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99Meaning, Meaning,

Understanding, Understanding, and Useand Use

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[W]e are so much accustomed to communication [W]e are so much accustomed to communication through language, in conversation, that it looks to through language, in conversation, that it looks to us as if the whole point of communication lay in us as if the whole point of communication lay in this: someone else grasps the sense of my wordsthis: someone else grasps the sense of my words—which is something mental: he as it were takes —which is something mental: he as it were takes it into his own mind. If he then does something it into his own mind. If he then does something further with it as well, that is no part of the further with it as well, that is no part of the immediate purpose of language. (PI: # 363)immediate purpose of language. (PI: # 363)

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This picture is reinforced by the fact that This picture is reinforced by the fact that signs are signs are arbitrary and conventionalarbitrary and conventional. .

If we replace ‘p’ by ‘t’ in ‘chap’ we end up If we replace ‘p’ by ‘t’ in ‘chap’ we end up with another sign with a different meaning, with another sign with a different meaning, but it is arbitrary that we should employ but it is arbitrary that we should employ one word instead of the other to signify one word instead of the other to signify such and such. such and such.

‘‘chat’ in English has a different meaning chat’ in English has a different meaning than in French. It seems that a sign’s than in French. It seems that a sign’s meaning is given by what goes on in the meaning is given by what goes on in the mind when it is read, uttered or heard. For, mind when it is read, uttered or heard. For, by themselves sign are death.by themselves sign are death.

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HenceHence::

Meaning and understanding seem to be Meaning and understanding seem to be mental phenomenamental phenomena..

Understanding is conceived as the Understanding is conceived as the underlying mental phenomenon of which underlying mental phenomenon of which the behaviour is a symptom and our the behaviour is a symptom and our access to someone’s understanding is only access to someone’s understanding is only indirect, i.e. by inductive or analogical indirect, i.e. by inductive or analogical inference, while she has direct access to inference, while she has direct access to her understanding.her understanding.

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UnderstandingUnderstanding Understanding as a Understanding as a state of the mindstate of the mind. .

Notice, however, that we speak of being in Notice, however, that we speak of being in a state of excitement, depression, joy, etc. a state of excitement, depression, joy, etc. but we do not speak of being in a state of but we do not speak of being in a state of loving, fearing, hating, etc. loving, fearing, hating, etc.

Do we speak of being in a state of Do we speak of being in a state of meaning, intending, minding? meaning, intending, minding?

Understanding is more linked to an Understanding is more linked to an activityactivity than to a state of the mind. than to a state of the mind.

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If understanding and meaning are mental If understanding and meaning are mental processes, experiences or states, then they processes, experiences or states, then they should be accessible to introspection, like should be accessible to introspection, like hearing, listening or suffering. hearing, listening or suffering.

Cf. Descartes methodology.Cf. Descartes methodology.

What, though, is the specific quality or What, though, is the specific quality or mental experience or state which mental experience or state which ‘understanding’ name?‘understanding’ name?

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On this approach ‘understanding’ is On this approach ‘understanding’ is conceived, like in the Augustinian picture, conceived, like in the Augustinian picture, as a word naming something. as a word naming something.

Besides, if understanding is a state whose Besides, if understanding is a state whose manifestation is behaviour, then this state manifestation is behaviour, then this state is likely to be conceived as a physico-is likely to be conceived as a physico-chemical state of the brain (cf. Central chemical state of the brain (cf. Central State Materialist position). It is the State Materialist position). It is the physical state that causes behaviour.physical state that causes behaviour.

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Meaning and understanding are not Meaning and understanding are not experiencesexperiences..

For experiences are neither necessary nor For experiences are neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding. sufficient for understanding.

The criterion for understanding lie in The criterion for understanding lie in performancesperformances. .

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Understanding is an activityUnderstanding is an activity. .

““Now I understand” is more a signal of Now I understand” is more a signal of understanding which is judged to be understanding which is judged to be correctly employed by what the pupil goes correctly employed by what the pupil goes on to do, rather than a report of an on to do, rather than a report of an introspective experience.introspective experience.

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Meaning is UseMeaning is Use

Understanding is not a mental process or Understanding is not a mental process or state. state.

It is more linked to an activity. It is more linked to an activity.

So, So, understanding is an abilityunderstanding is an ability

To understand a word it to be able to use it To understand a word it to be able to use it correctly. correctly.

Meaning is useMeaning is use..

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For any words to have meaning, or to be For any words to have meaning, or to be understood as having certain meanings, it must understood as having certain meanings, it must be used in a certain way, to do something or be used in a certain way, to do something or other. Sounds or marks do not possess meaning other. Sounds or marks do not possess meaning at all on their own. Someone’s meaning or at all on their own. Someone’s meaning or understanding something by a certain word on a understanding something by a certain word on a certain occasion could then perhaps be explained certain occasion could then perhaps be explained as the person’s engaging in a certain practice or as the person’s engaging in a certain practice or conforming to the way that word is used; without conforming to the way that word is used; without some such practice the word would have no some such practice the word would have no meaning at all. (Stroud; meaning at all. (Stroud; Meaning, Understanding, Meaning, Understanding, and Practiceand Practice, Oxford UP, viii-ix), Oxford UP, viii-ix)

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There are some interconnected central There are some interconnected central notions one should keep in mind when notions one should keep in mind when considerdeiring Wittgenstein’s motto considerdeiring Wittgenstein’s motto “meaning is used”.“meaning is used”.

Form of lifeForm of life

The non-linguistic context is essential to The non-linguistic context is essential to the understanding linguistic activities. the understanding linguistic activities.

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To Imagine a language is to imagine a form of life To Imagine a language is to imagine a form of life

((PIPI, # 7) , # 7)

What has to be accepted, the given, is—one could What has to be accepted, the given, is—one could say—say—form of life.form of life.

((PI IIPI II, 226), 226)

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Insofar as language has foundations, they Insofar as language has foundations, they are provided not by metaphysical atoms, are provided not by metaphysical atoms, but by patterns of communal activity. but by patterns of communal activity.

The idea that form of life provides the The idea that form of life provides the foundations of language has been foundations of language has been elaborated in opposite directions.elaborated in opposite directions.

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1.1. Transcendental readingTranscendental reading

Grammar is an integral part of human Grammar is an integral part of human practice. So it is subject to change. practice. So it is subject to change.

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2. Naturalistic reading2. Naturalistic reading

Form of life is part of our human nature Form of life is part of our human nature which determines how we act and react. which determines how we act and react.

But Wittgenstein’s naturalism is But Wittgenstein’s naturalism is anthropological rather than biological for anthropological rather than biological for the natural history is the history of the natural history is the history of cultural, language-using individuals.cultural, language-using individuals.

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Language gameLanguage game

There are many different games and there There are many different games and there is a is a family resemblancefamily resemblance between them. between them.

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The notion of a game allows to highlight the The notion of a game allows to highlight the facts that games must be played, that there facts that games must be played, that there are rules which must be followed, etc. are rules which must be followed, etc.

That one must engage in the game.That one must engage in the game.

Our language games are embedded in our Our language games are embedded in our form of life, the overall practice of a form of life, the overall practice of a linguistic community.linguistic community.

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Like any other game, language games are Like any other game, language games are “played” in a“played” in a setting setting..

Even if the setting is not involved in the Even if the setting is not involved in the explanation of the meaning of a given explanation of the meaning of a given expression, is nevertheless relevant to expression, is nevertheless relevant to that expression having that meaning. that expression having that meaning.

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We learn games, how to play, etc. We learn games, how to play, etc.

The foundation of our learning is training. The foundation of our learning is training.

Language games are not subject to Language games are not subject to justification; they are rooted in our natural justification; they are rooted in our natural reactions and activities.reactions and activities.

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Wittgenstein’s anti-Wittgenstein’s anti-reductionismreductionism

An ability is distinct from its vehicleAn ability is distinct from its vehicle. .

E.g. whisky can intoxicate (ability) because E.g. whisky can intoxicate (ability) because of the alcohol it contains (vehicle) but the of the alcohol it contains (vehicle) but the alcohol is not identical with the alcohol is not identical with the intoxicating power.intoxicating power.

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One can weight the alcohol but not the One can weight the alcohol but not the ability to intoxicate. ability to intoxicate.

So if an ability is distinct from its vehicle, it So if an ability is distinct from its vehicle, it is distinct from the structure of its vehicle is distinct from the structure of its vehicle which may explain the ability. which may explain the ability.

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Hence it is misguiding to think that we can Hence it is misguiding to think that we can reduce power to the structure of its reduce power to the structure of its vehicle. vehicle.

E.g.: sugar is soluble, but solubility E.g.: sugar is soluble, but solubility (disposition) is not a state of sugar. (disposition) is not a state of sugar.

The same for psychological dispositions: The same for psychological dispositions: being able to speak French, like being being able to speak French, like being clever, charming, etc., is not a state of a clever, charming, etc., is not a state of a person. person.

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We are not tempted to identify the horse-We are not tempted to identify the horse-power of a car with a state of its engine power of a car with a state of its engine although the car has this horse-power although the car has this horse-power because of the state. because of the state.

Why, though, are we so tempted to reduce Why, though, are we so tempted to reduce mental powers with the underlying neural mental powers with the underlying neural structure?structure?

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MoralMoral

Wittgenstein reverses the traditional Wittgenstein reverses the traditional direction of fit between meaning and direction of fit between meaning and understanding. understanding.

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While the Augustinian picture deals with While the Augustinian picture deals with understanding, explanation and understanding, explanation and communication using the concept of communication using the concept of meaning meaning quaqua correlation between words correlation between words and objects, Wittgenstein reverses the and objects, Wittgenstein reverses the order of explanation. order of explanation.

Meaning is explained using the notion of Meaning is explained using the notion of understanding, explaining and understanding, explaining and communications. Meaning reduces to use.communications. Meaning reduces to use.

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ConceptsConcepts

Concepts get their meaning, i.e. their use, Concepts get their meaning, i.e. their use, because they are embedded in a complex because they are embedded in a complex form of life that is revealed (and is the form of life that is revealed (and is the background) in the way speakers live and background) in the way speakers live and act.act.

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Wittgenstein and PsychologismWittgenstein and Psychologism

ConventionsConventions play a central role in play a central role in Wittgenstein’s conception of language.Wittgenstein’s conception of language.

Cf. the notion of rules and rules following.Cf. the notion of rules and rules following.

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Conventions Conventions vs. vs. IntentionsIntentions

Grice, Lewis, Schiffer, … argue that the Grice, Lewis, Schiffer, … argue that the notion of convention can be analyzed in notion of convention can be analyzed in terms of the speaker’s intentions.terms of the speaker’s intentions.

Thus linguistic conventions can be Thus linguistic conventions can be explained in terms of the psychological explained in terms of the psychological notion of intention. notion of intention.

We would hence have a psychological We would hence have a psychological theory of meaning.theory of meaning.

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The Psychological Theory of The Psychological Theory of CommunicationCommunication

Communication resumes to the Communication resumes to the transmission of what one has in the mind transmission of what one has in the mind and and understandingunderstanding to the grasping of what to the grasping of what one has in the mind, i.e. to grasp one’s one has in the mind, i.e. to grasp one’s mental representation. mental representation.

The latter need not be, The latter need not be, pacepace Frege, Frege, private.private.

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Words in their primary or immediate signification, Words in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them ... nor can anyone apply them as that uses them ... nor can anyone apply them as marks, immediately, to anything else but the marks, immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath. (Locke; 1690: III.ii.2)ideas that he himself hath. (Locke; 1690: III.ii.2)......The chief end of language in communication The chief end of language in communication being to be understood, words serve well for that being to be understood, words serve well for that end, neither in civil nor philosophical discourse, end, neither in civil nor philosophical discourse, when any word does not excite in the hearer the when any word does not excite in the hearer the same idea which it stands for in the breast of the same idea which it stands for in the breast of the speaker. (Locke; 1690: III.ix.4)speaker. (Locke; 1690: III.ix.4)

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The Institutional Theory of The Institutional Theory of CommunicationCommunication

It rests on the It rests on the Division of Linguistic LabourDivision of Linguistic Labour (see Putnam 1975 “The Meaning of (see Putnam 1975 “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”).‘Meaning’”).

““Meanings aren’t in the head”.Meanings aren’t in the head”.

Mental representations do not determine what Mental representations do not determine what words stand for (reference or extension). words stand for (reference or extension).

Cf. twin-Earth thought experiment.Cf. twin-Earth thought experiment.

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We could hardly use such words as ‘elm’ and We could hardly use such words as ‘elm’ and ‘aluminum’ if no one possessed a way of ‘aluminum’ if no one possessed a way of recognizing elm trees and aluminum metal; but not recognizing elm trees and aluminum metal; but not everyone to whom the distinction is important has everyone to whom the distinction is important has to be able to make the distinction. ... Consider our to be able to make the distinction. ... Consider our community as a “factory”: in this “factory” some community as a “factory”: in this “factory” some people have the “job” of people have the “job” of wearing gold wedding wearing gold wedding ringsrings, other people have the “job” of , other people have the “job” of selling gold selling gold wedding ringswedding rings, still other people have the “job” of , still other people have the “job” of telling whether or not something is really goldtelling whether or not something is really gold. ... . ... everyone to whom gold is important for any reason everyone to whom gold is important for any reason has to has to acquireacquire the word ‘gold’; but he does not the word ‘gold’; but he does not have to acquire the have to acquire the method of recognizing method of recognizing if if something is or is not gold. He can rely on a special something is or is not gold. He can rely on a special subclass of speakers. (Putnam 1975: 227-8)subclass of speakers. (Putnam 1975: 227-8)

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Direct ReferenceDirect Reference

Cf. causal theory, social character of Cf. causal theory, social character of meaning/reference, … meaning/reference, …

Reference depends on a social causal Reference depends on a social causal chain. chain.

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LanguageLanguage

It is conceived as the result of a social It is conceived as the result of a social interaction and cooperation.interaction and cooperation.

[T]he harmony between thought and reality is to [T]he harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language. be found in the grammar of the language. (Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein Philosophical GrammarPhilosophical Grammar: 162): 162)

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Theory of meaning = theory of Theory of meaning = theory of understandingunderstanding (cf. Dummett)(cf. Dummett)

A theory of meaning deals with the A theory of meaning deals with the speaker’s speaker’s masteringmastering the language, that is, the language, that is, with her knowledge of the language.with her knowledge of the language.

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This account can only be given in terms of the This account can only be given in terms of the practical ability which the speaker displays in practical ability which the speaker displays in using sentences of the language; and, in general, using sentences of the language; and, in general, the knowledge of which that practical ability is the knowledge of which that practical ability is taken as a manifestation may be, and should be, taken as a manifestation may be, and should be, regarded as only implicit knowledge. (Dummett regarded as only implicit knowledge. (Dummett 1978: p.101)1978: p.101)

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Knowing-how Knowing-how vsvs. knowing-that. knowing-that

The knowledge involved in the mastery of The knowledge involved in the mastery of a language is a sort of implicit knowledge a language is a sort of implicit knowledge akin to a practical ability, a kind of akin to a practical ability, a kind of knowing-how.knowing-how.