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International Agricultural International Agricultural Trade: Trade: Export Competition

by Dr Melaku Geboye Destaby Dr Melaku Geboye DestaCEPMLP, University of DundeeCEPMLP, University of Dundee

ScotlandScotland

Graduate Institute of International and Development StudiesSummer Programme on the WTO, International Trade and Development

15-16 July 2008, Geneva July 2008, Geneva

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Agricultural subsidies Agricultural subsidies

Subsidies: support to enterprises provided or Subsidies: support to enterprises provided or mandated by governmentmandated by government

Types: – domestic/production and export Types: – domestic/production and export subsidies subsidies

Why bother? trade/production distortions: Why bother? trade/production distortions: recipients gaining market share -- hence recipients gaining market share -- hence “unfair trade practices”“unfair trade practices”

Why do countries subsidize agriculture? The Why do countries subsidize agriculture? The usual story: food security; culture; usual story: food security; culture; environment; voting; environment; voting;

Then why subsidize exports? The other usual Then why subsidize exports? The other usual storystory high domestic support ► excess supplies ► lower high domestic support ► excess supplies ► lower

world market price ► export subsidies = a simplistic world market price ► export subsidies = a simplistic viewview

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Export subsidies: GATT to Export subsidies: GATT to AoAAoA

Art XVI of GATT 1947: then only one para: no Art XVI of GATT 1947: then only one para: no distinction between domestic and export distinction between domestic and export subsidiessubsidies

Only two legally meaningless obligations:Only two legally meaningless obligations:1.1. the obligation to ‘notify’ subsidies (and not all) andthe obligation to ‘notify’ subsidies (and not all) and

2.2. in case of serious prejudice, the obligation to ‘discuss’ in case of serious prejudice, the obligation to ‘discuss’ the possibility of limiting the subsidizationthe possibility of limiting the subsidization

The 1955 Amendments: a landmarkThe 1955 Amendments: a landmark a discipline prohibiting export subsidies (dual a discipline prohibiting export subsidies (dual

pricing)pricing) special sub-discipline exempting ‘primary special sub-discipline exempting ‘primary

products’: the problem of “equitable shares”products’: the problem of “equitable shares” Primaries=Agriculture + forestry + fisheries + Primaries=Agriculture + forestry + fisheries +

miningmining

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Export Subsidies and Export Subsidies and the 1979 Subsidies the 1979 Subsidies

CodeCode 1979 Subsidies Code: “plurilateral”?1979 Subsidies Code: “plurilateral”? Export subsidies prohibited per seExport subsidies prohibited per se Primary products Primary products ► “certain …”: mining ► “certain …”: mining

outout Definition of “more than equitable share”: Definition of “more than equitable share”:

“any case in which the effect of an export “any case in which the effect of an export subsidy granted by a signatory is to subsidy granted by a signatory is to displace the exports of another signatory”displace the exports of another signatory”

Displacement v. equitable share: Displacement v. equitable share: difference?difference?

The agriculture discipline unchangedThe agriculture discipline unchanged Agricultural disputes proliferatedAgricultural disputes proliferated

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The Uruguay RoundThe Uruguay Round Agriculture: the most contentiousAgriculture: the most contentious Agricultural export subsidies: the most Agricultural export subsidies: the most

contentious within agriculture contentious within agriculture 1985: Leutwiler Report: ultimate goal 1985: Leutwiler Report: ultimate goal

should be “the total elimination of … should be “the total elimination of … export subsidies, as they produce export subsidies, as they produce many of the major distortions in world many of the major distortions in world agricultural markets” agricultural markets”

1986: Punta del Este: to bring “all 1986: Punta del Este: to bring “all measures affecting … export measures affecting … export competition under strengthened and competition under strengthened and more operationally effective GATT more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines”rules and disciplines”

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Uruguay Round Uruguay Round AchievementsAchievements

Important developments from two sources: Important developments from two sources: The AoA: establishment of a “fair and market-The AoA: establishment of a “fair and market-

oriented agricultural trading system” oriented agricultural trading system” The SCM Agreement The SCM Agreement

Complex relations between themComplex relations between them SCM Agreement: SCM Agreement:

Generic with explicit exceptions for agriculture Generic with explicit exceptions for agriculture Could still affect agriculture: Could still affect agriculture:

by filling loopholes in agriculture; and by filling loopholes in agriculture; and as a contextual guide for interpretationas a contextual guide for interpretation

US Upland Cotton: US Upland Cotton: (similar issues to (similar issues to domestic support)domestic support)

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Export subsidies under Export subsidies under the AoAthe AoA

Definition: subsidies contingent upon export Definition: subsidies contingent upon export performance performance

Included: illustrative list of 6 specific Included: illustrative list of 6 specific practices: Art.9:1practices: Art.9:1

Elements of definition: subsidy + export Elements of definition: subsidy + export contingency (not defined by AoA): contingency (not defined by AoA):

Resort to SCM? Resort to SCM? FSC FSC Panel: “Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, which Panel: “Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, which

defines the term ‘subsidy’ for the purposes of the defines the term ‘subsidy’ for the purposes of the SCM Agreement, represents SCM Agreement, represents highly relevant context highly relevant context for the interpretation of the word ‘subsidy’ within for the interpretation of the word ‘subsidy’ within the meaning of the Agreement on Agriculturethe meaning of the Agreement on Agriculture, as it , as it is the only article in the WTO Agreement that is the only article in the WTO Agreement that provides a definition of that term.” provides a definition of that term.”

Subsidies under AoA potentially broader than under Subsidies under AoA potentially broader than under SCMSCM

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The AoA export The AoA export subsidies disciplinesubsidies discipline

Key AoA provisions: Art. 8:Key AoA provisions: Art. 8: ““Each Member undertakes not to Each Member undertakes not to

provide export subsidies otherwise than provide export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with this Agreement and in conformity with this Agreement and with the commitments as specified in with the commitments as specified in that Member's Schedule.”that Member's Schedule.”

All export subsidies divided into two: All export subsidies divided into two: listed and non-listedlisted and non-listed

All agricultural products divided All agricultural products divided into two for export subsidies into two for export subsidies purposes: purposes:

Scheduled and non-scheduledScheduled and non-scheduled

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Export subsidies ct’dExport subsidies ct’d Article 3.3: Article 3.3:

““a Member a Member shall notshall not provide export subsidies provide export subsidies listedlisted in in paragraph 1 of Article 9 in respect of the agricultural paragraph 1 of Article 9 in respect of the agricultural products or groups of products or groups of products specifiedproducts specified in Section II of in Section II of Part IV of its Schedule in excess of the Part IV of its Schedule in excess of the budgetary outlay budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels specified thereinand quantity commitment levels specified therein and and shall notshall not provide such subsidies in respect of any provide such subsidies in respect of any agricultural agricultural product not specifiedproduct not specified in that Section of its in that Section of its Schedule.”Schedule.”

Listed subsidies on scheduled products: permitted Listed subsidies on scheduled products: permitted subject to reduction commitments in value and volume:subject to reduction commitments in value and volume: By: 36% value; 21% volumeBy: 36% value; 21% volume From: 1986-90 base periodFrom: 1986-90 base period On: scheduled productsOn: scheduled products

Listed subsidies on non-scheduled products: prohibitedListed subsidies on non-scheduled products: prohibited Non-listed subsidies on scheduled products: permitted Non-listed subsidies on scheduled products: permitted

but no circumvention! (Art. 10:1)but no circumvention! (Art. 10:1) Non-listed subsidies on non-scheduled products: Non-listed subsidies on non-scheduled products:

prohibited (SCM) prohibited (SCM)

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Who can provide export subsidies?Only 25 members (with EC15 as 1) have export subsidy reduction commitments: i.e. i.e. only 25 allowed to use them:only 25 allowed to use them:

AustraliaAustralia BrazilBrazil BulgariaBulgaria CanadaCanada ColombiaColombia CyprusCyprus Czech RepublicCzech Republic European CommunitiesEuropean Communities HungaryHungary IcelandIceland IndonesiaIndonesia IsraelIsrael MexicoMexico

New ZealandNew Zealand NorwayNorway PanamaPanama PolandPoland RomaniaRomania Slovak RepublicSlovak Republic South AfricaSouth Africa Switzerland-Switzerland-

LiechtensteinLiechtenstein TurkeyTurkey United StatesUnited States UruguayUruguay VenezuelaVenezuela

Source: TN/AG/S/8/Rev.1

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Export subsidies: ct’dExport subsidies: ct’d

Other countries: Other countries: undertaking not to introduce export undertaking not to introduce export

subsidies subsidies Special and differential treatment for Special and differential treatment for

developing countries: developing countries: two-thirds of reduction commitments two-thirds of reduction commitments

over ten years (24% and 14%)over ten years (24% and 14%) exempt from reduction commitments on exempt from reduction commitments on

export subsidies for internal transport export subsidies for internal transport and marketing and marketing

Does it make sense? Does it make sense?

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EU Sugar:EU Sugar: Highlights Highlights Complainants: Australia, Brazil, ThailandComplainants: Australia, Brazil, Thailand Third Parties: Third Parties: Barbados, Belize, Côte d'Ivoire, Barbados, Belize, Côte d'Ivoire,

Cuba, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Cuba, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Saint Kitts Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and and Nevis, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Tobago, CanadaCanada, , ChinaChina, , ColombiaColombia, , IndiaIndia, , NewNew ZealandZealand, , ParaguayParaguay, , and theand the USUS

Challenged measure: EC Regulation No. Challenged measure: EC Regulation No. 1260/2001 on the common organization of 1260/2001 on the common organization of markets in sugar sectormarkets in sugar sector Regulation: sets out basic rules with respect to, Regulation: sets out basic rules with respect to,

inter aliainter alia, intervention prices for raw and white , intervention prices for raw and white sugar, minimum prices for beet within A and B sugar, minimum prices for beet within A and B quotas (and exclusion of C sugar), import and quotas (and exclusion of C sugar), import and export licences, levies, export refunds, and export licences, levies, export refunds, and preferential import arrangementspreferential import arrangements

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EU Sugar ct’dEU Sugar ct’d Two categories of production quotas: A sugar Two categories of production quotas: A sugar

and B sugar:and B sugar: sets max quantities eligible for domestic price sets max quantities eligible for domestic price

support and export subsidies support and export subsidies No limits on production, but:No limits on production, but:

Sugar produced in excess of A and B quantities, Sugar produced in excess of A and B quantities, i.e. i.e. C sugarC sugar, not eligible for domestic price support , not eligible for domestic price support or direct export subsidies and or direct export subsidies and must be exportedmust be exported

Intervention prices fixed for A and B beetIntervention prices fixed for A and B beet Sugar manufacturers must pay growers at Sugar manufacturers must pay growers at

least minimum price for A and B beetleast minimum price for A and B beet Price for beet to produce C sugar may be lowerPrice for beet to produce C sugar may be lower

Export refunds: cover difference between Export refunds: cover difference between world market price and EC price (3x!) – only world market price and EC price (3x!) – only for A and B sugarfor A and B sugar

EC preferences: sugar protocol (ACP) and EC preferences: sugar protocol (ACP) and IndiaIndia

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EU Sugar ct’dEU Sugar ct’d EC Commitments for sugar export subsidies: EC Commitments for sugar export subsidies:

€€499.1 million (value) and 1,273.5 thousand tonnes 499.1 million (value) and 1,273.5 thousand tonnes (vol)(vol)

The controversial footnote to EC schedule: The controversial footnote to EC schedule: "Does not include exports of sugar of ACP and Indian "Does not include exports of sugar of ACP and Indian

origin on which the Community is not making any origin on which the Community is not making any reduction commitments. The average of export in reduction commitments. The average of export in the period 1986 to 1990 amounted to 1.6 mio t." the period 1986 to 1990 amounted to 1.6 mio t."

EC export subsidies actually provided in EC export subsidies actually provided in 2001/02: 2001/02:

4.097 million tonnes4.097 million tonnes Compare against commitment level of 1.273 million Compare against commitment level of 1.273 million

tonnestonnes Not all excess explained by ACP/India sugar: Not all excess explained by ACP/India sugar:

hence claim of cross-subsidization of C sugar!hence claim of cross-subsidization of C sugar!

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EU Sugar ct’dEU Sugar ct’d Complaint: Complaint:

EC has, since 1995, been exporting quantities of EC has, since 1995, been exporting quantities of subsidized sugar in excess of its annual commitment subsidized sugar in excess of its annual commitment levels, contrary to Articles 3 and 8 of the Agreement on levels, contrary to Articles 3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Agriculture.

Measures also inconsistent with SCM Agreement.Measures also inconsistent with SCM Agreement. Defence: Yes they are higher than figures shown in Defence: Yes they are higher than figures shown in

schedule but EC export subsidy commitments for schedule but EC export subsidy commitments for sugar made up of two components: sugar made up of two components: (i) one component which has been subject to progressive (i) one component which has been subject to progressive

reduction during the implementation period; and reduction during the implementation period; and (ii) a second component, Footnote 1 to Section II, Part IV (ii) a second component, Footnote 1 to Section II, Part IV

to its Schedule containing the so-called "ACP/India sugar to its Schedule containing the so-called "ACP/India sugar Footnote" which, it maintains, is subject to a ceiling of 1.6 Footnote" which, it maintains, is subject to a ceiling of 1.6 million tonnesmillion tonnes

So EC export subsidies do not exceed commitments; So EC export subsidies do not exceed commitments; ACP/India equivalent sugar not included in commitmentsACP/India equivalent sugar not included in commitments

Issue: what is the effect of the footnote? Or, what Issue: what is the effect of the footnote? Or, what is the EC commitment level?is the EC commitment level?

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EU Sugar ct’dEU Sugar ct’d

Finding: EU commitment levels for Finding: EU commitment levels for exports of subsidized sugar do not exports of subsidized sugar do not cover ACP/India import equivalent cover ACP/India import equivalent in footnote; footnote of no legal in footnote; footnote of no legal effect; export subsidies in excess of effect; export subsidies in excess of commitment levels; a violation!commitment levels; a violation!

Relations to the Lomé/Cotonou Relations to the Lomé/Cotonou sugar protocol: sugar protocol: Is this the end of the sugar protocol? Is this the end of the sugar protocol? Is sugar following on the foot steps of Is sugar following on the foot steps of

bananas?bananas?

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User marketing or Step 2 payments: User marketing or Step 2 payments: Payments made to domestic users and exporters Payments made to domestic users and exporters

of upland cotton for documented purchases by of upland cotton for documented purchases by domestic users and sales for export by exporters domestic users and sales for export by exporters when the lowest price quotation for United States when the lowest price quotation for United States cotton exceeded the Northern Europe price cotton exceeded the Northern Europe price quotationquotation

Payments to domestic users: Payments to domestic users: import-substitution: compensate users for buying import-substitution: compensate users for buying

domestic; not protected by peace clause; violation domestic; not protected by peace clause; violation of SCM Art. 3.1(b)of SCM Art. 3.1(b)

Payments to exporters: Payments to exporters: subsidizing exports: making exportation profitablesubsidizing exports: making exportation profitable Problem: US had no scheduled commitments for Problem: US had no scheduled commitments for

export subsidies to upland cotton; no scheduling export subsidies to upland cotton; no scheduling = no subsidies = no subsidies

US Upland CottonUS Upland Cotton on on export subsidiesexport subsidies

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Other Means of Export Other Means of Export Support: Support:

Export CreditsExport Credits Export credit: Export credit:

export financing schemes on terms more export financing schemes on terms more favourable than the market due to gov’t favourable than the market due to gov’t backingbacking

Art. 10:2: agreement to develop Art. 10:2: agreement to develop internationally agreed disciplines: internationally agreed disciplines:

Result: Result: failure due mainly to US failure due mainly to US oppositionopposition

Promising developments in DohaPromising developments in Doha Issue: implications of AB ruling in Issue: implications of AB ruling in

US Cotton?US Cotton?

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US Upland CottonUS Upland Cotton on on export credit guaranteesexport credit guarantees

Brazil: challenges three types of export credit Brazil: challenges three types of export credit guarantee programs: guarantee programs: General Sales Manager (GSM) 102 and GSM 103: provide General Sales Manager (GSM) 102 and GSM 103: provide

guarantees to exporters when credit is extended by guarantees to exporters when credit is extended by foreign financial institutions, and Supplier Credit foreign financial institutions, and Supplier Credit Guarantee Program (SCGP) applies when credit is Guarantee Program (SCGP) applies when credit is extended by the exporter to the purchaser of US ag extended by the exporter to the purchaser of US ag productsproducts

How does it work? How does it work? Example Example based on GSM 102:based on GSM 102:

exporter receives L/C in its favour from a foreign bankexporter receives L/C in its favour from a foreign bank exporter applies for guarantee before making the exporter applies for guarantee before making the

exportationexportation exporter pays a fee for the guarantee based on a exporter pays a fee for the guarantee based on a

schedule of rates, but fees schedule of rates, but fees capped by law at 1% of capped by law at 1% of guaranteed dollar value of transactionguaranteed dollar value of transaction

if foreign bank fails to make payment, the USDA’s if foreign bank fails to make payment, the USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) steps inCommodity Credit Corporation (CCC) steps in

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Brazil: export credit guarantees violate AoA Arts. Brazil: export credit guarantees violate AoA Arts. 10.1 & 8, not protected by peace clause, and 10.1 & 8, not protected by peace clause, and violate SCM Art. 3.1(a) and 3.2violate SCM Art. 3.1(a) and 3.2

US: AoA US: AoA Art. 10.2 excludes export credit Art. 10.2 excludes export credit guarantee programs from AoA export subsidy guarantee programs from AoA export subsidy disciplines, and if not, beneficiaries pay disciplines, and if not, beneficiaries pay premiums, so no subsidy premiums, so no subsidy

Panel report (upheld by AB, with separate Panel report (upheld by AB, with separate opinion):opinion): US US export credit guarantee provided ‘at premium rates export credit guarantee provided ‘at premium rates

inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes’, hence losses of the programmes’, hence per seper se export export subsidiessubsidies

Export credit guarantee a non-listed subsidy, used to Export credit guarantee a non-listed subsidy, used to circumvent commitments; in violation of AoA Art. 10.1circumvent commitments; in violation of AoA Art. 10.1

Not protected by peace clause; in violation of SCM Art. Not protected by peace clause; in violation of SCM Art. 3.1(a) and 3.23.1(a) and 3.2

export credit export credit guarantees ct’dguarantees ct’d

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Other Means of Export Other Means of Export Support: Support: Food AidFood Aid

Food Aid: two-fold issues:Food Aid: two-fold issues: LDCs & NFIDCs: fear of: LDCs & NFIDCs: fear of:

production cuts due to the subsidies discipline; production cuts due to the subsidies discipline; rising world market prices; and rising world market prices; and resulting food security concernsresulting food security concerns

Net-food-exporters: fear of:Net-food-exporters: fear of: use of food aid as means of market penetration; use of food aid as means of market penetration;

andand circumvention of export subsidy commitments: circumvention of export subsidy commitments:

concessionality and the borderline problem.concessionality and the borderline problem. The final outcome: The final outcome:

Decision on LDCs and NFIDCs: a non-binding Decision on LDCs and NFIDCs: a non-binding documentdocument

Referral to the FAC system: an institutional Referral to the FAC system: an institutional anomalyanomaly

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Major Export Subsidies Major Export Subsidies Issues for the Doha Issues for the Doha

NegotiationsNegotiations Export subsidies “proper”: Export subsidies “proper”:

Issue: when, not whether, to eliminate them Issue: when, not whether, to eliminate them (see Doha Declaration)(see Doha Declaration)

Other export support mechanisms: Other export support mechanisms: Discriminatory nature of relevant AoA Discriminatory nature of relevant AoA

regime: call for discipline in export regime: call for discipline in export credits/insurance, tighter discipline on food credits/insurance, tighter discipline on food aid, state trading enterprises, etc.aid, state trading enterprises, etc.

Export restrictions: Japan no longer Export restrictions: Japan no longer alone!alone! The new issue of food supply security even The new issue of food supply security even

when you can afford to pay for itwhen you can afford to pay for it

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‘‘July Framework’ on July Framework’ on export subsidies export subsidies

A breakthrough – agreement to abolish all forms A breakthrough – agreement to abolish all forms of export subsidies: date to be agreedof export subsidies: date to be agreed

Commitment covers: Commitment covers: listed export subsidieslisted export subsidies export credits, guarantees and insurance with payment export credits, guarantees and insurance with payment

dates beyond 180 days (or those violating rules to be dates beyond 180 days (or those violating rules to be agreed for payments within 180 days)agreed for payments within 180 days)

trade distorting practices of exporting STEstrade distorting practices of exporting STEs food aid violating rules to be agreedfood aid violating rules to be agreed

S&D: S&D: Longer phase out implementation periods = a false Longer phase out implementation periods = a false

image!image! AoA Article 9.4 exemptions (marketing and transport) AoA Article 9.4 exemptions (marketing and transport)

to be available for a ‘reasonable period’!to be available for a ‘reasonable period’! Future agreements on export credits, etc. to Future agreements on export credits, etc. to

accommodate concerns of LDCs and NFIDCsaccommodate concerns of LDCs and NFIDCs To address food emergencies otherwise impossibleTo address food emergencies otherwise impossible

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HK MinisterialHK Ministerial Elimination of export subsidies set for end 2013: Elimination of export subsidies set for end 2013:

will it happen?will it happen? Guidelines agreed on new disciplinesGuidelines agreed on new disciplines Export credits, export credit guarantees or Export credits, export credit guarantees or

insurance programmesinsurance programmes with repayment periods of with repayment periods of 180 days and below should: 180 days and below should: be self-financing, reflect market consistency, and period be self-financing, reflect market consistency, and period

should be of a sufficiently short durationshould be of a sufficiently short duration Trade-distorting practices of STEs:Trade-distorting practices of STEs:

disciplines to extend to the future use of monopoly powersdisciplines to extend to the future use of monopoly powers Food aid: Food aid:

commitment to maintain adequate levels commitment to maintain adequate levels "safe box" to be created for bona fide food aid to ensure "safe box" to be created for bona fide food aid to ensure

that there is no unintended impediment to dealing with that there is no unintended impediment to dealing with emergency situationsemergency situations

to ensure elimination of commercial displacementto ensure elimination of commercial displacement New disciplines set to be agreed by 30 April 2006 New disciplines set to be agreed by 30 April 2006

as part of modalities, but missed as part of modalities, but missed

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May 2008 Modalities May 2008 Modalities Draft Draft

Elimination of scheduled export subsidies: Elimination of scheduled export subsidies: Developed countries by end 2013Developed countries by end 2013 Developing countries: by end 2016Developing countries: by end 2016 cotton export subsidies to be eliminated on day cotton export subsidies to be eliminated on day

11 Developing countries: continue to benefit Developing countries: continue to benefit

from AoA Art. 9.4 until end 2021 (i.e. 5 from AoA Art. 9.4 until end 2021 (i.e. 5 years after end-date for elimination of years after end-date for elimination of export subsidies)export subsidies)

Export credits/guarantees/insurance: Export credits/guarantees/insurance: Annex JAnnex J

Exporting STEs: Annex KExporting STEs: Annex K Int’l food aid: Annex LInt’l food aid: Annex L

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ReadingsReadings

Official Documents: Official Documents: Texts of GATT 1947; Agreements on Agriculture and SCMTexts of GATT 1947; Agreements on Agriculture and SCM Uruguay Round Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Uruguay Round Modalities for the Establishment of Specific

Binding Commitments Under the Reform Programme, Binding Commitments Under the Reform Programme, GATT doc. GATT doc. MTN.GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993MTN.GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993

Doha Doha Revised Draft Modalities For AgricultureRevised Draft Modalities For Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.2, , TN/AG/W/4/Rev.2, 19 May 2008 19 May 2008

Primary Readings:Primary Readings: Merit Janow and Robert Staiger, “Canada – Dairy: Canada – Merit Janow and Robert Staiger, “Canada – Dairy: Canada –

Measures Affecting the Importation of Dairy Products and the Measures Affecting the Importation of Dairy Products and the Exportation of Milk” 3(2) Exportation of Milk” 3(2) World Trade Review World Trade Review (2004), pp. 277-(2004), pp. 277-315315

WTO, Unofficial Guide to Revised Draft Modalities, 19 May 2008, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_modals_may08_e.pdf

Cases:Cases: United States – Subsidies on Upland CottonUnited States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267, Panel , WT/DS267, Panel

Report (8 September 2004), and AB Report (3 March 2005) Report (8 September 2004), and AB Report (3 March 2005) European Communities − Export Subsidies on SugarEuropean Communities − Export Subsidies on Sugar: : Complaint Complaint

by Australiaby Australia (WT/DS265), (WT/DS265), by Brazilby Brazil (WT/DS266), (WT/DS266), by Thailandby Thailand (WT/DS283), Panel Reports (15 October 2004), and AB report (28 (WT/DS283), Panel Reports (15 October 2004), and AB report (28 April 2005)April 2005)