com-munity (Miller,
2003). The name Little Russia initially wasthe normal designation
of the Ukrainians and was used in apejorative sense only since the
end of the 19th century.According to the dominant Russian view the
Little Rus-sians consisted mainly of peasants, speaking a
strangeRussian dialect and not being able to develop a high
cultureand statehood. Their aristocracy had been largely
Russiedalready during the 18th century, their written language
andhigh culture had been absorbed by the Russian culture.
So,Ukrainians had a low place in the ethno-social hierarchy ofthe
Russian Empire, much lower than the nations withtheir own nobility
and high culture like the Poles, Finns,Baltic Germans and
Georgians. On the other hand Ukrai-nians were not discriminated as
individuals, because theywere regarded as Russians. Only when a
small group of theUkrainian intelligentsia in the middle of the
19th centurystarted developing a Ukrainian national ideology,
tsaristRussia reacted with repressions and prohibited schools
andpublishing in the Ukrainian language. The Russian gov-ernment
reacted so harshly, because a defection of theUkrainians was
regarded as a danger for the Russian nation,which was imagined as
an all-Russian East Slavic nation,consisting of Great Russians,
Little Russians and WhiteRussians.
After the Russian Revolution and during the Civil Warmost
peripheral regions of the Russian Empire declaredthemselves
independent states, among them the UkrainianPeoples Republic
(Yekelchyk, 2007). Until 1921, the RedArmy and the new Soviet state
succeeded in re-establishingits rule over the majority of the
former peripheral regions,among them Ukraine, Central Asia and the
South Caucasus.However, only after the Second World War the
SovietUnion became again a powerful empire with a sizeWhen the
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, all UnionRepublics declared their
independence. The remainingcentre was reduced to the territory of
the former RussianFederal Soviet Republic, whose territory
correspondedroughly to the Muscovite state in the middle of the
17thcentury (the exceptions are the North Caucasus and the FarEast,
conquered only in the 19th century, and the region ofKaliningrad
[Knigsberg], annexed afterWW II). Russiawasdeprived of most of the
imperial peripheries and lost itsstatus as a super-power. However,
Russia is still an empirewith its huge territory extending from the
Baltic Sea andthe Black Sea to the Pacic and with its polyethnic
andmultireligious population, non-Russians having a percent-age of
approximately 20 percent.
Many Russians and especially the political elites aresuffering
from the lost status as a great power. There is awide-spread
nostalgia for the tsarist Empire and the SovietUnion, even for the
totalitarian Stalinist regime. Thesetendencies became stronger
under the presidency of Vla-dimir Putin. So one main goal of
Russias foreign policy iskeeping the regions of the former empire
under its hege-mony. Russia tries to control the post-Soviet space,
desig-nated as near abroad, and to restrict the sovereignty ofthe
former Soviet republics by interfering into their inneraffairs.
Russia had to recognize that the Baltic states werelost, but
Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Belarus andUkraine are regarded
as parts of the Russian orbit.approximately reaching the extent of
the Russian Empirebefore 1914. With the annexation of Western
Ukraine forthe rst time all Ukrainians were under the rule of
aRussian-dominated state. The population of the late SovietUnion
consisted of 51% Russians, 15% Ukrainians, almost20% Muslims, and
14% other groups.
The Soviet state and the Communist party controlledthe
peripheral territories (Martin, 2001). All kinds of po-litical
movements and national emancipation were sup-pressed. However, the
Ukrainians now were recognized asa separate nationwhich had its own
territory, the UkrainianSocialist Soviet republic. During the 1920s
the Ukrainianlanguage and culture were developed andmany
Ukrainianswere coopted into the Soviet elite. So, the
nationalitiespolicy of the early Soviet state contributed
substantially toUkrainian nation-building. However, this policy
wasreversed since the 1930s, Russication of Ukrainiansreappeared
and the Ukrainians again became subalternsubjects of a
Russia-dominated centre. Many educatedUkrainians moved to Moscow
and other Russian cities andnumerous Ukrainian communists were
coopted into theSoviet elite, especially during the Khrushchev era.
Becauseof their numerical strength and the strategic and
economicsignicance of their country the Ukrainians were
controlledmore tightly than most other Soviet nationalities.
So,Ukrainians were late-comers in the emancipation processof Soviet
nationalities and only in 1991 played a decisiverole in the
dissolution of the Soviet Union.
3. Factors of the imperial legacy
-
A. Kappeler / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 107115
111Again Ukraine is the most important and disputed re-gion. Russia
fears a complete separation of Ukraine fromRussia and its entrance
into the European Union and theNATO. As already in tsarist Russia
this is regarded as athreat for Russias position as a great power
and also athreat for the Russian nation, imagined again as an
Or-thodox all-Russian nation. So, the asymmetry of therelationship
persists until today. Russia exerts considerableeconomic and
political pressure to keep Ukraine in its im-perial strategic realm
and tries to prevent the integration ofUkraine to EU and NATO. As
already mentioned, thisproblem is on todays political agenda.
3.2. The Orthodox Church
For the Russian Empire the close cooperation of thestate and the
Orthodox Church was an important factor oflegitimation and
stability. Todays Russia follows this policyand is using the
Orthodox Church as an instrument of itspolitics of hegemony. On the
other hand the aspirations ofthe Orthodox Church are supported by
the state. In Ukrainethis policy is facilitated by the fact that a
majority ofUkrainian Orthodox believers declare themselves
asmembers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church headed by thePatriarch
of Moscow. Strongminorities are the adherents ofthe rival Ukrainian
Orthodox Church, headed by the Patri-arch of Kiev (in Ukrainian
Kyiv), which tries to play the roleof a national church, and the
Ukrainian-Catholic Church,concentrated and deeply rooted in Galicia
and Sub-carpathia (Vulpius 2011).
The cooperation of the state with the Russian OrthodoxChurch has
been intensied during the presidency of Vla-dimir Putin. The
Russian nation is imagined as an Orthodoxnation, and Orthodox
Ukrainians are regarded as parts ofthis community. Patriarch Kirill
of Moscow explicitly sup-ported the idea of Holy Russia and of the
Russianworld,uniting Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. In summer 2013
hecelebrated in Kiev together with the Presidents of Russiaand
Ukraine the 1025th anniversary of the baptism of Rus,in order to
afrm the leadership of Russia in the RussianOrthodox world.
3.3. The hegemony of the Russian language
In the tsarist and Soviet Empires the Russian languagewas the
dominant one, although in the Soviet Union thenon-Russian
languages, among them Ukrainian, wererecognized theoretically as
equals and the position ofUkrainian was enhanced during the 1920s.
However, inpractice Russian remained the dominant language andsince
the 1930s its position was strengthened, while theposition of the
Ukrainian language was weakened again.Until today the Russian
language remains the commonlingua franca of the post-Soviet space.
This is especially truefor the Central Asian republics and for
Belarus. AgainUkraine is a disputed battleeld.
In independent Ukraine Ukrainian is the only statelanguage. The
government advocates the use of Ukrainianin schools and bureaucracy
in order to overcome the sub-altern status of the Ukrainian
language (Besters-Dilger,2009). However, the Russian language keeps
its strongposition until today. More than half of the population
ofUkraine is using Russian as its main language, althoughmany of
them are bilingual. In the cities of Eastern andSouthern Ukraine
Russian remains the dominant language.Only in Western Ukraine and
in the countryside theUkrainian language is deeply rooted.
Many Russians and numerous Europeans and Ameri-cans regard
Ukrainian as a dialect of the Russian language.The Ukrainian
culture is considered as a peasant culturewith beautiful folk
songs, traditional costumes and Cossackdances. The Ukrainian
literature and music is not takenseriously. On the whole the
backward Ukrainians have tobe civilized by Russia, by its language
and by its devel-oped culture.
The Russian government often has reproached theUkrainian
government with forceful Ukrainization of Rus-sians and the
Russian-speaking Ukrainians by enforcing theuse of the Ukrainian
language in schools and state in-stitutions. So, under the pretext
of the protection of therights of linguistic minorities it uses the
language questionas an instrument of pressure and intervention into
the in-ternal affairs of Ukraine. In reality, as already
mentioned,the Russian language keeps its strong position and
theUkrainian language only slowly recovers from the russi-cation
during the imperial past. Again there is an obviousasymmetry: Most
Ukrainians do not regard the Russianlanguage and culture as
inferior, and the Ukrainian gov-ernment does not use the largely
russied Ukrainians inRussia as a political weapon.
3.4. The heritage of the Soviet Empire
As already mentioned, the politics of nation-buildingduring the
1920s is an important factor of the Soviet leg-acy (Smolii, 2004).
The existence of a Ukrainian SovietRepublic and the recognition of
Ukrainians as a nationwereimportant preconditions for the
independent Ukrainianstate, created in 1991. On the other hand the
politics ofrussication from the 1930s on weakened again
Ukrainiannation-building. The Soviet regime fostered themyth of
thefriendship of peoples and of the family of Soviet nations,the
Russians being the older, the Ukrainians the youngerbrothers.
Russia has declared itself the legal successor of the So-viet
Union. This includes the nuclear weapons, this includesimperial
ambitions and the maintenance of the hegemonicdiscourse. Ukraine on
the other hand did not abandon fullyits subaltern position in
regard to Moscow, the former So-viet centre.
In Soviet times the economies of the republics had beenclosely
intertwined, and Ukraine and the other Soviet re-publics were
dependent on the Soviet centre. The situationdid not change
fundamentally after 1991. Russia remainsthe main trading partner of
Ukraine and Ukraine isdependent on Russian gas and oil, and Russia
uses thisdependency as a political instrument.
In the Soviet Union Ukraine and the Ukrainians hadbeen
integrated into the Soviet state, society and economy.Many
Ukrainians worked in Russia, numerous Russiansmigrated to Ukraine.
So, there were many interethnic per-sonal ties and networks on the
level of political and
-
A. Kappeler / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014)
107115112economic elites as well as betweenworkers and
employees,especially in the border areas. Russians and Ukrainians
tookpart in the common Soviet political culture with commonvalues
and ideological traditions. This transnational heri-tage of the
Empire has not been destroyed entirely by thenew borderlines
between the new nation-states. On apersonal level there are hardly
any antagonisms betweenUkrainians and Russians, with the exception
of Galicia.
4. Competing historical narratives and memories
The question of the historical heritage is the mostcontroversial
issue of the RussianUkrainian relations. His-tory is one of the
crucial factors of national identity and it isused in the politics
of history by states and societies (Miller,2012). Among the
building blocks of the Ukrainian nationcollective memorymay be
themost important one. Nationsdene themselves in delimitation from
other nations, theirhistorical narrative competes with other
narratives. For theUkrainian and for the Russian national
identities thedelimitation from the Russian imperial respectively
theUkrainian national narratives is crucial (Kappeler, 2011,2012:
183190; Kravchenko, 2011: 391454; Plokhy, 2008;Sanders, Ed., 1999;
Velychenko, 1992, 1993).
In the Russian and Soviet imperial narrative Russia andUkraine
did have not only a common history, but also acommon memory.
Ukraine is included into the national-imperial narrative of Russian
history from medieval Kie-van Russia until the Russian Revolution
and the commonvictory in the Great Patriotic War. The periods,
duringwhich Ukrainewas part of other states, above all of
PolandLithuania, are interpreted as times of national and
religiousoppression. They only interrupted the main stream ofcommon
history. The so-called reunications of Ukrainewith Russia in 1654,
1793 and 1939/44 are regarded ascornerstones of this Russian
national vision. For Russiannation-building the inclusion of
Ukraine and the Ukrai-nians was and is of crucial importance.
In the Ukrainian national narrative Ukrainian history
isseparated from Russian history, beginning with medievalKievan
Rus, regarded a Ukrainian state, and ending withthe independent
Ukrainian state, with highlights in theCossack Hetmanate of the
17th century and the indepen-dent Ukrainian Peoples republic of
19171920. Accordingto this narrative the Ukrainian nation had to
suffer underRussian rule and had to ght against Russia, until the
nalgoal of its history, the independent nation-state,
wasattained.
Ukrainian national ideologues stress the fact that themajority
of the Ukrainian lands belonged during more thanfour centuries to
PolandLithuania and only two centuriesto Russia respectively the
Soviet Union. In this period, fromthe 14th to the 18th Centuries,
Ukraine became part of theCentral European space and was inuenced
by Westernideas, by renaissance, humanism, reformation,
Germanmunicipal law and Jesuit schools. Ukrainians emphasizethat
the rst stage of the Westernization of Russia origi-nated in
Ukraine, especially in the Kiev Academy, foundedin 1632, which was
the rst institution of higher learning inthe East-Slavic world.
Graduates from the Kiev Academybecame prominentWesternizers in
Russia since the middleof the 17th century and even more so during
the reign ofPeter the Great. One can speak of a Ukrainization of
Russiain this period. According to the Ukrainian national
narrativeRussian and Soviet rule separated Ukraine from the com-mon
European world, and only independent Ukraine nowre-establishes the
traditional ties with Central Europe. Thisargument is used in
support of the integration of Ukraineinto the European Union and
against closer relations withnon-European Russia.
Although the most important Ukrainian national myth,the
Cossacks, is not exclusively Ukrainian, because therewere also
Russian Cossacks, only the Ukrainian Cossacks in1648 succeeded in
creating their own political body. Ac-cording to Ukrainian national
thinking the Cossack tradi-tion and the central European inuences
during Polish rulemade Ukraine and the Ukrainiansmore European
andmoredemocratic than Russia and the Russians.
This image is contested, of course, by Russia and theRussian
national ideologues looking at the Ukrainians asuncivilized Russian
peasants or anarchic Cossacks whohave to be ruled and civilized by
Russia which brings Eu-ropean culture to Ukraine.
Thus, the different and competing, often incompatible,historical
narratives are an important element of the im-perial legacy. Russia
and Ukraine conducted a War ofmemories, which was accelerated by
the national politicsof history of the former President Yushchenko
and theincreasing imperial tendencies in Russian politics(Kasianov
& Miller, 2011; Portnov, 2013).
I will mention four examples
4.1. The heritage of Kievan Rus
My rst case is the issue of the heritage of medievalKievan Rus.
This rst political body in East-Slavic territorywas among the
leading powers in Europe at the beginningof the second millennium.
Medieval history seems to be faraway from contemporary politics.
However, if we look atother countries, e.g. on the Balkans, it
becomes evident thatmany of the political disputes concern medieval
or evenancient history, the question of the heritage of
ancientstates and high cultures. Among numerous examples Imention
the discussions concerning the heritage ofMacedonia between
Macedonians, Greeks and Bulgarians,the controversies about
Transylvania between Hungariansand Romanians, the controversies
between Serbs and Al-banians concerning Kosovo or between Armenians
andAzeris about Nagorno-Karabakh.
So, the disputes between the Ukrainian and the Russiannational
narratives concerning the heritage of Kievan Rusare by no means an
exception. In the history of the con-struction of a Ukrainian
national narrative and nationalconsciousness, this was one of the
crucial issues. In thework of Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the father of
modernUkrainian historiography and rst President of Ukraine
in1917/18, the question of the Kievan heritage is the mostimportant
founding myth of the Ukrainian nation (Plokhy,2005). Hrushevsky and
his work have been condemnedin Soviet times and are canonized in
todays Ukraine. Theportrait of Hrushevsky is represented on the 50
hryvninote, and the portraits of the Kievan princes Volodymyr
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A. Kappeler / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 107115
113(Vladimir in Russian) and Yaroslav on the 1, respectively the2
hryvni-notes. In an article, published in 1904, Hrush-evsky
protested against the usual scheme of Russian (EastSlavic) history
and claimed that Kievan Rus was anexclusively Ukrainian state,
while Russia and the Russiansemerged only later in the forests of
the North as a mixtureof Finno-Ugric and Slavic elements. The
heritage of KievanRus according to Hrushevsky was taken up by the
princesof GaliciaVolhynia, then the grand Princes of Lithuaniaand
later the Ukrainian Cossacks.
This interpretation of the heritage of Kievan Rus iscontested by
almost all Russian historians and politicians,and also by the
majority of historians in other countriesclaiming the Kievan
heritage at least partially for Russia.Arguments for this view are
the continuities of the rulingdynasty from Kiev to Moscow and of
Orthodoxy from thebaptism of Rus in the end of the 10th century
until today.The Ukrainian-Russian controversy about medieval Rus
isa-historical, projects the modern terms Russia and Ukraineinto
deep history. Nevertheless, the issue of the heritage ofmedieval
Rus is of primary importance for historians aswell as for
politicians.
One example, how Kievan Rus is used in contemporarypolitics is a
recent talk of the Russian President VladimirPutin. He declared in
September 2013 at the Valdai Forumthat Kievan Ruswas the nucleus of
the Russian Empire andthat since then Russians and Ukrainians had a
commonhistory and culture.
Ukraine, without a doubt, is an independent state. Thatis how
history has unfolded. But lets not forget that todaysRussian
statehood has roots in the Dnieper; as we say, wehave a common
Dnieper baptistery. Kievan Rus started outas the foundation of the
enormous future Russian state. Wehave common traditions, a common
mentality, a commonhistory and a common culture. We have very
similar lan-guages. In that respect, I want to repeat again, we are
onepeople (http://valdaiclub.com/politics/62880.html).
An example of the contrary national-Ukrainian view isthe
statement of the prominent Ukrainian writer MykolaRiabchuk who
stresses the signicance of the exclusiveKievan heritage for a
Ukrainian identity:
We can see that the identity issue is in the core of in-ternal
and international problems Ukraine is coping with.In a sense
Ukraine is coping with the consequences of aperdicious historical
myth that, being internalized, heavilyinuenced Ukrainian identity
and, being internationalized,heavily inuenced the Western
perception of both Ukraineand Russia. In brief, it is the myth of a
thousand-year-oldRussian state which in fact has neither been
thousand-years old, nor Russian. Hardly any historical myth hasever
made such a great international career as an indis-puted historical
truth. Hardly any was so broadly anduncritically accepted in
academies, multiplied in massmedia, and enshrined inmass
consciousness and in populardiscourse as a commonwisdom (Kappeler,
2011: 42122).
4.2. Hetman Mazepa traitor or national hero?
My second example is the Ukrainian Cossack HetmanMazepa who
defected from Russia in 1708 in order to joinKing Charles XII of
Sweden. During the last years therewere fervent discussions about
the historical role of Het-man Mazepa (Kappeler, 2009: 220223;
Kappeler, 2003:2527). He may be the historical gure polarizing
opinionsin Russia and Ukrainemore than any other. In Russia, he
hasthe reputation of the archetype of a traitor, who broke hisoath
to Peter the Great and fought together with CharlesXII. against
Russia at Poltava where they were defeated in1709. The Russian
Orthodox Church even laid an anathemaon him which has not been
revoked until today. Peter theGreat and the battle of Poltava are
prominent sites ofRussian national-imperial memory, immortalized by
Alex-ander Pushkin and Peter Tchaikovsky. In the Russian andSoviet
Empires disloyal Ukrainians were qualied asMazepists and even today
the term is used as a negativestereotype for Ukrainians. So, during
the propagandacampaign against the conclusion of an Association
Agree-ment of Ukraine with the EU in late 2013, the
prominentRussian journalist Dmitry Kiselev reproached the
Ukrainiangovernment with neomazepism
(http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2013/09/24/6998567).
In Ukraine, Mazepa is widely regarded as a nationalhero.
According to this narrative Mazepa with the supportof the Swedish
king tried to liberate Ukraine from theRussian yoke in order to
attain an independent Ukrainianstate. Peter the Great is blamed for
having violently sub-jugated Ukraine, an image conrmed in the
writings of thenational poet Taras Shevchenko.
In connection with the 300th anniversary of the battleof Poltava
in 2009, the arguments over Mazepa and Poltavawere charged with
political meaning again (Kliewer &Hausmann, 2010). There were
political disputes about ajoint RussianUkrainian celebration of the
battle in Poltava,proposed by the Russian President Putin. The
propositionwas declined by the Ukrainian President Yushchenko,
andthe celebration in Poltava took place without higher polit-ical
representatives. However, the Russian victory wascelebrated in the
former imperial capital St. Petersburg.Yushchenko for his part
advocated a joint Ukrainian-Swedish celebration of the battle and
the erection ofmonuments of Mazepa and Charles XII in Poltava. The
lateViktor Chernomyrdin, then Russian Ambassador inUkraine,
commented this idea with a provocative questiondrawing a parallel
between Charles XII and Hitler: Whatwould you think if wewould
erect amonument for Hitler inStalingrad? (Kappeler, 2009: 221).
After long discussionsthemonuments, as far as I know, have not been
erected andthe monument of glory and the monument to the
victorPeter the Great remain the only ones in Poltava
(Shebelist,2012). This outcome shows that the discussion
aboutMazepa like many of the other discussions is not only
onebetween Russian and Ukrainian historians, journalists
andpoliticians but it takes place also inside Ukraine. There
arenumerous Ukrainians sharing the view of Mazepa as atraitor.
The discussions about Mazepa, Peter and Poltava insideUkraine
and between Ukraine and Russia are aggressiveand express
antagonistic, exclusive interpretations of thepast. They were
conducted not only by historians andjournalists, but also by
politicians, including the presidentsof both countries. So again, a
historical topic was politizedand instrumentalized in the
competition of memories.
-
A. Kappeler / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 1071151144.3.
Holodomor
My third example is Holodomor, the Ukrainian name ofthe terrible
famine of 1932/33, man-made by the politics ofStalinist Soviet
Union, which caused the deaths of morethan 5 millions people, among
them more than 3 millionsUkrainians. In Soviet times the famine had
been taboo andwas never mentioned. In post-Soviet Ukraine,
especiallyafter 2004, it was ofcially interpreted as a
genocidedirected against the Ukrainian people. Today, it
representsone of the crucial elements of the historical narrative
and ofthe national mythology uniting almost all parts of Ukraineand
delegitimizing the Soviet past (Kasianov, 2010).
The interpretation of Holodomor was internationalizedand became
a source of tensions between Ukraine andRussia. In todays Russia
the famine is recognized as adisaster, but Russian historians
contend that the Hol-odomor was a common tragedy of all Soviet
peoples andthat as many of the victims of Holodomor were living
inRussia. The controversy among historians about Hol-odomor turned
into a War of memories. Ukrainian na-tionalists accused Russia
(instead of the Soviet Union) ofthe crime of Holodomor and even
demanded an ofcialexcuse. Russian media attacked the Ukrainian
interpreta-tion and in 2008 the Russian President Medvedev
harshlycriticized in a letter to President Yushchenko the
nation-alist interpretations of the mass famine of 1932/33 in
theUSSR, calling it a genocide of the Ukrainian people. Hedeplored
that these efforts are aiming at maximallydividing our nations,
united by centuries of historical, cul-tural and spiritual links,
particular feelings of friendshipand mutual trust
(http://www.kremlin.ru/news/2081;http://document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID052421).
So, the Russian President interfered in the interpreta-tion of
the Ukrainian past and appealed to the Soviet mythof the friendship
of peoples. However, Russia mayconsider itself as the legal
successor of the Soviet Union,but Russia is not responsible for the
Stalinist crimes. On theother hand Ukrainians have to accept that
Russia is not theSoviet Union and that among the perpetrators and
victimsof Holodomor there were Ukrainians and Russians. Thecommon
heritage as victims of the Stalinist terror wouldindeed have the
potential for a common RussianUkrainianremembrance of Stalinism and
a common coming to termswith the Soviet past. There are good
arguments against theinterpretation of Holodomor as a genocide.
However, theattempt of the Russian President of imposing a
hegemonicdiscourse on Ukraine is again an imperial message.
4.4. Great Patriotic War or Ukrainian war of liberation?
My last example is the interpretation of the SecondWorld War. In
Russia the victory in the so-called GreatPatriotic War is the most
important element of the col-lective memory and of national
consciousness. So, ofcialRussia as well as Russian society and
Russian historiansreact harshly to all attempts of revisionism
concerning thistopic.
In Ukraine, especially in its Western part, there wereactivities
for a re-evaluation and rehabilitation of the Or-ganization of
Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and theUkrainian Insurgent army (UPA),
both organizations havingfought against the Soviet Union
(Golczewski, 2011; Jilge,2008). However, numerous members of these
organiza-tions collaborated with Nazi Germany, participated in
theextermination of the East European Jews and committedmassacres
among the Polish population of Volhynia.Nevertheless, the
revisionism in the interpretation of WWII was supported by the
ofcial politics of history during thepresidency of Yushchenko. It
culminated in the erection ofnumerous monuments to the UPA and in
awarding the titleof hero of Ukraine to Roman Shukhevych, the
leader of theUPA, in 2007 and to Stepan Bandera, the leader of the
OUN,in 2010. So, in Ukraine, the myth of the Great PatrioticWar of
the Soviet Union was partially substituted by themyth of a
Ukrainian national liberation war against theSoviet Union.
Ofcial Russia and the Russian media protested againstthis
revisionist re-interpretation of the Great PatrioticWar. The
expression banderovtsy together with maze-pintsy was used for a
negative designation of nationalistUkrainians already during the
Soviet era and is still usedtoday. In 2009, the Russian President
founded a Commis-sion of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts
toFalsify History to the Detriment of Russias Interests, andto
defend Russia against. those who would deny Sovietcontribution to
the victory in World War II
(http://document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID052421). Obviously
theactivities of the commission should be directed against
there-interpretation of WW II in Ukraine and in the
Balticstates.
However, the interpretation of WW II as an anti-Sovietliberation
war is by far not shared by all Ukrainians. Espe-cially in Eastern
and Southern Ukraine OUN and UPA,Bandera and Shukhevych have a bad
reputation and manyUkrainians remain supporters of the Soviet and
Russianview of the Great Patriotic War.
So, the divided memories over WW II show that thingsare not so
simple. Russians and Ukrainians have not onlyone history and one
narrative and not a single memory, butmany histories, narratives
and memories. The historicalmemory is divided not only between
Russians and Ukrai-nians, but there are different remembrances
inside ofRussia and Ukraine. This is more important for
Ukraine,where Russian and Soviet narratives are deeply rooted inthe
minds of many Ukrainian citizens, than for Russia. Thisconcerns
many Ukrainians in the Eastern and Southernparts of the country,
while the national narrative supportedby Ukrainians in the West and
the centre fundamentallydistinguishes itself from the Russian one.
So the issues ofthe national narratives and the historical memory
aredisputed not only between Ukraine and Russia, but alsoinside
Ukraine. In Russia there are also distinctions anddisagreements
between imperial, national and liberalmemories and narratives, but
to a lesser degree than inUkraine. The national-imperial narrative
seems to beshared by a majority of Russians.
5. A short summary
The legacy of the tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union isone of
the crucial factors for an understanding and an
-
explanation of current affairs in the post-Soviet space. Thisis
especially true for Ukraine and for RussianUkrainianrelations. It
is undeniable that Ukraine and Russia have aspecial relationship.
They are closer entangled than othernations by the common religion
(Orthodoxy), by a partiallycommon East-Slavic culture, by long
periods of a commonhistory and parts of a common memory. Most
Ukrainians
Golczewski, F. (2011). Die umstrittene Tradition: OUN/UPA und
nation-building. In A. Kappeler (Ed.), Die Ukraine (pp. 319334).
Kln: Bhlau.Prozesse der Nationsbildung.
Jilge, W. (2008). Nationalukrainischer Befreiungskampf. Die
Umwertungdes Zweiten Weltkriegs in der Ukraine. Osteuropa (vol.
58)(6), 167186.
Kappeler, A. (2001). The Russian Empire. A multiethnic history.
Harlow/London/New York: Longman.
Kappeler, A. (2003). Great Russians and Little Russians:
RussianUkrainian relations and perceptions in historical
perspective. Seattle (
A. Kappeler / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 107115
115over centuries were parts of the Russian Empire and
theRussia-dominated Soviet Union. So, the
RussianUkrainianrelationship was and is still characterized by an
obviousasymmetry, a hegemony of Russia over Ukraine.
This asymmetry is reected in the competing discourses.Many
Russians regard Ukraine as part of the Russian orbitand even of the
Russian nation. Independent Ukraine triesto liberate itself from
the Russian hegemony, while Russiawants to keep Ukraine in its own
sphere of inuence. Russiauses the Orthodox Church and the
traditional dominance ofthe Russian language as instruments for its
hegemonicpolicy. It is supported by a signicant part of Ukrainians
ofRussian and of Ukrainian origin, who adhere to this view ofa
common Russia-led Orthodox East Slavic world. Not onlyRussian
historians, but also politicians and even the RussianPresident try
to impose the imperial narrative on Ukraine.Ukrainian historians
and politicians use the Ukrainian lan-guage and the Ukrainian
historical narrative with its na-tional myths of liberty and its
closeness to Europe in theircampaigns against the Russian hegemony.
The on-goingRussianUkrainian War of memories is of special
inter-est. Both sides use and abuse history as a political
weapon,and the controversies about the heritage of Kievan Rus,
theinterpretation ofMazepa, theHolodomor andWWII are notonly
academic, but also political issues.
So history and memory matter. It is impossible to un-derstand
and to explain what is going on in Russia and theother post-Soviet
states without taking into account theimperial heritage of the
tsarist Empire and of the SovietUnion and its interpretations and
remembrances. Theongoing struggle over hegemony in Eastern Europe
and theCaucasus between Russia on the one hand and the Euro-pean
Union and the NATO on the other hand, is focused onUkraine, the
second state in Europe by territory. In 2013Russia again exerted
considerable pressure on Ukraine inorder to keep Ukraine in its own
strategic orbit and toprevent the integration of Ukraine into the
EuropeanUnion. The outcome of the struggle over Ukrainewill have
adecisive impact on the future development of the post-Soviet space
and of Eastern Europe.
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Ukraine and Russia: Legacies of the imperial past and competing
memories1 RussianUkrainian relations since 19912 Ukraine in the
Russian and the Soviet Empire3 Factors of the imperial legacy3.1
Russia and the post-imperial space3.2 The Orthodox Church3.3 The
hegemony of the Russian language3.4 The heritage of the Soviet
Empire
4 Competing historical narratives and memories4.1 The heritage
of Kievan Rus4.2 Hetman Mazepa traitor or national hero?4.3
Holodomor4.4 Great Patriotic War or Ukrainian war of
liberation?
5 A short summaryReferences last updated January 14 2014
