1) Medina v. Valdellon

10/19/15, 02:44SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 063

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278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Spouses Medina and Bernal vs. Valdellon

No. L-38510. March 25, 1975.*

SPOUSES DOLORES MEDINA and MOISES BERNAL,petitioners, vs . THE HONORABLE NELLY L. ROMEROVALDELLON OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OFMALOLOS, BULACA N , SPOUSES CIPRIANOVILLANUEVA and RUFINA PANGANIBAN, respondents.

Actions; Accion publiciana; Accion publiciana distinguishedfrom unlawful detainer; Case at bar.The nature of the actionembodied in the complaint is one for recovery of possession broughtbefore the Court of First Instance by the alleged owners of a piece ofland against the defendants who were supposed to have unlawfullycontinued in possession sin ce 1969 when they were supposed toreturn it to plaintiffs, plus damages. That the action is not forunlawful detainer contemplated in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,which falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the citycourts or municipal courts, is very apparent because an action ofunlawful detainer is defined as withholding by a person fromanother for not more than one y ear, of the possession of a land orbuilding to which the latter is entitled after the expiration ortermination of the formers right to hold possession by virtue of acontract express or implied.

Same; Same; Dispossession by means other than thoseenumerated by Rule 70, Rules of Court; Action to recover possessionmay be brought even before the expiration of the one-year period.Not all cases of dispossession are covered by Rule 70 of the Rulesof Court because whenever the owner of property is dispossessed b yany other means than those mentioned in the

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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aforementioned rule, he may initiate and maintain a plenary actionto recover possession in the Court of First Instance, and it is notnecessary for him to wait until the expiration of one year beforecommencing such action. It may also be brought after the expirationof said period of one year, if no action had been initiated for forcibleentry and detainer during that time in the inferior court. Thisplenary action to recover possession must be insti tuted in theCourt of First Instance.

Same; Same; Plea of title or ownership over the land in questioncannot be used as basis to di smiss action to recover possession.Itis a fundamental principle in the law governing unlawful detainercases (including recovery of possession cases) that a mere plea oftitle or ownership over the disputed land by the defendant cannotbe used as a sound legal basis for dismissing an action for recoveryof possessio n because an action for recovery of possession can bemaintained even against the very owner of the property .

Same; Same; Judgment rendered in action conclusive only onquestion of possession.An action for recovery of possession istotally distinct and different from an action for recovery of title orownership. In fact, a judgment rendered in a case of recovery ofpossession is conclusive only on the question of possession and notthat of ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affect theownership of the land or building.

Same; Dismissal; Pendency of another action between the sameparties for the same cause; Pendency of land registration case willnot bar institution of action to recover possession; Case at bar.Thecase for recovery of possession and damages was arbitrarily anderroneously dismissed on the basis of the alleged pendency ofanother action because while identity of pa rties may be establishedin both cases, there is no identity of cause of action or of rightsasserted and relief pray ed for, so that judgment which may be



rendered in one case would not necessarily result in res judicata forthe other.

Courts; Land registration court with limited and specialjurisdiction to determine the legality and propriety of the issuance oftitle over land in question.The Court of First Instance acting as aland registration court has a limited and special jurisdictionconfined to the determination of the legality and propriety of theissue of title over the land subject matter of the registration, and ithas no power to entertain issues of rightful possession and claim fordamages emanating from ownership.

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PETITION for review by certiorari of an order of the Courtof First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Ponciano H. Gupit (Citiz en Legal Assistance Office)

for petitioners. Rosendo G. Tansinsin, Jr. for respondents.

ESGUERRA, J.:

Petition to review by certiorari the order dated October 23,1973 of the Hon. Nelly L. Romero Valdellon, Ju dge of theCourt of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, whichdismissed with costs against the plaintiffs its Civil CaseNo. 4353-M, entitled Spouses Dolores Medina and MoisesBernal, plaintiffs, vs. Spouses Cipriano Villanueva andRufina Panganiban, defendants.

The complaint in Civil Case No . 4353-M of the Court ofFirst Instance of Bulacan alleges that plaintiffs (petitionersin this case) are the owners of a parcel of land situated atBo. San Pascual, Hagonoy, Bulacan, with an assessed valueof P800.00 which was purchased sometime in April 1967from Margarita Punzalan, Rosal Punzalan, Quaquin Gaddiand Paulina Gaddi; that as defendants are family friendsof the plaintiffs, defendants were allowed to remain in thepremises and to construct their residential house, sub ject



4.

5.

to the condition that defendants will return unto th eplaintiffs the premises upon demand; that much to thesurprise of the plaintiffs-spouses, on demand, defendants-spouses refused and remain obstinate in their refusal tosurrender th e property in question; that because of saiddefendants unjustified acts plaintiffs had to instituteaction and incur damage of P 500 as expenses for courtlitigation; that the reasonable value of the use of thepremises is P100 a month, taking into consideration itscommercial value; and prayed that the defendants beordered to vacate the premises and surrender untoplaintiffs the said property and defendants be ordered topay plaintiffs the amount of P500 as incidental expensesand the amount of P100 a month from the filing of thisaction to the time they surrender its possession to theplaintiffs.

A subsequent motion to amend and admit amendedcomp laint was filed by plaintiffs, the amendmentconsisting of:

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That as defendants-spouses are family friends of theplaintiffs, they (defendants) were allowed to build asmall house in the premises in April 1967, subject tothe condition that they will return to the plaintiffsthe premises in 1969;

That much to the sur prise of the plaintiffs-spouseson demand, defendants-spouses refuse d andremains obstinate in their refusal to surrender theproperty in question claiming that they are theowners thereof;

A motion to dismiss the comp laint a nd an opposition tothe motion to amend and admit the amended complaintfiled by the defendants (respondents in this case) precededthe respondent courts questioned order of October 30,1973, that dismissed the comp laint on the ground of th



ere being another case pending between the same partiesover the same property, namely Land Registration CaseNo. 2814 of this Court. Petitioners motion forreconsideration was denied by respondent court in its orderdated February 8, 1974.

The only legal issues raised are:

Whether or not the pendency of a land registration case will barthe institution of an action for the recovery of possession; and in thenegative, whether or not the respondent judge can be countenancedin her act of dismissing the latter case in view of the pendency ofthe land registration case.

When this Court (First Division) on May 10, 1974, resolv edwithout giving due course to the petition, to require therespondents to comment thereon, within 10 days fromnotice, and both parties to state whether or not there is anyvalid reason why Civil Case No. 4353-M of the respondentcourt should not be tried and decided jointly with LandRegistration Case No. 2814 of Branch VI of said court,considering that the claim of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.4353-M (herein petitioners) for damages due to allegedillegal occupancy of the land involved by the defendants(respondents herein) may not be properly passed upon andadjudicated in the land registration case, where only thequestion of title to the property sought to be registered willbe decided between the applicants and oppositors, counselfor respondents, Rosendo G Tansinsin Jr., included in hisManifestation and/or Comment, dated May 20, 1974 , th efollowing state ment: nevertheless, from the reading of theresolution aforequoted, one will certainly have no doubt that there is no need for the

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respondents to make any comment on the matter as thesame will be an exercise of futili ty sin ce this HonorableCourt has not only given due course to the petition, but hasactually decided the sa me, x x x. By reason of the



disrespectful tone of the aforesaid statement, said counselwas required by this Courts (First Division) resolution ofMay 29, 1974, to show cause why he should not be dealtwith for contempt of court.

The petitioners by way of comp lia nce with th is Courtsaforementioned resolution of May 10, 1974, requested thatthe order of October 30, 1973 of the respondent court be setasid e and that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan(Branch I and VI) be ordered to consolidate, try and decideCivil Case No. 4353-M of Branch I and L. R.C. Case No.2814 of Branch VI.

The explanation submitted by respondents counsel,although it contained an apology, was not consideredsatisfactory by this Court. Hence in its resolution of July10, 1974, Atty. Rosendo G. Tansinsin Jr. was declared incontempt of court and suspended from the practice of lawfor a period of three months. His subsequent motion forreconsideration and personal plea for leniency, sympathyand understanding, coupled with his repeated apolog y andregret an d the fact that his act appeared to be his firstoffense of that nature, made this Court reconsider thesuspension from the practice of law and, instead, orderedhim to pay a fine of P300.00 which he has paid.

On the principal issues raised in this case, W e have nodoubt that the nature of the action embodied in thecomplaint in Civil Case No. 4353-M is one for recovery ofpossession brought before the Court of First Instance bythe alleged owners of a piece of land against the defendants who were su pposed to have unlawfully continued inpossession since 1969 when they were supposed to return itto plaintiffs, plus damages. That the action is not forunlawful detainer conte mp lated in Rule 70 of the Rules ofCourt, which falls under the exclusive original jurisdictionof the city courts or municipal courts, is very apparentbecause an action of unlawful detainer is defined aswithholding by a person from another for not more thanone year, of the possession of a land or building to which thelatter is entitled after the expiration or termination of theformers right to hold possession by virtue of a contractexpress or implied. (Tenorio vs. Gomba 81 Phil. 54; Dikitvs. Ycasiano 89 Phil. 44) On the basis of the alleg ations ofthe complaint in Civil Case No. 4363-M, the defendants



withheld possession from the

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plaintiffs since 1969 or very much more than the one yearperiod contemp la ted in unlawful detainer cases at thetime the comp laint was filed in July of 1973. Not all casesof dispossession are covered by Rule 70 of the Rules ofCourt (Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer cases)because whenever the owner of property is dispossessed byany other means than those mentioned in theaforementioned rule, he may init iate and maintain aplenary action to recover possession in the Court of FirstInstance, and it is not necessary for him to wait until theexpiration of one year before commencing such action.(Gumiran vs. Gumiran 21 Phil. 174) It may also be broughtafter the expiration of said period of one year, if no actionhad been initiated for forcible entry and detainer duringthat time i n the inferior court. This plenary action torecover possession (accion publiciana) must be instituted inthe Court of First Instance as was done in this case.

The respondent courts action in dismissing Civil CaseNo. 4353-M on the ground that there is another pendingcase (L.R. C. No. 2814 of Branch VI of the same court)between the same parties over the same property is to Ourmind rather precipitate, for We find sufficient merit inpetitioners contention that the rights sought to be enforcedand the reliefs prayed for in Civil Case 4353-M (recovery ofpossession and damages) are entirely separate and distinctfrom that sought in L. R. C. Case No. 2814 (wherepetitioners as oppositors are seeking the exclusion of theirland from that of private respondents claim of title over abigger tract of land). It is likewise true that the Court ofFirst Instance of Bulacan (Branch VI) acting as a landregistration court has a limited and special j urisdictionconfined to the determination of the legality and proprietyof the issue of title over the land subject matter ofregistration, and it has no power to entertain issues ofrightful possession and claim for damages emanating from



ownership. It is a fundamental principle in the lawgoverning unlawful detainer cases (including recovery ofpossession cases) th at a mere plea of title or own ershipover the disputed land by the defendant cannot be used asa sound legal basis for dismissing an action for recovery ofpossession because an action for recovery of possession canbe maintained even against the very owner of the property.(Prado vs. Calpo et al, G. R. No. L-19379, April 30, 1964) Inthe case at bar, there is not

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even a plea of title on the part of priv ate responden ts overthe disputed property but a mere allegation that there isanother action (L. R. C. No. 2814 pending in Branch VI ofthat court) for registration of title to that land thepossession of which is being recovered by petitioners inCivil Case No. 4353-M. An action for recovery of possessionis totally distinct and different from an action for recoveryof title or ownership. In fact, a judgment rendered in a caseof recovery of possession is conclusive only on the questionof possession and not that of ownership. It does not in anyway bind the title or affect the ownership of the land orbuilding. (Sec. 7, Rule 70, Revised Rules of Court)

The inevitable conclusion fro m the foregoing is thatCivil Case No. 4353-M (for recovery of possession anddamages) was arbitrarily and erroneously dismissed on thebasis of the alleged pendency of ano ther action (L. R. C.No. 2814 pending in Branch VI of the same court), becausewhile identity of parties may be established in both cases,there is no identity of cause of action or of rights assertedand relief prayed for, so th at j udg men t which ma y b erend ered in on e case would not necessarily result in resjudicata for the other case.

We cannot see any sufficient reason for any of theparties in this case to object to the consolidation of the trialof both cases (L. R. C. Case No. 2814 and Civil Case No.4353-M), since the evidence that ma y be presented by theparties involving possession and ownership of the disputed



parcel of land may facilitate an expeditious termination ofboth cases. While the issues raised in both cases are notexactly identical, the evidence involving the issues ofpossession and ownership over the same land mu st berelated and its presentation before one court of justicewould redound to a speedy disposition of this litigation.

WHEREFORE, the respondent courts orders of October30, 1973, and February 8, 1974, are hereby declared nulland void and set aside; the comp la int a nd amendedcomplai nt in Civil Case No. 4353-M revived; both therespondent Judge and the Presiding Judge, Branch VI, ofthe Court of First Instance of Bulacan, being directed toconsolidate the trial of L. R. C. No. 2814 and Civil Case No.4353-M in one branch of that court. Costs against privaterespondents.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee and Makasiar,JJ., concur.

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Omico Mining And Industrial Corporation vs. Vallejos

Orders declared null and void and set aside; complaint andamended complaint revived; bo th respondent Judge andPresiding Judge, Branch VI, of the Court of First Instanceof Bulacan directed to consolidate trial of L.R.C. No. 2814and Civil Case No. 4353-M in one branch of that court.

Notes.a) Possession.Public interest, public policy,and public order demand that the party in peacefulpossession of the land, regardless of wh ether it is priv ateor is part of th e public domain, be not ousted therefrom bymeans of force, violence, or inti midation, reg ardless of thequality of his alleged right to possession thereof, and thatwhoever claims to hae a better title or right thereto shouldseek from the proper authorities the legal re mediesestablished therefo r instead of taking the law into theirown hands (Lopez vs. Judge Santiago, L-14889, April 25,1960).



b) Description of property.In an action for recovery ofpossession of real property where a description of theproperty claimed is indispensable, it is not required that adetailed technical description be given; all that is called foris an adequate identification of the portion s involved bydescribing the location, area, and boundaries (Galace vs.Bagtas, L- 15400, August 31, 1964).

c) Propriety of ejectment and not accion publiciana.Ejectment and not an accion publiciana is the properreme dy in a case of undoubtful deprivation or withholdingof possession of a real property when a demand to vacatethe same was ignored (Calubayan vs. Pascual, L-2 2645,September 18, 1967).

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1) Medina v. Valdellon