THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 141853. February 7, 2001] TERESITAV.IDOLOR, petitioner,vs. HON.COURTOFAPPEALS,SPS. GUMERSINDODEGUZMANandILUMINADADEGUZMANand HON.PRUDENCIOCASTILLO,JR.,PresidingJudge,RegionalTrial Court,NationalCapitalJudicialRegion,Branch220,Quezon City, respondents. D E C I S I O N GONZAGA-REYES, J.: ThisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorarifiledbypetitionerTeresita Idolor which seeks to set aside the decision[1] of the respondent Court of Appeals which reversed the Order[2]of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City[3]grantingIdolorsprayerfortheissuanceofawritofpreliminary injunctionandtheresolutiondenyingpetitionersmotionfor reconsideration.[4] OnMarch21,1994,tosecurealoanofP520,000.00,petitioner TeresitaIdolorexecutedinfavorofprivaterespondentGumersindoDe GuzmanaDeedofRealEstate Mortgagewithrightofextra-judicial foreclosureuponfailuretoredeemthemortgageonorbefore September20,1994. Theobjectofsaidmortgageisa200-squaremeter propertywithimprovementslocatedat66IlocosSurStreet,Barangay Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 25659. OnSeptember21,1996,privaterespondentIluminadadeGuzman, wifeofGumersindodeGuzman,filedacomplaintagainstpetitioner IdolorbeforetheOfficeoftheBarangayCaptainofBarangayRamon Magsaysay,QuezonCity,whichresultedinaKasunduangPag-aayos which agreement is quoted in full[5]: Kami, ang (mga) may sumbong at (mga) ipinagsusumbong sa usaping binabanggit sa itaas, ay nagkakasundo sa pamamagitan nito na ayusin ang aming alitan gaya ng sumusunod: Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor of legal age ay nakahiram ng halagang P520,000.00 noong September 20, 1994. Na ang nasabing halaga ay may nakasanlang titulo ng lupa (TCT No. 25659) under Registry receipt 3420 dated July 15, 1996. Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor ay humihingi ng 90 days palugit (grace period) to settle the said amount. Failure to settle the above account on or before December 21, 1996, I agree to execute a deed of sale with the agreement to repurchase without interest within one year. Total amount of P1,233,288.23 inclusive of interest earned. At nangangako kami na tutupad na tunay at matapat sa mga katakdaan ng pag-aayos na inilahad sa itaas. Petitionerfailedtocomplywithherundertaking;thusprivate respondent Gumersindo filed a motion for execution before the Office of theBarangaycaptainwhosubsequentlyissuedacertificationtofile action. OnMarch21,1997,respondentGumersindoDeGuzmanfiledan extrajudicialforeclosureoftherealestatemortgagepursuanttothe parties agreement set forth in the real estate mortgage dated March 21, 1994. OnMay23,1997,themortgagedpropertywassoldinapublic auctiontorespondentGumersindo,asthehighestbidderand consequently,theSheriffsCertificateofSalewasregisteredwiththe Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997. OnJune25,1998,petitionerfiledwiththeRegionalTrialCourtof QuezonCity,Branch220,acomplaintforannulmentofSheriffs Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order(TRO)andawritofpreliminaryinjunctionagainstprivate respondents,DeputySheriffsMarinoCacheroandRodolfoLescanoand theRegistryofDeedsofQuezonCityallegingamongothersalleged irregularity and lack of notice in the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings subjectofthe realestatemortgage. Inthemeantime,atemporary restraining order was issued by the trial court. OnJuly28,1998,thetrialcourtissuedawritofpreliminary injunctionenjoiningprivaterespondents,theDeputySheriffsandthe RegistryofDeedsofQuezonCityfromcausingtheissuanceofafinal deedofsaleandconsolidationofownershipofthesubjectpropertyin favoroftheDeGuzmanspouses.Thetrialcourtdeniedthemotionfor reconsideration filed by the de Guzman spouses. SpousesdeGuzmanfiledwiththerespondentCourtofAppealsa petitionforcertiorariseekingannulmentofthetrialcourtsorderdated July 28, 1998 which granted the issuance of a preliminary injunction. OnSeptember28,1999,therespondentcourtgrantedthepetition andannulledtheassailedwritofpreliminaryinjunction. TeresitaIdolor filedhermotionforreconsiderationwhichwasdeniedinaresolution dated February 4, 2000. Hencethispetitionforreviewoncertiorarifiledbypetitioner Teresita V. Idolor. The issues raised by petitioner are: whether or not the respondentCourtofAppealserredinruling(I)thatpetitionerhasno moreproprietaryrighttotheissuanceofthewritofinjunction,(2)that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos did not ipso facto result in novation of the real estatemortgage,(3)thattheKasunduangPag-aayosismerelya promissory note of petitioner to private respondent spouses; and (4) that thequestionedwritofpreliminaryinjunctionwasissuedwithgrave abuse of discretion. The core issue in this petition is whether or not the respondent Court erredinfindingthatthetrialcourtcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretion in enjoining the private and public respondents from causing the issuance ofafinaldeedofsaleandconsolidationofownershipofthesubject parcel of land in favor of private respondents. Petitioner claims that her proprietary right over the subject parcel of landwasnotyetlostsinceherrighttoredeemthesubjectlandfora period of one year had neither lapsed nor run as the sheriffs certificate of salewasnullandvoid;thatpetitionerandthegeneralpublichavenot beenvalidlynotifiedoftheauctionsaleconductedbyrespondent sheriffs;thatthenewspaperutilizedinthepublicationofthenoticeof sale was not a newspaper of general circulation. We do not agree. Injunctionisapreservativeremedyaimedatprotectingsubstantive rightsandinterests.[6] Beforeaninjunctioncanbeissued,itisessential thatthefollowingrequisitesbe present: 1)theremustbearightin esse ortheexistenceofarighttobeprotected;2)theactagainstwhichthe injunctionistobedirectedisaviolationofsuchright.[7] Hencethe existenceofarightviolated,isaprerequisitetothegrantingofan injunction. Injunctionisnotdesignedtoprotectcontingentorfuture rights. Failuretoestablisheithertheexistenceofaclearandpositive rightwhichshouldbejudiciallyprotectedthroughthewritofinjunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right, is asufficientgroundfordenyingtheinjunction.[8] Thecontrollingreason fortheexistenceofthejudicialpowertoissuethewritisthatthecourt maytherebypreventathreatenedorcontinuousirremediableinjuryto someofthepartiesbeforetheirclaimscanbethoroughlyinvestigated andadvisedlyadjudicated.[9] Itistoberesortedtoonlywhenthereisa pressingnecessitytoavoidinjuriousconsequenceswhichcannotbe remedied under any standard of compensation.[10] Intheinstantcase,weagreewiththerespondentCourt that petitioner hasnomoreproprietaryrighttospeakofoverthe foreclosedpropertytoentitlehertotheissuanceofawritof injunction. Itappearsthatthemortgagedpropertywassoldinapublic auctiontoprivaterespondentGumersindoonMay23,1997andthe sheriffscertificateofsalewasregisteredwiththeRegistryofDeedsof QuezonCityonJune23,1997. Petitionerhadoneyearfromthe registrationofthesheriffssaletoredeemthepropertybutshefailedto exerciseherrightonorbeforeJune23,1998,thusspousesdeGuzman arenowentitledtoaconveyanceandpossessionoftheforeclosed property. Whenpetitionerfiledhercomplaintforannulmentofsheriffs sale against private respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminaryinjunctiononJune25,1998,shefailedtoshowsufficient interestortitleinthepropertysoughttobeprotectedasherrightof redemptionhadalreadyexpiredonJune23,1998,i.e.two(2)days beforethefilingofthecomplaint. Itisalwaysagroundfordenying injunctionthatthepartyseekingithasinsufficienttitleorinterestto sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought - in other words, that sheshowsnoequity.[11] Thepossibilityofirreparabledamagewithout proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.[12] Petitionersallegationregardingtheinvalidityofthesheriffssale dwells on the merits of the case; We cannot rule on the same considering that the matter should be resolved during the trial on the merits. PetitionernextcontendsthattheexecutionoftheKasunduangPag-aayosdatedSeptember21,1996betweenherandspousesde Guzman beforetheOfficeoftheLuponTagapamayapashowedthe express and unequivocal intention of the parties to novate or modify the realestatemortgage;thatacomparisonoftherealestatemortgage datedMarch21,1994andtheKasunduangPag-aayosdatedSeptember 21,1996revealedtheirreconciliableincompatibilitybetweenthem,i.e., that under the first agreement, the amount due was five hundred twenty thousand(P520,000)pesosonlypayablebypetitionerwithinsix(6) months, after which it shall earn interest at the legal rate per annum and non-paymentofwhichwithinthestipulatedperiod, privaterespondents have the right to extra-judicially foreclose the real estate mortgage while underthesecondagreement,theamountduewasonemilliontwo hundredthirtythreethousandtwohundredeightyeightand23/100 (P1,233,288.23)inclusiveofinterest,payablewithin90daysandincase of non payment of the same on or before December 21, 1996, petitioner shouldexecuteadeedofsalewithrighttorepurchasewithinoneyear withoutinterest;thatthesecondagreementKasunduangPag-aayoswas a valid new contract as it was duly executed by the parties and it changed theprincipalconditionsofpetitionersoriginalobligations. Petitioner insiststhattheKasunduangPag-aayoswasnotamerepromissorynote contrarytorespondentcourtsconclusionsinceitwasenteredbythe partiesbeforetheLuponTagapamayapawhichhastheeffectofafinal judgment.[13] We are not persuaded. Novationistheextinguishmentofanobligationbythesubstitution orchangeoftheobligationbyasubsequentonewhichterminatesit, either by changing its objects or principal conditions, or by substituting a newdebtorinplaceoftheoldone,orbysubrogatingathirdpersonto therightsofthecreditor.[14] Underthelaw,novationisnever presumed. Thepartiestoacontractmustexpresslyagreethattheyare abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one.[15] Accordingly, it was heldthatnonovationofacontracthadoccurredwhenthenew agreement entered into between the parties was intended to give life to the old one.[16] AreviewoftheKasunduangPag-aayoswhichisquotedearlierdoes notsupportpetitionerscontentionthatitnovatedtherealestate mortgagesincethewilltonovatedidnotappearbyexpressagreement of the parties nor the old and the new contracts were incompatible in all points. Infact,petitionerexpresslyrecognizedintheKasunduanthe existenceandthevalidityoftheoldobligation whereshe acknowledged herlongoverdueaccountsinceSeptember20,1994whichwassecured by a real estate mortgage and asked for a ninety (90) days grace period to settleherobligationonorbeforeDecember21,1996andthatupon failure to do so, she will execute a deed of sale with a right to repurchase withoutinterestwithinoneyearinfavorofprivaterespondents. Where thepartiestothenewobligationexpresslyrecognizethecontinuing existenceandvalidityoftheoldone,where,inotherwords,theparties expresslynegatedthelapsingoftheoldobligation,therecanbeno novation.[17] Wefindnocogentreasontodisagreewiththerespondent courts pronouncement as follows: In the present case, there exists no such express abrogation of the original undertaking. The agreement adverted to (Annex 2 of Comment, p.75 Rollo) executed by the parties on September 21, 1996 merely gave life to the March 21, 1994 mortgage contract which was then more than two years overdue. Respondent acknowledged therein her total indebtedness in the sum of P1,233,288.23 including the interests due on the unpaid mortgage loan which amount she promised to liquidate within ninety (90) days or until December 21, 1996, failing which she also agreed to execute in favor of the mortgagee a deed of sale of the mortgaged property for the same amount without interest. Evidently, it was executed to facilitate easy compliance by respondent mortgagor with her mortgage obligation. It (the September 21, 1996 agreement) is not incompatible and can stand together with the mortgage contract of March 21, 1994. A compromise agreement clarifying the total sum owned by a buyer with the view that he would find it easier to comply with his obligations under the Contract to Sell does not novate said Contract to Sell (Rillo v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 461 [1997]). Respondent correctly argues that the compromise agreement has the force and effect of a final judgment. That precisely is the reason why petitioner resorted to the foreclosure of the mortgage on March 27, 1997, after her failure to comply with her obligation which expired on December 21, 1996. Reliance by private respondent upon Section 417 of the New Local Government Code of 1991, which requires the lapse of six (6) months before the amicable settlement may be enforced, is misplaced. The instant case deals with extra judicial foreclosure governed by ACT No. 3135 as amended. Notably,theprovisionintheKasunduangPag-aayosregardingthe executionofadeedofsalewithrighttorepurchasewithinoneyear wouldhavethesameeffectastheextra-judicialforeclosureofthereal estatemortgagewhereinpetitionerwasgivenoneyearfromthe registration of the sheriffs sale in the Registry of property to redeem the property,i.e.,failuretoexercisetherightofredemptionwouldentitle thepurchasertopossessionoftheproperty.Itisnotpropertoconsider anobligationnovatedbyunimportantmodificationswhichdonotalter itsessence.[18] Itbearsstressthattheperiodtopaythetotalamountof petitioners indebtedness inclusive of interest amounted to P1,233,288.23 expired on December 21, 1996 and petitioner failed to execute a deed of salewithrighttorepurchaseonthesaiddateuptothetimeprivate respondentsfiledtheirpetitionforextra-judicialforeclosureofreal estate mortgage. The failure of petitioner to comply with her undertaking inthekasunduantosettleherobligationeffectivelydelayedprivate respondentsrighttoextra-judiciallyforeclosetherealestatemortgage whichrightaccruedasfarbackas1994. Thus,petitionerhasnotshown that she is entitled to the equitable relief of injunction. WHEREFORE,the petitionisDENIED. Thedecisionoftherespondent Court of Appeals dated September 28, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Melo(Chairman),Vitug,Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur. [1] CA-G.R.SPNo.49469,pennedbyJusticeJesusM.Elbinias,concurredinbyJustices Delilah Vidallon Magtolis and Rodrigo V. Cosico; Rollo, pp. 35-37. [2] CA Rollo, pp. 42-46. [3] Branch 220, presided by Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo, Jr.; Civil Case No. Q-98-34728. [4] Justice Elbinias retired on October15,1999, thus the motion for reconsideration was raffled to another member, Justice Cosico; Rollo, pp. 40-42. [5] Rollo, p. 43. [6] Heirs of Joaquin Asuncion vs. Gervacio, Jr. 304 SCRA 322. [7] Ibid.; Sales vs. SEC, 169 SCRA 109. [8] S&AGaisanoIncorporated vs. Hidalgo,192SCRA224citingRosauro vs. Cuneta,151 SCRA 575. [9] Del Rosario vs. CA, 255 SCRA 152. [10] Del Rosario vs. CA, supra. [11] Angela Estate, Inc. vs. CFI of Negros Occidental, 24 SCRA 500. [12] Heirs of Joaquin Asuncion vs. Gervacio, Jr., supra citing Arcega vs. CA, 275 SCRA 176. [13] Sections416and417of RA7160otherwiseknownas TheNew Local Government Code of 1991 provides: Section416. Theamicablesettlementandarbitrationawardshouldhavetheforceand effect of the final judgment of a court. Section417. Theamicablesettlementorarbitrationawardmaybeenforcedby executionbytheluponwithinsix(6)monthsfromthedateofsettlement. Afterthe lapseoftime,thesettlementmaybeenforcedtheactionintheappropriatecityor municipal court. [14] Cochingyan,Jr. vs. R&BSuretyandInsuranceCo.,Inc.,151SCRA339 citingDe Cortes vs. Venturanza, 79 SCRA 709. [15] Huibonhua vs. CA, 320 SCRA 625 citing Rillo vs. CA, 274 SCRA 461. [16] Ibid. [17] Huibonhua vs. CA, supra citingCochingyanJr. vs. R&BSuretyandInsuranceCo. Inc., supra. [18] Tolentino,VolumeIV,CivilCodeofthePhilippines,1991edition,p.387citing Sentencias, March 14, 1908, April 15, 1909 and July 8, 1910.