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CHAPTER 6

PREJUDICE

ContentsPrejudice: Old and NewPrejudice, Discrimination and Intergroup BiasRacismSexism

Individual Differences in PrejudiceThe Authoritarian PersonalitySocial DominancePrejudice and Self-Regulation

Intergroup TheoriesSherifs Summer Camp StudiesThe Minimal Group Paradigm

Reducing PrejudiceThe Contact HypothesisThe Common Ingroup Identity ModelCrossed Categorization

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Prejudice

162 Essential Social Psychology

Account of a Racist Murder

One night in July 2005, an 18-year-old college student, Anthony Walker, was spending the eveningat his Huyton home with girlfriend Louise Thompson. They were babysitting his two-year-oldnephew, Reuben.

At around 11pm, Mr Walker and his cousin Marcus Binns offered to walk Louise to her bus stop,close to the Huyton Park pub. Standing outside the pub was Michael Barton, dressed in a hooded top with a scarf or ski mask covering his face. He began hurling racist abuse at Mr Walker andMr Binns, telling them: Walk, nigger, walk.

Mr Walker, a devout Christian, walked away. He intended to take a short cut to a different busstop through McGoldrick Park.

As they walked away, Barton told his friend Paul Taylor that he had lost face during a row.They got into a car, drove to the entrance to the park and hid in bushes before ambushing

Mr Walker and his friends. Ms Thompson and Mr Binns escaped but Mr Walker was trapped.Taylor drove a mountaineering axe into the teenagers head with such force that the axe end wasembedded 6cm into his skull.

While their victim lay unconscious on the ground, Barton desperately tried to retrieve theweapon, but it was stuck fast in Mr Walkers skull. Even doctors struggled later to remove it.

Barton fled with his hands covered in Mr Walkers blood. By the time Mr Binns returned withhelp, there was little anybody could do. Mr Walker was taken to Whiston hospital, then transferred

to Walton neurological centre.Mr Walker died at 5.25am, with his family at his bedside.

Source: The Guardian , 30 November, 2005

T E X T B O X 6 . 1

Text box 6.1 gives an account of the racially-motivated murder of college studentAnthony Walker by four white men in Merseyside on July 2005. This was a shocking,tragic event that vividly illustrates the very worst consequences of racial prejudice. Suchacts are not representative of attitudes held by the general population, but simple statis-tics show us that less savage, but nonetheless highly divisive, forms of prejudice persist.In the 20th British Social Attitudes report (Park et al., 2003), the percentage of respon-dents who openly admitted being racially prejudiced was 31 per cent (a figure that has


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generally stayed the same since 1987). Prejudice is a fundamental social problem, andone that remains so even in the light of apparent widespread egalitarian beliefs. Social psy-chologists have therefore been very much concerned with understanding the psychologi-cal processes that can explain such pervasive, destructive human tendencies. This chapteris about what psychologists have learned about the nature of prejudice, and what we cando to fight against it .

PREJUDICE: OLD AND NEW

Prejudice, Discrimination andIntergroup Bias

This chapter introduces what social psychologists have learned about prejudice, inter-group discrimination and social conflict. We will be talking about ingroups and out-groups . Ingroups are social categories (see Chapter 2) to which you belong. Otherpeople who share your category membership are ingroup members. Outgroups are socialcategories to which you do not belong. People who are members of categories that dontinclude you are outgroup members. While not terms typically used in common language,we make reference to ingroups and outgroups all the time. Generically speaking, when-ever we refer to us or we, they or them, all of these terms denote shared versusnon-shared category membership (and this fundamental role that group referents havein everyday language suggests some of the psychological causes of prejudice that wediscuss later on). We are going to be talking about people seeing their ingroup as morepositive than their outgroup, something we call intergroup bias (sometimes also referred

to as ingroup favouritism or ingroup bias ). Intergroup bias is an umbrella term thatincludes different manifestations of bias in favour of ones own social category. Thisbrings us to prejudice which is defined as a negative attitude or feeling held towardsmembers of an outgroup. Intergroup discrimination is the behavioural manifestationof prejudice. That is, people who hold prejudiced attitudes might be those more likely toshow discriminatory behaviour. We will refer to experiments that measure prejudice ordiscrimination, and for the purposes of this chapter we can treat them both as manifesta-tions of the same intergroup bias. However, it is important to remember that attitudes donot always predict behaviour (see Chapter 3 and the discussion of the attitude-behaviour relationship).

Given these basic definitions, how can we start trying to understand the nature of prejudice? In Chapter 2 we talked about how people use social categories to make theworld easier to understand; they are heuristics that help people make cognitively efficient

judgements and better understand the world by providing information in the form of normsand stereotypes (for a detailed discussion of the role of stereotypes in prejudice, see

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Chapter 2). It is this tendency to use categories to define our worlds that belies the mosttalked about forms of prejudice racism and sexism. Racism is prejudice against some-one based on their race; sexism is prejudice against someone on the basis of their sex. Wesaw in Chapter 2 that people appear to use categories such as race and sex chronically; thatis, they spontaneously categorize others along these dimensions without even realizing it.This tendency to use race and sex in defining others is a problem because membership of these categories can come with stigma attached (Crocker et al., 1998). Stigmatization iswhen a persons social category puts them at a lower status than a dominant group andascribes to them negative characteristics (or stereotypes , see Chapter 2). In this section wechart psychologists understanding of racism and sexism, how the expression of thesemost common forms of prejudice have developed over time, and how the development of societies egalitarian norms have had a key defining role.

Racism

There are two types of racism: old-fashioned racism and aversive racism . Old-fashionedracism is the blatant expression of negative and unfair stereotypes of others based on theircategory membership. For instance, African Americans have been seen as aggressive(Devine, 1989) and of low intelligence (Steele & Aronson, 1995). Although we periodi-cally read about racially-motivated violence in our newspapers, we may regard these asacts carried out by a small criminal minority. You may think that blatant racist attitudes arerarely expressed, and only by a small minority of people, that prejudice is decreasing. Tosome extent this is true; we now have societal norms that largely prohibit the blatantexpression of prejudiced beliefs. However, psychologists have identified a second, morepervasive, manifestation of racism that people do not admit to, and which is thereforemuch more difficult to detect: aversive racism.

Aversive racism describes the type of racism that is defined by having both egalitarianattitudes and negative emotions towards members of different groups. Gaertner andDovidio (1986) argue that modern racism is best described by this conflict betweenmodern egalitarian values (such as equal treatment of all people and sympathy for victimsof racial prejudice) and the more explicit forms of prejudice that are perpetuated by imagesof minority groups as conforming to negative stereotypes. The result of this conflict is theexperience of negative emotions such as uneasiness, fear and discomfort. Because egali-tarianism is important to many people, these negative emotions arouse feelings of shameand guilt in those who experience them, leading them to avoid publicly acknowledgingthese feelings, and to avoid intergroup encounters that might mean having to face up to thisconflict. The consequences of aversive racism are clearly demonstrated in a study reportedin Text Box 6.2 which shows that while people may report holding egalitarian attitudes,

their behaviour towards the ingroup and the outgroup can vary dramatically. These implicitprejudiced attitudes can also be understood in terms of the automatic stereotyping pro-cesses which we discussed in Chapter 2. We return to consider these processes in moredetail later in this chapter.


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The Effect of Race on Helping BehaviourThe majority of studies on racism and discrimination involve participants directly reporting theiroutgroup attitudes. However, people may not always be completely honest when reporting suchattitudes, because of a fear of violating the egalitarian norms of modern society. Gaertner andBickman (1971) used a subtle measure of discrimination, investigating whether people are morelikely to help ingroup members than outgroup members.

METHOD

1,109 residents of Brooklyn, New York (approximately half of whom were black and half of whomwere white) were called by either a black or a white confederate. To ensure that their ethnicity wasobvious to the caller, the confederates used an accent that was typically associated with their eth-

nic group. When a participant answered the phone, each confederate used the following script:

Caller: Hello Ralphs Garage? This is George Williams listen, Im stuck outhere on the parkway and Im wondering if youd be able to come out hereand take a look at my car?

Expected response: This isnt Ralphs Garage you have the wrong number.Caller: This isnt Ralphs Garage! Listen, Im terribly sorry to have disturbed you, but

listen Im stuck out here on the highway and that was the last dime Ihad! I have bills in my pocket but no more change to make another phonecall Now Im really stuck out here. What am I going to do now? Listen do you think you could do me the favour of calling the garage and letting them know where I am? Ill give you the number They know me over there.

If the participant agreed to help, the callergave him the telephone number of thegarage. Calls were actually received by aresearch assistant, posing as a garageattendant, who logged the calls.

RESULTS

White participants showed ingroupbias; they were more likely to help awhite caller than a black caller

Black participants were actually more

likely to help a white caller than a blackcaller, although this difference was not statistically significant

80

70

60

50

P e r c e n

t a g e o

f P a r

t i c i p a n

t s

W h o H e l p e d

Black WhiteParticipant

Black Caller White Caller

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T E X T B O X 6 . 2

(Continued)


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One can conceptualize a societys progression towards egalitarianism as movingthrough stages defined by these different types of racism, from old fashioned blatantracism, through to aversive racism, where both egalitarian and prejudiced attitudes co-exist, through to full egalitarianism where there is no longer any conflict (Kleinpenning &Hagendoorn, 1993). Where is our society on this continuum? Many commentators believethat western societies are at stage two: aversive racism. We have a society that acknow-ledges the importance of egalitarian values, but there are still pervasive biases evident inall strata of social life, from the sort of violent racist murder described at the beginning of this chapter through to less obvious, but still destructive, forms of prejudice such as insti-tutional racism . In the second half of this chapter we talk about how social psychologistsare developing interventions to help us move to stage 3, total egalitarianism. Next, how-ever, we discuss another type of prejudice that has proved difficult to eradicate: sexism.

Sexism

Sexism is the subordination of someone on the basis of their sex. Typically this is definedas male domination of females, and can be exemplified in sexual harassment through toinstitutional discrimination and the glass ceiling effect (Hymowitz & Schellhardt, 1986).Like racism, sexism can be divided into two components: hostile sexism and benevolentsexism . Hostile sexism is what we typically think of as sexist attitudes towards women, theview that women are inferior, irrational, and weak. However there is also a less blatant,more benevolent side to sexism. Benevolent sexist attitudes are positive in valence and arecharacterized by idealizing women in traditional female roles such as homemaker ormother. Although these are positive stereotypes they restrict women to specific roles, jus-tifying male social dominance (Sidanius, Pratto, & Brief, 1995). Modern forms of sexism,

just like modern racism, can be characterized by the conflict between positive (egalitarian)and negative (prejudiced) attitudes.

Interestingly, it seems possible for sexist men to possess both hostile and benevolentattitudes towards women. Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner, and Zhu (1997) found that menhigh in ambivalent sexism had polarized views of women that fell into the two types of


INTERPRETING THE FINDINGSPeople have a general tendency to help those in need, because we hold a social responsibilitynorm; we feel we should help others even if it is of no personal benefit. For white people, however, this norm was violated more frequently when the person in need of help was in the outgroup; whitepeople were more likely to help ingroup members than outgroup members.

T E X T B O X 6 . 2 ( C O N T I N U E D )

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sexism. Men high in ambivalent sexism who were asked to think about a womantranscending traditional roles (e.g. a career woman) reported negative feelings such as fearand envy. These negative feelings were correlated with hostile sexism, but not with benev-olent sexism. Men high in ambivalent sexism who thought about a woman in a traditionalrole (e.g. a homemaker) reported positive feelings (warmth, trust, etc.) which were corre-lated with a measure of benevolent sexism but not hostile sexism. These findings suggestthat ambivalent sexist men can hold simultaneously positive and negative attitudes aboutdifferent subcategories of women, which may help to explain why sexism has been hardto counteract. It is harder to show someone that their negative stereotype is unjustifiablewhen they can counter with the argument that they do have a positive view of women(albeit along restrictive and inherently biased dimensions).

Summary

In this section we have seen how, at first glance, racism and sexism appear to be indecline. This may be because we live in societies that encourage egalitarianism as a uni-versal value and where there are now laws against the expression of extreme racist and sex-ist views. However, when we take a closer look we can see how such prejudices haveadapted and live on in different forms. Aversive racism and ambivalent sexism show usthat prejudice still exists and can have a profound negative impact on peoples lives (fromexperiencing racist taunts in the street through to gender discrimination at work). There is,of course, also prejudice apparent against many other groups, including gay men andwomen, immigrants and asylum seekers, Muslims, Jews and other religious groups. Socialpsychologists have sought to understand why these prejudices occur, and why they proveso pervasive. The research we discuss above on ambivalent sexism suggests that, at leastto some extent, prejudice might be the result of individual differences. In other words,

some people may simply have personalities that lend them to possessing prejudiced views.We discuss this possibility in the next section.

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Aversive racism

Ambivalent sexism PREJUDICE

OLD AND NEW FORMS

Figure 6.1 Memory Map


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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PREJUDICE

The Authoritarian Personalit yAn obvious place to begin any examination of the causes of prejudice is to ask thequestion: are some people more prejudiced than others? Perhaps understanding prejudiceis simply a matter of personality. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Stanford(1950) thought just this, and put forward a theory of prejudice as a personality type. Theyargued that some people were more prejudiced than others because of the way they hadbeen brought up. According to their theory, which was heavily influenced by the writingsof Freud, an authoritarian personality arises as a defensive reaction against over-strictparenting methods. Having over-strict parents means the child is unable to express anynatural hostility towards their parents, and as such transfers this aggression elsewhere(to weaker, easier targets). This displaced aggression is thus targeted towards minority orlow status groups. These tendencies are then said to continue into adulthood, along withother, associated characteristics, like an overly-deferential attitude towards authorityfigures (who represent the parents).

Although intuitively appealing, this explanation of prejudice can be criticized in twomajor ways. First, it did not receive unequivocal empirical support. The F-scale , themeasure devised by Adorno et al. (1950) to measure if someone had an authoritarianpersonality, did not predict racism in South Africa in the 1950s (Pettigrew, 1958), but thisis a social setting where prejudice was self-evident. Second was the bigger, conceptual,problem. Personality theories, by definition, explain individual variation in attitudes andbehaviours. As such, they have difficulty as explanations of widespread and uniform prej-udice. For example, in the 1990s there was clear prejudice in former Yugoslavia, evidentin an extreme and brutal form, ethnic cleansing . Is one to conclude that a whole genera-tion of people in this context were raised in the same way by authoritarian parents, andthus ended up all with the same prejudiced tendencies?

We can therefore question the specific Freudian basis for research on the authoritarianpersonality. But does this mean people do not vary in the level of prejudice they are likelyto express? Common observation would tell us that there is significant variation acrossdifferent people in terms of how willing people are to express prejudiced views. If this isthe case, then how can we explain these individual differences? An idea that has been thesubject of much recent attention by social psychologists is that the extent to which peoplehold broad ideologies about the nature of society can predict differences in prejudice.

Social Dominance Orientation

Sidanius (1993) argued that people vary according to something called social dominanceorientation . This is the idea that our societies are defined in part by implicit ideologiesthat either promote or attenuate intergroup status hierarchies, and that people can vary inthe extent to which they either accept or reject these ideas that are ingrained in society.


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According to Sidanius, people who are high in social dominance orientation favourintergroup hierarchies this means that people who are in high or low status groups shouldfavour the high status group (i.e. it can explain both ingroup and outgroup favouritism).Empirical evidence is more supportive of social dominance orientation than it was for theauthoritarian personality, and studies have shown it to predict things like racism, sexism,and other non-egalitarian attitudes. Overall, then, there does seem to be something in theidea that the extent to which people endorse authoritarian beliefs, the extent to which theyagree with prevailing status hierarchies, and a general tendency towards accepting thedominance of some groups over others, provides some basis for individual differences inthe expression of prejudice.

When we discussed aversive racism above we noted how modern racism is defined by theinternal struggle between the desire to conform to positive egalitarian norms and negativeprejudiced attitudes. Social dominance orientation explains why we might observe individualdifferences in tendencies to express prejudiced attitudes, but what about the opposite perspec-tive: do people differ in the extent to which they are motivated to go along with egalitarian

social norms? Below we examine the psychological processes that can predict how some peo-ple come to question prejudiced attitudes, and modify their own behaviour accordingly.

Prejudice and Self-Regulation

We discussed how people can be more or less sexist or racist in the earlier sections of thischapter, and it is evident from this research that people do vary from one another in termsof how racist or sexist they are. But can we specify the thought processes that one mightgo through to become more egalitarian? It does appear that people can develop a motiva-tion to control prejudice (e.g. Fazio, 1990). When someone becomes aware that they mayhave acted in a prejudiced way, they may feel guilty about this because it violates other

beliefs based on shared egalitarian values (see the discussion of aversive racism above).We know this kind of discrepancy between attitudes and behaviours can motivate peopleto change their attitudes (this is cognitive dissonance ; see the discussion in Chapter 3).Devine and Monteith have suggested that a similar desire to deal with this dissonance interms of prejudiced attitudes and behaviours can result in attitude change, and individualsultimately becoming less prejudiced. They argue that people who detect such discrepan-cies (and who are motivated to control their prejudices) then engage in a deliberate self-regulation process, to monitor and consistently inhibit prejudice-related thoughts (Devine& Monteith, 1999), replacing them with a low prejudiced response (Plant & Devine, 1998)until ultimately they no longer think prejudiced thoughts or behave in prejudiced ways.

On an individual level this idea that people can choose to self-regulate to avoid prejudicedthoughts shows us how people can become less prejudiced (Monteith, 1993). This theory

describes how individuals, once they decide to become less biased, can achieve that goal. Ittherefore describes how individual differences in the level of prejudice may arise, but not whyindividuals may decide in the first place that prejudice is wrong, that existing stereotypesabout groups are biased, or that egalitarianism is a good thing. To answer these questions we

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need to know why people are prejudiced in the first place. To understand widespreadcategory-based prejudice and discrimination (e.g. racism, sexism, ageism) social psycholo-gists have argued that we need to understand how people use social categorization to makesense of their social worlds, and why they pay attention to differences defined by (for instance)ethnic (Asian, white), gender (female, male), or age (young, old) categories. Tajfel (1978)suggested that to understand intergroup behaviour like prejudice and discrimination we needto conceptualize theories in terms of intergroup processes, not inter-individual processes. It isto these intergroup theories of prejudice and discrimination that we now turn.

INTERGROUP THEORIESSocial categorization is central to explaining prejudice and discrimination, because with-out it, there can be no prejudice or discrimination. Put quite simply, prejudice and discrim-ination depend upon a negative view of them relative to us, a recognition that somepeople are in the same social category as ourselves and some people are not. This self-inclusion and the distinction between ingroups and outgroups is critical to understandingprejudice, discrimination, and intergroup bias. The importance of this distinction isstrikingly apparent when we consider a classic study by Muzafer Sherif and colleagues inthe 1950s that set the agenda for the next 50 years of research into intergroup relations.

Sherifs Summer Camp StudiesSherif and colleagues (Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Sherif, White, & Harvey, 1955) realized thata long-standing American tradition could provide an ideal setting in which to observe


Social dominanceorientation

Motivation tocontrol prejudice

The authoritarianpersonality

INDIVIDUALDIFFERENCES

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intergroup behaviour from inception to dissolution (and thus avoid any of the typicalconfounding influences with real and established social group memberships, such aspolitical, economic and historic relational factors, all of which can obscure the psycholog-ical elements in group processes). Their idea was to take over a boys summer camp atRobbers Cave State Park (150 miles south of Oklahoma City) where 20 white, middle-class 11 to 12-year-old boys would go to take part in varied outdoor pursuits.

The study worked in three stages. In Stage 1 Sherif wanted to observe the immediateeffects of group formation; in Stage 2, the effects of introducing competition between thegroups was studied. In Stage 3, he wanted to see whether certain factors could reduce anyconflict that had occurred at Stages 1 and 2. In this way, Sherif planned to obtain a modelof intergroup behaviour at all the stages from group formation to interaction and eventualdissolution.

At Stage 1 the boys had just arrived at the camp and knew nothing of each other. Thefirst thing that happened was that they were placed, on a purely random basis, into twogroups for the remainder of the two weeks at the camp (this was not an unusual thing;

such camps are based on team competition but this division into arbitrary groups suitedthe interests of the psychologists perfectly). On doing this, Sherif immediately observedspontaneous suggestions for competition between the two groups, spontaneous socialcomparisons and the development of group icons . That is to say, as soon as the group of boys was split in two, and allocated different group labels, they began to suggest that thetwo groups compete against each other. They began to throw verbal taunts at each other(along the lines of, Our group is better than yours!). One group called themselves theRattlers and the other the Eagles. Interestingly, within a short time the boys in therespective groups had made some icons to represent the animal name of their group, andput it above their (separate) dormitory huts. This was a first indication of the develop-ment of a group norm and a social identity (a term that will be important later on inthis chapter).

Having observed these immediate behavioural effects, Sherif wanted to introduce aparticular element into the context that he believed might be a key determinant of inter-group hostility. Again, he took advantage of a typical element of the summer camp expe-rience: the introduction of competitive games between the groups. The introduction of these games (including baseball and tug-of-war) had some expected effects. Sherif andcolleagues observed a dramatic rise in derogation between the two groups. This culmi-nated in the groups even physically attacking each others icons (including burning theirflag and ransacking their cabin). Another consequence of imposing the group labels andthe competition was that interpersonal affiliations gave way to intergroup concerns; byStage 2, 93 per cent of friendships were defined by ingroup affiliation (i.e. friends werealmost exclusively within-group, and rarely crossed the intergroup boundary). Thissupports Tajfels (1978) idea that there are two ways to define social encounters: from

interpersonal through to intergroup. In the case of the summer camp, relations hadbecome very much defined at the intergroup end of this continuum. This intensificationof ingroup loyalty and increase in hostility towards the outgroup is called ethnocentrism(Sumner, 1906).

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Having observed a dramatic increase in bias following the introduction of competition,Sherif was then interested in seeing whether changing other aspects of the group contextcould attenuate this intergroup hostility. The psychologists arranged for the boys bus tobreak down on their way back from a competitive activity one day (this was, of course, aset-up). They arranged it so that only if the two groups worked together cooperated could they push start the bus in time to get back for lunch. Here, then, Sherif had intro-duced a cooperative goal in order to gain a reward that would be beneficial for both groups.Cooperation between the groups did indeed lead to a reduction in intergroup conflict anda considerable reduction in the observed derogation between the two groups.

Realistic Group Conflict TheorySherifs summer camp studies were hugely influential. They were the first time that any-one had attempted to systematically examine the psychological and behavioural conse-quences of group formation, competition, and cooperation whilst controlling for other

possible factors. These findings supported an explanation for prejudice, discrimination andintergroup conflict called realistic group conflict theory (Levine & Campbell, 1972).According to this theory, conflict between groups is the result of the perception of scarceresources. The theory would predict, for instance, that under conditions of economicdeprivation intergroup conflict would increase (this is similar to the frustration-aggressionhypothesis described in Chapter 7). Outgroup derogation and ingroup favouritism asobserved in Sherifs summer camp studies supports this contention; once competition hadbeen introduced at Stage 2, conflict and examples of ingroup bias dramatically increased.The conflict can be seen as realistic because it is based on a real competition forresources (in Sherifs case, competition for prized rewards such as medals and penknives).But does this mean that all conflict is due to competition for scarce resources? In Sherifsstudies, spontaneous derogation of the outgroup occurred at Stage 1, when all that had

happened was that the groups had been divided into two groups. Could mere categoriza-tion therefore be enough on its own to incite intergroup bias? Some years later the idea that just being categorized could lead to prejudice was addressed experimentally in what wouldbecome one of the most influential experiments in social psychology.

The Minimal Group Paradigm

Henri Tajfel was interested in systematically finding the baseline conditions under whichpeople would prefer their own group over other groups. Put another way, he wanted to find,under highly controlled experimental conditions, what might be the minimal conditionsnecessary to observe prejudice (Sherifs summer camp studies were observational, and soless powerful than experimentally controlling the context). In order to do this he created a

paradigm that removed all the possible factors that might accentuate intergroup bias, sothat all that was left was mere categorization as ingroup and outgroup. Tajfel wanted toknow whether simply being categorized into one group versus another would be sufficient ,


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without any differences in political or religious ideology, economic imbalance or a historyof conflict, to elicit intergroup bias. In actuality, Tajfel did not expect mere categorizationto elicit bias; he was simply trying to find the baseline no-bias conditions from which toincrementally add further possible contributing factors. However, to his surprise he foundthat the conditions that could lead to intergroup bias were far more minimal than anyonecould have imagined.

Tajfels minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) describesan experimental context that creates an ad hoc basis for categorization and includes mea-sures of evaluation of, and discrimination between, the groups involved. In Tajfels origi-nal experiment the participants, who were schoolchildren, were allocated to two groups onan arbitrary basis (rather like they were in Sherifs summer camp studies). The allocationinto the two different groups was done by showing the participants a number of slides of abstract paintings. These were by the painters Paul Klee and Wassily Kandinsky who, tothe participants, were unfamiliar, and had broadly similar abstract styles. Participantsnoted for each slide which one they preferred. After all the slides had been shown the

experimenters pretended to go away and compare each persons responses. After a shortwhile they came back and told each participant that they were either in the Klee orKandinsky group. This feedback was, however, contrived by the experimenter, andallocation to groups was in fact random and meaningless.

Participants then completed a task in which they were required to allocate points (viacode numbers) to people in the two groups. The points represented money and participantswere told that at the end of the task they would receive the money allocated via points totheir code number by the other people doing the task. The idea was that this allocation of points would represent behavioural discrimination (more points given to members of theingroup compared to the outgroup represents ingroup favouritism). Allocation wascompletely anonymous; participants did not know who was in which group nor to whomthey were allocating points. Participants could not allocate points to themselves, thus

removing any element of self-interest from the task. The points were allocated via a seriesof decision matrices on which participants indicated with a cross through one columnhow much the ingroup and how much the outgroup member should receive. There weredifferent types of matrix which were used to assess different strategies of allocation(we discuss these strategies in more detail below). For now, the important thing is that thetotal amount of points allocated to the ingroup and outgroup could be calculated fromthese matrices, and from this the experimenters could assess whether there was an ingroupfavouring bias.

The unique characteristic of this minimal group paradigm was that the groups really didrepresent the most basic form of social categorization. Unlike real social groups definedby nationality, religion, or age, there was no economic imbalance, political motivations,past interaction, or even any meaning ascribed to these groups. They were the most basic

form of group membership, based on simply being in one group or the other.So what would happen in this experiment? Just for a moment put yourself in the positionof someone taking part. You have to allocate points to anonymous others. You cant give

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points to yourself, so any money you receive at the end of the experiment will be downto what other people give to you. But they dont know who you are. The only thing youknow about the people listed on each matrix that you fill in is that they are in one group(your group) or the other group. Theres no objective reason to give more points to someone

just because they are in your group and not the other (the group labels have no impact onhow much money you personally will receive at the end), so what would you do?

Well, even in this most minimal of group contexts, Tajfel and colleagues observed a per-sistent tendency for participants to allocate more points to people in their own groupcompared to people in other groups. Remember that the allocation of points to individualswas anonymous (otherwise people may have recognized their friends and given them morepoints) and all that distinguished people was a random code number (e.g. person number:419) and their group membership (e.g. Klee or Kandinsky). Amazingly, Tajfel and colleaguesfound that mere categorization simply knowing that someone is in the same group asyou was sufficient to elicit intergroup bias. People ignored the logic that told them that thegroup labels made no difference to how much money they would receive at the end; for some

reason they used the category labels to guide their allocations. Importantly, if different allo-cation of points to the two groups had no impact on the objective of the exercise (i.e. to amassmoney for oneself), then this suggests that there must be some other more implicit psycho-logical motivation that differential allocation of points served.

This mere categorization effect has been replicated many times using many differentways to categorize people and many different measures of evaluation. It is a very robustfinding (Brewer, 1979; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). This finding is so importantbecause it suggests that there is a psychological component to prejudice, beyond anyeconomic, political, or historical factor. Tajfel et al. demonstrated that the mere recogni-tion that someone is in a different group to oneself is enough for us to like them less,quite independent from the apparent goals and aims of the task at hand. This suggesteda then unknown psychological motivation pushing people to differentiate their own group

from others. In the next section, we introduce the theories that have been put forward toexplain the mere categorization effect, and therefore how categorization can lead to inter-group bias.

The Category Differentiation ModelDoise (1978) suggested a model of categorization effects that can explain why we observedifferential allocation of points as a function of group membership in the minimal groupparadigm. The category differentiation model specifies that imposing a system of classifi-cation on a series of previously unordered stimuli can lead to an accentuation of the differ-ences between categories and an attenuation of similarities within categories. Put anotherway, when category labels are made salient (such as in the minimal group paradigm), accord-ing to Doise there is then an automatic tendency to think of all people who are in the samecategory as being similar to one another, and a corresponding automatic tendency to think of all people who are in different categories as being different from one another (see Figure 6.3) .


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As discussed in Chapter 2, people are sometimes cognitive misers ; they have a generalmotivation to simplify their view of the world by using broad generalizations social cate-gories. The category differentiation model describes how this process works when there is aningroup and a corresponding outgroup category. The accentuation of similarities withincategories, and the accentuation of differences between categories, simplifies things so thatinformation about people in the immediate context can be more efficiently processed, enabling

judgement to be made more easily and with less effort.The power of this categorization process has been consistently and reliably demon-

strated in a number of domains including judgements of both physical and social stimuli

(e.g. Crisp & Hewstone, 1999; Eiser, Van der Pligt, & Gossop, 1979; Tajfel & Wilkes,1963). But how does this apparently basic-level cognitive mechanism help to explainallocation of points in the minimal group paradigm? If we examine the procedure in Tajfelet al.s experiment we can see how Doises (1978) proposed mechanism might apply.In the minimal group paradigm participants are faced with a decision regarding how theyshould allocate the points. They know that they cant allocate points to themselves, andthat there is really nothing they can do to maximize the potential reward they will gain atthe end of the experiment when the money is distributed. There is, however, still thisobserved tendency for people to allocate more points to ingroup members than outgroupmembers (even though this doesnt help them achieve the objective goal of the task, tomaximize their personal profit). The category differential model offers the implicit psycho-logical motivation that can explain the mere categorization effect. If people are implicitlymotivated to simplify their perception of social contexts (see Chapter 2) they should usesome functional mechanism, such as the mechanism specified by the categorydifferentiation model, to achieve this aim. The only way they can express this desire to

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Accentuation of differences between categories

Group A Group B

Accentuation of similarities within categories

Figure 6.3 Representation of category differentiation (ovals represent thegroups attributes)


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classify and simplify is to use only thing in the minimal context that lends itself to this aim:the point allocations. Allocating more points to one group compared to another group is anexpression of category differentiation: it accentuates the differences between people in twocategories.

The way the matrices were used in the minimal group paradigm offers a means to testdirectly the predictions derived from the category differentiation model. As we mentionedabove, there were different versions of the matrices which assessed different allocationstrategies. Two strategies are of primary interest for distinguishing support for the cate-gory differentiation model. On some matrices the participant had the choice betweenchoosing either of two boxes, both of which allocated more points to the ingroup than theoutgroup. The difference between these two boxes was defined in two ways: the totalnumber of points that would be given to the ingroup and the difference between the num-ber of points given to the ingroup compared to the outgroup. Importantly, choosing tomaximize the number of points going to the ingroup would minimize the difference in thenumber of points going to the ingroup compared to the outgroup. In other words, allocat-

ing more points to the ingroup would also mean allocating more points, in relative terms,to the outgroup. Maximizing ingroup profit could only be achieved by sacrificing theamount of differentiation (the difference in points given to the ingroup and outgroup). Itwas therefore possible to identify two different strategies participants were using in theirallocations.

To illustrate, box 1 might indicate 25 points for the ingroup member and 21 points forthe outgroup member. Box 2, on the same matrix, might indicate 7 points for the ingroupmember and 1 point for the outgroup member. The choice of the box 1 (25/21) wouldindicate that the participants are mostly concerned with maximizing the total number of points allocated to their group. In contrast, the choice of the second allocation (7/1) wouldindicate that participants were not interested in maximizing their groups profit overall, butrather in maximizing the differentiation between the ingroup and the outgroup in terms of

points allocated. This is because although the first allocation would give the ingroup 25points, it would also give the outgroup 21 points, leaving the outgroup with only 4 pointsless than the ingroup. But, if the ingroup sacrificed having more points overall and wentfor the 7 points, this would mean that the outgroup would only get 1 point, creating a largerdifference ( of 6 points) between the ingroup and outgroup. If differentiating the ingroupfrom the outgroup was primary in the participants mind then they would choose box 2(7/1), but if they were not particularly bothered about being different from the outgroupthen one might expect then to choose box 1 (25/21) as this overall maximizes the totalprofit for the ingroup.

Examination of the choices made in the minimal group paradigm reveals a consistenttendency to choose maximum differentiation . This therefore supports Doises idea thatgiving more to ingroup members compared to outgroup members reflects a fundamental

motivation towards categorizing and simplifying.The elegance of this model makes it very appealing, but it cannot be the whole story.Although there is undoubtedly a drive towards maximal differentiation in the minimal



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group paradigm, this is not the only observed tendency. As well as going for distributionsof points that differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup to the greatest extent, participantsalso showed a strong tendency to favour their own group over the outgroup. If all that wasimportant was maximizing the difference between the ingroup and outgroup then why notallocate more points to the outgroup than the ingroup? This would satisfy the same drivetowards differentiation as giving more to the ingroup than the outgroup. However, thisdoes not happen; the differentiation is always ingroup favouring. In order to explain thispersistent ingroup favouritism we require another theory. This theory, which we describebelow, makes specific reference to something the category differentiation model ignores:self-inclusion.

Social Identity TheoryThe finding that mere categorization can lead to ingroup favouritism has implications forevery aspect of our understanding of intergroup relations. The fact that social categoriza-

tion was apparently so important in determining discrimination between ingroups andoutgroups required a theory that could explain ingroup favouritism in the minimal groupparadigm. With John Turner, Henri Tajfel came up with such a theory.

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) is a theoretical account of the relation-ship between personal (i.e. individual) and social (i.e. group membership) identity. Withrespect to judgements about people in different groups, the logic goes like this. First, Tajfeland Turner assume that people prefer to have a positive self-concept (i.e. positive self-esteem (feeling good about themselves); we know this is a valid assumption as it had beendemonstrated empirically many times, e.g. Baumeister, 1998; Sears, 1983). The theorystates that one source of self-esteem is the social groups to which we belong. Put simply,if our social groups are seen as being of high status and positively valued, then by exten-sion we, as members of such groups, can also view ourselves positively. Because of the

link between how positive our groups are and how positively we see ourselves, Tajfel andTurner argue that we are motivated to do what we can to increase the status of our owngroup because, by extension, if our group does better than others then we also look goodas individual members of that group. In the minimal group paradigm, social identitytheory can explain why people have a tendency to award more points to their own groupcompared to the other group. In so doing, this will increase the status of the ingroup, rel-ative to the outgroup, and as such increase the self-esteem of the group members.

Category differentiation can therefore satisfy the motivation to clarify and simplify,whereas social identity theory can provide the motivational explanation for the ingroupfavouring direction of differential points allocation. We can refer to this combined desire tobe differentiated from outgroups, and to be differentiated in a way that is ingroup favouring,as a desire for positive distinctiveness . Broadly speaking, there is much evidence that there

is a strong motivation to achieve such positive distinctiveness from outgroups. Indeed, any-thing that threatens this distinctiveness can increase intergroup bias, apparently in a desire tore-establish positive differentiation, in the same way as participants in Tajfel et al.s original

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experiment appear to use points allocation as a means of differentiating the ingroup from theoutgroup (Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004). However, despite the appeal of the social iden-tity theory explanation, the strength of the mere categorization effect has meant a prolifera-tion of theories as alternatives to the category differentiation and social identity perspectives.Below we outline some of these alternatives.

Belief SimilarityOne criticism of the original Tajfel et al. (1971) minimal group paradigm experiment wasthat allocation to the two groups was not, in fact, entirely minimal, but that there was abasis for belief similarity that could have accounted for liking. Recall that participantswere allocated to different groups on the basis of their apparent preference for the Klee orKandinsky abstract paintings. Although these ad hoc social categorizations were largelymeaningless, participants could have inferred that people who were allocated to thesame group as them, because they liked the same painting style, perhaps shared other

beliefs in common. In Chapter 9 on affiliation and attraction we will see how belief simi-larity can account for some degree of interpersonal attraction. Perhaps intergroup bias inTajfels experiment was not, therefore, to do with intergroup processes at all, but withinterpersonal processes of belief similarity. To test this hypothesis Billig and Tajfel (1973)carried out a replication of the original minimal group paradigm experiment but madesome important changes. In the new condition participants saw clearly that they were allo-cated to groups on a purely random basis: the toss of a coin. This random allocation wasthen compared with categorization based on belief similarity, that is, allocation on thebasis for apparent liking of the Klee or Kandinksy abstract paintings. Billig and Tajfelsfindings can be seen in Figure 6.4. Quite clearly, there was more intergroup bias in thebelief similarity condition compared to the random allocation condition. However, what isimportant is that although there was less bias in the random allocation condition, there was

not an elimination of bias. In other words, even when participants were allocated to the min-imal groups on the basis of a toss of a coin, they still gave more points to members of theirown group compared to members of the outgroup. This suggests that while belief similaritycan increase intergroup bias, just like competition between groups, it is not a necessary pre-condition to observe bias. Mere categorization, even when it is ostensibly based on purelyrandom criteria, is enough for people to favour their own group over others.

Self-Categorization TheorySelf-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) is based onsocial identity theory but re-emphasizes the cognitive processes associated with contextualaffiliation to social groups. Rather than focusing on motivational processes (as socialidentity theory does), self-categorization theory outlines how identity salience leads todepersonalization, assimilation to group norms, and self-stereotyping, and how these cog-nitive processes can impact on intergroup behaviour such as prejudice and discrimination.In a salient group context, Turner et al. argued that people depersonalize and take on the


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characteristics associated with the prototypic qualities of their groups (see Chapter 2 fora discussion of category structure, prototypes, and stereotypes). Similar to the categorydifferentiation model (Doise, 1976), self-categorization theory specifies a meta-contrastprinciple that describes the perception of increased similarity within, and increaseddifferentiation between, ingroup and outgroup categories; Oakes & Turner, 1990). Self-categorization theory states that social categorization and intergroup discrimination are(a) context dependent and (b) involve a search for meaning.

An elaboration of the motivational component of self-categorization theory is offered byHoggs (2001) subjective uncertainty reduction hypothesis . Social categorizationclarifies and defines social situations, providing a means for predicting how outgrouperswill behave, and providing a set of prescriptive ingroup norms to guide perceivers. Groupmembers are thus motivated to maintain the distinctiveness of their own groups fromothers in order to reduce subjective uncertainty (Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Mullin, 1999). Themotive of reducing uncertainty via self-categorization and meta-contrast will lead mem-bers of valued groups to compare the ingroup with the outgroup, particularly when posi-tivity and distinctiveness is threatened. The reduction of uncertainty caused by ingroupidentification imbues people who are associated with this reduction (i.e. ingroup members,including the self) with a positive valence. Ingroup favouritism is explained as a reflectionof the resulting perceived differences in intergroup positivity (Hogg & Abrams, 1993).

An elaboration on the idea that people have a need to differentiate their social identitiescan be seen in the form of Brewers (1991) optimal distinctiveness theory . This theory

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4

5

3

2

1

0

I n t e r g r o u p

b i a s

No similarity(mere categorization)

Similarity

Categorization method

Figure 6.4 Effects of belief similarity on points allocations in the minimal groupparadigm. Data from Billig & Tajfel (1973)

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argues that people are motivated to satisfy two needs which conflict with one another.These are the need for assimilation and the need for differentiation. People seek out groupsthat provide a balance in satisfying these two motives. This theory argues that bias willresult when the need for differentiation is not fulfilled, and so can be seen as a furtherspecification of the distinctiveness motivations outlined above.

Self-Anchoring TheoryAn explanation of intergroup bias that is applicable particularly to the minimal group paradigmis self-anchoring theory (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996). The foundation for the idea thatthe self can be used as an informational base in social judgement is outlined more generally bythe concept of social projection (Clement & Krueger, 2000; Krueger & Clement, 1996), whichrefers to peoples tendency to predict the feelings, thoughts and behaviours of others based ontheir own feelings, thoughts and behaviours (see Chapter 2s discussion of attribution theory).Social projection is stronger when the target person is similar to self. In an intergroup con-text this suggests that people will project self attributes onto the ingroup to a greater extentthan the outgroup (Marks & Miller, 1987). This ingroup-outgroup projection asymmetrymay help to explain intergroup bias in the minimal group paradigm. Since people generallyhave a favourable self-concept (Baumeister, 1998; Sears, 1983), projection of positive self-beliefs onto others in ones ingroup (but not outgroup) leads to a perception that the ingrouppossesses more favourable attributes than the outgroup (see Otten & Wentura, 1999).Previous demonstrations of this theory have been restricted to minimal group settings, whereingroups are not defined by an existing knowledge base, and where projection is functionalbecause it provides information about groups where there is none (satisfying drives towardsuncertainty reduction and cognitive efficiency). As such, it may be more applicable whengroups are new to people (e.g. when going to university and figuring out what it means to bean university student what attitudes and behaviours one is supposed to have).

Associative LearningWhile social projection might provide a good explanation for how people come to seenovel ingroups as more positive than outgroups, when people have had a lot of experienceof their own group, and other groups, then another explanation can apply. From work onlearning we know that classical conditioning is a way that animals and people learn byobserving associations between stimuli in their environment. Some psychologists havesuggested that this process could help to explain prejudice. The argument is that in thecourse of growing up, we are constantly bombarded with opinions about all sorts of things.Some of these opinions refer to social groups. As children we will hear others discussingdifferent social groups and we are likely to be exposed to more positive language beingused to refer to our own groups and more negative language being used to refer to

other groups. It therefore follows that we might develop more positive association with ourown group, and more negative associations with outgroups which over time becomeautomatized (Bargh, 1984; Devine, 1989). Staats and Staats (1958) have demonstratedhow this process might work: they found that repeated pairings of Dutch and Swedish


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names with positive and negative words respectively led to corresponding positive andnegative feelings towards these national groups.

The idea that generalized positive and negative feelings towards groups can becomeautomatized via associative learning has an important consequence: we might be unable tocontrol the arousal of such feelings when we think about ingroup and outgroup members.In Chapter 2 we discussed automatic behaviour and stereotyping, and the same principlesapply here. If someone has experienced a particular group being associated with negativefeelings over and over again, whenever they subsequently think about that group member,according to the associative learning principle, they should then, without awareness orcontrol, experience the corresponding affective state.

Intergroup bias, as we have discussed in this chapter, can be defined by having morepositive feelings towards ingroup members or negative feelings towards outgroupmembers. If the associative learning principles outlined above apply, we should thereforeautomatically think of more positive associations with ingroup names, and negative associa-tions with outgroup names. The strength of these associative links can be measures using

response times to lexical decision tasks. For example, if positive words are associatedwith ingroup-related words (e.g. for nationality, names of people that clearly indicate anationality such as Pierre, Nikita, or Brad) then one should facilitate response times to theother. So, identifying a positive word as positive (and not negative) should be quicker whenthe word preceding it is also a word with positive connotations. If ingroup, but not out-group, words facilitate responses to positive words, this therefore implies that ingroup, butnot outgroup, words are associatively positive.

There is much evidence for these associative links. For instance, Fazio, Sonbonmatsu,Powell, and Kardes (1986) showed that black and white faces facilitated responses topositive and negative words depending on the race of the participant (i.e. ingroup facesfacilitated responses to positive words but not to negative words). Dovidio, Evans, andTyler (1986) showed similar effects with black and white category labels instead of faces.

Even generic ingroup and outgroup designators show this effect. Perdue, Dovidio,Gurtman and Tyler (1990) showed how this tendency to see ingroups as associatively pos-itive and outgroups as associatively negative can be seen even in the most basic forms inlanguage. They found that priming with the word weled to faster response times to deter-mining the valence of subsequent positive words than negative words (see Figure 6.5).

These forms of implicit associations have huge implications for understanding thenature of unintended racism in our societies. For instance, an implicit association betweenrace and criminality has been observed by a number of researchers. Payne (2001) foundthat white participants who had been subliminally exposed to black faces were more likelyto mis-perceive a tool as a weapon than participants exposed to white faces. Such implicitassociations have clear implications for issues of racial bias in criminal law proceedings.Measurement of implicit biases on any number of category dimensions race, age,

nationality is now commonplace. The most commonly used measure is the ImplicitAssociation Test, a test that has proven tremendously robust in detecting such biases,although it has also sparked fierce debate over the nature of so-called implicit prejudice,see Text Box 6.3.

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900

950

1000

850

800

750

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R e a c t

i o n

t i m e

Positive Negative

Trait connotation

Ingroup prime Outgroup prime

Figure 6.5 Response times taken to identify positive and negative traits following genericgroup designators. Data from Perdue et al. (1990)

The Implicit Association Test (IAT)The IAT, developed by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998), measures the degree to which anindividual has an automatic preference for a group to which they belong (e.g. white) over a group to which they do not belong (e.g. black). An example of a race (black/white) IAT, which involvesseveral stages, is outlined below. At each stage, participants were required to react as quickly andas accurately as possible.

1. Participants are presented with photographs of faces one at a time in the middle of acomputer screen. They are required to categorize each face as either black (using a key on the left side of the computer) or white (using a key on the right side of the computer).

2. Participants are presented with positive or negative words one at a time in the middle of the

computer screen. They are required to categorize each word as either positive (using the leftkey) or negative (using the right key).

(Continued)

T E X T B O X 6 . 3


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3. Participants are presented, one at a time, with a random mix of the photographs and thewords. Each key now has a dual meaning. The left key now signifies black and positive, while the right key now signifies white and negative.

4. Stage 2 is repeated, but this time using the left key for negative and the right key for positive.5. Stage 3 is repeated, but this time the left key signifies black and negative, while the right key

now signifies white and positive.

To calculate an IAT score for an individual, participants average response time at stage 3 andstage 5 are compared. If a participant is quicker at stage 3 than stage 5, they have a pro-black bias; they find it easier to respond when black is paired with positive words and white with negativewords. If a participant is quicker at stage 5 than stage 3, they have a pro-white bias, finding iteasier to respond when white is paired with positive words and black with negative words.

Greenwald and colleagues (1998) got Korean and Japanese participants to complete the IAT. Thegraph on the right shows theirfindings. Both Koreans andJapanese were much faster toassociate their own group(rather than the outgroup) withpositive attributes.

This implicit ingroup favouritism is a very robust finding,emerging in a great many studiesusing a variety of differentgroups.

SUMMARY

The IAT has been used to assessa range of implicit intergroupattitudes, on the basis of race,gender, nationality and age.Participants frequently show more ingroup favouritism on the IAT than on self-reported attitudemeasures, leading some to argue that the IAT reveals peoples true outgroup attitude that theywould rather keep hidden. However, there is a fierce debate regarding exactly what the IAT mea-sures. In contrast to those who believe that the IAT is a measure of attitudes (e.g. Greenwald et al.,1998), others argue that it simply reflects participants exposure to associations in their social envi-ronment (e.g. Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). A white person, for example, is exposed to more positive

white role models and more negative black stereotypes. This, rather than an endorsement of theseattitudes, may explain a pro-white bias on the IAT.

800

700

600

500 S p e e

d o

f r e s p o n s e

( i n m

i l l i s e c o n

d s )

Korean JapaneseParticipant

Korean/pleasant, Japanese/unpleasantKorean/unpleasant, Japanese/pleasant

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T E X T B O X 6 . 3 ( C O N T I N U E D )


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The idea that people have implicit biases is now well-established in research onprejudice, but we should not conclude from this that such implicit biases are outside of ourcontrol. Although early research painted a depressing picture of peoples ability to controlactivation of negative associations with outgroups, subsequent research has shown thatthere are considerable individual differences in the degree to which this occurs (e.g.Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999), and that exposure to people who discon-firm negative stereotypes of outgroups can change these automatic tendencies (e.g. Blair,Ma, & Lenton, 2001). As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the desire to self-regulate and adhere to egalitarian goals can, over time, reduce the spontaneous activationof negative affect associated with outgroups (Devine & Monteith, 1999).

Summary

In this section we have talked about intergroup theories of prejudice. We have described

Sherifs classic summer camp study. This observational study showed us that competitionbetween groups for scarce resources can accentuate intergroup conflict (as outlined by real-istic group conflict theory ), but that there were also spontaneous social comparisons assoon as the groups were formed, before any competition. This suggested that perhaps therewas something simply about being categorized that leads to some level of ingroup bias. Insubsequent more controlled experiments carried out by Tajfel in his minimal group para-digm , the idea that mere categorization was enough to elicit some degree of bias was con-firmed. So, even though the ingroup and outgroup labels used in these experiments had noimplications for the aims of individuals (to amass money), participants still allocated morepoints to the ingroup than the outgroup. Analysis of the matrices used to measure the pointsallocations suggested that maximal differentiation was more important to participants thanmaximal ingroup profit that is, participants appear to be driven more by a desire to dif-

ferentiate themselves from the outgroup than to amass most points for the ingroup. Doisescategory differentiation model provides an account of how the desire to create a simplified,meaningful impression of the social context leads to differentiation, but it cannot account forthe ingroup favouring direction of this differentiation. For this we need other theories, suchas social identity theory , which argues that people want positive distinctiveness from out-groups, so as to acquire a positive social identity (positive self-esteem via association with apositively valued group). There are other theories that can also, however, explain why ingroupsare persistently seen as more positive than outgroups. These include self-categorizationtheory and the idea that a positive and distinct social identity reduces subjective uncertaintyby providing normative expectancies about ingroups and outgroups. Self-anchoring theoryargues that for novel ingroups, we project our own positive attributes to create a positivenorm, but we dont do this for outgroups. Finally, for more established groups, there is theidea that implicit associations between ingroup membership and positivity develop an auto-matic tendency to like ingroups more than outgroups over time. In the final section of thischapter we return to what Sherif tried to do in Stage 3 of his summer camp studies: reduceintergroup bias.



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REDUCING PREJUDICE

The Contact Hypothesis

According to the contact hypothesis , contact between members of different social groups,under appropriate conditions, can lead to reductions in intergroup bias. Allport (1954)argued that a number of conditions were necessary for contact to be successful at reducingprejudice. First, social norms favouring equality must be in place. In other words, thesocial conditions (government policy, schools, and laws) should all promote integration.We can make a link here with cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) which we discussedin Chapter 3 on attitudes. When attitudes are not in line with behaviour this causes anunpleasant internal state. People are motivated to avoid this dissonance. So they changetheir attitudes to be in line with behaviour. It follows that laws which prevent discrimina-tory behaviour can therefore eventually lead to changes in attitudes. Second, contact mustoccur under conditions of equal social status. If the minority group has contact with themajority group as a subordinate then this is likely to perpetuate negative stereotypes of inferiority. Third, contact must involve cooperation to achieve a common goal. Sherif

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The minimalgroup paradigm

Self-anchoringtheory

Self-categorizationtheory

Social identitytheory

Categorydifferentiation

Associativelearning

PREJUDICE

Sherifs summercamp studies

INTERGROUPTHEORIES


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(1966) showed that cooperation and common goals were necessary for reductions in bias.However, Blanchard et al. (1975) found that cooperation worked best when the outcomeof the superordinate goal is successful.

Since the theory was originally proposed, a large number of additional necessary condi-tions have been added. It has been suggested, for example, that initial intergroup attitudesshould be favourable, and that the interaction should be pleasant and rewarding (Amir, 1969).However, the most important condition to be added to the theory is the need for sustained close contact . Contact must be of sufficient frequency, duration, and closeness to allow thedevelopment of meaningful intergroup relations (acquaintance potential; Cook, 1978).Supporting this idea, in a survey of 3,800 participants from all over Europe, Pettigrew (1997)found that the more friends from minority groups that participants had, the less prejudicethey showed and the more sympathy and admiration they had for those groups. The effect of neighbour and co-worker contact on prejudice was considerably weaker. Thus, cross-group

friendship seems to be a particularly effective form of intergroup contact.Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, and Ropp (1997) recently illustrated that even knowl-

edge that other people in your group have friends in the outgroup can reduce intergroupbias, a phenomenon referred to as extended contact (see Textbox 1.2 in Chapter 1 for moredetails of this study). In the first phase of the experiment, participants were divided intotwo small groups (formed ostensibly on a random basis). Ingroup solidarity was createdby having group members work together on a series of cooperative tasks designed to cre-ate ingroup familiarity and liking. In the second phase of the experiment, intergroup rivalrywas generated by having the two groups compete against one another on a series of tasks.To enhance intergroup conflict, each team was given a negative evaluation from the oppos-ing group following each task. In the third phase of the experiment, one participant fromeach group was randomly chosen to take part in what they were led to believe was a dif-ferent study. The chosen participants together completed a closeness-building task (Aronet al., 1997) that had previously been shown to create high levels of interpersonal close-

ness among pairs of stranger in a short period of time. Finally, these two participantsreturned to their previous groups and were asked to discuss the experience with the rest of the group, in order to bring everyone up to date.

At each stage of the experiment, participants were asked to divide $500 between the twoteams. The findings revealed that participants showed intergroup bias (allocating moremoney to the ingroup than the outgroup) even after phase 1, following categorization butbefore the introduction of intergroup competition (see Sherifs summer camp studies).Intergroup bias was even greater following the introduction of competition in phase 2.However, after learning about the positive intergroup contact experience of one groupmember in the final phase of the experiment, even participants not directly involved in thecloseness-building task showed a reduction in intergroup bias.

Despite its successes, the contact hypothesis has often been subject to two major criti-

cisms, although both of these have now been addressed in contemporary research. The firstcriticism was that the contact hypothesis failed to specify how the effects of contact wouldgeneralize beyond the immediate situation to other situations and from the individualsinvolved in the contact to the entire outgroup. For instance, if a white person and a black person have a friendly, positive interaction with one another, although they will likely



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develop a positive opinion of one another, how can be we be sure that (a) they would benice to members of the other ethnic group in other situations, and (b) they would have amore positive attitude towards the other ethnic group in general ? Contact may also lead tosubtyping of individuals involved in the contact away from the group representation. Thewhite person in the previous example may, for example, decide that although they like theblack person they met, this person is unusual, an exception to the rule, and therefore can-not be considered representative of black people in general. As a consequence, category-based prejudice would remain.

Hewstone and Brown (1986) have argued, however, that contact can generalize to theoutgroup as a whole when the ingroup and outgroup members taking part in the contactencounter are regarded as sufficiently typical or representative of their groups, and so can-not be subtyped away from the group so easily (Wilder, 1984). They argued that for this tohappen, group memberships must be psychologically salient during contact (Johnston &Hewstone, 1992). In other words, group members must be aware of their respective groupmemberships during the interaction. This fits in with the multicultural perspective: the

idea that colour-blind policies (ignoring group membership) are not effective and thatgroup differences need to be embraced, and seen in a positive light.

A second criticism of the contact hypothesis was that it became overly complex, as aresult of researchers specifying many conditions that need to be met for intergroup contactto reduce prejudice. The theory became essentially unfalsifiable, as few contact situationswould meet all the conditions specified (Hewstone, 1996). Recently, however, a number of theorists have argued that none of the proposed conditions are essential ; instead, they facil-itate the effect of intergroup contact in reducing prejudice (e.g. Brown & Hewstone, 2005).Supporting this argument, in a meta-analysis of 515 contact studies, Pettigrew and Tropp(in press) found that although contact which met Allports original conditions led to thegreatest reductions in prejudice, prejudice reduction still occurred in their absence.

The Common Ingroup Identity Model

One of the consequences of contact is that it can change how people perceive differentia-tion between ingroups and outgroups. This idea forms the basis of the common ingroupidentity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), which is a second approach to reducing inter-group bias. While the common ingroup identity model arose from research into contact,and can be seen as outlining some of the cognitive consequences of contact, it can alsoexplain how bias can be reduced outside of contact settings.

According to the model contact can lead to recategorization from a two-group (usvs. them) representation to a one-group representation. Recall that category differenti-ation between ingroups and outgroups is a prerequisite for intergroup bias (Doise, 1978):

we cannot discriminate against them if they are not seen as different and distinct fromus. Gaertner and Dovidio argue, based on principles outlined by self-categorization the-ory (Turner et al., 1987), that when members of two groups engage in cooperativecontact, bias is reduced because group members form a new common ingroup identitythat includes both ingroup and outgroup members (remember stage 3 of Sherif s summer

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camp study, where the two groups of boys had to work together to get the bus back tocamp in time for lunch). By working cooperatively, a new ingroup is formed and as suchthe same processes that lead to ingroup favouritism in the first place will now apply tothe new common ingroup which includes the former outgroup member. For all the rea-sons why ingroups are evaluated more positively than outgroups that we have discussedearlier, everyone including the former outgroupers will be seen as positive in therecategorized common ingroup.

Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, and Dovidio (1989) carried out a minimal group paradigmexperiment to test their model. Two minimal groups were formed in the same way asdescribed earlier in this chapter. There were three conditions: two-groups versus one-groupversus individuals. Gaertner and Dovidio wanted to test whether forming a commoningroup would reduce bias in a way that was distinct from something called decategoriza-tion . Decategorization describes when people stop using categories to form an impressionof others, and instead see them as individuals. This is like moving from thinking about oth-ers in intergroup terms to interpersonal terms (Tajfel, 1978; see the discussion earlier in

this chapter) or shifting from a categorical mode of perception to a individuated mode of perception (see Chapter 2 and the discussion of dual process theories). Although decate-gorization should reduce bias, because it implies a focus on individual characteristicsrather than using stereotypes (see Chapter 2), it is limited in that it only applies to thespecific outgroup member involved in the task there is no generalization of positiveaffect to other outgroup members, and so no overall improvement in intergroup relations(see the discussion of subtyping above). Gaertner and Dovidio argued that recategorizationwould not be limited in such a way because a common ingroup reduces bias by recatego-rizing at a new level, rather than abandoning categorization altogether.

In Gaertner et al.s (1989) experiment participants either sat round a table in a segregated(AAABBB) or integrated (ABABAB) pattern. In these seating patterns participants had totake part in a problem-solving exercise requiring either the original (segregated seating)

groups decision, a decision to be given by each individual (integrated seating), or anaggregated groups decision (integrated seating). In the problem-solving phase the partic-ipants in the two-group (segregated seating) condition retained their original group names(A vs. B). In the individuals condition participants had individual nicknames, and in theone-group (integrated seating) condition participants were given a new single name thatincluded everyone who had been in the original two different groups.

The first thing to note is that reduced bias was observed in both the one-group and indi-viduals conditions compared to the baseline condition. What is interesting is that this wasachieved in two distinct ways. In the individuals condition bias was reduced due to adecrease in the evaluation of the ingroup. This is consistent with decategorization: if thecontext has moved from being intergroup to interpersonal then the typical boost in evalu-ation enjoyed by ingroup members when group contexts are made salient will be reversed

(Brewer, 1979). In contrast, bias was reduced in the one-group condition due to an increasein the evaluation of the outgroup (see Figure 6.7). This is consistent with the predictionsof the common ingroup identity model. Bias is reduced because former outgroup memberscome to be seen as new ingroup members in the recategorized common ingroup. Whengroups are formed, bias is created because ingroups are evaluated more positively than



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outgroups. Following recategorization, however, the former outgroups, who are now in anew common ingroup, will be evaluated positively. In further support of this idea, someadditional measures that directly assessed whether participants perceived people as twogroups or one overall group shows precisely what would be predicted (see Figure 6.8).

Subsequent research has offered much support for the idea that creating a commoningroup can reduce intergroup bias. Importantly, it is not only contact that can lead to theformation of common ingroups, but a range of other factors from simply getting people towear the same coloured lab coats (Worchel et al., 1978) though to making them moreaware of a superordinate inclusive identity (Crisp, Stone, & Hall, 2006). Even puttingpeople in a good mood, by giving them a chocolate bar, can create a common ingroupidentity (Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, & Lowrance, 1995).

Crossed Categorization

A third approach to reducing prejudice and intergroup bias, crossed categorization , is based onencouraging people to use many different ways of categorizing people, rather than thinkingabout others all the time in terms of race, gender or age. Getting people to realize that membersof minority groups should not be pigeonholed into just one category, that there are all sortsof other ways they can be described, should reduce bias according to any single basis for

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categorization. Put simply, this crossing of categorizations reduces prejudice because rather thanapplying a negative stereotype to someone just because they are a member of a stigmatizedgroup, people come to realize that social categories are fluid, flexible and dynamic, and that

there are many different (and positive) ways in which anyone can be described (see Roccas &Brewer, 2002). As such, the impact of any one negatively-valued identity should be reduced.There are a number of studies that support the idea that getting people to appreciate the

complexity of social categorization can reduce intergroup bias. Crisp, Hewstone and Rubin(2001) asked university students to think about a number of different categorizations thatthey could use to describe someone from a rival university, other than this simple outgroupstatus. Their findings can be seen in Figure 6.9. In line with predictions, thinking about themultiple different ways that others can be construed did indeed reduce intergroup bias.

There has also been some work applying this kind of crossed categorization approach toeducational settings in an attempt to develop interventions to reduce prejudice. Accordingto cognitive-developmental theory, the categorization process is somewhat rigid duringearly childhood, particularly regarding the ability to classify objects into categories(Piaget, 1965). In order to try to better develop the ability to see others as being potentiallyclassifiable along multiple dimensions, Bigler and Liben (1992) created a task throughwhich primary school children were taught to classify along multiple dimensions. Everyday, for a period of one week, participants were given one set of 12 pictures of men andwomen engaging in stereotypically feminine (e.g. hairstylist, secretary) and stereotypically


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Figure 6.8 Perception of the experimental context as a function of common ingroupcategorization. Data from Gaertner et al. (1989)


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masculine (e.g. construction worker, truck driver) occupations. Children then practisedsorting these pictures along both gender and occupation dimensions.

Bigler and Liben (1992) tested their multiple classification training method among 5 to10-year-old children attending a summer school programme. They found that while beforethe training, less than 3 per cent of participants were competent at multiple classification,after training 95 per cent were able to classify a long multiple dimension. Importantly, par-

ticipants who had acquired multiple classification skills showed significantly less genderstereotyping than participants who had not acquired multiple classification skills. Thisresearch shows that multiple classification skills may become an important thing to includein our curriculum if we are to achieve the aim of a more egalitarian society.

Summary

In this section, we talked about three theories of prejudice reduction. According to thecontact hypothesis , contact between members of different social groups can lead to reduc-tions in int

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