Chapter

4Outlook2002–32

UNEP, R.Novak, Still Pictures

The record of the past three decades showshow tricky it can be to foresee the futurecourse of events on such a time scale.

Enormous social, economic and political changes haveshaped and transformed present-day realities overthat period, not least the oil crises of the 1970s, theend of China’s isolation and the collapse of the Sovietsystem, that were not — and perhaps could not havebeen — predicted.

Some aspects of modern life might have beenforeseen in general terms, by extending such long-term trends as reduction in trade barriers, continualtechnological innovation and the growing role of theservice sector. Following the 1972 StockholmConference, the emergence of a worldwideenvironmental movement might have beenanticipated and hoped for. But few, if any, recognizedthe major regional and global issues such asacidification, stratospheric ozone depletion andclimate change, which have driven much of the actionin recent years.

Moving into the future means travelling intouncharted waters. Some of the way ahead is clear butthere is much that cannot be mapped out, even withadvanced technologies. As before, there will be

challenges that can be prepared for but others thatwill seem to materialize from out of the blue.

How shall we proceed as a society? By placingfaith in further globalization and liberalization,trusting primarily in the market economy to solvewider social and environmental concerns? Or byputting policy first, whereby coordinated action tosolve social and environmental problems balancesthe drive for economic development? If and whentroubles arise, will everyone work together toaddress these threats, or will groups that are betteroff focus on self-protection, creating fortressconditions that increasingly exclude the ‘have-nots’? Or could a more visionary state of affairsemerge, where radical shifts in the way peopleinteract with one another and with the worldaround them stimulate and support sustainablepolicy measures?

There is no knowing which of these — or other —possible futures will actually unfold over the next 30years. Much of what will happen has already been setin motion by policy decisions and actions that havealready been taken. Uncontrolled forces, both humanand natural, will contribute to the course of events.But informed decision-making also has a real and vitalrole to play in the process of shaping the future.

Scenario analysis can make a difference to thisprocess. By exploring an array of possible futurescenarios, today’s decision-makers can get a clearerpicture of what tomorrow might bring in terms of humanwell-being and environmental security and what theimpact of their decisions is likely to be. And they candetermine more accurately what it would take — andwhat they can do — to create a more desirable future.

Scenarios are descriptions of journeys to possiblefutures. They reflect different assumptions about howcurrent trends will unfold, how critical uncertaintieswill play out and what new factors will come into play.Since it emerged as a formal methodology in the middleof the past century, scenario analysis has evolvedswiftly as a tool for anticipating the future. It is nowgenerally accepted that scenarios do not predict.Rather, they paint pictures of possible futures andexplore the differing outcomes that might result if basicassumptions are changed. Hence the relevant questionthat scenarios can answer is not what will happen butwhat might happen and how people could act toencourage or counteract particular events and trends.As a way of exploring the unknown, scenario analysiscan result in surprising and innovative insights.

The scenarios developed for GEO-3 have anenvironmental focus but recognize that theenvironment cannot be discussed without alsoconsidering what may be happening in the social andeconomic spheres. The scenarios therefore spaneventualities in many overlapping areas, includingpopulation, economics, technology and governance.Moreover, though many issues are of global concern,some take on special relevance or sharper focus whenviewed at a regional or smaller scale. To take account ofthis effect — and so that each can enrich the others —this chapter presents both global and regionalperspectives. In addition, the role of policy choices inshaping the future is highlighted in the scenarioswherever possible, although this influence can be hardto judge because other policies and independentdevelopments may cloud the effects of any single policy.

3 2 0 OUTLOOK 2002–32

‘The record of the past three decades shows how tricky it can beto foresee the future course of events on such a time scale.’

Drawing on the experience and work of otherscenario initiatives, including those of the GlobalScenario Group (Raskin and Kemp-Benedict 2002), aset of four scenarios has been developed for GEO-3.

The Markets First scenario envisages a world inwhich market-driven developments converge onthe values and expectations that prevail inindustrialized countries;In a Policy First world, strong actions areundertaken by governments in an attempt toreach specific social and environmental goals;The Security First scenario assumes a world ofgreat disparities, where inequality and conflictprevail, brought about by socio-economic andenvironmental stresses; andSustainability First pictures a world in which anew development paradigm emerges in responseto the challenge of sustainability, supported bynew, more equitable values and institutions.

For each of these scenarios, an overall narrative — ‘Atale of four futures’ — describes the future in the next30 years in a predominantly qualitative manner,providing both regional and global perspectives.

The stories of the four scenarios are followed by amore detailed examination of their environmentalimplications, drawing on quantitative data derived froma number of analytical tools — and with a regional focusintended to highlight particular concerns in thedifferent regions. A brief comparison of qualitative andquantitative approaches is provided in the box. Formore details of the GEO-3 scenario analysis, see thetechnical annex to this chapter (page 398).

The chapter concludes with ‘Lessons from thefuture’, a discussion of important lessons arising fromthe scenario analysis for future environmentallyrelevant policy development. Before embarking on thejourney through these four possible futures, however,it is useful to know the key assumptions made inconstructing them and how these act as driving forcesbehind the scenarios. These assumptions aretherefore outlined in the next section.

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 2 1

Scenarios can be told in many ways. The two most commonmethods used in scenario analysis have been descriptive,written narratives (qualitative scenarios) and tables andfigures incorporating numerical data, often generated bysophisticated computer models (quantitative scenarios).Both approaches have strengths and weaknesses and theirrelative worth has been much debated. ● Qualitative scenarios can explore relationships and

trends for which few or no numerical data are available,including shocks and discontinuities. They can moreeasily incorporate human motivations, values andbehaviour and create images that capture theimagination of those for whom they are intended.

● Quantitative scenarios can provide greater rigour,precision and consistency. Their assumptions areexplicit and their conclusions can be traced back to theassumptions. The effects of changes in assumptionscan be easily checked, pointing to importantuncertainties. They can provide order-of-magnitudeestimates of past, present and future trends in, forexample, population growth, economic growth orresource use.

In GEO-3, qualitative narratives take centre stage with thequantitative tools playing a supporting role.

Narratives or numbers?

Earlier chapters of this report have reviewed presentconditions and trends in a number of socio-economicfactors that are driving environmental change. Howthese factors evolve will shape global and regionaldevelopment and the state of the environment far intothe future. Trends may continue as they have in thepast or change speed and direction — perhaps evengoing into reverse. Trends may lead to convergenceor divergence between circumstances in differentregions of the world. Trends in one region orresponses to one driving force may oppose othersthat originate elsewhere, or they may run up againstabsolute physical limits.

The scenarios explored in the pages that followare based on certain assumptions about how thesedriving forces will evolve and interact with developingsituations, potential future shocks and human choices.This section briefly describes the assumptions madeabout driving forces underlying the scenarios and, inparticular, how these assumptions differ from scenarioto scenario. For descriptions of the scenarios seepages 329, 334, 339 and 344 in the next section.

The seven driving forces under consideration aredemography, economic development, humandevelopment, science and technology, governance,culture and environment. The environment is

3 2 2 OUTLOOK 2002–32

Driving forces

UN

EP, M Rogers, Bolivia, Still Pictures

included as a driving force because it is more than apassive receptacle for change. Just as theassumptions about human and societal behaviourshape the scenarios, so do the assumptions aboutpressures exerted by the environment.

Developments arising from each of the drivingforces will not unfold in isolation from one another.Issues will interweave and chains of cause and effectare likely to be hard to trace back to individualsources. Finally, any number of possible future trendscould be constructed from the available array ofvariables. Narrowing down this range to a small yetrichly contrasting set of futures that are consistent,plausible, recognizable and challenging, depends onstarting out with an intelligent set of assumptions.

DemographyPopulation size, rate of change, distribution, agestructure and migration are all critical aspects ofdemography. Population size to a great extent governsdemand for natural resources and material flows.Population growth enlarges the challenge ofimproving living standards and providing essentialsocial services, including housing, transport,sanitation, health, education, jobs and security. It canalso make it harder to deal with poverty.

Rapid population growth can lead to political andsocial conflict between ethnic, religious, social andlanguage groups. Increases in the numbers of peopleliving in towns and cities are particularly importantbecause urbanization means big changes in lifestyle,consumption patterns, infrastructure developmentand waste flows. Population structure — the relativeproportions of children, persons of working age andelderly people within a population — has importantrepercussions for future population growth as well asfor matching the provision of education, healthcare,incomes and pensions, to predicted needs. Finally,internal and international migration, whethervoluntary or forced, can sometimes ease andsometimes worsen the pressures that otherdemographic factors and other forces place on societyand the environment.

Because so many of the people who will havechildren over the next 30 years have already beenborn, much can already be said about population overthat period. All of the scenarios assume continuedgrowth in global population, tailing off at the end ofthe period as more countries pass through the

demographic transition. Nearly all the growth occursin developing countries, with North America the onlydeveloped region with noticeable growth. Slightlylower population levels are foreseen in Policy Firstand Sustainability First, reflecting the idea that policyactions and behavioural changes speed up thetransition to slower growth. In Security First, lack ofeffective policy as well as much slower economic andsocial development, combine to slow down thetransition. This leads to significantly higherpopulation levels in this outlook, regardless ofdevastating demographic trends or events such as theHIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa that might be expectedto have the contrary effect.

Urbanization increases or remains stable inalmost all regions in all the scenarios, with thegreatest increase in those regions currently leasturbanized — Africa and much of Asia and the Pacific.In all regions, much of the development occurs inlarge coastal cities, a shift with serious implicationsfor the coastal environment.

Apart from the Antarctic sub-region, which has nopermanent resident population, current and futurepopulation structure differs markedly from region toregion. North America, Europe and Japan have

significantly larger shares of elderly people, apattern that persists and increases in all scenarios.This trend is less marked in Security First, whereadvances in medical science (and hence in lifeexpectancy) make less headway in all regions. Otherareas, particularly Africa, West Asia, Latin Americaand the Caribbean and South Asia, are dominated byyouth. Their share of the population in these regions— but not their absolute population size — graduallydecreases over the next 30 years in all scenarios.

In terms of migration patterns, Markets First andespecially Security First are likely to have moreconflicts and inequality, provoking more and moremovements of refugees and economic migrants.Whereas more openness is assumed under MarketsFirst, barriers to migration are expected in SecurityFirst. Policy First and Sustainability First also assumemore open migration, especially for refugees and

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‘North America, Europe and Japan have significantly largershares of elderly people in all scenarios.’

displaced communities. At the same time, moreequitable sharing of resources for economicdevelopment and international assistance reduce theneed for migration.

Economic developmentEconomic development encompasses many factors,including production, finance and the distribution ofresources both between regions and across sectors ofsociety. Although the pattern varies conspicuously,there has been a general trend towards more service-based economies. Product, financial and even labourmarkets are becoming increasingly integrated andinterconnected in a worldwide economy with globalcommodity chains and financial markets. Similartrends are appearing at a regional level in severalparts of the globe. These processes have beenspurred on by advances in information technology,international pacts designed to remove trade barriersor liberalize investment flows and the progressivederegulation of national economies. The sameadvances have also allowed wealth produced bynational and transnational mergers to becomeconcentrated in fewer and fewer hands. There has

also been an increase in inequality in terms of incomeand resource use across — and often within —nations. For many nations the problem of inequality ismade worse by debt burdens that seriously constraingrowth. As transnational enterprises respond toglobal business opportunities, the traditionalprerogatives of the nation-state and the capacity formacro-economic intervention by the state arechallenged anew.

In Markets First, it is assumed that most of thetrends noted above persist, if not accelerate. Economicdevelopment outweighs social and environmentalconcerns in most international discussions. Resistancecontinues but no radical changes in policy result.Recognition that maintenance of environmental andsocial conditions is important for ensuring economicdevelopment slows economic growth down over time,but not very noticeably.

In Security First, trends towards global integration

continue for some parts of the economy, yet come to ahalt or even go into reverse for others. Over time,more and more activity takes place in the grey orunderground economy.

Integration trends persist in Policy First andSustainability First but they are tempered by theintroduction of new policies and institutions to tacklesocial and environmental concerns. This reflectsimproved understanding of the crucial roles of human,social and natural capital in determining economichealth. Changes in attitudes and behaviour inSustainability First affect these trends more than inthe other scenarios as the whole notion of economicdevelopment becomes increasingly subsumed in thebroader concept of human development.

The effect of these changes on per capita incomevaries strongly across regions and scenarios. Averageincome growth in all regions is lowest in SecurityFirst but also very unevenly distributed due to thegreater inequality within regions. In the otherscenarios, average growth at the global level issimilar but there are key differences between andwithin regions. In Policy First, the more equabledistribution of growth makes average incomes of thewealthy grow slightly slower than in Markets First,whereas incomes rise more rapidly among the poor.The most dramatic increases in income growth areseen in Africa, but also in parts of Latin America andthe Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, and West Asia.The convergence in per capita incomes is evengreater in Sustainability First, especially as wealthierpersons shift their emphasis away from market-oriented production and consumption. However, largedifferences remain at the end of the 30-year period.

Human developmentHealth, education, security, identity and freedom areaspects of human development that are all clearlyrelated to economic development, yet go well beyondit. Dramatic differences in access to these importanthuman needs are a feature of the contemporaryglobal scene. Impoverishment and inequity arecritical problems for the poorer countries butconspicuous pockets exist even in the richestcountries. As the world grows more interconnected,these forces affect everyone directly or indirectly,through immigration pressure, geopolitical instability,environmental degradation and constraints on globaleconomic opportunity.

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‘For many nations the problem of inequality is made worse bydebt burdens that seriously constrain growth.’

The United Nations, World Bank, InternationalLabour Organization (ILO) and InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) recently set out specificinternational development goals for povertyreduction, universal primary education, genderequality, infant and child mortality, maternal mortality,reproductive health and the environment. Achievingthese goals depends on: ‘Stronger voices for the poor,economic stability and growth that favours the poor,basic social services for all, open markets for tradeand technology, and enough development resources,used well’ (IMF and others 2000).

Among obstacles to achieving these goals are:‘weak governance; bad policies; human rights abuses;conflicts; natural disasters, and other external shocks.The spread of HIV/AIDS. The failure to addressinequities in income, education and access to healthcare, and the inequalities between men and women.But there is more. Limits on developing countryaccess to global markets, the burden of debt, thedecline in development aid and, sometimes,inconsistencies in donor policies also hinder fasterprogress’ (IMF and others 2000).

Policy First and Sustainability First place emphasison meeting basic needs and providing the resourcesto meet them, even where this may hinder short-term economic growth. In Sustainability First,relatively more of the provision of basic needs comesfrom groups outside the public sector, bothbusinesses and nongovernmental organizations.

In Markets First, these issues are not addressedto the same extent, as it is taken for granted thateconomic development naturally leads to socialimprovement. In addition, more of the facilities thathave traditionally been provided as public servicesare privatized. These trends are even morepronounced in Security First, accompanied by greaterinequality in terms of access. Where new funds,whether public or private, are invested indevelopment, physical security increasingly takesprecedence over social welfare.

Science and technologyScience and technology continue to transform thestructure of production, the nature of work and theuse of leisure time. Continuing advances in computerand information technology are at the forefront of thecurrent wave of hi-tech innovation. Biotechnologygalvanizes agricultural practices, pharmaceuticals

development and disease prevention, though it raisesa host of ethical and environmental issues. Advancesin miniaturized technologies transform medicalpractices, materials science, computer performanceand much more.

The importance of science and technologyextends beyond the acquisition of knowledge and howit is used. Continuing concerns over the distributionof the benefits and costs of technological developmentprovoke much national and international debate. Suchconcerns include technology transfer, intellectualproperty rights, appropriate technologies, trade-offsbetween privacy and security, and the potential forinformation-poor countries to find themselves on the

wrong side of a ‘digital divide’. The ultimateresolution of these matters influences the futuredevelopment of science and technology, as well astheir impacts upon society and the environment.

In Markets First, it is assumed that the rapidtechnological advances of recent years continue, butare increasingly driven by profit motives. Over timethis may actually slow down development as basicresearch is given less priority. Technology transfer,intellectual property rights and other issues aretackled, but mainly to the advantage of those withgreater power in the marketplace. Environmentalbenefits largely come about as side effects of effortsto improve the efficiency of resource use. Thesepatterns are even more pronounced in Security First,where — in addition — the diversion of more andmore public funding into security provision, coupledwith social, economic and environmental crises,means slower progress all round.

Rapid advances in science and technology are alsoassumed in the Policy First and Sustainability Firstscenarios, but these are driven by different factors.Direct investment by governments, subsidies andregulation — for example, pollution taxes — play adominant role in Policy First. In Sustainability First,these levers are overshadowed by changingpreferences of both consumers and producers. In bothscenarios, greater caution on the part of governments

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‘In Markets First, it is assumed that the rapid technologicaladvances of recent years continue, but are increasingly drivenby profit motives.’

and society at large may slow technologicaldevelopment in some areas, but it also helps to headoff serious side effects. Greater efforts are also madeto share the benefits of science and technology.

GovernanceGovernance refers to actions, processes, traditionsand institutions by which authority is exercised. It ismost often associated with governmental bodies at thenational level and with regional or global institutionssuch as the United Nations, but this need not alwaysbe the case. Private institutions, such as corporationsand non-governmental organizations, also play animportant role in governance. In all cases,developments that affect participation, accountability,transparency, corruption and civil strife have animportant influence on the shape of the future.

Although the forms and effectiveness ofgovernance differ markedly around the world, varioustendencies can be identified. One tendency is towardsgreater individual autonomy and the devolution ofauthority. This shift is expressed at the personal levelin terms of a growing emphasis on individual ‘rights’— human rights, women’s rights and the like. It isalso noticeable in the devolution of governmentalauthority to smaller and more local units and inseparatist movements. The private sector, too, hasmoved towards ‘flatter’ corporate structures anddecentralized decision-making. A second andsomewhat opposite tendency is towards forms ofgreater regional integration and global governancethrough such mechanisms as international trade andenvironmental agreements. Another tendency istowards greater integration and the growth ofnetworks within and across private and public

institutions. This is seen, in part, in the rise of globalpublic policy networks and the emergence of civilsociety as an important voice in decision-making inmany regions.

In Markets First, present trends are assumed tocontinue but with heavier emphasis on ensuring thesmooth functioning of markets. Efforts are focused onthe development of international institutions which

encourage free markets for resources, finance andproducts. In Policy First, greater coordination isassumed, particularly at the level of internationalgovernance. This includes the development of newinstitutions and more cooperation between the publicand private sectors. Significantly, these changes aredriven from the top, by governments, corporations orlarge non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

In Sustainability First, the shifts in governanceare assumed to be driven much more from the bottomup. Reflecting the changing values and making use ofthe trends towards greater participation in general,individuals and grass-roots organizations becomemore and more involved in setting the agenda, a leadthat larger organizations then follow. Governmentscontinue to govern but do so in a fashion that involvesmore power sharing.

As with much else in the Security First scenario,assumed trends regarding governance differ over timeand across groups more than in the other scenarios.Corruption, ineffective governance and reactionsagainst both, contribute to breakdown in parts ofsociety. As societies regroup, governance among the‘haves’ is assumed to become more centralized andautocratic, but largely effective. International co-ordination also bolsters the relative stability of thesegroups. Among the ‘have-nots’, the nature andeffectiveness of governance is mixed.

CultureCulture includes the set of values and institutionsthat enables a society to develop and maintain itsidentity. Cultural signatures differ around the globeand reflect, for instance, conflicting ideas about theworth of economics as an integrating system of valuesor about the importance of technology andtechnological change as springboards for humanprogress. They also hinge on differing concepts ofjustice and fairness, and on differing beliefs about therelationship between people and the natural andspiritual world.

Recent history, particularly where racism,colonialism and genocide have occurred, cannot beoverlooked. Much has been said about the expansionof Western culture to the detriment of others, aboutreactions to this spread and about possible clashes ofcivilizations as a result. It is clear that manyindividuals aspire to Western lifestyles, while otherssee Western values permeating societies and

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‘In Policy First, continual movement towards greatercoordination is assumed ... in pursuit of a broader agenda.’

associate them with selfish individualism andexcessive consumption. This spread is both a causeand an effect of economic globalization, aided by thefar-reaching penetration of information technologiesand electronic media. At the same time, there havebeen clear signs of nationalist and religious reactionagainst it, sometimes resulting in terrorist activitiesand in open warfare within or between nations.

Among the four scenarios, Sustainability Firstassumes the largest shift from current trends interms of culture. The ascendance of the values ofsolidarity, reciprocity, sufficiency and stewardship is atthe heart of this scenario. To the extent that thesecore values are not violated, tolerance is also a keyaspect of culture in this scenario. In Markets First,little change in current trends is assumed. As befitsthe basic notion of a market, the trend towardsindividualism accelerates, as does a trend towardshomogenization of culture. At the same time, so dopassive and active resistance by particular groups andregions. In Security First, these and other trends leadto clashes that undermine many elements of society.Policy First assumes a middle path between MarketsFirst and Sustainability First; efforts to encouragesome of the trends of the latter compete withtendencies to follow the trends of the former.

EnvironmentThough the focus of this section is on the importance ofsocio-economic change in triggering environmentalimpacts, it is clear that environmental change is apotent driving force in its own right. Countries andregions must contend not only with unequalenvironmental endowments, but also with acuteenvironmental problems. Human impacts on the

environment have aroused growing anxiety.Atmosphere, land and water resources have beenspoiled. Persistent organic pollutants and toxicsubstances have accumulated in living organisms.

Species have been lost and ecosystems degraded. Inaddition, social and ecological systems are vulnerable tonatural and human-influenced hazards and catastrophes.

The way natural systems react to these pressures(the rate, for instance, at which climate patterns changeas a result of higher concentrations of greenhousegases, or the response of coastal ecosystems topollution), can have a big impact on social, economicand other natural systems. The realization thatindividual states cannot shield themselves fromenvironmental change is already changing the basis ofgeopolitics and global governance.

The scenarios presented here do not differ greatlyin their assumptions about the environment as adriving force. Most significantly, it is assumed thatnatural systems are in a more fragile condition inSecurity First than in the other scenarios. Thisimplies that ecosystem collapses and curbs on thecapacity of certain natural systems to provide goodsand services are more likely, even when facing thesame pressures. In Policy First and especially inSustainability First, the values of stewardship andcaring for the environment play a greater role inguiding science, technology and governance, as wellas in shaping economic and social development.

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‘Among the four scenarios, Sustainability First assumes thelargest shift from current trends in terms of culture.’

3 2 8 OUTLOOK 2002–32

The turn of the 21st century was an opportunity toreflect on the past and speculate about the future.This milestone not only heralded the beginning of anew millennium but also marked more than 50 yearsof several key global institutions, not least the UnitedNations and World Bank.

Events at regional level also provide much food forthought. The countries of the European Union (EU)face the possibility of membership nearly doubling inone or two decades, spurred on by the end of the ColdWar and the collapse of the eastern bloc. In Africa, therelatively peaceful end of apartheid in South Africa andthe transition from military to civilian rule in Nigeriahave changed the political climate. These turnabouts

in the continent’s two most populous countries openthe door for new debate on how to solve Africa’spersistent problems, including civil wars, poverty,inequality and the AIDS pandemic. Political changes in

Asia and the Pacific, notably in Indonesia and thePhilippines, and the repercussions of the economiccrisis in the late 1990s are stimulating fresh dialogueabout the future of the region. In Latin America andthe Caribbean, a period of relative stability hasprompted increased willingness to address importantissues inherited from the past. As they findthemselves in the centre of some of the mostpublicized geopolitical events, the people of West Asiaeye their future warily. Meanwhile, the recenteconomic slowdown and terrorist attacks have ledmany North Americans to reassess their actions athome and abroad to a degree not seen in decades.

At this time, the world is marked by tumultuouschange. A global system seems to be takingshape as economic interdependence increases.Information technology accelerates the spread ofideas and the human transformation of naturebecomes evident on a planetary scale. As economiesgrow, the rich get richer and many of the poor manageto escape from poverty. But huge disparities persistas vast wealth coexists with abject poverty and eachextreme generates its own characteristicenvironmental pressures.

A tale of four futures

‘When sizing up prospects for the future, some find grounds foroptimism but others are more apprehensive.’

UN

EP, V Bugaldon, Still Pictures

When sizing up prospects for the future, some findgrounds for optimism but others are moreapprehensive. In spite of potentially powerful anti-globalization forces, the optimists foresee theformation of a true global market and relish theopportunities for greater efficiency andconnectedness. The pursuit of individual wealth on aglobal economic playing field made level by universalgovernance mechanisms to reduce market barrierscan, they believe, open the way to a new age ofaffluence for all. If developing country institutions canbe adapted to benefit from the new technologies andthe emerging borderless economy, and if appropriateforms of global governance can be created, the risingtide of global prosperity will lift everyone to newheights of well-being.

Sceptics, looking at the same phenomena, seeriskier times ahead. They point to wealth and poweraccumulating in just a few hands, especially those oftransnational corporations. They see unequalexpansion of modern production methods around theworld, two-track development and stubbornly one-sided and manipulative approaches to globalnegotiations. The pessimists fear the result will beerosion of trust between the North and the South andbetween populations within both, ending up in achronic inability to forge credible, legitimate andenforceable agreements on sustainable development.How, they wonder, can unbridled pursuit of economicgrowth be kept within environmental limits? Willmarket-driven global development, far fromengendering a sense of participation in a commonglobal society, tend instead to continue to splithumanity into privileged and excluded, North andSouth, modernist and traditionalist factions? If theaccelerated transition to a global economy fails to giveinstitutions time to adapt, will community cohesionand democratic participation be sacrificed to it?

Many feel apprehensive, too, about the prospectthat their children will inherit an impoverished andfragile world that is ecologically, socially andeconomically depleted. More fundamentally, someobject to the encouragement of traits and lifestylesfounded on individualism and greed, which they seeemerging from this global consumer culture.

Several important initiatives pave the way for the majordevelopments in the new century. The Doha round ofnegotiations within the World Trade Organization(WTO) — including its newest member, China —provides the legal basis for an expanded global tradingsystem. Significantly, it has written into it a recognitionthat this system must take into account importantsocial and environmental concerns, in addition to thecore economic goals. A multilateral agreement oninvestment liberalizes investment regimes first inOrganization for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD) countries, with expectations thatthis will follow shortly throughout the world. Thecoalition against terrorism paves the way for newapproaches to international security.

Meanwhile, efforts continue to salvage theclimate negotiations, to build upon multilateral

environmental agreements in other areas and toaddress important social issues. Much of this effortinitially hinges on international activities, particularlythe World Summit on Sustainable Development(WSSD) and follow-up activities, which galvanize arenewed commitment to action.

This commitment revolves around a mixture of oldand new initiatives designed to gain a betterunderstanding of the issues that cause concern and totackle them more effectively. Goals and targets relatedto basic needs (food security, access to clean water,

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‘Factors combine to make the shift to a liberalized, market-oriented society almost universal.’

Most of the world adopts the values and expectationsprevailing in today’s industrialized countries. The wealth ofnations and the optimal play of market forces dominatesocial and political agendas. Trust is placed in furtherglobalization and liberalization to enhance corporatewealth, create new enterprises and livelihoods, and so helppeople and communities to afford to insure against — orpay to fix — social and environmental problems. Ethicalinvestors, together with citizen and consumer groups, tryto exercise growing corrective influence but areundermined by economic imperatives. The powers of stateofficials, planners and lawmakers to regulate society,economy and the environment continue to be overwhelmedby expanding demands.

Markets First

sanitation, literacy and life expectancy) andenvironmental conditions (urban air quality,availability of fresh water, resource use, wastedisposal and habitat/species preservation) arereiterated. A commitment is also made to strengtheninternational institutions of governance.

The best laid plans …Businesses and NGOs play an important role. Theindustry lobby argues for clear and economicallyefficient rules and regulations. It also points to thevalue of voluntary standards and programmes, such asthe Global Compact and Global Reporting Initiative

negotiated with the United Nations. The NGOs, alongwith some business groups, stress issues of equityand fairness for current and future generations, aswell as respect for other species.

Over the next decade there is a clear divergencein the follow-through on these various sets ofactivities. Barriers to trade and movements ofcapital gradually vanish, as protectionism becomes athing of the past. New instruments promote marketopenness and global competition. Virtually allnational governments advance a package of policyadjustments, including modernization of financialsystems and investment in education to create aworkforce that is competitive in the emergingglobal market. Privatization spreads, social safetynets are reduced and reliance is placed on market-based approaches.

There is still distrust of what is viewed as atypically Western mode of development, growing attimes into outright hostility. Gradually, however, theshift to a liberalized, market-oriented societybecomes almost universal. New technologies,particularly in the form of digital information andcommunication technologies (ICTs) continue toincrease connectivity between different parts of theworld. This is reinforced by the presence ofmultinational corporations, or at the very least theirproducts, in many parts of the world.

Businesses benefit from liberalization andglobalization, and increasingly operate across

national borders. At an institutional level,international bodies maintain an important role inguiding economic and related policy in manycountries, particularly those that are still burdenedby high debt loads. At a personal level, more youngpeople from around the world take the opportunityto travel and study in other countries. Takentogether, these factors seem to imply that an air ofinevitability surrounds the ongoing processes ofglobalization. How they play out, however, differsfrom region to region.

In Europe, a major focus is on the continuingproject of broadening and deepening the EU. Theextension of the EU to the east continues with anumber of countries being added in waves ofaccession. Economic interdependence betweennations continues to grow, along with widespreadadoption of the Euro and harmonization of financialsystems. Political union proceeds more slowly,however, as countries prove less willing to forgotheir sovereignty in other areas. For example,although most nations are intent on cutting backsocial safety nets, there are differences over howfar and how fast these cuts should be applied.Taxation is also a point of contention. Nevertheless,there is a general shift in governance away fromthe nation state, to higher as well as to lowerlevels. By the end of the second decade of thecentury, various regional bodies, some of whichoverride national borders, play as large a role assome nation states.

Even as it struggles to deal with persistentconflicts and the AIDS pandemic, Africa pushesahead with economic modernization and greaterintegration into the global economy. Shifts awayfrom official development assistance towards foreigndirect investment give multinational corporationsmore influence. At the same time, the influence ofinternational organizations is maintained as effortscontinue to restructure and pay off foreign debts.These efforts strongly shape the portfolio ofeconomic investments, which continues toemphasize the production of exports. Regionalcooperation, in the form of free trade zones andpower pools, works to better integrate the continent.Similarly, transboundary collaboration is expanded inan attempt to deal in some areas with water conflicts,in others to pursue cross-border conservation anddevelopment initiatives.

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‘Privatization spreads, social safety nets are reduced and relianceis placed on market-based approaches.’

Continuing dependence on oil throughout theworld still provides a strong economic base for muchof West Asia, the development of alternative energysources and efficiency improvements having failed tomake more than minimal advances. The strategicimportance of the region increases as the world’sremaining oil supplies become even moreconcentrated here and in nearby Central Asia and is amajor reason why countries in other regions want toensure stability in West Asia. Along with localtraditions, oil dependence keeps the globalizationprocess from proceeding as quickly in certain areas ofsociety here by comparison with some other regions.Some countries in West Asia continue to grapple withforeign debt. The repayment process keeps movingforward, however, thanks to flexible conditions fordebt restructuring. An Arab Free Trade Agreement iseventually reached.

In the Western Hemisphere, Latin America andthe Caribbean become ever more economicallyintegrated with North America. This development isspurred on by the assistance provided by the UnitedStates to Mexico in the 1990s and to Argentina andother nations in the 2000s, boosted by the interests oflarge corporations. It is also seen as a way to address,in part, the joint problems of an ageing and shrinkingworkforce in the United States and immigration fromthe south. Moves towards integration culminate in aFree Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) in themiddle of the second decade of the century. In theprocess, existing trade agreements like NorthAmerica Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), CommomMarket of the South (MERCOSUR) and CaribbeanCommunity (CARICOM), get absorbed under theFTAA umbrella. A number of nations go further,adopting the US dollar as a national currency.

In the Asia and the Pacific region, the recoveryfrom the economic downturn of the late 1990s andfrom the decade-long recession in Japan, sees manycountries return to the patterns of growth and degreeof integration into the world economy they hadpreviously experienced. To this are added thecontinued economic reforms in China and India, thetwo most populous nations in the world. With itsaccession into the WTO, China becomes a major worldimporter and exporter, eventually growing to rival theUnited States as the world’s largest economy. Theadvances in technology coming out of Asia and thePacific, the impact on corporations that set up facilities

here and the increased exposure of its cultures allenlarge the role this region plays on the global stage.

… gradually go astrayWhile systems of governance and longer termplanning remain poorly developed, the regional shiftsdescribed above modify relationships between regionsand the concerted management of common resources.These resources are increasingly incorporated into theglobal economic system but authorities in charge oftheir management persist in putting economicpotential first. In polar regions multinationalsnegotiate agreements, either with nations or, in the

case of the Arctic, directly with indigenouspopulations. More areas and more resources (such asfreshwater) are laid open to commercial exploitation.

Developments in international security look stillless promising. The United States falls back on a moreunilateralist stance, involving only a limited number ofpartners. This encourages other nations and regionsto continue development of their military forces. Thusopportunities for broad-based internationalcooperation are not pursued. Acts of terrorism arefollowed by periods of retaliation involving short-livedcoalitions. This keeps the level of the problem fairlylow in the short term, but does little to address theroot causes of discontent in the long term.

Influenced by large national and multinationalcorporations based inside their borders, manycountries adopt a fairly narrow approach to globalnegotiations, in which the paramount concern is theprotection of their respective national interests ratherthan shared or common resources. Efforts to ratify atreaty to address climate issues drag on withoutfruition and are set aside part way through the firstdecade. There is more success in other arenas, suchas dealing with selected persistent organic pollutants,but even here the scope of the agreements is limitedand difficulties with enforcement mechanisms lead todisappointing results.

Actions continue to address social andenvironmental issues, but are mainly taken at local

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 3 1

‘China becomes a major world importer and exporter, eventually growing to rival the United States as the world’slargest economy.’

level. Europe drafts regional conventions which dealprimarily with transboundary pollutants and theburdensome environmental legacy of the formerSoviet Bloc. Similar efforts arise in other regions,though not always resulting in formal conventions andeven then many of the signed conventions are noteffectively implemented. There are attempts to cross-link these instruments to trade and other economicagreements. When conflicts arise, however, it is theeconomic imperative that usually takes precedence.Most notably, the agreement on Trade-RelatedAspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) ofthe WTO tends to override competing pacts reflectedin the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) andother multilateral environmental agreements. InEurope, the policy change that arguably has thegreatest impact on the environment, the reform of theCommon Agricultural Policy at the end of the firstdecade of the century, is pursued for primarilyeconomic reasons.

The United Nations, other international bodies,NGOs and some businesses persist in their efforts tomake advances on the goals set out in Agenda 21, atthe WSSD and in other high-profile arenas.Nevertheless, without full commitment from itsmember nations and without fundamental reform, theUnited Nations continues to struggle to play the rolemany expect of it. It makes slow progress in

international coordination on environmental and socialissues. It scores moderate successes in peacekeepingand disaster relief efforts, which are called on moreand more frequently as the years pass. However, theorganization finds itself operating in a primarilyreactive, as distinct from a proactive, mode. NGOsalso find their efforts hindered by more powerfulforces, including the steady ascendancy ofindividualistic over altruistic values in civilsociety and public life. When NGOs urge others towork for the common good, their appeals tend to bemet with complacent apathy. NGOs that prosper tendto be those that adopt a more market-orientedapproach or form partnerships directly withbusinesses, industry or both.

Overall, most advances in social andenvironmental arenas are by-products of efforts toimprove economic development.

Constraints are lifted …Throughout the world, cuts in subsidies to agricultureand the opening of trade in agricultural productsmodify the environmental impacts of agriculture. Theuse of debt-for-nature swaps and the outright purchaseof debt for the right to exploit genetic resourcescontribute to the preservation of some natural areas,especially within tropical regions, while at the sametime easing the debt burdens of these countries.Similar actions are taken to preserve natural orcultural heritage sites that also happen to be keytourist attractions.

Somewhat less directly, certain advances intechnology and structural changes in economiesproduce environmental and social benefits, throughimprovements in efficiency. In transportation, thedevelopment and spread of more efficient and cleanerfuel burning vehicles, beginning with hybrid andmoving towards fuel celled vehicles (with methanol asthe carrier of hydrogen) curbs the increase in fossil fueluse. The growth in transportation is also tempered bycontinued progress in ICTs. More people now workfrom home.

Energy efficiency continues to improve asderegulation proceeds, opening up markets in micro-power developments. Micro-power becomesincreasingly important in rural areas of the poorerregions, where the high cost of extending electricitygrids has restricted the power supply network.Improvements in irrigation techniques and advances indesalination improve water use efficiency, particularlyin West Asia and arid parts of other regions. Agriculturefurther benefits from progress in biotechnology, whichincreases yields and helps to reduce the pressure onecosystem resources in many regions. Biotechnologyalso has positive effects in the areas of wastewatertreatment. Advances in nano-technology improvematerials use efficiency.

… but not for allThese developments, along with improvementsin medical science and healthcare, enhance the livesof many. At the same time, these trends create new orintensify existing social and environmental concerns.Advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering,

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‘Most advances in social and environmental arenas are by-products of efforts to improve economic development.’

both in combating disease vectors and creating hardiercrops, open up areas of Africa and other regions tointensive exploitation by large-scale commercialagriculture and ranching. This jeopardizes both naturaland agro-biodiversity and it leads to far worse landdegradation than before, destroying harvests andlivelihoods and driving even more people into poverty.

Improvements in information technology help drawattention to the vast differences between how differentpeople live, often causing great frustration among theless well off. In the polar regions, resource exploitationspeeds up as a result of technological advances andeasier access due to climatic changes, puttingecosystems in those regions at greater risk. More useis made of hydropower resources in the Arctic, as wellas in Asia and the Pacific, Latin America, parts ofEurope, and Africa. Water is also transported overincreasing distances to drier regions to cater to soaringdemand. This trend is highlighted by the initiation oflarge-scale projects in the 2010s to move water fromthe Great Lakes and the Pacific Northwest to the aridregions in the southwest of North America. Thesesteps are followed by similar efforts in Europe and partsof the Asia and the Pacific region.

At the heart of all these market-led concerns is aseemingly never-ending obligation on society tomuster enough technological and structural progressto catch up with the skyrocketing demand for goodsand services. Meanwhile, environmental conditionsare constantly shifting. The effects of climate changeare becoming clearer, particularly in the polar regions,in poorer countries and along the world’s coastlines.Plans are already being made to evacuate some smallisland states. Other environmental changes, includingimbalances in the nitrogen cycle and the continueddispersion of persistent organic pollutants, are alsohaving their impacts, evidenced by the ‘red tides’ thathit the Mediterranean in the 2010s and the IndianOcean in the 2020s.

Prolonged (though decelerating) population growthin Africa, West Asia and parts of Asia and the Pacificand increasing urbanization in almost all regions,aggravate problems such as biodiversity loss, waterstress and the frequent breakdown of basic services.These are reflected, in turn, in persistent regionalconflicts and migration pressures. As a consequence,the economic advances that have characterized the past

few decades begin to slow noticeably. More and moreeffort is needed simply to maintain the achievementsrealized so far. Social and environmental goals, whichare still in the minds of many even though otherconcerns have relegated them to the back seat, seem tobe moving further beyond reach every year.

What lies ahead?By 2032, many of the same questions that werebeing posed at the turn of the century remainunanswered. The world has achieved much in termsof modernization and economic growth, presentingnew opportunities for millions of people. Yetfundamental questions are still being raised about thesustainability and desirability of this pattern ofdevelopment. Environmental standards continue to falland pressures on resources remain severe, raisingagain the spectres of economic uncertainty andconflict. Social stresses threaten socio-economicsustainability as persistent poverty and growinginequality, exacerbated by environmental degradation,undermine social cohesion, spur migration and weakeninternational security.

Opinions differ as to where the world is heading.Depending on which indicators the observer choosesto focus upon, arguments can be made for either side.Many argue that the cases of breakdown already seenin some social, environmental and ecological systemsportend even more fundamental and widespreadcollapses in the future. These same groups expressparticular concern that efforts have not been made todevelop the institutions that will be needed to handlethese predicaments. Others point out that we havebeen able to handle most of the crises we have facedand that there is no reason to assume we will not dolikewise in the future.

Most people stick to their daily routines, leavingthe big questions to others. Plus ça change, plus c’est lamême chose; the more things change, the more theystay the same.

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‘The economic advances that have characterized the past fewdecades begin to slow noticeably. More and more effort is neededsimply to maintain the achievements realized so far.’

In the early years of the century, there are signs of agreat desire and demand for coordinated leadershipfrom the local to the global level, not only amonggovernments, but also in industry and among NGOsand other citizens’ groups. The terrorist attacks onthe United States and the subsequent retaliationlend immediacy to the calls for policy reform tocome to terms with economic, social andenvironmental concerns that many see as the rootcauses of these actions.

Renewing commitmentsThe award of the 2001 Nobel Prize for Peace to theSecretary General of the United Nations and to thefamily of organizations that he leads, highlights therenewed interest shown in systems of internationaland regional governance. To begin with, much of thisinterest is expressed at and around international

activities, including the WSSD, meetings of the G7/G8and the negotiations of the WTO and multilateralenvironmental agreements. Protests anddemonstrations, coupled with less adversarial sideevents and more open consultations involving officials,NGOs and the broader public, help to galvanizerenewed commitment to action by formal institutions.

This commitment is translated into initiatives tobetter understand and deal with issues of current

concern. A common characteristic of these initiativesis a highly structured approach, complete with theestablishment of formal institutions and the setting ofvery specific targets. Efforts to improve knowledge ofthe issues build upon existing activities, including theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and GlobalInternational Water Assessment. To these are addedan Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and a globalassessment of the nitrogen cycle.

Target-setting draws on the efforts of internationalconferences in the 1990s. These were outlined in ABetter World for All (IMF and others 2000). Followingthis precedent, global environmental and social prioritiesare expressed in terms of measures that target basicneeds such as reducing extreme poverty, cutting infantand child mortality, improving reproductive health,promoting gender equity, upgrading environmentalconditions and achieving universal primary education.Quantifiable indicators are agreed to help track progresstowards each of these goals.

The environmental targets fall into two broadcategories. Climate stabilization, improving eco-efficiency and reducing toxic wastes require a focus onindustrial activities and the demands of modernlifestyles. Halting deforestation and land degradation,maintaining biodiversity, sustaining fisheries andimproving access to clean water and sanitation,require issues of poverty and growing populations tobe addressed as well. The targets agreed fordeveloping countries reflect a general acceptance thatthe process of development and industrialization mustcontinue in these regions. Thus, although per capitamaterials use and releases of pollutants will grow, theyshould not exceed the levels recorded in the OECDregions and will gradually converge to similar values.

Customizing the blueprintAlthough the ultimate goals are similar, the particularcircumstances of each region — political, economic,cultural and environmental — dictate differentemphases in each region. In Africa, a premium isplaced on food security, governance, economicdiversification, population growth and urbanization,universal primary and secondary education, poverty,health (particularly in relation to HIV/AIDS),deforestation and land degradation.

Deforestation, inequity, poverty, urbanization,freshwater resources and regional air pollution head the

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‘A common characteristic of these initiatives is a highlystructured approach, complete with the establishment of formalinstitutions and the setting of very specific targets.’

Decisive initiatives are taken by governments in an attemptto reach specific social and environmental goals. Acoordinated pro-environment and anti-poverty drivebalances the momentum for economic development at anycost. Environmental and social costs and gains arefactored into policy measures, regulatory frameworks andplanning processes. All these are reinforced by fiscal leversor incentives such as carbon taxes and tax breaks.International ‘soft law’ treaties and binding instrumentsaffecting environment and development are integrated intounified blueprints and their status in law is upgraded,though fresh provision is made for open consultationprocesses to allow for regional and local variants.

Policy First

reform agenda in Asia and the Pacific. In Europe, theaccent is on energy, governance (especially in relationto EU enlargement), agriculture, transport and thepreservation of natural areas. Governance, healthcare,universal primary and secondary education,deforestation, poverty and inequity, and urbanization arehighlighted in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Discussions in North America focus on energyuse, perverse subsidies, trade regimes and wateravailability in the arid west. The principal concerns inWest Asia are water availability, food security,diversifying the economy, healthcare and universalprimary and secondary education. In the polar regions,the focus is on governance in relation to internationalactivities in the Antarctic, rights of indigenous peoplesin the Arctic and resource exploitation in both.

Collaborative frameworksThe strengthening of governance institutions at alllevels is critical to achieving agreed goals. At theglobal level, these include the United Nationsorganizations and Bretton Woods institutions, whichimplement new or step up ongoing reform efforts.Fresh impetus also boosts existing multilateralenvironmental agreements, while existing protocols,such as those on climate and biosafety, are ratified.

Complementing this drive are efforts at regionallevel to increase intra- and inter-regional cooperationmechanisms and make them more efficient. Theseefforts are stimulated by a series of regional meetings,drawing together nation states and regional and sub-regional entities. The most conspicuous of these isheld in Africa by the newly formed African Union,which results in the Africa Millennium Charter forSustainable Development.

Of course, the efforts at both regional and globallevels require action at the national level.Furthermore, intentions expressed at the higherlevels need to be translated into meaningful goals andactions to be implemented at national and sub-nationallevels. This requires nations to place greater faith in— and assign more authority to — ministries focusingon social and environmental policies.

It is understood that significant changes in socialand economic systems will be needed to achieve thetargets that have been set and that these changes willtake time. Action is required at many different levels.Certain areas stand out in which nations mustcooperate with one another and with global

institutions. Among them are global environmentalissues such as stratospheric ozone depletion, climatechange, biodiversity loss and the long-range transportof persistent organic pollutants. Perhaps moreimportant because they lie at the root of theseenvironmental concerns are economic issues like tradeand foreign debt. Technology development and transfer(particularly in the areas of ICTs, biotechnology and

energy use) and the maintenance of intellectualproperty rights are also on the joint agenda. Otherissues that demand attention are migration, securityand sharing common resources from, for example, theoceans, the polar regions and space.

Trade and industry take a leadNot all activity is limited to the governmental sphere.Business groups, such as the International Chamber ofCommerce (ICC), World Business Council onSustainable Development (WBCSD) and theInternational Standards Organization (ISO), work toenhance the positive role in policy making played byindustry. NGOs continue to build partnerships,between themselves and with business groups andgovernment organizations.

In trade, the opening up of international marketscontinues, with much of the action occurring at theregional level. New entities, such as the Arab FreeTrade Association in West Asia, are formed, whileexisting unions survive and grow. A Free Trade Areaof the South is initiated by an agreement betweenMERCOSUR and South Africa.

The role of the World Trade Organization continuesto evolve. The Doha round of negotiations works tobalance free trade with social and environmentalconsiderations. It plays a special part in opening upagricultural markets by means of the Agreement onAgriculture (AoA) and in managing the exploitation ofresources in the Arctic and Antarctic, including totalprohibition of trade in certain resources. It also seeks totackle the broader issues of trade in biological andgenetic resources, working in close coordination withthe parties to the CBD and associated protocols.

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‘It is understood that significant changes in social and economicsystems will be needed to achieve the targets that have been set,and that these changes will take time.’

Dealing with debt and conflictIn terms of foreign debt, many developing countriesfeel they need and deserve special help to pursuesustainability. Key lenders, including the World Bankand the IMF, work together with borrowers torestructure and — in some cases — eliminate existingdebts. Options such as debt for nature or debt forpoverty alleviation swaps are explored as options tomanage international debts in ways that help achievesustainability goals. Development aid is increasinglyseen as a matter of national and international security,

prompting nations to increase contributionsprogressively to target levels set — but rarely achieved— in the previous century.

Increasingly, regional and international bodiesadopt a more direct role in resolving conflicts withinand between nations. One of the lessons learned fromperiodic terrorist activities and the responses to themis that greater cooperation between nations, evenwhere it may involve sacrificing some elements ofsovereignty, can bring definite benefits in terms ofnational security.

Efforts at international and regional levels helpprovide economic and political support for policychanges needed at national and sub-national levels.Comprehensive environmental and social policyframeworks are established. Where necessary,international actions such as insisting on treatycompliance and limiting aid and capital flows, help toput pressure on governments that are slow tointroduce reforms. More often, however, nations areproactive in taking action internally.

Tax breaks and other instrumentsA vital step in many countries is to restructure taxsystems and subsidy programmes in order to bringthem more in line with social and environmentalgoals. Such reforms also enable governments toacquire some of the huge amounts needed to financethe changes in public sector systems needed toachieve set targets.

In other cases, more stringent and direct

regulations are introduced, including restrictions oroutright bans on particular activities, such as loggingin national parks, the use of particular chemicals andeven driving in urban areas. These efforts can also bevery costly, at least in the short term.

Although hampered at times by the actions ofgovernments and NGOs, businesses play a positive rolein many areas. As a sequel to the 14000 series ofstandards on environmental management systems, theISO introduces a series of standards related to thesocial and ethical dimensions of business. These actionsbuild upon and complement joint efforts bygovernments and business, such as the Global Compactfor Business and the Global Reporting Initiative.Businesses take an increasingly active role in theconsultation processes associated with many policyinitiatives, a form of intervention that does much tostimulate technology development and transfer.

Action by NGOs and consumer groups includes theuse of consumer boycotts and media campaigns topush less progressive businesses to act. They lobbyfor new labelling and reporting requirements to ensurethat business practice is more transparent andaccountable. Several of these groups are explicitlyincluded in later rounds of the WTO negotiations. Atthe same time, these pressure groups also act aswatchdogs on governments, ensuring that leaders actresponsibly. Stricter limits are placed on howgovernment officials behave, allowing most whooverstep reasonable bounds to be voted out of office.

Challenges remainMost people support these efforts and exhibit trust inand patience with their leaders. Tension exists,though, as most citizens mistakenly assume that thechanges can be made in ways that do notfundamentally alter their lifestyles in terms ofconvenience, mobility and similar comforts. Inaddition, some people resent the higher direct andhidden costs that they are being forced to pay to effectthese changes. Others are impatient with the time ittakes to make the dramatic changes they see asnecessary. Frustrations also arise as the evolution ofsocial, economic and natural systems does not alwaysprogress on the same schedule as the institutionalchanges that are being implemented.

Potential conflicts of interest arise in achievingdesired goals. One example is the effort to meetincreasing demands for food from populations that are

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‘Efforts at international and regional levels help provideeconomic and political support for policy changes needed atnational and sub-national levels.’

growing in both size and affluence, without impairingbiological diversity or soil fertility. This dilemmastimulates calls for a new global Green Revolution,although the social and environmental drawbacks ofthe first are still evident. Questions are raised aboutthe risks of biotechnology, including geneticengineering, on which any such drive will have to rely.The environmental, medical, social, economic andethical issues surrounding these technologies raisethe temperature of public debate to heights not seensince the era of the nuclear debate.

Biotechnology watchdog Early efforts to address specific issues arising frombiotechnology and gene transfer, such as theCartagena Protocol on Biosafety, had set the stage fora regulatory regime for biotechnology developmentand use, to ensure that ‘the planet’s biologicaldiversity (including human systems) will be able tocoexist with this powerful technology’ (UNEP 2000).Such efforts lead to the founding of a newinternational regulatory body in the early 2010s,patterned on the International Atomic Energy Agencybut with greater authority.

Despite these challenges the signs of positivechange strengthen the resolve to ensure that theagreed targets will be met. The initial responses of theinstitutions increase their legitimacy and stature.Events such as the 75th anniversary of the UnitedNations and World Bank and the 50th anniversary ofUNEP present occasions to celebrate the progressthat is being made, but also to acknowledge thechallenges that remain and to reassert the need forcontinuing action.

The demands of continued population andeconomic growth still outweigh many incrementaladvances in sustainable production. Regional conflicts,often over contested resources, persist in severalparts of the world, directly causing social andenvironmental damage, as well as diverting scarceresources from other priorities. And tropical storms,droughts, floods, wildfires, earthquakes, chemicalspills and other industrial accidents remind societythat natural and technological systems do not alwaysbehave according to plan.

It takes time for many to accept the idea of globalpublic policy for the pursuit of sustainable development.Furthermore, the path pursued has meant adopting ahighly technocratic approach and has not engendered a

widespread shift in basic attitudes and behaviour. Thismakes certain policy actions either unfeasible or lesseffective than had been assumed.

Reviewing progressAs the world looks back after three decades, there aremixed feelings. Much has been accomplished, butmuch remains to be done. Although not all the long-range targets have yet been achieved, the world is ona fair trajectory to meet them. It is clear, though, thatthere are significant differences in progress on thedifferent goals and in different regions.

There has been broad success in reducing extremepoverty, achieving universal primary education,improving gender equity, reducing infant and childmortality and improving reproductive health.International debt relief has contributed to the fundingrequired to meet these targets in many developingcountries. Areas of concern remain, including much ofAfrica, where 10 per cent of the population go hungryin most sub-regions. But even this representsreductions of two-thirds to three-quarters over the 30-year period. Similarly, the more technology-dependent

environmental targets — increases in materials useefficiency and reductions in the releases of toxicmaterials — have proved to be achievable.

A key role has been played by the private sector,which has accepted major responsibility and ploughedmore profits back into research and development andinto global and regional business coalitions. Thesenew groupings have actively supported technologytransfer to developing countries. The effect of privatesector initiatives is further reflected in theachievement of such goals as improving urban airquality and providing access to safe water.

For the goals related to water stress, landdegradation, deforestation and marine overfishing,significant though costly advances have been made,but considerable risks remain. Growing (althoughstabilizing) populations and improving lifestylescontinue to intensify demands for water, food, forestresources and space. Changes in climate have

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‘Growing (although stabilizing) populations and improvinglifestyles continue to intensify demands for water, food, forestresources and space.’

contributed to these concerns. Whilst the percentageof the population living in areas of high and severewater stress remains stable, the total number ofpersons potentially affected has risen.

Crises have been prevented through expensiveinfrastructural developments and pricing policies,which place a greater financial burden on end users.The amount of land at risk from water-induced soildegradation has risen significantly due to agriculturalexpansion into marginal lands and climate changes.But the rate at which degradation is actually takingplace has fallen substantially over the period asfarmers have implemented more stringent landconservation measures in response to changing tax

and subsidy structures. By 2032 there is almost no netadvance of degradation.

There has been success in halting deforestation.Total forest area has even increased in most regions, inpart because the area under plantations has expanded.However, the level of exploitation of forests hascontinued to increase. Similarly, growth in aquacultureand better management of fishery systems (includingstricter controls on marine fish catches) have preventedfurther decline in most fish stocks, but overallexploitation has not fallen significantly.

Finally, the scale and nature of the efforts neededto address climate change and biodiversity declinehave proved to be enormous. Emissions of carbondioxide and other greenhouse gases per unit ofeconomic activity have fallen significantly throughoutthe world and absolute levels have fallen in thewealthier regions. More rapid economic developmentand continued population growth in other regionshave resulted in higher absolute emissions, even

though per capita emissions in these regions remainrelatively low. The net result is a continuing rise inglobal emissions.

Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 continue toclimb, indicating that much more stringent measureswill be required in the future to bring them back downto the target levels. Global temperatures have risen bynearly 0.75°C since the turn of the century andcontinue to increase, although models indicate that, asreductions already negotiated take effect, this rate ofincrease has reached a plateau and will begin todecline in a few decades. The regional manifestationsof climate change and the infrastructure developmentthat has taken place to meet growing human needsand to achieve the other goals have placed manyhuman and natural systems at increased risk.

In summary, the forces driving the world inunsustainable directions, while not necessarilydefeated, appear to be on the way to being tamed. Notall the alarming trends have been reversed, thougheven in the worst cases ‘things are getting worse at aslower rate’ (Meadows 2000). The actions that havebeen required to keep the world on track to meet thelong-term goals have not always been popular andhave often been expensive. Halting deforestation, landdegradation and marine overfishing has requireddrastic measures, at times including total bans onhuman activity in some areas.

Efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gaseshave required fairly high levels of taxation on mostenergy sources and certain industrial chemicals, aswell as expensive shifts in agricultural practices.There is a question as to how much more can beaccomplished with similar policies, even given freshtechnological advances. There is also a question markover how long businesses and the general public willcarry on accepting such policies. Without fundamentalchanges in human behaviour and demands, theachievement of sustainability could well mean an evermore managed, bureaucratic, technocratic andultimately dehumanized world.

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‘The actions required to keep the world on track to meet thelong-term goals have not always been popular and have oftenbeen expensive.’

In the early years of the century, a world view that putsmarket principles and security concerns to the fore,dominates global development. This is reflected atinternational level in the half-hearted mood of debatesat the WSSD and similar meetings. Negotiations onclimate change and other multilateral environmentalagreements drag on with minimal progress.

Where there are advances at international level,these tend to be in areas with a more economicfocus, such as international trade and foreigninvestment. Even in this arena, promisinginitiatives like the Global Compact for Business, theGlobal Reporting Initiative and the Doha round oftrade negotiations under the WTO, are slow todeliver on their promises to create the basis for moreequitable and sustainable economic globalization.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on theUnited States and the initial armed response inAfghanistan, the emphasis is on providing security bymore traditional means, such as military power andcontrol of arms and financial flows. Little attention ispaid to the social and environmental issues that manyargue provide the motivation for terrorist activity.

The market’s call: the need for securityThe momentum for sustainable development, sopromising in the 1990s, gradually fizzles out, for a widerange of reasons. The voices that urge the world tobuild upon this momentum and achieve agreed goals gounheeded as the belief spreads that free markets alonecan come up with flexible enough checks and balancesto deal with issues of social justice and globalenvironmental care. This complacency also reflectscompeting concerns, such as recurring fiscal crises anddownturns in national economies, cycles of terrorist

activity and retaliation and the continuation of armedconflicts in several parts of the world. Hence the firstdecade of the new century is in many ways a period ofmuddling through.

In Africa, the decade is characterized byprolonged civil conflicts affecting many nations andoften drawing in neighbouring countries. In thesecases little progress is made in introducing greatertransparency and accountability into governments. Atthe same time, the AIDS pandemic continues,curtailing economic advances even in those countriesthat enjoy political stability.

Conflicts also continue to simmer in parts of WestAsia, at times boiling over into periods of intenseviolence. Disputes over water, oil and other resourcesare intensified by, and contribute to, these conflicts.Instability in the price of oil, due to fluctuating demandand the inability to control supply in the region andelsewhere, slows economic growth in the region.

Economic problems remain significant in manyparts of the Asia and the Pacific region. Downturnsreminiscent of the crash that occurred in the late1990s periodically resurface and impact upon abroader range of countries. Here, also, internal andexternal conflicts continue to command attention anddivert valuable resources.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, problemsposed by the continuing growth of mega-cities plaguemany countries while internal conflicts, often relatedto the drug trade, persist. At the same time, pushed

by the countries of North America and multinationalcorporations, the primary focus of many politicians ison the continued expansion of free trade in the region,rather than on social and environmental concerns.

Security is a consuming preoccupation in NorthAmerica, giving rise to concern not only over thethreat of direct physical attacks but also overdependence on foreign suppliers for strategicresources. The latter fear increases the pressure toexploit resources within the region, including parts ofthe Arctic. Arctic resources are made more accessibleas ice-free periods in the north are extended by thewarming of the climate. Access is also eased by a

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 3 9

This scenario assumes a world of striking disparities whereinequality and conflict prevail. Socio-economic andenvironmental stresses give rise to waves of protest andcounteraction. As such troubles become increasinglyprevalent, the more powerful and wealthy groups focus onself-protection, creating enclaves akin to the present day‘gated communities’. Such islands of advantage provide adegree of enhanced security and economic benefits fordependent communities in their immediate surroundingsbut they exclude the disadvantaged mass of outsiders.Welfare and regulatory services fall into disuse but marketforces continue to operate outside the walls.

Security First

‘A world view that puts market principles and security concernsto the fore, dominates global development.’

wave of privatization in the region, extending to thecontrol of natural resources.

Similar bursts of resource exploitation are alsooccurring in the Arctic parts of the Russian Federationand the Nordic countries. Much of the effort ofEuropean policy-makers is focused on dealing withexpansion of the EU. A few more countries areadmitted into the Union, but persistent tensionsrelated to taxes, subsidies, immigration, freedom of

movement and other issues, slow this process.Disagreements also linger on between a central coreof countries that wishes to move towards muchgreater integration and others that prefer a looserunion. Meanwhile, countries in Eastern Europegenerally make little economic progress and sufferfurther tensions and internal conflicts.

In all these regions and at the global level, large,non-state entities increasingly influence and drive thepolitical agenda. These include multinationalcorporations, but also crime syndicates. The level ofcorruption within governments is generallyunderstood to be increasing, although given littleimprovement in transparency and accountability, thisis not easy to verify.

The start of the second decade of the new centurysees the world functioning in a more laissez fairemanner than before. Businesses wield enormous powerbut maintain a focus on enhancing shareholder value,believing it is the job of governments to addressenvironmental and social issues. They, however, expendresources to build up private police forces to protecttheir assets in areas with strategic resources, especiallyin countries where protection is considered unreliable.

Veering towards breakdownGovernment efforts to tackle environmental and socialproblems are generally late in coming and ineffectivein scope. Furthermore, governments use much oftheir power to protect the economic interests ofnational and corporate enterprises to which they areincreasingly tied. NGOs and other groups in civilsociety find themselves focusing more and more on

short-term crises, rather than working to influencelong-term development patterns.

This trend is epitomized by the collapse of theAntarctic Treaty system, a result of pressure fromnon-claimant states and non-state actors, coupledwith the failure of claimant states to reach agreementon resource exploitation and environmentalprotection. There is a rush to exploit the region’smineral and marine living assets, including freshwaterin the form of ice. This free-for-all does not meanequal access for all groups, as the more powerfulstates and large corporations still exert dominance.Exploitation of resources by these groups also speedsup in the Arctic. There, the impacts have animportant social element as native peoples gain littlebenefit. Although many people move north to takepart in the expanded economic activity, most incomeflows out of the region.

As the decade proceeds, the effects of the erosionof institutions at the international and national levelsbecome more apparent. If the first decade was a periodof muddling through, this is one of stumbling andserious falls. Conflicts in various parts of the worldnever coalesce to form what might be called a ThirdWorld War. They do, however, escalate in particularregions and at particular times to destabilize nations.Of even more concern to some is the sporadic use ofchemical, biological and other non-conventionalweapons. The sheer numbers of refugees also createssevere problems in neighbouring (mainly non-combatant) states. The ability of internationalinstitutions such as the United Nations HighCommission for Refugees to cope with these eventshas been compromised by reductions in support,leaving them overwhelmed.

These conflicts, along with enduring economicweaknesses and environmental deterioration, affectregions further afield, as migration pressures increasethroughout the world. These pressures stem not onlyfrom factors within regions forcing migration, but alsofrom tantalizing images broadcast by the media that lurethem elsewhere. The response of the receivingcountries is mixed, with some more open to newimmigrants than others. Over time, however, even thecountries and regions with relatively open borders beginclamping down as they focus on problems at home.

Some of these problems spring from recurrenteconomic malaise. In North America, Europe andparts of Asia and the Pacific, part of the problem is the

3 4 0 OUTLOOK 2002–32

‘In all regions and at the global level, large, non-state entitiesincreasingly influence and drive the political agenda. Theseinclude multinational corporations, but also crime syndicates.’

declining size of workforces. Allowing highly educatedand skilled workers from other regions to immigrateeases this shortage somewhat. Unfortunately thedeterioration of educational opportunities in manyregions has reduced the availability of such workers.From the perspective of their home regions, thedeparture of even a small number of skilled migrantworkers represents a significant loss of indigenouscapacity. The repercussions affect economic andpolitical stability, further widening the gap betweenhave and have-not nations.

Environmental changes and events also havewidespread effects, in wealthy and poorer regionsalike. The impacts of climate change and variabilitybecome more apparent. The gradual rise in sea level ispunctuated by severe storms that cause heavy damageto coastal (and even some inland) areas. In Europe,North America and the wealthier parts of Asia and thePacific, the financial losses are staggering, even ifthere are no dramatic losses of life. Re-financing on ahuge scale, not only to recover the losses wherepossible, but also to prepare for future events, divertsimportant resources from other parts of the economy.

In other regions, particularly Latin America andthe Caribbean, and the poorer parts of Asia and thePacific, the loss of life is significant and the financiallosses seriously damage economies. After theimmediate clean-up, there is little funding left to makeravaged areas less vulnerable in the future.Elsewhere, droughts are adding to water stress,already on the increase because of runaway growth inwater demand. This shortfall cripples agriculture inmany parts of West Asia and Africa, where it directlymenaces the very survival of many people andincreases regional tensions, and also in NorthAmerica, where it tips the balance in favour ofpursuing risky, large-scale water transfer projects.

Many sectors bear the mark of developments inthe areas of biotechnology and genetic engineering.Difficulties in mastering these new technologies aremade worse by a drop in public funding for researchand development. Finance for these purposes is nowconcentrated in the hands of private firms that arebiased in favour of those applications that will yieldthe highest profits. Minimal social and environmentalsafeguards characterize the early phases ofbiotechnology development.

Significant advances are achieved in medicine,agriculture and environmental clean-up technologies,

but detrimental side effects also arise. These includeaccidental releases, illicit use by terrorist groups,epidemics among human and animal populations andnegative impacts on various plant species. Attacks onbiotechnology trials by eco-terrorists and pro-natureactivists further complicate matters. Ultimately, aclampdown on research and application trials isimposed by governments and key firms involved inthese fields.

The net result is a slowdown in advances in thoseareas with potentially the highest impacts for thebroadest section of society, such as the production offood crops. In combination with the deterioration ofarable land in many areas, food stocks fall perpetuallyshort in some regions. Cutbacks in foreign assistancehave left relief agencies unable to handle many of theresulting crises. In general, conventional forms ofdevelopment aid decline and poverty rises.

Little action is taken to alleviate the debt burdenof poorer nations. The global economy remainsstratified and fails to embrace the billions who areeconomically and politically marginalized. This split isdeepened by institutions of international trade thatfocus on freeing up markets in developing countries,

without also doing so in industrialized regions.The flow of new technology and training from theindustrialized countries also declines.

Not only are the poor excluded from the neweconomy, but also traditional livelihoods andcommunities erode as global markets penetrateperipheral regions, seeking cheap labour and controlof resources. In poorer countries especially,economies increasingly come under the control oftransnational corporations. In parts of LatinAmerica and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific,and Africa, this takeover is very clearly seen in thecommercial exploitation of biological resources withlittle compensation for the majority of the people inthese regions.

The drawdown of fiscal resources of the statetreasury in poor countries leads to disintegration ofsocial and civic services. In particular, systems of

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 4 1

‘The global economy remains stratified and fails to embrace thebillions who are economically and politically marginalized… traditional livelihoods and communities also erode.’

education, especially higher education, collapse. Thisdeepens the divide between the rich and the poor andexacerbates absolute poverty. Furthermore, as a resultof cutbacks in public provision of education, much ofthe alternative schooling that is available is laden withprejudicial seeds of intolerance and violence.

As conditions worsen in many places the excludedgrow increasingly restive. Many seek their fortunes inexploding mega-cities. The pace of urbanization putsextra strain on already overextended infrastructures,leading to more problems with air pollution and lack ofaccess to clean water and sanitation. Limitedeconomic opportunities in cities foster the growth oforganized crime. In an atmosphere of despair, illegaldrugs find ready markets. Many of the poor try tomigrate to rich countries and rising numbers of themresort to illegal entry. The stream of people on themove grows into a river of the desperate flowing (bothwithin and across national boundaries) towards thewealthy areas. Affluent groups respond with growingxenophobia and oppressive policing of borders. Socialpolarization spreads and extremists and terroristgroups find ready recruits.

In this atmosphere of rising social, environmentaland economic tension, violence is endemic. Poorcountries begin to fragment as civil order collapsesand various forms of criminal anarchy fill the vacuum.War and environmental degradation lead to massivemovements of refugees in some regions.Environmental changes and overloaded infrastructuresalso favour another kind of migrant; new andresurgent infectious diseases and the vectors thatcarry them.

Divided worldAlarmed by migration, terrorism and disease,members of the affluent minority fear that they toowill be engulfed. Even some of the more prosperousnations feel the sting as infrastructure decays,

technology fails and institutions collapse. As OECDeconomies falter and their populations age, socialprogrammes introduced in the 20th century but

neglected year after year, begin to unravel.These and other factors lead to a dramatic swing in

approaches to governance. Having stood by,sometimes willingly, and seen their powers eroded,governments strive to reassert their authority. Tostem the collapse, the forces of order react withsufficient cohesion and force to impose anauthoritarian order throughout much of the world. Inmany regions these shifts appear merely as acontinuation of normal practice or a return to the not-so-distant past. In others, though, sacrificing longcherished ideals (such as democracy, transparency andparticipation in governance) for greater security is noeasy trade-off. A growing sense of lifeboat ethics — anacceptance that only by letting some drown can theothers remain afloat — allows the governments andcitizens of these countries to make certain consensualchoices. Other decisions are eventually made withoutpopular consent and are accepted without question.

This process takes time to develop, but a patterngradually emerges. In rich nations, the wealthiestpeople flourish in protected enclaves and the generalpublic receives some assurance from the increasedlevel of security. Strongholds also persist in the poorernations, protecting the remaining elites and strategicresources. In some regions, control is unstable; thepower base shifts as one faction or ethnic groupoverpowers another.

The strongholds are ‘islands of prosperity in anocean of poverty and despair’ (Hammond 1998),descendants of the walled cities of earlier eras and thegated communities of more recent times. Sometimesthe walls are physical; at other times they are moremetaphorical. Nevertheless, these bubbles of wealthare not isolated. They are connected in a globalnetwork with shared economic, environmental andsecurity interests. Through this network, globalizationcontinues, albeit in a distorted form.

Within the walls, life proceeds with somesemblance of order. Technological advances continueto be made. Health and educational services continueto be provided, consumption patterns do not shiftdramatically and environmental conditions holdsteady. Businesses assist in the provision of somesocially important programmes, especially thosedirectly related to their interests, for example,education to address skill shortages and provision ofbasic needs to workers. Still, there is always arecognition that security is of paramount importance.

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‘Many of the poor try to migrate to rich countries and risingnumbers of them resort to illegal entry. Affluent groups respondwith growing xenophobia and oppressive policing of borders.’

It is pursued by various authoritarian policies andinstitutions, whose methods include surveillanceand the profiling and harassment of particulardissident groups.

Outside the walls, the majority is trapped inpoverty. The provision of basic needs — water, healthservices, sanitation, food, shelter and energy — ispiecemeal or often non-existent. Many people aredenied basic freedoms. By comparison with thecohesive societies within the walls, this world isincreasingly chaotic and disconnected. Technologicalprogress continues to be made in these communities,at times by theft or leakage from within the walls, butalso by indigenous enterprises. Such breakthroughstend to be small-scale, however, and the lack ofharmonization and capacity building prevents dramaticadvances that might prompt large improvements. Theinability to achieve economies of scale further hindersprogress and growth.

The interplay between life inside and outside theenclaves goes well beyond merely policing the bordersbetween the two. The bubbles of prosperity dependheavily on a constant flow of resources from areas notfully under their control. Where the elite are able toexert control, there is strict management of sourceareas for products of commercial value and those thatserve a more basic life support function. These well-protected areas, both on land and in the oceans,provide a haven for many other species, but do little toimprove the lot of people who are excluded. Whereareas are simply mined and abandoned, those on theoutside are expected to deal with the aftermath.

The elite also rely upon the broader world toabsorb the excesses of their lifestyles. Wastesproduced within the strongholds are transported intooutlying areas. The pressures that such wastes placeon unprotected natural systems add to the problems ofpeople struggling to survive. These problems includeoveruse and fouling of water sources above and below

ground, the effects of uncontrolled use of dirty fossilfuels, contamination from untreated solid wastes,continued deforestation to provide fuelwood and thedegradation of marginal areas used for agriculture.

Trade also crosses the boundaries between the twoworlds. Those inside the walls have not lost theirtaste for products that must come from outside,including illegal drugs and those derived from rarespecies. Both money and military supplies find theirway outside in return, where they trigger not justexternal chaos and lawlessness but also periodic

terrorist attacks against the fortresses. In this atmosphere, both the informal and

legitimate small enterprises flourish by serving localneeds. Charities and other welfare providers in civilsociety try to assist where governments andbusinesses fall short in the provision of basic needs,which happens in many cases, but the task proves farfrom simple and their efforts far from effective.

What lies ahead?By 2032, an air of uneasy stability has begun to settleon this divided world. It is unclear, though, how longthis truce can last. The forces for further breakdownare ever present. At the same time, dreams of a betterway still beckon. Whereas many of the fears of thepessimists have come true, fresh opportunities forpositive change have not ceased to appear. Outside thewalls, small islands of calm exist and work is underway there to build links with others and withprogressive elements within the fortresses, offeringhope that someday, like the phoenix rising from itsashes, a better world for all might yet emerge.

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 4 3

‘The forces of order react with sufficient cohesion and force toimpose an authoritarian order throughout much of the world.’

In the early years of the century, there is evidence of acompelling desire and demand among peopleeverywhere for action to address the social, economicand environmental concerns affecting many regions ofthe world. The terrorist attacks on the United Statesand subsequent retaliation lend immediacy to calls toaddress economic, social and environmental concernsthat are seen as the root causes of such extremeactions. A reinvigorated NGO community becomes akey channel through which citizens everywhereexpress their demands. The Internet amplifies whathas become a global dialogue, or more accurately amultitude of dialogues, on the need for action.

An age of reflection …Some of these exchanges take place in formalgovernment arenas. Others, partly prompted bypressures from shareholders, employees and customers,are happening in industry, both within and among firms.Similarly, NGOs (including many that have a multinationalpresence) are reflecting upon their roles and missions.

There are also fresh attempts to collaborate across thegovernmental, industrial and NGO sectors. In total,however, these efforts pale by comparison with themyriad dialogues between individuals and small groups ofinterested citizens within and across regions.

Much of this desire for remedial action is

expressed in and around the lobbies of internationalactivities, including the WSSD and other UnitedNations conferences, meetings of the G7/G8 group ofnations, at the negotiations of the WTO andmultilateral environmental agreements, and atmeetings on specific social and environmental issues,such as climate change and HIV/AIDS.

At times, the formal events are overshadowed byparallel gatherings. For the most part, the mood ofthese gatherings is peaceable, akin to that of theGlobal Forum linked to the 1992 Earth Summit. Lessin evidence are the anti-globalization protests seen atthe meetings of the WTO in Seattle in 1999 and theG8 in Genoa in 2001. Their goal is to highlight theadvances that are being made and to shape the agendaof the governmental meetings. There is greateremphasis on presenting the positive aspects of asocietal transformation rather than the negativeconsequences of inaction. Over time, increasingnumbers of representatives from industry andgovernments participate in these encounters, makingthem more successful in achieving this goal.

… and a time for actionMuch of what is happening goes beyond meredialogue. Rather than waiting for political leaders totake the initiative, many individuals and groups havebegun to act on their own. They note the contrastingoutcomes of the 1992 Earth Summit on an informaland local scale, such as the spread of Local Agenda 21initiatives and those pitched at the more formal andinternational level, such as the United NationsFramework Convention on Climate Change. Theydraw inspiration from past and present efforts of localgrass-roots movements like the Green Belt movementin Kenya and the Chipko Andalan movement in India.They also recall successful interventions atinternational level, such as the campaign to end theproduction and use of landmines.

The business community is another source ofinspiration, principally for its success in developingsocial investment funds and establishing social stockindices. Firms that address environmental issuesahead of regulation, exemplified by companies in theClimate Neutral Network, serve as role models. Alsoheld up as role models are partnerships betweengovernments and other groups, such as EcotourismNamibia and Community-Based FisheriesManagement in Phang-Nga Bay, Thailand.

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‘There is evidence of a compelling desire and demand amongpeople everywhere for action to address the social, economic andenvironmental concerns affecting many regions of the world.’

A new environment and development paradigm emerges inresponse to the challenge of sustainability, supported bynew, more equitable values and institutions. A morevisionary state of affairs prevails, where radical shifts inthe way people interact with one another and with theworld around them stimulate and support sustainablepolicy measures and accountable corporate behaviour.There is much fuller collaboration between governments,citizens and other stakeholder groups in decision-makingon issues of close common concern. A consensus isreached on what needs to be done to satisfy basic needsand realize personal goals without beggaring others orspoiling the outlook for posterity.

Sustainability First

The more that individuals and groups applythemselves to practical initiatives, the more hopegrows that significant changes are possible.The media assist by making these efforts morevisible. Progressive elements in government andbusiness communities realize that this is the mostpromising channel for reform. They also recognizethat efforts like these are needed to get to thesources of dissatisfaction that lie at the root ofterrorist activities. This realization leads to thecreation of alliances amongst individuals from variousstakeholder groups in support of key initiatives.

The result is a mixture of old and new initiatives.Some initiatives are highly coordinated and involvelarge numbers of people. Others are pursued by smallgroups with wide ranging, but loosely knitconnections at local, regional and global levels.Whereas some are formal and embedded in nationaland international law, many take a voluntary approach,such as the Global Reporting Initiative, GlobalCompact Initiative and financial initiatives set up bythe United Nations and businesses.

Efforts continue to incorporate the results ofscientific research and analysis more thoroughly intothe policy making process. The MillenniumEcosystem Assessment, the Global InternationalWater Assessment and new studies on the nitrogencycle and persistent organic pollutants (POPs)complement the ongoing investigation of climatechange by the Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange. The POPs assessment is in part a responseto compelling new evidence of the long-rangetransport of these pollutants and the effects of theirpresence on animal life in the polar regions. Muchlike the discovery of the ozone hole over Antarctica inthe 1980s, these revelations stimulate intense effortto measure and counter the risk.

These new assessments differ fundamentally frompast efforts. Firstly, they are designed to include moreexpertise from developing regions, and to buildcapacity in these regions. Secondly, the contributionsof social scientists are given equal weight to those ofthe physical and natural scientists. Thirdly, whereverpossible, the many regional and local studies thatcomprise large parts of these assessments recruitlocal and lay communities as partners in the research.This stems from the desire of these groups to have avoice in the development and understanding of theissues and in how to address particular concerns.

The knowledge that these individuals and groups(particularly indigenous groups) possess has beenaccorded increasing recognition. The participatoryapproach also acknowledges that scope for actionextends beyond official government channels anddepends upon involvement of local communities.

Setting goals and targets and designing activitiesto achieve them, builds upon ongoing efforts, but also

reflects progress in striking a balance between formaland informal institutions. Social and environmentalgoals are re-affirmed, among them reducing foodinsecurity and infant mortality, increasing lifeexpectancy and literacy, stabilizing climate, haltingdeforestation and reversing declines in fisheries.

Rather than laying down specific numbers, quotasand timetables, however, more attention is paid toincreasing accountability and transparency by institutingmonitoring systems and placing responsibility ongovernments, industries, NGOs and others to discloseinformation in relation to agreed goals. The underlyingprinciple is that the widespread availability of goodinformation and appropriate checks and balances willencourage progress towards these goals, eitherdirectly or by way of pressure from an increasinglyvocal citizenry. The goal of policy, in this scenario, isto support the efforts of individuals and groups, ingovernment as well as in civil society, within the non-profit sector as well in the marketplace, to pursuesustainable development.

This evolving approach calls for a reappraisal ofexisting multilateral agreements. The list includesenvironmentally oriented agreements such as theUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea andthe Basel Convention on the Control ofTransboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes andtheir Disposal. It also features more socially orientedconventions such as those on the Elimination of AllForms of Discrimination Against Women and on theRights of the Child.

The process of revision provides momentum, too,for the continuing reassessment of internationalinstitutions of governance, with a view to

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 4 5

‘Some initiatives are highly coordinated and involve largenumbers of people. Others are pursued by small groups … someare formal … many take a voluntary approach.’

transforming them into more effective organizations.The United Nations, major financial institutions suchas the World Bank, regional development banks andthe IMF and the WTO are all included. Transparencyand accountability are key aspects of this course ofaction. Similar processes are ongoing in business,voluntary and other sectors.

At regional level, new and old organizationsbecome increasingly active. The Federation ofCaribbean Nations grows out of the formerCARICOM. In Europe, the growth of the EU proceedswith considerable deference paid to maintaining andimproving relationships with the Russian Federation.Africa sees the further evolution of the AfricanMinisterial Conference on the Environment(AMCEN). Most regions also explore greaterintegration of policies related to trade, migration, themanagement of water resources and similartransboundary issues. In this way, the regional effortsbecome part of a semi-formal web of global publicpolicy networks.

A great swing The journey that these processes set in motion is along one. It takes many years and does not proceedwithout constant pressure and action from manysectors of society. A profound set of changes, whichwere only hinted at in the early years of the century,gradually unfolds, quietly most of the time, not soquietly at others. People everywhere begin to embracethe idea of a ‘new sustainability paradigm’ thatpromises to transcend conventional values andlifestyles. This new paradigm combines a powerfulpersonal and philosophical dimension with concernover economic growth, technological potential andpolitical eventualities.

Among more affluent people and groups,disenchantment with consumerism sparks off aquest for more fulfilling and ethical ways of living

that can restore a sense of meaning and purpose totheir existence. The values of simplicity, cooperationand community begin to displace those of

consumerism, competition and individualism. Moretime is spent on study, art, hobbies and engaging inthe wider community.

The success of the Truth and ReconciliationCommissions in South Africa, East Timor andelsewhere stimulate similar exercises in other places,including less strictly political settings, such as withinthe tobacco and chemicals industries. The positiveresults of the peacemaking process in NorthernIreland and Bosnia enhance efforts in other regions.Dialogues between the world’s major religions,directly stimulated by the terrorist activities againstthe United States and subsequent retaliation, furtherhelp to create the foundation for greaterunderstanding and cooperation.

In some regions, the mood of society is a mixtureof battle fatigue and disgust with current leaders.Small-scale but locally significant environmentaldisasters also have an effect on this mood. Thesefactors combine to make more people willing toexplore and question fundamental beliefs.

Citizens and consumers, where possible with theirvotes and wallets and otherwise with their feet andtheir voices, make it clear that progressive businessesand governments will be rewarded while others willbe rejected. At some point, a critical mass is reached,whereby activities that have until now appearedisolated and of little consequence, begin to spread andaffect broader regions.

In developing regions and amongst indigenouscommunities everywhere, a new generation ofthinkers, leaders and activists emerges to join andshape the global dialogue. Many regions draw on thedual legacy of nature-conscious traditional societiesand ideas of visionary thinkers seeking better pathsfor development. Cultural renaissance evolves inmany regions, rooted in respect for tradition and anappreciation of local human and natural resources.Young people from all regions and cultures play a keyrole in promoting these values. The increasedopportunity to meet and learn from others of theirgeneration, both virtually and in person, fuels arediscovery of idealism as they join together in theproject of forging a global community.

What is new in the current discussion is thewillingness of people to reflect upon the positive andnegative aspects of their own actions and legacies aswell as those of other cultures. Many of these debatesare launched within the developing world, engaging an

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‘A profound set of changes gradually unfolds, quietly most of thetime, not so quietly at others. People everywhere begin toembrace the idea of a ‘new sustainability paradigm.’

ever-expanding circle of stakeholders.The notion that the prevailing market oriented

wisdom is both insufficient and undesirable garnersmore and more support. This switch is mostsignificant in North America and Western Europe, aswell as among many of the affluent in other regions,who have been seen as the key purveyors andbeneficiaries of this approach to development. At thesame time, it is recognized that the increasingopenness and participation in governance have playeda key role in the advances that have improved life formany people in many parts of the world.

This change of heart gives rise to more measureddiscussions about the seemingly inexorable spread ofglobalization in all of its forms. The realization growsthat, even if it were possible, it would not be desirableto stem this tide completely. Around the world, fromLatin America to Africa to West Asia, the re-examinationof history leads to new approaches for dealing with thechanges happening in and outside their regions.Inevitably, this re-think is influenced in part by thereturn of many former emigrants, for brief periods orpermanently, who have gained experience andunderstanding of how cultures can learn from each otherwithout losing their own identity.

A redefinition of roles … With the growth in global public policy networks,governments, particularly at the national level, oftenfind themselves trying to keep up with what ishappening in other sectors and at other levels. In asense, the leaders have become followers, althoughthey continue to have significant roles. They remainresponsible for setting and implementing overallnational policy and negotiating and ratifyinginternational treaties. Nation states remain the keyplayers in the areas of national and internationalsecurity. The public sector retains a pivotalregulatory role, as awareness dawns that laissez fairepolicies often promoted in the name of economicdevelopment do nothing to correct flaws in marketpractices. It also holds a brief to amend existingpolicies (notably subsidies for natural resourceextraction) that encourage such imperfections.

Demand for more participation, transparency andaccountability on all sides drives a number of policyshifts. A move away from reliance on exported rawmaterials towards producing more value added locallyis highlighted in Latin America, Eastern Europe,

Africa and parts of North America. Expansion ofmicro-credit and similar schemes is particularlyimportant in the developing world, enabling small-scale producers and manufacturers to purchase theinputs needed to increase the scale and productivity oftheir operations. Another pattern that emergesworldwide is a shift in the nature of taxes andsubsidies towards promoting more sustainable habitsof resource use.

New opportunities arise from looking at problemson a larger scale, with a view to recognizing limits andidentifying solutions. One example is the opportunity

to couple the issues of ageing and shrinkingworkforces in Europe and parts of Asia and the Pacific,with continued population growth and migrationpressures in other regions. Another involves drawingmore conscious links between the issue of waterstress and the trading of ‘virtual’ water in the form ofagricultural products. This linkage is accorded highpriority within susceptible regions, such as West Asiaas part of the Arab Free Trade Association, but it alsooccurs in region-to-region discussions.

… and a redirection of actionsActions are taken in many regions to preserve majorbiodiversity hotspots. In Europe and North America,major efforts are made to establish large-scalenetworks of protected areas and green corridors.Some of the most significant activities hinge on themanagement of common resources. Ocean fisheriesreceive greater attention. For this and other reasons,the high Arctic regions and the continent of Antarcticaare increasingly recognized as part of a common globalheritage. A fundamental revision of the Antarctic legalregime sets an example for similar action in theArctic, where indigenous groups play a significant role,individually and through the Arctic Council. Itbecomes widely accepted that the polar regions haveto be maintained as places apart, with special rulesregarding human activity.

Cooperation on these and other issues alsoprompts moves to address the tensions at the root ofmany ongoing conflicts. Sometimes these conflicts and

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‘The values of simplicity, cooperation and community begin todisplace those of consumerism, competition and individualism.’

their impact on other regions catalyse the formation ofbroad coalitions. The changing nature of securitythreats, as evidenced in the early part of the centuryand the pressures from businesses and other groupswith strong cross-national connections, push nationstowards increasingly multilateral efforts on manyissues. At other times, the resolution and avoidance ofconflicts are the results of networks and policies thathave been established for other purposes. Forexample, as borders become more open andresponsibility shifts from the nation state bothdownward to more local levels and upward to moremultinational levels, many disputes in countries and inborder areas in several regions, calm down or fadeaway entirely.

Underlying many of these shifts are policies toboost transparency and accountability. These policiesinclude more and better certification and labellingrequirements, often building upon efforts started byindustry. The Forest Stewardship Council, GlobalForest Watch and Marine Stewardship Council spawnsimilar efforts focusing on other resources. These

efforts in turn influence other areas of policy, such astrade, foreign debt and the enforcement of multilateralenvironmental treaties. In the developing world, amajor investment programme is undertaken tostrengthen capacities of governments, businesses(especially small and medium enterprises), NGOs andlocal communities to develop, access and useinformation. These changes are reflected in increasedmonitoring and communication. As much as any otherbusiness sector, the commercial media has shiftedaway from a pure emphasis on profit towardsestablishing a broader role in society.

There are also fundamental shifts in terms of howthe data used to track development are measured,analysed and presented. Aggregate figures that hidediscrepancies between, for example, genders and socialgroups, or between urban and rural areas, give way tomore disaggregated data collection and reporting. Thechanges are highlighted by the continuing evolution ofthe United Nations System of National Accounts,

especially the shift away from Gross Domestic Productas the major indicator of development. Environmental,economic and social indicators track real progress at allscales — business, national, regional and global —giving the public a more informed basis for seekingchange. New technologies also play a big role, both ascatalysts for, and in response to, many of these changes.

Developments in information and communicationtechnologies enable groups to connect to and learn fromeach other, by sharing success stories, but also byexposing behaviour, whether legal or illegal, existing orplanned, that gives cause for disquiet. Thesetechnologies also become more instrumental incoordinating social, political and economic activities.They are the natural medium for a new consciousness,providing a sense of immediacy and unity to a diverseand pluralistic movement.

New technologies play an instrumental role inprogress towards goals already set. Among suchadvances are improvements in energy and water useefficiency, desalination and medical technologies andtreatment. These breakthroughs are closely linked togeneral developments in the areas of nano-technologyand biotechnology. Governments, businesses and otherprivate organizations stimulate much of thetechnological development, not only by directinvestment in research and development, but also byoffering worthwhile prizes for new developments.

In the areas of biotechnology and geneticengineering, there is strong awareness of potentialissues related to biosafety, bioterrorism and moralconcerns. Biotechnology also becomes increasinglylinked to biodiversity research within regions.Concerns over genetic engineering continue to runhigh, but they are eased somewhat as developmentsin this area take on a more regional profile, both interms of who is undertaking and benefiting from theresearch and the raw materials used in theprocesses. Carefully controlled studies in manyregions, including Asia and the Pacific, West Asia,Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa,highlight the use of endemic resources.

Small and large businesses, in partnership withNGOs, provide valuable support in setting standardsand guidelines, technology transfer and mentoringprogrammes. They also take greater responsibilityfor the whole life cycle of projects and products. Thisincludes not only activities related to normalpractice, but also those related to infrastructure

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‘What is new in the current discussion is the willingness ofpeople to reflect upon the positive and negative aspects of theirown actions and legacies as well as those of other cultures.’

development, recovery of post-consumption wastes,capacity building and preparing employees andcommunities for periods of transition, such as whenprojects end or operations shift to another locality.

No turning back?These widespread changes unfold at different rates indifferent regions. By the year 2032, some shifts arealready well on the way to a new, more stable level offunctional completion, while others are only beginningto take off. Although there have been setbacks, thesehave not been major or widespread. The reason forthis smooth passage lies in the nature of the processwhich, while somewhat chaotic and unplanned attimes has been driven from the grass roots up withstrong support at higher levels. The degree ofparticipation between governments and society, andthe ongoing evolution of basic beliefs have beeninstrumental in allowing governments to pursuepolicies that would not otherwise have been possible.Examples are the establishment of land and marinesanctuaries and major shifts in the constructive useof tax breaks and penalties.

Furthermore, as businesses, NGOs andgovernments, working together or apart, achievenotable success, they push for action to encourageothers to follow. The evidence of these accruedbenefits helps governments in taking action, as theymake it very difficult for those who are opposed to

them to argue against the feasibility of meeting newtargets. And as formal actions are taken, they act as aratchet, keeping the advances from slipping back.

The interlinked sets of changes that haveoccurred during the first three decades of the newmillennium are clearly part of a broad societaltransformation. Although no one would argue thatsustainability has been achieved, there is a clearsense that the world is moving in the right directionand there is no turning back.

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 4 9

‘New technologies play a big role, both as catalysts for, and inresponse to, many of these changes.’

The foregoing section of this chapter presentedstories of four possible futures. Elements of each canbe observed in today’s world, as can the trends anddrivers that could push the world in the direction ofone or another of them. Which scenario — or whichmixture of scenarios — prevails in reality is a matterpartly of contingency and partly of choice.

This section illustrates what the four scenarioscan tell us about the consequences of policy andmanagement for the environment over the next threedecades. The pressures exerted on the environment,the changes in its state and the impacts on peoplediffer from one scenario to the next. Wheninterpreting the results it should be remembered thatnot all natural and human systems operate on thesame time scale: both feature fast, medium and slowprocesses. Hence some of the effects of our actionsemerge only slowly and much of what will happen inthe next 30 years has already been determined.Decisions made over the next 30 years will havesignificant impacts and implications that reach farbeyond this period.

Quantitative material is included to help illustratethe trends that would be expected under each

scenario. The quantitative results presented here ascharts and diagrams have been derived, inconsultation with regional experts, using a range ofanalytical tools. The results underline the magnitudeof the challenges we face in developingenvironmentally relevant policies for the future. Theemphasis is on general trends and the proportionaldifferences under different scenarios, rather than onthe precise levels of impacts. More details of theanalytical tools used and the variables presented areprovided in the technical annex to this chapter.

Certain environmental implications only makesense when viewed at the global scale. It is importantto remember, however, that the origins of these globaleffects are often local, national or regional. The initialglobal perspective of environmental implicationspresented below also provides a backdrop for the moredetailed examination of the environmental outlook thatfollows for each region. A box in each regional sectionoutlines a fictitious, but plausible, region-specific‘event’ and examines how the event might play outunder the four scenarios. Also summarized is theimpact that different policy approaches have on thepossible outcomes of the event.

3 5 0 OUTLOOK 2002–32U

NEP, Ben, Still Pictures

Environmental implications

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

Implications: Global

Climate trendsClimate change is one of the most pressing andcomplex global environmental issues to come to thefore in the past 30 years. The absence of effectivepolicies to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2)and other greenhouse gases in the Markets First andSecurity First scenarios, as well as slow transfer oftechnology under the latter, leads to significantincreases in CO2 emissions over the next 30 years(see chart, right). The effects of the economic troublesin a Security First world push down per capita energyconsumption and lead to the slower emission growthseen at the end of this period. The policy actionstaken under a Policy First scenario, notably carbontaxes and investments in non-fossil-fuel energysources, effectively curb growth in global emissions.Actual reductions would start around the year 2030.The dramatic behavioural shifts implied underSustainability First, in conjunction with significantlyimproved production and conversion efficiencies,result in a very rapid levelling off of emissionsfollowed by a decline by the middle of the 2020s.

Because of time lags in the climate system, thesechanges in emission patterns will have a delayedeffect on the atmospheric concentrations of CO2 andeven more so on the actual changes in climate. Evenby the year 2050, some 20 to 25 years after the startof the decline in emissions in the Policy First andSustainability First scenarios, the atmosphericconcentrations are only beginning to level off inSustainability First and have yet to do so in PolicyFirst (see chart). Carbon dioxide trajectories inMarkets First and Security First continue to climbrapidly, reflecting the weak policies and lack ofbehavioural changes in these scenarios.

The rate at which climate is changing is indicatedby the rate of change in average global temperature(see chart, overleaf). The relatively long delay in theresponse of the climate system shows up in therelatively small differences between the scenarios intheir early stages. This figure also reflects thecomplexity of this issue. There are strong linksbetween climate change and other environmentalissues, specifically local and regional air pollution.Reduction in emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO2), forexample, leads to temperature increases which cantemporarily more than offset the effects of reducing

CO2 emissions. The higher rates of temperaturechange in the Policy First and Sustainability Firstscenarios between now and 2032 reflect thesuccessful implementation of SO2 reduction policiesin these scenarios. In the longer term, however, thedynamics in a world resembling Markets First orSecurity First imply much faster and greater overalltemperature rises, whilst the rate of temperatureincrease slows down in Sustainability First.

Delays in the response of the climate system arealso apparent in other ways. For instance, by 2032,there is very little difference between the scenariosin terms of sea level rise. The total increase since thebeginning of the century is approximately 10 cm, yetthis level and rate of rise has serious implications for

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 5 1

Carbon dioxide emissions from all sources(billion tonnes carbon/year)

Carbon dioxide isemitted above allfrom the use offossil fuels. Forall four scenarios,it is assumedthat stabilizationof primary energyuse is firstreached at theend of the 21stcentury.

Source: IMAGE 2.2(see technical annex)

1970

6

8

10

18

0

2

4

12

2000

2030

14

16

Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide(parts per million by volume)

The build-up ofgreenhouse gasesfollows trends inemissions but thestock has a longlife span once inthe atmosphere.Only theSustainabilityFirst scenario ison a trajectory tostabilize at 450ppm (parts permillion) carbondioxideequivalent.

Source: IMAGE 2.2(see technical annex)

1970

600

300

2000

2050

500

550

450

400

350

2030

coastal and low-lying regions throughout the world,implying that adaptation measures are important toconsider along with attempts to reduce emissions.

Ecosystems under pressureBiodiversity preservation represents another majorenvironmental challenge at the global level. Withoutstrenuous policy action, humans continue to developmore of the planet, reducing and fragmenting naturalecosystems. The built-up area increases in nearly allregions and scenarios, the only exceptions beingNorth America and Europe where the area declinesslightly in Sustainability First (see chart opposite).

Lack of effective controls, including realistic pricehurdles to urban land expansion, is most evident inthe Security First scenario. The percentage of built-upland may seem small, but the infrastructure network(roads, power lines, airports, harbours and dams) thatsupports these sites affects much larger areas andalso sees dramatic expansion over the next 30 years(see chart opposite and maps on page 354). Theintroduction of such infrastructure can lead touncontrolled resource exploitation often linked tohunting and poaching, deforestation, land and waterdegradation, growing of illegal crops, tourism and landconflicts. In both Markets First and Security First,these resource-driven processes accelerate, withrapid losses of remaining wilderness areas and severeimpacts on biodiversity and indigenous peoples. APolicy First world continues to protect additionalareas and introduce mitigation measures. It does so,however, at rates far below that of development, as inthe previous century. Even under Sustainability First

conditions, increasing impacts from infrastructure —the modern world’s central nervous system — as wellas continued growth in human consumption of fuels,minerals and goods and services from naturalresources, cannot be completely avoided. However,levels may stabilize across the 30-year period.

Together with the growing impacts of climatechange, these developments severely depletebiodiversity in most regions in all scenarios (seemaps on page 355). One particularly troublesomeresult related to climate change is that significantareas are at risk because the natural vegetationcannot adapt to the rates of change in temperatureand precipitation.

Some change for the worse appears unavoidable inalmost any scenario that can be considered for thenext 30 years. Nevertheless, reductions in theemission of greenhouse gases, coupled with boldconservation initiatives, including the following, canhave a significant limiting effect on the impacts:

● a sharp reduction in further expansion ofinfrastructure into remaining wilderness areas;

● curbs on further fragmentation of alreadyimpacted areas;

● implementation of mitigation measures to reduceimpacts on biodiversity from existing networks;

● introduction of potentially costly restorationmeasures; and

● demarcation of wide buffer areas around naturereserves.

Pressures also increase on coastal ecosystems inmost regions and scenarios. In addition to pressuresfrom the direct exploitation of resources in theseareas, there are also impacts from coastalinfrastructure and land-based sources of pollution(see chart on page 355). These pressures areespecially large in Asia and the Pacific, where theystem from various sources, dominated by agriculturalactivity. West Asia also faces rising pressures underSecurity First and Markets First conditions, butgenerally sound water management practices in theregion have a very positive effect, especially inSustainability First.

In Europe the Mediterranean coast comes underspecial pressure through a combination of urbangrowth with inadequate waste water treatmentfacilities, tourism and intensively farmed croplands

3 5 2 OUTLOOK 2002–32

Global temperature change (°C per ten years)Temperaturechange up to the2030s can nolonger beavoided. In allscenarios its ratefar exceeds0.10°C per tenyears — the levelabove whichdamage toecosystems islikely.

Source: IMAGE 2.2(see technical annex)

0.40

0.00

2000

2050

0.20

0.25

0.15

0.10

0.05

2030

0.30

0.35

close to major river mouths. Latin America and theCaribbean currently features minor pressure fromland-based sources of pollution along much of itscoastline, compared to other regions, but this risessharply over the coming years. North America andAfrica also start from a relatively low base, butcertain areas, such as the mouths of large riversystems like the Mississippi and the Nile are ofkey concern.

Pressure on peopleThe scenarios carry important implications for theprovision of basic human needs that are related tobroader environmental impacts. In the longer term,global climate change can have a strong impact on thelocal availability of freshwater. Meanwhile, growingpopulations and increased economic activity,

particularly in agriculture, lead to increased demandfor freshwater in most scenarios.

Permutations of these pressures determinethose areas and populations that face the greatestchallenges in meeting needs. Outside North Americaand Europe, these challenges increase inall scenarios, along with a trend toward moreextreme water stress (see charts on page 356).Differences in policy actions, such as reforms inthe pricing of water and shifts in subsidies, andtechnological improvements can have a strongeffect on the size of these challenges. The ability tomeet these challenges reflects broader social andeconomic policies.

Under the Markets First and Security Firstscenarios, the number of people living in areas withsevere water stress increases in both absolute and

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 5 3

2002

200220

02

200220

02

2002

2002

Africa

4

5

6

7

0

2

3

1

Asia andthe Pacific

Europe Latin Americaand the Caribbean

NorthAmerica

West Asia global

Extent of built-up areas (% of total land area)

Human demandsfor resources andtransportationcontinue toimpact onbiodiversity andecosystemfunction up to2032.

Source: GLOBIO (seetechnical annex)

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

Africa

40

50

60

100

0

20

30

10

Asia andthe Pacific

Europe Latin Americaand the Caribbean

NorthAmerica

globalWest Asia Polar

70

80

90

2002

2002

2002

Land area impacted by infrastructure (% of total land area)

Populationgrowth andurbanization aredrivers ofexpanding landuse for humansettlements. Asiaand the Pacific,Africa and WestAsia see bigincreases to2032,irrespective ofscenario.

Source: PoleStar(see technical annex)

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

3 5 4 OUTLOOK 2002–32

Human resource demand continues to take an ever-greater toll on biodiversity. Land-useinduced impacts are most often associated with existing infrastructure. In a Markets Firstscenario, biodiversity comes under threat in nearly 72 per cent of the land area by2032. The situation is particularly critical in Southeast Asia, the Congo Basin and alsoparts of the Amazon. The pattern is however evident across all continents and terrestrial

ecosystems with the exception of tropical and polar deserts. As much as 48 per cent isdirectly converted to agricultural land, plantations and built-up areas, compared to 22per cent today, suggesting widespread depletion of biodiversity. Even the SustainabilityFirst scenario suggests continued biodiversity loss across nearly 56 per cent of the landarea by 2032.

Source: GLOBIO (see technical annex)

semi-desertsand deserts

wetlands

forests

grassland/savannah

croplands

water

low – mediumimpact

medium – highimpact

high impact

Markets First 2032 Policy First 2032

Security First 2032 Sustainability First 2032

Ecosystems impacted by infrastructure expansion 2002

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 5 5

Change in selected pressures on natural ecosystems 2002–32

Markets First Policy First

Security First Sustainability First

Pressures (population density, density of energy use, clear cutting, rate of temperature change) Overall change in land use

substantial decrease

small decrease

no change

small increase

substantial increase from domesticated to natural area

from natural area to domesticated area

remains domesticated

ice and polar area/no datastrong increase

North Latin America and Europe and Central West Asia (with Asia and the America the Caribbean Africa Asia (without Turkey) Iran and Turkey) Pacific (without Iran)

Markets First ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Policy First ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Security First ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Sustainability First ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Expected increase by 2032 ● small ● ● large ● ● ● very large

Potential increase in nitrogen loading on coastal ecosystems

The maps picture the combined effect of habitat loss and decreasing quality. Security Firstfeatures a large conversion of natural into agricultural land. By 2032, this conversion is infull motion, especially in the Southern Hemisphere. The Markets First scenario sees astrong decrease of the quality of nature in most regions. In some regions agricultural landis taken out of production and presumed to be reconverted into natural area. However, inbiodiversity terms this reconverted land is of low quality during the first decades or longer.Policy First and Sustainability First show roughly comparable results in the scenario period.But their trends by 2032 are different, with Sustainability First moving towards a sharpdecrease in pressures.

NoteThese maps show the change in pressure between 2002 and 2032, relative to the 2002situation. The development of the biodiversity situation in absolute terms is shown in theregional bar charts. For example, the increases in pressures in Australia and New Zealandare large in relative terms because the pressures in 2002 are small. The reverse applies to West Asia.

Source: IMAGE 2.2 (see technical annex)

Nitrogen loading can be taken as a proxy for a wider range of land-based pollution oncoastal ecosystems. Currently it is especially large in East Asia, and Western and Central

Europe and along the Mediterranean coast of West Asia and Northern Africa.

Source: IMAGE 2.2 (see technical annex)

3 5 6 OUTLOOK 2002–32

relative terms in almost all parts of the world. Theseincreases are partly due to continuing populationgrowth in water-stressed areas and partly due to newareas experiencing severe water stress (namely largeparts of Africa, North and Latin America and Europe).The situation is different under the Policy First andSustainability First scenarios. In most regions theactual area under severe water stress remains moreor less constant or even decreases, due to stable or

decreasing water withdrawals, particularly forirrigation. This results in little change in the overallproportion of people living in water-stressed areas by2032. Nevertheless, the absolute number of peopleliving in water-stressed regions increasessignificantly across the developing world.

Similarly, the size of demands for food and theability to meet them in the different scenarios reflectsa combination of shifts in supply and demand, which

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

Africa

40

50

80

70

0

20

30

10

100

Asia andthe Pacific

Europe Latin Americaand the Caribbean

NorthAmerica

West Asia global

60

90

Population living in areas with severe water stress (%)

Sustainability First

total global 2 414

Africa 172

Asia and the Pacific1 693

Europe 239

Latin Americaand the Caribbean 112

North America 124

West Asia 74

Security FirstPolicy First

Markets First

2002

Number of people living in areas with severe water stress (million persons)

When more than40 per cent ofthe renewablewater resourcesof a river basinare beingwithdrawn forhuman use theriver basin isconsidered to beunder severewater stress.

Source: WaterGAP 2.1 (seetechnical annex)

All the pie chartsshow total globalimpacts. The topleft pie shows thecurrent situation,the relative sizeof the othersreflects themagnitude ofimpacts by 2032under the fourscenarios.

Source: WaterGAP 2.1 (seetechnical annex)

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

can be influenced by social, environmental andeconomic policies. In a Markets First world, even withdecreases in the percentage of the population facinghunger, the total number affected changes relativelylittle and even increases in some regions aspopulations grow (see charts). The targeting ofhunger reduction as a key goal under the Policy Firstor Sustainability First scenarios, and the generalemphasis on more balanced development betweenregions, helps to achieve dramatic reductions in boththe percentages and the total numbers of peopleaffected. The sharp increases in most regions inSecurity First points to the unsustainability of such ascenario in terms of social acceptability.

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 5 7

Markets First Policy First

Security First

Sustainability First

Africa 209

West Asia 12

total global 829

Latin Americaand the Caribbean 57

Europe 19

Asia and the Pacific 526

North America 62002

All the pie chartsshow total globalimpacts. The topleft pie shows thecurrent situation,the relative sizeof the othersreflects themagnitude ofimpacts by 2032under the fourscenarios.

Source: PoleStar (seetechnical annex)

2002

10

15

0

5

Population living with hunger (%)

A world of Markets First, although by no means equity-oriented, wouldreduce the percentage of the population living in poverty, and with ithunger. But in some regions, most notably in Africa, this does notcounterbalance population growth. Committed action towards achievingsocial goals could bring hunger levels back into line with global targets inthe Millennium Declaration.

Source: PoleStar (see technical annex)

Population living with hunger (million persons)

Implications: Africa

Poverty is endemic in many areas of Africa and a rapidlygrowing population continues to rely on naturalresources and agriculture for much of its economicproductivity and for the provision of basic human needs.These conditions leave the region highly vulnerable toadverse impacts of environmental change. Furtherinsights are offered below into what the scenarios meanfor land, forests, biodiversity, freshwater and coastal andmarine resources, all crucial to the sustainability ofAfrica’s economies and livelihoods. Also explored (seebox, page 362) is the destiny under each scenario of anAfrican Environmental Protection Commission,established under the recently formed African Union.

Land hunger bitesGrowing populations, economic development andchanges in climate all contribute to increasing the risk ofland degradation in much of Africa (see chart below).Stronger economic growth in the region under PolicyFirst and Sustainability First conditions, implies that therisk of land degradation is higher than in Markets First.The sharper increase apparent in Security First reflectsthe greater area of land brought into agriculture underthis scenario in order to meet the demands of the stillrapidly increasing population. It also indicates relativeinability to fall back on food imports and diminishingrates of return from improving agricultural practice.

The translation from risk to actual degradation maybe mediated in a number of ways, however (see chart).Cropland has been extensively degraded in the past inAfrica due to salinization, wind and water erosion. Inthe worlds of Policy First and Sustainability First, easieraccess to support services helps farmers to managesoils better, curtailing problems like compaction,

erosion and salinization. Policies based on integratedland use management, including more stable landtenure systems, become commonplace in most parts ofthe region. Technological advances prompted by acombination of government incentives and privatesector innovations, help improve productivity ofdegraded land. The slightly higher level of degradationin Policy First versus Sustainability First reflects slightdifferences in demand for food — particularly animalproducts. At the other end of the spectrum, in a SecurityFirst scenario, a combination of inequitable landdistribution, poor farming methods, unfavourable landtenure systems and inefficient irrigation systems leadsto declining productivity of grazing and agriculturallands. Better conditions are, however, maintained in theprotected areas serving the elite. The concentration oflarge numbers of people in fragile areas beyond thecontrol of the land-owning elite further contributes tothe degradation of land and severe soil erosion. Similarproblems arise in a Markets First situation as betterquality agricultural land is taken over for commodityand cash crop production. The environment suffers as aresult as soils are ‘mined’ and the use of fertilizers andpesticides becomes more extensive. Water resourcesand aquatic ecosystems are particularly damaged.

Forests in fluxMuch of the increased demand for food is met byconversion of forests to cropland. This is reflected inboth loss of total forest area and increased exploitationof remaining forests (see chart opposite). Patterns offorest loss vary by sub-region. Very little natural forestremains in Northern Africa in any of the scenarios.

3 5 8 OUTLOOK 2002–32

Africa is at highrisk from water-induced soilerosion, exceptfor NorthernAfrica where lowrainfall keeps therisk extremelylow. The areaunder risk growsconsiderably inall scenarios as aresult ofintensifyingagriculture,combined withadverseconsequences ofclimatic change.

Source: IMAGE 2.2(see technical annex)

20

40

0

10

30

2002

Area with high risk of water-induced soildegradation: Africa (% of total land area)

15

20

0

5

10

Percentage of 2002 cropland severely degradedby 2032: Africa

Bars represent the percentage of 2002 cropland that has become so degradedby 2032 that it is of little value for production.

Source: PoleStar (see technical annex)

Elsewhere, the percentage losses are greatest inSouthern Africa, but the total losses are higher inWestern and Central Africa given their larger forestareas. The lack of political and market controls in aSecurity First scenario, results in the worst forest andwoodland losses. Some areas are protected for theexclusive benefit of the elite, but elsewhere forestresources are overexploited for the export market.Poverty leads to overexploitation of the remainingnatural forest resources for fuel, food, medicines andshelter. In a Markets First world, advances in agriculturalefficiency and the efforts of governments and businessto protect forests that serve as the backbone of anexpanding forest products industry, actually keep thelosses somewhat lower than in a Policy First world. Inthe latter scenario, however, benefits from the productsof the forest are more broadly shared and the degree ofexploitation is not as damaging. Similarly, community-based natural resources management, includingreforestation programmes, help to limit the total lossesin both Policy First and Sustainability First scenarios.

Biodiversity besiegedAlong with expanding infrastructure (see chart) andclimate changes, land transformations leading tofragmentation and loss of habitats play a key role indetermining the future of biodiversity. The combinedpressures result in a lowering of Natural Capital Indexin all scenarios (see chart). Strenuous efforts are madeto control the degree of fragmentation in Policy Firstand Sustainability First even as the amount of land

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 5 9

2002

2002

2002

2002

Northern Africa(without Sudan)

20

30

0

10

40

Western and CentralAfrica

Eastern Africa andWestern Indian Ocean

(with Sudan)

SouthernAfrica

all subregions inAfrica

2002

Natural forest, excluding regrowth: Africa (% of total land area) Conspicuousdeforestation canbe expected inAfrica, especiallyin a Security Firstscenario.

Source: IMAGE 2.2(see technical annex)

40

80

0

20

6020

02

Natural Capital Index: Africa

Source: GLOBIO (see technical annex)

40

80

0

20

60

2002

Land area impacted by infrastructure expansion:Africa (% of total land area)

An index of 100 is the situation when total land area is undomesticated andall pressures are below the minimum threshold (see technical annex).Reduction in the Natural Capital Index indicates habitat loss and increasingpressure on terrestrial and aquatic biodiversity. Pressures on biodiversityincrease between 2002 and 2032 in all scenarios.

Source: IMAGE 2.2 (see technical annex)

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

converted grows to meet the demands of increasinglybetter-off populations. Even in these cases,biodiversity loss is unavoidable in the short term,particularly from the effects of climate change.

Although policy efforts are not quite so determinedin a Markets First world, the protection of commerciallyvaluable natural areas and improvements in agriculturaltechnology provide some benefit. In a Security Firstscenario, regulatory and trade mechanisms such as theConvention on International Trade in EndangeredSpecies of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) break downcompletely, resulting in more illegal trade inendangered species. This setback spurs further loss ofbiodiversity, both directly and indirectly. As populationsof key species are driven to extremely low levels, theecosystems become increasingly fragile and vulnerableto slight changes in climate and other factors. At thesame time, more coercive efforts, including the use ofpublic and private armies, do allow for the protection ofstrategic areas.

Water and food: gains and strainsWith a growing population and economy, the demandfor water in the region is expected to grow in allscenarios. Policies regarding water pricing andtechnological advances may temper this in allscenarios other than Security First. Under theMarkets First scenario, total water withdrawals areexpected to nearly double in Africa, with particularlyhigh increases in sub-Saharan Africa. The rise inwater use linked to economic growth will outpaceany savings on a per unit basis in both agricultureand industry. Similar increases are expected underSecurity First conditions, although conflicts betweennations and the generally slow growth in theeconomy will slow the increased demandsomewhat. Controls are largely absent outside of thewealthy enclaves, although pollution from theseenclaves is likely to increasingly affect other areas.On both the Markets First and the Security Firsthorizons, the African population living in areas undersevere water stress increases to around 40 per cent(see charts). An especially steep rise in the numberand percentage of people affected occurs in EasternAfrica, as rising water withdrawals in the Upper Nileriver basin bring it into the severe water stresscategory under both scenarios.

Water withdrawals increase in most of sub-Saharan Africa under the Policy First andSustainability First scenarios, yet by considerablyless than in the other two scenarios — due to acombination of technology transfer and additionalpolicies that encourage water savings. With such

3 6 0 OUTLOOK 2002–32

When more than40 per cent ofthe renewablewater resourcesof a river basinare beingwithdrawn forhuman use theriver basin isconsidered to beunder severewater stress.

Source: WaterGAP 2.1 (seetechnical annex)

20

40

0

10

30

2002

Population living in areas with severe waterstress: Africa (%)

Markets First

Security First

Policy First

2002

NorthernAfrica 114

region total 172

Western Africa 5

SouthernAfrica 33

Central Africa 0

W.Indian Ocean 1

Eastern Africa 19

SustainabilityFirst

Number of people living in areas with severe water stress: Africa(million persons)

All the pie charts show total region impacts. The top left pie shows the current situation, the relativesize of the others reflects the magnitude of impacts by 2032 under the four scenarios.

Source: WaterGAP 2.1 (see technical annex)

policies in place, even water withdrawals in NorthernAfrica are tempered, mainly by restructuring theirrigation sector. Efforts are made to enhancetransboundary basin-wide management of waterresources, and water quality issues receive particularattention by policy-makers, especially as these arelinked to human health. Nevertheless, as populationgrowth continues, the number of people living inareas with severe water stress still doubles in Africaunder these two more reform-oriented scenarios.

The net result of all these effects is that thenumbers of people living in areas experiencing severewater stress increase in all sub-regions in all scenarios,but most notably in Markets First and Security First.The percentage of people affected rises only slightly inPolicy First and Sustainability First for the region as awhole, but varies within the region. Southern Africa, forexample, sees a decline in these scenarios whereasWestern Africa has a marked increase. Under MarketsFirst and Security First there is an increase in all partsof the region except the Western Indian Ocean islands.In all scenarios, the most striking increases, in terms ofpercentages of the population affected, occur in EasternAfrica. Arid Northern Africa continues to have thehighest percentage of the population impacted, whereaswet Central Africa and the Western Indian OceanIslands have the fewest. Of course, the ability to copewith the stresses on freshwater supply will differ acrossthe scenarios and sub-regions.

Trends in water and land, along with more broadlydistributed economic growth and effective social andeconomic policies, are reflected in the incidence ofhunger in the region (see charts). Although the

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 6 1

Markets First

Security First

Policy First

2002NorthernAfrica 13

region total 209

WesternAfrica 35

Southern Africa 53

Central Africa 37

W.IndianOcean 6

EasternAfrica65

SustainabilityFirst

NorthernAfrica

20

30

40

0

10

50

WesternAfrica

CentralAfrica

EasternAfrica

Western IndianOcean

SouthernAfrica

total region

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

Population living with hunger: Africa (%)

Population living with hunger: Africa (million persons)

All the pie charts show total region impacts. The top left pie shows the current situation, the relativesize of the others reflects the magnitude of impacts by 2032 under the four scenarios.

Source: PoleStar (see technical annex)

Average incomes rise in all sub-regions, contributing to a drop in thepercentage of the population that is hungry. However, rapid population growthcan lead to an increase in the hungry population, even as the percentagehungry declines.

Source: PoleStar (see technical annex)

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

percentage of people experiencing hunger falls in allscenarios, the reduction is more than offset by a risein total population in Markets First and Security Firstover this period. In Security First the numbers ofpeople at risk rise by more than 50 per cent. Risinginequality in both scenarios serves to negate anybenefits of economic growth. Dramatic improvementsare possible, though, as seen in Policy First andSustainability First. A key here is the broader

distribution of economic growth, both between Africaand other regions, but also within Africa itself.

Increased food aid and reduced conflict also havedirect effects. The fundamental shifts in SustainabilityFirst allow the total numbers to be cut by more thanhalf. Despite the progress made, however, certain sub-regions remain problematic. Most notably, hungerlevels in Eastern Africa remain above 10 per cent,even under Sustainability First.

3 6 2 OUTLOOK 2002–32

The African Union (AU) established by African countries in 2001 to replace the Organization of African Unity launches an AfricanEnvironmental Protection Commission (AEPC) in the near future. The activities of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment(AMCEN) are subsumed within the AEPC. The goal of this body is to be an environmental watchdog in the region with powers tomonitor and sanction states violating regional and sub-regional environmental agreements and threatening sustainable development inthe region.

This is the first time that African countries have a regional organization specifically dealing with environmental issues. Although itfalls under the aegis of the AU, the AEPC charter guarantees its autonomy from political influence, though member states contributedirectly to its budget. The mandate of the AEPC is to not only promote the adoption of new regional and sub-regional environmentalagreements, but also monitor national-level implementation through sub-regional organizations. Strong links are established with theUnited Nations Environment Programme.

In the case of …Markets First

● Enforcement of conventions and protocols is compromised by the need to encourage foreign direct investment.● Rising debt in the region fuels destructive natural resource exploitation in defiance of policy responses to Multilateral Environmental

Agreements.● Delayed impact of AEPC on sub-regional institutions hinders national enforcement of environmental measures.

Policy First● National governments commit themselves to strengthening AEPC by paying annual dues to the Commission. ● Governments endorse the establishment by AEPC of two standing committees of senior officials responsible for social and economic

planning to boost sustainable development policy formulation and implementation.● Regional, sub-regional and national institutions responsible for the environment are revamped to better respond to the AEPC

mandate.

Security First● Budgetary constraints reduce AEPC to a token force funded by donors. National interests weaken AEPC initiatives, which are

overruled by strict insistence on sovereignty claims.● The role of AEPC remains peripheral at the global level as the environmental agenda continues to be set by rich countries that are

reluctant to fund environmental programmes.● Linkages with similar organizations in other regions are minimal as each region focuses on internal issues.

Sustainability First● National governments cede some of their authority to the AU and AEPC.● Traditional environmental programmes are linked to innovative social and economic programmes addressing poverty in rural and

urban areas in order to reduce overexploitation of resources.● The AEPC introduces stringent measures to protect the region's intellectual property rights, thereby strengthening Africa's role in the

global biotechnology trade.

The lessonsRegional and global environmental institutions are only as strong as the commitments made to them by national governments. Withoutcontinued support, both financially and politically, their efforts are less effective and liable to lose out to conflicting interests. Nationsmay need to sacrifice some sovereignty in order to achieve broader environmental benefits.

Imagine … an Environmental Protection Commission for Africa

Implications: Asia and the Pacific

It is no easy matter to generalize aboutenvironmental implications of the scenarios for aregion as large and varied as Asia and the Pacific. Itcontains the two most populated countries in theworld, India and China, as well as oceanic islandnations and the land-locked states of the formerAsian republics of the Soviet Union. It includes someof the poorest nations of the world, some of the mostdynamic economies of recent times and severalindustrially advanced OECD countries.

The future of the environment in the regiondepends on a number of currently unansweredquestions. Can the region recover from the recessionof the late 1990s, as all the scenarios apart fromSecurity First presume? How are pressures ofcontinued population and urban growth handled — ina relatively hands-off manner as in Markets First andSecurity First, or with more hands-on planning andconsideration as in Policy First and SustainabilityFirst? How does technological development fare,especially in relation to the provision of energy? Doabundant coal resources dominate energy productionas in the worlds of Markets First and Security First?How do national, regional and internationalgovernance structures develop and regional andinternational trade regimes evolve?

The specific themes of land, forests, freshwater,urban issues and biodiversity are addressed in moredetail and at the sub-regional level in the remainder ofthis section. The potential impacts of a dramaticdecline in the availability of clean freshwater areexplored in the box on page 369.

Growing populations, the spread of agricultureand climatic changes imply that the risk of landdegradation increases in many parts of the region inall scenarios (see chart). Of particular concern areloss of soil fertility and soil erosion in mountainousareas, which increase downstream sedimentation.The oceanic sub-regions — the South Pacific andAustralia and New Zealand — are the leastthreatened and South and Southeast Asia the mostaffected. The effect of more rapid climate change inthe Policy First and Sustainability First scenariosimplies somewhat higher risk than might beexpected, but as the rate of change slows in thelonger term compared with Markets First andSecurity First conditions, other effects predominate.

Measures taken in Policy First and SustainabilityFirst scenarios to improve agricultural practices limitthe actual amount of degradation, at least on croplands(see chart). These policies include improvements inland tenure systems and regional cooperation inmanaging erosion, particularly on steep slopes. Inaddition, some degraded land is restored. Croplanddamage is exacerbated in a Security First world, wherethere is greater reliance on uncontrolled use ofchemical fertilizers and less regional and internationalcooperation. Such agriculture practices decline in theworld of Markets First, but the sheer volume ofeconomic growth and associated demand leads todegradation as great as in Security First.

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 6 3

Area with high risk of water-induced soil degradation: Asia and the Pacific (% of land areas)

Bars representthe percentage of2002 croplandthat has becomeso degraded by2032 that it is oflittle value forproduction.

Source: PoleStar (seetechnical annex)

2

4

6

0

Percentage of 2002 cropland severely degradedby 2032: Asia and the Pacific

South Asia(without Iran)

20

60

0

80

North WestPacific andEast Asia

SoutheastAsia

Australia &New Zealand

and South Pacific

all subregionsin Asia andthe Pacific

(without Iran,without Central Asia)

40

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

Source: IMAGE 2.2 (see technical annex)

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

3 6 4 OUTLOOK 2002–32

When more than40 per cent ofthe renewablewater resourcesof a river basinare beingwithdrawn forhuman use theriver basin isconsidered to beunder severewater stress.Nearly 1 700million of theworld’s 2 400million people inareas facingsevere waterstress live in Asiaand numbers arehighest in SouthAsia. Apart fromwealthiercountries in theregion, demandfor water risessignificantly, withmore and morepeople living inregions sufferingfrom severewater stress.

Source: WaterGAP2.1 (see technicalannex)

2002

SouthAsia

40

50

60

80

90

0

20

30

70

10

100

SoutheastAsia

NorthwestPacific andEast Asia

Central Asia South Pacific Australia andNew Zealand

totalregion

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

Markets First

SecurityFirst

2002

region total 1 693

SustainabilityFirstPolicy First

NW Pacificand East Asia

509

SoutheastAsia 74

South Pacific 0

Central Asia 45

SouthAsia1 053

Australia andNew Zealand 12

Number of people living in areas with severe water stress: Asia and the Pacific (million persons)

Population living in areas with severe water stress: Asia and the Pacific (%)Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

All the pie chartsshow total regionimpacts. The topleft pie shows thecurrent situation,the relative sizeof the othersreflects themagnitude ofimpacts by 2032under the fourscenarios.

Source: WaterGAP2.1 (see technicalannex)

Deforestation and water stress The risk of land degradation is linked to forest cover.A complex set of forces determines the future offorests in the region. Population growth, includingurban expansion in all scenarios and economicimprovements in all but a Security First situation, leadto mounting demand for agricultural land at theexpense of forest area. Efforts to address theproblems of mega-cities in the worlds of Policy Firstand Sustainability First also increase deforestation assettlement programmes encourage wider dispersal. Ina Security First world there are added pressures as thepoor are pushed onto ever more marginal lands.

These pressures are cushioned to some degree byadvances in agricultural technology but the effects differacross scenarios. Advances may be most rapid inMarkets First, but probably do not have environmentalprotection as their key goal. More importantly,economic forces such as rising prices for timber andnon-timber forest products, which can encourage bothdeforestation and reforestation, are balanced againstreductions in subsidies that have driven conversion offorest and woodlands to agriculture, and other economicinstruments introduced to improve conservation. Theseall influence the area and condition of remaining forests.Market instruments play the biggest role in a world ofMarkets First. These are complemented in the worldsof Policy First and Sustainability First by governmentand local programmes to subsidize reforestation andencourage a shift to agroforestry, and by direct effortsto preserve biodiversity.

The net result is that the total area of forest inAsia and the Pacific declines over this period, but thiseffect differs significantly across sub-regions andscenarios. South and Southeast Asia suffer the mostsignificant losses in total forest area. WhereasNorthwest Pacific and East Asia experience a netincrease in forest area due to plantations, the totalarea of undisturbed natural forest declines. InAustralia and New Zealand and the South Pacific, theeffect of replanting is such that more new forest iscreated than is used for logging or other production.

Water stress is presently one of the mostcontentious problems in Asia and the Pacific, leavingaside the small Pacific Island Countries (PICs), and itremains high on the agenda for the foreseeable future(see opposite). Growth in demand is especially high in aMarkets First world, but also in Policy First andSustainability First, where economic growth is similarly

robust. Water pricing and more efficient use of water inagriculture due to advances in biotechnology help totemper this growth. Under the Markets First scenario,water withdrawals increase in all sectors, especiallywhen further expansion of irrigated area is assumed.These increases in water withdrawals lead to anexpansion of areas with severe water stress in Southand Southeast Asia in all scenarios and more people areaffected throughout the region. In Security First overallgrowth in demand is moderated by slower economicgrowth in many sub-regions and no further expansion inirrigated areas, rather than any significant efforts tobecome more efficient.

Under the Policy First and Sustainability Firstscenarios, where effective policies and lifestylechanges combine with greater regional cooperationand technology transfer, water withdrawals remain atcurrent levels or even decrease in most of the rest ofAsia. However, with population growth continuing, thenumber of people living in areas under severe waterstress continues to increase across Asia.

Urban areas, especially the growing mega-cities inSouth, Southeast and East Asia, face many trials inaddition to water stress. They include land usepressures, air and water pollution and solid wasteoverload. All these challenges are related to rapidlygrowing populations, from both natural growth andrural–urban migration, and increasing economicactivity. Trends in local and regional air pollutiondepend heavily on choices in energy production. If coalcontinues to dominate, as is likely in a Security Firstsituation with reduced trade or in a world of MarketsFirst where the cost is what counts, then local airpollution tends to worsen significantly.

The increase is most evident in Security First,where little effort is made to control sulphuremissions from stationary sources and nitrogen oxideemissions from stationary and mobile sources (seecharts overleaf). The setting and enforcement ofregulations prescribing cleaner fuels and fuel uses,cleaner technology and upgraded emission standards,all help to curb these trends in a Policy First world. InSustainability First, major efforts towardsdecentralization with dispersed satellite cities relievethe pressures. This step, combined with betterphysical planning and management of urban systems,leads to more effective coordination of growth,distribution of clean industry, servicing, handling ofpollution streams and housing design.

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 6 5

These policies help to buffer ill-effects in thePolicy First and Sustainability First scenarios, but thehigher levels of economic growth make environmentalprotection difficult. In all scenarios, the amount ofbuilt-over land grows significantly across the region(see chart below).

Similarly, CO2 emissions and production of solidwaste (see opposite) increase in most scenarios.Emission standards, which tend to be weak or lacking ina Security First situation, help to limit the growth in airpollutants in the other scenarios, especially in PolicyFirst. Emissions of CO2 increase more rapidly in Markets

First circumstances because of high economic growth.In Policy First, advanced technologies are introduced toreduce CO2 emissions. Because a Sustainability Firstsociety shifts from conventional to sustainable lifestyles,CO2 emissions are somewhat mitigated. On the otherhand a Security First society holds on to technologieswith low energy efficiency. CO2 emissions increase mostrapidly in this scenario everywhere except in CentralAsia where low economic activities mitigate CO2emissions vis-à-vis Markets First. The effects of lifestylechanges are also evident in the lower levels of solidwaste production in Sustainability First.

3 6 6 OUTLOOK 2002–32

2002

200220

0220

02

2002

2002

2002

South Asia

5

10

0

15

SoutheastAsia

Northwest Pacificand East Asia

Central Asia South Pacific Australia andNew Zealand

total region

Extent of built-up areas: Asia and the Pacific (% of total land area)

Built-up areaexpands as bothpopulation andbuilt environmentper head ofpopulation grow.The latter valueis among thelowest in theworld in Asia, butwith risingincomes andexpandinginfrastructure,each person'sfootprint, asmeasured in builtland, grows overthe course of thescenarios.

Source: PoleStar (seetechnical annex)

0

80

60

40

20

2002

Energy-related sulphur dioxide emissions: Asia and the Pacific (million tonnes sulphur)

10

0

30

25

15

20

5

2002

Energy-related nitrogen oxide emissions: Asia and the Pacific (million tonnes nitrogen)

Nitrogen oxide emissions grow rapidly with the increase of motorization andrise even in a Policy First scenario. A very high increase is expected in SouthAsia in line with the large increase in motor traffic.

Source: AIM (see technical annex)

Sulphur dioxide emissions increase most rapidly in a Security First worldbecause little money is invested to reduce emissions. In the other scenarios,especially in Policy First and Sustainability First, the increase of SO2 emissionsis less as steps are taken to avoid severe air pollution. In some sub-regionsemissions drop below 2002 levels.

Source: AIM (see technical annex)

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

Bad news for biodiversityGrowing populations, expanding urban and decliningforest areas and increasing economic activity putincreased pressures on terrestrial and marinebiodiversity. The growth in infrastructure alone tomeet growing demands has a large and increasinglysignificant impact across the region in all scenarios(see chart). Better planning, coordination andenforcement of land use policies alleviates thissomewhat in Policy First and Sustainability First. Thelack of such policies in a Security First world, coupledwith higher population growth, leads to impacts almost

as large as in Markets First, even with much slowereconomic growth.

At the same time as infrastructure is expanding,changing climate affects biodiversity, resulting insignificant reductions in the quantity and quality ofnatural capital in some sub-regions over the next30 years. As with other pressures, these differsignificantly across the sub-regions, with themost significant pressures on biodiversity occurringin South and Southeast Asia under all scenarios(see overleaf).

Finally, increases in trade affect biodiversity,particularly in the worlds of Markets First andPolicy First. Under Security First conditions,reductions in trade and greater control of theexploitation of particular areas may actually benefitbiodiversity in these areas, whereas other areassuffer from lack of control.

Some of these pressures on biodiversity arecountered in a Policy First world by regionalcooperation to reduce illegal extraction and establishmore protected areas. In a world of SustainabilityFirst, advances in technology enable real-timeidentification and monitoring of biodiversity assetsand sensitive ecosystems. Communities are betterequipped with knowledge and understanding of thedynamics of environmental systems, tools forstrategic assessment and planning. Over time thisresults in a greater representation of species,communities and genes within protected areas.Maintenance of endemic genetic stocks provides

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 6 7

20

40

100

0

60

80

2002

Land area impacted by infrastructure expansion:Asia and the Pacific (% of total land area)

2 000

0

8 000

6 000

4 000

2002

Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions: Asiaand the Pacific (million tonnes carbon)

Trends under different scenarios are similar throughout the region and reflectboth state of technology and lifestyles.

Source: AIM (see technical annex)

1

0

3

2

1995

Municipal solid waste generation: Asia andthe Pacific (index related to value of 1 for baseyear 1995)

Total municipal waste is expected to increase more than 150 per cent by2032 in South Asia, Southeast Asia and Central Asia in a Markets Firstscenario. Municipal waste generation is closely linked to income level andsize of population.

Source: AIM (see technical annex)

All sub-regions in Asia and the Pacific show a similar pattern betweenscenarios as infrastructure expands.

Source: GLOBIO (see technical annex)

valuable source materials for biotechnology advances,captures benefits for local communities and reducesopportunities for invasive species to take over.

Relevant environmental trends, along with thedistribution of economic growth and effectiveness ofsocial policies, are reflected in the incidence ofhunger in the region (see charts). The percentage ofpeople experiencing hunger remains high in much ofthe region in Markets First and Security First. Withgrowing populations, this implies only slightreductions in absolute numbers in the former andsmall increases in the latter. Dramatic improvements

3 6 8 OUTLOOK 2002–32

An index of 100 isthe situation whentotal land area isundomesticatedand all pressuresare below theminimumthreshold (seetechnical annex).Reduction in theNatural CapitalIndex indicateshabitat loss andincreasingpressure onterrestrial andaquaticbiodiversity.Pressures onbiodiversityincrease between2002 and 2032in all scenarios.

Source: IMAGE 2.2(see technical annex)

Average incomesrise in all sub-regions,contributing to adrop in thepercentage of thepopulation that ishungry. However,rapid populationgrowth can leadto an increase inthe incidence ofhunger, even asthe percentage ofpeople at riskdeclines.

Source: PoleStar(see technical annex)

South Asia(without Iran)

20

40

60

0

80

North West Pacificand East Asia

Southeast Asia Australia and New Zealandand South Pacific

all sub-regions inAsia and the Pacific

(without Iran,without Central Asia)

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

Natural Capital Index: Asia and the Pacific

2002

NW Pacificand East Asia164

region total 526

SoutheastAsia63

South Pacific 1Central Asia 6

SouthAsia292

Australia andNew Zealand 0

Security First

Markets First

Policy First

SustainabilityFirst

Population living with hunger: Asia and the Pacific (million persons)

5

0

20

10

15 2002

Population living with hunger: Asia and thePacific (%)

All the pie chartsshow total regionimpacts. The topleft pie shows thecurrent situation,the relative sizeof the othersreflects themagnitude ofimpacts by 2032under the fourscenarios.

Source: PoleStar (seetechnical annex)

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 6 9

are possible, though, as seen in the Policy First andSustainability First results where there are steepreductions in both the percentage and the totalhungry. In the Policy First scenario this is achievedthrough a combination of relatively high growth and

more equitable income distribution. In theSustainability First scenario it comes about asgreater equity both between and within countries isreflected in rapid economic growth and a narrowingof income distributions.

Rapidly growing populations and economies escalate demand for food and living space, leading to greater intensification of agriculture.More irrigation and fertilizer use in rural areas, together with unimpeded growth of urban centres and mega-cities, mean morecompetition for water resources between geographic regions and economic sectors. This rivalry reaches crisis proportions around 2010,when the quality of surface and ground waters across the region begins to go into widespread, rapid and accelerating decline. Thesurface water changes are a reaction by aquatic ecosystems to the cumulative loading of nitrogen and other organic materials frominadequately treated agricultural and municipal solid waste. The impacts on groundwater arise from the run-off of chemical fertilizersand pesticides from agriculture as well as toxic materials from industry. The effect is enhanced by the more rapid extraction ofgroundwater resources, resulting in a further increase in the concentration of these pollutants in the remaining groundwater as well asincreased rates of salt water intrusion in the region’s extensive coastal areas.

In the case of …Markets First

● Some agricultural production is affected and food prices rise significantly, stimulating increasing food trade within the region andimports from other regions.

● Private biotechnology companies compete to provide genetically engineered pollutant-eating bacteria.● Private companies contract with urban governments to transport uncontaminated water from other regions, including freshwater in

the form of icebergs from the Antarctic.

Policy First● Policies to move industry toward zero emissions production are accelerated.● Public investment into genetic engineering in order to produce pollutant-eating bacteria increases.● Water rationing is introduced and water saving devices distributed to urban populations, where treatment is unable to make up for

water lost due to quality declines.● Policies to integrate water resources management into development plans are promoted, with a focus on the integration of land and

water related issues within a river basin or water catchment area.

Security First● Water resources are placed under public and private military control.● There is a sharp increase in deaths related to water-borne diseases such as cholera.

Sustainability First● The move toward more organic and low-input sustainable agriculture receives a major boost as producers using these methods

cope better with the disruptions and are seen as having a neutral impact on the problem.● Urban areas that have already implemented advanced water-saving, waste reduction and waste treatment practices expand their

campaign to accelerate the introduction of similar practices across the region.

The lessonsIt can often take crisis situations to induce necessary changes that lead to more sustainable practices. In any case, coping with issuessuch as freshwater quantity and quality requires an integrated perspective that recognizes interactions between sectors and the potentialfor threshold effects in natural systems from cumulative pressures. Part of this shift involves encouraging diversity in agricultural andother economic systems so that when surprises and crises occur, a versatile repertoire enables new strategies to be formed.

Imagine … widespread surface and groundwater contamination in Asia and the Pacific

Implications: Europe

Over the next 30 years, Europe is dominated by thereintegration of Western, Central and Eastern Europefollowing the end of the Cold War. In both MarketsFirst and Policy First worlds, expectations of asignificant expansion of the European Union are borneout. This process may stall in a Security First scenarioor take on a very different form in a world ofSustainability First. In all four scenarios, therelationships between those countries within the EUand those outside — notably the Russian Federation— are significant in determining, among other things,the state of the environment in this region. Thedifferences in the evolution of such bodies as theEuropean Environment Agency, which is likely tobecome much stronger in a world of Policy First orSustainability First, also play a role.

Developments in Europe’s relationships with otherregions are also important. The contrast betweengreater openness to trade and migration in MarketsFirst and Policy First worlds and a possible reversal ofboth in a Security First situation, imply significantimpacts either way. Similarly, differences in theevolution of multilateral environmental agreementsmake a conspicuous mark.

Two critical areas of development are agriculturalpolicy and the relationship between climate, energyand transport. They are explored here together withother issues, in the contexts of atmosphere, land,biodiversity, freshwater and coastal and marine areas.Finally, the implications under each scenario of a majorfood scare brought on by a combination of factors areexplored in the box on page 373.

Europe’s scope to address the issues of large-scaleair pollution and greenhouse gas emissions dependsheavily upon developments in the areas of energy useand transportation. Whereas extremely active policiesto improve public transportation, for reasons of bothpollution and congestion control, and to improve energyefficiency can be expected in Policy First andSustainability First worlds, these advances are unlikelyin Security First or even Markets First circumstances. Inthe Markets First case, some economic policies, such asroad and carbon taxes, are likely and technologicaldevelopments will continue to improve the energy useper unit of activity. Growth in volume of travel andeconomic activity in general is, however, expected tooutweigh per unit improvements in response to these

policies. In a Security First situation, lack of economicdevelopment in Central and Eastern Europe restrainsenergy use in general.

Emissions and land use — turning pointsThese changes in energy use, along with shifts infuel use, are reflected in gaseous emissions, notablyof carbon dioxide (see chart). There are somestriking differences between scenarios and sub-regions. The growth in emissions is quite significantin all regions in Markets First, with transportcontributing a major share. The economic difficultiesin Security First for Eastern Europe result inapproximately the same level of emissions as inPolicy First, where more proactive policy actionprompts improved energy use and a switch to non-carbon fuels. In a Sustainability First situation, strongpolicy actions and changes in lifestyles, including thewillingness of more people to shift to publictransport, achieve significant reductions, heralding aturning-point in the battle to reduce human-inducedclimate change.

Land use change in Europe is affected by decisionsrelated to spatial planning of development andtransportation policies. It is also driven by theevolution of agricultural policy, including changes inagricultural trade regimes and the reform of theCommon Agricultural Policy. In the Markets Firstscenario, the built-up area grows over time in WesternEurope (see opposite). Elsewhere, population declineleads to a stable or modest decrease in the total built-

3 7 0 OUTLOOK 2002–32

1 000

2 000

3 000

4 000

0all subregions in Europe and Central Asia (without Turkey)

2002

Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions: Europe(million tonnes carbon)

In three of the four scenarios, Europe’s total carbon dioxide emissionsincrease, diminishing the chances of eventual climate control. The shorterterm target of the Kyoto Protocol may be met in a Policy First world, butcertainly not in a Markets First or a Security First scenario.

Source: IMAGE 2.2 (see technical annex)

up area in Markets First and throughout the region inPolicy First and Sustainability First, where alreadycompact settlement patterns combine with lowerpopulation growth to reduce the need for expansion ofbuilt-up areas. In Security First, rising populations andmore sprawling settlements trigger sizeable growth ofbuilt-up areas in Western Europe but little increase inthe rest of the region.

At the same time, continued development ofroads, plantations and other human works will lead tothe extension of infrastructure throughout the regionand in all scenarios, with a general increase in levelsof impact (see chart). Even so, careful policies —including restrictions on the siting of infrastructure— can help to lessen the effect of this expansion.This potential is most evident in Eastern Europe. InMarkets First and Security First, rising pressures todevelop resources and infrastructure reduceremaining biodiversity. Impacts include loss ofreindeer and wolf populations and of many insects andplants adapted to farmed conditions. To restore losthabitat, particularly where lost agro-ecosystems andwetlands are concerned, would require SustainabilityFirst conditions.

These pressures play a role in determining land-based biodiversity in the region. Europe must alsocontend with the effects of changing climateconditions, including those determined by greenhousegas emissions that have already occurred. Overall,differences between the various scenarios by 2032 aresmall, owing to the delayed effect of climatic changesover foregoing decades. Furthermore, in the shortterm, the greater regional and global reductions insulphur oxides and other pollutants seen in PolicyFirst and Sustainability First actually result in fasterclimate change, increasing the pressure onecosystems. However, present-day initiatives such asthe EU’s Natura 2000 take effect and pan-Europeannetworks of protected areas and green corridors arelaunched to protect biodiversity more effectively inSustainability First and possibly in Policy First, too.Effective action to rehabilitate former agricultural landas additional habitats for wildlife also plays animportant role. This is reflected in the somewhatbetter results for the Natural Capital Index (see chartoverleaf) in Sustainability First.

Shifts in agriculture, along with improvedtechnologies, management practices and shifts in cropchoices reduce overall water demand in agriculture in

all scenarios other than Security First. Under theMarkets First scenario, however, economicdevelopment still leads to sharp increases in overallwater demand, especially in Eastern and CentralEurope. With these increases comes expansion ofareas in the severe water stress category. Overalldemand in a Security First scenario is similar, with thegreater population by comparison with Markets Firstsomewhat offset by reduced economic activity.

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 7 1

2002

2002

2002

Western Europe

4

5

6

9

10

0

2

3

8

Central Europe total regionEastern Europe

7

1

2002

Extent of built-up areas: Europe (% of total land area)

Source: PoleStar (see technical annex)

2002

2002

2002

Western Europe

40

50

60

90

100

0

20

30

80

Central Europe total regionEastern Europe

70

10

2002

Land area impacted by infrastructure expansion: Europe (% of total land area)

Much of Central and Western Europe has been directly converted to farmland. The few remaining low-disturbance areas are limited to Scandinavia and protected areas, where tourism and recreationaldevelopment is putting increasingly greater strain on mountain ecosystems. Restoration of formerwetlands has begun, but still on a much smaller scale than the continued development of infrastructure.

Source: GLOBIO (see technical annex)

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

The situation is very different under the PolicyFirst and Sustainability First scenarios, wherestructural changes lead to reductions in waterwithdrawals in all sectors across Europe. Throughthese continuing efforts to save water, some of theriver basins that currently experience severe waterstress, no longer do so under these scenarios. Withthis advance, the number of people who live in areaswith severe water stress drops significantly. Thesechanges are most dramatic in Sustainability First,where declines in meat consumption augmentpolicies, such as water pricing, introduced in theother scenarios. Differences in the amount ofwastewater that is purified and industrial recycling ofwater amplify the differences between the scenarios.These changes are reflected in the number of personssubject to water stress in the sub-regions across thedifferent scenarios (see charts). Potential problemsrelated to water stress in Policy First andSustainability First are reduced by fullimplementation of the Water Framework Directiveand agreements regarding regional seas. Meanwhile,these problems intensify in a Security First world,

leading to conflict over water and contamination fromuncontrolled industrial activity and the inability todeal with the legacies of former lax policies.

Coastal concernsCoastal and marine environments are also a keyconcern in Europe. In a world of Markets First,tourism exercises an ever-increasing pressure oncoastal zones throughout the region, leading to an

3 7 2 OUTLOOK 2002–32

all subregions in Europe and Central Asia (without Turkey)

20

40

60

80

0

2002

Natural Capital Index: Europe An index of 100is the situationwhen total landarea isundomesticatedand all pressuresare below theminimumthreshold (seetechnical annex).Reduction in theNatural CapitalIndex indicateshabitat loss andincreasingpressure onterrestrial andaquaticbiodiversity. Asthe pressure fromagriculturestabilizes andstarts todecrease, thegeneralbiodiversitysituation inEurope over30 years doesnot deviate muchfrom the present.

Source: IMAGE 2.2(see technical annex)

20

30

40

50

0

10

2002

Population living in areas with severe waterstress: Europe (%)

When more than40 per cent ofthe renewablewater resourcesof a river basinare beingwithdrawn forhuman use theriver basin isconsidered to beunder severewater stress.Water stress inEurope is asmuch aboutwater quality asit is about waterquantity, and dueto high waterwithdrawalsmany of Europe’swaters areseverely over-used. However,in regions inwhich demandfor industrialpurposesdominates thewater use sector,water can oftenbe heavily re-used, mitigatingthe effects ofsevere waterstress.

Source: WaterGAP 2.1 (seetechnical annex)

Markets First

Policy First2002

region total 239

SustainabilityFirst

Security First

WesternEurope148

Central Europe 50

EasternEurope41

Number of people living in areas with severewater stress: Europe (million persons)

All the pie charts show total region impacts. The top left pie shows thecurrent situation, the relative size of the others reflects the magnitude ofimpacts by 2032 under the four scenarios.

Source: WaterGAP 2.1 (see technical annex)

increase of local environmental problems such assalinization. In addition, second homes exercise aconsiderable footprint in some areas such as theBaltic. Specifically in Eastern Europe, coastal zonesare increasingly left to local authorities to manage,with somewhat unpredictable outcomes.

Under Policy First conditions, governments acquiresome coastal zones in Western Europe for fullprotection status. In Eastern Europe, basic legislationregarding coastal zone protection is put in place andzoning plans are revitalized. In a Security Firstsituation, coastal zones in Western Europe see a

continuation of industrial development, tourismdevelopment, airport construction and otherinfrastructure. In Central Europe, coastal zonesremain by and large as they were in 2002.

In Eastern Europe, coastal zones may be re-militarized, restricting access, but also used for newport development. On balance, pressures remain atapproximately the same level as in 2002. InSustainability First, integrated coastal zonemanagement schemes based on voluntarypartnerships and participatory arrangements,significantly improve coastal environments.

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 7 3

A major food scare breaks out in Europe in the middle of the 2010s, reminiscent in some respects of the Spanish cooking oil disaster inthe 1980s or the BSE crisis in the 1990s. But this crisis is on a much larger scale and so is its psychological impact. It erupts withsimultaneous outbreaks of death and illness among young children in various parts of Western and Central Europe. With casualtiesgrowing, the cause remains elusive for at least a year. Speculation is widespread about a link with genetically modified organisms orbiotransplants, but there is no conclusive evidence. Eventually, the cause is found to be a hitherto uncommon mycotoxin. It turns outthat a fungus in many cereals, the emergence and spread of which appears related to the changing climate, produces this toxin.Unfortunately, the news does little to diminish the problem for a culture that relies on bread as a staple food.

In the case of . . .Markets First

● Consumer distrust rises in Western and Central Europe. This leads to agricultural demise in countries for which the EU is a keyexport market in the 2010s, such as Argentina, Ukraine, Romania, Latvia and Kenya.

● Stricter certification schemes are put in place, stimulated by initiatives by transnational corporations.

Policy First● There is European-wide coordination on issues such as sharing the burden of the costly recall of cereals and a rush programme to

develop alternative bases for common children’s food, many of which rely on the affected cereals. Heavy reliance is set on earlywarning systems and regulation of developments in biotechnology to avoid similar outbreaks in the future.

● There is a renewed global effort to address climate change.

Security First● Initial fears of a biological weapons attack cause several nations to place themselves on military alert.● Xenophobic reactions to illegal immigrants increase as they are seen as potential carriers of exotic viruses.● Trade disputes increase, stemming from fears of other possible outbreaks.

Sustainability First● Efficient support systems, notably at local level, help to minimize deaths and to optimize treatment of victims.● Ongoing agricultural reforms, which are further accelerated in the aftermath, help reduce the spread of the fungus.

The lessonsThe roots of many environmental crises can lie in the very complexity of human and natural systems and their interactions. Recognizingthis and remaining alert to unexpected developments can help to reduce shocks and to respond to crises when they occur. Foresight,early warning and flexible response provisions can play key roles.

Imagine … a major food scare in Europe

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

Implications: Latin America and the Caribbean

The future of the environment in Latin America and theCaribbean is driven by many internal and externalfactors that differ across the four scenarios. At the heartof issues such as economic growth, social developmentand environmental health are the region’s internalpolicies and its unbalanced relationship to itsneighbours to the north. An increasingly integratedWestern Hemisphere is envisioned in both MarketsFirst and Policy First scenarios. Greater cooperation,but in a less formal setting is expected in SustainabilityFirst. Developments in regional and international traderegimes have both positive and negative effects. Thegreatly increased trade posited in a world of MarketsFirst opens the door to bigger exports of agriculturaland forest products. While these may be beneficialeconomically, they also put increased pressure onresources. More care is taken to consider social andenvironmental impacts in both Policy First andSustainability First.

Internally, evolving governance concerns and theissues of poverty, inequality and urbanization in largepart determine environmental developments in theregion. Major issues to be confronted by the regioninclude deforestation, water shortages and landdegradation. All these issues are explored here,focusing on the themes of land, forests, coastal andmarine areas, biodiversity and urban areas. The box onpage 379 explores the possible impacts in the regionof a major world recession.

Forests — a mixed fateLand and forest degradation as well as forestfragmentation remain among the most relevantenvironmental issues in this region in all scenarios.The patterns of conversion of forests to pasture andagricultural land vary by scenario and sub-region. Justas important as the total forest area is the level ofexploitation of the forests.

Significant loss of forest area occurs in a MarketsFirst scenario. This scenario also sees much greaterexploitation of existing forests. In a Security Firstworld, the control over forest resources bytransnational companies that create cartels inassociation with the national groups in power, promotethe growth of some forest areas, but this is not enoughto stop net deforestation. Private control of forests

also leads to occasional violent resistance from forestdwellers and nearby settlers who need access to theforests to meet their daily needs.

More effective management remedies some ofthese problems in Policy First. In this scenario, policiesto promote forest plantations are enacted andinstitutional strengthening creates better forestcontrol, reducing illegal extraction of timber fromnative forests and promoting sound forest managementpractices for commercial production. However,deforestation remains a problem and pressures alsoarise on forests from the desire to be more self-sufficient in food production. Unsound deforestationstops almost completely in Sustainability First. Policiesaddressing the restoration of degraded forests throughthe natural regeneration of forest ecosystems areimplemented as the value of forest services isinternalized by world markets. Moreover, the use ofalternative fuels to firewood is now more scientificallyand economically feasible, while commercial use offorests under forest management certification regimeshas turned out to be highly profitable.

Changes in land cover pose risks for landdegradation (see chart opposite). In Markets First andSecurity First worlds, the agricultural frontiercontinues to expand into rainforest ecosystems. Thisexpansion is driven by large commercial livestockfarming and industrial cropping, along with influxes ofimmigrants attracted by these developments and bynew infrastructure projects. Exacerbated by drought,many more desertification hotspots are evident by2032. Land tenure reforms ameliorate these drivers inPolicy First and Sustainability First but not in theother scenarios. However, enforcement of direct andindirect regulations does lead to improvements incontrolling soil erosion, dramatically reducing theamount of cropland lost to degradation. In addition,some degraded land is restored, leading to markedlylower net rates than in Markets First or Security First(see opposite).

Cities sprawlProminent among other land use changes is thecontinued growth of urban areas (see opposite). Built-up area per person continues to grow in the MarketsFirst scenario, tending towards the sprawlingsettlement patterns of North America. Despiterelatively compact settlement patterns in Policy Firstcompared to Markets First, higher income growth is

3 7 4 OUTLOOK 2002–32

accompanied by a more rapid expansion in built-upland. As a result, the built-up area in Policy First isonly slightly below Markets First. Unplannedexpansion and rapid population growth lead tosubstantial growth in built-up area in Security First. InSustainability First, as in Policy First, a tendencytowards compact settlement patterns is offset by morerapid economic expansion. However, the offset is onlypartial and total built-up area grows least in thisscenario.

Expansion of urban conditions raises problems ofwater quality, waste management, air pollution andgeneral sprawl throughout much of Latin America.Economic driving forces continue to attract people tothe cities, especially in Markets First. Withoutimproved planning and organization, theenvironmental pressures on urban areas, especially inmega-cities, continue to grow as the rates ofpopulation growth outpace that of infrastructuredevelopment. This effect is stepped up in a SecurityFirst world, where the affluent increasingly withdrawinto their enclaves, denying the poor access to safedrinking water, sanitation and health services. Thequality and quantity of water and the disposal of solidwaste are major worries in the small island countriesand territories of the Caribbean. Unchecked airpollution has serious and costly health impacts,especially for urban populations (see chart overleaf).

In a world of Policy First, measures to curb urbanmigration and to improve public transportation systemsand the collection, disposal and recycling of domestic

and industrial wastes, diminish — but do not eliminate— the vulnerability of cities and their inhabitants tohuman-induced and natural disasters. More success isachieved in a world of Sustainability First. Air pollutiondeclines due to effective regulation and targetedtechnological progress. The dissemination of soundknowledge and scientific advice, and the transfer ofappropriate technology, further improve wastemanagement. Waste generation declines in relativeterms and its quality and composition allows for higherrates of reuse, recycling and use in energy production.Finally, more equitable distribution of income and

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 7 5

20

50

0

10

40

3020

02

Area with high risk of water-induced soildegradation: Latin America and the Caribbean (% of total land area)

Source: IMAGE 2.2 (see technical annex)

total region (excluding Caribbean)

5

10

15

0

Percentage of 2002 cropland severely degradedby 2032: Latin America and the Caribbean

Bars represent the percentage of cropland that has become so degraded by2032 that it is of little value for production.

Source: PoleStar (see technical annex)

Source: PoleStar (see technical annex)

2002

2002

2002

Caribbean

8

10

16

18

0

4

6

14

Meso-America total regionSouth America

12

220

02

Extent of built-up areas: Latin America and the Caribbean (% of total land area)

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

wealth between urban and rural areas has a moderatingeffect on rural-to-urban migration.

Ecosystems and species at riskAll of the above factors, along with the expansion ofinfrastructure (see chart) and changing climate,influence biodiversity in the region. The loss of forestarea leads to decreases in natural capital and in land-based biodiversity in all but a Sustainability Firstscenario (see chart). In Policy First conditions,improved monitoring and management of criticalecosystems in the protected areas help to conservebiodiversity. However, the continued demands andsomewhat higher economic growth than in a MarketsFirst situation work against these changes.

Better knowledge of — and keener concern for —ecological systems foster more effective stewardshipof both marine and terrestrial biodiversity inSustainability First. Innovative approaches help manypreviously threatened species to recover. From boththe scientific and aesthetic perspectives, biodiversityhas been given a high value, widening the number ofspecies available for pharmaceutical and foodpurposes. New areas have also been incorporated intothe national protected areas systems for theprotection of biodiversity, as well as to provideenvironmental services and recreation. In bothMarkets First and Security First scenarios there islikely to be extreme degradation and even destructionor disappearance of unique ecosystems and someendangered species.

Shadow over seas and coastsIn Markets First, the uncontrolled expansion ofcoastal settlements, proliferation of tourist resorts,uncontrolled discharge of wastes into oceans,expansion of aquaculture and lack of strongregulations and enforcement over fisheries all posedangers for the marine and coastal environment,especially for small islands in the region. In PolicyFirst, some pressure on fisheries is reduced by directregulation efforts and the implementation of market-based instruments, but still the biomass of certaininshore species drops significantly. In a Security Firstsituation, reduced economic activity may outweighthe lack of controls, sparing some areas from theseeffects. More integrated ecosystem managementschemes, such as coastal and river basin managementplans, including surveillance systems and the control

3 7 6 OUTLOOK 2002–32

20

40

60

80

100

0

2002

1

2

3

5

0

4

2002

Energy-related nitrogen oxide emissions: LatinAmerica and the Caribbean (million tonnesnitrogen)

Source: IMAGE 2.2(see technical annex)

An index of 100is the situationwhen total landarea isundomesticatedand all pressuresare below theminimumthreshold (seetechnical annex).Reduction in theNatural CapitalIndex indicateshabitat loss andincreasingpressure onterrestrial andaquaticbiodiversity.

Source: IMAGE 2.2(see technical annex)

Increasedindustrialexploration foroil, gas andmineralsaccelerates roadconstruction,which in placesencouragesencroachmentinto forests andsubsequentconversion ofland toplantations andfarmland.Conversion oftropical rainforestto farmland andfor ranchingpurposesconstitutes one ofthe greatestthreats tobiodiversity.

Source: GLOBIO (seetechnical annex)

20

40

60

80

0

2002

Natural Capital Index: Latin America andthe Caribbean

Land area impacted by infrastructure expansion:Latin America and the Caribbean (% of totalland area)

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

of land-based sources of pollution that affect inlandand marine waters, ease the situation in Policy Firstand still more so in Sustainability First.

Food and water fearsThe scenarios also have important implications forthe provision of basic needs that are related to thebroader environmental impacts. While global climatechange affects the availability of freshwater, growingpopulations and increased economic activity,particularly in agriculture, lead to increased demandfor freshwater in most scenarios. Similarly, morepeople live in areas experiencing water stress in allscenarios (see charts). Under the Markets First andSecurity First scenarios, the area affected by severewater stress increases in Meso-America and theCaribbean, while it remains constant in SouthAmerica. Nevertheless when population growth isfactored in, numbers of people living in areas withsevere water stress increase by a factor of two tothree. The number of people living in areas withsevere water stress is also on the rise under thePolicy First and Sustainability First scenarios, despitetotal water withdrawals staying roughly at currentlevels. In Policy First circumstances, reforms in thepricing of water and shifts in subsidies, andtechnological improvements have a positive effect onaddressing demands.

Similarly, the size of, and ability to meet, demands

for food in the different scenarios reflects acombination of shifts in supply and demand, which canbe influenced by social, environmental and economicpolicies. Average incomes rise in all regions,contributing to a drop in the percentage of thepopulation that is hungry. In the Markets First

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 7 7

2002

10

20

30

40

50

0

Population living in areas with severe waterstress: Latin America and the Caribbean (%)

2002

SouthAmerica53

SustainabilityFirst

Caribbean 10

Security First

region total 112

Meso-America 49Markets First

Policy First

Number of people living in areas with severe water stress: LatinAmerica and the Caribbean (million persons)

All the pie charts show total region impacts. The top left pie shows the current situation, the relativesize of the others reflects the magnitude of impacts by 2032 under the four scenarios. In LatinAmerica about a quarter of the total population — more than 100 million people — are estimated tolive in water stressed areas, mostly in Mexico, Argentina and countries along the Western coastline ofthe continent.

Source: WaterGAP 2.1 (see technical annex)

When more than 40 per cent of the renewable water resources of a riverbasin are being withdrawn for human use the river basin is considered to beunder severe water stress.

Source: WaterGAP 2.1 (see technical annex)

scenario, the relatively high inequality in LatinAmerica today is moderated somewhat as regionalpatterns converge towards those of the industrializedregions. Nevertheless, the benefits of growth andnarrowing income distribution are not enough to offsetthe growth in population and total numbers rise. In thePolicy First scenario, a combination of relatively highgrowth and comparatively equitable incomedistributions leads to a sharp drop in the percentage

hungry, as well as in the total. In the Security Firstscenario, diverging income distributions lead to aworsening in both the percentage and the total whoare hungry in the region as a whole. In theSustainability First scenario, greater equity bothbetween and within countries is reflected in rapideconomic growth and narrowing income distributions,leading to a strong decline in both the percentage andthe total who are hungry (see charts).

3 7 8 OUTLOOK 2002–32

region total 57

SouthAmerica35

Caribbean 10

Meso-America 12

2002

Markets First

SustainabilityFirst

Policy First

Security First

2002

2002 20

02 2002

Caribbean

15

20

25

30

0

10

Meso-America total regionSouth America

5

Population living with hunger: Latin America and the Caribbean (%)Rise in averageincomes andimprovement inequity are keyfactors inreducing hungerin Policy FirstandSustainabilityFirst scenarios.

Source: PoleStar(see technical annex)

All the pie chartsshow total regionimpacts. The topleft pie shows thecurrent situation,the relative sizeof the othersreflects themagnitude ofimpacts by 2032under the fourscenarios.

Source: PoleStar (seetechnical annex)

Population living with hunger: Latin America and the Caribbean (million persons)

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 7 9

A profound economic recession starts in the industrialized world and soon spreads around the world, destabilizing most of the leadingdeveloping economies. The flow of capital between the developed and developing countries changes direction as international investorsmove financial assets back home or to wealthier countries. Local capital is moved towards more attractive and safe destinations.Serious fiscal and trade deficits force governments to implement restrictive policies to reduce expenses and imports while encouragingmore exports. Environmental budgets are among the first to be cut and exploitation of natural raw materials is intensified to boost exportearnings, though with little effect on employment. Social expenditures are also cut drastically.

In the case of …

Markets First● Public and private sector expenditures are cut and funds reallocated among sectors to favour exports. Overall production is

significantly reduced. Treasury officials neglect issues that they regard as low priority, not least environmental and socialprogrammes, and those relating to compliance with environmental law.

● Adverse social effects include increases in poverty and inequality and a rising flood of migrants.● Virtually uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources runs to extremes. The Amazon Basin and other rainforest areas are ruthlessly

exploited and invaded by migrants from depressed areas. New desertification hotspots appear and numbers of people in areasunder water stress expand. Fishing and aquaculture thrive, heedless of environmental impacts.

Policy First● New policies boost production of exports and import substitutes and raise the region’s competitiveness.● International agreements on environment and labour standards among countries of the region are consolidated.● Although the recession harms all sectors of the economy and sets back environmental and social progress — especially in least-

developed countries — the region is well-placed to overcome the crisis.

Security First● Impacts of recession are most keenly felt in mega-cities. Unprecedented levels of unemployment prompt migration from relatively

urbanized sectors of cities to the outskirts and to sites exposed to landslides, floods and other risks. People grow increasinglyvulnerable to outbreaks of infectious diseases.

● Domestic and industrial solid waste overload becomes a major environmental hazard. ● In rural areas, poverty and loss of environmental quality create a vicious spiral. Land degradation intensifies and desertification

hotspots increase.

Sustainability First● The events and aftermath of 11 September 2001, joined to the outcomes of the Johannesburg Summit, spark awareness of anti-

poverty and pro-environment imperatives and governments commit themselves to change. By 2010, the world and the region areboth firmly set on a path towards sustainability.

The lessonsPressure to produce exports is best directed onto activities that are founded on sustainable production practices. Impacts of recession onemployment can be lessened, health problems can be minimized and the tide of economic and environmental migrants can bestemmed without resorting to destructive or exploitative practices. Even so, it may sometimes take negative impacts caused byoverexploitation of natural resources to create the awareness that production systems relying on them for raw materials need to beimproved along more sustainable lines.

Imagine … effects on Latin America and the Caribbean of a profound world recession

Implications: North America

The North American region is one of the world’s leastdensely populated and consists of just two countries,both advanced industrial economies undergoing atransition to more information-based systems. Bothhave relatively long records of environmentalmanagement. For these reasons, more than perhaps anyother region, the environmental impacts of the fourscenarios on this region are reflected as much in itsinfluence on inter-regional and global issues. A moreinternationally engaged North America, as in the worldsof Policy First and Sustainability First, has a strikinglypositive effect on environmental impacts at a globallevel and in other regions. Similarly, a North Americathat is only engaged at an economic level, as in a worldof Markets First, or with only selected groups in otherregions, as in a Security First world, has big and oftennegative impacts.

Environmental impacts still occur within the region,however, and these vary between scenarios. This

section takes a look at a number of these in the areas ofthe atmosphere, urban areas, water stress, landdegradation, land-based biodiversity and coastal andmarine areas. The specific issue of potential waterstress in the mid-continent and its wider repercussionsis explored in the box on page 383.

Emissions pendulumAs a predominant emitter of greenhouse gases, NorthAmerica plays a major role in determining the futureclimate of the planet. In Markets First the region’srefusal to participate notably hampers internationalefforts to control emissions of these gases. The regionremains the highest emitter on a per person basis andalso among the highest in absolute terms (see chart).This happens despite overall improvements in energyefficiency stimulated by increasing fuel prices andgeneral technological advance. Transportation-relatedemissions show the sharpest increase as motor fuelgains a greater share of total energy consumption,pushing up total emissions as it does so. The collapseof parts of the transport infrastructure and thegrowing restriction of ownership of fossil-fuel-poweredvehicles to the elite in Security First are not enough tocounteract the overall impacts of expandingpopulation, resulting in even greater increases inemissions in this scenario.

In a world of Policy First, North America’s successin implementing policies to reduce carbon emissions inan economically efficient manner leads to reductions inthe region’s contribution to global emissions.Nevertheless, emissions per person remain relativelyhigh, at over twice the world average. Emissions fromtransport and other sources decline through acombination of increased fuel efficiency and greater useof public transport. Even more spectacular results areseen in a world of Sustainability First as greenhousegas emissions plummet, a goal thought to be unrealisticjust a few decades earlier. This transformation is due totechnological advances, but more importantly tochanges in lifestyle reflected in reductions in perperson energy use to the point where it is only slightlyhigher than that in other developed countries.

One of the most visible impacts of reliance on theautomobile is urban sprawl — low urban populationdensities with heavy reliance on personal transport. Thedominance of the automobile culture is also a majorfactor in local air pollution. These issues continue toplague many cities in the region in both Markets First

3 8 0 OUTLOOK 2002–32

1 000

2 000

3 000

0

2002

Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions: NorthAmerica (million tonnes carbon)

1.0

1.5

2.0

3.0

3.5

0

0.5

2.5

2002

Extent of built-up areas: North America(% of total land area)

Source: PoleStar(see technical annex)

To a large extent,policies to reduceemissions inPolicy First andSustainabilityFirst can harvestco-benefits withother policyimperatives.

Source: IMAGE 2.2(see technical annex)

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

and Security First. In the Markets First scenario, thebuilt-up area expands over time (see chart opposite),continuing an upward trend in the region, albeit moreslowly than in the past. Combined with rising population,the built environment per person expands significantly.

In Security First, faster population increase andsprawling settlements lead to even greater growth inbuilt-up areas. Here, the sprawling urban spaces thatare the legacy of the 20th century are further burdenedwith a decaying infrastructure. Waste treatmentdeclines steeply and water-borne diseases spread.Populations also rise in the Policy First scenario, but atendency towards more compact settlements stabilizesthe built-up area. In Sustainability First, the values ofthe scenario are reflected in much more compactsettlements than in the past, or in the other scenarios.Combined with relatively smaller populations, the built-up area declines as the scenario unfolds.

A Policy First world sees the built-up environmentcreating less pressure on land resources andecosystems (see chart). More effort is put intorepairing ageing infrastructure, particularly in the innercities. In Canada, large land areas continue to be setaside for indigenous people, with likely positive futureoutlook for many of the ecosystems involved. However,very extensive mining, hydropower, oil and gasdevelopment projects, along with forest roadconstruction continue to reduce wilderness areas. InSecurity First and Markets First, exploration processesincrease substantially, not least in Alaska, Yukon andQuebec, although these inroads are slightly smaller inthe former scenario due to lower economic growth.

Going further in a world of Sustainability First, thegreat urban centres of North America begin a slowprocess of reorganization in response to the populardesire for greater proximity of home, work, commerceand leisure activity. For many, the ‘towns within cities’that begin to emerge from the process by 2032 providean attractive balance between access to a lively cultureand the immediacy of a small community. Others opt forgreater access to green spaces, leading to small townsdispersed around larger metropolitan centres,connected by advanced transport systems.

Continued advances in information technologyexpand the options for living and working arrangementsand a diverse range of lifestyle choices emerges. Acommon feature of most of these lifestyles is that theyare far less resource intensive, automobile-dependentand stressful than their 20th century antecedents.

People enjoy a strong sense of affiliation with theirlocal, national and global communities.

Climatic change and the introduction of exoticspecies pose additional threats to land-basedbiodiversity in the region. Although natural forest arearemains relatively constant in the region in allscenarios, in some cases there is swift expansion ofplantations, built areas and agricultural land, withassociated infrastructure. This is particularly the caseunder the Markets First scenario with its strongeconomic growth. The diverse biota found in wetlandsalso continues to be threatened by conversion anddegradation of these ecosystems.

Natural vegetation in much of the region,particularly in the north, is threatened by changes inclimate. There are slightly greater impacts of climatechange in Policy First and Sustainability First scenarios,reflecting the short-term effects of efforts to reduceother pollutants, especially sulphur dioxide, in additionto greenhouse gases. However, over the next 30 yearsthe climate change situation is dominated by themomentum built up before 2002 and there is littleoverall difference in Natural Capital Index between thescenarios (see chart overleaf). The full effects ofclimate change will be apparent only after 2032.

Biodiversity in coastal and marine ecosystemsalso faces threats from infrastructure development,pollution and climate change. In the cases ofSustainability First and Policy First, the slowergrowth in infrastructure and significant changes inagricultural policy lead to important reductions inland-based sources of pollution. The effects ofclimatic changes lag somewhat behind those on land-based biodiversity, because of the slower changes inwater temperature, but significant threshold effects

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 8 1

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60

70

0

10

50

2002

Land area impacted by infrastructure expansion:North America (% of total land area)

Source: GLOBIO(see technical annex)

may play a role here. In fisheries, greater cooperationboth within the region and with other regions inPolicy First and Sustainability First contributes to thepreservation and restoration of important fish stocks.Some of the pressure on marine resources is reducedby the expansion of aquaculture in these scenarios, aswell as in Markets First. The potential forinternational conflicts over marine resources withinthe region and with other regions is high in SecurityFirst, with negative implications for the health ofaquatic ecosystems.

Water withdrawals easeCertain areas of North America, particularly thesouthwest of the United States, are already subject tohigh levels of water stress. Without strong action toreduce water use, this is likely to grow withpopulation increases and shifts in geographicdistribution. Local policies, such as water pricing, cansignificantly affect demand. In addition, internationalpolicies related to agricultural trade can strongly affectcrop type and therefore, irrigation requirements andwater use. Advanced technologies, includingbiotechnologies to develop more water efficient cropsand improve irrigation efficiency, can also have astriking effect. Total water withdrawals decreaseunder the Policy First and Sustainability Firstscenarios, where structural changes lead to reducedwithdrawals in all sectors across North America.

Under Markets First and Security First conditions,the number of people living in areas with severe waterstress increases with population growth although thereis a decline in percentage of population affected.Regulatory efforts in Policy First and Sustainability Firstlead to much more significant decreases in percentagesas well as reductions in total numbers (see chart).

3 8 2 OUTLOOK 2002–32

20

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80

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2002

Natural Capital Index: North America An index of 100is the situationwhen total landarea isundomesticatedand all pressuresare below theminimumthreshold (seetechnical annex).Reduction in theNatural CapitalIndex indicateshabitat loss andincreasingpressure onterrestrial andaquaticbiodiversity.

Source: IMAGE 2.2(see technical annex)

20

30

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10

2002

Population living in areas with severe waterstress: North America (%)

When more than 40 per cent of the renewable water resources of a riverbasin are being withdrawn for human use the river basin is considered tobe under severe water stress. In many of the river basins of the westernUnited States, home to over 100 million people, withdrawals currentlyexceed these limits.

Source: WaterGAP 2.1 (see technical annex)

100

150

200

0

50

2002

Number of people living in areas with severewater stress: North America (million persons)

Source: WaterGAP 2.1 (see technical annex)

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 8 3

A number of trends point to increased vulnerability of large areas of mid-continental North America to water stress. These includecontinued draw down of major aquifers and indications of chemical contamination. At the same time, climate models point to mid-continental drying and lowering of both lake and river levels. An extended hot, dry period starting midway through the 2010sexacerbates these trends. The demand for irrigation water increases at the same time as its availability declines. Transport on the GreatLakes and on major rivers such as the Mississippi, faces disruption.

In the case of …Markets First

● Widespread introduction of water pricing and the removal of agricultural subsidies have already led to the reduction of agriculture inthe region, somewhat reducing pressures on water demand.

● Deals are struck to explore transport of water from the Great Lakes or even more remote sources, to increase water levels in theMississippi River system.

● Amounts of goods transported by road increase.● Production loss drives more intensive farming elsewhere in the United States, such as California's Central Valley, fuelling water

conflicts there. Higher water prices almost everywhere hit marginal businesses and the poor.● The region increases imports from abroad to meet domestic shortfalls. This move boosts economies in some producer countries but

also makes local and national food security problems worse in situations where land is taken out of the local food productionsystem to meet export demands or quotas.

Policy First● Research and legislative efforts are implemented to encourage the introduction of more efficient irrigation methods such as drip

irrigation.● Processes of reform are accelerated to introduce water pricing and begin to reduce agricultural subsidies.● Initiatives are launched throughout the region to enhance rail transport.● There is a new push for a strong international climate stabilization treaty.● Energy efficiency, renewable energy and forest conservation programmes are promoted and speeded up.● Bio-engineered cultivars that yield more ‘crop per drop’ are researched, developed and introduced faster.

Security First● Competing interests in the United States and Canada contest plans for big-scale transfer of water from the Great Lakes.● A powerful farm lobby continues to oppose reform in the system of agricultural supports and water subsidies.● Knock-on effects of water diversions aggravate long-standing Mexico–United States rows over shared water resources.● Falling food exports and rising prices for food commodities on the world market contribute to food shortages, heightening

geopolitical tension and giving rise to violence in hotspot areas.

Sustainability First● A shift to rain-fed crops and restoration of much of the region to its original tall grass prairie is accelerated.● Efforts to enhance rail transport throughout the region are introduced.● There is a more rapid shift away from meat-based diets, allowing more efficient land uses for human food rather than animal

fodder.● Consumer movements call for and galvanize more dispersed, sustainable and localized farming systems.● There is a fundamental re-think of lifestyles, economic development and social policy, responding to an emerging awareness that

intensive use of capital, water and chemicals by agri-business cannot be sustained, as well as to awareness of parallel problems inother economic sectors and environmental frameworks.

The lessonsMany — if not all — economic systems depend heavily on natural systems but regrettably the latter are too often taken for granted orassumed to be unlimited or easily replaceable. Given the inherent variability and mutability of natural systems, policies should bedesigned to reduce excessive levels of dependence, especially in the presence of potential threshold effects whereby small changes canprompt catastrophic effects.

Imagine … increased water stress in mid-continental North America

Implications: West Asia

West Asia is characterized by relatively high populationgrowth rates, heavy economic dependence on oilproduction, fairly severe water stress and pockets ofconflict or unrest. Developments in all these respects,along with the promotion of technological advances inareas such as desalination and biotechnology, varymarkedly between the four scenarios. As in otherregions, these shifts are largely driven by trends andevents in the areas of governance and culture, and inrelations between nations within and outside the region.Possible outcomes in terms of environmental impactsare considered in more detail below for land, freshwater,biodiversity, urban areas and coastal and marineresources. The repercussions of an extended drought inthe region are explored in the box on page 389.

Vulnerable landPressures on West Asia’s limited arable lands aredriven by the ever-expanding food demands of agrowing population and expansion of other land uses,including urbanization, industrial activities,infrastructure and tourism. In Markets First andSecurity First scenarios, transfer of arable land tothese sectors continues in the absence of effectivearable land protection policies. The built-up areaexpands (see chart) in step with growth in population.Built environment per person continues to grow inMarkets First, with sprawling settlement patterns.

Rapid population growth and unplanned expansion leadto even greater growth in built-up area in a SecurityFirst world. In Sustainability First and Policy First,more rapid economic expansion is partially offset by atendency towards compact settlement patterns.Expansion of built-over land in Sustainability First isthe smallest among all four scenarios.

The land that remains in agriculture is susceptibleto water-induced soil degradation (see chart). In PolicyFirst, implementation of a regional food demandmanagement strategy results in more food beingimported from other regions. This spares arable landfrom increased pressure for local food production. In

3 8 4 OUTLOOK 2002–32

2002

2002

2002

Arabian Peninsula

2

3

4

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Mashriq total region

5

6

Extent of built-up areas: West Asia (% of total land area)

West Asia (with Iran and Turkey)

4

6

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2002

Water-induced soil degradation continues to be a risk throughout the region.

Source: IMAGE 2.2 (see technical annex)

Area with high risk of water-induced soildegradation: West Asia (% of total land area)

4

6

8

10

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2

Bars represent the percentage of cropland that has become so degraded by2032 that it is of little value for production.

Source: PoleStar (see technical annex)

Percentage of 2002 cropland severely degradedby 2032: West Asia

Source: PoleStar (see technical annex)

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

Sustainability First, there is slightly more landsusceptible to soil degradation than in either the PolicyFirst or Markets First scenarios because more arableland is kept in production. The greatest risk is in aSecurity First situation, where management is poorestand more marginal land is used.

Coping with land and water problemsIn all scenarios except Security First, some forms ofland use planning and effective arable land protectionpolicies are implemented to prevent actual degradationof the extremely scarce cultivable land in the region. Asa result, the rate of land degradation and loss slowsdown and gradually stabilizes. In a Markets Firstscenario, the available cropland is managed morecarefully than in the past, in the interest of protectingagricultural markets. However, population andeconomic growth more than counteract these efforts(see chart opposite). Land conservation in Policy Firstand Sustainability First leads to much slower croplanddegradation. In addition, some degraded land isrestored, leading to substantially lower net rates than inMarkets First or Security First. In Sustainability Firstreductions in population growth and well-researchedadvances in biotechnology and genetic engineeringfurther offset these pressures.

Water stress in West Asia continues to increase aswater demands exceed available water resources,owing to population growth and expansion of differentdevelopment sectors (see charts). In Markets First andSecurity First, deteriorating water quality andincreasing competition between sectors, users orboth, hampers food production and leads to conflicts(mainly between the domestic and agriculturalsectors), increasing water-related health problems.Water withdrawals are slightly higher in Security First,due to more water-cooled thermal electricityproduction. Improved irrigation efficiency and minorshifts in irrigated areas (under Markets First only) leadto decreasing water withdrawals for irrigation. In total,water withdrawals increase slightly under bothscenarios, leading to an increase in areas with severewater stress and affecting over 200 million people.Demand management and conservation policies areintroduced gradually in Markets First as the degree ofwater scarcity rises in individual countries but there isno strategic water resources planning in a SecurityFirst world. In this scenario, water scarcity reaches itshighest levels in the Arabian Peninsula, in terms of

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 8 5

40

60

80

100

0

20

2002

Population living in areas with severe waterstress: West Asia (%)

2002

region total 74

ArabianPeninsula33

SustainabilityFirst

Mashriq 41

Security First

Markets First

Policy First

Number of people living in areas with severe water stress:West Asia (million persons)

All the pie charts show total region impacts. The top left pie shows the current situation, the relativesize of the others reflects the magnitude of impacts by 2032 under the four scenarios. West Asia is oneof the most water stressed regions of the world, with over 80 per cent of its area under severe waterstress and over 70 million people (or nearly 90 per cent of the region’s total population) living in theseareas. In both sub-regions, the irrigation sector dominates the total water withdrawals, both undercurrent conditions as well as under all four scenarios.

Source: WaterGAP 2.1 (see technical annex)

When more than40 per cent ofthe renewablewater resourcesof a river basinare beingwithdrawn forhuman use theriver basin isconsidered to beunder severewater stress.

Source: WaterGAP 2.1 (seetechnical annex)

the number of the population affected, andgroundwater resources, the principal source of waterin this sub-region, are depleted and deteriorate to theextent that they are no longer directly usable.

Under the Policy First and Sustainability Firstscenarios, reductions in irrigated areas in theregion, combined with structural changes in theway water is used in industry, lead to reductions intotal water withdrawals. Accordingly some riverbasins drop out of the severe water stress category.In Policy First, the area under water stress isstabilized by adopting strategic water resourcesmanagement to increase water use efficiency andresource protection. A major policy shift, from‘supply augmentation’ towards ‘demand managementand conservation’ occurs. This shift is achievedthrough water pricing, awareness and educationcampaigns, enforcement of legislation andmanagement of marginal water, as well as moreefficient allocation of water resources among thecompeting economic sectors. In Sustainability First,the increase of freshwater made available bydesalination technology, wide application of

biotechnology in the field of food production anddecrease in population growth rate in the region, helpto counteract the effects of additional demand relatedto higher economic growth. In both scenarios,however, water scarcity persists and affects growingnumbers of people as water demand continues toexceed available water resources.

The impact of water stress in the differentscenarios also depends on relations betweenindividual countries in West Asia and on West Asia’srelations with other regions. About 60 per cent ofsurface water resources originate from outside theregion. In Security First, countries sharing riverbasins fail to sign conventions and agreements onsharing and management of water resources,including surface and groundwater, or on monitoringtheir quantity and quality. In Markets First, equitablesharing of surface water resources among suchcountries might eventually be reached, limitingconflicts and tension. This shift also helps overalldevelopment, increases agricultural production andreduces uncertainty in planning. Even so,construction of dams in upstream countriescontinues, curbing downstream flows, increasingtension in the region and impacting river and marineecosystems downstream. This situation isexacerbated by cyclical droughts common to theregion. In Security First, conflicts and tensionincrease within the region, as well as with countriesoutside the region, eventually leading to water wars.These concerns ease in Policy First and SustainabilityFirst as countries negotiate agreements on theequitable sharing of surface water resources.

Such steps are taken further in SustainabilityFirst. A total catchment management approach iswidely adopted and conventions agreed on sharingand managing groundwater resources to safeguardboth quantity and quality. There is also greatercooperation between countries on dam construction,including environmental impact assessments that lookat potential impacts on downstream parts of the riverand marine ecosystems.

Natural capital leaks awayWest Asia also faces increasing pressures on itsbiodiversity. Infrastructure expands in all scenarios(see chart), destroying and fragmenting the region'secosystems. These pressures lead to steady declinein populations of wild species, a growing list of

3 8 6 OUTLOOK 2002–32

40

50

60

70

0

10

30

20

2002

Source: GLOBIO(see technical annex) Land area impacted by infrastructure expansion:

West Asia (% of total land area)

West Asia (with Iran and Turkey)

40

60

80

0

20

2002

An index of 100is the situationwhen total landarea isundomesticatedand all pressuresare below theminimumthreshold (seetechnical annex).Reduction in theNatural CapitalIndex indicateshabitat loss andincreasingpressure onterrestrial andaquaticbiodiversity.Biodiversity isseverelyimpactedbetween 2002and 2032 in allscenarios, butespecially underSecurity First.

Source: IMAGE 2.2(see technical annex)

Natural Capital Index: West Asia

Key to charts

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

threatened species and an overall and continual lossof biodiversity. These trends are counteracted tosome degree in Policy First and Sustainability Firstcircumstances by implementing land usemanagement plans to reduce human pressures onnatural ecosystems. Other counter measures includelegislation protecting biodiversity and endangeredspecies as well as regulating the introduction offoreign and genetically modified organisms. Onlyslower economic growth in Security First keeps theexpansion of infrastructure and its impacts belowthat of Markets First.

Other problems, particularly climate change, joinwith these pressures to diminish natural capital inthe region in all scenarios. In Policy First, presentefforts to enlarge protected areas continue and mayreach international targets. In addition, regionalcooperation and transboundary reserves areestablished between neighbouring countries. Publicawareness is stimulated through botanical gardensand museums. These efforts go further inSustainability First where there is greater localcontrol of resources. The extent of protected areasreaches target levels, halting depletion of biologicalresources. Furthermore, the region witnesses anincrease in cooperative regional research, investmentand sustainable use of genetic and biologicalresources through the use of advanced technology.However, even here the efforts are not enough tofully counteract the effects of changing climate (seechart opposite).

The somewhat slower onset of climate change inMarkets First means that the losses to natural capitalare somewhat less than in Policy First and SecurityFirst. In Security First, the introduction of foreign andgenetically modified species carries on unregulated,posing a major additional threat to indigenous speciesin the region. Moreover, efforts already under waybecome increasingly ineffective under decliningeconomic and environmental conditions and foodinsecurity. Significantly, many indigenous biologicalresources in the region could be completely lost.

Differences in population growth, urban planningand zoning, rural area development and the situationof refugees all influence the level, type and impact ofurbanization across the region. Rapid unplannedurbanization and high population concentrationscaused by rapid population growth, rural to urbanmigration and the increase in refugee numbers are

factors in both Markets First and Security First. Allhave negative environmental and healthconsequences in terms of local air pollution (seechart), add to waste production and encourageencroachment on limited agricultural and recreationalareas. Basic healthcare, sanitation and infrastructurefacilities fail to cope.

More effective urban planning and zoning prevailin Policy First and Sustainability First scenarios.Rural to urban migration is reduced conspicuously bywell-planned integrated development of rural areas.In Sustainability First, rural area developmentincludes environmental considerations to minimizeencroachment and loss of agricultural andrecreational lands, stimulating some reversemigration. Finally, in the Mashriq, the environmentaland health problems associated with refugeecentres are solved as part of the resolution ofconflicts in the region.

Associated with the differences in land use andfreshwater management, as well as otherdevelopments, the scenarios also differ in theirimplications for coastal and marine areas. Under thePolicy First and Sustainability First scenarios, memberstates in the Arabian Gulf ratify the Convention for thePrevention of Marine Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)73/78 and other established protocols, establish wasteoil reception facilities and declare the RegionalOrganization for the Protection of the MarineEnvironment (ROPME) Sea Area a Special Area, whichreduces oil pollution significantly. The GlobalProgramme of Action for the Protection of the MarineEnvironment from Land-Based Activities is strictlyimplemented, controlling and significantly reducingsewage releases into the sea.

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 8 7

West Asia (with Iran and Turkey)

2

3

0

1 2002

Energy-related nitrogen oxide emissions: West Asia (million tonnes nitrogen)

Source: IMAGE 2.2(see technical annex)

These environmental trends, along with morebroadly distributed economic growth and effectivesocial policies, are reflected in the incidence of

hunger in the region (see charts). In both MarketsFirst and Security First, the levels of hunger are stillnear 10 per cent in 2032. In the Markets Firstscenario, relatively high inequality persists, limitingthe improvements that can be achieved fromeconomic growth. In the Security First scenario,divergent income distributions worsen the situationeven more. Combined with the population growth,the numbers of persons experiencing hungerincrease by half in Markets First and approximatelydouble in Security First. In Policy First andSustainability First, a combination of relatively higheconomic growth and comparatively equitable incomedistributions leads to a sharp drop in the percentagehungry, as well as in the total.

3 8 8 OUTLOOK 2002–32

8

10

12

14

0

2

6

4

2002

Population living with hunger: West Asia (%)

2002

region total 13

ArabianPeninsula 8

Mashriq 5

Markets First

Policy First SustainabilityFirst

Security First

Population living with hunger: West Asia (million persons)All the pie chartsshow total regionimpacts. The topleft pie shows thecurrent situation,the relative sizeof the othersreflects themagnitude ofimpacts by 2032under the fourscenarios.Average incomesrise in all regions,contributing to adrop in thepercentage of thepopulation that ishungry, but inMarkets First andSecurity First, thebenefits ofgrowth are notenough to offsetthe growth inpopulation andthe total numberof peopleaffected by foodshortages.

Source: PoleStar (seetechnical annex)

Source: PoleStar(see technical annex)

Key to chart

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 8 9

An extended drought occurs, starting late in the first decade of the century. A significant drop in groundwater resources has affectedmajor aquifers in the region since the mid-1990s. Growing scarcity of irrigation and clean drinking water in the Mashriq sub-regionleads to more dependency on food imports in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and proliferation of hunger and poverty inMashriq countries and Yemen. As approximately 60 per cent of surface water resources in the region originate from outside, thepotential exists for disagreements to escalate between countries over shared and depleted water resources.

In the case of …Markets First

● Water resources policies focusing almost exclusively on ‘supply augmentation’ prove unwise in this drought-prone region. There issome movement towards demand management but this is not implemented quickly enough to avert major water shortages.

● There is mass dependency on desalination facilities in GCC countries.● Cash crops in irrigated areas are halved, resulting in major deficits in locally grown food. ● New, genetically engineered, more drought-tolerant crops are introduced.● Water-related health problems proliferate.

Policy First● Sweeping institutional reforms strengthen authorities in charge of water resources management.● An existing policy focus on demand management, conservation and protection makes it relatively easy to introduce prompt

additional measures that help eke out water supplies while drought conditions persist. ● Remedial instruments and programmes are introduced, including water pricing mechanisms, awareness and education campaigns,

legislation to strengthen powers of enforcement, measures to boost the management of marginal waters, and codes to enableefficient water resources allocation among competing economic sectors.

● Economic integration and regional cooperation help modify agricultural policies in the Arabian Peninsula and reduce waterconsumption in the agricultural sector.

● Temporary agreements deal with the problems of shared water resources and help enhance regional stability.

Security First● Competition and conflicts between sectors and users increase, leading to social unrest.● There are widespread signs of increase in the rate of desertification and deterioration of biological resources combined with

extinction of some species due to over-hunting and habitat destruction.● Water-related health problems proliferate.● Political instability and conflicts in the region mount, leading to open war over water resources, threatening regional and

international stability.

Sustainability First● Strategic regional water resource and river basin management planning reduce impacts of drought, in turn enhancing the efficiency

of water use, resource protection and water resources augmentation.● Major institutional reforms further consolidate the authority of water resources management bodies. Previous policy shifts in favour

of ‘demand management and conservation’ ease the way for additional measures to eke out water supplies.● More freshwater is made available by desalination technology in the GCC countries, increasingly using alternative and renewable

energy sources, such as solar and wind power, to run desalination plants.● There is widespread application of biotechnology to crop production, to boost drought resistance and yields.● More equitable sharing of surface and groundwater resources is achieved as riparian countries sign and ratify treaties to that effect.

This process is helped by the resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict.

The lessonsDevelopments not directly related to the environment, such as improvements in regional cooperation, can have a major impact onenvironmental issues. Similarly, the ways in which one environmental issue is tackled can have significant impacts on others, forinstance the choice of renewable energy sources to power desalinization works reduces fossil-fuel burning. Experience and adoption of amixed set of policy instruments allows greater flexibility to react swiftly in times of unexpected and increased environmental stress.

Imagine … a major seven-year drought in West Asia

Implications: the Polar Regions

Far more than in other regions, the environmentalfuture of the polar regions is largely determined byglobal developments. The Arctic and Antarctic sharevarious environmental concerns with other regionsand with one another.

Despite shared concerns, the two sub-regionsthat make up the GEO-3 Polar Region are verydifferent in geographical circumstances, in theirdegree of isolation from major centres of populationand human activity and in their legal status. Inaddition, unlike the Antarctic, the Arctic has apermanent human population, including indigenouspeoples (see Chapter 2).

Carving up the ArcticThe evolution of governance structures for the Arcticand Antarctic determines, to a large extent, theenvironmental futures of the region. In a MarketsFirst scenario, the Arctic Council does not live up toits goals and has limited impact on policy decisionsaffecting the Arctic and its constituent states. In theearly 21st century, land-claim agreements are reachedwith all indigenous groups, giving them varyingdegrees of ownership and rights to Arctic resources.Multinational entrepreneurs negotiate legally bindingagreements with local populations and indigenouspeople’s organizations for the rights to exploit theresources in exchange for cash and the promise oflong-term local employment. However, much of thispromised benefit does not play out and the localpopulations can do little to enforce the agreements.

In Policy First, the Council partially lives up toits goals and its advice has significant impact onpolicy decisions affecting the region. The Council’sworking groups and its observers successfullyfacilitate a vibrant environmental ethic and networks— especially among younger people — throughoutthe circumpolar world. Agreements reached betweenmultinational entrepreneurs and local populationsnot only make provision for cash outlays andemployment in exchange for exploration andproduction rights but also guarantee long-termmanagement, part ownership and profit sharingrights. Where needed, the Council is effective inguaranteeing the latter are adhered to.

In Security First, a highly splintered, factionalcircumpolar world emerges, in which the United

States, the Russian Federation, the Nordic states,and Canada compete to protect their respectivenorthlands and their prized resources. Furthersplintering leaves power in the hands of an elite ofcommercial stakeholders. Some areas are subjectedto ruthless exploitation and resource depletion.Local and indigenous peoples are increasinglymarginalized. Unanimity of purpose is rupturedwithin communities of indigenous peoples, as keymembers of these communities and some of theirorganizations join forces with the multinationalstakeholders. Although many people living in theArctic gain a measure of economic independence,their existence becomes unstable.

In Sustainability First, the Arctic Council becomesa forceful advocate for the new thinking aboutsustainable livelihoods. Strong social andenvironmental support networks are establishedthroughout the circumpolar world. An overallconservation and development plan for the region isagreed and partly implemented by Arctic states. Itincludes a system of protected areas to ensure thecontinuing survival and development of Arcticbiodiversity and heritage. The Arctic peoplesstrengthen traditional alliances and moderninternational partnerships to serve the common goodas well as specific interests.

Southern legal regimeIn a Markets First scenario, the Antarctic legal regimeresponds to some emerging issues yet increasinglyruns up against entrenched stakeholder positions onpoints such as sovereignty and freedom of commercialaccess. There is a gradual addition of states, regionaleconomic groupings and other international entities tothe Antarctic Treaty System but most states continueto remain outside. Developing states are still (ineffect) excluded from the system by lack oftechnology and funds. The Antarctic is increasinglypenetrated by ‘pirate’ operators beyond the effectivelegal control of individual states or of internationalregimes. These operators are increasingly able to‘regime-pick’ to sanction their particular activity.

In a Policy First situation, the Antarctic legalregime recognizes the need to adopt new agreementsand harmonize regional legal and global approaches.This stimulates new membership and new forms ofmembership, including non-state entities.Administering regional agreements becomes more

3 9 0 OUTLOOK 2002–32

complex as membership grows and the increasinginvolvement of developing countries highlights theneed to address equity issues such as burden-sharingand technology-sharing, in appropriate ways.

Under Security First, the Antarctic legal regimeessentially collapses as a result of rivalry betweenclaimant states seeking to secure their putativerights, and other advanced technology states andentities that do not recognize those rights. In practicea small number of very large corporations andpowerful states operate Antarctica as a jointfranchise. The wider international communitycontests the legitimacy of this deal, but is unable tochallenge the new hegemony to any practical effect.

In Sustainability First, the Antarctic legal regimeinitially continues its gradual development. By thecentury’s third decade, however, piecemeal changes areno longer seen as sufficient. With more fundamentalshifts in international norms under way, it becomespossible to tackle some of the key issues, including theclaims to sovereignty in Antarctica and policies of thehigh seas. As resolution of these issues becomesfeasible, the possibility arises of a more fundamentalrevision of the Antarctic legal regime. Under a newlegal structure, no property rights can be assigned toany part of the continent or its resources.

Heating upThese differences, combined with the impacts on polarareas of activities and processes in other parts of theworld, translate into a varied range of environmentalimplications under the four scenarios. Large increasesin average polar temperatures are to be expected in allthe scenarios, especially in the Arctic (see chart). PolicyFirst and Sustainability First feature the highestincreases up to 2032, reflecting the rapid abatement ofemissions of sulphur oxides under these scenarios.Warming in Antarctica is less pronounced on account ofthe ocean currents in the area.

In Security First, both areas suffer fromproliferation of illegal production of ozone depletingsubstances, which obliterates the gains made earlier,in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Likewise,chemical pollutants originating from outside theregion increase significantly in Security First due toweak regulation and in Markets First, where economicgrowth is higher. In Policy First and SustainabilityFirst, efforts to phase out pollutants effectivelyterminate these problems.

Safety-nets for fish stocksA key area of concern in both regions is the health offish and other marine stocks. The effects of a crash inAntarctic krill are examined in the box on page 393.There is a big increase in the number andsophistication of vessels employed, and harvestingincreases massively in both the Antarctic and theArctic in Markets First. The very rapid rate ofindustrial exploitation and abandonment of targetedfisheries means that management responses often lagbehind events. Continued depletion of targetpopulations leads to some population crashes andadverse impacts on associated species.

In Policy First, the Antarctic marine ecosystem isplaced under ever-increasing pressure as fishingproves the hardest resource activity to manage. Starkchoices between commercial and developmentimperatives on the one hand, and environmental andethical considerations on the other, prove difficult toreconcile. Underwater setting of lines and othertechnological developments eliminate seabird by-catch, but other forms of by-catch are unaffected andtarget stocks continue to be exploited beyondsustainable limits. In the Arctic, provision is made for

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 9 1

0.50

0.75

0.00

0.25

2.00

Arctic

Antarctic

1.00

1.25

1.50

1.75

Spread of results from fourGlobal Circulation Models (GCMs)

Average calculated temperature change

Large increasesin average polartemperature areto be expectedfor each of thescenarios,especially in theArctic. The graphclearly showsthat the changeof temperaturebetween 2002and 2032 is farlarger than theuncertainty.

Source: IMAGE 2.2(see technicalannex)

Change in average temperature: Polar regions (°C per ten years)

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

traditional local fisheries and for the engagement oflocal communities in international Arctic fisheries.Total collapse of any single fishery is averted usingstringent harvesting quotas, limited entry schemes,and enforceable bilateral regimes.

In Security First, illegal, unregulated andunreported fishing activities cease under directpressure from the powerful new interests regulatingthe region. Exploitation of marine living resources bythe new interests takes off, however, and rises tovery high levels. Self-interest sees attempts tomanage this activity at sustainable levels, withapproaches including fish-farming and biotechnology.The ecological and economic consequences of thisshift are still unresolved by 2032. In the Arctic,fishing rights are unilaterally withdrawn from all butthe Arctic states. However, overfishing has alreadyexacted a heavy toll and desperate conservationmeasures may be too late to secure the resources forthe future.

In Sustainability First, fish and marine mammalsare rigorously defended against overexploitation.Quotas are reasonable and the resource base ishealthy. Penalties for abuse are severe — and robustlyenforced. One option being explored is to cap catchesbut set initial limits at a liberal level, then scale downfrom this level over a period of several decades. In theAntarctic, rights to fisheries are incrementallytransferred from developed to developing world fleets.In the Arctic, local communities now manage most ofthe fisheries and potentially harmful practices such astrawling are outlawed in most areas.

Wildlife rearguardInfrastructure developments, often related to fishing andtourism in both the Arctic and the Antarctic, and to oil,gas and other mineral development in the Arctic, expandsignificantly in a Markets First world (see chart for thesituation in the Arctic). In the Antarctic, this includesspontaneous private colonization by a limited number ofeconomically and technology-rich individuals or entities.In the Arctic, habitats of wide-ranging species, such asthe caribou, reindeer, grizzly bear and musk ox areseverely fragmented and encroached upon. All Arcticwildlife is substantially affected either directly orindirectly from the disruption of the food chain, fromhabitat loss and from the insidious impacts of climatechange. Excessive hunting further reduces some of thepopulations to biologically unsustainable levels.

In Policy First, these pressures are kept in check,although effects of decades of warming — on land andsea — are visible over large expanses. Responsibleplanning decisions have prevailed and wildlife habitathas remained relatively intact. In many cases this is dueto the improved effectiveness of habitat management,particularly in protected areas which are now integratedinto circumpolar and north–south networks. Thenumbers and size of protected areas have increasedsignificantly, but many sites still have inadequateregulations on mineral, oil and gas exploration andextraction and hydropower generation. Hunting issustainable in most parts of the Arctic and quotas arebased on much improved scientific evidence.

Security First sees permanent residence inAntarctica becoming possible for personnel employedby industries active in the area and as a status symbolfor the wealthy. Numbers of endemic wildlife in theArctic plummet, the food chain is disrupted and geneticdiversity is weakened due to habitat degradation andfragmentation. Opportunistic alien species able tosurvive in the warming climate have filled availableniches. However, even they are having a hard time dueto contamination by wastes and habitat destruction.

In Sustainability First, biodiversity hot spots andhabitats are protected and large areas are set aside asnational parks or nature reserves to help wildlife copewith climate change. Small, regulated subsistencehunts are still allowed in accordance with agreementsnegotiated with indigenous peoples. The public doesnot tolerate poaching. Residence in the Antarctic isdenied for anything other than specifically agreedpurposes, generally scientific research.

3 9 2 OUTLOOK 2002–32

Arctic

2002

1.0

2.0

0

0.5

1.5

The Arctic holdsthe largestremainingundisturbed —but highlysensitive —wilderness in theworld.

Source: GLOBIO(see technical annex)

Key to chart

Markets First

Sustainability First

Security First

Policy First

Land area impacted by infrastructure expansion:Arctic (% of total land area)

In the Arctic, the condition of the boreal forestsdiffers markedly between scenarios. Large areas offorest in the region have come under stress from rapidclimate change, leading to long-term shifts intemperature and precipitation, as well as to increasing

incidence of fires. Continued and increasing levels oflogging in Markets First and Security First furtherexacerbate these pressures. Most notably, in SecurityFirst muddy plains and clear-cut forested areas havereplaced many of the once vast pristine landscapes.

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 9 3

Clear signs emerge that circumpolar Antarctic krill (Euphausia superba) stocks are crashing. The immediate cause is believed to becommercial over-harvesting, but the picture is complicated by simultaneous sea-ice changes and rises in ultraviolet radiation levels, bothof which are believed to affect krill population dynamics. There is evidence of serious adverse impacts on breeding success of Antarcticbirds, seals and cetaceans within a few seasons, leading to serious concerns over the viability of populations of higher predators.Indications of severe damage to stocks of other marine species — initially evident through declining stocks of fin-fish and squid — raiseconcern about the stability of the entire Antarctic marine ecosystem, and knock-on effects on other ecosystems in and around the sub-region. Dramatic falls in catches of krill and commercial fisheries stocks that prey on krill, result in widespread reduction in fishingactivity and collapse of the fishing industry in some areas. The treaties, institutions and other international arrangements set up toconserve and manage the fishery are seen as having failed. Public concern runs high at the prospect of threats to charismatic wildlifespecies such as penguins, seals and whales.

In the case of…Markets First

● Some regulatory steps are taken, but market mechanisms are the prime response measures used — reducing krill demand byraising prices, and harvesting by raising costs.

● Harvesting switches to other species, including those that are not dependent upon krill themselves and may be competitors. Wherethese responses fail, the fishing industry abandons the area.

● It is widely presumed that krill stocks will in time recover, and that the adverse knock-on effects will turn out to be reversible.

Policy First● Moratoria on krill harvesting are agreed to allow stock recovery.● These steps are accompanied by reductions in fisheries activities across all target species.● Major research effort is directed to understanding what has happened and underpinning policy responses.● The regulatory regime for the marine environment is revised.

Security First● Measures are taken to ban some operators from the region as a way to curb pressures on krill stocks.● Market mechanisms are employed when they underpin the interests of key stakeholders in the region. ● In a bid for short-term ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ exploitation, harvesting switches to other species, including those expected to decline

steeply as a result of krill stock collapse.● Active management of the marine environment begins by seeding new krill stocks (including genetically modified types), enhancing

nutrient levels and depressing predators or competitors.

Sustainability First● There is an immediate closure of all krill fisheries pending recovery of stocks.● Substantial reductions in other fisheries are introduced as a precautionary measure — although directed harvesting of particular

predator populations is considered in some areas.● A renewed effort is made to understand the functioning of the Antarctic marine environment.● Negotiation begins for a new legal regime to manage the marine environment and regulate more limited harvesting when stocks

have recovered.

The lessonsExisting knowledge of many natural systems is limited, including the thresholds for resource exploitation, beyond which systemscollapse. Such thresholds may be reached in a comparatively sudden way. It makes sense, therefore, to continue efforts to improveunderstanding, but also to take a precautionary approach where baseline data are lacking, where uncertainty is high and whereirreversible impacts are possible. This course of action may avoid the need to take more drastic action in the event of a system crash.

Imagine… a crash in circumpolar Antarctic krill stocks

As we step back into the world in which we live now,a number of important lessons arise from theforegoing scenarios that can help to provide generalpolicy guidance.

LESSON ONEContrasting yet plausible stories can be toldfor how the world and its regions willdevelop in the next 30 years; each hasfundamentally different implications for theenvironment.

Earlier chapters of GEO-3 have outlined importantand very specific changes that emerged over the past30 years, and there is no reason to believe that thenext 30 will be any less dynamic. Using scenarios, itis possible to tell strongly contrasting but plausiblestories about how the world and its regions mightdevelop in the future. None of the stories requiresexotic surprises to materialize and elements of eachof the four scenarios can already be discerned intoday’s world. In appreciating the scenarios, it isimportant to realize that, in real life, they are notmutually exclusive. A given region may experience allfour or a combination of several at once. And although

3 9 4 OUTLOOK 2002–32

Lessons from the future

UN

EP, Pramkaew, Still Pictures

the scenarios have been presented as fairly uniformacross the world, it is clear that not all regions haveexperienced, are experiencing, or will experience thesame developments.

Examining the environmental implications casts aspotlight on the differences across scenarios, regionsand issues. These variations have been illustrated inthe narratives, the quantitative material and thediffering outcomes of particular events or trends.

Sustainability First implies the most positiveenvironmental outlook of the four scenarios. MarketsFirst and Security First conjure up much morepessimistic pictures, but for very different reasons.This contrast is reflected in the issues that comemost conspicuously to the fore in each scenario. Forexample, water shortages are generally more of aproblem in Markets First, reflecting increasingresource demand, whereas urban pollution and loss ofbiodiversity are more marked in Security First,reflecting a lack of effective environmental policies.Policy First falls somewhere in between — some ofthe environmental targets are met, through a mainlytop-down approach, whereas it is unrealistic to makesignificant progress on others without a broadercommitment to change.

LESSON TWOThere can be significant delays betweenhuman actions, including policy decisions,and associated impacts on the environment,specifically:

● much of the environmental change thatwill occur over the next 30 years hasalready been set in motion by past andcurrent actions

● many of the effects of environmentallyrelevant policies put into place over thenext 30 years will not be apparent untillong afterwards.

Social and economic systems can be notoriously slowto change. The basic infrastructure of modern society,including transportation and energy systems, cannotbe refashioned rapidly without great expense.Financial and political systems, and basic behaviourpatterns also tend to exhibit overpowering inertia.Furthermore, even when social systems change,

resulting in reduced pressures on the environment,time lags in natural systems can delay the ultimateresponse to these changes. Therefore, it is importantto consider not only the state of the environment atthe end of the time horizon for these scenarios, butalso the trends.

This proviso is perhaps most clearly seen in thecase of climate change impacts, which differminimally between the scenarios in most regions overthe next 30 years. This is because much of theclimatic change expected to occur over the next 30years is the result of actions that have already beentaken. It is not surprising that the issues which standout as the most difficult to tackle — halting landdegradation, preserving biodiversity and ensuringaccess to freshwater — are all linked to climatechange among other factors. The intractable nature ofthese impacts is also related to the fact that they aredriven by fundamental human demands and are noteasily amenable to technical fixes.

LESSON THREEAchieving widely agreed environmental and social goals will require dramatic andcoordinated action starting now andcontinuing for a number of years. Steps must include policies based on preventionand adaptation.

The environmental implications of the variousscenarios illustrate the legacy of the past decades andthe level of effort that will be needed to reversepowerful trends. These challenges can only be metwith robust and coordinated action at all levels ofgovernment and among many different sectors ofsociety. The scenarios also demonstrate that it cantake many years for important social andenvironmental indicators to diverge from one another.Given the likelihood that large numbers of people willcontinue to be vulnerable to environmental change,even where the scenarios point to eventualachievement of environmental goals, adaptation policieswill be needed to complement mitigation policies.Among other reasons, these may be necessary to meetsocial goals, minimize the transient effects ofenvironmental change, prevent irreversible losses, andmaintain the enthusiasm for the necessary social andpolitical will to achieve the long-term goals.

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 9 5

LESSON FOURImportant linkages exist between differentenvironmental issues and betweenenvironmental and broader social issues. Itfollows that:

● policy can be made more effective bylooking for synergies or ‘co-benefits’

● care must be taken to avoid conflictsbetween policies.

The scenarios presented here demonstrate theimportance of interlinkages between theenvironmental, social, economic and political spheres,both within and across regions. The complex interplaybetween human and natural systems calls forapproaches that treat social, economic andenvironmental concerns in an integrated fashion.

Positive synergies between policies can bemaximized. For example, well-designed policies cansimultaneously address issues such as climatechange, transport, and urban and regional airpollution. Thus, ambitious climate policies couldserve as a cornerstone of modern, integrated

environmental programmes in many situations. In other cases, connections imply potential

conflicts. The large-scale introduction of modernbiofuels in certain regions as a substitute for fossilfuels, a feature of the Policy First scenario, could haveadverse implications for biodiversity and agriculture inthese areas. Similarly, the use of biotechnology andgenetic engineering to improve agricultural productivitycould, rather than reducing the demand for agriculturalland, lead to a dramatic expansion if organisms aregenetically modified to be able to thrive in areascurrently unsuitable for widespread crop production orgrazing. This outcome would have serious implicationsfor biodiversity and land management.

There is a need to be aware of both the smalland the large-scale effects of policies, particularlythose related to the introduction of newtechnologies. On a small scale, stimulating bettertechnology to deliver the same services with lessresource use is clearly a robust policy that makessense in almost any conceivable scenario. If scaledup, however, two possible drawbacks arise. First, theimproved efficiency may induce an increased level ofactivity (such as additional travelling in improvedmotor vehicles), which outweighs the gainsachieved by better technology (in this instancelower fuel consumption or lower pollutionemissions per kilometre travelled). Second, newtechnologies that increase dependence, either onother countries or on the technology itself, canincrease vulnerability of regions to disruptions in,or misuse of, these technologies.

LESSON FIVEThe establishment of strong institutions forenvironmental governance is a prerequisitefor almost all other policies.

A fundamental distinction between the four scenarioslies in the existence and effectiveness of stronginstitutions for environmental governance. Thescenarios represent largely different politicalattitudes, citizen values and degrees of acceptance of(or action against) inequality. The political will andvision of governments and other authoritiesdetermine, above all else, whether environmentallysustainable development comes within reachworldwide. Where strong institutions for

3 9 6 OUTLOOK 2002–32

For this Global Environment Outlook a scenario approach has been chosen thatdeliberately emphasizes the possibility of many different futures rather than theprobability of any single one. None of the four scenarios that has been presentedshould be viewed as more or less likely than the others, or as a reference scenariofrom which the others represent variants. Recent experience and reflections uponissues such as insufficient information (ignorance), the complexity of human andnatural systems (surprise), and the ability of humans to choose (volition), suggeststhat for longer range policy thinking it is not only disingenuous to presume we canknow the most likely future, but that it is also detrimental to good policy makingbecause it unnecessarily narrows our vision (Raskin and Kemp-Benedict 2002).

The process also revealed some of the challenges in such a scenario exercise.The choice to begin with global archetypes aided in the effort to create sets ofnested global and regional scenarios that were consistent with each other. At thesame time, this choice arguably limited the range of scenarios that might havearisen had the regional scenario teams been able to operate more independently.The efforts to combine narrative scenarios with quantitative information comingout of models and other analytical tools also drew attention to the need to useconsistent assumptions in the two approaches. The quantitative underpinningcertainly helped to stimulate the development of the narrative scenarios andprovided both consistency checks and powerful means of depicting the differencesbetween the four scenarios in the different regions. It remains apparent, though,that the existing quantitative tools are limited in their ability to capture therichness of narrative scenarios, particularly where these involve significantdepartures from the current situation.

Reflections on the use of scenarios

environmental governance are absent, as in SecurityFirst, or afforded a lower status than otherinstitutions, as in Markets First, improvements inenvironmental conditions are less likely to occur. Asthe range of concerns traverses the local to theglobal, so must these institutions. Furthermore, asall sectors of society are, in some way, bothresponsible for and impacted by the status of naturaland human systems, these institutions must reachacross these sectors. Thus, not only formalgovernments, but also business, NGOs and otherelements of civil society must play a role,individually and in partnership, in establishing andmaintaining these institutions.

LESSON SIXEnsuring timely access to accurateinformation is a robust policy, as it:

● allows for early warning of environmentalproblems

● can stimulate voluntary action bybusiness and industry

● can support formal and informal market-based mechanisms that promote goodenvironmental conduct.

Ensuring and stimulating timely access to informationis crucial not only for keeping abreast of the currentstate of environmental and social systems and trendsin both, but also for coordinating action to addressemerging or existing problems. Efforts are requiredto ensure that key public information remainsaccessible, and that more flows are established. Afundamental message, from Policy First andSustainability First in particular, is that informationcan both encourage voluntary action and increase theeffectiveness of other policies. The flow of accurateinformation can therefore actively support otherpolicies. Conversely, as Security First most notablyshows, when economic and political relations polarize,the control of information can be an importantinstrument of power.

LESSON SEVENNot all policy instruments are appropriate forall situations.

It is clear that there are particular policy instrumentsthat are more in accordance with different types ofworlds. For example, market-based instruments such ascapping and trading systems for curbing pollutants willfind a niche in a world that resembles Markets First,whereas ambitious zoning and other spatial planningmeasures would not go down so well. Similarly, eco-labelling will be suited to a world that resemblesSustainability First, but forcibly restricting access toprotected areas would be much less suitable. This sameargument implies that the most appropriate choice ofpolicy instruments can vary between different regionsor at different times. Careful selection of specific andappropriate policy instruments is clearly very important.

The final lesson from the scenarios presented inthis chapter may be one of perspective.

LESSON EIGHTThe achievement of environmental goals willrequire decisive action, will encounterunforeseen eventualities and will not happenovernight. Fortunately or unfortunately,much of the success or failure of thisendeavour is in our hands.

The four scenarios show that the future is notsomething that we should wait for passively. Rather,the choices we have made in the past, those we arecurrently making and those we will make in thefuture all strongly influence in which world we willlive. There will be many branch points whenstakeholders will have the opportunity to turn in onedirection or another, whether towards Markets Firstor towards Policy First, Security First, SustainabilityFirst or another, as yet unimagined, scenario. Beingaware of threats, opportunities and the possibleoutcomes of different choices is a prerequisite toeffective policy making.

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 9 7

3 9 8 OUTLOOK 2002–32

The quantitative results presented in this chapterwere developed to illustrate the narrativescenarios and to provide an indication of theirlikely environmental implications. These resultswere derived using a range of analytical tools, inconsultation with regional experts. Theyemphasize general trends and differencesbetween scenarios, rather than precise levels ofimpact. This technical annex outlines the scenariodevelopment process followed for GEO-3, andpresents summary descriptions of the analyticaltools employed, and the indicators presented inthe chapter. More extensive information, includingmore detailed data tables and figures, ispresented in Raskin and Kemp-Benedict (2002)and in a separate technical report (RIVM andUNEP, in press).

The scenario development process

Drawing from previous work of the GlobalScenario Group (see Raskin and Kemp-Benedict2002), four global storylines were designed by acore scenario team of global and regional experts.An initial quantification for a small set ofindicators was prepared at the level of the GEOsub-regions. Teams in each of the seven majorGEO regions then elaborated the storylines atregional level and provided input to thequantitative analyses, particularly with respect tokey driving forces. The results of the regionalefforts were used to refine the global narrativesand to undertake the subsequent quantitativeanalyses associated with the scenario narratives.Further refinement of both the narratives and thequantitative analyses was achieved through aniterative process involving the core scenario teamand the modelling groups. During thedevelopment process the work underwent twoformal rounds of review and was scrutinized at aspecial workshop with a group of scenario expertsfrom around the world.

Quantitative analytical tools

AIM (Asian Pacific Integrated Model) is anintegrated environment-economy model developedby the National Institute for Environmental Studies(NIES) and Kyoto University, Japan, to assessfuture scenarios of socio-economic developmentand environmental change in Asia and the Pacificas well as at global level. The set of AIM moduleswas developed primarily for assessing effects ofclimate change policies and climate changeimpacts, but it can also be applied to otherenvironmental fields such as air pollution, waterresources, land use change and ecosystemassessment. With externally derived socio-economic data as input, the model estimatesfuture environmental conditions of 42 countries inAsia and the Pacific. The ecosystem module usesa latitude-longitude grid with a spatial resolutionof 2.5 x 2.5 minutes to facilitate policy analyses.The model has been extensively reviewed andfrequently used by the IPCC. More informationabout AIM is available at http://www-cger.nies.go.jp/ipcc/aim/

GLOBIO (Global methodology for mapping humanimpacts on the biosphere) is a simple transparentglobal model developed under the GLOBIOproject, coordinated by the Norwegian Institutefor Nature Research (NINA), UNEP-GRID-Arendal, UNEP-WCMC and UNEP/DEWA. It isused to visualize, at a scale of 1 x 1 km, thecumulative impacts on biodiversity and ecosystemfunction of growth in human resource demandand associated infrastructure development. Themodel provides a statistical risk assessment ofprobability of human impacts using buffer zonesfrom infrastructure that vary with type of humanactivity and density of infrastructure, region,vegetation, climate and sensitivity of species andecosystems. Satellite imagery is used to deriveoverviews of cumulative impacts of ongoingdevelopment. Future scenario situations arederived from data on existing infrastructure,historic growth rates of infrastructure, availabilityof petroleum and mineral reserves, vegetationcover, population density, distance to coast andprojected development. More information onGLOBIO can be found at http://www.globio.infoand in UNEP 2001.

IMAGE 2.2 (Integrated Model to Assess the GlobalEnvironment) is a dynamic integrated assessmentmodel for global change developed by the NationalInstitute for Public Health and the Environment(RIVM), The Netherlands. IMAGE quantifies theconsequences of different future developments fora broad range of environmental issues. Drivingforces are modelled for 17 world regions, partlyvia the WorldScan general equilibrium model.Impacts are calculated over long time frames(typically 100 years), and with a high spatialresolution (0.5 x 0.5 degree latitude-longitudegrid). Long historical series are used to calibratethe model and place future developments inperspective. The model has been extensivelyreviewed and frequently used by the IPCC. Moreinformation about IMAGE is available athttp://www.rivm.nl/image/ and in Alcamoand others (1998) and IMAGE Team (2001aand 2001b).

PoleStar is a comprehensive and flexible softwaretool for sustainability studies developed by theStockholm Environment Institute (SEI), BostonCentre, USA. Rather than being a rigid model, thesoftware provides an adaptable accountingframework and modelling environment formounting economic, resource and environmentalinformation and for examining alternativedevelopment scenarios. PoleStar has been used ina number of international assessments, includingquantification of the scenarios of the GlobalScenario Group (GSG). Technical documentationon PoleStar and details of the GSG scenarios canbe found online at http://www.seib.org/polestarand http://www.gsg.org

WaterGAP 2.1 model (Water — GlobalAssessment and Prognosis) is the first global modelthat computes both water availability and wateruse on the river basin scale. WaterGAP, developedby the Center for Environmental Systems Research(CESR), University of Kassel, Germany, has twomain components, a Global Hydrology Model and aGlobal Water Use Model. The Global HydrologyModel simulates the characteristic macro-scalebehaviour of the terrestrial water cycle to estimatewater availability. The Global Water Use Modelconsists of three main sub-models that computewater use for the domestic, industry andagriculture sectors. All computations cover theentire land surface of the globe on a 0.5 x 0.5degree latitude-longitude grid. A global drainagedirection map then allows the analysis of the waterresources situation in all large drainage basinsworldwide. For a more detailed description of themodel see Alcamo and others (2000) and Centerfor Environmental Systems Research (2002).

Note: Any discrepancies between the GEO-3regions and sub-regions and the regionsrepresented in data sets used to generate chartsand other figures are noted with the individualgraphics.

Variables

Variables charted or mapped in the Outlooksection of GEO-3 are (in alphabetical order)as follows.

Area with high risk of water-induced soildegradation indicates the land area that is at highrisk from water erosion under a specific form ofland use. The sensitivity to water erosion iscomputed from the soil and terraincharacteristics, rainfall erosivity and land cover. Inglobal terms, water erosion is the most seriousform of land degradation and it is irreversible.Whether erosion actually occurs depends onimplementation of soil conservation measures atfarm and landscape levels.

Source: IMAGE 2.2; Hootsmans and others2001. For definition of erosion risk seeUNEP/ISRIC 1991

Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxidepresents the global CO2 concentration in theatmosphere as the net balance between CO2emissions from fossil fuel combustion, industrialproduction, deforestation and CO2 uptake by matureand regrowing vegetation, and by the oceans.

Source: AIM for Asia and the Pacific; IMAGE 2.2for other regions and global chart; De Vries andothers 2001

Carbon dioxide emissions covers emissions fromland use, industrial production and energy use.Emissions from industrial sources include theemissions from non-energy use of fossil fuels(mainly feedstocks) and industrial activities. Land-

Technical annex

OUTLOOK 2002–32 3 9 9

use sources of carbon dioxide include burningforest biomass (after deforestation) and fuelwood,and releases by waste processes after disposal ofconsumer goods such as paper, furniture andbuilding materials.

Source: AIM for Asia and the Pacific; IMAGE 2.2for other regions and global chart; De Vries andothers 2001

Change in average temperature, 2002–32. Giventhe uncertainties in the regional distribution oftemperature increase, this graph is based onresults from four different Global CirculationModels (GCMs) in combination with IMAGE 2.2.For each of the GCMs, the spatially differentiatedpattern of temperature change for a referencescenario (1 per cent per annum growth inequivalent greenhouse gas concentration from1990 onwards) was taken, north of 66°N andsouth of 66°S latitude. This pattern was thenscaled on the basis of global average temperaturechanges for each of the scenarios as calculated byIMAGE 2.2. Finally, the average temperaturechange for the Arctic and Antarctic wascalculated. The GCMs used are HadCM2,ECHAM4, CSIRO Mk2 and CGCM1. The GCMresults were taken from the IPCC Data DistributionCentre for Climate Change and Related Scenariosfor Impacts Assessment (IPCC-DCC 1999).

Source: four GCMs and IMAGE 2.2

Change in selected pressures on naturalecosystems 2002–32. For the ecosystem qualitycomponent, see the explanation of the NaturalCapital Index. Values for the cumulative pressureswere derived as described under Natural CapitalIndex. The maps show the relative increase ordecrease in pressure between 2002 and 2032.‘No change’ means less than 10 per cent changein pressure over the scenario period; smallincrease or decrease means between 10 and 50per cent change; substantial increase or decreasemeans 50 to 100 per cent change; strong increasemeans more than doubling of pressure. Areaswhich switch between natural and domesticatedland uses are recorded separately.

Source: IMAGE 2.2

Ecosystems impacted by infrastructure expansionreflects the probability of human impact onbiodiversity based on distances to different types ofinfrastructure, such as roads, dams and otherutilities. Impact zones vary according to climate,vegetation and political region.

Source: GLOBIO

Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions are totalCO2 emissions from all energy uses.

Source: AIM for Asia and the Pacific; IMAGE 2.2for other regions and global chart; De Vries andothers 2001

Energy-related nitrogen oxide emissions are totalNOx emissions from all energy uses.

Source: AIM for Asia and the Pacific; IMAGE 2.2

for other regions and global chart; De Vries andothers 2001

Energy-related sulphur dioxide emissions are totalSO2 emissions from all energy uses.

Source: AIM for Asia and the Pacific; IMAGE 2.2for other regions and global chart; De Vries andothers 2001

Extent of built-up areas includes land cleared and altered for businesses, residences, roads,parking lots, parks, landfills, burial grounds andother similar uses. A combination of differentsources was used to arrive at regional estimatesfor built-up land.

Source: Polestar

Global temperature change is the averageincrease of global temperature, expressed indegrees per ten years. The rate of temperaturechange is important since sensitive ecosystemsmay not be able to adapt at high rates. Researchhas shown that, at rates larger than 0.1 °C per tenyears, extensive damage to ecosystems is probable(Vellinga and Swart 1991).

Source: IMAGE 2.2

Land area impacted by infrastructure expansion.See note under Ecosystems impacted byinfrastructure expansion, above.

Source: GLOBIO

Municipal solid waste generation is an index ofsolid waste generation from household andcommercial sources. Total solid waste generationin the Asia and Pacific region in the year 1995has been allocated an index value of 1. Indexvalues for 2032 under each scenario relate to theindex for the base year.

Source: AIM

Natural Capital Index is a measure for terrestrialand aquatic biodiversity of natural ecosystems andagricultural land. The index is calculated as theproduct of habitat area times ecosystem quality,expressed as a percentage. The habitat area istaken as the percentage of remaining surface ofnatural ecosystems. Ecosystem quality isapproximated from four pressure factors that areconsidered to have a major influence onbiodiversity and for which global data areavailable. Based on literature, for each pressurefactor a range is defined from no effect tocomplete deterioration of habitats if the maximumvalue is exceeded over a long time. Pressurefactors are population density (min-max: 10–150persons per km2), primary energy use (min-max:0.5–100 peta Joules per km2), rate oftemperature change (min-max: 0.2–2.0 °C in a 20 year period) and restoration time for exhaustedagricultural land, livestock area and deforestedzones in re-conversion towards natural, low-impacted ecosystems (min-max: 100–0restoration time). The proxy for ecosystem qualityis a reversed function of these pressures,

calculated as a percentage of the low-impactedbaseline state. The higher the pressure, the lowerthe quality. Finally, the percentages for habitatarea and quality are multiplied, resulting in apressure-based Natural Capital Index. Thecalculations were carried out on a detailedlatitude-longitude grid, before aggregation to sub-regions and regions.

Source: IMAGE 2.2; ten Brink 2000 and 2001,ten Brink and others 2000

Natural forest, excluding regrowth is the area ofmature forests (excluding plantations) that has notbeen harvested using clear cutting since 1972.

Source: IMAGE 2.2

Potential increase in nitrogen loading on coastalecosystems. At the sub-regional aggregation levelemployed in GEO, nitrogen loading can be takenas a proxy for a wider range of land-basedpollution on the coastal ecosystems. The potentialgrowth of the subregional nitrogen load under eachof the scenarios has been estimated by rating thechange in determinants such as sewage inputsand level of treatment, fertilizer use and airborneemissions, on a ten-point scale.

Source: IMAGE 2.2; van Drecht and others(in press)

Percentage of 2002 cropland that is severelydegraded by 2032 represents cropland sodegraded that it is of little value for production.The degraded area is expressed as a percentage ofland that was under crops in 2002.

Source: Polestar

Population living in areas with severe waterstress. Water stress is measured by the‘withdrawal-to-availability’ ratio (wta-ratio). Thisratio captures how much of the average annualrenewable water resources of a river basin arewithdrawn for human purposes in the domestic,industry and agricultural sectors. In principle, thehigher the ratio, the more intensively the water ina river is used; this reduces either water quantityor water quality or even both for downstreamusers. Commonly it is assumed that when the wta-ratio in a river basin exceeds 0.4, or 40 per cent,the river basin experiences severe water stress.

Source: WaterGAP 2.1

Population living with hunger refers to theincidence of chronic under-nutrition in developingand transitional regions (using 1995 data based onFAO estimates), the incidence of food insecurity inthe United States and estimates for other countriesbased on income distribution. Hunger patterns aredetermined in the scenarios by changes in income,income distribution and population.

Source: PoleStar

4 0 0 OUTLOOK 2002–32

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