07045143 Blanton et all 1996 A Dual- Processual Theory for the Evolution.pdf

8/9/2019 07045143 Blanton et all 1996 A Dual- Processual Theory for the Evolution.pdf

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CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

Volume

37,Number , February996

?

I996

bytheWenner-Grenoundation

or

Anthropological

esearch. ll rightseserved

OOII-3204/96/370I-0003$4.50

AGENCY,

IDEOLOGY,

AND

POWER IN

ARCHAEOLOGICAL

THEORY

I

A

Dual-Processual

Theoryfor he

Evolutionof

Mesoamerican

Civilization'

by Richard

E.

Blanton,

Gary

M.

Feinman,

Stephen

A.

Kowalewski,

and Peter

N.

Peregrine

The explanation of the

development

of

ancient Meso-

american

civilization s

in

need of

a

new theoretical p-

proach to replace

the sterile

debates

between,

or

xam-

ple, materialists and cognitivists or

region-centered

versusworld-systems

heorists. he foremost

ource of

theoretical

difficulty

s that all of the

arguments

ake

place within he conceptual

confines

f

flawedneoevo-

lutionism.

Current heory as proved nadequateto the

study of sociocultural evolution

in

Mesoamerica

and

elsewhere because

it

focuseson

a

directional

develop-

mentthrough volutionary tages from andsto states)

(Flannery

972,

Service

I975)

that are static societal

types. n neoevolutionary

heory he administrativeub-

systems of

chiefdoms and states respond to

socio-

environmental tresses by increasingpolitical

central-

ization

Flannery972, Wrightnd Johnson

975),

but

there s no

convincing heory f human

behavior, spe-

ciallythe crucialbehavior ound n

politicalcompetition

(Brumfiel

992).

Researchers hould

abandon its static

ideal-type

stages and instead investigate the

varying

strategies sed by political actors

o construct ndmain-

tain

polities and other

ociocultural nstitutions.n this

Current

eoevolutionaryheory

s

inadequate

o the

nalysis f

past social change ecause

t lacks a

suitable ehavioral

heory

and because ts simple

tage ypologyails o account or aria-

tion mong ocieties f imilar

omplexitynd scale. Wepropose

a

remedial rogram or eoevolutionaryheory hatwill

help

t

avoid these

hortcomings.

o

accomplish his,we layouta pre-

liminary ehavioral

heory rounded

n

political conomy, oint

to comparativeituations

rom

ariousworld reasthat llus-

trate heprocesses

nvolved, nd then pply he approacho pre-

HispanicMesoamerica.We argue hat productive

xplanatory

frameworkorMesoamericawill be a dual-processual

heory hat

elucidates he nteractionsnd

contradictions

f

wo mainpat-

terns

f

political ction, ne exclusionarynd ndividual-

centered nd theother

moregroup-oriented.

i.

We were

stimulated

o write his paper fter eading

he

n-

sightfulomments

ound

n

Willey

i99I).

Two distinguished

ec-

tures resented

o the Archaeology

ivisionofthe

American n-

thropological

ssociation,y

Elizabeth rumfiel

i992)

andGeorge

Cowgill I993),

also contributed

mportantly

o our thinking.

n

earlier ersion

f hispaper

was presented y

Blanton t theSchool

of AmericanResearch

Advanced eminar

n the Archaic

tate,

organizedy

Gary einman nd

Joyce arcus.

he paper's evelop-

ment benefitedrom

he seminar

discussions.We

thankDavid

Grove nd an

anonymouseferee

or seful omments.

ny rrors

are

our own.

RICHARD

E. BLANTON

iS

Professor

n the

Department

f Sociol-

ogy nd

Anthropologyt PurdueUniversity

West

afayette,nd.

47097-I365,

U.S.A.).

Bom n

I943,

he

was educated t theUni-

versity f

Michigan

B.A.,

966; M.A., 967;

Ph.D.,

970).

His re-

search

nterests re early ivilizations, re-Hispanic esoamer-

ica, economic nthropology,nd cross-cultural

esearch. is

publications

ncludeMonte

Alban

(New

York:Academic ress,

I978), (with

tephen

owalewski, ary einman,

nd LauraFin-

sten),AncientMesoamericaCambridge:ambridge niversity

Press,

993),

and

Houses and Households

New

York:Plenum

Press,

994).

GARY

M. FEINMAN

iS ProfessorfAnthropology

t the Univer-

sity

fWisconsin-Madison. e was born

n 95

I

and

received

his B.A.

from he UniversityfMichigann

I972

and his

Ph.D.

from he CityUniversity

fNew YorkGraduate enter

n I980.

His researchnterests

re craft

pecialization,

ncient tates, et-

tlement rchaeology,

nd ceramics nd shell.He is a coauthor

withBlanton, owalewski,

nd others fMonteAlban's

Hinter-

land

(Memoirs

ftheUniversity

f

MichiganMuseum

ofAnthro-

pology

5

[i9821

and

3

[i9891)

andcoeditorwith

T.

Douglas

PriceofFoundations f

Social Inequality

New

York:Plenum

Press,

995).

STEPHEN

A.

KOWALEWSKI iS ProfessorfAnthropologyt the

University

f

Georgia.

orn

n

947,

he received is Ph.D. from

theUniversityfArizona n

I976.

His researchnterestsre re-

gional nalysis, olitical

conomy,nd cultural cology.

n addi-

tionto being enior

uthor fMonte

Alban's Hinterland, t.

2

(Memoirs

f

the

University

f

Michigan

Museumof

Anthropol-

ogy

3

[i989%1,

e

is

the author

f The Evolution

f

Complexity

in the Valley

f

Oaxaca

(Annual

Review fAnthropology

g:

39-58).

PETER PEREGRINE

iS Assistant rofessorf

Anthropologyt Law-

renceUniversity.

e was

born

n

I963

and educated t Purdue

University

B.A.,

985;

M.S.,

987;

Ph.D.,

ggo).

His

research

n-

terests

re

anthropological

heory,he origin

f

complex

ociety,

and the ntegration

f rchaeologynd ethnology.

e has pub-

lished

Mississippian

volution:

A World-Systemserspective

(Madison:

Prehistory ress,

i992).

The

present

aperwas submitted

2 IX

94

and accepted

II

95;

thefinal ersion eached heEditor's ffice

II

95.

I

1/14

07-045-143PrehAm

eryArg-14Copias


2/14

2

CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY

Volume

37,

Number

,

February 996

paperwe

take a beginning

tep toward he

development

of politicalbehavioral

heory f

ocial changeby

point-

ingto two

largelydistinct

political-economic

trategies

employed

n

the Mesoamerican

past. We then

discuss

the

interrelationshipsf

the two in space

and time and

apply

thistheory

n

a consideration

f ome

ofthe main

features fsocioculturalchange n pre-HispanicMeso-

america.

Our approach

builds on

the

suggestions

f Giddens

(I984),

Bourdieu

I977),

and Sewell

i992) and

has many

features

n commonwith the behavioral approach

de-

scribedby

Brumfiel

i992; see

Blanton

n.d.).

We assume

that

ome

persons

n

any

society

will

strive

o influence

thegoverning

nstitutions

f ociety

s

theypursue,

ar-

iously,

wealth, tatus,

r

power.

Political

action

s inher-

ently onflictive;

ctors

may

have diversepolitical

aims

and

varying

views

of the

ideal

formof

the governing

institutions nd

may

contest

for

positions

of

power.

As

Sewell (I992:22) points

out,

states

are

consciously

es-

tablished,

maintained,

fought over, and argued

about

rather han takenforgranted. Political actors capable

of

nfluencing

he

governing

nstitutions f society

are

oftenpersons

already occupying

positions

of

power

or

wealth

but

may

be

persons

or

groups

factions)

halleng-

ing

the dominant

ones. While

political

struggle

as

the

potential

of

bringing

with t social and cultural hange,

it

is

played

out against

a

background

f

shared culture,

acquired

through ocialization,

hatconstrainswhat

po-

litical

actors

may

do.

Culture

is

not,

however,

com-

pletely

determinative,

ecause

political

actors'

knowl-

edge

of

society's

structure nd

its culture

s

potentially

not

just

a

constraint

ut a

resource

that

they

can

use

as

they pursue

their

goals. Thus, political

actors

may,

variously,reproduce

society

and

culture, reject

it,

or

modifyt as a way ofachievingdesiredoutcomes.

Variation

n Political

Strategies

TWO

TYPES

OF

POWER

Political

actors

make use

of

differing

trategies

hat can

be

analytically

rokendown

by

reference o

the

type

of

power

strategy

nd

the source of

power here

we follow

Lehman

I969]

but

modify

ome

of his

terminology

nd

concepts).

A

heuristically

useful

distinction

may

be

made

between two

main

types

of

power

strategy,

he

exclusionary

nd

the

corporate,

which coexist

to some

degree

n the

politicaldynamics

fall social formations

(e.g.,Mann

I986:chap.

i)

butone or theotherofwhich

is

likely

to be

dominant

t

anyparticular

ime

nd

place.

In

the

exclusionary ower

strategy, olitical

actors aim

at

the

development

of

a

political system

built

around

their

monopoly

control

of

sources

of

power.

Exclusion-

ary

power may

be

exercised

n

small-scalenetworks f

personal

dominance,

for

example,

in

patron-client

e-

lationships

such

as

vassalage

in

European

feudalism

(Bloch

i96i).

On

a

larger

cale,

a

bureaucratic

orm f

government

upplants

the

personalized

control found

in

patron-client

elationships

nd similar

ntermember

power

relationships,

or

xample,

n

situations

n

which

rulers re able

to subordinate state's bureaucracy

Ei-

senstadt

969:278-79).

In the corporate

olitical strategy,

n contrast, ower

is shared across

different roups and

sectors of society

in such

a way as to inhibit

xclusionary trategies.

his

need

not mean a hierarchically lat

societyor a com-

pletely egalitarianone (see, e.g., Blanton n.d.); chiefs,

rulers, bureaucracies,

and govemingcouncils

may be

foundwithin he

structure f corporate overnance.

Mo-

nopoly

controlof sources of power

is precludedby re-

strictions n

the

political

behaviorof those vestedwith

power

or

aspirants

o

power.

In

corporate olities, the

distribution

f

power

is structured, etermined, egiti-

mated,

and controlledwithin

the limits set

by the pre-

vailing corporate ognitive

ode

(Blanton

n.d.).

The

evolution

of

corporate

ehaviorhas received n-

sufficient ttention

n the

literature n sociocultural

change in ancient

complex societies (Cowgill

I993).

Here the major goal of research

has been understanding

political

centralization

and

the

development

of eco-

nomic inequality. t is generally ssumed, n fact, hat

exclusionarypower

strategiespredominate

n

archaic

states.

For

example,

it is

almost

always accepted that

the cognitive ode

of an archaic state simplyserves

to

mystify system

f

powermonopoly

nd nequality but

see Abercrombie, ill,

and

Turner

980

and Thompson

I978 and

cf.

Blanton

n.d).

This

argument

s one

of

the

very ew areas

of

overlap

betweenfunctionalist-systems

and

marxist

theories of

complexsociety.

For

example,

the

systems

nalyst lanneryI972:407)

writes, It

is

the hierarchical arrangement

of

the

members and

classes of

society

whichprovides

he actual

integration

in states. The critical ontribution

f state

religious nd

state

art

tyles

s

to

egitimate

hat

hierarchy,

o confirm

the divine ffiliationfthoseat thetop by nducing eli-

gious experience

see

also

Rappaport

97I;

for

imilar

false consciousness

arguments,

see

such marxist

sources

as Bourdieu

I979;

Broda

i982;

Wolf

i982:83).

We

wouldargue,however,

hat

cognitive

ode

and

ritual

experience

may

also

support

corporate olitical

struc-

ture

Blanton

n.d.).

Archaic

state

systems

with

strongly

corporate features,

for

example,

the

Classic-period

Greek

polis (Humphreys

978),

are

infrequently

onsid-

ered

in

general

works on

sociocultural

evolution

e.g.,

Service

I975;

for

n

exception,

ee

Runciman

i982)

or

in comparative

tudies

of

archaic

states

(e.g.,

Claessen

and Skalnik

I978).

Brumfiel nd Fox's

collection

I994)

takes a

behavioral pproach

to

factionbuilding

n

New

Worldaboriginalpolitiesbut considersonlyexclusion-

ary power

strategies.One

of the

purposes

of this

paper

is to correct

what

we

perceive

as a

centralization

ias

in theories

of

complex

societies.

We

point

to the

dual

natureof

political

strategy

nd ask that

equal

attention

be

paid

to

exclusionary

nd

corporate

ower strategies,

their

ontradictions,

nd

their

nteractions.

SOURCES OF

POWER

Political actors

draw

upon

various

sources

of

power or

funds

f

power

Brumfiel992:554-55;

Wolf

982:

2/14


3/14

BLANTON

ET

AL. Agency,deology, nd Power 3

971).

Objective

ources

ncludewealth nd factors f

production,while symbolic

ources

nclude elementsof

a cognitive ode, includingreligion

nd

ritual

table

).

Whatever

ts

source,power

s

always

exercised n a cul-

ture-laden

ocial situation.

Materials and

symbols

are

powerful nly

to theextent hat

they

move

people.

POLITICAL ECONOMY: TYPES AND SOURCES

OF

POWER

By political economy

we

mean

an

analytical pproach

that elucidates the interactions f

types

nd sources of

power.

No

simple evolutionary-stageequence

of soci-

etal types appears capable

of

capturing

he

complexity

and variety ound

n

politicaleconomy.Although

ome

aspectsofpolitical

economy

re

ikely

to

be

common

n

the

evolutionof

all

complexsocieties,

ach

majorworld

region developed

a

characteristic attern

of

political-

economic

behaviors.More work will be

required

o elu-

cidate and explainthis

cross-regional

nd

temporal

ari-

ation, but a few major patterns an be mentioned. n

China,

for

xample, partially orporate ystem

had

de-

veloped

as

early

as the

Chou

dynasty e.g.,

Creel

I970).

This arrangement as

exemplified

most

clearly

n

the

Mandate

of Heaven and

the

doctrines f the

Confucian

literati,which placed

constraints n the ability of rul-

ers to

employ

xclusionary ower trategies;

ltemative

schools of political theory llowed more eeway for en-

tralization

e.g.,Hsu

I986:308;

summarized n

Blanton

n.d.).

A

pattern riginating

n ancient

Mesopotamia Ja-

cobsen

957)

and

extending o

later

polities

n

the east-

ern

Mediterranean

ndbeyond Humphreys978:I8I-

82)

involved

forms

of

assembly government,nother

aspect

of

corporate oliticalbehavior. n ancient Egypt,

in contrast, xcept during he intermediate eriods, a

powerfully entralized olitical

economywas character-

ized bythesubordination fthe bureaucracy o the pha-

raoh and

supported y

a

cognitive ode that viewed the

whole

society

as

his

patrimony e.g., Eisenstadt 969:

23).

In ancient

Mesoamerica,

no

largecentralized olity

comparable

n scale

to ancient

Egypt's

ver

developed.

Instead,both corporate

nd exclusionary trategies ro-

duced

political-economic ystems

of

varying

cale

and

degree

of

complexity.

Exclusionary power strategies

were

principally

ssociated with

comparatively mall,

autonomouspolities

inked

by

trade,war,

nd the strate-

gic

marriagesof rulers

in

large interactivenetworks.

Corporate ystems

f

differing

cales also

developed,

ut

large-scalepolities seem

always

to have been based on

some kind of

corporate trategy.

The Dual-Processual

Theory

Analogous

political-economic

trategiesmay

be

found

in

social formations f

widely varying egreesof

com-

plexity and

scale,

not

just

in certain

evolutionary

stages (Feinman

I995).

Lindstrom

i984), following

Modjeska

i982),

argues

that the traditional

iew

of the

big

man as one who

manipulates

wealth to create

prominence

and

political power

(e.g.,

Sahlins

I963;

I972:I35-37)

is

limited

n

thatt

ignores

ther

otential

sources of

power see

Godelier

and Strathern

99i).

An

alternative

ontext for

political

struggle

nd

social

in-

equality

s found

n

the control

f

knowledge

ndritual

(see Harrison

987, I993).

In the latter,bigmen who

command attractive

xplanatory ystemsgather

ollow-

ers

or,

according

o the

stereotypic

Melanesian

model,

exchangepartners

who

become indebted

n a

commerce

of deas

(Lindstrom

984:294).

An important istinctionbetween

wealth-based nd

knowledge-based olitical economies is in

the

spatial

scale of

political action. For the

wealth-based actor,

prominencecomes

primarily

rom

entrality o

a

net-

work of

extragroup xchange

partnerships.

he

manipu-

lation of

network

xchanges

ranslates

ntoprestige nd

power

vis-a-vis

the

actor's

own

group,

but it is

aimed

also at

gaining regional

prominence Strathern

969,

I978). In knowledge-based

ystems,by

contrast, oliti-

cal action takesplace primarilywithin the local group.

Further,

t

is concerned ess

with the

acquisition of ndi-

vidual

prestige

hanwith the

maintenance

f

ocal-group

solidarity.

s

Lindstrom

i984:305) expresses t, Where

control

of

knowledge

s the

dominant

dimensionof n-

equality.

.

. the

consumption

f

nformationnd

explan-

atoryknowledge

does

not support

nequalitygenerated

elsewherebut

tself ervesto structure nd

maintain o-

cial

groups. This

structuringf social relations

s done

through

the

manipulation

of

ideational

systems that

transcend

principles

of local

atomism

(p. 294). In

TABLE

I

Sources of Power

Objective Symbolic

Reference

Wealth

Knowledge

Lindstrom

i984)

Political-economic

Ritual

ModjeskaI98

2)

Material

Magic

Harrison

i987)

Allocative esources

Authoritative

esources

Giddens I

98

I;

I

984:2

5

8)

Economic

interests Authority

Weber

I978:943)

Material nterests

Ideal nterests

Weber

I946:280)

Natural Moral

Rowlands

i987)

Objective Symbolic

Lehman

i969)

3/14


4/14

4


Volume 37, Number ,

February 996

Avatip (Harrison

i 987),

for example,

this

is accom-

plished

through

he development

f a cognitive

model

of

an unchangingcorporate

ocial

structure

ased

on

reciprocal

obligations

between

disparate

subgroups,

supported

by a ritual cycle

emphasizing

cosmological

themes

thattranscend

ocal

belief

ystems.

Knowledge-based olitical systems re not unrelated

to

material flows

in

society.

For example,

Harrison

(I987:

I4) points

to the way

n whichsuccess

n deation-

ally

based Avatip

politics

brings ccess

to resources,

ar-

ticularly ffines

nd land rights.n his

comparative

is-

cussion

of highland

New

Guinea exchange

systems,

Strathern I969,

I978)

describes

two main

strategies

used by

men

who

strive for

preeminence- finance

and

home production.

n the

latter, s in

our corpo-

rate-based

trategy,

igmen

aim

for

consensus

manage-

ment within

the local system p.

49). Both

political

strategies equire

thatgoods

be assembled

forprestige-

buildingprestations,

ut

in the finance

trategy

resta-

tional

items

come

primarily

rom ntergroup

xchange

partnershipswhile in home production a participant

depends

on

the

labour forceofhis own settlement

o

raise

the

goods

(Strathern

969:42;

see Friedman 982;

Modjeska

i982:79).

As

Strathern bserves,

bothstrate-

gies

have

inherentmaterial

imitations.

A finance trat-

egist

seeking

to obtain

more

goods

for

prestations

nd

payments

inds

t difficult o

influence istantly

ocated

exchangepartners

o

reciprocate

with

goods

at

timely

intervals

Strathern

969, I971).

Also,

although

a fi-

nance strategy

ffers

greater

scope

for

preeminence,

where

t

predominates

tmakes the

conditions

f com-

petition

more

fluid

(I969:47).

Home production

will

be

curbedboth

by

the

limited

potential

for

gricultural

intensification

nd

the limited

ways

in which

political

actorscan gain access to land and labor. n both cases,

building arger,

more

complex

polities

requires

hat

new

institutions

e

put

in

place,

but the

strategies

sed

to

accomplish

this

will differ

ccording

to whether

n

a

particular

ituation

the

network

r the

corporate

trat-

egy

s

dominant.

THE

NETWORK

STRATEGY

We

adopt

the

term network

o characterize

political-

economicpattern

n which

preeminence

s an

outcome

of

the

development

and

maintenance

of individual-

centered

exchange

relations

established

primarily

ut-

side one's local group.Like Strathern's inance trategy,

the

network

strategybrings

preeminence

principally

through

ction

on a

large

spatial

scale

throughmanipu-

lation

of

distant

ocial connections.

ocial

relationships

outside

ocal

groups

re

created

nd maintained

hrough

prestational

events

and

payments,

nvolving

the ex-

change

of

marriage

partners,

xotic

goods,

and

even

knowledge e.g.,

Helms

I988),

whosevalue

is

recognized

cross-culturally.

articipation

n

extralocal

networks

and

the

accompanying

ifferential

ccess to

prestigious

marriage

lliances,

exotic

goods,

nd

specialized

knowl-

edge

also

translate

to

varying

degrees

nto

leadership

within

the local group.

Theoretically,ny

ndividual

or

household

may strive

to establish network ties,

im-

plying

considerable

potential

for competition

between

individuals

with overlapping

networks.

Thus where

a

network

trategy

s the basis

of the political economy,

leadership

endsto be

volatile and

the social sceneladen

with

potential

for

onflict

Douglas I967:I33;

Modjeska

i982:87-I02;

Strathern

969:47;

cf.Schneider,chnei-

der, nd Hansen

I972:338).

Also, since individual

mili-

tary, rading,

nd social

skills

are

often mportant

om-

ponents

of political

success or failure

Strathern

969:

47;

Weiner 983),

networks end

to

go

through ycles

thatapproximate

generation

n length.

In the purest

maginable

case, effective

articipation

in

extralocal

networks

lone would

underpin

political

preeminence,

s

in

the

case describedby

Vogel (I990:

124)

in

which

trade

endorsed

n elite

authority.

om-

mand of t endowed power.

t was literalproof

f

execu-

tive performance

cf. Modjeska

[i982:861

on the Enga

as

opposed

to the Duna of

Highland

New

Guinea and

Sillitoe

[I979]

on

the Wola).

But actors

manipulating

long-distancenetworkseventuallyface the structural

limitationspreviously

lluded

to, namely, he

inability

to control xchangepartners

t a

distance nd the nevi-

table

competition

rom

ther

imilarly triving

ndividu-

als.

Reallocating

resources

from

xisting

radepartner-

ships

n order

o create

new

partnerships

r to enhance

status within

the local

group

s

likely

to

be

counterpro-

ductive,

or xample,

when divergences

f

kula goods

result

in conflicts

between

Massim

trade

partners

(Weiner

983:I64;

cf.

Appadurai

986:i9-20;

Bohannan

I955;

Fortune932:21I7;

Lederman

986).

Establishing

new

partnershipsr

successfully

ompetingwith

other

similarly

spiring

etwork layers

equires

n increased

frequency

f feasting,

morewarfare,

nd increasedpro-

duction of desirableprestationalgoods. Change along

these ines implies,

n

turn,

need for

morecontrol ver

local followers;

trategies

eveloped

to

accomplish

this

bring

bout

sociocultural

volutionary hange

n

a net-

work-based

olitical

economy.

We

suggest

hat themost

important

recondition

or

the establishment

f

a

larger

faction

n the

context

of

the network trategy

s an

ability

to divert

restational

goods and

followers

way

from

potential

competitors.

This

is accomplished

primarily

hrough

what we will

call

patrimonial

rhetoric

following

Weber

[I978:chap.

I121)

nd

through

restige-goods

ystemsfollowing

ome

of the

suggestions

fFriedman nd

Rowlands

I978],

al-

though

heir

framework

oes not

explicitly

distinguish

betweennetwork nd corporate trategies).Obviously,

strategies

imed at consolidating

local faction

t the

expense

of other

political

actors re not often

uccessful

(e.g.,

Weiner

983:I66),

since

they

are

potentially

on-

strained

by

limitations

such

as the above-mentioned

trade

divergences

nd environmental

eilings

n

agricul-

tural ntensification. lso,

followers

may

resist

ttempts

to ncrease

production

r

migrate

n theface

of

excessive

workloads

Sahlins

i963:292-93;

I972:I30).

Within he

dynamic

f

the network-based

olitical

economy,

volu-

tionary

ransformation

nvolves

he

development

f

new

patrimonial

ocial structures

nd the

manipulation

of

prestige-goods

ystems

s follows:

4/14


5/14

BLANTON

ET AL. Agency,

deology,and

Power

5

Patrimonial rhetoric. Polygyny,gender

hierarchy,

multigenerational

xtended households, clanship,

and

tribal ormation

Swidler

992:554)

are strategiesor

the mobilization

of

labor

and the controlofmaterial

resources and

marriage exchanges (for similar argu-

ments,

ee

Arnold

993;

Blanton

994: chap.

3;

Bonte

I979;

Flanagan

989;

Moore

99I;

Paynternd Cole

I980;

Strathern

982;

Webster

990;

Wolf

982:88-96).

The affirmationfhousehold,descent,

nd ethnic ocial

ties

also

serves

to

dampen

the

free

migration

f

faction

members

between

competing

network

strategists

n

what

otherwisewould be a

more

openly

fluid, ompeti-

tive social landscape.

A

system

frankeddescent

groups

(conical clans) allows an emergent lite

to

monopolize

the

most

advantageousmarriage

lliances between

in-

eage segments

nd

legitimates

he

appropriation

f sur-

pluses fromhierarchically

onnected segmentsbeyond

one's own household and community.

atrimonial

het-

oric

s thus

likely

to be

primarily

n outcome

of

an ex-

clusionary trategynstituting

nd

culturally egitimat-

ing new social arrangementso solidify he controlof

local followers.Our

approach

differs rom hat

of Fried-

man

nd

Rowlands

I978:206),

who

regardineages

s

a

given and the starting ointfor heirdiscussion of the

evolution

of civilizations.

Prestige-goodsystems.Manipulating he production,

exchange,

nd

consumption

f

valuable

goods

s

central

to

strategies

imed at

gaining

control over

politically

potent exchange

relations Appadurai

986:24-25;

Douglas I967;

Feil

I984:chap.

3;

Friedman and Row-

lands

978;

Strathern

979).

From

ur

perspective,

uch

manipulations

of

exchange goods

allow the

emergent

elite to

monopolize

network

xchange

and its

political

payoffs y

reducing he

number f

households

n

a

local

system that can acquire preeminence n a network-

based political economy. Some elements

of this same

processpermitnetwork layers

o compete uccessfully

outside their ocal domains as well. The outcome

ofthis

kind

of exclusionary olitical behavior

s thegrowth f

a

prestige-goodsystem cf.

Ekholm

972;

Frankenstein

and

Rowlands

978;

Friedman

982;

FriedmanndRow-

lands

978:2I4; Peregrine99i, i992).

Among

the many elements

of

prestige-goodsystem

are

the

following:First,

difficult-to-obtainxotic

goods

are

ncreasingly

ubstituted or he

food

or other tilitar-

ian itemsfound

n

simpler ntergroupxchange

ystems,

giventhe greater usceptibility

f

the

rarer tems to mo-

nopoly

control

Brumfiel

nd

Earle

I987). Goods that

are producedusing complex technologies r are highly

labor-intensive

re also consistentwiththe exclusionary

political strategyBrumfiel

nd Earle

I987,

Peregrine

iggi).

This

processresults

n social

pressures

favoring

technological

nnovation

primarily

n the production f

exotic

goods

rather

han

in

basic

productive

echnolo-

gies.

The

distribution

f

prestige oods

in

society

s

al-

tered,

ome

of them

being ncorporated

nto the process

of ndividual nd household

social reproduction,nclud-

ing marriage ayments

nd

events suchas age-grade it-

uals, creating

new consumer

demands.

Since the elite

has control ver

the requisiteraw materials nd produc-

tion processes

of

these goods of social reproduction,

household social

reproduction

orms n important asis

ofreciprocal

obligationsbetween

the elite and the

de-

pendent

members

of its own

and other households

(Friedman

nd Rowlands

978:2I4,

222;

Meillassoux

I978).

Where

this

prestige-goods

anipulation

s

successful,

the elite is able tomonopolizea network trategy is-a-

vis

its local domain,

but network trategists

t

the

tops

of ocal

hierarchies

n

adjoining

groups

both

participate

in exchanges

and compete

with one another

fordomi-

nance

of argermultigroup

actions peer-polity

nterac-

tion [Renfrew

nd

Cherry986]).

At thisscale,

the

frag-

mented macroregional

political landscape reproduces

many

of the same

features

f

the network

dynamic

s

smaller-scale

systems,

namely, fluidity, ompetitive-

ness, and an emphasis

on individual kills

in

the

estab-

lishment

and maintenance

of

exchange

networks.

n

this context,

networkparticipants

make

use of a

sym-

bolic vocabulary

we

refer

o

as an international

tyle

in goods and

information rossing

ociocultural

bound-

aries (see Brumfiel

989,

Robertson

968;

similarcon-

cepts

include

the nonnuclear system [Smith

and

Heath-Smith

982:i9],

the

interaction

phere [Vogel

I990:I37-38],

and

the

multinationalulture

Willey

I973:I58-59];

cf.

Flannery I968,

Levi-Strauss i982,

Schortman

989).

This international

tyle

facilitates

cross-cultural xchanges

nd reconfirms

he elite's egit-

imacy

vis-a-visother

elites as well as any

local faction

(e.g.,

Kopytoff987:I7)

but

in

a

situation

n which no

single ociety

has the ability

o

dictate

ts

symbolic

on-

tent

or

its stylistic

anons.

THE

CORPORATE

STRATEGY

Fromour Mesoamericanperspective, n important i-

mension

of the

corporate

trategy

s

its ability

to tran-

scend

the scale limitations

of

the network

trategy o

include arge,

powerful

tates such as Teotihuacan.

But

we would

argue

that thesecases areanalogous

to social

systems

of

smaller

scale, including

those Strathern

(I969, I978)

describes

n

New

Guinea

n which

ig

men

gain preeminence

hrough

he

control

of

home

produc-

tion.

Similarly,

enfrew's

I974:74-79)

concept

f the

group-oriented

hiefdom

eems

to

us

to fit his

cate-

gory,

nd Friedman nd Rowlands

I978:2i5)

point

o

Polynesia,

where there are highly

developed political

structures

n

the

relative bsence

of

elaborate

prestige-

good

systems.

Thus our

dual-processual

pproachhas

featuresn commonwith several nalytical chemes ad-

dressing

he nature

of variation n

political organization

(table2).

Similarly,

he

political-economic

atterns

hat

underlie our categories

network and corporate

re

found n

several

ources that

ink

political

form oecon-

omy

table 3).

We

emphasize

thatour dual scheme

high-

lights

major forms

of political-economic trategy

nd

does

not

aim

to developa rigid ocial typology.

We reit-

erate Sewell's

(i992:22)

point

that social actorswith

varying

gendas

and

strategiesmay compete

for

olitical

preeminence.

Although

either the corporate r the

ex-

clusionary

trategymay dominate

the political process

of social formationt

any given ime, lements f

both

5/14


6/14

6

1

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

Volume37,

Number ,

February

996

TABLE

2

Political

Typologies

Analogous to

the

Network/Corporate

ichotomy

Network

Corporate

Reference

Individualizinghiefdoms Group-orientedhiefdoms RenfrewI974),Drennan

i99i),

Earle

i99i)

Gumsa

Gumlao

Leach

I954),

Friedman

I975)

Prestige-goods ystems

-

Friedman

and

Rowlands

(I978),

Peregrine

i992)

Prestige-goodsystems

Big-manompetitive

easting

Friedman

i982)

Wealth-based

Knowledge-based

Lindstrom

i984)

Material-based

Magical-based

Harrison

I987)

Primitive

oupon

ystems

-

Douglas

i967)

Finance-based

ig-man

Production-based

ig-man

Strathern

i969)

Prestige

economy

-

Strathern

I979)

Noncorporate

rganization

Corporate

rganization

Schneider,

chneider,

nd

Hansen

(I972);

cf.PaynterI98I)

may coexist,and cyclic changebetweenformsmay be

found.

The variantpatterns

f political

economydiscussed

here are

well illustrated

by Renfrew's I974)

compari-

son of group-oriented

hiefdoms

nd individualizing

chiefdoms

n

prehistoric

Europe (cf.

Drennan I99I,

Earle 99I). Group-oriented

hiefdomsre

characterized

by

impressive

public works,

including arge

architec-

tural paces

suitablefor ommunalritual,

nd a compar-

ative egalitarianism

n

which individuals

are faceless

and

anonymous (p. 79).

The archaeological

data

from

individualizing

hiefdoms

ndicate emphasis

on compe-

tition,warfare,

ersonal

wealth, and the consumption

of elaborate

prestige

goods, often

found in princely

burials (p. 82). We associate Renfrew's roup-oriented

chiefdoms

withour concept

of

the

corporate

trategy.

As Renfrew oints

out, group-oriented

ocial

forma-

tions were capable

ofconstructing

assive architectural

features.

This may

seem counterintuitive

n

light

of

their

comparative egalitarianism

nd the lack of evi-

dence

for ominationby particular

owerful

ndividuals

who

might

be identified

s the

chiefly

eads ofcentral-

ized polities.

However,

t

is clear that politically

com-

plex social

formationsmay

evolve

along

corporate

ines.

In

our

conceptualization,

he

corporate mphasis

may

be achieved

n

several

ways

but

always

nvolves

the es-

tablishment

nd maintenance

of a

cognitive

ode

that

emphasizes a corporate olidarity fsocietyas an inte-

gratedwhole, based

on a

natural, ixed, nd

immutable

interdependence

etweensubgroups nd, n more com-

plex societies, between

rulersand subjects (Lamberg-

Karlovsky

985). The ecumenical viewpointof the

cor-

porateorientation ontrastswith

ancestral ritual that

legitimates he controlofsociety by a

limited number

of high-rankingndividuals or

households. A

corporate

strategy

mphasizes

collective

representationsnd the

accompanying

itual

based

on

broadthemes

uch as fer-

tility nd

renewal

n

society nd

cosmos.The

corporate

strategy s thus able to

transcend he scale

and scope

limitations

ofpatrimonial

rhetoric,which emphasizes

the

controlling

oles of

particular ndividualsbased on

gender,generation, nd primacyofdescent from om-

mon

ancestors.

A

cognitive

estructuringnvolving

ran-

scendent hemes

of

cosmic

renewal not

only

allows the

incorporation f

disparate thnically

defined ubgroups

into the

arger ociety

but also

legitimates

he

appropria-

tion of surplusesof

primary roduction,

specially ag-

ricultural

goods ( staple finance

[D'Altroy and Earle

I985;

cf. Earle

I987a]).

A

hierarchically raded

set

of

roles and statuses-what Miller

I989:70)

calls

struc-

turally ntegrative

lassifications -constrains and

reg-

ulates the outcomes of network

entrepreneurship

nd

individual achievement

n

the

determination f

social

preeminence,

thus

defusing

nternal

political threats

TABLE

3

Variationn Forms fGoods

Productionnd Exchangen theContexts f

Exclusionary

nd

Corporate trategies

Exclusionarytrategy Corporate

trategy Reference

Finance Home

production Strathem

I969)

Wealth

inance

Staple

finance

D'Altroy

nd Earle

I985),

Earle

I987a)

Wealth istribution Staplefinance Gilman

I987)

Twem

exchange Sem exchange Lederman

i986)

6/14


7/14

BLANTON

ET AL.

Agency,deology,

nd Power

7

from triving olitical actors see Mann

i986:22;

Mead

I93 7:466). Merchants, n particular, hose access to and

control ver exotic goods and other orms

f

wealth may

have disruptive political implications, are placed, as

Miller i989:70) puts it, within ystems f catego-

ries

..

to assert ontrol verthemwithrespect o arger-

hierarchies cf. Wolf

982:84-85).

In Douglas's

(I973:

86-87) terms hese are cognitive ystems

f

high lassi-

fication.

The relative unimportance

f

the prestige-goodsys-

tem n these cases should result

n

differentatterns f

materialproduction

nd

consumption

n the two

types,

of polities. The corporate rientation hould imply re-

duced consumption

of

prestige

items overall

and a

greater egree

of

wealth equality in society,but these

are issues

that require

further

mpiricaltesting.

n

his

comparison f

the

MillaranCopper Age and

the

Argaric

Bronze Age of beria,for xample, Gilman (i987) notes

distinctpatterns fmaterial ystems hathe calls sta-

ple finance our corporatemodel) and wealth distribu-

tion (our prestige-goodsystem).The Copper Age (sta-

ple finance) ites are characterized y collective tombs

and an

emphasis

on

ritual

and

utilitarian tems,

while

the BronzeAge (wealth distribution) ites display ten-

dency toward individual interments mphasizingper-

sonal finery, eapons, special pottery, nd wealth dif-

ferentials.Similarly,Morris

(I987:I73-2I7)

contrasts

the burial behaviorof the Greek Dark Age

(I050-750

B.C.), which displayed

n

emphasis

on

rank distinction

in

burials,with the Archaic period 750-500 B.C.), char-

acterized

by

the

polis

and

communal cemeteries.

Networkand CorporatePolities in Time

and

Space

In

both network

nd

corporate olities,

the

playing-out

of

political-economic trategymay place

strain

on

sub-

sistence

systems, providing

source of

pressure

that

might

favor

nnovative

changes

n

subsistence

echnol-

ogy see

Arnold

993;

Bender

978;

Friedman nd Row-

lands

I978:214; Hayden I990;

Runnels

and van

Andel

I988). Increased urplus gricultural roduction

enefits

political

actors

in

both cases

(e.g.,

Strathern

969:63;

Rowlands

i980). However,

because

in

network

polities

a

majorsource

of

power

s

the

manipulation

f external

social

ties and

prestigegoods, complex

social

systems

may develop nmarginal nvironmentalettings, or x-

ample, along

trade

routes,

even where the

potential

for

agricultural

ntensification

s

limited

e.g., Vogel

I990:

i05).

One

example

of a state's

employing

network

strategy

s the case

of

the

kings

of

the

Isth-century

entrepot

of Melaka. Melaka's

rulers

adopted

Hindu-

Buddhist nd then slamic styles ndsymbolism, reated

appropriategenealogies

for

themselves, manipulated

marriage lliances,

used both

Thai

and rival Chinese

pa-

trons, xchangedroyal prestations

nd

diplomatic

mis-

sions,

made war

against

ocal

rivals,

nd built trade

by

legitimating

hat

had

been

essentially iracy Wheatley

I96I, Sandhu

nd Wheatley983). They

adopted

he

most convenient

nternational tyle,

slam, encouraged

the polyglot

ctivity

fmerchants

rom

very ignificant

trading ociety

fromVenice to China, and

secured

ocal

shores militarily

ut invested

ittle

n

agricultural

ro-

duction.

To understand ocial changeof thistype n marginal

environmental

cases

the

analyst

must take a

top-

down view, placing

the local

system

within

ts

larger

macroregional

ontext

o examine

tsrole n the

control

and

manipulation

f

ntergroup

xchanges.

s the

polity

central o

an exchange

phere

r able to control he

raw-

material

ources

of

a

prestige-goods

ystem?

s it located

in

a weakly

controlledperiphery

r

in a

boundary

e-

gion

between

core

polities

such as

the nternalAfrican

frontier escribedby

Kopytoffi987;

cf.Blanton,

Kowa-

lewski, nd

Feinman 992,

Rowlands

g80)?

In

these

situations,

network

strategists

may

benefitfrom

con-

trolling

ntercore

trade

routes

or

providingperiphery

goods

to core

consumers,

but to do this they

must

at-

tractfollowerswho provide abor and fightingapacity.

In

the comparative

nstitutional

vacuum of

periphery

and

boundary

ituations,

xclusionary ower

s

acquired

through

he

use

of

patrimonial

hetoric, restige-goods

systems,

nd the

adoption

of an international tyle

see

Kopytoff987:I6-I7)

as

describedbove.

In

Mesoamerica,

the largest-scale

manifestations

f

a

corporate

olitical economy

were

developed

n regions

such as the

Basin ofMexico,which

contained arge

reas

of

rrigable

lluvium.

Thus

there s a loose association

of

the corporate

trategy

ith

environmental

ituations

providing

he potential

for substantialagricultural

e-

velopment

nd

of

the network

trategy

ith more

mar-

ginal

environments.

n a

macroregional

cale,

the

two

types re likelyto coexistantagonistically,maintaining

a

core/periphery

elationship

e.g.,

Hall

I99I,

Hedeager

i987), although

not all

network

olities

necessarily ad

periphery

r

boundary

tatus. Powerful

ore states

may

try

to manage

the

network

ctors

of the

periphery

o

monopolize

interregional

xchanges

and

to

reduce

the

political

threat

hese actors represent.

ut

the

weaken-

ing

or

collapse

of

a corporate olity

may produce

n

in-

stitutional

acuum

that

provides

cope

for

he

activities

of network

trategists

ven

in thecore.Thus a

regional

sequence

may

consist

of

cycles

of

alternating

etwork

and

corporate

mphases

in the

political

economy see

Sahlins

I983:5I7).

Corporate

nd

network

trategies

esult

n dissimilar

and antagonisticpolitical economies and so are likely

to

be

temporally

r

spatially

eparated.

lements fboth

approaches

may,however,

be

employed

n certain

om-

plex

cases.

Here

againwe

stressthat our

terms corpo-

rate and

network delimit

political-economic

trate-

gies,

not necessarily ypes

of societies.Dynastic-period

China's management

f

ts

chaotic

peripheries hrough

distributionsf prestige

oods e.g.,

Schneider

977:23-

24), for xample,

contrasts

with the nternal

ole emper-

ors

playedas mediators

n ritualsof

earthly nd societal

renewal Eisenstadt969:59).

To

this point,

we have

identified two

political-

7/14


8/14

8 CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

Volume37, Number

, February

996

economic

strategies

nd described

heir

characteristics

and

relationships.

Having

developed

our theoretical

r-

gument

and related

our

scheme to similar

conceptual-

izations

advanced

by other

researchers,

e now

turn

o

a consideration

of some

main trends

n

pre-Hispanic

Mesoamerica's

sociocultural

transformations.

igure

showsthe timeperiodsdiscussedandtheir hronologies

and figure

the

locations

of sites

mentioned.

Dual-Processual

heory

nd Sociocultural

Change

n

Pre-Hispanic

esoamerica

THE

EARLY AND

MIDDLE

FORMATIVE

PERIODS

We

suggest

that

the Mesoamerican

Early and

Middle

Formative

eriods

were

characterized

yextensive

ong-

distance

nteraction

within

an elite

exchanging

xotic

goods

and

perhaps

brides (Demarest

I989;

Flannery

I968;

Grove

984:64-65)

in the

manner

four

network

strategy. Drennan

i99

i, however,fromhis compara-

tive perspective

f

Colombian

chiefdoms,

ees

some

fea-

tures of group

orientation

n Renfrew's

ense

even

this

early.)

The Olmec

horizon style,

n particular,

eads

us to

thisconclusion;

as

Grove i

989)reminds

s,

t

was

widely

adopted

in western

Mesoamerica

but

cannot

be associated

entirely

with

any

one locality (cf.

Flan-

nery

nd

Marcus 994:385-90;

Marcus

989a;

Tolstoy

i989:98).

Groups

in various

regions

shared

an artistic-

symbolic

tradition,

ut,

consistent

with

the

process

of

the

international

tyle,

no

one

group

was

the singular

sourceof that

tradition.

Long-distance

xchange

of

exoticgoods

s

well docu-

mented (Pires-Ferreira-

976a,

b),

and although

during

the Earlyand Middle Formativeperiodstherewas evi-

dently

widespread

ccess

to

goods

of this

type

n some

localities (Tolstoy

i989),

at othersites,

including

San

Jose

Mogote,

Chalcatzingo,

nd

San

Lorenzo

Tenochti-

tlan,

the

production

nd consumption

f

prestige

oods

was

associated

mainly

with

elite

households

Flannery

i982).

Further,

he

content

f

Olmec

symbolism,

nclud-

ing

the importance

of

jaguarized

human

representa-

tionsthat

ndicate

elite

descent

from

mating

fhuman

and

animal

Coe

and

Diehl

i980),

is

consistent

with

pat-

rimonialrhetoric,

nd

evidence

for

ineages

s

noted

by

Pyne

I976)

at

San

Jose

Mogote (cf.

Marcus

i989a:i69).

Representations

fpreeminent

ndividuals-for

exam-

ple,

the colossal

stone

heads

of the Gulf

Coast lowlands

and the portraitmonuments and portraitfigurines

of Chalcatzingo

and

elsewhere Gillespie

I987,

Grove

i987a)-are

consistent

withthe ndividualizing

mpha-

sis

of the network trategy

nd its

public

glorification

of

mportant

ersonages

Grove

and Gillespie I99-2:35).

Prominent

ites

are often

ocated

in

settings

hat

are

environmentally

marginal

but

have

the

potential

for

controlling

ong-distance

trade

routes,

for

example,

Chalcatzingo

(Grove

I987b,

Hirth

i987).

One of

the

largest

Early

Formative

ites

in

the

Basin of

Mexico,

at

Coapexco

(Parsons

t

al.

982:3

66),

s located

onthe

ass

1500

LATE

POSTCLASSIC

1000

EARLY OSTCLASSIC

EPICLASSIC

500

CLASSIC

AD

0 TERMINALORMATIVE

BC

LATE ORMATIVE

500

MIDDLE ORMATIVE

1000

EARLY ORMATIVE

1500

PRECERAMIC

FIG.

i.

Major

Mesoamerican

chronological

eriods.

linking womajorCentralMexicanvalleys, nd itspop-

ulation evidently

was

involved

n

interregional

bsidian

exchange

Tolstoy

989).

Several

of the

largest

ites

of

the

Early

and

Middle

Formative,

ncluding

an

Lorenzo

Tenochtitlan

and

La

Venta,

were

positioned

centrally

with

respect

to

the interaction

phere

Demarest

989)

but

in a

comparatively

marginal

ropical

owland

that

never saw

the

growth

f

an

important

ore

polity.

n a

later

phase

of domination

by

network

olities,

however,

this

same

general

area

was a

major

zone of network

strategists.

8/14


9/14

BLANTON

ET AL. Agency,

deology,

nd Power

9

HUHU

STECA0

g

CHICHEN

TA

BASIN

F ELTAJIN

MEXICO0

-

ax

~TULA\

N

TEOTIHUACAN

TARASCAN

TENOCHTITLAN*

OAPEXCO

CERRODE

VERACRUZ

TEOTENANGO* CACAXTLA

LAS

MESAS

XOCHICALCO

CHALCATZINGO LE A

*1

ELMIRADOR

SAN

LORENZO

P

\MIXTECA TENOCHTITLAN PE TIN

IXTECA

~~~~ALENOUE

TIKAL

*

SANJOSE

MOGOTE

VLLEY

OF-MONTE

ALBAN \

0 100

200

?Cn,

KILOMETERS

FIG. 2. Locations

of sites

mentioned

n

text.

LATE AND TERMINAL FORMATIVE PERIODS

The comparativedecline in importance f the interna-

tional style duringthe subsequent Late

and

Terminal

Formativeperiods Willey 99I)

is

consistentwith

the

decline of a network-based olitical economy. Grove

andGillespieI992:35) point

othereductionnthefre-

quency of figural representations f identifiedrulers

after

he end of

the

Middle Formative.

n

the

Maya

low-

lands the first vidence of an elaborationof

political

structure s indicated by the construction f pyramid

platforms uring

he

Late Preclassic period beginning

around 300 B.C.) at sites such as Uaxactun and Cerros

(Freidel 98I). Unlike

the

highly xclusionary olitical

economies

of the Classic-period owland Maya king-

doms, these earlypolities appear to have been strongly

corporate, mphasizing ocial integration hrough om-

munalritual Freidel

98i:206).

The form f

this arly

public architecturellustrates

wo

themes that

we

sug-

gest characterized ther Mesoamerican corporate oli-

ties: First,

the

pyramids,decorated with large masks,

symbolize the serpent nd the daily passage of the sun

(p.

222),

both inked with earthly enewal n Mesoamer-

ican

cosmology Broda 982; Pasztory988:57). Sec-

ondly,

here

was an emphasis on the creationof ritual

places rather han on any particular itual or political

object

uch as the stela cult

that ccompanied he exclu-

sionary olitical-economic trategyf the owland

Clas-

sic Maya kingdoms

Freidel98I:226).

THE

TEOTIHUACAN

POLITY

Teotihuacan

from

he

Late

Tlamimilolpa through

Mete-

pec phases (A.D.

300-750)

of the

Classic

period

s

the

foremostmanifestation

f the

corporate trategy

n

an-

cient Mesoamerica. This

strategy

had four main fea-

tures:

i.

Individual

entrepreneurial chievement and ruler

cults were

deemphasized

n

favor f a

corporate overn-

ing structurendicated

by

the ack of

portrayal

f

or

tex-

tual reference o named rulers

nd any ndication fpat-

rimonial rhetoric

R.

Millon

I988a:II2;

I992:396;

Pasztory

992:292-95).

Theresnot ven neasilyden-

tifiable

palace;

the

Ciudadela

complex and

adjacent

ar-

eas along

the

Streetofthe Dead

were clearlyoffices f

the

centralgovernment

nd elite residences,

ut there s

no consensus

on

theirprecisefunctional

nterpretation

(Cowgill I983,

i992a).

Rene

Millon

(I973:55)

argues

that

the

strength

f

the Teotihuacan

polity stemmed

from ts massive

buildings nd

architectural paces and

the

rituals that occurred n

them rather

han from he

glorification f a particular

ulingdescent group.Obvi-

ous

parallels can be seen

between Renfrew's I974:79)

9/14


10/14

IO

I

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

Volume37,

Number

,

February 996

group-orientedhiefdoms,where public works are im-

pressive,but individualsfaceless and

anonymous, nd

Teotihuacan,whose architectural paces include a plaza

in the Ciudadela thatcould have held

some

ioo,ooo

per-

sons (Cowgill i983:322)-not the society'sor even the

city's total population but certainly broad segment f

that society. Ratherthan the exploits of rulersor royal

lineages,mural rt nd scenes on ceramicvessels portray

ritual

processions

of

high-ranking

personages. Fre-

quently depicted are individualswearing tassel head-

dresses, nterpreted y Clara Millon

I973,

i988) as indi-

cating

the named and ranked categories

of

persons

belonging o corporate rganizationswhose responsibili-

ties

lay

in

externalmilitarism, iplomacy,

nd perhaps

long-distance trade. Evidently, external military and

trade

ventures ould

bring reeminence

n

Teotihuacan

society,butonlywithin the nstitutional onstraints f

a

symbolic ystemdefining

hierarchy

franks nd

sta-

tuses.

2.

Teotihuacan state cults emphasized cosmological

principles inking rain, earth, un, moon, and serpents

with

renewal and

fertility

nd included an

important

female

eity Berlo992; Pasztory978:I30-32;

I988:

57;

I992:3II-I3).

3. The standardization

f

artistic onventions nd the

systematization

f

religious conography

Pasztory978,

i992) are consistent

with the

rejection

of an ethnic

(patrimonial)

basis

for

political ideology (cf.

Cohodas

i989:223) and

reflect hat

Pasztoryi988:57)

calls the

codification f

corporate deology -a

symbolic

ncor-

poration

f diverse

ethnic

groups.

4.

From the

surplusproduction

f

Teotihuacan's

vast

core

system,

estimated

to

include

a

population

of

5oo,ooo

persons

n

the

Basin of Mexico and

adjacent

ar-

eas of theCentralHighlands, t seems thatthecitywas

able

to

extend

ts direct control nto

peripheral

ones

through

he establishment

f

trade

nclaves and extrac-

tive

outposts

s

far

way

as

highland

Guatemala

R.

Mil-

lon I98I, i988b). Although

he

exact

institutional

nature of this

expansion

is

unknown,

t is

associated

with

groups

whose

authority

s indicated

by

the tassel-

headdressorporaterganizationC.

Millon

973, I988).

In

thiscase,

the basis

for he

spread

fTeotihuacantraits

was

not,

as

in

Olmec

art,

he

establishment

f an inter-

national

style. Instead,

this

episode

of Mesoamerican

horizontal ntegration Willey 99I)

reflects he dis-

semination f n

artistic-symbolicystem

rom

partic-

ular dominant

enter

a

nuclear

system,

n

Smith

nd

Heath-Smith's

i982:i9]

terms) s partof ts strategyf

institutional nd

cultural

restructuring

f a

periphery.

(In

areas outside

direct

Teotihuacan control,Teotihua-

can

style may

have been imitatedor modified

s an in-

ternational tyle.)

THE

EPICLASSIC

AND EARLY

POSTCLASSIC

The decline

of Teotihuacan

brought

return o

preemi-

nence of the

network-based

olitical economy

n

West-

ern

Mesoamerica.

These social formations ftendevel-

oped

in

boundaryregions

that

had

been

economically

and politically peripheral uring he highlandsClassic

period.

While

network strategists ominated much of

the Postclassic, n some cases local systemsmay have

cycled

between

network nd corporate tructure, or x-

ample,

n

Tula's attempt oreestablish entralMexican

hegemony. yand large,however, he political systems

of the Epiclassic up to the final century r so of the

pre-Hispanic equence illustratefeatures f a network

political economy.

n

what

follows,

we

summarize hese

characteristics n the basis of what

we know about

Xochicalco, Cacaxtla, Teotenango,

El

Tajin,

and Tula

(see esp.

Baird

989,

Berlo

989, Cohodas 989, Hirth

I989, Marcus

989b,

and Nagao 989; cf.Blanton, o-

walewski,

and

Feinman

992).

The

majorpattems

of o-

cial and

cultural

change

of

relevance

to

this

discussion

include the

following:

i.

Political power was

often inked

importantly o

involvement

in

long-distance exchange of prestige

goods,

for

example,

the

growth

f

Tututepec (Ball

and

Brockington978;

cf. Cohodas

i989:223; Brumfiel

I989).

Extensive radenetworks lourished, articularly

in the

mountainous and swampy reas of Veracruz nd

southern nd coastal Mesoamerica that

had

not been the

loci of Classic-period core systems Smith and Heath-

Smith

982:25, 26).

2.

Individual achievement-particularly masculine

achievement-in

trade and war was a

major

source

of

political legitimation.

The

exploits

of

ndividualrulers

were

publiclyproclaimed

n written

exts

carved-stone

monuments nd

codices) llustrating

uccess

in

war and

marriage

lliances

e.g.,

Marcus

992, Spores974); pat-

rimonialrhetoric s indicated

by genealogicalregisters,

which became

an

important omponent

f

written exts

(Marcus

980).

3. Mesoamerica was horizontally ntegrated tylisti-

cally

and

symbolically y

the elements

of the Mixteca-

Puebla

style for summary

f

chronology nd content,

see Smith and Heath-Smith

982).

Like the

previous

Olmec

style,

Mixteca-Puebla art and

symbolism

fit

comfortably

nto the

category

we have labeled the in-

temational

style.

Its sources

were

varied

(Smith

and

Heath-Smith

982) and, nterestingly,

ituated

n

zones

(e.g.,

he

Mixteca,

western

Mexico,

and the

Nicoya

Pen-

insula

of Costa

Rica)

that had

long

been

ntarginal

o

regions

where

corporatepolities

had flourished

uring

the Classic

period.

The riverineGulf Coast was

one of

the most

dynamic

areas

in

Mesoamerica

during

his

period

nd

prior

nes.

Wilkerson

i99i)

notes that themajorcenters f devel-

opment

here shifted ver time from

he

south

n

Olmec

times to the Cerro de las Mesas

region

n

the

Late

For-

mative and

then

to

El

Tajin

and

finally

he Huasteca

in

the Postclassic.

In

each

time

period

coastal

Veracruz

regions

had

special

connections

with

particular

ores

n

the

highlands

nd

acted

as

key players

n

wider Meso-

americannetworkrelations.

The

GulfCoast offers he

best

transportation

f

any major geographic

one

in Me-

soamerica.

n

these two

respects, ransportation

ndevo-

lutionarydynamics,

the Gulf Coast

is

Mesoamerica's

Mediterranean.

10/14


11/14

BLANTON

ET AL. Agency,

deology, nd Power

I

THE LATE POSTCLASSIC

By the Late

Postclassic, a

cycling

back to

corporate-

based polities s

evident, ncluding,

robably,

he

Taras-

can state Pollard

g80)

and,

most

important,

he

Basin

of

Mexico. There the

development

f

whatvan Zantwijk

(i

985)calls the Aztecarrangement imedat thepoliti-

cal, economic, and

cultural

consolidation

of

an ethni-

cally

fragmentedocial

landscape.

At

the same

time,

t

extended

eyond

he core to exert

ontrol verwhat

was

becoming n imperial

peripheryBerdan

t al.

i995).

Eth-

nohistorical and

archaeological sources

provide a

fas-

cinating

if

incomplete picture

of

social and

cultural

changes initiated

during n approximately

0-yearpe-

riod after

boutA.D. I430.

Severalsources describe

the

political

Brumfiel983, Davies

ig80,

Hodge

i995),

eco-

nomic (Blanton

995),

and

cultural

ecological

(Sanders,

Parson, and

Santley 979)

dimensions of

change

n

the

core,

while van

Zantwijk (i985)

analyzes

the

cognitive

code

that

became the

culturalbasis for

corporate

on-

ceptualization f ociety hat ranscendedhepetty oli-

tics

of

an

ethnically omplex landscape (cf.

Bray 978,

Kurtz

984,

van

Zantwijk

I973).

The

authorship

f the

new

cognitive

order s

not

clear, although

the

guiding

personality appears

to

have been

Tlacayelel I,

a re-

nowned soldier

and

cihuacoatl

(internal

hief)

of

the

powerful ulhua

Mexica

ofTenochtitlan.

his

new

cog-

nitive system s summarized

by

van

Zantwijk

(i985:

I27) as

follows:

In accordancewith this new

doctrine,

the Aztec

Mexican tribal

godHuitzilopochtli

was made

the

principaldeity

n the

pantheonconstellation f

the

fifth

un.

Thus the

Aztecs were

charged

o

organize

ife

on

earth

accordingly y guiding and

coordinating

he

united

efforts

f

all

humanity.

The resultingcognitivearrangementwas not built

from

whole cloth. Aztec

state builders

ppropriated

ld

Mesoamerican

symbols

to

anchor

themselves

deep

in

the

Mesoamerican

past,extendingnd

modifyingogni-

tive codes

relating

o

directional

ymbolism, osmologi-

cal

domains,

and

Mesoamerican almanacs. And

they

tried

o

draw

n

and

incorporate

he

known

contempo-

rary

world

symbolically

nto

a

single

worldview.The

features

f

he

Aztec

arrangement

hat

merged

rom he

application

fthis

deationalmandate o the

activities f

everyday

ife of the

Aztec

peoples

are far oo

numerous

and

complex

to

describe here.

Primarily ollowing

an

Zantwijki985: esp.

98-242),

we

point

othe

ollowing

key aspects

of the

corporate

trategy:

I.

In Tenochtitlan, he ceremonialcenter wherethe

main

plaza

was

large

enough

to hold

8,ooo-IO,OOO

people [Duran

I97I:76]),

city plan,

and

main temple-

pyramid

Templo

Mayor) symbolized

the pivot of

the

four-quartered

tructure f

the

heavens

Broda

987:2II;

Matos

Moctezuma

992:36).

The axis

mundi

contra

Wolf

994:I3)

was

not

n

the

palaces of

rulers, hich

were

placed

outside

the

boundary

walls of the

great

civic-ceremonial

ompond Marquina

i964:i85),

but in

a

plaza

bounded

by

the

west-facing

win-topped emplo

Mayor,which manifested

ain

Tlaloc) and sun

(Huitzil-

opochtli)

symbolism, and the

east-facing

Temple of

Quetzalcoatl,

with its

serpent ymbolism Broda 987:

2ii;

MatosMoctezuma

992:36-39). This patial truc-

turenot onlycreated

center efined

y

the ntersection

of the four cardinal

directions but

formed

quadrants

manifestinginks

between sectors of

the

social

system

(descent groups, occupational groups, ruling offices,

etc.), clarifying heir mutual interdependencies, ela-

tionships, and comparative mportances, hrough

he

use of principles of hierarchy, pposition dual

struc-

ture),

nd

tripartite

nd

quadripartite

tructure. his in-

cluded

ntemal

cihuacoatl)

and

external

huehuetin

la-

toani) rulership,

he

former

eing accorded,

t least

in

theory,

omewhat

higher

status

(van Zantwijk I985:

2I4).

In spite of the importance f dual rulership, he

Aztec Templo Mayor

and its Great

Compound setting

are nearly nonymous,

he Aztec rulers

being depicted

or

named

on

only

two

known carved

tone

monuments;

by far he mostfrequent ategory

f carved-stone

monu-

ment n

the

main

ceremonial concourse

s cult

effigies

(Townsend

979:23).

Massive burial

monuments f

rul-

ersare absent; Umberger

i983)

suggests hattheashes

of

one

of the most

important

Aztec

kings might

have

been

placed

in an urn

buried

n

a small

pit

next

to

the

Coyolxauhqui stone,

but even this would have been

in-

visible.

2.

Not only was the tribaldeityHuitzilopochtli pro-

moted

to a

prominent osition,

but

an

encapsulating

policy

was

pursued.

All

the

gods

of

other

peoples

were

regarded s appearances of their own gods, and in the

Coateocalli (the Temple

of

Unification)

f Tenochtitlan

each of them had its own place (van Zantwijk

I985:

II2).

Finally, he calpollis, uilds, nd othergroups

n

and outside Tenochtitlan

cooperated

n

the feast cele-

bration f the solar calendar p. 26i), emphasizing he

ritual nterdependencyfdistinct nd specialized social

sectors.

3.

The Mexica

ruler tzcoatl ordered he

destruction

of

books

in

orderbegin

the

processofrewriting istory

(van Zantwijk 985:267).

In their

new

cognitive ode

Aztec rulers promoted

he

concept

of

multitribal oli-

darity.Patrimonialrhetoric ontinuedto be an impor-

tantdeterminantfnoblestatus ndroyalofficeholding,

but a reconstruction f royal genealogiesclaimed Mex-

ica descent from Chinampanec, Toltec, Tepanec, and

even

Chichimec families

p. i86)

on the

basis

of

a new

originmyth hat integrated

ome

completely ifferent

originmyths

n one

single narrative, he so-called pil-

grimage

rom he

obscure and mystical and of Aztlan

(p.

267;

cf.Gillespie

989).

Thisnotion fmultiethnic

solidarity

devalued the factionalism

prevailing

n the

pre-A.D.

I430 Early

Aztec

period.

THE

LOWLAND MAYA AREA

Since

regionalpopulation

densities n the

Late Forma-

tive and

Classic

periods

were often

high

Culbert

and

Rice

I990),

our

discipline has often consideredplaces

such as the Peten

core

or

nuclear in the sense of

supportingmajor demographic nd political develop-

ment

Palerm

nd Wolf

957). This simple characteriza-

11/14


12/14

I1


Volume 37, Number , February 996

tion hides the fact that, at different imes, the same

place can support network or corporatepolities. The

Late Preclassic chiefdomsof the Maya lowlands seem

to display characteristics f corporatepolity building,

with head towns featuring pen expansive plazas in

front f some of the most massive architecturen the

history f the region for xample, at El Mirador), nd

pyramids eaturing osmic-renewal magery ather han

the cult-of-the-rulerexts ndicatedby the stelae of the

Classic period (Adams I977, Freidel I98I, Hammond

i992, Mathews 985, Sharer992). During he Classic

period hese politieswere replacedby a broadnetwork f

interacting ity-states e.g.,Freidel 986, Pohl and Pohl

I994, Sabloff 986), which have been interpreteds at-

omistic (Mathews I99I)

but

were probably apable of

becoming omewhat arger Culbert

99I).

Here were as

many

as

millions

of

people

in a

single cultural, eco-

nomic, and linguistic ystembut politically egmented

into a multiplicity f interacting tates. Elite families

promoted

he cults of

named

rulers

nd the rhetoric f

royal descent and ancestor veneration, ngaged n the

politics of warfare nd marriage lliance, and promoted

luxury rade and craft pecialization Schele and Miller

I986).

In

the development

f the

owland Maya concept

of

kingship

ahaw),

beginning

bout

Documents

07045143 Blanton et all 1996 A Dual- Processual Theory for the Evolution.pdf