09 Asmgcs Ocd Requirements Impl Level2

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EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR THE SAFETY OFAIR NAVIGATION

EUROCONTROL

Operational Concept &Requirements for A-

SMGCS Implementation

Level II

DAP / APT


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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION SHEET

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

Document TitleOperational Concept & Requirements for A-SMGCS Implementation Level II

EWP DELIVERABLE REFERENCE NUMBER:

PROGRAMME REFERENCE INDEX: EDITION: 1.0

EDITION DATE: 17/05/2004

Abstract

Keywords

CONTACT PERSON: Paul Adamson TEL: UNIT: DAP / APT

DOCUMENT STATUS AND TYPE

STATUS CLASSIFICATIONWorking Draft General Public


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Operational Concept & Requirements for A-SMGCSImplementation Level II

DSA / AOP

DOCUMENT APPROVAL

The following table identifies all management authorities that have successively approvedthe present issue of this document.

AUTHORITY NAME AND SIGNATURE DATE

A-SMGCS

Project Manager Paul Adamson


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DSA / AOP Operational Concept & Requirements for A-SMGCSImplementation Level II

DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD

The following table records the complete history of the successive editions of the presentdocument.

EDITION DATE REASON FOR CHANGESECTIONS

PAGESAFFECTED

0.a 22/11/2002 First draft

0.b 28/11/2002 Internal Review All

0.c 08/12/2002 EUROCONTROL comments All

0.d 10/01/2003 Comments from 18/12/2002 progress meeting 1.3, 1.5, 1.6,5, 6

0.e 12/02/2003 Comments from 11/02/2003 videoconference all

0.f 20/03/2003 Comments from 24 and 25/02/2003 meetings all0.g 26/03/2003 Comments from 25/03/2003 videoconference all

0.h 17/04/2003 Comments from 02/04/2003 progress meeting all

0.i 22/05/2003 Comments from 21/05/2003 videoconference all

0.j 11/08/2003 Comments from 03/06/2003 workshop 4.3

0.k 30/04/2004 Comments from 06/04/2004 coordinationmeeting

all

1.0 17/05/2004 Change in sub-sections breakdown 4.2.1


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................1 1.1 Scope of the document .............................................................................................................1 1.2 Structure of the document.........................................................................................................1 1.3 Reference Documents ..............................................................................................................2 1.4 Acronyms ..................................................................................................................................2 1.5 Explanation of terms .................................................................................................................3 1.6 Performance parameters ..........................................................................................................8

2. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT................................................................................12 2.1 Objectives ...............................................................................................................................12 2.2 Services...................................................................................................................................12 2.3 Operations...............................................................................................................................13 2.4 Benefits ...................................................................................................................................13

2.5 Implementation Consideration ................................................................................................13 2.6 Optional service ......................................................................................................................13

3. SERVICES..........................................................................................................14 3.1 Overview .................................................................................................................................14 3.2 Alerts to ATCOs ......................................................................................................................14

3.3 Compliance with ATC Procedures and Working Methods......................................................16 3.4 Protection Areas......................................................................................................................16 3.5 Guidance Service to Vehicle Drivers ......................................................................................18

4. RUNWAY SAFETY NET.....................................................................................19


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6.3 Vehicle driver ..........................................................................................................................32

7. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES........................................................................34

8. EQUIPMENT.......................................................................................................35

9. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................36 9.1 Methodology............................................................................................................................36 9.2 Services requirements ............................................................................................................36

ANNEXES ...................................................................................................................2 Annex A : Summary of Conflicts / infringements to be detected by the runway safety net ................1


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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Scope of the document

The Eurocontrol A-SMGCS project aims at defining pragmatic implementation stepsfor A-SMGCS. The first step named A-SMGCS Level I focuses on theimplementation of automated surveillance. Its associated operational concept andrequirements are presented in [D3].

A-SMGCS level II aims at complementing surveillance service with a control servicewhich provides a runway safety net and prevents incursions into restricted areas. Aguidance service may also be provided to the vehicles driver as an option.

This document defines the operational concept and requirements for A-SMGCSImplementation Level II, i.e. how ATS is expected to evolve through the introduction

of the A-SMGCS surveillance and control (automated) services.The surveillance service is identical at Level I and Level II (description available in[D3]). Therefore the document focus on the control and guidance services.

EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS Project Strategy and definition of ImplementationLevels are included in [D1] and [D2].

Note: The present document contains a draft version of the requirements in order tosupport validation activity. The document will be updated according to the validationresults.

1.2 Structure of the document

Introduction

Describes, in Chapter 1, the purpose of this document, its structure, the referencedocuments and an explanation of terms used throughout the document

Operational ConceptChapter 2 introduces the operational concept and principles associated to A-SMGCS Level II. Further definition of the concept is provided through the followingthree chapters :

Services Description


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Chapter 7 introduces the operational procedures that are associated to Level II andbeing developed by EUROCONTROL in close coordination with ICAO.

Equipment

Chapter 8 presents equipment required for A-SMGCS level II.

Operational Requirements

Chapter 9 contain the operational requirements associated to Level II, i.e. from an

A-SMGCS user point of view, the general requirements attached to Level II services,the functionalities and interfaces needed (functional requirements) and thecorresponding non-functional requirements (performances). Both normal andexceptional conditions (failure) are covered.

Annex

Annex A summaries the conflicts / infringements to be detected by the runwaysafety net and associated alerts.

1.3 Reference Documents

[D1] A-SMGCS Project Strategy

[D2] Definition of A-SMGCS Implementation Levels

[D3] A-SMGCS Level I Operational Concept and Requirements

[ICAO-SMGCS] ICAO Manual of Surface Movement Control and Guidance Systems

(SMGCS) doc 9476-AN/927 First Edition 1986[ICAO-A-SMGCS] ICAO European Manual on Advanced Surface Movement Control and

Guidance Systems (A-SMGCS) AOPG, Final Draft, Nov 2001

[ICAO-Annex14] ICAO Annex 14, Volume I, Chapter 8

[ICAO-4444] ICAO Doc 4444-RAC/501 RULES OF THE AIR AND AIR TRAFFICSERVICES

[ICAO-7030] ICAO Doc 7030- European Supplementary Procedures

[EUROCAE-MASPS] EUROCAE WG-41, MASPS for A-SMGCS, Edition ED-87A, January2001

[AOPG-Procedures] ICAO AOPG2, Proposed Implementation of A-SMGCS Procedures andamendments to ICAO Documentation, 2002

[AOP-Req] EUROCONTROL Airport Operations Group, Advanced Surface


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ANSPs Air Navigation Service Provider AMAN Arrival Manager AOP Airport Operations UnitAOPG ICAO Aerodrome Operations GroupAOT Airport Operation TeamA-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control SystemsATC Air Traffic ControlATCO ATC Controller ATM Air Traffic ManagementATS Air Traffic ServicesAVOL Aerodrome Visibility Operational LevelCDM Collaborative Decision MakingCFMU Central Flow Management UnitCNS Communication Navigation SurveillanceDMAN Departure Manager EC European CommissionECAC European Civil Aviation ConferenceEUROCAE European Organisation for Civil Aviation EquipmentFAA Federal Aviation AdministrationHMI Human Machine Interface

ICAO International Civil Aviation OrganisationLVP Low Visibility ProceduresR/T Radio TelephonyRWY RunwaySMGCS Surface Movement Guidance and Control SystemsSMR Surface Movement Radar TMA Terminal Manoeuvring Area

1.5 Explanation of terms

This section provides the explanation of terms required for a correct understandingof the present document. Most of the following explanations are drawn from the A-SMGCS manual [ICAO-A-SMGCS], the ICAO Annex 14 [ICAO-Annex14] or the


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Aerodrome[ICAO-Annex14] and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations, andequipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for arrival, departure andsurface movement of aircraft.

Aerodrome movement

[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition addresses only aircraft movement, we extended the definition to all mobiles.

The movement of a mobile (aircraft or vehicle) on the movement area.

Aerodrome Visibility Operational Level (AVOL)[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

The minimum visibility at or above which the declared movement rate can besustained.

Airport authority[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

The person(s) responsible for the operational management of the airport.

Alert[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

An indication of an existing or pending situation during aerodrome operations, or an

indication of abnormal A-SMGCS operation, that requires attention/action.Alert Situation[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

Any situation relating to aerodrome operations which has been defined as requiringparticular attention or action.

Apron

[ICAO-Annex14] and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

A defined area on a land aerodrome, intended to accommodate aircraft for purposesof loading or unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance.

A-SMGCS capacity[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition


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Application of measures to prevent collisions, runway incursions and to ensure safe,expeditious and efficient movement.

Cooperative mobile

Cooperative target [EUROCAE-MASPS] definition in which target is replaced by mobile (seemobile definition)

Mobile which is equipped with systems capable of automatically and continuouslyproviding information including its Identity to the A-SMGCS.

Note : as several cooperative surveillance technologies exist, a mobile iscooperative on an aerodrome only if the mobile and the aerodrome are equipped with cooperative surveillance technologies which are interoperable.

Cooperative surveillance

The surveillance of mobiles is cooperative when a sensor, named cooperativesurveillance sensor, collects information about the mobiles from an active element of the transponder type which equips the mobiles. This technique allows to collect

more mobile parameters than the non-cooperative surveillance, for instance themobiles identity.

The cooperative surveillance may be :

Either dependant on the cooperative mobile, when the mobile automaticallygenerates the information and transmits it to the surveillance sensor, for instance via ADS-B;

Or Non-dependant on the cooperative mobile, when the mobile isinterrogated by the surveillance sensor, for instance Mode S Multilateration.

Data Fusion[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

A generic term used to describe the process of combining surveillance informationfrom two or more sensor systems or sources.

False Alert

[EUROCAE-MASPS] definitionAlert which does not correspond to an actual alert situation.

Note : It is important to understand that it refers only to false alerts and does not address nuisance alerts (i.e. alerts which are correctly generated according to therule set but are inappropriate to the desired outcome).


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IdentityAircraft identification [ICAO-4444] definition extended to all mobiles.

A group of letters, figures or a combination thereof which is either identical to, or thecoded equivalent of, the mobile call sign to be used in air-ground communications,and which is used to identify the mobile in ground-ground air traffic servicescommunications.

Incursion

[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

The unauthorized entry by an aircraft, vehicle or obstacle into the defined protectedareas surrounding an active runway, taxiway or apron.

Intruder

Any mobile which is detected in a specific airport area into which it is not allowed toenter.

Manoeuvring area[ICAO-Annex14] and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft,excluding aprons.

Mobile

A mobile is either an aircraft or a vehicle.

Note : when referring to an aircraft or a vehicle, and not another obstacle, the termMobile will be preferred to Target. The term Target will only be used whenconsidering an image of a mobile or other obstacle displayed on a surveillancescreen.

Modularity[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

Capability of a system to be enhanced by the addition of one or more modules to

improve its technical or functional performance.Movement area[ICAO-Annex14] , [ICAO-4444] and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft,consisting of the manoeuvring area and apron(s).


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surveillance area and in particular to detect intruders. Examples of non-cooperativesurveillance sensors are the Primary Surveillance Radars.

Normal Visibility

Visibility conditions sufficient for personnel of control units to exercise control over all traffic on the basis of visual surveillance (correspond to visibility condition 1defined by ICAO [ICAO-A-SMGCS]).

Nuisance Alert[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

Alert which is correctly generated according to the rule set but are inappropriate tothe desired outcome.

Obstacle[ICAO-Annex14] and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition extended to all mobiles.

All fixed (whether temporary or permanent) and mobile obstacles, or parts thereof,

that are located on an area intended for the surface movement of mobiles or thatextend above a defined surface intended to protect aircraft in flight.

Participating mobile

Mobile whose identity is known by the aerodrome authority, and likely to move onairport movement areas. As illustrated in the Figure 1-1, a participating mobile iseither cooperative or non-cooperative.

ALL MOBILES

INTRUDERS

Cooperativemobiles

Non cooperativemobiles

PARTICIPATING MOBILES

Figure 1-1 : Types of Mobiles


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Restricted AreaAerodrome area where the presence of an aircraft or a vehicle is permanently or temporarily forbidden.

Route[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

A track from a defined start point to a defined endpoint on the movement area.

Routing[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

The planning and assignment of a route to individual aircraft and vehicles to providesafe, expeditious and efficient movement from its current position to its intendedposition.

Runway Incursion

EUROCONTROL Runway Incursion Task Force definition

The unintended presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the runway or runwaystrip.

Stand[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

A stand is a designated area on an apron intended to be used for the parking of anaircraft.

Surveillance[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

A function of the system which provides identification and accurate positionalinformation on aircraft, vehicles and obstacles within the required area.

Target[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition (this definition has been preferred to the [EUROCAE-MASPS] definition)

An aircraft, vehicle or other obstacle, which image is displayed on a surveillancedisplay.

Note : when referring to an aircraft or a vehicle, and not another obstacle, the termMobile will be preferred to Target. The term Target will only be used whenconsidering an image of a mobile or other obstacle displayed on a surveillancescreen


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[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition The time delay between an alert situation occurring at the input to the Alert SituationDetection Element and the corresponding alert report being generated at its output.

Coverage Volume (CV)[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

That volume of space which encompasses all parts of the aerodrome surface whereaircraft movements take place together with those parts of the surrounding airspacewhich affect surface operations.Display Resolution (DR)

[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

The number of individually addressed picture elements (pixels) along each axis of the display screen. (For a raster-scan display, the resolution is normally expressedin terms of the number of raster lines and the number of pixels per line.)

Information Display Latency (IDL)[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

The maximum time delay between a report, other than a target report, beingreceived by the A-SMGCS HMI and the corresponding presentation on the HMIdisplay of the information contained in the report.

Position Registration Accuracy (PRA)[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

The difference between the co-ordinates contained in the dynamic input data to the

HMI and the corresponding geographical position represented on the HMI display.

Probability of Detection (PD)[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

The probability that an actual target is reported at the output of the SurveillanceElement of an A-SMGCS.

Probability of Detection of an Alert Situation (PDAS)[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

The probability that the Monitoring/Alerting Element correctly reports an alertsituation.

Probability of False Alert (PFA)


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[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition The probability that the identity reported at the output of the Surveillance Element of an A-SMGCS is not the correct identity of the actual target.

Probability of Identification (PID)[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

The probability that the correct identity of a co-operative target is reported at theoutput of the Surveillance Element.

Reported Position Accuracy (RPA)


The difference, at a specified confidence level, between the reported position of thetarget and the actual position of the target at the time of the report.

Reported Velocity Accuracy (RVA)[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

The difference, at a specified confidence level, between the reported target velocityand the actual target velocity at the time of the report.

Response Time to Operator Input (RTOI)[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

The maximum time delay between the operator making an input on a data entrydevice of an A-SMGCS HMI and the corresponding action being completed or acknowledged on the HMI display.

Surveillance Capacity[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

The number of target reports in a given period which the Surveillance Element isable to process and output without degradation below the minimum performancerequirements.

System accuracy

[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition The term accuracy generally describes the degree of conformance between aplatform's true position and/or velocity and its estimated position and/or velocity.

System availability[ICAO A SMGCS] definition


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Continuity is the ability of an A-SMGCS to perform its required function without non-scheduled interruption during the intended operation in an A-SMGCS area.

System integrity


Integrity relates to the trust which can be placed in the correctness of the informationprovided by an A-SMGCS. Integrity includes the ability of an A-SMGCS to providetimely and valid alerts to the user(s) when an A-SMGCS must not be used for the

intended operation.System reliability


Reliability is defined as the ability of an A-SMGCS to perform a required functionunder given conditions for a given time interval.

Target Display Latency (TDL)[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

The maximum time delay between a target report being received by the A-SMGCSHMI and the corresponding presentation on the HMI display of the target positioncontained in the report.

Target Report Update Rate (TRUR)


The frequency with which target reports are output from the Surveillance Element.


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2. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

2.1 Objectives

A-SMGCS level II aims at complementing surveillance service (Level I) with acontrol service whose objective is to detect potentially dangerous conflicts in order

to improve safety of runways and restricted areas.A-SMGCS Level II provides to ATCOs a traffic situation picture associated to anautomated control service capable of detecting potential conflicts.

A-SMGCS Level II is fully compliant with ICAO SMGCS provisions ([ICAO-SMGCS]and Annex 14) to prevent runway incidents and accidents.

2.2 Services

At level II, A-SMGCS consists in the introduction of automated surveillance (identicalto Level I) complemented by an automated service capable of detecting conflictsand infringements of some ATC rules involving aircraft or vehicles on runways andrestricted areas. Whereas the detection of conflicts identifies a possibility of acollision between aircraft and/or vehicles, the detection of infringements focuses ondangerous situations because one or more mobiles infringed ATC rules. A-SMGCSlevel II will not address conflicts between two vehicles, but only between an aircraft

and another mobile.The A-SMGCS control service is available for all weather conditions, traffic densityand aerodrome layout. In particular, an A-SMGCS level II should be able to assistthe controller in preventing collisions between aircraft and mobiles especially under reduced visibility conditions.

The conflicts / infringements considered at Level II are related to the mosthazardous ground circulation incidents or accidents. They could be defined asfollows :

- conflicts / infringements on runway caused by aircraft or vehicles;

- restricted areas incursions caused by aircraft (i.e incursions on a closedtaxiway or runway).

Further extension of conflict detection to cover taxiway intersections has not been


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2.3 OperationsA-SMGCS Level II operations are identical to those defined for Level I in [D3], plusthose linked to the use of the automatic conflict / infringement detection tool.Procedures related to each type of alert shall be defined and applied by ATCcontrollers.

2.4 Benefits

The main benefits to be accrued from implementation of A-SMGCS level II will beassociated with the provision of a safety net for runway operations, i.e. capable of detecting and preventing potential hazards resulting from deviations or errors.

2.5 Implementation Consideration

A-SMGCS Level II has to adapt to local needs of different aerodromes concerning

the detection of runway safety hazards. In particular for some airports the adequacybetween conflict / infringements detected and working methods such as intersectiondepartures, multiple line-up or conditional clearance shall be ensured in order toavoid unnecessary alerts.

Level II will be built upon Level I but several improvements need to be implementedIn level II, as surveillance data will be used by the runway safety net, thesurveillance infrastructure will not be the same. In comparison to level I, the trafficinformation (position, identity) will be completed with other parameters like speed

vector, and the performance will be enhanced, i.e. the position accuracy will bebetter.

In addition, the automated control system shall be robust to failures of other ATCsystems (Flight Data Processing Systems) or other A-SMGCS elements. This willbe realised by minimising the interaction with these systems.

Consideration will be put on user workload, by minimising controller inputs.

2.6 Optional serviceA-SMGCS Level II may also optionally provide a guidance service to vehicle drivers.This service which will be available in the A-SMGCS level II implementationtimeframe, consists in an airport map showing taxiways, runways, fixed obstaclesand the mobile position. With this system, the driver could visualise his position and


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3. SERVICES

In A-SMGCS level II, the automated surveillance and control services are providedto ATC controllers, and the guidance service may optionally be provided to vehicledrivers. This section further describes the A-SMGCS control service, thesurveillance service being described in [D3].

3.1 Overview

A-SMGCS Level II provides an automated control service to ATCO. This servicedetects the following conflict / infringements :

conflicts / infringements on runway caused by aircraft or vehicles; restricted areas incursions caused by aircraft.

For each conflict / infringement detected, the A-SMGCS control service provides anappropriate alert to ATCOs.

This service gives assistance to the ATCO in his control tasks by : Anticipating potential conflicts; Detecting conflicts.

At level II the A-SMGCS control service primarily intends to contribute to operationsas a safety net, preventing hazards resulting from pilot or vehicle driver deviations or from operational errors or deviations.At further A-SMGCS Levels (III or IV) further developments of the service areenvisaged to :

Provide automatic alerts to pilots / drivers; Detect conflict at taxiway intersections, and any other conflict on the

airport surface;

Perform automatic actions following alerts (e.g. trigger stop bars); Improve decision support capability provided to ATCOs.

Levels III and IV are not the purpose of this document, they are described in [D2].

A-SMGCS level II can optionally provides a guidance service for vehicle drivers.This service consists providing the following information to the driver:


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Visual process consists in the provision of alert situation information : type andlocation of alert situation, identification of the conflicting mobiles. This visual alert ispresented on the same HMI used for the surveillance service.

Sound process consists in a sound alert issued when the alert situation necessitatesan immediate action. A sound process will always be associated with a visualprocess in order to provide the controller with the information he needs tounderstand the situation.

In A-SMGCS implementation level II, it is not foreseen to provide the alert with anindication on the procedure the controller must apply. The alert resolution assistancewill be provided in the level IV (see [D2]).

3.2.2 Stages of alert

Different levels of severity for alert situations may be distinguished. To each level of severity may correspond a different alert stage. Two stages of alerts arerecommended .

The number of alert stages needs to be kept to a minimum (i.e. 1 or 2) in order todecrease the controller disturbances and workload. More than two stages could betoo complicated and bewildering.

This recommendation is also based on the experience and practices of current A-SMGCS systems as well as projects such as BETA.

These 2 stages of alert are defined as follow :

Stage 1 alert is used to inform the controller that a situation which ispotentially dangerous may occur, and he/she needs to be made aware of.According to the situation, the controller receiving a stage 1 alert may take aspecific action to resolve the alert if needed. This is called INFORMATIONstep.

Stage 2 alert is used to inform the controller that a critical situation isdeveloping which needs immediate action. This is called ALARM step.

In general, a stage 2 alert is preceded by a stage 1 alert in order to anticipate the

conflicts / infringements. However, it is not systematic and depends on the scenario.Depending on the detected situation a INFORMATION will not necessarily be issuedand the system will directly trigger an ALARM.

Controllers have different preferences, some of them want to be alerted only whenthe situation is critical (only stage 2 alerts), others wish more anticipation (2 stagesof alert) This is confirmed by the evaluations performed in the BETA project As a


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3.3 Compliance with ATC Procedures and Working MethodsIn order to efficiently assist ATCO (and build confidence), the automated A-SMGCScontrol service shall be compatible with local procedures and working methods. Itcould have requirements for additional amended procedures that should beharmonised (i.e. ICAO).

In particular, the detection of conflict / infringements shall take into account localworking methods implemented according to the ICAO relevant provisions e.g.

multiple line-ups, intersection departures, conditional clearance (see definitions in[ICAO-7030]).

The control (automated) service shall also take into account that such workingmethods vary with respect to traffic load or meteorological conditions.

According to given visibility conditions (local parameter) operations such as multipleline-ups, could not be authorised and in such a case appropriate alerts shall begenerated.

However, in some cases the runway safety net provided by A-SMGCS level II couldallow the ATM providers to perform multiple line-ups and conditional clearanceseven in reduced visibility conditions, provided that aircrew can see each other.

3.4 Protection Areas

As introduced in [ICAO-A-SMGCS] section 5.5.6.3, a solution to detect conflict /infringements is to define virtual areas around runways, restricted areas or mobiles.These areas are called protection areas.As an example a conflict / infringement is detected when a mobile crosses therunway protection area boundary.

The form and size of the protection areas may vary depending on airport layout andATC procedures.

The runway protection area is composed of two boundaries :

A ground boundary to detect the mobiles on the surface,An air boundary to detect airborne aircraft.

Around the same runway several layers of protection areas may be defined, eachone corresponding to an alert situation severity level (and associated to alert stages,see section 3.2).

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As an example based on today ILS holding positions :In Non-LVP : ground boundary defined by Cat I holding position

In LVP : ground boundary defined by Cat II / III holding position

This ground boundary will be used for both INFORMATION and ALARM stages.

32 14 32 14 32 14 32 14

Figure 3-1 : Ground boundary of runway protection area

N.B : In order to avoid unnecessary INFORMATIONs or ALARMs to thecontrollers, current systems wait until the mobile has crossed theboundary.

Subject to further development, if the runway protection is ensured by analgorithm which could predict that a mobile is able or not to stop beforeentering the protection area, i.e. the ground boundary, an INFORMATION /ALARM could be generated before the mobile crosses the boundary.

Such algorithms, based on the speed and position of a mobile, may alreadyexist but they have to be evaluated.

3.4.2 Air boundary

The air boundary is defined as a flight time to threshold and would take into accountthe two stages of alert, INFORMATION and ALARM, as well as the meteorologicalconditions :

Non-LVP : INFORMATION around T1 = 30, ALARM around T2 = 15

LVP : INFORMATION around T1 = 45, ALARM around T2 = 30

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According to [ICAO-A-SMGCS] section 5.5.6.3.6, these times of the two alert stagesoutlined above should be configurable, depending upon optimisation at theaerodrome.

Note : it should be noticed that when a detection case is defined by arriving aircraft < T2 from threshold means all the flight phase from arriving aircraft at T2 fromthreshold till touch-down.

3.5 Guidance Service to Vehicle Drivers

At level II, the optional guidance service to vehicle drivers will provide basicinformation that allows drivers to visualise their position on the movement area.

Two main types of information have to be provided : Vehicle position; Traffic context information : static geographic information (layout,

reference points, holding positions).

At Level II the service is not intended to provide direct guidance instructions, for instance for crossing of holding positions.

This reduced service primarily intends to reducing navigation errors which mayoccur in reduced visibility conditions or with un-experimented drivers.

At further A-SMGCS Levels (III and IV) the guidance service will also be provided toaircrew and enhanced by visualising dynamic traffic context information : status of runways and taxiways, obstacles.

Operational Concept & Requirements for A SMGCS DSA / AOP


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4. RUNWAY SAFETY NET

A-SMGCS level II will provide runway safety net by detecting potentially dangerousscenarios dealing with runway. It is not intended to provide an exhaustive list of thecases to be monitored at Level II. These cases remain specific to each aerodrome.

Firstly, the cases depend on the aerodrome layout : the definition of runway

incursions could be different in an airport with only one runway to the one of anairport with two crossing runways.

Secondly, the conflicts / infringements cases are closely related to ATC localprocedures. For instance, in order to increase the departure rate, some airportsapply multiple line-up departures under which several aircraft may be lined-up at thesame time on the same runway. In such an airport, two lined-up aircraft are notconsidered as a conflict. Therefore, in that case, the A-SMGCS runway safety netshould deal with two aircraft in the same protection area without issuing an

immediate alert. This implies the use of A-SMGCS safety net whose algorithm goesfurther and deeper than the traditional algorithm.

In other airports where multiple line-up is not in operation, this two lined-up aircraftcase may be recognised as a runway incursion case.

Consequently, conflicts / infringements cases have to be specifically determined for each airport. In A-SMGCS level II, the control service shall detect all the conflicts /infringements on runway with respect to each airport particularities and definitions.

However, we provide in the following sections some general cases which should beaddressed by A-SMGCS level II.

4.1 Scope of conflicts / infringements on runway

Runway Incursion is defined by EUROCONTROL Runway Incursion Task Force :

The unintended presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the runway or runway strip.

In A-SMGCS level II, it is proposed to detect runway incursions caused only byaircraft or vehicles, not person.

Conflicts between 2 vehicles are out of the scope of A-SMGCS level II. It means A-SMGCS level II will detect only conflicts between an aircraft (reference) and another mobile hich ma be another aircraft or a ehicle

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DSA / AOP Operational Concept & Requirements for A SMGCSImplementation Level II

A-SMGCS Level IIscenarios

Runwaysconfigurations

Conflicts /infringements

involving a person


involving a singlemobile

Conflicts /infringementsinvolving two

mobiles


involving more thantwo mobiles

One runway

Two runways

More than tworunways

Not detected by A-SMGCS level II.

These scenarios are covered by consideringeach pair of runways.

These scenarios arecovered by the conflictsinvolving two mobiles inconsidering each pair of

mobiles.

Table 4-1: Scope of conflicts / infringements on runway

According to this scope, the different conflicts / infringements on runway scenariosare defined in the following sections. We address the different runwaysconfigurations (one or two runways) and the different mobiles configurations (asingle mobile or conflicts between an aircraft and another mobile). It is important tonotice that A-SMGCS level II will not address all the scenarios within the scopedefined above, but only those relevant and technical feasible.

4.2 One Runway

4.2.1 Conflicts / infringements involving a Single mobile

4.2.1.1 The mobile is not identified by A-SMGCS

Unidentified mobiles are intruders and not authorised to enter not only the runwaybut the whole manoeuvring area. Consequently, provided that the system makessure that the unidentified mobile does not correspond to a false detection, thesystem will trigger an INFORMATION when an unidentified mobile enters therunway protection area. As previously, the A-SMGCS could be equipped with apredictive algorithm which issues an INFORMATION before the mobile enters themanoeuvring area.

32 14 32 14 32 14 32 14

NOIDENTITY

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p p qImplementation Level II

Mobiles which have already been authorised and are temporarily unable to providetheir identity for any reason (e.g. transponder break-down) will also trigger INFORMATION that the controller will manage through R/T.

Note : The detection of intruders rely on non-cooperative sensors such as SurfaceMovement Radar (SMR). Some difficulties are encountered with the use of SMR which could generate false detection and consequently causing false alerts. It isimportant that A-SMGCS makes sure that the detected intruder does not correspond to a false detection before alerting the controller.

4.2.1.2 The mobile is a vehicle

The objective is to detect vehicles entering the runway without authorisationaccording to the ICAO rule : The movement of pedestrians or vehicles on themanoeuvring area shall be subject to authorization by the aerodrome control tower.Persons, including drivers of all vehicles, shall be required to obtain authorizationfrom the aerodrome control tower before entry to the manoeuvring area.Notwithstanding such an authorization, entry to a runway or runway strip or changein the operation authorized shall be subject to a further specific authorization by theaerodrome control tower. ([ICAO-4444] 7.5.3.2.1).

Prior to delivering an authorisation, the controller must identify the vehicle. In A-SMGCS level II, all participating vehicles (those likely to enter the manoeuvringarea) are cooperative, which means able to provide their identity to A-SMGCS. As aconsequence, for the system, any vehicle unable to provide its identity is consideredan intruder (see previous section).

Although the vehicle is identified, A-SMGCS doesnt know if the vehicle isauthorised or not. One way to do it, is to manually enter each authorisation in thesystem. This will highly increase the controller workload, and it is not acceptable.Consequently, the system will not know whether or not a vehicle is authorised.

It is therefore proposed to trigger an INFORMATION to the ATCO whenever anidentified vehicle is present on an active runway (further warnings will be generatedbetween such a vehicle and aircraft in accordance with section 4.2.2)...

4.2.1.3 The mobile is an aircraft

The objective is to prevent aircraft from using the runway without authorisation. Asthe controller gives its authorisation to the aircraft by voice, A-SMGCS cannotautomatically know if the aircraft is authorised or not. The only way to do it, is tomanually enter each authorisation in the system. This will highly increase the

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Implementation Level II

Aircraft proceeding to a closed runway will trigger the following alerts :aircraft on runway protection area surface => INFORMATION

32 14 32 14 32 14 32 14

aircraft lining-up or taking-off => ALARM

32 14 32 14 32 14 32 14

arriving aircraft (< T1 from threshold) => ALARM

32 14 32 14 32 14 32 14

Aircraft proceeding to a runway in the wrong direction will trigger the following alerts:

Ai f i i h i h di i ill i l

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Aircraft taking off in the wrong direction => ALARM

32 14 32 14 32 14 32 14 Runway

orientation

In order to avoid nuisance alerts, the runway protection area must be carefullydefined when runway is also used for other purposes such as crossing runway, or taxiing.

4.2.2 Conflicts / infringements involving an aircraft and another mobile

In order to trigger the appropriate alerts to the controllers, the position of the mobiles

should be analysed according to the set time-parameters, their relative speeds andpositions when entering the runway protection area :

Aircraft / vehicle

Arrival / Arrival

Arrival / Departure

Departure / Departure

Including aborted takes-off and go-aroundConsideration should be given to the working methods of every airport and the localparameters like reduced separations on the runway when approved by the ATSauthorities.

The following scenarios are recommended for A-SMGCS level II. They are based onICAO rules and experience from existing A-SMGCS. They will be assessed duringthe validation activities.

4.2.2.1 Arriving Aircraft

If a mobile (aircraft or vehicle) is on the runway protection area surface and :

1. the arriving aircraft < T1 from threshold => INFORMATION

2 th i i g i ft < T2 f th h ld > ALARM til th

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If there is a slower preceding departing aircraft which has not crossed the end of therunway-in-use or has not started a turn ([ICAO-4444] 7.9.1), and :

1. the arriving aircraft < T1 from threshold => INFORMATION

2. the arriving aircraft < T2 from threshold => ALARM

If reduced spacing procedures are in force, the previous case shall be adapted asfollowing according to D, the distance between both aircraft :

1. arriving aircraft < T2 from threshold and D > 2500 m =>INFORMATION ;

2. arriving aircraft < T2 from threshold and 2000m < D < 2500 m anddeparting aircraft has taken off => INFORMATION ;

3. arriving aircraft < T2 from threshold and 2000m < D < 2500 m andthe departing aircraft has not yet taken off => ALARM;

4. arriving aircraft < T2 from threshold and D < 2000 m => ALARM .

The system could be enhanced, as some existing systems do, by using theacceleration difference between both aircraft. It will allow to predict with moreaccuracy if there is a risk of collision or not, and so avoid unnecessary alerts.

32 14 32 14 32 14 32 14

If there is a preceding arriving aircraft which has not cleared the runway protection

area ([ICAO-4444] 7.9.1), and :1. the arriving aircraft < T1 from threshold => INFORMATION

2. the arriving aircraft < T2 from threshold => ALARM


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4.2.2.2 Departing aircraft If a mobile (aircraft or vehicle) is on the runway protection area surface and notbehind the departing aircraft:

1. the departing aircraft is not yet taking-off (speed < 50 knots) =>INFORMATION

2. the departing aircraft is taking-off (speed > 50 knots) => ALARM

32 14 32 14 32 14 32 14

If multiple line-up is applied, the system shall trigger a ALARM, only if the departingaircraft which is behind has started its take-off and not when it is lining-up. The useof INFORMATION in this case is left to local decision.

32 14 32 14 32 14 32 14

4.3 Two Runways

Th b



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Figure 4-1 : Example of parallel runways at Paris CDG airport

Converging :


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Figure 4-3 : Example of intersecting runways at Zurich airport (10/28 and 16/34)

4.3.1 Parallel or converging runways

When operations are conducted on two parallel or converging runways, the onlyincursion hazard happens if one aircraft enters the protection area of the other

runway while this one is engaged.In order to avoid this situation, the A-SMGCS should analyse the position of themobile according to the protection area of the active runway.

A design encompassing both runways in a large protection area would create toohigh a number of unnecessary warnings, especially when conducting simultaneousoperations.

For that reason each runway will be considered with its own protection area and as

a consequence two parallel or converging runways are considered as two individualrunways.

At most major airports the distance between the runways centrelines is such that therunway protection areas will not overlap.

Nevertheless in order to avoid unwanted warnings consideration should be given to



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p

4.3.2 Intersecting runways

4.3.2.1 Introduction

Even though there is no standard operating procedures for simultaneous operations1on intersecting runways, it is possible to identify rules for detecting conflicts onintersecting runways.

Although the only incursion hazard happens if one aircraft enters the protection areaof the other runway while this one is engaged (see single runway cases),intersecting runways create an additional risk of collision at their intersectionbetween two aircraft arriving or departing on both runways simultaneously.

In order to avoid this critical situation, the A-SMGCS will analyse the position of themobile according to each runway protection area as in the single runway case and itwill anticipate a conflict between two aircraft that could occur in the common part of the runways protection volumes before EITHER of the aircraft enters it. These rulesof detection do not apply to vehicles but only to aircraft, especially when they are

converging on the runway intersection. These rules of detection are definedhereafter.

4.3.2.2 Time To Threshold

It could be required to use Time To Threshold T1 and T2 different from thosedefined in section 3.4.2. We will call them Intersecting Runways Time To ThresholdIRT1 and IRT2. They could be defined as following :

Long final: Aircraft on final between IRT1 and IRT2; Short final: Aircraft on final between IRT2 and Threshold over-flight;

4.3.2.3 IR1: 1 aircraft is lining up

1 Line up + 1 Line up => INFORMATION;

1 Line up + 1 Take off => INFORMATION;

1 Line up + 1 Landing => INFORMATION;1 Line up + 1 Long final => No alert;

1 Line up + 1 Short final =>INFORMATION;

4 3 2 4 IR2: Simultaneous Take off & Landing


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1 Long final + 1 Short final => ALARM;

1 Short final + 1 Short final => ALARM.

4.3.2.6 IR4: Final + Landing or Take off The following cases apply only when both aircraft are converging to the runways intersection.

1 Long final + 1 Landing + converging => INFORMATION;

1 Long final + 1 Take off + converging => INFORMATION;

1 Short final + 1 Landing + converging => ALARM;

1 Short final + 1 Take off + converging => ALARM.



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5. RESTRICTED AREA INCURSIONS

The restricted area incursions only concern incursions by an aircraft (not vehicles)into an area where the presence of an aircraft or a vehicle is permanently or temporarily forbidden. Closed TWY, ILS or MLS critical areas are example of restricted areas. When closed, runways may be considered as restricted areas. Thecase of incursion on a closed runway is covered separately by the runway safety net

(section 4.2.1.3).The restricted areas and their associated protections used to detect incursionsshould be defined locally with respect to each airport particularity. However, sincerestricted areas incursions deal only with ground traffic, the definition of thecorresponding protection areas is easier than for runways. The protection area willbe composed of only a ground boundary to detect aircraft incursions and theprotection area boundary will be defined by the boundary of the restricted area(closed TWY, ILS critical area,).

An ALARM will be provided to the controller when an aircraft enters a restricted areaor before the entrance if a predictive algorithm is used.


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6. ROLES OF ACTORS

A-SMGCS actors take part in A-SMGCS operations as a user or contributor. Theroles of actors described in A-SMGCS Level I [D3] remain similar at Level II, exceptfor ATCOs, and vehicle drivers equipped with the optional guidance service asexplained in the following sections.

6.1 Controller

As for Level I, the role of the controller does not really change by the implementationof A-SMGCS level II, but the controller tasks evolve in the sense that the A-SMGCScontrol service provides the controller with a dedicated source of alert information inall visibility conditions, and the controller must apply the procedures related to eachtype of alert.

This new source of data complements the conflict / infringement detectionperformed by the controller in analysing the traffic visually or using surveillance data.

The table below summarises conflict / infringement detection in A-SMGCS :

VisibilityConditions

Conflict / infringementDetection with SMGCS

Conflict / infringementDetection with A-SMGCS

level I

Conflict / infringementDetection with A-SMGCS

level IINormal Analysis of traffic data :

Visual means

Mobiles R/T reports

Analysis of traffic data :

Surveillance Service

Visual means

Mobiles R/T reports


Surveillance Service

Visual means

Mobiles R/T reports

A-SMGCS control service

Reduced Analysis of traffic data :

Mobiles R/T reports


Surveillance ServiceMobiles R/T reports


Surveillance ServiceMobiles R/T reports

A-SMGCS control service

Table 6-1 : Conflict / infringement Detection for the Controller



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When alerted by a conflict / infringement detection, the surveillance information alsoprovided to the controller allows him to have a good awareness and understandingof the alert situation by identifying on his screen the area of alert situation and themobiles implicated in the alert situation. Therefore, the controller is able to quicklytake the appropriate action to resolve the conflict / infringement.

Even if provided with the A-SMGCS control service, the controller shall not rely on itto detect conflict / infringements, but shall continue the analysis of the trafficsituation to detect conflict / infringement himself as in SMGCS or A-SMGCS level I.

Air Traffic Controller

Traffic SituationPicture +

Conflicts /Infringements

Detection

Traffic Context

Position, Identity,Speed, of

Mobiles

Airport Traffic Context

Airport Traffic

Actions onTraffic

Surveillance Information

Alerts

Figure 6-1 : ATCO role

6.2 Other operatorsA pre-requisite for an efficient detection of conflict / infringements is the correctconfiguration of the automated tool, i.e. through the provision of the followinginformation :

f


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layout and fixed obstacles in all visibility conditions. This new source of data willcomplement the usual visual observation outside the vehicle. The guidance servicedoes not require any inputs neither from the driver, nor from the controller.

The driver will use this new information (position of its vehicle, airport map,reference points on the map, visualised on a display) for the navigation of its vehicle.For instance, when he is lost, there is no indications about its position outside or hecannot see them because of reduced visibility conditions, he will be able to use theinformation provided by the guidance service to know exactly where he is on the

airport platform.



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7. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

The procedures applying in A-SMGCS level I [D3], remain in level II.

However, the introduction of the A-SMGCS control service will require newprocedures defining the controller actions (acknowledgement) when the controlservice generated an alert.

These actions must be appropriate to each alert situation. An example of controller action when alerted by the A-SMGCS control service could be to contact by radio amobile involved in the alert situation, using the appropriate phraseology.

Concerning the guidance service provided to the vehicle drivers, emphasis shouldbe put on the training and licensing of the drivers. Contrary to the ATC controllerswho are familiar with the use of a display in their job, the use of a display iscompletely new for the drivers. Consequently, new procedures could define the wayto use the guidance service for vehicle drivers and the associated training and

licensing activities.


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8. EQUIPMENT

The aim of this section is to present the equipment required by A-SMGCS level IIwithout pre-empting any technology.

Airport Surface Movements

CooperativeSurveillance

sensors

Non-cooperativeSurveillance

sensors

Data Fusion

Position

Position +Identity +

Speed Vector

ExternalData

TrafficContext

ATCOConflicts / InfringementsDetection

Alerts

Figure 8-1 - Surveillance and Control services

In A-SMGCS level II, the same equipment required for level I may be used for thesurveillance service. However, the A-SMGCS control service will not only use thePosition and Identity of mobiles but also the speed vector and other mobileparameters if needed in order to detect the conflicts / infringements. Therefore, thecooperative surveillance sensors shall be able to collect these parameters.Moreover, enhanced performances will be required for A-SMGCS level II assurveillance data will be used by the runway safety net. For instance, it will require abetter accuracy for mobiles position.

The A-SMGCS control service will also use a module of conflict / infringement



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9. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

9.1 Methodology

The methodology introduced for Level I is also applied for Level II [D3].

9.2 Services requirementsAll A-SMGCS level I general principles and operational requirements related to SurveillanceService also apply to A-SMGCS level II. The following requirements are specific to theControl and Guidance services.

9.2.1 Control Service

All A-SMGCS performance and system monitoring operational requirements for surveillanceservice apply to A-SMGCS control service. The performance requirements presented in thefollowing section are specific to the control service.

Op_Perf-15-Position Accuracy

The allowable error in reported position shall be consistent with the requirements setby the Control service: 7.5 when the position is used by the conflict / infringementdetection process.

Note 1 : The position accuracy could not be the same in all areas, depending on theconflict / infringement detection requirements.

Note 2 : The required position accuracy may be specifically defined at each airportby the ATS authority on the basis of local safety analysis.Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.7.1.2, 4.3.3.1, [EUROCAE MASPS] 3.2.3.

Op_Perf-16-Reported Velocity Accuracy

The velocity shall be determined to the following accuracy:- speed:


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Op_Perf-17-Target Report Velocity Resolution

The target report velocity resolution shall be :

- speed: 1m/s

- direction of movement: 1.5Source: [EUROCAE MASPS] 3.2.3

Op_Perf-18-Alert latency The alert resulting of conflict / infringement detection shall be provided to the user well in advance within a specified time frame, to enable the appropriate remedialaction with respect to:

a) conflict / infringement prediction;

b) conflict / infringement detection; and

c) conflict / infringement resolution.Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.5.4.4

Op_Perf-19-Alert Continuity

The Conflict/Infringement Alert should be displayed continuously while the conflict isdetected.Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 5.5.6.3.4

Op_Perf-20-False and nuisance alert number

The number of false alerts and nuisance alerts shall be as low as possible to notdisturb the user and avoid him to loose confidence in the system.

Op_Perf-21-Impact of false alert on safety

The false alerts shall not impact on the airport safety.

Op_Serv-14-Service

A-SMGCS level II shall provide the control service to the users.

Op Serv-15-User



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The control service shall detect the restricted area incursions caused by an aircraft(not vehicles) into an area such as closed TWY, ILS or MLS critical area, to bedefined locally for each aerodrome.Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.5.4.1, [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.5.4.3

Op_Serv-18-Runway protection area

The runway protection area shall be composed of two boundaries : A groundboundary to detect the mobiles on the surface, an air boundary to detect airborne

aircraft.

Op_Serv-19-Ground boundary

The length of the ground boundary must at least include the runway strip. The widthcould be defined, and different, according to the meteorological conditions, e.g. Non-LVP, LVP.

As an example based on today ILS holding positions :

- In Non-LVP : ground boundary defined by Cat I holding position- In LVP : ground boundary defined by Cat II / III holding position

This ground boundary will be used for both INFORMATION and ALARM stages.

Note: In order to avoid unnecessary INFORMATIONs or ALARMs to the controllers,current systems wait until the mobile has crossed the boundary.

Subject to further development, if the runway protection is ensured by an algorithm

which could predict that a mobile is able or not to stop before entering the protectionarea, i.e. the ground boundary, an INFORMATION / ALARM could be generatedbefore the mobile crosses the boundary.

Such algorithms, based on the speed and position of a mobile, may already exist butthey have to be evaluated.

Op_Serv-20-Air boundary

The air boundary shall be defined as a flight time to threshold and would take intoaccount the two stages of alert, INFORMATION and ALARM, as well as themeteorological conditions :

- Non-LVP : INFORMATION around T1 = 30, ALARM around T2 = 15

- LVP : INFORMATION around T1 = 45, ALARM around T2 = 30


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Op_Serv-22-Alert

The control service shall alert the users in case of conflict/infringement detection.Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.5.4.1

Op_Serv-27-Stages of alert

The control service shall provide 2 stages of alert:

Stage 1 alert is used to inform the controller that a situation which is potentially

dangerous may occur, and he/she needs to be made aware of. According to thesituation, the controller receiving a stage 1 alert may take a specific action to resolvethe alert if needed. This is called INFORMATION step.

Stage 2 alert is used to inform the controller that a critical situation is developingwhich needs immediate action. This is called ALARM step.

Note: Controllers have different preferences, some of them want to be alerted onlywhen the situation is critical (only stage 2 alerts), others wish more anticipation (2stages of alert). This is confirmed by the evaluations performed in the BETA project.As a consequence, some ATS providers may choose to have ALARM only, and notuse INFORMATION. The choice of having several stages of alerts presented to thecontroller, according to the conflict / infringement, should be left to the ATSproviders.

Op_Serv-28-Alert priority

Priorities should be established so as to ensure system logic performs efficiently.

Conflict alerting priorities should be as follows:a) Runway incursions.

b) Restricted area incursions.Source: [ICAO A-SMGCS] 5.5.6.2.6

Op_Serv-29-Adaptation to local procedures

In order to efficiently assist ATCO, the automated A-SMGCS control service shall be

configurable to adapt to local ATC procedures and working methods.

Op_Serv-30-Traffic Information Update

For the Conflict/Infringement detection, additional updated and correct trafficinformation shall be provided to the system such as mobiles velocity



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Monitoring of the performance of the guidance service should be provided such thatoperationally significant failures are detected and appropriate remedial action isinitiated to restore the service or provide a reduced level of service.Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.7.5.3

Op_Mon-09-Data

The A-SMGCS shall perform a continuous validation of data provided to the user and timely alert the user when the system must not be used for the intended

operation.Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.7.3.2

Op_Mon-10-Back-up

The system shall allow for a reversion to adequate back-up procedures if failures inexcess of the operationally significant period occur.Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.7.6.4

Op_Mon-11-System FailuresOperationally significant failures in the system shall be clearly indicated to anyaffected user.Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.7.6.5, 3.7.5.4

Op_Mon-12-Failure Alerts

All critical elements of the system should be provided with audio and visualindication of failure given in a timely manner.Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.6.13.1

Op_Perf-22-Position Accuracy

For the guidance service, the allowable error in reported position shall be consistentwith the requirements set by the task of the user : 12 m.

Note:

For the Guidance service the position accuracy doesn't need to be better than for surveillance service.

If the same equipment is used to provide the position both to the control and theguidance service, the position accuracy must be consistent with the PositionAcc rac req irement set for the control ser ice


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Note : [EUROCAE MASPS] 3.2.3 and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] 4.3.5 require the updaterate should be at least 1s. For example, in one second, a vehicle at 35 km/h, willmove of 10 metres. In that case, the position displayed to the user can differ of 10metres from the actual position before being updated with the new reported value. If we take the maximum speed of 80kts for vehicules on the movement area ([ICAO-A-SMGCS] 4.2.4.2), the displayed position can differ of 40 metres.Sources : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.7.2.1, [EUROCAE MASPS] 3.2.3

Op_Perf-25-Integrity

A-SMGCS shall preclude failures that result in erroneous data provided to the users.Sources : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.7.3.1, [EUROCAE MASPS] 3.1.1.1

Op_Perf-26-Reliability

A failure of equipment shall not cause:

- a reduction in safety (fail soft); and

- the loss of basic functions.Sources : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.7.6.3, [EUROCAE MASPS] 3.1.1

Op_Perf-27-Continuity of Service 1

An A-SMGCS shall provide a continuous service.Sources : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.7.5.1, [EUROCAE MASPS] 3.1.1.2

Op_Perf-28-Continuity of Service 2

Any unscheduled break in continuity shall be sufficiently short or rare as not to affectthe safety of mobiles.Sources : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.7.5.2, [EUROCAE MASPS] 3.1.1.2

Op_Perf-29-Recovery time

When restarting, the recovery times of the guidance service shall be compatible withuser operations (a value of 1 minute would be reasonable as a maximum).Source : [ICAO A-SMGCS] 3.6.14.1

Op_Serv-23-Service

A-SMGCS level II may optionally provide the guidance service to the users.



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- Reference points: holding points, stop bars (and other airfield lighting),RWY thresholds...;

- Fixed obstacles.

- Other vehicle information (heading,...) if required by the user.

Op_Serv-26-Position

The vehicle shall be seen in the correct position with respect to the aerodromelayout.

Note: It means for instance, if a mobile is on the runway, it must be seen on therunway and not outside the runway. The position accuracy is given in another requirement.


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Edition: 1.0 Page 1

Annex A : Summary of Conflicts / infringements to be detected by the runway safety net

ReferenceAircraft Conflicting Mobile INFORMATION ALARM

Unidentified mobile on the runway protection area Yes No

Identified vehicle on an active runway Yes No

Aircraft proceeding to a closed runwayaircraft on runway

protection areasurface

Departing aircraft lining-up or taking-off or arriving aircraft (< T1 from threshold)

NoReference

aircraft

Aircraft departing on the runway in the wrongdirection When lining-up when taking-off

a mobile (aircraft or vehicle) is on the runwayprotection area surface

arriving aircraft < T1from threshold

the arriving aircraft < T2 from threshold, until the arriving aircraft haspassed the mobile (mobile behind the arriving aircraft)

a slower preceding departing aircraft which has notcrossed the end of the runway-in-use or has not

started a turn 2

arriving aircraft < T1from threshold arriving aircraft < T2 from threshold

Arrivingaircraft

a preceding arriving aircraft which has not cleared theprotection area 3

arriving aircraft < T1from threshold arriving aircraft < T2 from threshold

Departing

aircraft

a mobile (aircraft or vehicle) is on the runwayprotection area surface and not behind the departing

aircraft 4

departing aircraft isnot yet taking-off

(speed < 50 knots)departing aircraft is taking-off (speed > 50 knots)

Table 0-1 : Conflicts / infringements to be detected at each individual runway

2 See specific rules when reduced spacing procedures are in force3 See specific rules when reduced spacing procedures are in force4 See specific rules when multiple line-up is applied



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Page 2 Edition: 1.0

Note : The air boundary is defined as a flight time to threshold :

Non-LVP : T1 = 30, T2 = 15

LVP : T1 = 45, T2 = 30

Reference Aircraft Conflicting Mobile INFORMATION ALARM

an aircraft is lined-up on the other runway Yes No

an aircraft is taking off on the other runway Yes No

an aircraft is landing on the other runway Yes NoLining up aircraft

arriving aircraft on short final (