11
1 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks

1 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks. Potential Damage of DDoS Attacks l The Problem: Massive distributed DoS attacks have the potential to severely

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: 1 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks. Potential Damage of DDoS Attacks l The Problem: Massive distributed DoS attacks have the potential to severely

1

Distributed Denialof Service Attacks

Page 2: 1 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks. Potential Damage of DDoS Attacks l The Problem: Massive distributed DoS attacks have the potential to severely

Potential Damage of DDoS Attacks

The Problem:Massive distributed DoS attacks have the potential to severely

decrease backbone availability and can virtually detach anetwork from the Internet.

2

Page 3: 1 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks. Potential Damage of DDoS Attacks l The Problem: Massive distributed DoS attacks have the potential to severely

Motives for DDoS Attacks Cyber warfare: Prevent information exchange A means to blackmail a company or even country

and cause image and money loss Youthful mischief and desire to feel the power “to

rule the world“ Proof of technical excellence to “the world“ and

oneself Outbreak of worms from Internet security

research ;-) ??

3

Page 4: 1 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks. Potential Damage of DDoS Attacks l The Problem: Massive distributed DoS attacks have the potential to severely

4

What Are DDoS Tools?

Clog victim’s network. Use many sources (“daemons”) for

attacking traffic. Use “master” machines to control

the daemon attackers. At least 4 different versions in use:

TFN, TFN2K, Trinoo, Stacheldraht.

Page 5: 1 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks. Potential Damage of DDoS Attacks l The Problem: Massive distributed DoS attacks have the potential to severely

5

How They Work

Victim

Daemon

Daemon

DaemonDaemon

Daemon

Master

Real Attacker

Page 6: 1 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks. Potential Damage of DDoS Attacks l The Problem: Massive distributed DoS attacks have the potential to severely

6

How They Talk Trinoo: attacker uses TCP; masters and

daemons use UDP; password authentication

TFN(Tribe Flood Network): attacker uses shell to invoke master; masters and daemons use ICMP ECHOREPLY, TCP SYN flood, ICMP Broadcast (smurf)

Stacheldraht: attacker uses encrypted TCP connection to master; masters and daemons use TCP and ICMP ECHO REPLY; rcp used for auto-update and generation

Page 7: 1 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks. Potential Damage of DDoS Attacks l The Problem: Massive distributed DoS attacks have the potential to severely

7

Deploying DDOS

Attackers seem to use standard, well-known holes (i.e., rpc.ttdbserver, amd, rpc.cmsd, rpc.mountd, rpc.statd).– attacks on flaws of remote buffer

overflows They appear to have “auto-hack”

tools – point, click, and invade. Lesson: practice good computer

hygiene.

Page 8: 1 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks. Potential Damage of DDoS Attacks l The Problem: Massive distributed DoS attacks have the potential to severely

8

Detecting DDOS Tools

Most current IDS’s detect the current generation of tools.

They work by looking for DDoS control messages.

Naturally, these will change over time; in particular, more such messages will be properly encrypted. (A hacker PKI?)

Page 9: 1 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks. Potential Damage of DDoS Attacks l The Problem: Massive distributed DoS attacks have the potential to severely

9

What Can ISPs Do? Deploy source address anti-spoof filters

(very important!). Turn off directed broadcasts. Develop security relationships with

neighbor ISPs. Set up mechanism for handling customer

security complaints. Develop traffic volume monitoring

techniques.

Page 10: 1 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks. Potential Damage of DDoS Attacks l The Problem: Massive distributed DoS attacks have the potential to severely

10

Traffic Volume Monitoring – an example

Look for too much traffic to a particular destination.

Learn to look for traffic to that destination at your border routers (access routers, peers, exchange points, etc.).

Can we automate the tools – too many queue drops on an access router will trigger source detection?

Page 11: 1 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks. Potential Damage of DDoS Attacks l The Problem: Massive distributed DoS attacks have the potential to severely

11

References http://www.cert.org/reports/dsit_workshop.

pdf Dave Dittrich’s analyses:

– http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/trinoo.analysis

– http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/tfn.analysis

– http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/stacheldraht.analysis

Scanning tool: http://www.fbi.gov/nipc/trinoo.htm