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Bioterrorism and AgricultureBioterrorism and Agriculture

Regional Bioterrorism Symposium:Risk and Response

May 7-8, 2002

Sam D. Holland, D.V.M.South Dakota State Veterinarian

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Bioterrorism and AgricultureBioterrorism and AgricultureDEFINITIONS?DEFINITIONS?

(1) Terrorism - (FBI Definition) “Unlawful…force against persons or property to intimidate or coerce…”

(2) Agroterrorism - Terrorism at Agricultural targets- Animal/Plant

- Chemical- Physical

-Biological(3) Bioterrorism - A terrorist activity that employs a

biological agent as the means of force

Agro-bio-terrorism?Biological agent as unlawful force at agricultural targets

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Experience Bioterrorism in AnimalsExperience Bioterrorism in AnimalsBiowarfareWWI 1916-1918 - Germany used Pseudomonas Mallei

(glanders)

- “German agents in the U.S. probably innoculated horses and mules prior to shipment”

WWII 1942-1943 Britain developed and produced

Anthrax-infected cattle cakes

1945 - U.S. was within months of bringing

Anthrax program on line

1969 - U.S. terminated offensive biological weapons program - 2,000 people were out of work! Took 2 years to destroy stockpiles of agents

1972 - Biological and toxin weapons convention signed by 140 nations

(SOME WERE NOT SERIOUS!)

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1970s - Former Soviet Union (FSU)

9 Agents - Mainly the following 6 :

• Plague 1500T • Anthrax

• Tularemia • Smallpox 100T

• Glanders 2000T • Venezuelan Equine

Encephalitis 150T

1980s - Iraq

• Anthrax • Tetanus

• Botulism • Brucellosis

• Tularemia

(+) Plant Pathogens

STATUS — UNKNOWN!

United Nations Special Commission believes Iraq preserved capability!

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UNSCOM - Iraq - 380,000 liters Botulism

- 84,250 liters Anthrax

- 3,400 liters C. Perfringens

+ (2200 liters aflatoxin)

+ Camel Pox

March 2002

COWS SABOTAGED WITH ANTIBIOTICS

Java Center, N.Y. — Someone has been sneaking onto dairy farms at night in western New York and putting antibiotics into milk storage tanks and injecting cows with the drugs, police say.

The tampering has ruined 44,000 gallons of milk worth $49,000 to farmers, state police Lt. John Hibsch said.

Authorities have no suspects in the 14 cases under investigation since the fall, Hibsch said.

NO REAL THREAT DIRECTED AT AG ANIMALS IS KNOWN TO HAVE OCCURRED IN THE U.S.

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Biological TerrorismBiological Terrorism“The intentional use of micro-organisms or toxins from living organisms to cause death or disease in humans, animals, or

plants in civilian settings”

Biological WarfareBiological Warfare“Biological Terrorism as part of war”

Agro-TerrorismAgro-Terrorism“Biological Terrorism directed at

agriculture”

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What Are The Risks?What Are The Risks?Target is Large - Agriculture accounts for 1/6 of USGDP- Largest sector of South Dakota economy- 5 cattle for each person (3.9M cattle, 1.2M swine, .4M sheep)

Weapons Are Available - More readily available bioagents for animals than for

people.- Many of these agents are quite environmentally

resistant- Easy to acquire, legal to possess- Relatively easy to produce

Appealing to Terrorists- Animal disease agents can be selected that are not

infectious to the developer (FMD, CSF) - Less public emotional response to agro-terrorism than

bioterrorism directed at human health- Agents could intentionally be inflicted and made to appear

as non-intentional incurrence.

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HI

AK

498,949 Cattle from 44 States & Canada

2002 ANNUAL CATTLE IMPORTS

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1,436,324 From 44 States & Canada2002 ANNUAL SWINE IMPORTS

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What Are Our Vulnerabilities?What Are Our Vulnerabilities?

Animals

Production Systems

Food Supply - Food Security

Economic Collapse

Culture of Rural America

RisksVulnerabilitiesPrevent Prepare

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Food System Changes with GlobalizationFood System Changes with Globalization

Research and DevelopmentProductionProcessing/StoringDistribution

Concentration, Consolidation Internationalization

Trade Agreements, Authorizations

ALL These Lead to REAL RISKSFor Us [U.S.] [South Dakota]

Vulnerability

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U.S. CATTLE SLAUGHTER DAILYU.S. CATTLE SLAUGHTER DAILYAve = 130,000 / day (Total U.S. Slaughter)Tyson (IBP) / Excel / Con Agra

• Ave = 81,000 / day• Beef Sales = $22.3 B / year

Recently in Kansas:• FMD Minor Scare: 1.50 Limit

• = $5 Million / day loss to Industry• direct in value of Livestock sold

Some Exercises: • Estimate FMD Incurrence = $50 B

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Food Animal Sales

(Billion)

People Earning Living

on Farms

(Million)

1940

60

$57B

2000

50

40

30

20

10

8

30

1940

1.8M

2000

25

20

15

10

5

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Swine: China - 6 X more than U.S. Cattle: Brazil - 146 Million vs. U.S. 100 million

China - 110 MillionArgentina - 52 MillionMexico - 27 MillionCanada - 13 Million

Sheep: Australia - 118 Million vs. U.S. 7 MillionChina - 280 MillionIndia - 180 MillionNew Zealand - 46 Million

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Concentration, Internationalization, Trade AgreementsConcentration, Internationalization, Trade Agreements

Importing Food Supplies

Exporting Food Supplies

Costs of Production

Monetary Differences

Policy Differences

Infrastructure Differences

Potential for Dependence on Imports for FOOD SUPPLIES

Potential for New Food Safety RISKS (e.g.: mass exposure)

Potential for New/Emerging Animal Health RISKS

(e.g.: imported pesticides, contaminants, disease agents)

Vulnerability

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Emerging ConcernsEmerging ConcernsENDEMIC PRRS MSWD BLV Johnes Scrapie CWD

FAD’S FMD Rinderpest Heartwater BSE Hog Cholera S. Ves. Disease West Nile Virus Nipah Virus

Vulnerability

(Livestock population totally naïve and susceptible to diseases common throughout the rest of the world.)

*

*

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Map of OutbreakMap of OutbreakVulnerability

August 23, 2000 Receive information/request to participate in pilot project importing live cattle from Uruguay

October 15, 2000 Uruguay infected with FMD

October 29, 2000 Receive report of FMD in Uruguay

June 12, 2001 1358 CONFIRMED cases FMD in Uruguay

August 2000 US stopped Argentine fresh beef imports based on (+) FMD tests

December 2000 US re-opened Argentine fresh beef imports after sending officials to evaluate

February 2001 “Rumors” of FMD rampant in Argentina

March 13, 2001 Argentina reports one case of FMD

June 12, 2001 1105 confirmed cases FMD in Argentina

RISKS?RISKS?

0 3000

Globalization?3000

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Agro-BioterrorismAgro-Bioterrorism

Prevent - Prepare - Respond

- Reliance on international Peace Keeping

- Reliance on Office of Homeland Security

- Reliance on Industry Awareness

- Reliance on State officials

- Reliance on Individual Producers

Prevent/Prepare

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- Stay informed - Stay involved in commodity organizations- Provide input - express concerns to commodity group leaders, state and federal officials

- Personal Operations Biosecurity- entrance to farm/premises controlled-locked?- authorized personnel only- maintain integrity of inventories- inspection for inventory tampering- records of all deliveries, visitors-employee awareness-training- containment procedures for disease, agents- recognize and report: unusual conditions, disease mysterious substance, vehicles, persons missing supplies, chemicals, equipment vandalism, tampering unaccountable presence of supplies, chemicals, biologicals, equipment, animals

Prevent/Prepare

Preventing Agro-TerrorismPreventing Agro-Terrorism — —What can I, should I be doing as an individual producer?What can I, should I be doing as an individual producer?

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Know Where To Report - Don’t Hesitate!

STATE VETERINARIAN’S OFFICESTATE VETERINARIAN’S OFFICE (605) 773-3321

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Prevent - Prepare - RespondIndustry - Information

USDA - Emergency Management and Reporting System

South Dakota - AHEP - 1998- FMD Contingency Plan- Emergency Disease Fund- Training and maintaining 30+ Reserve

Veterinary Medical Officers- Biosecurity notices sent to over 1500 including

markets, dealers, packers, processors, commodity groups, tribes, veterinarians, pharmaceutical companies, retail stores, others

- Information to commodity groups

What Can/Should State Officials Be Doing?What Can/Should State Officials Be Doing?

*

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Preparing to Respond to Preparing to Respond to Bioterrorism - AgroterrorismBioterrorism - Agroterrorism

Federal - Border InspectionsInteragency Cooperation- Within USDA: FSIS/APHIS/PPQ/USFSMOU with DODCross Train with DOJ

South Dakota- Awareness - FMD/BSE Conference -

Bioterrorism Conference- Bioterrorism Task Force- WMD Task Force- Homeland Security Office- State Emergency Operations Plan

- Animal Health Function- FMD Addendum

- Cooperation/Sharing with State Health Department/Animal Industry Board

- National Guard Participation

- Other State Agencies Support

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FMD CONTINGENCY PLANFMD CONTINGENCY PLAN

For

South Dakota

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II RESPONSEII RESPONSEACTIVITIESACTIVITIES

(Four Scenarios)(Four Scenarios)

A) Scenario I - FMD Confirmed in North America (other than adjacent state)

B) Scenario II - FMD Confirmed in Adjacent State

C) Scenario III - FMD Suspected in South Dakota

D) Scenario IV - FMD Confirmed in South Dakota

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A) SCENARIO I – FMD CONFIRMED IN NORTH AMERICA (OTHER THAN ADJACENT STATE)

(1) Notify Governor Secretary of Agriculture Game, Fish and Parks SDAIB Members / SDAIB All Staff Division of Emergency Management – Alert All State Agencies, Universities and ADRDL NO TRAVEL TO / FROM AFFECTED AREAS ADVISORY

(2) Activate Public Information Officer – Issue Press Release

(3) Establish telephone line for inquiries – information

(4) Notify via press release, fax, or e-mail direct to industry and veterinarian contacts as listed I (B) of this plan

(5) Suspend all import permits from country / state involved

(6) Notify all import ports to stop all animal / people / vehicle movements from country / state involved until assessment can be made (Highway Patrol)

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(7) Advise all livestock transporters, dealers, markets, producers: NO TRAVEL TO/FROM AFFECTED AREA UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE PLUS NEWS RELEASE TO ALL AFFECTED

(8) Appoint FMD coordinator –

(9) Appoint FMD epidemiologist for trace in trace out reporting to state veterinarian by telephone

(10) Assess manpower needs

(11) Move to Step B., C., D. or terminate actions based upon

USDA / Emergency Programs / READEO (Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organization) reports

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Are We Prepared?Are We Prepared?

Individually?

Commodity — Industry wide?

State?

Nationally?

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The Animal Health Safeguarding ReviewResults and Recommendations

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYOctober 2001

Animal HealthSafeguarding

Review

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Safe Guarding ReviewSafe Guarding Review

- $100 billion value of livestock industry in the U.S.- Downsizing of Animal Health Infrastructure- “Livestock . . . sector a sitting duck”- “Horse-sized vulnerability to intentional or unintentional

introduction of pathogens”- Defense against threats fast becoming overwhelmed- Staffing, equipment, surveillance, detection, research,

communications, border security, laboratories, flexibility

EXPERIENCE IS GOOD- Foreign disease prevention - FMD, 1929; West Nile, 1999- Endemic disease control - screwworm, glanders, brucellosis,

tuberculosis, dourine, cattle fever, scab, hog cholera, pseudorabies

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Thankful for The System We Have,Strong National Leaders, Strong State Leaders

The Healthiest Livestock

The Safest Food

In The World!

THERETHEREIS

NONOPLACE

FORFORCOMPLACENCYCOMPLACENCY