Material PowersCultural studies, history and the material turn

Edited byTony Bennettand Patrick Joyce

Hl livJl:"9ff",LONDON AND NEW YORK

1 Matter and materialismA brief pre-history of the prescnt

Joltrt Frotr

I

Fol the last I ra l f - centr t r ) or thereabotr ts the l inkccl c()ncel) ts ol ' lhc nratcr ia l .

rnatcr iu l i ty and nratc l ia l isnr hur. 'c r" 'o lkcd in thc social ancl humart sciertccs as

a r e rv part icular k in i l o l ' te ' t ish. [ ) is tant ly 'der i r ing l l -onr the t racl i t i t ln ol 'd ia lect ic l l

t t t l te l . | l r l is t t t . t l te i r t t re I t ( ) ln l \u\ \c l ' i ( ) r . ls tor t t r t t i t r t te l t I lo i r r t te l l t0r lo l ( 'g) l l l i r l s i lu l r le:

cul tural or pol i l ical , legal or erpcr ier t t i l l nrat le Is in rc l l l i r tn to st tc ia l pou'er, social

inst i tut ions. econon.r ic lbrccs. or sourc buncl lc t l iereol . \ 'et thc uort l ' rnater ia l '

hcre is not scl l ' -explrurator) , s ince' i t t loes not havc a great dcal to c lo "r ' i th

thc

type ol ' l t l rcc. causal i tv. e l l icacl ' . and obst inucv I . ton- l tun. tan i tctants 1- lossess in

thc rror ld. " l \ lat tcr" . . . is a I i ighlv pol i t ic iscd in lcrprctat ion ol 'causal i t r ' ' (LatoLrr .

2005: 7(r) .

Lel nre begin rnl 'crplorat ion o1' t l re antccedents and the apor ias of these

conccpts r i i th a re l l re sL'ntat i \ c. i l ' Lrrrusual lv eornplcr at td nrtancccl . craniplc

o1'their usagc. In thc l9tt0 col lect ion [)t 'ol t l t tr t . t i t r X' lutt ' r iul istrr urtLl Culturc,

descr ib ing thc der e lo1'rnrent o1' thc phi losophical posi t ion hc cal ls 'cul tLrral

nratcr ia l isnr ' . I tayrnond \ \ ' i l l iarrrs *r ' i tes ol ' t l rc enrphasis hc had conrc to pluce'on t l re prot l t rct ion ( t r therthln only l l rc rcprr l t l t rct ion)of ' rneunings ancl values by

spcci l ic sociul lbrnrat ior . rs. orr thc ccntral i tv ol ' lauurtrgc ant l corurrrrrrr icat ion as

lbrrnl t ive social t i r rccs, ant l on t l tc conrplex intcract i ( )n both ol- inst i tLr t ic lns and

lblnrs ancl o l 'sociul re lut ionslr i t ' rs lncl l i r lnral convcrt t iot ts ' . ( 'u l tLrral r t ta lcr ia l isnt .

hc cont intres. rs

l r t l lcorv ol 'cul t r r re as a (s()c i l l lant l r r ratc l iu l )procl t rct i r c pr()ccss ant l of 'spcci l ic

1 ' r ract iccs, of 'ur ts ' . ns social uscs ol- n luter ia l r t tcans ol 'proclLrct ion ( f r tnr

lantuagc as uratc l ia l "pruct ical col tsciotrsr tess" to t l te speci f ic tcclrnologics

ol ' u l i t i r rg anr l l i r r rus ol ' nr i t i r tg. t l t lorrgh to nrcchl tn ic l t l and clectrort ic

c()nlnrun lc l l t lon systenrs ) .(Wi l l iarns. l ( ) t iO: 2l l )

Iu lhcsc passages. as i r t nuuty othcrs r t t \ \ ' i l l iarus's ()cu\rc. r ' r 'c u ' i tncss a proccss

o1' lnrnslat ion l rv r ih ich an older ] \ larr ist lungrragc ol 'base ancl superstructurc is

recast to assinr i late t l re 'supcrst |uctures' ( ' rncanings and Values' . cul ture. langUage

n

26 John Frov'

and communication) to the fbrces of production, and ir.r the same movementthe aestheticising language of literary and cultural criticism (fbrmal conventions,culture, the 'arts') is displaced into the language of practice, of materiality, and oftechnology.

These are familiar enough moves in the trajectory of Western Marxism awayfiom the crippling metaphors of reduction, derivation and determination withwhich Marxist orthodoxy accounted for the domain of culture. They governWill iams's repeated asseftion of the 'rnateriality' of cultural production (cf.Milner, 1993:62-63\ or, to take a more finely-grained example, his insistence ontreating writ ing as a system not of signs but of notations (Will iams, 1977:. 169).'Notations' puts the emphasis on a process rather than its result, and displacesattention frorn meanings to the physical particularity of the mark on the page.

Yet that particularity cannot be the whole point, for the difference betweenwriting and those objects (paintings, for example) whose semiotic force lies in theirdifference from every other such objectl is that the notations making up writ ingare necessarily repeatable, unless our interest is in type-faces or calligraphy, weattend not to the variations between notations but to the element of commonalitythat we call meaning. It is true, of course, that meaning is inflected by what wethink of as the materiality of the signifier: by intonation and cadence as they arecarried by the voice, by font and layout, by script; yet these signifiers are also, forthe most part, repeatable; it is not their materiality of itself that matters but theirrepeated organisation of phonic and graphic matter.

The invocation of materiality thus seems to me either wrong or trivial: trivialbecause no one doubts that n-reanings and practices are always and necessarilymaterially embedded; wrong because it is not the materiality of meanings andpractices that gives them their social fbrce but rather the particular social andcultural frameworks that govern how they are deployed. What puzzles me,and what I want to explore here, is how readily the concept of the materialhas come to act as a shorthand for something quite different (Bhaskar, forexample, casually notes that in Marx's 'practical materialism' the concept ofmatter' is to be understood in the sense of "social practice"': a non-sequitur foranybody not in the know) (Bhaskar, 1983: 327): and I'll ask whether it is worthhanging on to this shorthand that shores up a truth claim rather than doing seriousintellectual work.

I I

Philosophical rnaterialism in the West is carried in two major waves: that ofclassical antiquity, and that of the European Enlightenment.' The former developsaround an ontological question about the basic stuff of the universe and how itis organised, and its most interesting answer is the thesis that the fundamentalmatter of being is atoms moving in random motion through the void. The GreatDiakosmos, a lost work written by one or both of Leucippus and Democritus inthe Athens of the late fifth century BCE, argues that moments of organisation of

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. \ lut l t , t ' t tnd ttruteriul i .stt t 27

mattcrconre about as a resul t of thc col l is i t )n ol atonrs. resul l ing i r r ror t ices r ih ichpush the heavier atolns to l l te ccrttrc und lhus lbrrn bocl ies. ln t lre laler rvork ol 'l ip icurus and o1'Lucret iLrs. i t is thc s l ight c lcr iat ion of at()nrs l iom uni f i r rnr nrot iorr

that procluces col l isiclns. r 'ort ices at ld thLrs mor)ients t l f landonr ort ler in a context

of 'universal cntr()py. Irr this tradit iorr conscic' l rslress. too. is undcrstoocl in ternrsof the inrpact of u lonrs upon t l ic hurnan senses. und thus us a l turely physicalpr0cess.

' l he nrater ia l isrn o1' l l ie l :uropcan l :n l ightcnnrcnt is int inrately connectcd wit l tthe cxpcrir-netttal rnetlrocl ol ' t l te rte r i phy'sics antl i ts rel irsal ol ' r-ron-ntatcrialexplanat ions of ' physical pr()cesscs. l he nrcthodologicr l start ing point t i r r suchr i r i ters as ( iasscndi ancl I Iobbes is art assunrpt ion thal thelc is no part o1' thc unir e lsclhat is t . tot a material botly. and that no part ol-thc unive rse contuins no bocly; changeand variat ion take placc through the rnotion ancl contact ol 'botl ics. aud senstt ion isan interchangc bct*een tuo matcr ia l cnt i l ics. ' l 'he ccntr l l phi losophical quest ionshere tend tc'r bc not so nruclt aboi l t the prirnorcl ial stul- l 'of the unive'rsc as aboulthe laws ol ' tnotion and interaction of trodies. and thc relat ior.rs betrveen nratler anclconsciousrtess: that is to sa1' . the re lat ior t o l 'secondary represcntat ions ol 'mal ter lornattcr( is thought ulso rnaterial. or is i t cl i l lc 'rcnt in kind l ionr niattcr ' .) Or. as Marxsuccirrct ly put i t , 'can nratter think' ' ) l ()b l i t iVlutaric nitht dt ' trken l ;6nndll IMarx.1975: l2 l i l ; . ln the later phases ol ' thc t in l ighter)nrenl in thc r iork of La Mcttr ie.

d 'Holbach and Helvet ius thcsc rplcst ions shi l i on the onc hand into c l lcst lo l ts

of causalr ty and dcternr in isrn c l rganisecl by thc l igurc of '1he rnachine. and on thcother into the systernat ic cr i t ic luc ol ' rc l ig ion.

At the core of both ol ' these tracl i t ions is an assunrpt ion that nrat ter is in s.rnrescnsc fundan.rcntal ancl indepcnclent ol 'hunrarr rcpreseutations ol ' i t . What rnightbe nreant by the tcrrn ' rnat ter ' i tsel f is . of coursc. a nrore conrplex c luest ion.I r ronr thc encluir ics o1-the loniarr nretaphysic ians of '600 B( ' onwards, thc keyquest ion has been aboLrt the r taturc o1' that substance thal urrder l ies the nrul t ip l ic i ty

ol ' i ts instant iat ions: uhat Robcrt Boyle in l6(16 cal led 'one universal ntat ter ,conmron to al l bodics, an extcndecl. dir, isible. nncl inrpenctrable substance' (cluotccl

in Toulur in and Goodf ic ld, 1962: 180). IVat lcr in th is sense is an abstract ion l iorn

the nrater ia ls o1' the wor l t l . Alomisrn ar ls\ \ers thc pr i rnan'cprcst ion about the basicstut l ' ( thc rvorkl is r) lade up ol 'part iclcs ancl thc lbrces thut hold thcm together orapart f i r rces that Lmpcdoklcs c l l lecl 'Lore and Str i te ' ) ; but i t g ives rnuch lesssatisl irctory answers to lhc cluestiou ol 'hou'this stul ' l 'beconrcs cl i l ' lerentiatecl intothe actual r . 'ar iety ol 'spcci f ic lbrnrs. Var ious cont inLr ist theor ics posi t a pr inciplc

or a nrediurn ol 'organisat ion r) t - l r l i l t ter : the Stoics ' l r i let t i l tu. Nerr ton's aethcr. orthe l i rrce l ielcls ol 'contcn.lp()rary physics al l scck to nrove beyoncl thc nol ion ol 'a rncrely randon'r agglonrerat ion olpart ic lcs. I1 ' r 'e lat i re ly stablc ansrvers scernedlo curcrgc r . i ' i th in the t iame*ork of- t l ic Neutoni i ln cosrrros. ho*crer. they havebcen greal ly corrpl icatccl rv i th thc elncrqcnce ol 'c luanturrr mcchanics. where thecoulponcnts ol 1hat costnos tnass attcl encfg). parl icles ancl l i rrces lrave corueincrcasinglv to be secrr as nr()nrents ol 'each other rather than anir lvt ical l i , 'd ist inct

cnt l l re s.

28 Jtshn Fntv'

I I I

My cclncenr here. hclrvever. is not dircctly rvith these questions, but rather with thetbrmation ol-the versions of materialisrn associated with Marx. since I take it that itis these materialisn.rs and the nrodels of causal interaction associated with them thatf-eed rrrost strongly ir.rto conternporary uses of the concept ofmateriality in the socialand hurnan sciences. Marx alu'ays explicit ly associated hirnself with the materialisttradition; his doctoral dissertation explored the diflerences between the atonticmaterialisnrs of Dernocritus and Epicurus, and his decisive break with Hegelwas mediated by Feuerbach's n-raterialist inversion of Hegel's idealist ontology.ln Marx's earliest u'orks the fbrce of materialisrn is primarily to underpin thecrit ique ofreligion, which he sees as being central to any process ofrevolutionarychange; rvith the ' ' fheses on Feuerbach', however, the simple opposition of ananthropological materialism to an ultimately theological idealism is cornplicatedby an asserlion of the constitutive role of human praxis in the shaping of the worldand our knowledge of i t .

What is striking about the ' ' Iheses' is the way they explicit ly nlarry nlaterialistand idealist positior.rs in seeking to move beyond what fbr Marx is the passiveway in which Feuerbach conceives of the external world as an objective given.Avineri, contrasting Marx's position with Engels's later rnechar.rical materialism,sumnrarises its originality as well as its continuing indebtedness to Hegel aslbllows:

Marx's postulate about the ultirnate possibil i ty of human self:emancipationmust be related to his philosophical premise about the init ial creationol' the world by rnan. Philosophically such a view is a secular verslonof the l-legelian notion that actuality fWirklichkeit] is not an external,objective daturn, but is shaped by human agency. For Hegel this shaping isperfbnned by consciousness; Marx extricates the activist elernent of Hegel'sdoctrine fiorn its metaphysical setting and combines it with a materialistepistemology.

(Aviner i , 1968: 65)

Tlris move, which was combined as early as tlte 1844 Munusc'ripts, but moresysternatically in 7'he Gernun ldeologt', with a grounding of human practice inthe systern of production of material l i f 'e (that is, in work performed in an organisedand socially systemic manner upon raw rnaterials), init iates a more complex modelof materialism than that of Helv6tius and d'Holbach or of Feuerbach.

This is the l irst sentence of the crucial f irst thesis:

The chief del'ect of all previous r.naterialisrn (that of Feuerbach included) isthat things lGegenstund\ reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the formof the ob.lect ot'oJ ('ontentplatiotr lAnst'huuungl, but not as scnsuous hunanactit,i0, lnenst'hlit'he :;innliche TLitigkeitl, pructic'e, not subjectively.

(Marx, 1976a: 3)

l , )

' ( Lr t t l t ' t t t l r l l t t io l ) ' l t t ta i : u.et l i l t t l l ! \c t l \ f I l ' re! l : l l l r l l r ) | ( ) l l l r ! ! \ le l r ] i t l \ \ r i r ] t l

i l l i l ) ! ' l i i i l l l r ) l \e l ls()r \ r l i t l i r - - l l r l l le l t l l l i l l l ) r rs l t l l l : i l i r n l i l l ( i tetr \ f (nt , i tu! 'nrc l l l \ \ r l l i

l l r t r i l t l t l . l i , t I e l l f t l ) i l ! l t ' t l t i l t l t l t i \ l )Ct l t : be i t t - - . I t , , r i , l ' ' ,1 u r l l r n i ' l ' f l \ I l l r lL l l t l

t lu l l l l l r r ' : . r ' ( in l l r )n l : t l tc t i t l i , l t r l t let l t t l l \ ( ) l r ) i i lU|e l ) i t \ \ r \ ! ' l \ i i l t \ l int | l t t i \ t l r t l r t l t . r

l l I r r r l r t l t r i l t l rnr l l ) l l r r '1 l r ' l l l \ . i l ) . r \ i l1) l r \ ' i r \ r l \ \ \ l r r . l r r ' . r t t t l t r t t r ! i l ] l )1\ ' ( \ r ' l l i l l t i j l .

l ' l r i , l - ) . l l re r lore l r t t r re rr ' l l r l i r rn t ( ' l l )a ()hlert \ \ l r l t l l l r . t l \ l iu\ l ) r r ) l ) \ r \e\ l :

. l : : r rq1.1l i1 i \ \ t l l r t l t r ' t ( l ! i r i l \ t l | iLr i r l t ( )n. \ \ l l r ( l l l r ' ) \ \ r ' \ . r ' r l r r . : t t i ) l l \ l l r r \ \ l ! i l l . \ r ' t ) \u( ,U\

i r r l r \ l t \ i i5 \ur ' l t ( \ l : r r r . l ' ) - ( [ r . i ) .

l 'nt t , t . t t r r l [ : ln l l t . I l r r ' : t r ( ) t ] I r ' i t ! t l ) ,1! l t I l \ j l l l \ l . t \ i ln i l i l l l t r r l )Lr l1r , - '11,1i

({) t ) (c l ) t ( ) l i | | l i t5() ! l i l l U)( l l \ t r l i l i t l t : l l ] l t i l l l t l . . r l r : l l l t l l t l t t i l I r l ! ' \ ( ) l i l f ( 'n( ! ' l ) l t ( ) t l

i , l l l tc l tLt t t t l t t t - : t t i ) l r ' ! l i r \ . r n! l \ \or I L, l : I r t . t l t . l , t i t t r t t . I l r r : t . r ' l r : t t i l t r l l ) \ i l

af l l i | l l l l r i t i \c er l l l ) i l ]ars l ) l l r l \ l i i r \ ' \ i t \ \c | l l r ) l l t l I i l l r r l l t r ' i r l l \ l l : r \ ' t l ( ,n ol r t lc l r l r : l

r ' r r l l r ' f l ) l l \ ) l l5 ol l l tC. t t l l let t { i l \ r ' ( ) l l \ \ ' l ( r t ls l l ! \ \ ( ) i . l ) l l l t ) ] l f \ \ l l I r i l l l ) r r : t l l re t r i t ls l t l r '

re i r l l l \ ( ) l ' l i r in l hrr t t l rn r l ( l i \ r ( iu i r l \ ' ( \ l l r r ' r . . l ' ) .1t ' i r . I I ) ( r t :e l l . o l toulsr . . r l ( ) l l le l

. l l r \ l l l t ! l i { r t l i t t r r l t t t l t l l ta r(r l l ! r ! lc ' i : Lt t t r l . t \ l ( ) rJ( l i t \ ,1 i lu. l \ l l l ) l l l r ' ( l t . l ! \ I i i l l r ! ' l

l l l l r t r l t r l t t ( ) t t \ ' r ' l ) l r ] |et l t i l l r ' r i l r r r ls t r r t t t l t t t ( ) i l \ ( ) l l ) ( ) \ \ t l t t l l l \ i . \ c t l l re l i r r . t 0 l l l t t

r ' ( r r i ! ! l ) t \ ) l l ) r i r \ r \ . l r l ( l ( t \ l ( , ( r r i tn \ l . t t r \ ! i i l l \ \ \ r l i l r l \ . t l ) ( ) \ ! i r l l . r \ l l l . r r r r l l , l l

l l l l l l \ l i ) l l l l i r l l ( ) l l ( ) l l l i r l t l lc . l t t ' t t t t l le \ \ i r \ r l L\rr l l I i l l r ' \ \ \ r l l r l l l r ' ( l t l r (1 i l ! r r l | r i l i l t t l r l

. \ ( i l l ( ) l l1\ t ( ) ! !n j l l r la i r l l l ! ( ) l \ \ ) l t l la \u l ) l ! r '1. I r ( l ( ) l ) l ! r ' l r ' l r i r r r l ' i l r .Lt l i r :e. l l r t t r i I

l ! t t t l \ i t \ t l t ( r t t l ! ' t l l \ o l l l t t : i ' r ' l l t i I t l l t l t r r t t r r r l 1r1Lr1l111 1lrr t ] . I ) l \ l ) l . t ( tn. ! .ut i l | | l l l t ( ) l ) r i l ( ' ! \

r r l l l te:Lt l r l .L l i t t r ( l i l l l l ! l i l I l t \ . t t : r r l l l l r ' ( l l l i i l ! r1;1j1, ,1r ; . ,1 \ l . r r r , ' . \ l1 l ( lu!

i l . '1 l lqr l ls i l l l i t ( f r ) l l l l t r i l l l t t r l l t : : l ) i l \ ! r l \ ) l1t i I l t \ ; r l tot t r , l l l r f \ \ \ l !nr r r l 111t '1111111,,11

.r l l \ i . l I l ) l { r l l l l i i l l I l r ! l t l t l t t . ' , t l l l r l l i r l l , r \ \ \ I t ) r n() \ l i l l l ) l ! \ ! l ) l r . r l r r r r t I l l l r t : t

I t t L r 1t , ,1 e '

I l t t r t . . l t l l l \ l l l i l l l l le lL, l l l l . . l l l i l ! ( ' , lLr l t , ' l l l , . r . l r i t t , , t l l t i t l r , ,1 I i r t . r ' t r . r l . r l r i l , ,1

t l \ 1t , t t ( l i t l l l \ \ . l i r . l t l t r l l ( ) . l r r '1111 ptr l : r !

I l te r l t te: l tot l r , l 111'11 , t l l \ ' l \ \ ( ) l l . ( ,1 l ! l , l l l ( ) l r ' I i l lL l \ ( i l i l i ) r ' r ' t ] r \ )n l l ) i r \ \ ! t l

\ \ r t l ln rr \ re\ \ t l l l r t t l r l l : r t :e l i ' r r r . r t . l i r l r \ l l r \ l r r r : l r . r l r r r . - l r l t l i r r r l i t l t i re. 'c i l l r r

\ l ru. , t t t l l tc .a l l l r t t tenl \ . I l \ ' \nr t l ) l \ \ l ra\ \c\ l l te:ert . r l r l . . l l t r . r . l t r , r l l r t t t l l t r r

l ) r ' i r ! l t ! i : lJ t r t t l re:e. l t ( \ ( ) ! l . r l { r t t l \ l )Lr ' i r r5! l l ter Ie l . r l r ' l r ) e i r ! l l o l l t r ' r . l r l l t t t

l l l t t t l l let l t t t re , ,1 l l lutr \ ! ' l l \Lr i ) l r \ t t t l r ic l l l r l t l r \ \ r ' t t l . r ' t t r , l l , , l r l l l I r r r r r r l l r l

rc l l r l l r rn\ l l t t t l : t l t f \ n l l . ! l r l I r . . r I l r r r r r . , i ' r l l r ler l i l l r

( ( ) \ l ) \ , l l ) ! . - ) t ) t t i . l ( ) t

In l ) lu l l r ' t l l . r t . l l t . t t t t l l l l r l \ l l r r r ' r r i , , r i ' l i l [ ! \ rJ i l l r . ' l l t r ' . . ' r l t . r tsr \ . l r , l t .1 l r r r , . .

r l l r ( ) i l1 t l la l ) r \ ) l ) l ! ' r l l i i l r t \ r l i l r l ( ) i l l r ) l ( ) ! \ ( ) l I l i l l l ! r I I tet . ! , in l l . nr) r r i l lur t ' r r r r l :e l l -

l l l l r l i l l l i l l l l l ( ) l l l ( ) l l ) l l ( ) l 1\r l i l i l l l t t t I t . r l t . r i l r r l \ l l l \ ! \ r1t l l l ( r rn! l t . i l t ( l t l tJ)( l r l r l ! \

t l t t l , r t t t t : r r l l l l r l ) i t l ) : r r t l t t \ . ( rn l l r ! ( ) i l1!r 1 l , ,n l \ .LI) l ) ! . l r \ ln l l l { ru. : t l r l i ln( l ln t j i l l t t \

l l \ n lL l ! l l l l t r ' . t l { r ln l \ l \ . l l t r r r l l . l ' t i - r ( / i I l t . r i r r l r r r : , . i , l \ l . t r \ l l ru\ l l i l \ r '

l i t t l . t , , t l t i $t t l t t l l r ' t t i t r i l l t ( ) r ) . t l l ) r . ( ) ! r { l l l : l l r \ r i l : r r l I l t i i r i : r r l ) l l l ( i l l l t r i t l ! r t , i l t r t | . l l r .

t l i l l i l | l r \ . i i : t l ] )o: tLr l r t t . " l l I t l l l t . ' t . l - Lrrr l r ( )1. " \u l r \ l i l i l ! . " i l r l l r t \ \ ( ) r l (1. i l ] i l l l ! ' r .

i r t t t l r ' \L l r t l t t t t . ' .1: t ( t l tot t r l t t . l r i t t1," , ' , , ) r \ . t i l r ( ) ( l r l r ! . t l r ( ) i l , ) r . i l r . l t t l ' t l )u l . ( ) l t l '

l ( ) . l rq '111. ' . l l t t ts l - ) \ i t i l r r ' r : i t r , ' . i l l r t i l r , r r t l r t ' ' r r t , ' .1( j \ \ t t i l r ) r r l r , r t I . | .11111|.

l l l r \ [ )n l r r i ln l t ] i r r l l l r , r r r u l \ l . r r r t ' l i l r , r r r r r l , i

It\F' i

n

30 John Frov'

One fbrm taken by this reading is the apparently'weak' doctrine'that somethingexists independently of thought (and mind)' (Rubin, 1977:'63). Materialism, onthis account, is not a'strong' reduction of cognition to matter, but merely assertsthe ontological distinction of the object fiom human interaction with it. Yet eventhis apparently innocuous thesis l i ts poorly with Marx's understanding of theconstitutive role of praxis, and Rubin who is at least scrupulous about whetherhis claims correspond to the text of Marx - concedes that his argument holds trueonly fbr fully natural objects, not lbr the social world. Rubin cites a passage fromThe Germun ldeologl, which apparently asserts the independence of 'externalnature'. As the culmination of a long argument that Feuerbach 'does not seethat the sensuous world around him is not a thing given direct from all etemity.remaining ever the sarne, but a product of industry and of the state of society',Marx adds the qualification that 'Of course in all this the priority of external natureremains unassailed, and all this has no application to the original men producedby generatio etluivoc:u'(1976b: 39 40); but Marx's immediate qualif ication isthen that

nature, the nature that preceded human history, is not by any means the naturein which Feuerbach lives, it is nature which today no longer exists anywhere(except perhaps on a few Australian coral islands of recent origin) and which,therefore, does not exist fbr Feuerbach.

(Marx. 1976b: 40\

Nature is now, fbr all intents and purposes, socialised, or at least Marx's wholeinterest is in the social world and its constant transformations of the natural: notmatter in itself but matter transformed into the stuff of social interaction, and'known' to the extent that it is the object of human praxis. For Rubin to object - asthe core ofhis counter-claim that 'there are distant parts ofthe universe which . . .can never by mediated by man' (1977:82) is at once trivial, contestable (sincethose 'distant parts of the universe' are known and can be posited only withina human framework), and, most importantly, irrelevant to whatever it is that is'materialist ' about Marx's wclrk.

Sebastiano Timpanaro takes this 'theological f iction of "Matter"' (Colletti,1912 10 7l ) somewhat further in arguing for a materialism that posits the priority'of the physical level over the biological level, and of the biological level overthe socio-economic and cultural level' (Timpanaro, 1975: 35). ln this view theernphasis n.rust fall not so much on human uc'tion as on 'that which is passivityand external conditioning in the human condition' (Timpanaro, 197 5:36). By thiscriterion.

Marxism, especially in its f irst phase (up to and including The GermanIdeoktgl,) is not materialism proper. Physical and biological nature is certainlynot denied by Marx, but it constitutes more a prehistoric antecedent to humanhistory than a reality which sti l l l imits and conditions man.

(Timpanaro, 197 5: 4041)

t \ l ( t l l ( t ' (ut l i l tu l?t ' iu l i \ t t t 3 l

[ : r cr t the l l te r Nlurx ancl [ rnge ls. r i I r i le thel appare nt l l ' te l t thc ncccl lbr r t .

ne\er nranagcd i ic tual ly to c()nstnrct 'u nt l r te| ia l isnr w' l r ich rvus not 1-[r re lVsocio-cconor.nic brr l a lso "r)atunl l " ' ( I i rntrarraro. 1975: :1 1 ) .

tV

I le l i rnt l both I {ubin and f i r r ipanuro s lands. ol 'coursc. t l rc suplenre thcologian ol '

nrat ter . the Lenirr ct l ' i l lutcr iu l i .s t r t unt l L,nl t i r io-( ' r ' i t i t i . tnr . lbr u 'horn 'nrater ia l isnr.

i r r l i r l l agrccrrrent r i , i th natur l l sc icncc. takes rnat ler ls pr i r rur l 'and regarcls

consciousncss. thorrght uncl sensat i r ' rn as secont lar ' ) ' ( l .cnin. 1927: 3f i ) . l i i th thc

corol lary t l iat ' thc ob. jcct exists rnr lependcnt l l ot ' the sLrb. ;cct and is rc l lected

nrorc or less adet luutely in the srrb. jcct 's nr int l ' (Lenin. 1927: 100). or . in anothcr

l i r rnrLr lat ion, is 'copicd, p l ro lograplrccl and rel lcctecl bv our scnsat ions. u, l r i le

exist ing indepcnt lent lv ol ' thcrr ' (Lenin. l917: l2f i ) . On the one hand. thcn. is

an ontologv ol 'n iat tcr and on thc othcr rrn accor.rnl o1'kno*let lge as a nrerely

dcr i rat ivc registral ion ol ' the ob. ject . ant l o1'prar is as a conl i r rn i r t i t ln rather tharr a

translbrnrat ion o1' the knor in r i .or lc l 1 ' thc pracl ice ol 'hLrnrarr i ty. by lerr l 'v ing t tur '

idcas, corroboratcs lvhat rn lhosc ic leas corrcsl-ronds to absolulc t ruth ' . Le nin. 1927:

I0i ) . - l l re se argLl l l rcnts posi t uuturc as an abstract se rreralr t r ' . ' f l rc i r cr i t ic lue is u el l

put by Schnr ic l t :

l \1e n are l rot col lce niecl in t l rc i r [ ) r ( )c luct io l l u i th nlr t tcr 'as such' , l rut

aluays r . r , i th i ts coucrele. c luant i tat i lc lv and r lLralr t r t i r 'c lv dcternr incd lbrrns ol '

cx istcrrce . l ts general t i r r r r r . i .c . i ts indcpe ndcncc of cclnscir)usne ss. cr is ls only

in pal t icul i r r shupcs. I 'herc is no l i rncl l tnrcr t tu l r rat ter . no l i rnclunrcntal q lound

o1'bcing. I \ ' latel ia l rc l l i ty 'can no nr()rc pror idc an ontolosical pr inciple in thc'bcing l i r r thc c l thcr ' i t ou es to i ts relat i r i ly to rrren. than i t can in i ts 'being- i r r -

i tsc l l " . . . Not t l ic abstract nutul 'c of r ' l iat ter . but thc c()ncrct ! 'naturc ol-social

pract icc is thc l rLrc sLrb. ject i lncl l )asis ol 'nrale r ia l is t thcorr , .

lSchnr idt . I97l : l l . -10)

, , \ n iorc product ive ual of ' Lrnclerstunding rrhat is innorut ivc aborr t IVIarx 's'n later i l l isnr 'nrust sulc ly take i ts st l l t ing poirr t . thcn. not in phi losr lphical

nratcr ia l isnr 's prcoccupat ion i l i th t l tc untolosical and cl . l is tenrological s la lus of '

nral tcr . but rathcr in that 'pract ical ur l tcr ia l isnr ' r ih ich is conccnrecl at one lerel

u ' i th thc t ransf i r rnrat i r c * ork ol 'hrrrnunkincl upon a natur i r l n ol lc l constant l l shape d

and lc-s l iapct l to i ts ertds. uncl at arrot l rcr u i th the l laf t iculur l i is tor ic l l conl igulut iorr

o1-thc l i r rccs ancl rc lut ions ol 'procl t rct ion: l l ic r rse of 'capi ta l . tools and plant. anr llau rnater ia ls r i i th in u part icrr lur 'nror le ot 'prodLrct iorr o l ' r r rater ia l l i l 'e ' rvhich

stnrclLl l 'es t l re c leut ion uncl upprol ' r r iut ion ol ' ra l t re [ rv nreans o1'spcci l ic rc la l ions

belneen () \ \ ' l rcrs urtd pr-oducer-s. I l re s l to l thant l tefnr in \ ' larr ist thorrght l i r r th is

cornpler ol" l i r rccs' und ' re lut ions' is ' thc ccononr ic blsc ' . ancl l i r r Nlarr th is sphcrc

cnibraces'both t l ie prodrrct ion ol ' t / r i r r .g.r ancl thc prot l r rct iorr (ob. icct i l icat ion)t l l '

i r / i ' r r . r ; procluctron ant l i r r te lsrr t - r . je ct i r c conrnrtrnicut ion: rnate r iu l product ion ancl t l ieprocluct iot to l 'social re l l t ions'(( 'o l lc t l i . l ( )71:(r5). .1 hisrs l ( )s l \ ' . i ts( 'o l lc t t i l t ' rue\ .

I

32 John Frow

that the economic is not 'or?c isolated./uctor, separated from the other "moments"and thereby emptied ofany elfective sock>historicul content, representing ... anantecedent sphere prior to any human mediation' (Colletti, 1912: 65). Productionand social relations cannot be separated because

In production, men not only act on nature but also on one another. Theyproduce only by coopcration in a certain way and by mutually exchangingtheir activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite relations withone another and only within these relations does their action on nature, doesproduction, take place.

(Marx, ll/age Lubour and Capital, quoted in Colletti, 1972:66)

What ernerges from this rnodel of the interaction and mutual constitution ofmornents of the social is a conception of a causality which has no outside,no externul object to be acted upon. Although the simple form in which Marxsometimes casts his account of the social - the model of base and superstructure,in which an economic instance is causally prior to the institutions of law, religion,state and culture - supposes such an exteriority, it is clear that the relations ofproduction enter into, and are formative of, every moment of the process (bywhich in turn they are shaped). There is no 'materiality' with causal force vis-d-vis social relations, indeed no ground on which such a materiality could be posited;the material is a moment of production, not the outside of the social.

Yet much of the later history of Marxist thought has to do with an 'interpretationof the "economic base" as a "purely material" or "technical-economic" domain,not including social relations and hence inter-subjective communication' (Colletti,1972: 65n.). ln the case of G.A. Cohen's influential analytic account of Marx'stheory of history, for example, the materiality of production is grounded ina distinction between 'material' forces of production and 'social' relations ofproduction, which is also a distinction between content and form: 'People andproductive forces comprise [society's] material content, a content endowed byproduction relations with social form. On entering production relations, personsand productive fbrces receive the imprint of the form these relations constitute'(Cohen, 1978: 89). First there is matter, and then it enters the social. 'Persons' areincluded as part ofthe social 'content' in so far as they are physical bodies, but thiscorporeality is distinct frorn their social being. What is wrong with this before-and-after account is its reduction of the forces of production to their materiaiity (thatof tools, plant and bodies). But it is strictly impossible to imagine technologiesapart from their uses and the systems of use that govern them; technologies arecomplexes of scientific and practical knowledge, systems ofuse, legal ownership,financial calculation, and materiality, and no moment of this complex precedesany other.

It is difficult not to conclude that the work done by the concept of the materialin the Marxist tradition - whether in the most complex fbrmulations of Marxor in the crudest reductionisms of Soviet orthodoxy is rhetorical rather thanconceptual. Berube comments that ' in law as in history as in physics ... i t is worth

\ lLt t l t ' t t t t t t l t )1( t l ( ' t t ( t l i \1t l I I

n() l i l t ! l l lc r \ \ ( )cr i r t r ( ) l t \ ) l l l te "nr i r tcI l l l " \ \ r t l l t l rc . 'b l t : r t " l t r t t l l l te "c lcI tent l r l " '

( l l i ' r ' t rbr ' . l0()5: l l0) l t i : t l tc uLr l l to l i t t 'o l t l t ts r rssoci l l r ( )n. \ \ i l l r i ts r r rc l ; rPhol ie l r l

! f ( )unr l i l rs rn l l rc t l r I r l i :nr i , l nt t r t t l l r t t t l bot l r . t l r l r t lcnt l : i t .e l l t , , i l r le 'eI i I t ior Lr l

cc()n()n) ic i lc t i \ i t \ t l r l r t PorrcI l i r l l r i r r rp l re\ l ts l ) r ' l l l lar ' \ oreI ot l rcr lcrc ls rr l lhe

:oe i l r l . I l re tor tccl . r t o l thc rnrr tcr i r r l ILr : l re : t l re t l i : t i r re t i r f l )e s\ ( ) l \ l l r r ' . , r . t lnr l r . rs

Ioulr t ls t l te nt l r ter i l r l i t r o l l l rc etrr)rrrot i i t r l l r t l re l l l l r r r t l re ln\rr i l ) t l ( ) r ) \ \ t t l ) l l ) i t ( ) l t l )c

l r r 'or 'css rrr t t l t l tc tc l l r t iorrs ol pror l t re l ion r i l r ie h t lc tc lnrrrc i ls r l r l r rc , l r , l t l t i t l r ,u ' t 't t t t t . : l t i t l l t \ l ) t ( t l \ i l t .1 t t l t t l t t iLt l . I r r t lcct l . l l le ! r 'c l t t 1. l l t l i r t lot t l l \ l l t | r ' : i i l ) i l l \ \ i \ ( ) t

capi t i r l is t p lot lLrct iorr is l t is r l iscorel t o l ' l l rc:hecr ' / i / /nr i l lcrr i r l i t r o l ' the torrrnrot l i t l

( \ lu l r . l ( ) r ( rc lJ ) .

I r t t icr l t t t tg t l t t : r ' r i l i t lLr . ' ( ) l 1 l l . e()r l ln]or l i l r l i r tnr i : :ontc l l r i t t l l ike l r n,rst l r lq iu

l i r r l t uor l t l { l l l ts t ( ) r ' l ( ) e() l l lc) i r r r i l r re l r eotnI lcr \ \ \ lcr) l \ o l r l r l r rc rrorr l t l l i rc

r i i t \ l ( ) lhc . r r t tp l re i l r . intr le r j l tcr i ln( i :e n\u()u\ n l r te l i l r l i t r ( ) l u\e \ l r l t re : . \ ct t l re

uholc rrc i l l r t o l r i l r r r l is , r t ' ig in l r l l t r t t l pct l l t l - rs st i l l r 'ornpcl l r r tg in \ l l r r r ' : *o lk

l l l \ t \ ) r l ( ) t tot l r i t l t t l t ts t t r rs l l t lL i l t but \ \ i t l r the l tn l r l r : t : o l l l rs lot . ie l t l l r pt t t ' t i t r r l l r r

\ \s len)s ol l rb: l l re l \ l luf l i ) r 'nr \ : \ \ l l l t in ln l l r ter l r l s t l r r t l r r fe: l r r r l t l r t et i r rst l i t i r r t :

thcr i r t t l - ro:e r tPon hrtr l r rn r te t ton. I l tc inr oe l r l ion ol rnr i te l i l t l i \nr \cr- \ e s ()nl \ .

lnt l I t l r ink i r r r l i l i t l l r . lo Po: i l e i t l re l t l rc l i r rees Lr l I r , r , i r ret iorr r r r t l ru eLrr lyr lcr .

o l ' l i r le e s i t r r t l re lu l ior ts ol p lor lue l rorr l ts l r p let l rse rr ls i r c or l ) t 'es\ n l l ) ( ) l lc rctr l . I l rc

i i \ \u i l l l t t i ( )n i : l l f ( ) l t lcn) l l t le. l l r ) \ \c\cr ' . t ( ) l l r f c\ l r r ) l t l l i l t l tot l t l l tc t i r r tc: l rnr l t l rc

lc l l l i ( )n\ o l 'p lot l t tc l ion i t t ro l re. ln( lcc( l luc in l l l l r l r ' ( )nslr lLr tet l br . knot lct l t :e l r r r t l

eonrnt t t t t ic l r l i re rel l t t ion:hrp:(bel t tcenPe,r I lc . r r r t t l bclr iccnl)c() l ) ]curr t l t l r i r t ls) . l t r

1ro: i t l l re gr! ' l r l f r f f l l i t \ ( ) l l l lc ' r l l r le l i l i l ' i r \ \ r . l lne\ l l l t t t l re t l i r r r i , rn l ) ( ' t \ \ ( ' ( 'n t l re lc l t l

r r r t t l t l tc : r ' r rbol tc i : est l tb l is l ret l l t t i r t r ' lo t l tc srnt l ro l i t . l lorrcrer ' . th l r t t l rstrrr t l rorr

r \ l l ( ) l ( ) l l t ( ) l ( ) ! ic . t l l i g i rer t bLt t i . l t : r rc i r t l i l r ) r l l l l \ t ( ) r ' l ! r l lcsLr l t . I he t l i : t t t t : r te r :

l soci l r l lY eottstr t te let l rc l r l i t r . wl t t t l t cot tst lLtc ls l l tc e l r lesol ic. o l t l tc rc l r l i r r r t l t l re

:r t t t l r t r l ic t t t tL l l l t i : L l t : l i t t t l t , t t t / r r '1rr t t ' /1 t l tL ' r t t . l I i i \ j i !n\ :1r 'uclLlr ! l r r l l te |et t l l r t t l te

\ i lnrc t i l l te l rs i l ts r t p l r r t lLret i l r ) r l i t r ) lor) tcnt o l 1 ' . '111 \ l r L lc lu lc: . I t i : l l r t rs rrnProt l r r t l i r e

l ( ) i r rceI t ; . r t I l ree r l t lLtc t l tc t l i : t i r r t l iorr o l ontolol i t l r l lere l : o l t l tu:oe i l r l t l r l r l t l r i :

c t r r tp le intgr,r :c: . I l rc r i iehotontr ( ) l nt i r leIr i r l i i l l r l i r ) l r ) l i r tcI l l r l . r 'c l r l i I r ( l \ \ l l l i ) ( ) l ie.

l i r t ' t 'cs t l l 'prot l r tct iot t ln( l I \n() \ \ lc t lgc. sul l l rnr tc\ lu l r l l ) lc l iur ' l r rse: c lerrrr 'n ls t l l i l t iue

bcttc l r r r tc le lstoLrt l l r . beirru iner l l re lL l t l r l i r .ct l .' l

l re l \ l l r r r rst tuot lc l o l ' l l te t lc tcr tn i t t i rn l e l l t ' r ' l i r r l r o l t l re torr tp lcr o l ' l i r lec:

l tnt l tc l l t t tons ol 'p lot l t t t t ior t r \ I r ( ) t i r ) l tnr ntc l rnrrr l l r i l \e l r \c rr r r l r te l i l r l i : r l . I l l r lhcr ' .

tc eott lc l t l r i r rk rr l i l l t : : , r t t tct l t t r rg l ik . i l ' \ ( ) ! l r l l :nr n)el lnnl ! r ] ( )1. l l l t l lc l l l \ t

I l i r r 'e. l Pol i t ie.r l t lor ' t t ' i t tc bt t t l t rer tenr l t t todcl o l t l re t l t t ts l r l I i r tee ol l l le :or ru-

ee ()n()ni lc I i l ( )nrcnl \ o l t l rc soe i l i l \ i r r , lc . ( ln i t : ret l r ru l r r c l i r r r r . t l t r : st l rcrr ta i : l l l l t t

o l l r ) ccol tont isnt . ) \ \ l l t t l l te tnot l r l I le(r \ \ i rn l \ \u l l l l \ ) \e s r : t l re Po:sibr l i tv l t l lu) \

r t t ( )n lcnI Lr l l tp l t te l rer t t l r t l ot l t t le l t : t ] r ter l t r ' r t l in l t l rc l ( ) l i r l r l \ o l l l te:otrr l l r r r t l ot

t l tc Pl i r r o l l i r re c: l i l l tut i t . l t l to. i t r !cn! ' r ' i r l l i r t t : , r l \ l rur ' lL l r ' ! r rnt l e orts lnrr i r t . l rncl

i l l l ( )nr() !cnc()ur brr l l r iet l r r t l r \cr l \ l ) i lee \ \ r t l ] in \ \ l r r t l r t l r r 'se l i r \ \ \ r ) l )et l t le. l hr . i : t i r

\ l r \ t l l i r t t l te r ' lo:et l : l t l tetc ol t l tc .or ' t l t l ts tn l i r t t l iL l i r t l r l i ' t te l r l l )nnr ' r l ) lc ( t l t l r t o1

1l1g s1' l l 'p |csclr [ \ ) r 'grnl \ i t l i ( ) l r ( ) l l r n)()( lc ol l t rot l r r r ' t r t ,n. l i i I cr l r r rPlc) r i I r r r ' l r in l i r | rns

.'q3( . , i

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31 John Fntv

all aspects of a social order equally, and which renders time a principle of rupturebetween social orders rather thar.r an inherent dimension of any order. If Nature isin one sense absorbed into the social by virtue of its constant human mediation,it continues to work nevertheless as a principle of contrast which sustains thedistinctiveness of the social world.

V

Such a rnodel of closure and of an internal hierarchy of constitutive momentsofl'ers at once too n.ruch and therelbre too little to a theory of rnateriality; it leavesno space fbr the specificity of material things, sir.rce that specificity is absorbedinto the all-encompassing principle that unifies the social totality. lt is at this point.I think, that the l imitations of the Marxist rnodel rnost clearly ernerge: not becauseit is a materialisrn, but precisely because it subsumes the material within an orderthat must always precede it. I conclude this chapter by thinking briefly about howthe material might be conceptualised in its specificity, its modesty, and withoutreduction to meaning, structure, or law.

The chapters in this volume seem to me by and large to be grappling withan alternative way of thinking about the r.nateriality of the 'material ' that owesrnuch to late twentieth-century atter.npts to rethink the importance of rnaterialculture, on the one hand, and of technology on the other, while attemptingto avoid the assurnption that artefacts and technologies are most authenticallynatter before they are the structures and uses that inform and organise matter.The crucial move here is perhaps the one that, in refusing a model of socialtotality ( 'the social '), seeks to bypass the dualistic division of the world intoelements that are permanently and essentially on one or the other side of a causaltra.jectory. Rather than thinking in terms of an opposition of inanimate materialentit ies to bodies endowed with consciousness and intention, or of more to lessreal components of the social, such a rnodel would recognise the heterogeneityboth of things and of persons in the world categories complexly ordered alongintersecting scales running from the material to the immaterial, the simple to thecomplex, the functional to the nonfunctional, the l iving to the inert, the relativelyirnmediate to the highly mediated - and the fluidiry of the relations between thesecategories.

The relevant genealogy here runs frorn Foucault and Deleuze through to actor-network theory, with important contributions from material culture theory andelsewhere. The irnporlance of Foucault lies in his formulation of a model ofontologically indifferent and open-ended structures to replace his earlier, boundedmodels of the epistenre and (to a lesser extent) the discursive formation. Thusthe dispo.sitil is defined as 'a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting ofdiscourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, admin-istrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropicpropositions. ... The apparatus fdispositi/'l itself is the system of relations thatcan be established between these elements'(Foucault, 1980: 194). But'systemof relations' here means not an internallv coherent structure but something more

Matter and materialism 35

like a 'system ofdispersion' (Foucault, 1972:38): a contingent tying-together ofunlike elements for temporary structural purposes. If it is this contingent process,rather than its apparently stable end-product, that becomes the focus ofanalysis,then any account of structure shifts from an attention to determinants, whoseeffectivity is known and calculable in advance, to the play of elements and forcesthat operate under variable conditions to produce temporary and always unstablecrystallisations of form.

This is a matter ofmetaphors: how do we move from figures evocative of a closedtotality to figures of heterogeneous becoming? A series of concepts - dispositif,agencement, assemblage, network, chain, performativity, hybridisation ... -propose ways of thinking a relationality without ontological divisions, in which'material' and'immaterial' elements interact on the same plane to form structuresand in this process are at once constrained and formed by those interactions.The replacement by actor-network theory of the dichotomy of 'persons' and'things' with the undifferentiated term'actants', taken from Greimasian semiotics,performs a refusal of ontological division at the level of structures in favour of amultiplicity of differences in kind. The payoff of such an indifferentiation at themacro level is an account of interaction that can attend to the specific forms ofdifference at the micro level, where the affordances of material things translatehuman intentions and shape human uses; human persons shape themselves inconstant, active or passive interaction with a world of humanised things; andpersons, too, operate in part as things in a world formed of things, texts, codes,regulations, spatial environments, instifutions, frames of understanding and action,bodies, reflexive knowledges, and the accumulated weight of the interaction overtime of all of these materials of the world.

The 'material', in this framework, designates not substance in its oppositionto ideality, not matter conceived of as existing in some pure pre-social state,abstracted from its uses, but rather'a continuously enacted relational effect', some-thing 'endlessly generated and at least potentially reshaped' (Law, 2004: l6l ). Andit is perhaps in this sense, a deliberately neutral use ofthe concept ofthe 'material'that strips it of its connotations of substantiality, that we might imagine a quitedifferent kind of materialism.

Notes

l Cf. Kubler's (1962: 24-25) distinction between self-signification and adherentsignification.

2 Within Westem Christianity there is a third, very powerful theological and folk traditionof materialism, stretching from the early patristic period to the fourteenth century,which has to do with the resurrection of the body at the last trumpet by means of areassembling of all and only those material components of which it was composed inlife, thus guaranteeing a continuity between the living self and the rebom self which'in [its] f lesh shall ... see God'(see Bynum, 1995, passim). I have not discussed thistradition here because its materialism is, in a sense, always disavowed; but it does serveas a bridge between the materialisms of antiquity and modernity, and its influence onmodern Westem conceptions of the person is fundamental.

36 John Frow'

3 Cf.Pinncy: 'Anydiscussionofrnater ia l i ty thatstartsandendswiththeobject isdoomedtofai l . In configuring matcrial i ty as objectness, i t accidental ly chanrpions onc half(objects)of a binary whosc other half (subjectsl i t wishcs to attack. Hence i t intcnsif ics thc workof puri f i cat ion' (2005 : 257 ).

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