MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.

1992 Jan 13

En Banc

G.R. Nos. 99289-90

D E C I S I O N

REGALADO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and the addendum thereto, petitioner seeks to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Courts of Manila from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e); Criminal Case No. 91-94555 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 46; and Criminal Case No. 91-94897 for libel.

In Criminal Case No. 16698 1 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner stands charged as follows:

"That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said accused.

Contrary to law."

In Criminal Case No. 91-94555 2 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, petitioner, together with Daisy Montinola and Fermin Pacia, are accused of a violation of Presidential Decree No. 46 allegedly committed as follows:

"That on or about November 28, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Daisy Montinola and Fermin Pacia, all public officers, being then the Commissioner, Chief of the Board of Special Inquiry and employee of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, respectively, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally solicit and receive money, gifts and other valuable things from several (F)ilipino and foreign businessmen the same being given by reason of their respective official positions for past favor and expected favor and better treatment in the future from said accused, in the discharge of their respective official functions.

Contrary to law."

The information filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor with the Regional Trial Court of Manila and docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94897 3 indicts petitioner for the crime of libel, as follows:

"That on or about May 24, 1988, at the Office of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, Port Area, Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, acting in such capacity and taking advantage of her official position, did then and there with malice aforethought, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously call, utter, state, impute and make scurrilous and defamatory statements against Maria S. Tatoy, by portraying the latter, then Chief of the Certificate Section, Commission on Immigration and Deportation to be 'a corrupt employee, a perennial trouble-maker who has filed administrative cases against all the commissioners under whom she served' and the Certificate Section of which she was the head as 'not only useless but the most corrupt unit in the CID,' in the presence of newspaper reporters and media personalities, thereby finding print in the newspapers, which tend to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt of said Maria S. Tatoy, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

Contrary to law."

A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991 4 ordering the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, to respectively cease and desist from proceeding with Criminal Informations Nos. 11698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e) and 91-94555 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 46. This Court, in issuing the said restraining order, took into consideration the fact that, according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably

advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet said contingency.

Petitioner avers that in filing the aforequoted criminal informations, respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Specifically, petitioner contends that the criminal charges are meant and intended to harass her as a presidential candidate, in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."

Petitioner likewise asserts that the Ombudsman violated the very essence of fair play by choosing to file the informations at a time when petitioner was clearly disadvantaged by the injuries which she sustained in a vehicular accident, and only after three (3) years from the time the sixteen (16) charges were initially filed in 1988 by disgruntled employees of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID); and that in filing the criminal informations just a year before the presidential elections, respondent Ombudsman in effect wants to detain petitioner by reason of her political aspirations. She further submits that the instant petition seeks to prevent respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from proceeding against her in an oppressive and vindictive manner and to afford adequate protection to her constitutional rights. She consequently posits that, on the foregoing premises, her present recourse should be considered as an exception to the general prohibition against petitions of this nature in criminal cases.

In their Comment, respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor refute the claims of petitioner, explaining in the process the sequence of events which led to the filing of the three (3) informations, in this wise:

"The charges involved in Criminal Case No. 16698 and Criminal Case No. 91-94555 were taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman upon the same having been prominently published in the January 10, 1989 issue of the 'Manila Standard.' The investigation was originally handled by then Investigator Gualberto de la Llana but, on request of the petitioner, was reassigned to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon sometime in March, 1989. The case was handled by an investigating panel which submitted its draft resolution only on March 29, 1990. After the usual reviews by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, and of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, the resolution was submitted for final action of respondent Ombudsman in late March, 1991.

"A judicious appraisal of the record resulted in the issuance by the Ombudsman of the Memorandum for the Office of the Special Prosecutor directing the filing of the two (2) informations which have been docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan, and Criminal Case No. 91-94555 of the Manila Regional Trial Court . . .

"The said Memorandum, as may be noted on the face thereof, is dated April 26, 1991, or two (2) days before petitioner met the vehicular accident on April 28, 1991.

"Respondent Ombudsman received the informations prepared by the Office of the Special Prosecutor only on May 13, 1991. Per office routine, after respondent Ombudsman approved the informations, they were forwarded to the Office of the Special Prosecutor which filed the same in the appropriate courts on May 13, 1991.

"The record thus attests to the fact that the filing of Criminal Cases Nos. 16698 and 91-94555 was already a settled matter as early as two days before petitioner's unfortunate mishap. Their filing in court was in accordance with routine procedure, and impelled in some way by media's impatient and irritating inquiries as to what respondent Ombudsman had done in the petitioner's cases, induced no doubt by premature persistent false reports that the cases against petitioner had been dismissed by the Office of the Ombudsman.

"With respect to the libel case which was filed with the Manila Regional Trial Court on May 24, 1991, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 91-94897, the record will also show that the information in this case could have been filed as early as October 12, 1990 when the resolution recommending the prosecution of petitioner for libel was approved by respondent Ombudsman . . . However, on the day it was to be filed, some lawyers of the petitioner came and asked the respondent Ombudsman to defer the filing of the information inasmuch as they intend to file a motion for reinvestigation, which they did on October 29, 1990. The reinvestigation was denied in a Memorandum dated 25 March 1991 of Special Prosecution Officer Reynaldo L. Mendoza (approved by respondent Ombudsman on April 22, 1991) and an information was subsequently filed on May 24, 1991.

"Like in the previous two (2) cases, the filing of Criminal Case No. 91-94897 for libel had no relation at all to the accident which befell the petitioner on April 28, 1991. Its filing after that accident was caused by a clearly delaying tactic on the part of the petitioner. It is rather unkind for petitioner to impute ill-motivation on the part of the respondents for something she herself is to blame." 5

The Court accordingly also takes note of the aforesaid disclosures of respondent Ombudsman that it was petitioner, personally or through counsel, who made representations with said respondent which he granted and caused him to defer action for some time on the complaints which were ultimately filed against her.

It is a long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or prohibition will not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society, except in specified cases among which are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. 6

The rule is equally applicable in cases where the Ombudsman had authorized the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation or to file an information as in the case at bar. Indubitably, such a responsible official is vested with discretion and is endowed with the competence to determine whether the complaint filed is sufficient in form and substance to merit such referral. The Ombudsman may himself dismiss the complaint in the first instance if in his judgment the acts or omissions complained of are not illegal, unjust, improper or sufficient. The Special Prosecutor, in case of referral of the complaint, may also dismiss the same on proper grounds after the requisite investigative and adjudicatory proceedings. 7 But if, as emphasized by respondent Ombudsman, "the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation constitute very valid grounds to charge petitioner Santiago and her co-accused before the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Courts of Manila," no compelling reason would exist for us to rule otherwise.

Petitioner, claiming exception to the interdiction against a suit to enjoin criminal prosecution, avers that the instant petition seeks to prevent the strong arm of the law from being utilized in an oppressive and vindictive manner. 8 She then postulates that as one who has consistently topped all major presidential surveys from 1990 to 1991, the filing of the informations against her will prejudice her standing in the presidential surveys. This is, contextually and for legal intents and purposes herein, a mere verisimilitude.

At any rate, we definitely cannot subordinate the demands of public interest and policy to the political aspirations of herein petitioner. We have carefully gone over the records of the case and, contrary to the pretensions of petitioner, there is nothing to show that the informations in question were filed with the vindictive intention to oppress, harass and discriminate against her or to violate her constitutional rights. It is significant that petitioner failed to impute, much less prove, any ill-motive on the part of

herein public respondents. Respondent Ombudsman categorically states that, and convincingly explains why, he "has no purpose, motive nor desire to endanger or discredit petitioner's aspirations for the highest position in the land." 9 This is made no more apparent than in the various memoranda 10 approved by respondent Ombudsman establishing that the admitted facts of record are sufficient to engender a well founded belief that each of the crimes charged has been committed, which parenthetically, is the requisite quantum of evidence at this posture of each of said cases.

Petitioner submits that she cannot be held liable as charged and raises the following defenses: that the donations received were not for personal use but were distributed to the CID employees in a raffle held during the CID Christmas party; that the legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 was in accordance with the authority vested in her by Executive Order No. 324 and was intended to assure family unity; and that the defamatory words were made against Maria Tatoy only in self-defense.

We are not persuaded that we should, in the present recourse, pass upon these asseverations of petitioner which we note have previously been raised during the preliminary investigation. She will, of course, have all the opportunity to ventilate and substantiate the same in the proceedings before and/or during the trial of these cases in the lower courts which would be the proper stages and fora for the adjudication thereof. Accordingly, we quote with approval this portion of the Comment of respondent Ombudsman:

"In her Petition and in the Addendum hereto, the petitioner had not made any denial of the operative facts on the basis of which the charges have been filed. Instead, petitioner relies on her perceived defenses on her interpretation of the said acts and the laws applicable thereto.

"Thus, in Criminal Case No. 91-94555 for a violation of P.D. 46, petitioner admits the solicitation of donations and the giving of the same by those from whom such donations were solicited. Petitioner justifies the said act by claiming that the donations were not given for her 'personal use' but for the purpose of the Christmas Party of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Whether this claim would negate the applicability of P.D. 46 would involve an inquiry into certain facts which could only be ascertained during the trial of the case. Significantly, petitioner had not denied that the solicitation of said gifts was at her instance, and that she even scolded a certain Renato Orlanda whom she requested to sign the solicitation letters, but who refused to do so for fear of committing a violation of the law punishing such act.

"With respect to Criminal Case No. 16698 for a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, petitioner has also not denied that she admitted and approved the legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984, which act is contrary to the express provision of Executive Order No. 324. She reasons out her doing so by putting forth certain alleged principles and provisions of the same Executive Order which could be interpreted as giving her such authority to disregard the express prohibition in Executive Order No. 324. Again, these are matters of defense which the petitioner should prove during the trial.

"In the libel case (Criminal Case No. 91-94897), petitioner likewise admits having uttered the words constituting the bases thereof in a television interview. She does not deny its libelous nature. She claims justification for having uttered the defamatory words against complainant Maria Tatoy on the ground of self-defense. Allegedly, Tatoy in an earlier interview, had mentioned about desiring to form a labor union among the employees of CID, but that the petitioner was against such move. Respondents fail to see how said statement of Tatoy could be considered as defamatory to justify a libelous response thereto on the ground of self-defense." 11

WHEREFORE, the petition and the addendum thereto are hereby DISMISSED, the writs prayed for are DENIED, and the temporary restraining order issued in this case is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., No part. Did not participate in the deliberations.

Gutierrez, Grio-Aquino, Romero, JJ., dissent.