09.30.2019 Pg.260 BERKELEY PUBLICATION 09.30.2019 AND ...€¦ · 09.30.2019 Pg.262 Vol. 10, No. 6 BERKELEY RESEARCH & PUBLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL Bayero University, Kano, PMB 3011,

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Vol. 10, No. 6

BERKELEY RESEARCH & PUBLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL Bayero University, Kano, PMB 3011, Kano State, Nigeria. +234 (0) 802 881 6063, Website: www.berkeleypublications.com

International Journal of Humanities and Social Science

ISSN: 1867-5839

HE JIHADI EXTERNAL INFLUENCE IN NIGERIAN PRE-COLONIAL CONFLUENCE AREA, 1809-1900 MAIYAKI M. MEJIDA

Department Of History, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, Nigeria.

ABSTRACT vents with far-reaching

consequences made the nineteenth

century history of Nigeria quite

intriguing. There were struggles for political

control or commercial supremacy; Islamic

and Christian Missionary movements were

common. Some of these events destabilised

the erstwhile pre-nineteenth century

societies while others effected gradual

changes in the people’s patterns of life. This

study examined one of the events, the jihad,

which greatly affected the socio-political

history of not only the confluence area but the

entire Northern Nigeria. Specific attention

was given to the socio-political changes and

challenges created by the two Nasarawa and

Keffi sub-emirates of Zaria. This study has

found out that by 1812 the hegemony of the

non-Muslim polities had been overthrown

and replaced by Fulani authority. New

administrative reforms were introduced in

line with the new political dispensation. By

this, the Hausa and Fulani state builders

swung the pendulum of relationship and

planted the seed of ethnic contestation.

KEY WORDS: Jihadi, Nasarawa, Keffi,

Confluence Area, External Infuence

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Introduction

he nineteenth century was quite eventful in Nigerian history because

events with far-reaching consequences took place. In Sokoto, Kukawa

(Alkalawa) Calabar, Lagos, Confluence area, amongst other towns, there

were struggles for political control or commercial supremacy. Trade rivalries,

Islamic and Christian Missionary movements were common. Some of the events

destabilised the erstwhile pre-nineteenth century societies while others

effected gradual changes in the people’s patterns of life.1 Hence this study is

devoted to the examination of one of the events, the jihad, which greatly affected

the socio-political history of not only the Confluence area but the entire

Northern Nigeria in the nineteenth century. Specific attention was given to the

socio-political changes and challenges created by the two Nasarawa and Keffi

sub-emirates of Zaria.

The Concept Jihad

The term ‘Jihad’ has become complex and controversial for several centuries as

Muslim jurists have varying views regarding the meaning. To some it literally

means “striving” or determined effort” and in so many contexts it has become

synonymous with “fighting”. The description of warfare against the enemies of

the Muslim community as Jihad fi Sabid Illah gave a sense of religiosity to an

activity that otherwise might have appeared as no more that tribal warfare

endemic in pre-Islamic Arabia. For the jurists, Jihad fits a context of the world

divided into Muslim and non-Muslim zones, Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam) and

Dar al-Harb (Abode of War) respectively. One would definitely agree that the

Jihad has an explicitly political aim: the establishment of Muslim rule, which in

turn has two benefits: it articulates Islam’s supersession of other faiths and

creates the opportunity for Muslims to create a just political and social order.

In Sub Saharan Africa, the authoritative proponent of militant Islamisation in

the form of Jihad was the fifteen century Tunisian jurist, Abd al-Karim al-

Maghili, regarded as a militant activist and whose anti-Jewish stands led to the

massacre of Jews in Tuwat and Gurara in the fifteenth century. Al-Maghili left

an enduring legacy that was to become a central motivational factor to later

Jihad movements throughout West Africa. Al-Maghili’s influence on the then

Sudanese rulers later resonated into jihadi movements in West Africa. By late

eighteenth century and early nineteenth century for instance, a Fulani cleric,

Uthman Dan Fodio, who has got some tutelage from Al-Maghili, launched a Jihad

T


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in Hausaland in present day Northern Nigeria, This Jihadi protest movement

against the adoption of non-Muslim lifestyles by an increasing number of Hausa

people and the ruling class in Hausaland led to the establishment of what is

popularly known as Sokoto Caliphate in Northern Nigeria. Sokoto Jihad was the

first successful Islamic protest movement in the history of northern Nigeria and

has since become the ultimate goal of subsequent jihadi activism in most part of

the region. Emirates emerged in the region as a result of this movement which

were/are answerable to the Caliph of the Sokoto Caliphate.

Historical Perceptions

Turaki has shown the nature of socio-political responses of the people of the

central Nigeria to the political development in northern Nigeria.2 He used his

personal and direct experiences as son of the soil to discount some of the

methodological fallacies expressed about the central Nigerian people especially

in colonial and Islamic literature. These Islamic and colonial fallacies include

that the Fulani have superior intelligence and are empire builders as against the

peoples of central Nigeria area. Literature abounds on the political development

of Central Nigeria prior to the jihadi era. Kingdoms such as the Nupe, Ikereku of

the Bassa, Kwararafa of the Jukun and Opanda of the Ebira were among other

political initiatives of the people of Central Nigeria area. Mangvwat3 and

Zuwaqhu4 have also, using the Marxist-historical approach, highlighted some of

the major assumptions that guided Hausa and Fulani hegemony. They also

pointed out the subtle manipulation of religious sentiments that laid the

foundation for the development and exploitation of the peoples of this region.

They were subjected to raids from the Fulani and Nupe during the trans-

Saharan and trans-Atlantic slave trades and later in the early nineteenth to mid-

nineteenth century jihads.5 In fact it was a fallacy of supposition to postulate

that the Bassa, Gbagyi and a host of other indigenous groups were not known

for political initiative, or that the region was always a recipient of outside

civilisation and always under alien, superior external control

The Jihadi Experience

Hausaland experienced tumultuous events in the early nineteenth century in

the form of jihadists’ wars. According to Usman Dan Fodio, the leader of the

Jihad, the aim was to reform Islam as a means of correcting societal ills which

were very common in Hausaland during this period. In his words, “the purpose


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was to bring Islam back to its original orthodoxy and restore the faith to its

purity in the line with what obtained during the life of the Holy Prophet (SAW)

and that of the four caliphs”.6 These wars lasted in the core Hausa region

between 1804 and 1809 but continued in other areas up till the mid-nineteenth

century. By 1811, the jihadists were in control of major states and capitals in

Hausaland and beyond.7

About A.D 1809, it was recorded that Mohama or Makam, also called Makau, the

55th and last Habe ruler of Zaria , having been completely defeated by the Fulani

revolutionary force led by Mallam Musa, first emir of Zaria, fled southwards. The

expulsion of Makau from the throne in Zaria brought him to Zuba among the

Koro. After he has firmly established himself at Zuba, “Makau gathered around

him many more of his former Zaria office-holders and retainers with their

households and slaves, and was, thus, enabled to continue to enforce the annual

tribute formerly sent to him at Zaria” by the Koro and Gwari vassals.8 As he

waxed in power, he enlarged his influence and even adventured as far as Lapai

where he besieged the chief of Lapai, Dauda Maza. Makau was killed in the

encountered with Dauda Maza at the gates of Lapai in about A.D 1825.

On Makau’s death, his followers retreated from Lapai and were led back to Zuba

by his son Jatau, nicknamed “Abu Ja”, Abu, the “Red”, from his fair complexion,

who then became chief and built a large walled town which became known by

the nickname of the founder, Abuja. Makau’s other descendants established

Suleja and Abaji.

Emergence of Keffi Emirate

Keffi, traditions collected by Kasimu Judde, indicated that Abdul Zanga, the

conqueror of Keffi polities, is said to be a Fulani of “Dangawa stock of the Yan

Tumaki from Katsina”.9 Following the death of his father at Yan Tumaki, there

was succession dispute. Zanga set out to found a kingdom of his own. According

to the tradition:

He first settled at Bagaji around 1765 but latter grazed his cattle southwards to

the region of Keffi and decided to build his permanent home there. This was in

c.1770 and hence, he became the founder and first emir of Keffi. This place was

later used as a springboard for Islamisation and conquest of the non-Muslim

districts of Gbagyi, Afo, Gwandara, Bassa, Toni, Koro, Yeskwa, Mada and

Eggon.10


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Another tradition has it that before Abdul Zanga’s adventure into the area,

nomadic Fulani herdsmen had long visited the area and began to settle at the

end of the eighteenth century.11 It was found out, however, that before the

outbreak of the Jihad, Muhammadu Gani, a Fulani from Zanga, used to bring his

herds from Katsina every dry season to graze in the area. This annual cattle

grazing was continued by his son Abdullahi Zanga, who then decided to settle

permanently. He eventually persuaded his Fulani kinsmen to live under him.

They finally settled in 1802, built a stockade village and named it Keffi,

“stockade”. Zanga then appointed Umaru his deputy.12

When the jihad broke in Gobir in 1804, Usman Dan Fodio sent messages to all

Fulani leaders and Abdullahi Zanga decided to go to Sokoto to obtain a flag for

himself. But, Malam Musa (1804-1821), the first emir of Zaria obstructed him

and compelled Abdullahi Zanga to accept authority from Zaria. On conceding to

this demand, Malam Musa made it clear to Zanga that the area around Keffi and

beyond was granted to him (Musa) as fief by the Caliph, and therefore by

accepting the authority from Zaria, Keffi became its vassal.13 Hence, the

relationship of Keffi with Sokoto throughout much of the jihadist period was

circumscribed by Zaria, the most powerful southern emirate.14

During his forays, Abdul Zanga met some Gbagyi and Bassa settlements, which

he subdued, amalgamated and ruled them. There were several factors that

checkmated the speedy urbanisation of Keffi during the era of Abdul Zanga. The

process of establishing Keffi through conquest and slave raids of the

surroundings by Zanga and his people discouraged fast urbanisation of Keffi.

Other accounts noted how the Fulani ruling class and intra-house struggle, the

attack of Keffi by Zaria and Zaria’s war with Abuja, disharmony between Keffi

and Nasarawa and Keffi’s attack of neighbouring non-Hausa and Fulani, must

have combined to disable the rapid growth of Keffi.15 Perhaps, Keffi

urbanisation was part of the general transformation of central Nigerian area in

the 19th century. Both oral traditions and European eye-witnessed accounts

were very clear that the 19th century marked a turning point in the settlement

patterns of the whole of central Nigeria, and attributed such phenomenon such

to the jihadist’s activities and the European interest in trade. The process of

state formation and urbanisation in the central Nigerian area in the 19th century

was complex. This vassal emirate of Zaria, as aptly pointed out by Filaba:

It brought several changes like reduction in size of some autochthonous

kingdoms, depopulated some parts, urbanised and culturally diffused some


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parts, increased production and trade relations, emerged new polities and new

balance of power and evolution of new alliances, which with the intervention of

the Royal Niger Company culminated into the colonial conquest by 1900.16

The changes were partly influenced by the attempt of the heterogeneous

polities to survive some pressures, check some group monopoly and also

established more accommodative social relations of production. In this respect,

the Sokoto jihad movement was not merely wars and slave raids over-

emphasised in colonial historiography. The jihad added impetus to settlements

and the jihad pushed some fugitives from Hausaland into central Nigeria,

thereby increasing its demography and subsequent cultural and economic

transformation from which Zaria sub-emirates such as Keffi, Nasarawa, Nupe

(Bida), Jema’an Darroro, Lafia, Doma, and Wase emerged.17

Immediately when Zanga got some followers, he started to raid the region of his

hosts which destabilised the polities. Some sought refuge in Bagaji, Kurape,

Karu, Ikereku, Nasarawa and other places. Afterwards, Zanga then built a new

stockade around “Pebiyi or Kepii and became the first Sarki”.18 Filaba went

further and added that, “During the reign of Zanga, Keffi was battling to survive.

It was attacked by Kurape, Kurudu, and Abuja and also by Zaria under Mallam

Musa who burnt and destroyed its heavy stockade”.19

Before the death of Zanga in circa1820, the influence of Keffi was felt mostly

among the Gwandara and Mada to the east, Koro, Jabba and Yeskwa people to

the north and Bassa, Gbagyi, Gade and Egbura to the south-west, but remained

Zaria sub-emirate.

The shaky relationship between Keffi and Zaria also influenced Keffi to quickly

establish friendly ties with Bagaji, Kupan Gwari, Garaku, Kokona, Gwagwa,

Tattara and Ninkoro, which sometimes aided Keffi to withstand Zaria.20 The

successive emirs battled to safeguard Keffi and as well incorporate more

villages into the emirate. It was further stressed in the traditions that the

challenges Keffi faced from Zaria, Abuja and Jema’an Darroro forced it to come

to temporary peace with these settlements.

Keffi became a popular town in the region because of its location. The land there

is fertile and thus boosted agricultural and green for pasture. The trade routes

passed through Ninkoro and gradually shifted to Keffi and it became the major

trading centre. Its market was filled with products from the surrounding Gbagyi,

Bassa, Mada, Gwandara, Yeskwa, Jabba and Gade villages. Its karofi, (dye pits)

became the dominant centre of dyeing in the whole area. Keffi came to have a


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concentration of weavers, dyers, carvers, butchers, guilds of all sorts more than

any other town in the area. Most of the Hausa artisans and traders that brought

trans-Saharan goods stationed in Keffi.21

The integration of some of the villages which had owned allegiance to Keffi was

not only by conquest, but also through economic and cultural ties such as trade

relations and intermarriages. The ruling house intermarried with the

indigenous groups. Keffi intermarried with Nasarawa, Marmara, Laminga and

Keffi-Shanu, (Goya). This was further reflected in the nature of the emirate

administration and Keffi town whereby the palace officials also comprised of

representatives from various wards and ethnic groups, but with special

preference for Muslims. This type of cultural and political composition further

strengthened the integration of their neighbouring groups.

Another factor that strengthened Keffi was its ties with other emirates. Our

sources indicated that Keffi emirs used to send some yearly gaisuwa, tribute, to

the neighbouring emirates of Awe, Lafia, Jema’a, Zaria, as well as to the Caliph

in Sokoto at times of peace. These usually comprised of food-stuffs, textiles, iron

implements, crafts and slaves. Except Zaria and Sokoto, these emirates

reciprocated by sending some goods to the emir of Keffi.

It should be mentioned that the rise of Keffi saw the coming of new groups,

particularly the Hausa and Fulani. Before the rise of Keffi, the number of Fulani

and Hausa in the region was insignificant. But Keffi conquerors encouraged the

coming of their Fulani and Hausa kinsmen. With time, some economic relations

came to exist and encouraged interdependence between the Fulani cattle

bearers and the indigenous population as some indigenous farmers asked some

Fulani to settle in their farms for animal manure to bring higher yields. The

economic relationships between the Fulani and indigenous groups increased. In

an interview with Walid Jibrin (Sarkin Fulani, Nasarawa), Filaba found out how

“Gbagyi in Particular gave some cattle to the Fulani for grazing, after which the

Fulani were paid. Also, only the Fulani remained as the sole supplier of beef and

milk, which augmented the dietary intake of the whole region”.22

The Emergence of Nasarawa Emirate

Makama Dogo (tall man), according to a version of the traditions, was a migrant

from Ruma near Katsina. He first attached himself to Usman Dan Fodio during

the jihad and became a mercenary and helped Musa from Katsina in the

conquest of Zazzau in 1804 where he stayed for two years. The tradition further


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added that he later moved to spread Islam when he incidentally met Abdul

Zanga and Gunki at Zanga, and with approval of Zaria, he helped Abdul Zanga to

found Keffi.23 He also helped Abdul Zanga to conquer the Ninkoro chiefdom and

the Afo to the east.24 This bravery earned him the title of Makaman Keffi,

meaning the conqueror of Keffi and leader of Keffi army. Later on, Nasarawa

became a splinter emirate.

Another version has it that the founding of Nasarawa emirate had its origin in a

quarrel that arose at Keffi between emir Jibrilu and Umaru Makama Dogo, the

commander of Keffi army. In the course of the quarrel between Jibrilu, the third

emir of Keffi, and Umoru took Jibrilu to Abdul Karim’s court, the then reigning

emir of Zaria for appeal. Abdul Karim, jealous of Keffi growing powers,

supported Umoru’s independence of Keffi. The role of Zaria in these affairs can

be clearly expressed in this quotation:

Abdu Karim of Zaria, jealous of the growing power of Keffi, determined to

detach Makama Dogo’s party from the Keffi chiefdom, and offered Imoru

Makama Dogo the Igbira Kingdom of Panda, then at the height of its power and

still unconquered. The crafty move of Abdul Karim was a double one; if Makama

Dogo could subdue the Igbira, a large slice of country would thus be added to

the Zaria Emirate; if the Igbira proved too strong for Makama Dogo, the latter’s

party would be much weakened but still detached from the Keffi Emirate; and

the Caliphate was attempting to capture the confluence area in order to have

direct supply of European fire-arms through the Niger trade.25

However, when Umoru Makama Dogo failed to enter Keffi, with his following,

he went south of Keffi and pitched his camp at Yankadi. Here, Umoru cast about

for a place to settle in and build his headquarters. He bethought him of a certain

stretch of grassy town situated near a large river, where Abdullahi, his old chief,

always pitched his camp on his forays into the Afo and Bassa country. As the

tradition continued, he remembered that on each occasion, he (with Abdullahi)

had encamped here, they had returned victorious, and he therefore proceeded

to this place and in due time built a settlement. The victories that he won in

these areas influenced him to name his settlement Nasarawa, meaning “the

victorious”.26

Another tradition has it that “Imoru was a Katsina Fulani (escaped) slave and

when Abdul Zanga (Abdullahi) established himself at Keffi in 1802, Imoru took

service under him”.27 Arguments emanating from Nasrawa emirate today


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disputed this servile origin of Makama Dogo. According to the source Umaru

Makama Dogo could not have been a slave because:

The man who Abdullahi claimed had come to Abdul Zanga labelling Umaru a

run-away slave belonging to his wife was said to have come from Katsina as well

as Umar. ...if Umaru was a run-away slave, he would not have gone as close as

he did to Emir Musa of Zaria, neither would he be accorded recognition by Dan

Fodio, nor would they send him southwards to spread the Islamic faith which

subsequently led to the founding of Keffi jointly by him, Zanga and Gunki.

Furthermore, if he were a slave, he would not have been conferred with the title

of Makama and later Madakin Keffi by Abdu Zanga. These two titles were and

are still reserved for the heirs.28

These arguments and many others, according to the above source, were aimed

at ridiculing Nasarawa as an appendage of Keffi and by so doing portrayed Keffi

as better polity.29 However, by 1835, Nasarawa emirate, through series of

forays by Makama Dogo’s forces and destruction of the indigenous polities, was

established.

Impact of the Emergence of Nasarawa Emirate on the Polities of the Area

The growth and popularity of Nasarawa were first and foremost, due to its

successful conquest of the Afo, Bassa and Ebira.30 It should be noted that

Nasarawa was not as successful as it is portrayed in the recorded traditions.

This shall become clearer as we proceed in this discourse. Makama Dogo was

declared Sarki Kwatto. Dogo could not effect this by raiding and harassing the

neighbouring areas in order to force them to submission.31 Up to the end of the

19th century, Nasarawa could not have any significant success on the south-

western side of its border, which is Bassa country. Despite the fact that it allied

with pockets of Hausa settlements and some Gwandara-Gade of the area, Toto

and other settlements, Nasarawa could not capture Ikereku kingdom of the

Bassa lying to the south-west of Nasarawa. Ohiare noted that Nasarawa people

had difficulty in conquering the Gbagyi, Bassa, Gade, Afo and Ebira to south and

east of Nasarawa because these people engaged in a struggle against the

jihadists based at Nasarawa and Keffi, who made their area slave raiding

ground.32

Series of Fulani attacks on the Bassa and their neighbours, however, led to the

desolation of their environments and settlements. William Balfour Baikie,


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Samuel Cowther and T. J Hutchinson, to mention but a few, attested to this fact.

W. B. Baikie for instance noted that:

We got many particulars of the attack of the Fulbe (Fulani) on Bassa, which, with

what we learnt before, enabled us to form a tolerably correct idea of the whole

affair. It commenced by the refusal of the people of Afo named also Ekpe, living

on the borders of Bassa, to pay their usual tribute. Adama, king of Bassa, not

feeling himself sufficiently powerful to coerce them, requested assistance from

the Fulani, and accordingly Ama Dogo; or more correctly Makama Dogo,

meaning “tall man” a Fulbe chief of Zozo came with an armed band for that

purpose. Afo being subdued, a quarrel arose between Ama Dogo and Senami,

brother of the king of Bassa, and chief of Akpata, which, led to a general attack

on the whole country. Ikereku, the capital, about fifteen miles from Eruko, was

sacked and rendered desolate, and many of the people were slain or made

captive, and thus the cupidity of the king led to the desolation of his territories33.

Again T.J. Hutchinson in his Narrative of the Niger, Tshadda and Binue

Exploration, 1855 described the event of the destruction of the capital of the

Bassa Kingdom thus:

Some people living at Ousha, in the direction of Doma, but in the Bassa kingdom

refused to pay tribute to Adama, king of Bassa. To punish them, Adamo invited or

employed some Filatahs (Fulani) from Zaria, which, is the capital of Zeg-zeg and

over which Mohammed Sani is ruler, to come and subdue the obstinacy of the

people of Ousha. The Filatahs, ever ready to fight, accepted the invitation, and

punished the Ousha gentry to their hearts content.34

The work of Macgregor Laird compiled by Rev. Samuel Ajayi Crowther in a book

titled, Journal of An Expedition up the Niger and Tshadda Rivers, 1854 stated

how the king of Bassa, Adama, employed mercenaries to punish those who

refused to pay tribute to him.35

Again, Crowther while still writing on the Bassa, stated that “They were at one

time the dread of their neighbours, to whom the Agatus, a tribe of Doma, were

once tributary of Ikereku. Ikereku had been twice attacked before by the Filanis,

but they were repulsed”.36 Temple O. in his book, Notes on the Tribes of the

Northern Provinces of Nigeria, wrote that, “The Bassa of Tawari successfully

repelled the attacks of the Fulani and gave shelter to the people of Koton Karfi

(the Igbirra) who were less fortunate”37. Samuel Crowther again noted that

from Abuku, in Loko District “is said to be the beginning of Bassa country” and

at “Oruko Baikie met chief Adama who is the chief of all Bassa country”.38


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Similarly, the Gbagyi and Gade people of Ara that aided Nasarawa later suffered

raids from Makama Dogo.39

In fact, the challenges of the balance of power in the region started gaining

momentum with the establishment of Abuja, Keffi, and Nasarawa as the sub-

emirates of Zaria. The nature of diplomacy and alliance system towards the end

of the 19th century was not simply the emirates versus the autochthonous

kingdoms. It was very complex and fluid. This was so because the relationship

between Zaria and Sokoto on the one hand and the sub-emirates of Abuja, Keffi

and Nasarawa, among the non-Muslim communities at the confluence area on

the other was fragile and changing. Zaria sometimes laid siege of some of these

sub-emirates whenever their rulers refused to bring gaisuwa, in form of taxes,

and booties, ganima, to Zaria, and whenever they rejected Zaria imposed prince.

In such circumstances, “The emirates allied with the “pagan states” of Kurape,

Karu, Ikerekwu, Doma against a neighbouring “Pagan State” to survive”.40 Abuja,

for example survived Zaria onslaught by relying on the surrounding Gbagyi,

Bassa and Koro polities. The complexity of the nature of diplomacy and alliances

and changes that characterised relations are well described in the words of

Ohiare who stressed that the Confluence area in the 19th century:

was characterised by political instability, social unrest, tenuous relationship

between the groups and classes, and economic dissatisfaction. This state of

affairs manifested itself in various ways such as succession disputes which

factionalised the society into antagonistic groups each of which was ever ready

to team up with a third force to oust the other not caring, whether such a third

force favoured the cooperate existence of the state.41

The British traders, based at Lokoja, exploited this type of revolutionary situation

by first taking side with the most powerful groups such as the Nupe and Fulani

rulers who promised breaking the stiff trade barriers put by the autochthonous

states. According to Filaba:

The British made allies trading agents and excluded ‘Pagan’ kingdoms of

Ikerekwu, Kurape, Kurudu and Karu. After the British had succeeded in using the

Nupe, Ebira and Fulani rulers to establish wide-trade-network and to check the

German and French competitors, the British turned round to instigate the

‘Pagans’ to rebel against the Nupe and Fulani rulers in order for the British to

appear as the sole monopolist.42

Most clearly and based on the evidence at our disposal, the Confluence area has

undergone series of changes from the 17th century onwards as a result of both


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internal and external factors. The evidence revealed that a continuous motion,

interactions of internal and external forces and contradictions which were

beyond the control of an individual or group, and this further exposed and

integrated the region to the global system. The direction of changes was towards

growth of larger polities and increased inter-group relations.

It is obvious from the preceding analysis that the Bassa had their own

independent kingdom, not semi-independent as assumed by some scholars.43 In

fact, it was a fallacy of supposition to postulate that the Bassa, Gbagyi and a host

of other indigenous groups were not known for political initiative, or that the

region was always a recipient of outside civilisation and always under alien,

superior external control.44 In fact all evidence point to the obvious fact that the

Bassa were independent people; with their forces, they repelled series of attacks

from the Fulani.

The Bassa history of resistance has long antecedents. These earned the Bassa the

reputation of being a warlike group who employed poisoned arrows and who

destroyed towns and villages in Panda, and even to the westwards of Panda,

beyond the confines of their districts, which lie to the eastward of Panda.45 Kirk-

Greene noted emphatically the political prowess of the Bassa, thus: “As a result

of their strong defensive position and their political skill, they were able to

preserve their political independence both of Nasarawa, Ebira Koton Karifi and

Nupe”.46 This assertion is supported by information contained in the Intelligence

Reports in the National Archives, Kaduna47.

However, the victories of Makama Dogo were attributed to the number of

mercenaries he had. It is on record that Nagwamatse, the notorious slave raider

of Nupeland served as a mercenary captain, and helped Dogo to conquer

important town of Toto.48 Other mercenaries, to some of whom Dogo gave titles

in order to help him achieve his scheme, were Umar Manashi from Katsina as

galadima, Jatau Azaga from Bida as wambai, Audu Bayaraba a Nupe from Ilorin

as barde, a platoon commander. Others were Kwatari from Katsina, Maikaita

from Kaita, Mazawaje Mohammed from Ringin Kano, Isa Gado from Kusede in

Katsina, Musa from Katsina and Maitarewa from Hadeja.49 Makama Dogo also

used some of his Gbagyi, Gade, and Bassa captives as his mercenaries in his

forays in Afo country. These captives were also used to raid the Gbagyi, but were

unsuccessful in capturing Kurape, Karu, and Kurudu confederations.50 Thus, it

can be stressed that Nasarawa sprang so quickly due to the great support she

got from Zaria-which wanted Makama Dogo to check the popularity and


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excesses of Keffi, and to extend Zaria control to the kingdoms in the

confluence.51

The contradiction in the region also contributed to the initial success of

Nasarawa. The Egbura kingdoms of Igu and Opanda were struggling over

territory and economic dominance in the Benue with the Bassa kingdom of

Ikereku. In these contradictions, traditions of both the Bassa and Egbura in Toto

and Umaisha have it that the Bassa people invited the Nasarawa people against

the Egbura and acceptance of this invitation by the latter led to the conquest of

Opanda Kingdom in 1854.52 It is also related that some Bassa soldiers were war

commanders in the army of Makama Dogo. Unfortunately for the Bassa,

Makama’s imperial ambition did not spare them; their settlements were equally

destroyed later.53

Arising from our sources, Nasarawa’s relationship with Zaria depended largely

on the personality of the ruler. Sources had it that Zaria confronted Nasarawa

immediately after the death of Makama Dogo. Keffi at the later age of Makama

Dogo assisted Nasarawa to attack Jenkwe of Doma kingdom. The Doma tradition

portrayed that Jenkwe, Agaza and Udeni areas of Doma kingdom were

conquered by Makama before he died,54 however, our sources maintained that

Makama failed to establish permanent administration over them, and that in the

raid that led to the death of Makama, Afo sought the support of Alago who

claimed to have taught and given the Afo a mythical spear pegged on a mythical

gammo, ringed straw, with which they stroke and killed Dogo. Afo tradition

claimed that they buried Dogo there and pilled stones on his grave, purportedly

to march with the terrain of the scene of his burial, while his horse tail was still

used as the royal fan of the kings of Angewa.55 However, another source claimed

that Makama died of old age, at 72 years in c.1858.56 The last claim is more

plausible since the current palace of Nasarawa emirate house the grave of

Makama and some of his paraphernalia. The claim of Angewa could be referring

to any strong commander in the army of Makama they killed and believed it was

Makama himself.

However, the relationship between Nasarawa and their neighbours was not

only that of raiding. The new emirate overlords married their host communities’

daughters while they refused to give their daughters in turn to these

communities whom they looked down upon as “pagans”.57 Similarly, Nasarawa

emirate lords married their daughters to their kinsmen at Maramara, Laminga


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and Keffi, so much so that the lineage chiefs of these settlements now claim the

same ancestry.58

The economic factor also served as an important impetus to the growth and

development of Nasarawa. Nasarawa market was attended on Mondays and

Fridays, days which the colonial administration later scheduled for treating

leprosy cases in the area. Again, the position of Nasarawa on the banks of rivers

Uke (Kurape) and Hadari influenced its profession and population. Many

Nasarawa people were gardeners, fishermen, hunters and farmers.59 But it has

less number of artisans than Keffi. Keffi town was larger, with more number of

blacksmiths and more integrated into the indigenous society than Nasarawa.

This integration was measured in terms of free association, inter-ethnic mixed

settlements, cultural relation and the spread of Keffi people among the villages

such as Yarkadi, Gauta, Gindin Mangoro (now called High Court Area), Angwan

Ka’are, Angwan Kwano among others.60

Incorporation of the Indigenous Polities Into the Emirate System of Northern

Nigeria

Evident from the preceding scenario, Fodio set out to make Muslims of all in the

northern region of Nigeria. However, economic and political considerations in

the established Islamic society complemented religious goals and subsequently

de-emphasised religion. With time and space, as conquest and expansion got

further away from the core-Islamic centres of the revolution towards the other

areas of the north, the central Nigerian groups increasingly became defined as

peripheries to be exploited. As noted by Logams:

Whatever were the religious motives in the establishment of the Islamic society

in the ‘North’, the revolution of Dan Fodio was another phase in the historical

oppression of some of the M-Belt groups, one factor in the complex range of

systemic oppressive forces that set in motion the underdevelopment of the M-

Belt areas, when the religion of the Islamic society degenerated into something

indefinable as it raided both friend and foe alike.61

By a political process which carefully selected religious and military leadership

rooted in the indoctrination of some of his personal students, in order to fulfil

Islamic objectives in the north, Dan Fodio gave political orders directed at the

Islamic Hausa City-States as well as on the non-Islamic groups and societies

with the urge “...to spread the faith and oust the Habe and Kafiri rulers”.62 To

each of the leaders, Dan Fodio gave an Islamic ‘Green-Flag’ as the symbol of


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authority directed by him.63 The acceptance and blessing of flags of authority

from Dan Fodio showed that the leadership of the scattered Fulani communities

among the different groups and societies became formally acknowledged under

one central political and religious authority of Dan Fodio. This move by Dan

Fodio suggested political plot masqueraded under the guise of religious

purification to install the Fulani on the political positions of the Hausa and non-

Hausa Habe kings. In other words, ethnic political considerations played in the

Islamic Reformist Movement and were determining factors in the establishment

and political domination of the Islamic society with “Islamic ideological

consideration taking secondary influence in the contest to control power in all

of the Hausa-City States”64 and even beyond. This means that there was political

timing of a previously existing plot developed from religious teaching of Dan

Fodio to his pupils rather than spontaneous political activity. Thus, “...when they

heard of Dan Fodio’s uprising they went back to him for acceptance and

blessing”.65

By 1817, the Caliphate had expanded the political boundaries of the Hausa

States to include the Yoruba of Ilorin and the Nupe Kingdom. By this action,

Logams aptly noted, “Usman dan Fodio created an emirate system of

government on most of Hausaland and subsequently went beyond the Hausa

kingdoms and created about 30 emirates in addition to numerous sub-emirates

all over a centralized Islamic system of government and religious authority in

Sokoto”.66

From Sokoto therefore, a political power and authority radiated to other regions

of northern Nigeria. The society was, of course, held together by the Islamic

institutions and by the personality of Dan Fodio himself. He established a

“remarkable ascendancy and authority over his appointed rulers”.67

What obtained in the pre-colonial period, then, in terms of the confluence

engagement with Caliphal expansion, were a series of complex stalemates, fluid

accommodations, and tense, frequently violated treaties of co-existence that

John Nengel calls the amana.68 These pre-colonial relationship tensions created

ambivalences of resentment and fear-inspired accommodations among north

central Nigerian people. Kukah sums it up this way, “Around the Middle Belt, the

(Hausa-Fulani) Jihadists seemed more preoccupied with slavery, economic and

political expansionism than the spread of the (Islam). As a result, all forms of

alliances came into being, but economic considerations were paramount.”69


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Although, as Kukah argued, the winning of converts to Islam in the Confluence

Area gradually took a backseat, the spread of Islamic, Hausa and Fulani cultural

influence did not. And although, this was truer for the frontier non-Muslim

communities of the Southern Kaduna and Bauchi corridors than it was for the

Benue Valley, the fate of Doma and Bagaji (in Keffi area) in the southernmost part

of the Confluence showed that Jihadist aggression and Caliphate influence spread

to all the areas of the Confluence. In fact, Doma and Bagaji became satellite vassals

of Zazzau in the mid-19th century by a combination of military defeats and

strategic self-preservation through the acceptance of Caliphate influence and

quasi-control.70 This was so because, theoretically, the emirates recognised and

accepted the independence of the non-Muslim polities as they were left to run

their internal affairs without any interference, in practice however, the payment

of tribute, haraji, by the latter to the former as a fundamental requirement for the

maintenance of the peaceful co-existence, was construed by the emirate powers

to mean that the non-Muslim societies were politically subordinate to them, a

view that was not shared by all the Non-Muslim polities. The Caliphate

administration and policing of its culture were assured in the Confluence area

because of the influence and military might of the southern Fulani sub-emirates

of Keffi, Suleja, Lapai and Nassarawa, and because of the presence of numerous

other enclaves of garrisoned Hausa and Fulani settlements in the confluence area

of Nigeria.71

By the creation of Nasarawa emirate for instance, the Fulani created particular

patterns of social and political process of incorporation of the non-Muslim

Bassa and Gbagyi socio-political and economic life into Islamic culture. By 1845

most non-Muslim Bassa, Gbagyi, Afo, Gwandara, Egbura and Gade political

structures had been overthrown and replaced by Fulani authority. New

administrative reforms were also introduced in line with the new political

dispensation. The entire area was brought under Caliphal authority with

headquarters in Nasarawa sub-emirate. Each of the conquered areas was

constituted politically into emirate appointees. The emirs, having obtained flags

from Uthman Dan Fodio, continued to swear allegiance to Uthman Dan Fodio

and his successors as the commander of the faithful.72 Apart from this, they sent

a part of their tax proceeds to Sokoto and contributed an annual levy of troops

meant to continue the jihad. They also accepted the right of appeal to the Sokoto

court and the Caliph’s authority to confirm them and some of their subordinates

in office.73 The creation of the Nasarawa sub-emirate has, therefore, profound


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effects on the non-Muslim Bassa, Gbagyi, Gade, Egbura, Afo, Alago, Gwadara and

a host of others on the Niger-Benue Confluence area. These jihadist

relationships created ambivalences of resentment among communities in the

Confluence area. It was this pre-existing, rather complicated cultural and

religious corollary that the British encountered in the late nineteenth century

in the confluence area. The situation however, did not prevent the British from

establishing colonial administration in the area.

Conclusion

This study has shown that the greatest interaction of the internal and external

factors led to the emergence of polities with well established bilateral ties and

trade alliances. In fact, prior to the coming of the jihadists, there were cultural

and religious links and festivals across ethnic groups and each ethnic group host

the others. The study demonstrated also how the success of the jihad led to the

creation of the Sokoto Caliphate and the Zaria sub-emirates of Keffi, and

Nasarawa among others. By 1812 the hegemony of the non-Muslim polities in

the confluence area had been overthrown and replaced by Fulani authority.

New administrative reforms were also introduced in line with the new political

dispensation. The entire area was brought under Caliphal authority with

headquarters in Keffi and Nasarawa sub-emirates. Each of the conquered areas

was constituted politically into emirate appointees. By this, the Hausa and

Fulani state builders swung the pendulum of relationship and by this act,

planted the seed of ethnic contestation in the area.

Endnote 1The works of Murray Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, (London, 1967), R. A. Adeley, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria, 1804-1906, (London, 1971); Usman Bala Yusufu ed. Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate, (Third Press International Lagos, Nigeria, New York, 1976), and J. S. Hogben, The Mohammedan Emirates of Northern Nigeria,( Oxford, 1930), gave critical and detailed assessments of the Jihad in Hausaland and the establishment of Islamic administration in Northern Nigeria 2 Turaki Yusuf, The British Colonial Legacy in Northern Nigeria: A Socio-Ethnical Analysis of the Colonial and Post-Colonial Society in Nigeria, (Challenge Press, Jos, 1993) 40.


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3Monday Mangvwat, “A History of Class Formation on the Plateau Province, 1902-1960: The Genesis of a Ruling Class,” PhD Thesis, A. B.U. Zaria, 1984. 4Bonat Zuqwahu, “Colonialism and Underdevelopment of Zaria Province, 1902-1945,” M. A. Dissertation, A. B. U. Zaria, 1985. 5See the Anthropological Authorities Blackney etal. 6B. G. Martin, Muslim Brotherhoods in the nineteenth Century, (Cambridge University Press, 1976) 17. See also Murray Last, The Sokoto Caliphate…, (London, 1967) 3-22 for full details. 7D. Robinson and Smith Doughlas, eds. “The Spread of the Jihad”, in the Sources of the African Past, 143. 8Sciortino, J. C.,Gazetteer of Northern Provinces of Nigeria,….. 8 9Kasimu, S. Judde, “ Resistance to Colonial Administration in Keffi: Magaji’s Encounter with the Britsh”, in Aliyu A. Idrees and Yakubu A. Ochefu, eds. Studies in the History of Central Nigeria Area Volume 1, (CSS Limited, Lagos) 599. 10Kasimu, S. Judde: “Resistance to Colonial Administration in Keffi…599. 11J. C. Sciortino, Nasarawa Province…, 5. 12J. S. Hogben, and A. M. H. Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: A Preliminary Survey of their Historical Traditions,(London, 1966) 530; Sciortino, Nasarawa Province…6, Mahdi, A, The Hausa Factor in West Africa 101-104. 13Hogben and Kirk- Greene: Emirates of Northern Nigeria…531. 14Hogben and Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria…4 15H. A. S. Johston, The Fulani Emirate of Sokoto,( London, 1977), 184-185. 16Filaba, Aruwa Mailafiya, Kurape, Karu, Kurudu and Rubochi Kingdoms: History of Gbagyi Confederation in Central Nigeria to 1960, Jimma,Ethiopia: Jarmai Publishers, 2008), 10.4 17 R. A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906: Sokoto Caliphates and Its Enemies, (London, 1977); Hogben, J. S, The Mohammedan Emirates of Northern Nigeria, (Oxford, 1930), and Hogben: and Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria, Part 1, (London, 1969). 18Filaba, Kurape, Karu…107. 19Filaba, Kurape, Karu…107. 20Interview with village head of Kokona Malam Audu Musa …24/4/10 21Interview with village head…. 22Filaba, Kurape, Karu…..110. 23Plateau State National Census Office: Historical Committee Report, (1973), 5-6; and Plateau State of Nigeria: Programme of Installation of the Emir of Keffi, His Royal Highness, Alhaji Chindo Yamusa II, (1981). 24Z. D. Mohammed, History of Nasarawa Emirate, (Abuja, Garkida Press, 1992) 2. 25Dehham, Clapperton, Narrative of Travels…304-331; Ohiare, 37-38, and Lander, A. R., Records of Clapperton’s Last Expedition to Africa, 2 vols, (London, Frank Cass, 1960).


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26Oral interview with Alhaji Hassan Ahmed Rufa’I, Makaman N asarawa, 2006 to date, 95 years, Alhaji Mahmud Ramalan Abubakar, Ciroma Nasarawa, 2004-date, C. 86. 27Sciortino, Nasarawa Province…, 16. 28Ibrahim J. Mairiga, Zubairu D.Mohammed etal, Historical Perspective of Nasarawa Emirate….37. 29Ibrahim J. Mariga, etal…..37. 30Flaba, Karu, Kurape…, 111. 31Filaba, Karu, Kurape…, 111. 32Ohiare, History of Opanda and Igu… 559. 33W. B. Baikie, Narrative of an Exploring Voyage Up the Rivers Kwora and Binue Commonly Known as the Niger and Tshadda in 1856, (London Reprinted Frank Cass) 252. 34T. J. Hutchinson, Narrative of the Niger, Tshadda and Binue Exploration, 1855,……. 72. 35Rev. Samuel Ajayi Crowther, Journal of an Expedition Up the Niger and Tshadda Rivers, 1854…… 152. 36Rev, Samuel Ajayi Crowther, Journal of an Expedition…152. 37Oliver Temple, Notes on the Tribes of Northern Provinces of Nigeria, 1919… 42. 38Samuel Crowther, Niger Expedition 1857-1859, (London) 153. 39Ohiare, History of Opanda and Igu… 440-443 and 502-504. 40Filaba, “Transformation in Nasarawa Province of Central Nigeria Area C1600-1900”, in Aliyu Idrees and Yakubu, A, Ochefu, eds. Studies in the History of Central Nigeria Area, Volume 1, (CSS Limited, Lagos 2002) 291. 41Ohiare, “The Kingdom of Igu and Opanda C.1700-1939: A Study in Inter-Group Relations”, Ph.D Unpublished Thesis, A.B.U, Zaria, 1987. 382. 42Filaba, Transformation in Nasarawa Province... 291-292. 43See Mailafiya Aruwa Filaba for such notions, “Transformations in the Niger-Benue Confluence During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries”, in Akinwumi Ogundiran, ed. Pre-colonial Nigeria Essays in Honour of Toyin Falola, (Africa World Press, Inc. Asmara, Eritrea, 2005), 491. Earlier scholars however upheld the sovereignty of the Bassa Kingdom and people. For more details see, A. M. H. Kirk-Greene, Lugard and Amalgamation: A Documentary Record, (London, 1968). He noted how the “Bassa were able to preserve their political independence both of Nasarawa, Ebira Koton Karifi and Nupe.” 542; also J. C. Taylor, and Samuel Crowther, Niger Expedition 1857-1859, (London) 50 and Daryll Forde, Peoples of the Middle Belt Region, (London, 1955) 70. 44SPN17/K3148: General Notes on the Gwari Tribes, Keffi Emirate, by Smallwood, 32. 45Samuel Crowther: Journal of An Expedition…, 50 and Daryll Forde (ed): Peoples of the Middle Niger Region, (London, 1955) 77.


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46A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Lugard and Amalgamation: A Documentary Record, (London, 1968) 542. 47NAK, SNP 3/506/1963; SNP17,/K3/17,and Lok Prof 164. 48Johnston, The Fulani Empire of Sokoto, (London, 1977) 184-185. 49Abdullahi Mahadi, Hausa Factor in West Africa History, (Geskiya, 1979), 103. 50Filaba, Karu, Kurape….112. 51Mahadi, Hausa Factor….103. 52Bassa Group Interview (BGI)and Egbura Group Interview (EGI). 53BGI and EGI and also W. B. Baikie: Narrative of an Exploring Voyage Up the Rivers Kwora and Binue Commonly Known as the Niger and Tshadda in 1856, (London Reprinted Frank Cass), 252; Hutchinson, T. J, Narrative of the Niger, Tshadda and Binue Exploration, 1855, 72; and Samuel Ajayi Crowther, Journal of an Expedition Up the Niger and Tshadda Rivers, 1854….. 152 54Gazetteer of Nasarawa Province… Vol.III: 18. 55Interview with, Abubakar Ogabu, c. 60 years, chief of Angewa, 19/4/09. 56Gazetteer of Nasarawa…18. 57Gazetteer of Nasarawa …..18 58Interview with, Alhaji Walid Jibrin, Sarkin Fulani Nasarawa and also his write up, “The Dangi and Chiroma Fulani of Nasaraw”, Marmara, 1992. 59Interview with Alhaji Walid Jibrin… and also see, A. M. H. Kirk-Greene, “Expansion on the Benue, 1830-1900: A Review of the River Benue with special Reference to the Administration of the RNC”, Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria, 1, 3, (1968). 60Random interviews with various ethnic groups living in Keffi and her environs. 61Logams Paul Chunun, The Middle-Belt Movement in Nigerian Political Development: A Study in Political Identity 1949-67, (Centre for Middle Belt Studies, 2009) 53-54. 62Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates of Northern Nigeria…382. 63Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates of Northern Nigeria…382. 64Logams Paul Chunun, The Middle-Belt Movement in Nigerian Political Development... 58. 65R. A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria… 14-15. 66P. C. Logams, The Middle-Belt Movement in Nigerian Political Development...59. 67P. C. Logams, The Middle-Belt Movement in Nigerian Political Development...59. Adeleye, R. A, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria…39-40. 68John Garah Nengel, Pre-colonial African Intergroup Relations in the Kauru and Pengana Polities of the Central Nigerian Highlands, 1800-1900, (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1999). Although the work of Professor James Ibrahim cast some doubt on the extent to which the amana system was the normative relational model on the non-Muslim southern frontiers of the Caliphate, there is evidence to suggest that amana did hold informally in some areas and over


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certain periods. For details see, James Ibrahim, Studies in the History, Politics and Cultures of Southern Kaduna Peoples Groups, (Jos, Nigeria, Crest, 1997) 17. 69Kukah Matthew Hassan, Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria, Ibadan, Nigeria, (Spectrum Books Ltd, 1993) 2. 70Kukah Matthew Hassan, Religion, Politics (Fardon Michael, Raiders and Refugees: Trends in Chamba Political Development 1750-1950, (Washington and London, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988) 147.) 71Kukah Matthew Hassan, Religion, Politics (Ikime Obaro, The Fall of Nigeria, (London Heinemann, 1997) 34. 72Amette Infaku’l Maisuri: Mohammed Bello’s narrative on the expeditions on the frontiers of Idoma (Doma) is a rather triumphalist rendering of the encounters between the Agatu Idoma and the Fulani raiders in that it masks the stalemated outcome of the wars. The wars produced uneasy stalemates and fluid triumphs for Keffi, the Zazzau-controlled raiding sub-emirate in the area. The stalemates nonetheless resulted in the partial adoption of Islam and Hausa-Fulani culture as a strategy of survival and accommodation. 73John Garah Nengel, Pre-colonial African Intergroup Relations in the Kauru and Pengana Polities of the Central Nigerian Highlands, 1800-1900, (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1999). Although the work of Professor James Ibrahim cast some doubt on the extent to which the amana system was the normative relational model on the non-Muslim southern frontiers of the Caliphate, there is evidence to suggest that amana did hold informally in some areas and over certain periods. For details see, James Ibrahim, Studies in the History, Politics and Cultures of Southern Kaduna Peoples Groups, (Jos, Nigeria, Crest, 1997) 17.


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