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Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Planning

(TSCP)

(excerpt from PCAS presentation July 11, 2005)

Nazli Choucri1, Stuart E. Madnick2, Michael D. Siegel31 Political Science Department

2 Sloan School of Management & School of Engineering3 Sloan School of Management

{nchoucri, smadnick, msiegel} @ mit.edu

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What is TSC*?What is TSC*?

Those activities Combatant Commanders conduct with foreign allies and friends to:

– Build defense relationships that promote specific US strategic interests

– Develop allied and friendly capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, including allied transformation

– Improve information exchange and intelligence sharing to help harmonize views on security challenges

– Provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access and en route infrastructure

* Theater Security Cooperation Source: OSD Security Cooperation Guidance Coordination Draft , July 26, 2004

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

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Possible uses of System Dynamics in TSC

• Dynamics of the TSC planning process

• Build defense relationships to improve interoperability to improve– Learning, building trust, working together

• Develop allied and friendly capabilities by improving their allocation of resources for– Training troops– Assignment of officers– Intelligence gathering

• Combine dynamics and political stability to assist planning (ISX-EL-Sentia-MIT TIE)

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TSCP Dynamics - Causal Diagram

Theater SecurityCooperation Program(TSCP) Participation

DefenseRelationships

+

Trust Building withForeign Allies

+

Effectiveness ofTSCP

+

+R

"Relationships thatBuild Trust"

Development of Alliedand FriendlyCapabilities

Ability forCoalition

Operations

+

+

Success ofTSCP

+

+

R

"Building TrackRecord"

Promoting USStrategic Interests+ +

InformationExchange

Harmonious Views onSecurity Challenges

Ability to do WiderRange of TSCP

Activities

+

++

+

+

R

"BuildingIntelligence

Cooperation"

4

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Dynamic & Interdependent Behavior of Planning Activities

Planning BPlanning X Planning A

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Value of Studying the Dynamics of the TSCP Planning Process - Examples

• “Software project dynamics: an integrated approach” – Tarek Abdel-Hamid & Stuart Madnick – Complexity and Tradeoffs in Planning Large-Scale Software

Projects, especially government systems

• “Strategic management of complex projects: a case study using system dynamics” - James M. Lyneis - Case study of the Peace Shield Air Defense System

• “Modeling intergovernmental cooperation: A system dynamics approach” - Laura Black - Model of collaboration, trust building, and knowledge sharing in a complex, intergovernmental information system project. 6

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Build defense relationships to improve interoperability

• Joint exercises are an important tool for- Building defense relations- Improving interoperability

PlannedExercises

InteroperabilitySkills

New ExercisesPlanned

DoingExercises Building Skills

Loss ofInteroperability

+

Time to LoseInteroperability

-

IndicatedImprovement Desired

Interoperability

+

-

+

B

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But much more is going on …

PlannedExercises

InteroperabilitySkills

ExperienceParticipating

in JointPlanning

New ExercisesPlanned

DoingExercises Building Skills

Loss ofInteroperability

Participation inJoint Exercise

Decay ofExperience

+

Time to LoseInteroperability

-

IndicatedExercise Rate

DesiredCompletion Time

+

ResourcesAvailable

NormalExercise Rate

SchedulePressure

+

Time Spent inJoint Planning

-

Time SpentConductingExercises

+

+

+

Effectiveness ofExercises in Skill

Building

+

+

Decay Time

-

IndicatedImprovement Desired

Interoperability

+

-

+

+

BR

B

8

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Develop Allied and Friendly Capabilities

• Better understanding of implications of allocation of resources for– Training activities– Military Leadership– Intelligence sharing

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Officer Allocation Policy• Allocation policy has resulted in unequal

distribution of officer talent between North and South.

• Officer talent in the South can affect the mix of anti-insurgency activities.

• Short-term solutions respond to violence and insurgency.

• Long-term solutions build trust with local communities (example: Marine Corps Combined Action Program).

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Officer Quality Policy

Building Trust Assignment ofTroops to Trust

Building

TroopsResponding to

Violence

Assignment of Troopsto Respond to

Violence

+

-

Frequency ofViolence

Indicated Troopsin Field

Gap

+

+

-

+

Trust

-

SendingCommanders to

South

+

Fraction of HighlyQualified Commanders

in South

Preference forShort-termSolutions

Effectiveness ofTrust Building

+

+ +

-

-

R

B

B

+

+

+

R

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Officer Allocation Policy

• Officer allocation can skew mix toward short-term solutions at the expense of a long-term optimal mix.

• Trust and relations suffer, so violence is more likely.

• Despite continued increases in troops, frequency of violence chronically increases.

• “Unintended consequences” of the allocation policy exacerbate the problem.

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Disaggregating TSCP Activities: Combine dynamics and political stability (ISX-EL-Sentia-MIT TIE)

MultilateralConferences

EffectIncreasing MultilateralConferences

Decreasing MultilateralConferences

HumanitarianAssistance EffectIncreasing Humanitarian

AssistanceDecreasing

Humanitarian Assistance

Effect of MultilateralConferences on End

State

Effect of HumanitarianAssistance on End

State

Duration of MultilateralConferences Effects

Duration ofHumanitarian Assistance

Effects

Adjustment toPolitical Stability

MultilateralConferences per Year

HumanitarianAssistances per

Year

Strength of MultilateralConferences Effects on

End State

Strength of HumanitarianAssistance Effects on

End State

MultilateralService

Exchange EffectIncreasing MultilateralService Exchange

Decreasing MultilateralService Exchange

Other HighLevel Visits

EffectHigh Level Visits Decreasing HighLevel Visits

Effect of Multilateral ServiceExchange on End State

Effect of High LevelVisits on End State

Duration of MultilateralService Exchange Effects

Duration of High LevelAssistance Effects

Multilateral ServiceExchange per Year

High Level Visitsper Year

Strength of MultilateralService Exchange Effects on

End State

Strength of High LevelVisits on End State

BilateralConferences

EffectIncreasing BilateralConferences

Decreasing BilateralConferences

SME ExchangeEffectIncreasing SME

ExchangeDecreasing SME

Exchange

Effect of BilateralConferences on End

State

Effect of SMEExchange on End State

Duration of BilateralConferences Effects

Duration of SMEExchange Effects

Bilateral Conferencesper Year

SME Exchangeper Year

Strength of BilateralConferences Effects on

End State

Strength of SME ExchangeEffects on End State

Staff AssistanceEffectIncreasing Staff

AssistanceDecreasing Staff

Assistance

PME Effect

Increasing PME Decreasing PME

Effect of Staff Assistanceon End State

Effect of PME onEnd State

Duration of StaffAssistance Effects

Duration of PMEEffects

Staff Assistanceper Year

PME per Year

Strength of Staff AssistanceEffects on End State

Strength of PME Effectson End State

SeniorGovernmentVisits EffectIncreasing Senior

Government VisitsDecreasing SeniorGovernment Visits

Effect of SeniorGovernment Visits on

End State

Duration of SeniorGovernmentVisitsEffects

Senior GovernmentVisits per Year

Strength of SeniorGovernment Visits Effects on

End State

Effect of MultilateralConferences on

objective

Effect of HumanitarianAssistance on

Objective

Strength of MultilateralConferences Effects on

Objective

Strength of HumanitarianAssistance Effects on

Objective

Effect of Multilateral ServiceExchange on Objective

Effect of High LevelVisits on Objective

Strength of Multilateral ServiceExchange Effects on Objective

Strength of High LevelVisits on Objective

Effect of BilateralConferences on

Objective

Effect of SME Exchangeon Objective

Strength of BilateralConferences Effects on

Objective

Strength of SME ExchangeEffects on Objective

Effect of Staff Assistanceon Objective

Effect of PME onObjective

Strength of Staff AssistanceEffects on Objective

Strength of PME Effectson Objective

Effect of SeniorGovernment Visits on

Objective

Strength of SeniorGovernment Visits Effects on

Objective

Adjustments toPolitical Capacity

SocialFractionalization Democracy

Effect of HumanitarianAssistance on Social

Fractionalization

Strength of Effects ofHumanitarian Assistance on

Social Fractionalization

Effect of BilateralConferenceson on Social

Fractionalization

Strength of BilateralConferences Effects on Social

Fractionalization

Effect of Senior GovernmentVisits on SocialFractionalization

Strength of Effects of SeniorGovernment Visits on Social

Fractionalization

Effect of Other High LevelVisitson SocialFractionalization

Strength of Effects of OtherHigh Level Visits on Social

Fractionalization

Effect of HumanitarianAssistance onDemocracy

Strength of Effects ofHumanitarian Assistance on

Democracy

Effect of BilateralConferenceson on

Democracy

Strength of BilateralConferences Effects on

Democracy

Effect of SeniorGovernment Visits on

Democracy

Strength of Effects of SeniorGovernment Visits on

Democracy

Effect of Other HighLevel Visits on

Democracy

Strength of Effects of OtherHigh Level Visits on

Democracy

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Disaggregating TSCP Activities- “Zoom in” example

Adjustment toPolitical Stability

BilateralConferences

EffectIncreasing

BilateralConferences

DecreasingBilateral

Conferences

Effect of BilateralConferences on End

State

Duration of BilateralConferences Effects

BilateralConferences per

Year

Strength of BilateralConferences Effects on

End State

Effect of BilateralConferences on

Objective

Strength of BilateralConferences Effects on

Objective

Adjustments toPolitical Capacity

SocialFractionalization

Democracy

Effect of BilateralConferenceson on

Social Fractionalization

Strength of BilateralConferences Effects onSocial Fractionalization

Effect of BilateralConferenceson on

Democracy

Strength of BilateralConferences Effects on

Democracy

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