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September 2014 57

Ses of Hoe A CaeSuyi00

Stephanie A. Duriez, Francis T Cullen, Sarah M. ManchakUniversity of Cincinnati

AbstractBased in Hawaii, Project HOPE uses certain butnon-severe graduated sanctions to specificallydeter probationers from violating supervisionconditions, especially drug use. Scholars andpolicy makers have trumpeted HOPE as a newmodel for offender supervision even thoughthe evaluation evidence, though promising, islimited. In this context, we explore the sourcesof the program's "correctional popularity,"which has led to its uncritical acceptance andimportation to the US. mainland. We argue thatseveral uncertainties about the program maypotentially compromise its effectiveness in otherjurisdictions, thus offering false hope as a newparadigm for effective probation supervision.Finally, we caution that correctional popularityrisks exacting a high cost when promising,if not unproven, programs-such as ProjectHOPE-are adopted rather than alternativeevidence-based treatment strategies.

EVERY FEW YEARS, an interventionbursts upon the scene, is heralded as havingspecial crime-reducing powers, and isenthusiastically implemented. Prominentexamples include DARE programs foryoungsters' drug prevention, scared straightfor nascent delinquents, boot camps for youngadults supposedly in need of a good doseof discipline, and three-strikes-and-you're-out laws for predatory recidivists. JamesFinckenauer (1982) has used the term "panaceaphenomenon" to describe initiatives that, withvery little criminological or empirical scrutiny,arise, are quickly embraced, and are imposedon the wayward with very little understandingof their true impact.

Attracting wide popularity, in and of itself,does not mean that a program is ineffectiveand should be abandoned. But whenpopularity leads to the uncritical acceptanceof a program, caution is called for. In additionto asking for further critical appraisal andquality evaluations, the very source of aprogram's popularity needs to be unpacked.Why are so many policy makers and scholarsso willing to throw caution to the windand to jump on an initiatives bandwagon?Correctional popularity-why some programsare embraced and others are not-thus shouldbe seen as an important area for study.

In this context, "Project HOPE"-the Hawaii Opportunity Probation withEnforcement program-warrants analysis.Though limited, there is some evidence ofProject HOPE's effectiveness (Hawken& Kleiman, 2009). But this does not fullyexplain why the program is being trumpetedas a crime solution to be adopted widely andwithout concern. Indeed, statements praisingHOPE abound:

HOPE holds the promise of significantlyreducing the demand for illegal drugs,crime, and prison populations acrossthe U.S. This innovative program can bebranded and promoted as a high-visibility,high impact upgrading of the nation's effortsto reduce illegal drug use and crime at thesame time that it will reduce the nation'sprison population. (DuPont, 2009, p. 1)

There aren't any magic bullets that can endAmerica's continuing battle with crime andaddiction. But HOPE comes closer thananything we've seen in a long time. It hasremarkable impact-cutting new arrests

and failed drug tests by more than half,compared to a randomly selected controlgroup. And it can be applied to thousandsof offenders at a time. It's not a boutiqueprogram that works well with a few dozen.(Gelb, 2011, p. 2)

Notably, it is not just commentators whohave jumped on the HOPE bandwagon.With the "H" in HOPE now changed from"Hawaii" to "Honest:' this intervention isbeing implemented with amazing rapidity.As Angela Hawken-an evaluator and nowadvocate of Project HOPE-observes, "Weknow of at least 40 jurisdictions in 18 statesthat have implemented similar models"(quoted in Pearsall, 2014, p. 3). Wishing tospread this approach further, the AmericanLegislative Exchange Council (2014)-knowncommonly by its acronym of "ALEC"-hasdeveloped model legislation for the "Swift andCertain Sanctions Act."

Again, no claim is being made that theHOPE program is necessarily ineffective. Still,although trite to a degree, there is wisdomin the saying that "when something seemstoo good to be true, it usually is." The riskinherent in correctional popularity is thata promising program can be prematurelyoversold. It can gain the status of a proven,rather than of a promising, program. It also cancause otherwise judicious scholars and policymakers to trumpet a program for the wrongreason-not because the intervention works,but because it resonates with their worldviewand thus seems "obviously" effective. Evenif it works, correctional popularity cancause observers to misperceive why this isso, leading them to accept that a proposedmechanism is responsible for offender

58 FEDERAL PROBATION Volume 78 Number 2

change. In reality, other unpublicized and thus

unrecognized features may be driving theprogram's success. Subsequent interventionsmay be implemented with an emphasis on the

wrong "key ingredients' Finally, correctionalpopularity may have a high opportunitycost if a newly invented popular program ofquestionable effectiveness is used instead ofan existing intervention that is evidence-based

and of proven success.This article thus uses Project HOPE to

provide a case study in correctional popularity.The analysis will be undertaken in four

sections. First, the origins and the details ofthe HOPE program will be presented. We alsoreview the limited literature available on itseffectiveness. Second, an attempt will be madeto unpack why HOPE has become so popular,

despite several theoretical and empiricallimitations. Six factors will be considered that,when taken together, constructed a persuasive

social reality that defined HOPE as an effectiveintervention. Third, we then explore whyProject HOPE may be creating a false sense

of hope by offering a community supervisionmodel that may be limited in its effects,difficult to implement, and inattentive to whatis now known about offender change. Fourth,

we will conclude by arguing for correctionalpopularity to be seen as an intervention risk

to be studied and guarded against. Popularprograms can be effective, but popularity cantrump professional skepticism and scrutinyand have a high cost for corrections.

Project HOPE

The Invention of Hope

Project HOPE was first developed in Honolulu,Hawaii, in 2004 by Judge Steven Alm in thecriminal felony division. Aim (2011) noticeda pattern among the cases brought before himby the probation department. Case after caseinvolved an offender with multiple violationswho, according to the probation officer,would not be able to complete probation

successfully in the community. Judge Almconcluded that offenders had come to believethat probation did not have to be takenseriously because there were no immediatesubstantial consequences for their violations(Hill, 2010). Indeed, ongoing deferred courtdates meant that some probationers were notbeing brought before a judge sometimes up toa full year after a transgression was detected(Kiyabu, Steinberg, & Yoshida, 2010). Witha lack of any real consequences and a courtdate in the distant future, probationers werecoming into court with multiple violations.

Judge Alm worried that offenders were thusincurring multiple probation violations thatoften allowed probation officers to develop a

strong case for revocation and eventual prisonsentence (Alm, 2011).

Judge Alm was persuaded that there hadto be a better and more efficient way to dealwith the probationers who were not abiding

by their supervision conditions. Alm had seeninnovative programs take shape and producepromising results, at least in the preliminary

stages. Created by David Kennedy, oneexample was the deterrence-based violenceprevention program CeaseFire in Boston,Massachusetts (Rosen, 2010). The goal of

CeaseFire was to reduce gang violence. Thefirst step was to provide a warning that if anymember of a gang killed someone, the entire

gang would face consequences. Second, anyperson affiliated with a gang or criminal groupwas offered support if he or she expressed thedesire to leave. Finally, a community meetingwas held in which non-gang members voicedtheir desire for the violence to end.

It also occurred to Alm (2011) that thesolution could be as simple as applyingthe same concepts to probationers that hehad used in his parenting. Judge Aim hasdescribed the system that was in place uponhis appointment as being similar to child-

rearing supervision in which parents donothing about their child's misconduct, let asignificant amount of time pass between thetransgression and the punishment, and thenpunish them harshly for their behavior (Aim,2010). Judge Alm believed that in his family,

the use of swift-and-certain consequences formisconduct taught his son what was expectedand worked to curb subsequent misbehavior(Alm, 2011).

With this new perspective, Judge Alm set

out to create a system in which violations ofconditions were met with a swift-and-certainpunishment, proportionate to the violation.Alm understood that he could not change theprobation system on Oahu on his own. Thus,as a first step, he consulted with his court staffto determine whether he had the authorityto make the necessary changes. Aim and his

staff concluded that the penal codes languageallowed a judge to make modifications to aprobation plan (AIm, 2011). This modificationwould become the cornerstone of HOPE:

the ability to change the existing probationplan and immediately jail probationers whoviolated their supervision conditions. JudgeAlm realized, however, that applying swift-and-certain sanctions meant that probation,

law enforcement, and the prosecutor's andpublic defender's offices would all need to

cooperate with one another. Cheryl Inouye,the supervisor of the Integrated CommunitySanctions Unit (ICS), Honolulu's high-riskprobation unit, agreed to change proceduresby requiring both immediate enforcementand her officers to file motions directly withthe court. Once the motion was filed, courtstaff were responsible for contacting theprosecutor's office (Alm, 2011).

Judge Alm next met with the prosecutor

and public defender's offices. The prosecutoragreed to change procedure so that probationofficers could notify the court directly when aprobationer violated in order to expedite the

process. The prosecutor also created a newfill-in-the-blank form that would be used bythe judge to change the probation to include

a short stay in jail if a probationer violated.The public defender realized that offenderswould not expect that the rules would actually

be enforced and asked that offenders beinformed of the change to probation. JudgeAlm agreed, and this notification became acrucial component to HOPE (Alm, 2011).

Judge Alms final step was to solicit support

from various law enforcement agencies.He first contacted the Oahu Community

Correctional Center and told them that he didnot expect them to see an influx in offenders,but warned that they might see the sameoffenders processed repeatedly. By providingthe facility with this warning, Alm was tryingto give it time to streamline its own intake

process. To carry out the objective of keepingsanctions swift, Judge Alm approached theHawaii High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area(HIDTA) and the United States Marshals for

warrant enforcement assistance. With theagreement of the U.S. Marshals Service to servewarrants for the program and with assistance

from HIDTA for any overtime funding thatmight be needed, Judge Alm had secured thelast component to begin his new probationprogram (AIm, 2011). With multiple agencies

on board, Judge Alm launched Project HOPE,and with each passing year the program

has grown.On the island of Oahu, there are

approximately 8,000 offenders who arecurrently on felony probation (Alm, 2013).Half of these probationers are considered to be

low risk and are therefore automatically placedon "probation as usual" (PAU) caseloads thatinvolve minimal supervision. The remainingprobationers, including the 2,000 in theHOPE program, are assessed as a higher risk

Volume 78 Number 258 FEDERAL PROBATION

September 2014

and are therefore accorded a higher level ofsupervision. The 2,000 HOPE probationersare supervised by Judge Aim, with assistancefrom 10 other felony judges who have agreedto join the program since its inception in 2004(Aim, 2011, 2013).

The Organization and Process of HOPE

Referral to HOPE

There are three avenues by which probationerscan be referred to the HOPE program. First,sex offenders are automatically placed in theHOPE program. Alternatively, probationerswho have been found guilty of some othertype of felony (e.g., property, violent crime)and are having issues with compliance ontraditional supervision may be referred byeither a circuit judge or the probation officerfor screening. Screening entails administrationof the Level of Service Inventory-Revised(LSI-R) to determine risk level and the AdultSubstance Abuse Survey (ASAS) to determinewhether a given probationer has issues withdrugs or alcohol. Probationers are consideredappropriate for HOPE if they (1) are high riskfor recidivism as determined by the LSI-R, (2)show repeated problems with noncomplianceand therefore show need of increasedsurveillance, according to the probationofficer or circuit judge, and/or (3) have drug/alcohol problems listed among their top threecriminogenic need areas (Wright, 2013).

Entrance into HOPE

Once a probationer has been deemed eligiblefor HOPE, Judge Aim delivers a "warninghearing' As described by Judge Aim, thishearing is much more than a court proceedingwhere probationers learn the conditions andexpectations of probation. The hearing startswith a positive message to probationers. Theyare told that they have support from the judge,court staff, prosecutor, defense counsel, andtheir probation officer, and that everyonewants to see them succeed on HOPE. The judgethen explains that they should understandthat they are adults and can make their owndecision to either follow the rules of probationor to violate their conditions. However, healso notes that it is his responsibility as theirjudge to hold them accountable if they chooseto violate the conditions of their probation.Judge Aim has stated that he knows that hecannot make probationers comply with theirconditions, but he can provide them with theinformation needed to make an informeddecision (Alm, 2011).

The next part of the warning hearinginforms probationers of the consequencefor violating their conditions-immediatearrest and jail time. This component allowsthe program to fulfill its objective of beinga swift-and-sure probation. Unlike in thepast when probationers were able to violatetheir conditions without any immediateconsequence, HOPE probationers arewarned that they will be arrested and jailedimmediately following a violation, and thenthey actually are. Judge Aim has credited thiscomponent as the key to the effectivenessof HOPE with probationers. When someexpressed doubt that jail time would serveas a deterrent for offenders who had alreadyexperienced incarceration, Judge Aimdisagreed: "Yes, many people can do timewhen they have to. But human nature beingwhat it is, they dont want to do it today" (Alm,2010, p. 30; emphasis in the original). Further,probationers are warned that if they repeatedlyviolate the conditions of their probation, theywill face a prison sentence. According toJudge Aim, the purpose of these warnings isto create accountability among probationers,something that he believes most of them havenot experienced in the past (Aim, 2011).

Finally, during the warning hearing,probationers are assigned a color and numbercombination and told they must call in to theHOPE hotline every morning to learn whichcombination has been randomly selected fordrug testing (Hill, 2010). If compliant overtime, the probationer will be assigned a newcolor and number, and the testing will becomeless frequent. Each probationer is randomlytested a minimum of once a week in the firsttwo months and gradually reduced to one testper month (Hawken & Kleiman, 2009; Kiyabuet al., 2010; Hill, 2010).

Addressing Violations in HOPE

If those on probation miss a scheduledmeeting with their probation officer or violateany condition of their probation, a "Motionto Modify Probation' is filed with the court,and the probationer can be sentenced toa short stay in jail (Hawken, 2010a, b). Ifprobationers violate repeatedly, they can beordered to serve the entire length of the prisonsentence they received prior to being placedon probation (Lopez, 2012). With respect todrug testing and related violations, there areseveral stipulations. If a probationer does notreport for a drug screening, a warrant is issuedimmediately. If probationers test positive atany time, they can be reassigned to a different

CREATING A FALSE SENSE OF HOPE 59

color code, one that requires more frequentdrug testing. Additionally, any probationerarrested for testing positive for drugs has theright to dispute the charges, but if results offurther testing confirm the presence of illegalsubstances, the consequences will be moresevere (Hawken, 2010a, b). Probationers whoadmit to their drug use before they are testedare likely to receive a significantly reduced jailsanction (e.g., less than 5 days), compared tothose that do not admit to their use beforebeing tested (e.g., 2 weeks). Repeated drug useand/or dishonesty about drug use results inincreasingly lengthy jail sentences.

Repeated positive drug tests can also resultin mandatory drug treatment, but probationerscan also request to enter drug treatmentvoluntarily. By placing probationers who needor want to be in treatment, programs canconcentrate their efforts on those who aremost likely to benefit from treatment andpreserve resources that might otherwise bewasted on individuals for whom substance usedoes not seem to be a central concern. In turn,this reduction in the number of probationersinitially assigned to treatment allows programsto improve the quality of the treatment andextend the amount of time probationers canstay in treatment (Aim, 2013).

The Effectiveness of HOPE

Does HOPE work? The answer to this questionis an important one. The empirical evidenceneeds to be fairly presented and carefullyevaluated before we can argue (as we do) thatthis intervention has been inappropriately andprematurely adopted by policy makers andpractitioners alike. Project HOPE is designedto reduce probationers' violations while onprobation, and, ideally, to reduce recidivismfor new criminal behavior. It is believed thatHOPE does so because it uses swift-and-certain punishment and graduated sanctionsto lower noncompliance on supervision.

Thus, a proper program evaluation mustpay attention to both outcome and process-and do so using a rigorous methodologicalapproach. Ideally, HOPE would be evaluatedusing a randomized control trial (RCT), whereoffenders are randomized to HOPE or' somealternative condition; this strategy helps toreduce the possibility that any effects observedare due to differences between individuals inthe two groups and increase the likelihoodthat the effects are due to the treatment itself(i.e., HOPE). If possible, the comparisongroup would preferably be some comparablealternative-for example, another treatment

60 FEDERAL PROBATION Volume 78 Number 2

program that has established effectiveness.

Using a comparison group that is also likelyto be effective can answer for policy makersthe important question, "compared to what?"If HOPE is being compared to somethingthat is ineffective or inert, then positiveresults are not only likely but also will suggestonly that the program being evaluated isbetter than doing nothing or than deliveringimproper or ineffective interventions. A more

useful test of a program's effectiveness forpolicy and practice is one that compares anew intervention to other evidence-basedinterventions to see how well it fares incomparison. Finally, a good evaluation ofany program, including HOPE, must test theprogram's "logic model" by exploring not onlywhether it works but also if it works becauseof its proposed active ingredients. For HOPE,this is swift-and-certain, graduated sanctions.

Thus far, only a few studies have examinedthe effectiveness of HOPE and other localadaptations of HOPE. To date, there havebeen only two RCTs-one completed study ofthe original HOPE program from Hawaii andone ongoing study in Washington State. Otherevaluations have used quasi-experimentaland pretest-posttest designs-weaker

study designs that introduce the potentialfor several rival explanations for HOPE'seffectiveness, undermining the confidencewith which practitioners and researcherscan attribute positive offender outcomesto the HOPE intervention alone. Notably,although each evaluation (described below)examines offender outcomes, none to datehas conducted a formal process evaluation totest HOPE's logic model. Further, no studyhas yet employed a control group receivingan alternative treatment shown previouslyto be effective; the standard comparisonthus far has been to offenders on regularsupervision (also called "probation-as-usual").The results from known outcome evaluationsare detailed below.

Positive Effects from Hawaii

The earliest evidence for HOPE's effectivenessstems from descriptive data collected byHawaii's Office of the Attorney General onprobationers' outcomes in the first year ofthe program. Although we could not locateanywhere in press the specific statistics, dataon participants' drug tests and the numberof missed probation appointments indicatedto Judge Alm that he and his staff "were onthe right track" (Alm, 2011, p. 21). Aim knew

that the data collected by the state was not

enough, and that outside research was goingto be required to bring legitimacy to HOPE(Alm, 2011).

The first formal outcome evaluationof HOPE was conducted by two outsideresearchers not affiliated with the HOPE

program. In this study, 940 HOPE probationerswere compared to 77 probationers on"probation as usual" (PAU) across several

primary (e.g., number of positive drug testsand no-shows to supervision appointments)and secondary (total jail and prison days,revocations, and new arrests) outcomes.After accounting for baseline differencesbetween PAU and HOPE probationers, theresearchers found that HOPE probationerswere significantly less likely to have a positivedrug test than PAU probationers at a 3-monthand 6-month follow up. Specifically, PAUprobationers were 28 percentage points higher

at 3 months and 15 percentage points higherat 6 months for positive drug tests thanHOPE probationers. The effects are smallerfor missed probation appointments and donot seem to change much over time. For thisoutcome, PAU probationers were 7 and 6percentage points higher at 3 and 6 months,respectively (Hawken & Kleiman, 2009). Ofcourse, these findings need to be consideredin light of the study limitations that the studyauthors either noted (e.g., short follow-up,inability to examine tie sustainability ofeffects after probation, spillover influencesinto the comparison group) or did not note(but that we will discuss below).

To address some of the methodologicallimitations of the quasi-experimental study

(i.e., a non-equivalent comparison group),Hawken and Kleiman next conducted an RCTcomparing 330 HOPE to 163 PAU probationers.After a one-year follow-up, a significantlysmaller proportion of HOPE probationers hadnegative outcomes than PAU probationers:missed supervision appointments (9 percentvs. 23 percent); positive drug tests (13 percent

and 46 percent); new arrests (21 percent vs.47 percent); revocations (7 percent vs. 15percent); and incarceration days sentenced(138 vs. 267) (Hawken & Kleiman, 2009).

Mixed Effects Elsewhere

In recent years, the HOPE program hasgained in popularity. Although variants ofthis program have now been implementedin at least 40 jurisdictions (Pearsall, 2014),evaluation research has been limited and hasyielded mixed results. For example, in onepretest-posttest study of 93 HOPE offenders

in Saline County, Arkansas, preliminaryresults indicate good fidelity to the HOPEmodel (e.g., shortened jail time, swift andtimely sanctions) and reductions in violations(DFE Fidelity Review, 2013). However,because no control (RCT) or comparison(quasi-experimental study) was used in thisevaluation, it is difficult to attribute offenderchange to the HOPE program.

Other studies yield mixed effectsof the HOPE program across variousmethodological approaches. In Anchorage,Alaska, for example, a pre-post evaluationof PACE program (Probation Accountabilitywith Certain Enforcement) participantsshowed, on one hand, a reduction in positivedrug tests (25 percent pre vs. 9 percent post),but on the other hand, more petitions forrevocation at the post-test (Carns & Martin,2011). Similarly, an RCT pilot study of theWashington Intensive Supervision Program(WISP) for parolees showed reductions indrug use, incarceration, and criminal activityfor a small group (n = 35) of offenders overa short (6 month) follow-up, but there alsowas an increase in bench warrants (Hawken& Kleiman, 2011). Finally, Delaware's quasi-

experimental evaluation of the Decide YourTime (DYT) program showed no significantdifferences in arrests and reincarceration forDYT and probation as usual participants(O'Connell, Visher, Brent, Bacon, & Hines,2013). We will discuss the DYT program inmore detail below.

Sources of Project HOPE'SPopularityBy all accounts, Judge Alm developed aninnovative program intended to addresspressing problems in his jurisdictionsprobation system. But many local policyshifts remain just that-local initiatives. Whatcaused Project HOPE to become nationallyknown and embraced by diverse audiencesas a model to be used to reform probationnationwide? We suggest that the program's"correctional popularity" is rooted in a

confluence of six factors.Again, in and of itself, a program's

popularity is not unsavory. In fact, it wouldbe unfortunate if worthy programs remainedlocal secrets and hidden from public view. Still,we would be naive to believe that correctionalinterventions are embraced only due to theirdemonstrated effectiveness. More often, theyearn support for extra-scientific factors. Inthis case, beyond some promising evaluationresults, Project HOPE was imported from

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September 2014 CREATING A FALSE SENSE OF HOPE 61

Hawaii by the mainland because it resonatedwith underlying cultural and correctionalvalues, had strong advocacy, and wasaccorded legitimacy from the criminologicalcommunity.

1. Names Matter

The first source of HOPE's popularity comesfrom the genius of creating the acronymHOPE. Alm held a contest among his courtstaff asking for people to submit names forhis new probation program. A staff membersubmitted the name Hawaii OpportunityProbation with Enforcement. Alm knewimmediately he had a winner (Am, 2011).

Consider the alternative-if the programhad been called "HIPP" or the HawaiiInitiative to Punish Probationers. For otherreasons, it is possible that HIPP might haveearned some attention outside Hawaii. But inall likelihood, the name would not have struckobservers as having any uplifting dimensionto it. By contrast, HOPE conveys the idea thatthe goal is not simply to deter probationersbut also to lend a helping hand so as to assisttheir improvement. The goal of the programthus is not to do harm but to deliver "hope."In the end, names matter because they arepregnant with meaning. They either resonateor are inconsistent with underlying valuepreferences. There are few Americans who areagainst hope!

2. The Appeal of Tough Love

The second source of HOPE's popularitycomes from the "tough love" approachthe program takes toward offenders. Thesimultaneous use of a certain amount oftoughness while maintaining a caring andloving approach makes the program appeal toboth liberals and conservatives. This sectionwill explain how HOPE takes this tough-loveapproach and how this approach appealsto conservatives (who value toughness) andliberals (who value love). Notably, HOPEis not the first correctional program whosepopularity is linked to its embrace of toughlove. Boot camps are one obvious exampleof a previous tough-love intervention thatearned widespread support (Cullen, Blevins,Trager, & Gendreau, 2005). Although perhapsless apparent, restorative justice also blendselements of toughness (e.g., demands ofaccountability, shaming the behavior) withelements of love (e.g., forgiveness, reintegrationinto the community) (Levrant, Cullen, Fulton,& Wozniak, 1999; see also Braithwaite, 1989).

Such programs appear to resonate with a corecultural belief.

As noted, HOPE's toughness centers aroundswift, certain, and proportionate consequences(Alm, 2011). By contrast, different aspectsof HOPE exemplify the "love" component ofthe tough-love approach. HOPE participantsknow that the judge, court staff, prosecutor,defense counsel, and probation officer allwant to see them complete HOPE successfullyand become contributing members of society(Alm, 2011). Additionally, HOPE offers anyparticipant who makes the request accessto drug and alcohol treatment (Alm, 2013).Finally, violations of the conditions ofprobation result in punishments that areintended to be consistent and fair-notdraconian. Before HOPE, probationers wouldviolate multiple times with no immediateconsequence; however, when finally broughtbefore a judge, they often would receive alengthy prison sentence. Now, through the useof immediate arrest, HOPE judges are able togive a punishment that is proportionate to theviolation-mild at first and then escalatingto the point where offenders receive theiroriginal prison sentence (Hawken, 2010a,b; Kiyabu et al., 2010). Thus, HOPE wasdesigned to use revocation as a punishment ofthe last, rather than first, resort.

Project HOPE is popular because it offerssomething appealing to those at both ends ofthe political spectrum. Conservatives, whoare advocates of the "tough" component oftough love, like HOPE because they see itas a punitive program that holds offendersaccountable each time they violate the rulesof their probation, regardless of the severityof the infraction. Liberals, the advocates ofthe "love" component, like HOPE because itis intended to lessen the use of imprisonmentand to offer offenders the opportunity tochange their lives through such avenues astreatment (Cullen & Jonson, 2012; Rosen,2010). In other words, it gives offenders hope.

The tough-love approach towards offendersis popular not just with lawmakers but alsowith the American public. Research showsthat Americans harbor punitive attitudes andgenerally support the use of imprisonment.But this punitiveness is balanced by strongsupport for "corrections"-the idea that effortsalso should be made to save offenders froma life in crime (Cullen, Fisher, & Applegate,2000; Jonson, Cullen, & Lux, 2013). Thus,in a poll completed by the National Councilon Crime and Delinquency (Krisberg &Marchionna, 2006), the overwhelming

majority of respondents, 87 percent, favored acorrectional system that included rehabilitativeservices, rather than a correctional system thatwas solely based on punishment. Similarly,in a survey completed by the Pew ResearchCenter (2003, p. 75), 72 percent of the 1,284adults who completed the telephone intervieweither mostly or completely agreed with thestatement that, "The criminal justice systemshould try to rehabilitate criminals, not justpunish them"

3. Charismatic Leadership

A third source of HOPE's popularity canbe attributed to Judge Alm. In particular,he brings two important contributionsto the table that have helped to directlycontribute to the HOPE program in Hawaii.First, he has been quite effective at forgingalliances with a number of criminal justiceprofessionals. His nearly 30 years of serviceacross a number of positions (e.g., DeputyProsecuting Attorney for the City and Countyof Honolulu, United States Attorney for theDistrict of Hawaii, First Circuit Court Judge;Aim, 2011; Walden, 2011) have helped toestablish him as a leader in the Hawaiiancriminal justice system and earn respect andsupport from his colleagues. Second, Almhas a charismatic personality. He has beendescribed as "armed with an obvious passion,a persuasive tone, a muscular build and ano-nonsense buzz cut" (Hill, 2010), "excited...about what he's doing" (Lopez, 2012), and a"one-man-public-relations machine" (Blair,2012). His dynamic personality and strongprofessional relationships have helped to pushHOPE to the forefront in the discussion ofcommunity supervision. Undoubtedly, Aim isHOPE's greatest ambassador and spokesmanfor the program both in the State of Hawaiiand at the national level, even meeting withleaders from other states to advise them anddiscuss their own non-traditional probationand parole program ideas (Hill, 2010).

4. Strong Advocacy by Researchers

Judge Alm (2011) played another importantrole when he realized that initial positiveevaluation results needed to be confirmedby external researchers with impeccablecredentials. He knew that the data collectedby the state were not enough, that outsideresearch was going to be required to bringlegitimacy to HOPE (Alm, 2011). EnterAngela Hawken, who holds a Ph.D. andthe position of Associate Professor of PublicPolicy at Pepperdine University. Hawken

September 2014 CREATING A FALSE SENSE OF HOPE 61

62 FEDERAL PROBATION Volume 78 Number 2

was the primary policy analyst for the cost-benefit analysis of California's Proposition

36, the statewide initiative to divert non-violent offenders away from incarceration andinto community-based treatment programs(Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs,2000). In the spring of 2006, she flew toHonolulu for a preliminary visit. In a 2013interview with Sam Kornell of the online

magazine Slate.com, Hawken admitted that

she was skeptical of HOPE and of the statisticsshe was seeing from the pilot program. Thestate was reporting a 50 percent reductionin new arrests and a 70 percent reduction in

drug use. Hawken thought these numbersmust be flawed. "When you hear something

that sounds too good to be true:' she observed,"it's because it is too good to be true" (Kornell,2013, p. 1; emphasis in the original).

Upon her arrival at the Honolulu jailand subsequent in-person interviews withoffenders who had been in HOPE, herskepticism began to fade. Hawken toldKornell that the language of responsibility she

heard from these offenders shocked her. Hercuriosity had been piqued (Kornell, 2013).Hawken agreed to perform the evaluationstudy of HOPE and solicited the assistance

of Mark Kleiman, a professor of public policyat UCLA with a strong national reputation inthe area of crime control. As noted, Hawkenand Kleiman (2009) reported results similar to

those initially released by the state, conductingtwo evaluations yielding positive results. Theyhave made their evaluation report availablefor consideration, although it should be notedthat their study was not published in a referredjournal and subjected to peer evaluation (see

also Byrne, 2013).It appears that the positive evaluation

findings have persuaded Hawken and Kleiman

that HOPE is an evidence-based program thatshould be expanded to other locations. Theiradvocacy is thus the fourth source of the

project's popularity. Since the completion oftheir evaluations, they have written articles,

given interviews, and delivered presentationsadvocating for HOPE. As the evaluators ofHOPE, Hawken and Kleiman have speciallegitimacy. They not only know the intricaciesof the program-how it works-but also can

claim to show its effectiveness-that it doeswork. Given their credibility, their strongadvocacy has almost certainly contributed

to the expansion of HOPE and to furtherfunding of research by the National Instituteof Justice.

Hawken (2010a) and Kleiman (2009) are

reputable scholars, and they are careful toinsert the requisite caveats about the need

for further replications and the challenges ofimplementing HOPE in other jurisdictions.

Still, they seem to display an uncriticalacceptance of the project and its underlyingtheory that scholars rooted in the correctional

treatment paradigm would not share (an issuewe will revisit later). Rehabilitation scholars

would immediately note the dismal history ofdeterrence-oriented programs in corrections,because these programs do not address the

empirically known causes of recidivism (e.g.,antisocial attitudes), especially among high-risk offenders (Andrews & Bonta, 2010;

see also Cullen, Pratt, Micelli, & Moon,2002; Cullen, Wright, & Applegate, 1996;MacKenzie, 2006; Schaefer, 2013). They would

not reject the idea that firm and fair sanctions

should be part of treatment protocol, but thispractice would be a secondary component,

subsidiary to the delivery of therapy aimedat fixing the deficits (or criminogenic needs)leading to reoffending.. Hawken and Kleiman reverse this emphasis,

embracing certainty of punishment and thetheory of graduated sanctions. Their advocacy

of HOPE thus is not simply for the programbut for a way of thinking about how the

correctional enterprise should be structured.They are inalterably opposed to the gratuitoususe of severe punishments-or "brute force:'as Kleiman (2009) terms it-but they believethat certainty of punishment should be theguiding theory of offender supervision. AsHawken (2010a, p. 40) argues, "the centralidea of HOPE is the commonsensical one that

certainty and swiftness count far more thanseverity in determining the deterrent efficacyof a threatened punishment." Similarly,providing rehabilitation is not the goal oftheir correctional model. Rather, "the HOPEapproach is focused directly on reducing druguse and missed appointments rather than ondrug treatment" (Hawken, 2010a, p. 46; see

Kleiman, 2009, for a similar rationale for usingHOPE over drug courts). Treatment should

be reserved for those who ask for it and for

those who repeatedly fail drug tests, much as"triage" is used for seriously wounded soldiers

(Hawken, 2010a, b). In a coauthored essay,Kleiman again makes the case for deterrence

over treatment:

The Hawaii results seem to refute theclaim that the nature of drug abuse makesdesistance without treatment impossible.How well it will work in other jurisdictions

remains to be seen, but there seems to bemore reason to worry about whether theinstitutions of the criminal justice systemin other places can work together wellenough to deliver the promised swift-

and-certain sanctions than about whetherdrug-using offenders will respond to those

sanctions if they are actually put intopractice. (Boyum, Caulkins, & Kleiman,

2011, p.396)

In short, Hawken and Kleiman areadvocating for a paradigm shift away froma rehabilitation model and toward a specificdeterrence model in offender supervision.

In a different time, it is possible that theirembrace of punitiveness-even in a scaled-down version-would have been rejected by

many criminologists. In fact, the oppositeoccurred, as an increasing number of scholarshad independently begun to think along the

same lines.

5. Gaining Legitimacy fromCriminologists

The fifth source of HOPE's popularity

comes from the legitimacy garnered frombeing mentioned favorably in the writingsof criminologists other than Hawken andKleiman. The program's appearance has

been fortuitous because it coincides with amovement within criminology to emphasizethe certainty rather than the severity ofdeterrence. At the core of this approach is

a rejection of mass imprisonment in favorof policing (to increase the risk or certaintyof apprehension) and of non-custodialsanctions that are invariably applied (toincrease the certainty of punishment followingapprehension) (see, e.g., Durlauf & Nagin,2011; Nagin, 2013; see also Kleiman, 2009;Robinson, 2011). Because HOPE is a certainty-based program, it has obvious appeal toscholars trumpeting certainty. Thus, Nagin(2013, p. 228) comments favorably about the

initiative, noting that the "deterrence strategyof nondraconian sanctions has been appliedwith apparently great success in Project

HOPE, an intervention heralded by Hawkenand Kleiman' Other prominent scholarshave similarly praised the HOPE Project forincreasing not only the certainty but also the

celerity of punishment (Blumstein, 2011).

6. Gaining Legitimacy from NIl

The sixth source of HOPE's popularity hascome from the legitimacy the program hasreceived from its promotion by the NationalInstitute of Justice (NIJ). NIJ has been

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September 2014 CREATING A FALSE SENSE OF HOPE 63

involved with HOPE since 2006 when itfunded the initial evaluation study (Hawken &Kleiman, 2009). The funding decision showsNIJ's support for and investment in HOPEbecause, according to the agency, programsand evaluations that receive funding from theagency are those "with the greatest chanceof advancing the field" (www.nij.gov/nij/about). NIJ gave further legitimacy to HOPEat its 2009 conference. During a speaker seriestitled What Works in Offender Supervision,Judge Aim and Angela Hawken delivered apresentation in which they described andpromoted the program. During this forum,Alm also offered his consultation servicesfor jurisdictions interested in implementingthe program.

Further promotion of HOPE by the NIJcame once Hawken and Kleiman submittedtheir findings to NIJ for evaluation. Theagency took a series of steps to evaluate thefindings and to make an overall determinationof the program's effectiveness. After carefulconsideration by outside reviewers, NIJrated HOPE a "promising" program, a ratingthat they placed on their CrimeSolutions.gov website. The rating of "promising" is asignificant endorsement by NIJ. This ratingconveys to researchers and practitionersthat although further research into HOPE isrecommended, there is indication that it canbe an effective evidence-based communitysupervision program. In other words, HOPEaccomplishes what it sets out to do-to deterprobationers from violating the conditions oftheir probation.

After the rating of "promising" had beengiven to HOPE-and much to its credit-NIJdecided to support further study of the program(Robinson, 2011). Thus, in 2011, to determineif the success of HOPE could be replicated inother locations, NIJ, in conjunction with theBureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), createda funding opportunity for any jurisdictioninterested in implementing HOPE. Eachdemonstration site would need to meet therequirements set forth by the BJA and NIJand be willing to have a follow-up evaluationstudy completed by NIJ (www.ojp.usdoj.gov/funding/hopesol).

Advocating the systematic assessment ofHOPE should be seen as a good-faith effort byNIJ to provide data where the evidence baseremains limited. Still, NIJ's willingness to fundfollow-up evaluations has carried with it animplicit endorsement that HOPE is sufficientlycredible to justify special testing. By notsimilarly funding assessments of alternative

treatment-oriented supervision models, it lentcredibility to the prospect that swift-and-certain probation was an innovation deservingof unique consideration. More broadly, thelegitimacy HOPE has acquired from the NIJthrough funding, promotion, and expansionhas been invaluable to the program.

A False Sense of HopeThis cautionary essay is not intended tocriticize the HOPE initiative in Hawaii orthose who have advocated its expansion.Rather, our comments are directed moreat the larger community of policy makers,practitioners, and scholars who have beenuncritical bystanders or willing accomplicesto the program's sanctification. The riskof correctional popularity is that plausibleprograms that resonate with our core beliefsare hard to resist. In such circumstances,the sharp edge of doubt that normally iselicited by grand claims of correctionalsuccess is dulled. Almost without knowing it,everyone jumps on the bandwagon (see alsoFinckenauer, 1982).

Project HOPE might yet prove to be auseful tool in efforts to supervise offendersmore effectively-especially drug offenders.What is striking, however, is how littlecriticism the program has received. Althoughfavorable to the underlying principles of theprogram, Durlauf and Nagin (2011) are anexception. They observe that no evidence yetexists that Project Hope can be "replicatedgenerally outside the small island state ofHawaii" (p. 39). They note further that thefailure of past attempts to use intensivesupervision to monitor offenders "shouldlead to circumspection in claiming thatProject HOPE can be extrapolated to therest of the United States" (p. 39). Anotherexception is Byrne (2013), who notes thatthe existing evaluation research does notprovide "definitive evidence" that "combiningpunishment certainty and celerity" will"induce probationers to stop using drugs.'He further observes that HOPE'S "entirefocus on formal mechanisms of social controlignores a large body of existing researchthat supports the contention that informalsocial control mechanisms are much strongerspecific deterrents than formal social controlmechanisms" (p. 8). Such cautionary voices,however, remain the exception, and, moreimportantly, do not lead to a more systematicanalysis of why Project HOPE should beviewed with a measure of trepidation. In thiscontext, we offer seven reasons why those

trumpeting Project HOPE may be offeringfalse hope that this intervention should be theprototype to guide future offender supervision.

1. An Over-Emphasis on a PotentiallyWeak Key Ingredient

HOPE's correctional popularity has led to anover-emphasis on a key program ingredient:the use of swift-and-certain sanctions. HOPEassumes that specific deterrence is the keyto enforcing compliance with probationconditions and reducing recidivism inthe short and long term. Two importantconsiderations question the validity of thisassumption and caution that sanctions mayexert only weak effects on offender behavior.

First, although disputes exist, researchsuggests that the criminal justice system hasa general deterrent effect and that focuseddeterrence strategies can lower offending incrime "hot spots" (Apel & Nagin, 2011; Braga& Weisburd, 2012; Durlauf & Nagin, 2011;Nagin, 2013). By contrast, little evidenceexists that specific-deterrence programsare consistently effective with correctionalpopulations (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Cullen& Jonson, 2012, 2014; Cullen, Jonson, &Nagin, 2011; Cullen et al., 2002; Lipsey,2009; MacKenzie, 2006; Schaefer, 2013; seealso Farrington & Murray, 2014). Classicexamples include the failure of scaredstraight and intensive supervision programsto prevent recidivism (Finckenauer, 1982;Byrne & Pattavina, 1992; Petersilia & Turner,1993). In fact, ISPs tend to work only whencomplemented with treatment services(Paparozzi & Gendreau, 2005; Petersilia &Turner, 1993). Notably, research also suggeststhat compared with leniency, harsher sanctionsfor technical violations, such as confinement,may actually be criminogenic (Clear, Harris,& Baird, 1992; Drake & Aos, 2012). Althoughit is conceivable that a deterrence schemethat is exquisitely designed and performedmight exert some control over offenders (see,e.g., Moffitt, 1983), the clear risk exists thatcorrectional history will be repeated andthat HOPE will prove to be at most a modestsuccess and at worst a misguided adventure.

Admittedly, some research indicates thatgraduated sanctions and/or drug testing withsubstance-abusing offenders may producecompliance with supervision conditions and,in some instances, produce some long-termreductions in recidivism, especially whencombined with treatment (see, e.g., O'Connellet al., 2013; Taxman, Soule, & Gelb, 1999).The evaluation evidence, however, is not

September 2014 CREATING A FALSE SENSE OF HOPE 63

64 FEDERAL PROBATION Volume 78 Number 2

consistent; examples of failure also exist (Britt,

Gottfredson, & Goldkamp, 1992; Cullen et

al., 1996; Jones & Goldkamp, 1993). This

inconsistency may be due to the lack of

integrity in implementing deterrence schemes

as designed (e.g., because they strain system

resources) (Jones & Goldkamp, 1993).Programs are also likely to fail if offenders

receive the wrong dose of punitive "medicine'Experimental research shows that "not getting

the punishment dosage just right can leadto unintended consequences" (Bonta, 2014).

Too much punishment can prompt "learned

helplessness and retaliatory aggression" andtoo little will fail to suppress the conduct

(Bonta, 2014). Not all judges may be talented

clinicians and not all sanctioning systems will

be calibrated to be equally effective. Researchalso reveals that punishments that are applied

in a coercive, disrespectful way, especially

to offenders with few social bonds (e.g.,unemployed, unmarried), can foster defiance

and increased recidivism (Sherman, 1993;see also Braithwaite, 1989; Colvin, 2000).

Similar to parents, staff in Project HOPE

wish to sanction in a context of concern foroffenders and with fairness. This orientation

and organizational culture may not be presentin other jurisdictions.

Further, advocates of HOPE implicitly

claim legitimacy for the project by implyingthat it is analogous to effective parentalmonitoring of children. Without any citations,

they assume-as do most Americans-thatswift-and-certain parenting is responsible

for compliant youngsters. As it turns out,this "nurture assumption,' as Harris (1998)

terms it, appears to be wrong or, in theleast, overstated. Parental management styles

(e.g., an authoritative "warm but restrictive"style) explain only a small percentage of

the variation in personality and in conduct(Wright & Beaver, 2013). This is why siblings

who share the same family and the same

parents can turn out so differently. Of course,parents can determine the quality of theiroffsprings lives, restrict their friendships and

choice of schools, and do damage throughextreme forms of abuse. Nonetheless, agrowing body of research would caution

that it is problematic to ascribe powerful

behavioral effects to parental managementstyles-whether swift and certain or otherwise(Wright & Beaver, 2013).

Second, beyond implementation

challenges, the inconsistent effects ofspecific-deterrence interventions may bedue to a more fundamental consideration:

Deterrence-oriented programs have achieved

only modest success, if that, because they

are based on a limited theory of reoffending

that dismisses as unimportant all othercausal factors identified in the criminological

literature. According to deterrence theory,

offenders make rational choices and thus will

obey supervision conditions and avoid crimeif they fear being detected and sanctioned.

But this perspective ignores that offenders-

especially high-risk or life-course-persistentoffenders-may have a strong propensity to

offend that is rooted in multiple criminogenic

risk factors that are acquired and developcumulative effects over a lifetime (Andrews

& Bonta, 2010; Cullen & Jonson, 2014;

Moffitt, 1993). If these underlying factors areignored-as they are in deterrence programs

such as HOPE-they do not vanish. Rather,left untreated, they continue to lead offendersinto crime. Put another way, a key program

ingredient can only be strong if its underlyingtheory is correct and directs correctional staff

to target for change the full range of factors

implicated in offender recidivism.As noted, it is possible that closely applied

deterrence-oriented programs- especiallywith drug offenders, where testing can reveal

noncompliance (no direct supervision is

required)-can coerce short-term conformity

with probation conditions. Still, it is

unfortunate that advocates of these programssimply choose to ignore the readily availableand expansive evidence-based treatment

literature that demarcates the main sources of

recidivism and how to address them (see, e.g.,Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Bernfeld, Farrington,& Leschied, 2001; MacKenzie, 2006; Van

Voorhis, Braswell, & Lester, 2009). Similar to

medicine, treating the symptoms but not the

underlying causes of a malady (in our case,reoffending) may "work" in the short termand for those who would have recovered

by themselves (i.e., low-risk offenders). Butin the absence of a strong human services

component, these programs may well providean inappropriate intervention to offenderswho need not coercion but a treatment capable

of reducing their criminogenic propensity (seeAndrews, Bonta, & Wormith, 2011).

Indeed, a strong bodyofevidence (discussed

next) suggests that change in criminal

behavior results not only from effective (i.e.,

consistent and fair/proportional) use ofpunishment and reinforcement (see Dowden& Andrews, 2004) but also from teaching

offenders new prosocial skills and behaviors.Without these other components, punishment

alone is unlikely to have lasting effects. Wesimply cannot expect offenders to "knife off"

maladaptive and antisocial behavioral patternsif we do not first teach them alternative

prosocial behaviors and give them motivation

(i.e., reinforcement) to adopt these strategies

into their repertoires. Nevertheless, becauseno study to date has formally tested the

mediating effects of HOPE's swift-and-certain

sanctions on offenders' outcomes, we cannotknow whether and how much this component

is crucial for HOPE's effectiveness.

2. An Under-Emphasis on ActiveIngredients

The above discussion leads us to state

explicitly a second source of false hope:Because HOPE places such great emphasis

on swift-and-certain sanctions, it loses sightof-and correspondingly fails to emphasize-

factors and practices that do have a verystrong research base and proven effectiveness

for reducing recidivism. When it comes tocorrectional rehabilitation, addressing theknown predictors of recidivism would involve

taking seriously the field's dominant treatmentparadigm: the Risk-Needs-Responsivity(RNR) model developed by Andrews, Bonta,Gendreau, and fellow Canadian psychologists(Cullen, 2012a; see Andrews & Bonta, 2010;

Gendreau, 1996). The RNR model proposesthat the (1) highest-risk offenders shouldreceive the most intensive services (Risk

Principle); (2) services should target crime-

producing risk factors (i.e., "criminogenicneeds") such as antisocial thinking and peers

(Need Principle); and (3) interventions must

be delivered within a cognitive-behavioralframework (Responsivity Principle). Thismodel is based on a strong theory of criminal

conduct and has unprecedented empiricalsupport that spans literally hundreds of studies

across thousands of offenders (Andrews &Bonta, 2010; Gendreau, Smith, & French,2006; Smith, 2013).

HOPE partially adheres to these principles,

which may contribute to the program's success.

However, this adherence appears to be more

by default than by design: Because they arenot explicitly identified as central to HOPE's

effectiveness, strong compliance with the RNR

principles and recognition of their saliencein changing offenders' behavior are lacking.For example, the eligibility criteria for HOPE

include attention to offender risk; however, it

appears that some offenders who potentiallyare not at high risk for recidivism (as

determined by a validated risk assessment tool

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September 2014 CREATING A FALSE SENSE OF HOPE 65

like the LSI-R) can still be accepted into HOPEbecause of their offense (e.g., sex offense)or their poor compliance on supervision.Delivering intensive supervision or servicesto low-risk offenders is contraindicated bythe RNR model (Andrews & Bonta, 2010).Additionally, HOPE emphasizes drug andalcohol treatment for those who need it.Substance use is indeed a criminogenic need,but it is only one of seven of the strongestchangeable risk factors for crime. To trulyimpact recidivism, HOPE must also targetantisocial attitudes, associates, and behavioralpatterns; familial relationships; problems ineducation and employment; and poor use ofleisure time (Andrews & Bonta, 2010). In fact,the more appropriate criminogenic needs thatare targeted, the better the outcomes are likelyto be (see French & Gendreau, 2006).

Further, consistent with RNR principles,HOPE (and probation as usual) officers areactually trained in Motivational Interviewing(Miller & Rollnick, 2002) and in cognitive-behavioral approaches. But this importanttraining goes largely unrecognized inmost discussions about the program andthus is unlikely to be part of the technologytransferred to other jurisdictions that chooseto implement HOPE-like interventions. Evenif these treatment components are used-whether in Hawaii or elsewhere-their impactis likely to wane if they are not monitored,discussed in regular staff meetings, andreinforced in refresher courses (Bonta, 2014).

3. Failure to Identify AlternativeExplanations for HOPE's Effectiveness

Because no process evaluation of HOPE hasbeen conducted to date, we do not knowfor certain what may be driving the successof the HOPE program, when it has beensuccessful. If agencies wish to optimize theeffects of their correctional interventions,it is essential to get inside the "black box"of interventions to identify the "activeingredients" that are actually working toreduce reoffending. Although this fact is eitherignored or mostly mentioned in passing, theHOPE model contains a number of potential"active ingredients" beyond swift and certainpunishments. Even its proponents recognizethis reality, arguing that an enthusiastic judge,commitment from key personnel, and closecommunication and collaboration betweenagencies are essential (see Pearsall, 2014).

Other critical features of the HOPE modelalso have largely been absent from descriptionsand evaluations of HOPE. These features seem

to have occurred more by happenstance,perhaps due in part to the deliberate andconcerted effort and commitment of judgesand probationers to the HOPE programand, ultimately, to HOPE probationers'success. We contend that it is likely that thesecomponents are some the "active ingredients"

of the program, and that they have potentiallystronger influences on offender behavior thanswift and certain sanctions. Because thesecomponents are not explicitly identified ascentral to the HOPE model, however, otheragencies cannot replicate them and fall shortof the outcomes achieved in Hawaii.

First, as noted above, the HOPE structureincludes some modest adherence to the threeRNR principles. Research shows that programeffectiveness varies directly by the degree towhich it complies with these principles andthus delivers appropriate versus inappropriatetreatment (Andrews & Bonta, 2010). Second, indelivering Project HOPE in Hawaii, probationstaff and judges have engaged in what areknown in the "what works" literature as CoreCorrectional Practices (CCPs) (Andrews &Kiessling, 1980; Dowden & Andrews, 2004).Specifically, judges and probation officersembrace a "firm-but-fair" interaction stylewith the offenders and exhibit an "effectiveuse of authority" They clearly state rules andexpectations and consistently hold offendersaccountable for their misconduct, applyingsanctions that are commensurate with theoffense. At the same time, all those involvedin delivering HOPE are invested in offenders'success and therefore likely to engage with theoffenders in a manner that reflects genuinecare and concern. The judge and probationofficers also provide offenders with theforum to express interest in obtaining drugand alcohol treatment-and then help linkoffenders to this treatment. Thus, "relationshipquality" and "service brokerage"-two otherCCPs-are naturally occurring as a result ofthe program's structure and goals.

Notably, CCPs are meant to complementthe RNR model and have been shown toincrease the utility of RNR for offenders'outcomes (Dowden & Andrews, 2004). Thus,they potentially affect HOPE offenders'outcomes as well, and may even help toexplain some of HOPE's effectiveness. Forexample, timely access to effective drug andalcohol treatment is likely to impact substanceuse and may also impact criminal offending.Additionally, high-quality relationshipsbetween offenders and officers can reducetechnical violations (e.g., missed supervision

or treatment appointments) and arrests (seeManchak, Skeem, Kennealy, & Eno Louden,2014; Kennealy, Skeem, Manchak, & EnoLouden, 2012; Skeem, Eno Louden, Polaschek,& Camp, 2007).

4. Over-Selling the Promise ofApplicability for Other Jurisdictions

A fourth source of false hope is the challengeof creating in other locations the activeingredients that produced Project HOPE'Ssuccess in Hawaii. The conditions underwhich HOPE was implemented in Hawaii wereso specific that replicating the same conditionsmay prove to be difficult, if not impossible. Forexample, we have already explained how JudgeAim used his extensive connections withinthe criminal justice system in Hawaii whenlaunching the pilot program in 2004 (Aim,2011). Additionally, Judge Aim continuesto carry the majority of HOPE probationerson his caseload (Alm, 2013). Whether theprogram would function as effectively underdifferent or diverse leadership is debatable.

Further, a HOPE-type program mayconsume too many resources for otherjurisdictions to accommodate. As explainedabove, there were significant changes atevery level of the criminal justice system inHawaii when HOPE was implemented. Therelationships that Alm had with differentagencies within the state helped to facilitatethe start of HOPE using minimal funds (Alm,2011). Other locations should not assume thatthis will hold true in their jurisdictions.

The fate of an NIJ-funded replication of aHOPE-like program in Delaware is instructive.Under the name "Decide Your Time" (DYT),this program "was designed to manage highrisk substance-using probationers by focusingon the certainty of detection through frequentdrug tests and graduated but not severesanctions" (O'Connell, Visher, Martin, Parker,& Brent, 2011, p. 261). The start-up of thisintervention, however, quickly encountered aseries of unanticipated problems: too manyoffenders failed urine tests, too rapidly; therewas strain on personnel who had to transportthose failing drug tests immediately to facilitieslocated one to two-and-one-half hours away;there was a legal requirement to accord allincarcerated offenders a medical check-upand to hold a judicial revocation hearing foroffenders who exceeded the maximum of 10incarceration days; and there was the exclusionfrom the program of offenders with specificconditions of probation (e.g., zero-tolerancefor a single failed urine test). Efforts were

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66 FEDERAL PROBATION Volume 78 Number 2

made to redesign the program. Nonetheless,

although a formal evaluation report has not

been issued, the preliminary results suggest

that the percentage of program participants

arrested for a new crime, arrested for violatingparole conditions, and incarcerated (at 6, 12,

and 18 months) was comparable for offenders

in the DYT and standard probation groups

(O'Connell et al., 2013). As O'Connell andhis colleagues (2013, power-point slide 34)

observe, "swift and certain sanctions can work(see HOPE)" and "swift and certain sanctionscan also not work (see DYT)'

The lesson is that the "transfer of

technology" from one jurisdiction to

another-from Hawaii to Delaware andelsewhere-is a daunting challenge. The

context in each system potentially differs inmeaningful ways, including court personnel,

justice system coordination, legal restrictions,offender populations, resource capacity, and

sanctioning practices. If Hawaii and ProjectHOPE offered a perfect storm of favorable

conditions, this intersection of conditionsmay not be possible in other locations. Beforejumping on the HOPE bandwagon, it would

be prudent to wait for positive replicationselsewhere-even assuming that they will

be forthcoming.

5. Delivering an Intervention That Maybe Inappropriate for Some Offenders

A fifth source of false hope is that ProjectHOPE has been touted as a program that

is appropriate for all offenders who arerepeatedly noncompliant with probation.Although Hawaii's HOPE program includes a

variety of offenders (sex, property, assault), its

evaluation studies have only been performed

on drug-involved offenders (Hawken &Kleiman, 2009). Therefore, we do not knowwhether HOPE can work for other types of

offenders-that is, those who do not have adrug problem. Much of the leverage behind

HOPE's operation hinges upon the frequent

and random drug testing. Without this near-foolproof method to discover noncompliance,the only probation violations that will beconsistently detected are those that are easilywitnessed (e.g., an offender does not show up

for an office appointment) or monitored by

technology (e.g., electronic monitor for thoseon home confinement). Without the elixirof drug tests, it thus is unclear how HOPE

supervision will differ from probation as

usual. In short, if many probation violationsare not detected, the swiftness and certainty

of punishment-the key ingredient of theprogram-will be compromised.

6. Focusing on Something That MightNot Matter

Project Hope assumes that technical violationsof probation conditions are a bad thing.

Such conduct leads to expensive revocations.But most important, a core assumption, if

sometimes unstated, is that technical violationsare a precursor to recidivism. Of course,nobody condones irresponsible behavior in

which rules are flouted, with probationersrepeatedly missing appointments and failing

drug tests. Still, the fundamental questionis whether an entire probation system-

including judges, prosecutors, police, andprobation staff-should be reorganized to

focus its primary attention on compliancewith probation conditions. Resourcesdevoted to swift-and-certain punishmentcannot be devoted, for example, to increasingprobationers' low rate of participation in

evidence-based programming found toreduce recidivism (see Taxman, Pattavina, &Caudy, 2014).

So, here is the concern: What if technicalviolations are unrelated to recidivism? The

immediate difficulty is that criminologicalknowledge on this critical issue is limited.

Still, the research that does exist suggeststhat focusing excessively on curtailing

technical violations might be misplaced if

the correctional goal is to reduce recidivism(Paparozzi & Gendreau, 2005). In their

classic ISP study, Petersiia and Turner (1993)

conducted a special analysis of this issue usingoffenders in California and Texas. Offenders

on ISPs were monitored more closely and thus

were detected and sanctioned more often fortechnical violations. However, they discovered"no support for the argument that violating

offenders on technical conditions suppressednew criminal arrests" (p. 342).

In contrast, research by MacKenzie and

De Li (2002) did find that probationers whocarried a gun, used drugs, and engagedin heavy alcohol consumption were moreinvolved in self-reported crime. These "high-

risk behaviors" might be targets for sanctions,but sanctioning without teaching offendersnew skills to change these behaviors (apoint mentioned previously) is unlikely to

curtail future violations or recidivism fornew offenses. MacKenzie and De Li also

discovered, however, that social bonds-beingemployed and living with a spouse-decreased

criminal involvement. Jail time would seem to

disrupt these important protective factors (seeSampson & Laub, 1993). Further, advocates

of desistance-oriented interventions (e.g., the

Good Lives Model) argue that these positivesocial relationships or bonds should be builtthrough supportive, not punitive, supervisionstrategies (see, e.g., Porporino, 2010; Raynor &

Robinson, 2009; Ward & Maruna, 2007).The point is that it remains unknown

whether technical violations are related to

recidivism and, if so, which ones and for

whom. Even if there is a relationship, itis unclear whether it is causal or spurious

(e.g., individual traits such as low self-controlcould cause an offender to miss scheduledmeetings and to commit crimes). Similarly, itis not established whether technical violations

are best addressed through swift-and-certain punishments or through assessingcriminogenic needs and responsive treatments,

building quality interpersonal relationships

between officers and offenders, and trainingofficers in motivational techniques. Finally,it remains to be seen if the embrace of

HOPE's specific-deterrence probation

paradigm will unwittingly curtail attentionto other predictors of probation success andrecidivism-specifically offender strengths-

that might prove crucial to a complete model ofoffender supervision (Porporino, 2010). Withso much uncertainty, the real possibility existsthat technical violations might not matter thatmuch in probationers' recidivism and thus

should be relegated to a secondary concern in

any probation model concerned with reducinglong-term criminal involvement.

7. Opening a Pandora's Box throughPunishment-Oriented Probation

The history of corrections teaches three things:

First, well-intentioned reforms typicallyhave untoward consequences; second,punitive regimens in corrections rarely arerestrained in their punitiveness; and, third,deemphasizing rehabilitation produces harsh,

uncaring, bureaucratic corrections. Indeed,a core lesson of the attack on rehabilitationin the 1970s and beyond is that it helpedto unleash a mean season in correctionsoriented to "waste management" from whichAmerican corrections is just beginning torecover (Cullen & Gilbert, 2013; Kruttschnitt& Gartner, 2005; Rothman, 2002; Simon,1993). Prior to endorsing HOPE, policy

makers and practitioners-and criminologistsas well-should be aware of its potentialunanticipated consequences. Three issues

suggest that HOPE may be less a panacea

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September 2014 CREATING A FALSE SENSE OF HOPE 67

and more of a Pandora's Box that shouldremain unopened.

First, doing punishment efficientlyand effectively becomes the focal point ofprobation. Accordingly, energies will befocused on acquiring the latest monitoringand surveillance technologies so as to increasethe certainty of detection. Probation officialswill meet with judges, prosecutors, andjailers to make sanctions swifter; they willnot meet with service providers to increasetreatment capacity and effectiveness. Whenhiring probation officers, the emphasis willbe on their enforcement skills, not on theirinterpersonal talents; policing, not socialwork, will be valued. And when jurisdictionsexhaust their ability to improve swiftness andcertainty, they will seek to reduce violationsand recidivism with the only componentof punishment remaining in their arsenal:severity. The history of corrections teachesthat when punishment fails to be effective, thelesson drawn is not that harshness does notwork but rather that the costs of crime simplyare not yet high enough.

Second, rehabilitation will be reducedto "triage." Only when offenders manifestclear behavioral problems will treatment beinvoked. It is clear what this might be forthose who repeatedly fail drug tests (substanceabuse treatment will be forthcoming), but itis a mystery what triage entails for those whofail to show up for five meetings with theirprobation officer. In either case, rehabilitationbecomes reactive rather than proactive.Officers will conduct risk assessment to learnwho to watch more closely and not who needsresponsive treatments immediately. Morebroadly, no effort will be made to create theculture, expertise, and organizational practicesneeded to deliver effective treatment. Nobodywill be using the Correctional ProgramAssessment Inventory to build an agencywith the capacity to undertake rehabilitationthat works (Andrews & Bonta, 2010). In thisregard, Paparozzi (2014) has offered thispoignant observation about one swift-and-certain probation system:

The result is that the community correctionsofficers violate at the drop of a hat and thatviolators are sanctioned for a few days, up to30 days (presumptively; oh yes, aggravatingand mitigating factors may come intoplay). The purpose of all of this is to "getthe offender's attention.' The reality is thaioffenders are supervised by warrant insteadof supervised by risk/need assessment,case planning, an acknowledgement of

the relevance of relapse, and the totality ofcircumstances involved in a particular caseat a particular time.

Third and perhaps most important, HOPEand its likely descendants embrace a valuesystem that is potentially disquieting. Arehabilitative probation is built on a concernfor offenders and a belief that investing inthem will improve their lives and publicsafety. Implicitly, it follows the mandate ofa "Correctional Hippocratic Oath" to dono harm (Cullen, 2012b). Thus, the firstprinciple of the RNR model is "respect forthe person"; this means that "services areprovided in an ethical, legal, just, moral,humane, and decent manner" (Andrews et hl.,2011, p. 738). Similarly, embracing positivepsychology, the Good Lives Model arguesthat to achieve desistance, offenders "shouldbe given the knowledge, skills, opportunitiesand resources to live a 'good' life.... In short,treatment should provide them with a chanceto better people with better lives" (Ward &Maruna, 2007, p. 111). As Clear and Frost(2014) point out, however, HOPE reflectsinstead the "punitive imperative" Clearand Frost recognize the appeal of trying"to find the optimal calibration of sanctionsneeded to shape the behavior of recalcitrantprobationers' especially because of "thepromise that less is required than ordinarilybelieved" (2014, p. 111). But they also cautionthat there "is a harsher, more unpleasant sideto this argument" (p. 111). In the end, HOPEembraces the belief that "community penaltieshould be generally unlikable and distasteful"

and "punitively repugnant" (pp. 111, 112).Even if shown to be modestly effective, is thiswhat we wish the future of corrections to be?

Conclusion: The High Costof Popularity

The emergence of HOPE as a popularchoice in community supervision is notwithout some merit. Judge Aim was notcontent to see offenders repeatedly violateconditions of probation and inevitably endup imprisoned. He designed a program basedon clear guidelines applied in a fair and firmmanner, offender accountability, certain butnon-severe graduated sanctions, and supportfor those deserving of it. He was masterful insecuring cooperation from other componentsof the justice system to ensure that theprogram would be conducted with fidelityto its principles. He also invited empiricalevaluation that has produced positivefindings. At the very least, he has created a

model program-one that is worthy of furtherinvestigation-for the management of thoseon probation who are unable to comply withsupervision conditions, especially drug tests.

Even so, evaluations of HOPE and itsadaptations are few in number and haveproduced mixed results. They also aremethodologically limited, in that thesetests have not included various offenderpopulations, an extended follow-up period,or direct assessments of the program's "logicmodel." Further, this logic model may bemisguided. Theory and research wouldsuggest that swift-and-certain sanctions areunlikely to drive HOPE's effects alone, andthat other, somewhat organically occurringpractices (i.e., those not explicitly emphasized,taught, or viewed as central to the model)within the HOPE program are actually morelikely to explain its effectiveness.

More broadly, as Merton (1973) notes, acore norm of science is "organized skepticism."When new discoveries or startling findings areannounced, science cautions against a readyacceptance. Instead, as an evidence-basedenterprise, the appropriate response is to callfor further study and replication. Similarly, inthe pharmaceutical field, drugs with seeminglyremarkable curative powers are not broughtto market until properly vetted. Rushing tomarket on limited trials could result in adrug being ingested without sufficient studyto determine if harmful side-effects mightoccur. In recent years, a more sobering realityhas been uncovered: Many well-publicized,widely accepted experimental findings, frommedicine to the social sciences, have not beenreplicated in subsequent research (Lehrer,2010; Ioannidis, 2005a, b).

In corrections, such organized skepticismand reliance on careful evaluation to discerniatrogenic effects of interventions are sorelylacking-often leading to the implementationof programs that are sheer quackery (Latessa,Cullen, & Gendreau, 2002). Clearly, the HOPEprogram was carefully designed and did notshy away from empirical assessment. Still,it is an initiative that was widely heraldedand not subjected to careful scrutiny. Due toa convergence of circumstances (reviewedabove), it was seen as an important invention.The correctional audience-policy makers,practitioners, and scholars-might havepaused to wonder whether a program basedon a limited theory of crime that has rarelysucceeded in producing effective interventions(specific deterrence) might have only limited

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effects and not be effective in courtrooms not

led by a charismatic judge.

In the end, correctional popularity risks

having a high opportunity cost. When

offenders are placed into popular but unprovenprograms, they are not given correctional

services that are evidence-based and of proven

effectiveness. Thus, when drug and other

offenders are sanctioned, the issue is this:Why should they receive HOPE rather than a

treatment based on the RNR model (Andrews& Bonta, 2010; Cullen, 2012a; see also Van

Voorhis, 1987)? Of course, it might be possible

to merge a program that attempts to diminishrevocations (such as HOPE) with an evidence-

based rehabilitation component. Still, HOPE

has been largely celebrated not as an add-on

to proven interventions but as a remarkablepanacea in and of itself.

The obligation of policy makers and

practitioners thus is to use the best science tointervene in the lives of offenders. Evidencethat is extensive and that shows a program's

reliable efficacy, not popularity, should guidehow corrections is undertaken. Although

experimentation with new programs suchas Project HOPE should be welcomed, if

not encouraged, the embrace of such fresh

inventions should be cautious and not marked

by unfounded hubris. Ultimately, the use ofpopular but ineffective programs consigns

offenders to a life in crime and diminishespublic safety. We owe correctional populations

and the citizenry better than this.

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