35
7/23/2019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 1/35 Speculaions: A Jounal of Speculaive Realism V (2014) 2327-803 htp://speculaions-journal.org 92 Sellars Contra Deleuze on Intuie Knowledge  Maija Jelača Universiy o Pula T - edge has hauned philosophy since he beginning o philosophical ime. 1  I appeared under various guises, and ook on many differen names. Bu is essence remained he same: i was always supposed o be some kind o immediae knowledge defined explicily in opposiion and as an alernaive o con- cepual knowledge. Depending on he general ramework in which i was invoked, i eiher proclaimed a higher  orm o knowledge capable o ataining he absolue (raionalism), or a more basic/fundamenal  kind o knowledge necessary o ground all knowledge claims (empiricism). 1  I am deeply indebed o Ray Brassier and Pee Wolendale wihou whom mos o his would no even have been inuied. Apar rom heir ideas, I am jus as graeul or heir coninual suppor, encouragemen, generosiy and paience. I would also like o hank he organisers o he  Aesheics in he s Cenur conerence or he opporuniy o presen my views in ron o such an eseemed audience, and all he paricipans or making i such a memorable even. This version o he paper benefied immensely rom he discussions ha ollowed my alk, especially he ones I had wih Seven Shaviro, Vijak Haddadi and Ridvan Askin. Finally, a special hanks is in order o Ridvan or being such an atenive reader and discerning inerlocuor. The final version o his ex is cerainly much beter or all his quesions, inervenions, and suggesions.

04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 135

Speculaions A Jounal of Speculaive Realism V (2014)983145983155983155983150 2327-803983160htpspeculaions-journalorg

92

Sellars Contra Deleuze

on Intuie Knowledge Maija Jelača

Universiy o Pula

T983144983141 983155983152983141983139983156983154983141 983151983142 983145983150983156983157983145983156983145983158983141 983147983150983151983159983148-edge has hauned philosophy sincehe beginning o philosophical

ime1 I appeared under various guises and ook on manydifferen names Bu is essence remained he same i was

always supposed o be some kind o immediae knowledgedefined explicily in opposiion and as an alernaive o con-cepual knowledge Depending on he general ramework inwhich i was invoked i eiher proclaimed a higher orm oknowledge capable o ataining he absolue (raionalism)or a more basicfundamenal kind o knowledge necessary oground all knowledge claims (empiricism)

1 I am deeply indebed o Ray Brassier and Pee Wolendale wihou whom

mos o his would no even have been inuied Apar rom heir ideas Iam jus as graeul or heir coninual suppor encouragemen generosiyand paience I would also like o hank he organisers o he Aesheics inhe 983090983089s Cenur conerence or he opporuniy o presen my views in rono such an eseemed audience and all he paricipans or making i sucha memorable even This version o he paper benefied immensely romhe discussions ha ollowed my alk especially he ones I had wih SevenShaviro Vijak Haddadi and Ridvan Askin Finally a special hanks is in ordero Ridvan or being such an atenive reader and discerning inerlocuorThe final version o his ex is cerainly much beter or all his quesionsinervenions and suggesions

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 235

Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

93

Kan was he firs o denounce he specral naure o inuiiveknowledge Bu alhough Kanrsquos criical injuncion agains ispossibiliy boh in is raionalis (ldquohoughs wihou conenare empyrdquo) and empiricis (ldquoinuiions wihou conceps are

blindrdquo) guises cerainly pu he specre on he deensive iwas by no means enough o vanquish i2 Kanrsquos atack wasollowed by numerous ohers bu always wih he exac sameresuls no sooner had one o is incarnaions been laid ores he specre would rise rom he dead almos insanlyeach ime in a slighly differen orm And o his very dayi coninues o haun us sill

Gilles Deleuze and Wilrid Sellars wo major represena-

ives o he coninenal and analyic philosophical radiionsrespecively are he bes esamens o he claim ha hespecre o inuiive knowledge is prety much alive and wellon boh sides o he philosophical divide While he ormerdeveloped his whole philosophical sysem around an incred-ibly rich and sophisicaed (and all he more insidious or i)accoun o inuiive knowledge he later devoed he greaespar o his philosophical advenure o sharpening he weap-ons necessary o haun his specre down and exorcise i in

whichever orm i akes Conroning he wo wih regards oheir opposing views on inuiive knowledge presens a per-ec opporuniy no jus or esing heir respecive claims oknowledge bu also and more imporanly or posing againhe quesion o he naure and jusificaion o knowledge aquesion almos compleely orgoten by recen rends inconinenal philosophy

Ray Brassier one o he very ew conemporary coninenalphilosophers unwilling o join in on his collecive orge-

ing o he quesion o knowledge expressed his perplexiiesabou one paricular varian o his rend

I am very wary o ldquoaesheicsrdquo he erm is conaminaed by noions o

ldquoexperiencerdquo ha I find deeply problemaic I have no philosophy o

2 Immanuel Kan Criique of Pure Reason rans Paul Guyer and Allen WWood (Cambridge Cambridge Universiy Press 1998) 193-94 A51B75

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

94

ar worh speaking o This is no o dismiss arrsquos relevance or philoso-

phymdashar rom imdashbu merely o express reservaions abou he kind o

philosophical aesheicism which seems o wan o hold up ldquoaesheic

experiencerdquo as a new sor o cogniive paradigm wherein he Modern

(pos-Caresian) ldquorifrdquo beween knowing and eeling would be overcome3

Alhough i has recenly been aken up again by cerain ac-ions o conemporary coninenal philosophy he endencyha Brassier describes here is nohing new In ac i has along and noble heriage daing back all he way o he earlyRomanics Deleuzersquos criique o discursive reason and hisappeal o inuiive knowledge on he one hand coupled wih

he srong alliance he has orged wih ar and aesheics onhe oher reveal him as a direc successor o he philosophicallegacy o early Romanicism Wha beter way o challengeDeleuzersquos Romanic atemp a overcoming he dualism oknowing and eeling han o conras i wih Sellarsrsquos raional-is upholding o is necessiy and irreducibiliy

This essay is divided ino hree pars The firs par atempso demonsrae ha Deleuze was in ac a firm believer inhe powers o inuiive knowledge To his end I will presen

Deleuzersquos accouns o hree imporan noions ha appearedhroughou his early work he ideas o mahesis universalisBergsonian inuiion as a mehod and he ranscenden ex-ercise o he aculies The second par o he essay is devoedo Sellars and atemps o show ha his amous myh o hegiven is nohing else han inuiive knowledge isel Threedifferen accouns o his myh are presened namely heones ound in ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo4

ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo5 and ldquoThe Carus Lecures o

3 Ray Brassier ldquoAgains an Aesheics o Noiserdquo Transizone nY htpny-webberansizoneagains-aesheics-noisehml (accessed July 15 2013)4 Wilrid Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo in Science Pe-cepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991)5 Wilrid Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo htpwwwdiexcomsellarsskhml (accessed January 22 2013) Published in Acion Knowledgeand Realit Sudies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars ed Hecor-Neri Casantildeeda(Indianapolis Bobbs-Merrill 1975) 295-347 originally presened as The

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

95

Wilrid Sellarsrdquo6 The hird and final par concludes he essay by saging a conronaion beween hese wo ormidableopponens

Deleuze Mahesis Univesalis Intutonranscendental Emprcsm

For Deleuze ldquohe world o represenaionrdquo is no a philoso-pherrsquos world7 I migh be a scienisrsquos world i cerainly is aechnicianrsquos poliicianrsquos journalisrsquos and bureaucrarsquos world bu he only engagemen wih i worhy o a philosopherrsquosime is learning how o escape i The main reasons or De-

leuzersquos philosophical disrus in his world are neiher newnor paricularly original and neiher is his plan o escapePossibly he cleares and mos sraighorward expressiono Deleuzersquos views on his accoun can be ound in his firspublished ex on Bergson

One says ha science gives us a knowledge o hings ha i is hereore

in a cerain relaion wih hem and philosophy can renounce is rivalry

wih science can leave hings o science and presen isel solely in a

criical manner as a reflecion on his knowledge o hings On heconrary view philosophy seeks o esablish or raher resorean ohe

relaionship o hings and hereore an ohe knowledge a knowledge

and a relaionship ha precisely science hides rom us o which i

deprives us because i allows us only o conclude and o iner wihou

ever presening giving o us he hing in isel8

To undersand his passage ully i is bes o supplemen i

Machete Foundaion Lecures or 1971 a he Universiy o Texas6 Wilrid Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Process The CarusLecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo Te Monis (1981) 641 3-907 Gilles Deleuze Difference and Repeiion rans Paul Paton (New YorkColumbia Universiy Press 1994) xix8 Gilles Deleuze ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquo in Dese Islands and Ohe Texs 983089983097983093983091-983089983097983095983092 ed David Lapoujade rans Michael Taormina (New York Semioex(e)2004) 23 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

96

wih anoher quoe rom one o Deleuzersquos earlies publishedwriings ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo

Scienific mehod is explanaion To explain is o accoun or a hing

hrough somehing oher han isel hellip A he oher exreme philo-

sophical mehod is descripion in he wides sense o he word i is

ha reflexive analysis whereby he sensible world is described as he

represenaion o he cognizing subjecmdashha is o say here once again

i receives is saus rom somehing oher han isel9

Deleuzersquos argumen is seducively simple science and phi-losophy (o represenaion) give us a knowledge o hings

only hrough somehing oher han he hing isel Thereorehey canno give us he knowledge o he hing isel An oherkind o knowledge is necessary in order o ge us a he hingisel Oher o represenaional or mediaed knowledge isimmediae knowledge Thereore only immediae knowledgecan give us knowledge o he hing isel This is he generalsrucure o Deleuzersquos argumen agains represenaional andin avour o inuiive knowledge Depending on he conexhe erms may vary bu is basic srucure remains he same

hroughou Deleuzersquos enire opusTo confirm his claim and dispel he possible objecion ha

he quoes above come rom Deleuzersquos early exs which dono necessarily express his own views i will suffice o akea closer look a one imporan and well known passage romDiffeence and Repeiion considered by many o be Deleuzersquossingle mos imporan philosophical work and also he firs

book in which Deleuze expressly speaks in his own name Byhe end o chaper one eniled ldquoDifference in Iselrdquo Deleuze

amously claims We have conrased represenaion wih a differen kind o ormaion

The elemenary conceps o represenaion are he caegories defined

9 Gilles Deleuze ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo rans Robin MackayCollapse (2007) 3 147 Deleuzersquos ex was originally published as an inroduc-ion o Jean Malati de Monereggiorsquos Eacuteudes sur la Mahegravese ou anarchie ehieacuteachie de la science (Paris Ediions Du Griffon DrsquoOr 1946)

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

97

as he condiions o possible experience These however are oo general

or oo large or he real The ne is so loose ha he larges fish pass

hrough hellip Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o

real experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which

differ in kind rom he caegories10

I does no ake much effor o noice he similariy wih heprevious argumen represenaion can give us knowledge ohe real only hrough he caegories Caegories are by defini-ion general while he real is singular Thereore represena-ion canno give us knowledge o he real An oher kind oknowledge is necessary Oher o general conceps are singular

conceps and only he later can give us knowledge o he realDeleuze hen has saged prety much he same argumenagains represenaion ha he has saged in avour o im-mediae knowledge rom his earlies wriings up o Diffeenceand Repeiion Le us briefly analyse he srucure o hisargumen I consiss o wo pars he firs criical par layshe basis or he second consrucive par Alhough i migh be ineresing o quesion he criical par o he argumeni will be bes o leave ha aside or now and ocus insead

on is consrucive par which is much more imporan ormy presen purpose

Deleuzersquos conclusion o he criical par o he argumenpresens he firs premise o he second consrucive par inorder o ge a he knowledge o he hing iselhe real anoher kind o knowledge is necessary This oher knowledgeis supposed o be immediae and o consis o he creaionand applicaion o some kind o singular conceps concepsappropriae o he hing iselhe real In order o learn more

abou his ohe knowledge i is necessary o reurn o he exsmenioned above

Alhough i was one o Deleuzersquos earlies published wri-ings laer explicily disowned by him along everyhing elsepublished beore 1953 ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquomigh very well be he mos revealing ex by Deleuze when

10 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 68

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

98

i comes o he quesion o wha his ohe knowledge is sup-posed o be The shor answer would be mahesis universalisBu hen wha is mahesis univesalis According o Deleuzehe opposiion o science and philosophy has opened upa undamenal dualism wihin knowledge he Caresiandualism beween res exensa and res cogians11 Mahesis uni-versalis (universal knowledge or universal science) nameshe desire o overcome his dualism and accomplish a ldquouniyo knowledgerdquo12 This uniy is ldquohe uniy o lie iselrdquo ldquoLieis he uniy o he soul as he idea o he body and o he body as he exension o he soulrdquo13 Accordingly ldquomahesisdeploys isel a he level o lie o living man i is fis and

foremos a hinking of incarnaion and of individualitrdquo14

Buhow does mahesis atain his knowledge o incarnaion andindividualiy As we have seen boh science and philosophyreduce he sensible objec o an objec o hough In ordero overcome his dualiy o he objec o hough and hesensible objec he mehod o mahesis mus reduce ldquohisobjec o hough back o he sensible quaniy o qualiyrdquo15 I achieves his hrough he deploymen o he symbol whichpresens precisely ldquoa sensible objec as he incarnaion o

an objec o houghrdquo his sensible objec being ldquohe veryincarnaion o knowledgerdquo16 And finally ldquohe symbol is heideniy he encoune o he sensible objec and he objec ohough The sensible objec is called symbol and he objeco hough losing all scienific significaion is a hieroglyphor a cipher In heir ideniy hey orm he conceprdquo17

Wihou geting ino all he deails ha a complee accouno his ex would require his shor and condensed exposiion

11 Deleuze ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo 14212 Ibid 14213 Ibid 14314 Ibid my emphasis15 Ibid 15016 Ibid17 Ibid 150ndash51

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

99

o only a ew o is aspecs is more han enough o clearly showha mahesis universalis indeed is Deleuzersquos oher knowledgeDefined as a knowledge o incarnaion and individualiymahesis univesalis responds perecly o our earlier descrip-ion o Deleuzersquos ohe knowledge as an immediae knowledgeo he hing isel Furhermore his ex provides a clue aso how his singular knowledge migh be possible by way oconceps ormed hrough he deploymen o symbols

In his various wriings on Bergson his oher knowledge figures under he name o inuiion In ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquoDeleuze explicily pis inuiion agains science conraryo science which ldquoallows us only o conclude and o iner

wihou ever presening giving o us he hing in iselrdquo iis ldquoin and hrough inuiion ha somehing is presened isgiven in person insead o being inerred rom somehingelse and concludedrdquo18 Bu in Deleuzersquos reading o Bergsoninuiion is no o be undersood in he ordinary sense o heword Tha is inuiion is ldquoneiher a eeling an inspiraionnor a disorderly sympahy bu a ully developed mehodone o he mos ully developed mehods in philosophyrdquo amehod capable o esablishing philosophy as an ldquoabsoluely

lsquoprecisersquo discipline as precise in is field as capable o beingprolonged and ransmited as science isel isrdquo19 A quesionimmediaely springs o mind one ha Deleuze cerainlyacknowledges ldquoHow is inuiionmdashwhich primarily denoesan immediae knowledge (connaissance)mdashcapable o orminga mehod once i is acceped ha he mehod esseniallyinvolves one or several mediaionsrdquo20 As an answer o hisquesion Deleuze firs saes ha alhough Bergson ofen doespresen inuiion ldquoas a simple acrdquo his simpliciy ldquodoes no

exclude a qualiaive and virual mulipliciyrdquo ollowing whichhe ormulaes ldquohree differen sors o acs ha deerminehe rulesrdquo o inuiion as a mehod ldquoThe firs concerns he

18 Deleuze ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquo 2319 Gilles Deleuze Begsonism rans Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam(New York Zone Books 1991) 13-14 original emphasis20 Ibid 13-14

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

100

saing and creaing o problems he second he discoveryo genuine differences in kind he hird he apprehensiono real imerdquo21 The mos ineresing aspec is addressed inhe second rule which presens inuiion as a mehod ha

ldquorediscovers he rue differences in kind or ariculaions ohe realrdquo22 The mos concise accoun o his crucial aspec oinuiion as a mehod is o be ound in Deleuzersquos ex ldquoBerg-sonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo

Inuiion suggess isel as a mehod o difference or division o divide

whaever is composie ino wo endencies This mehod is somehing

oher han a spaial analysis more han a descripion o experience

and less (so i seems) han a ranscendenal analysis I reaches hecondiions o he given bu hese condiions are endency-subjecs

which are hemselves given in a cerain way hey are lived Wha is

more hey are a once he pure and he lived he living and he lived

he absolue and he lived Wha is essenial here is ha his ground is

expeienced and we know how much Bergson insised on he empirical

characer o he eacutelan vial Thus i is no he condiions o all possible

experience ha mus be reached bu he condiions o real experience

Schelling had already proposed his aim and defined philosophy as

a superior empiricism his ormulaion also applies o BergsonismThese condiions can and mus be grasped in an inuiion precisely

because hey are he condiions o real experience because hey are

no broader han wha is condiioned because he concep hey orm is

idenical o is objec hellip Reason mus reach all he way o he individual

he genuine concep all he way o he hing and comprehension all

he way o ldquohisrdquo23

The firs hing o noe wih regard o his quoe is ha i un-

equivocally reveals ha despie being a mehod and hereoreinvolving various mediaions inuiion sill remains an es-

21 Deleuze Begsonism 13-1422 Ibid 2123 Gilles Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo in Dese Islands andOher Texs 983089983097983093983091-983089983097983095983092 ed David Lapoujade rans Michael Taormina (NewYork Semioex(e) 2004) 35-36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

101

senially immediae aculy Le us summarise as a mehod odifference and division ha is a mehod capable o dividinghe composies ino wo endencies inuiion is able o reachhe condiions o he given or real experience These condi-ions are variously named by Deleuze ldquoendency-subjecsrdquo

ldquopurerdquo ldquohe livingrdquo ldquohe absoluerdquo and ldquohe groundrdquo Deleuzersquosclaim ha hese condiions ldquocan and mus be grasped ininuiionrdquo simply reieraes his previous claims ha hesecondiions are ldquohemselves given in a cerain wayrdquo ldquolivedrdquo and

ldquoexperiencedrdquo Thereore proclaiming i o be a mehod in noway excludes he immediacy o inuiion As Deleuze pus ihimsel ldquoInuiion has become mehod or raher mehod has

been reconciled wih he immediaerdquo24

Secondly his quoeconfirms once more ha or Deleuze he aim o philosophyis he knowledge o he hing isel or he individual andha his knowledge is atainable by consrucing a singularor ldquouniquerdquo concep ldquoidenical o is objecrdquo25 Finally hequoe above reveals no only ha Deleuzersquos philosophicalprojec as explicaed in Diffeence and Repeiion is bes readas a coninuaion o Bergsonrsquos own projec bu also in whichrespecs Deleuze depars rom i To demonsrae boh hese

claims i is necessary o urn our atenion o Diffeence andRepeiion isel

Wih regard o he firs claim some o he mos imporanpassages in Difference and Repeiion are saed in viruallyhe exac same erms as hose ound in he quoe above Onewell-known passage in paricular sands ou in his respec

Empiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics an apodicic

discipline only when we apprehend direcly in he sensible ha which

can only be sensed he very being o he sensible difference poenialdifference and difference in inensiy as he reason behind qualiaive

diversiy I is in difference ha movemen is produced as an ldquoeffecrdquo

ha phenomena flash heir meaning like signs The inense world o

differences in which we find he reason behind qualiies and he being

o he sensible is precisely he objec o a superior empiricism This

24 Deleuze Begsonism 3225 Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo 36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

102

empiricism eaches us a srange ldquoreasonrdquo ha o he muliple chaos

and difference (nomadic disribuions crowned anarchies)26

I we add o his quoe he already cied claim rom he endingo he firs chaper o Diffeence and Repeiion ha philosophyshould search or he condiions o real experience and nomerely possible experience i becomes quie obvious haDeleuze makes in his own name virually he very same claimsas hose he atribues o Bergson in he passage quoed aboverom ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo Wha hen doesDeleuze reain rom Bergson Firs and oremos Deleuzeclearly has no relinquished Bergsonrsquos belie in he power o

inuiion o immediaely apprehend he condiions o realexperience ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal andaesheics an apodicic discipline only when we apprehenddirecly in he sensible ha which can only be sensedrdquo (myemphasis) Likewise Deleuze reains he idea ha inuiionis a mehod o difference ie ha which inuiion direclyapprehends is diffeence ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo or

ldquohe very being o he sensiblerdquo is ldquodifference poenial di-erence and difference in inensiyrdquo or simply ldquohe inense

world o differencesrdquo I is in his world o differences ha

we mus find he lived realiy o a sub-represenaive domain I i

is rue ha represenaion has ideniy as is elemen and similariy

as is uni o measure hen pure presence such as i appears in he

simulacrum has he lsquodisparaersquo as is uni o measuremdashin oher words

always a difference o difference as is immediae elemen27

Add o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o ldquohe immediaerdquo

wih he ldquosub-represenaiverdquo28 and here can be no moredoub or Deleuze ldquohe inense world o differencesrdquo or

ldquosub-represenaive domainrdquo is ldquoa pure presencerdquo ldquoa livedrealiyrdquo or simply ldquohe immediaerdquo

26 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 56-5727 Ibid 6928 Ibid 56

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

103

Le us now address he second quesion in which respecdoes Deleuze depar rom Bergson The passage rom

ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo quoed earlier is ogrea assisance here In a seemingly ofand remark ahe beginning o he passage Deleuze makes he ollowingclaim inuiion as a mehod is ldquomore han a descripion oexperience and less (so i seems) han a anscendenal analysisrdquo(my emphasis) I is my conenion ha Deleuzersquos accouno he ranscenden or superior exercise o he aculies aspresened in Diffeence and Repeiionrsquos cenral chaper ldquoTheImage o Thoughrdquo is precisely he anscendenal version oBergsonrsquos inuiion as a mehod ha Deleuze invokes in his

quoe In order o confirm his claim le me briefly oulinehe basic conours o Deleuzersquos accoun o he ranscendenexercise o he aculies

Deleuze amously saes ldquoSomehing in he world orces uso hink This somehing is an objec no o recogniion buo a undamenal encoune rdquo29 The firs characerisic o heobjec o his encouner is ldquoha i can only be sensedrdquo30 Fol-lowing his Deleuze variously reers o ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo as ldquohe signrdquo ldquohe being o he sensiblerdquo ldquoha by

which he given is givenrdquo and he ldquoseniendumrdquo31 Furhermorei is imporan o highligh ha his objec o he encouneris ldquoimpercepible (insensible) rom he poin o view o anempirical exercise o he senses in which sensibiliy graspsonly ha which could also be grasped by oher aculies andis relaed wihin he conex o a common sense o an objecwhich also mus be apprehended by oher aculiesrdquo32 Con-rary o is empirical exercise hus defined ldquosensibiliy inhe presence o ha which can only be sensed (and is a he

same ime impercepible) finds isel beore is own limi hesign and raises isel o he level o a ranscenden exercise

29 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 139 original emphasis30 Ibid 13931 Ibid 139-4032 Ibid 140

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Speculations V

104

o he lsquonhrsquo powerrdquo33 Once sensibiliy has been raised o isranscenden exercise by is encouner wih he seniendum i

ldquoorces memory o remember he memoandum ha which canonly be recalledrdquo34 hereby raising memory o a ranscendenexercise o is own Finally memory in is urn

orces hough o grasp ha which can only be hough he cogiandum

or noeeon he Essence no he inelligible or his is sill no more han

he mode in which we hink ha which migh be somehing oher han

hough bu he being o he inelligible as hough his were boh he

final power o hough and he unhinkable35

According o Deleuze wha is revealed by his ldquoranscendendisjoined or superior exercise o he aculiesrdquo is preciselyheir ldquoranscendenal ormrdquo36 For in order o avoid racinghe ranscendenal orm o he aculies rom heir empiricalexercise as Kan does Deleuze claims ha

each aculy mus be borne o he exreme poin o is dissoluion a

which i alls prey o riple violence he violence o ha which orces

i o be exercised o ha which i is orced o grasp and which i alone

is able o grasp ye also ha o he ungraspable (rom he poin o viewo is empirical exercise)37

I is a his poin ha each aculy ldquodiscovers is own uniquepassionrdquo38 or is ranscendenal orm

As I have emphasised hough always begins wih anencouner wih he seniendum Bu wha is his paradoxi-cal elemen ha can only be sensed ye is impercepible ahe same ime This elemen which orces sensibiliy o is

ranscenden exercise is33 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14034 Ibid 14135 Ibid36 Ibid 14337 Ibid38 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

105

inensiy undersood as pure difference in isel as ha which is a once

boh impercepible or empirical sensibiliy which grasps inensiy only

already covered or mediaed by he qualiy o which i gives rise and

a he same ime ha which can be perceived only rom he poin o

view o a ranscendenal sensibiliy which apprehends i immediaely

in he encouner39

Thus or Deleuze hough always begins wih an immediaeapprehension o difference in isel Deleuze could hardly

be any more explici abou his belie in he idea o inuiiveknowledge The noion o he ranscenden exercise o heaculies represens nohing less han Deleuzersquos atemp o

give a properly ranscendenal accoun o his age-old philo-sophical idealOne las remark is in order I migh be objeced ha I am

equivocaing by eliding he disincion beween houghand knowledge As he objecion migh go no only doesDeleuze ake over he Kanian disincion beween houghand knowledge bu he is also expressly criical o he noiono ldquoknowledgerdquo hroughou he book This is o course rueBu i is also quie obvious ha ldquohoughrdquo in Difference and

Repeiion has almos he exac same uncion as ldquomahesisuniversalisrdquo and ldquoan oher knowledgerdquo have in his earlierexs I he accoun given above o he ranscenden exerciseo he aculies were no enough by isel his claim could beurher reinorced by highlighing he ac ha on variousoccasions hroughou he book Deleuze explicily invokes boh ldquoan esoeric knowledgerdquo40 and ldquomahesis universalisrdquo41 isel To esablish even sronger ies beween Deleuzersquos earlierexs and Diffeence and Repeiion in his regard le me quoe

rom he preace o he book

Empiricism is by no means a reacion agains conceps nor a simple

appeal o lived experience On he conrary i underakes he mos

39 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14440 Ibid 15 24241 Ibid 181 190 199

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Speculations V

106

insane creaion o conceps ever seen or heard Empiricism is a mysi-

cism and a mahemaicism o conceps bu precisely one which reas

he concep as objec o an encouner as a here-and-now or raher as

an Erewhon rom which emerge inexhausibly ever new differenly

disribued ldquoheresrdquo and ldquonowsrdquo42

Similar o his earlier work Deleuze here explicily invokeshe creaion o conceps idenical o heir objecs as he goalo philosophy Furhermore his idenificaion o empiricismwih ldquoa mysicism and a mahemaicism o concepsrdquo urherencourages he conclusion ha ldquoranscendenal empiricismrdquoisel is or Deleuze jus anoher name or mahesis univesalis

or inuiion as a mehod

Sellars Te Myth of Te Gven

Around he same ime as Gilles Deleuze was invoking hemyhical powers o mahesis univesalis Bergsonian inuiionand ranscendenal empiricism Wilrid Sellars was waginghis lielong batle agains ldquohe myh o he givenrdquo on he oherside o he Alanic By no means was Sellars he firs nor

will he be he las philosopher o ace his myhical creaurein an open field o batle Bu he may very well be is mosenacious opponen o dae Wha made Sellarsrsquos atack on hemyh o he given so powerul was his recogniion o is highlyproean naure As he amously saes a he very beginningo ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo

Many hings have been said o be ldquogivenrdquo sense conens maerial

objecs universals proposiions real connecions firs principles

even givenness isel And here is indeed a cerain way o consruinghe siuaions which philosophers analyze in hese erms which can

be said o be he ramework o givenness This ramework has been a

common eaure o mos o he major sysems o philosophy includ-

ing o use a Kanian urn o phrase boh ldquodogmaic raionalismrdquo and

ldquoskepical empiricismrdquo I has indeed been so pervasive ha ew i any

42 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion xx

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 2: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

93

Kan was he firs o denounce he specral naure o inuiiveknowledge Bu alhough Kanrsquos criical injuncion agains ispossibiliy boh in is raionalis (ldquohoughs wihou conenare empyrdquo) and empiricis (ldquoinuiions wihou conceps are

blindrdquo) guises cerainly pu he specre on he deensive iwas by no means enough o vanquish i2 Kanrsquos atack wasollowed by numerous ohers bu always wih he exac sameresuls no sooner had one o is incarnaions been laid ores he specre would rise rom he dead almos insanlyeach ime in a slighly differen orm And o his very dayi coninues o haun us sill

Gilles Deleuze and Wilrid Sellars wo major represena-

ives o he coninenal and analyic philosophical radiionsrespecively are he bes esamens o he claim ha hespecre o inuiive knowledge is prety much alive and wellon boh sides o he philosophical divide While he ormerdeveloped his whole philosophical sysem around an incred-ibly rich and sophisicaed (and all he more insidious or i)accoun o inuiive knowledge he later devoed he greaespar o his philosophical advenure o sharpening he weap-ons necessary o haun his specre down and exorcise i in

whichever orm i akes Conroning he wo wih regards oheir opposing views on inuiive knowledge presens a per-ec opporuniy no jus or esing heir respecive claims oknowledge bu also and more imporanly or posing againhe quesion o he naure and jusificaion o knowledge aquesion almos compleely orgoten by recen rends inconinenal philosophy

Ray Brassier one o he very ew conemporary coninenalphilosophers unwilling o join in on his collecive orge-

ing o he quesion o knowledge expressed his perplexiiesabou one paricular varian o his rend

I am very wary o ldquoaesheicsrdquo he erm is conaminaed by noions o

ldquoexperiencerdquo ha I find deeply problemaic I have no philosophy o

2 Immanuel Kan Criique of Pure Reason rans Paul Guyer and Allen WWood (Cambridge Cambridge Universiy Press 1998) 193-94 A51B75

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

94

ar worh speaking o This is no o dismiss arrsquos relevance or philoso-

phymdashar rom imdashbu merely o express reservaions abou he kind o

philosophical aesheicism which seems o wan o hold up ldquoaesheic

experiencerdquo as a new sor o cogniive paradigm wherein he Modern

(pos-Caresian) ldquorifrdquo beween knowing and eeling would be overcome3

Alhough i has recenly been aken up again by cerain ac-ions o conemporary coninenal philosophy he endencyha Brassier describes here is nohing new In ac i has along and noble heriage daing back all he way o he earlyRomanics Deleuzersquos criique o discursive reason and hisappeal o inuiive knowledge on he one hand coupled wih

he srong alliance he has orged wih ar and aesheics onhe oher reveal him as a direc successor o he philosophicallegacy o early Romanicism Wha beter way o challengeDeleuzersquos Romanic atemp a overcoming he dualism oknowing and eeling han o conras i wih Sellarsrsquos raional-is upholding o is necessiy and irreducibiliy

This essay is divided ino hree pars The firs par atempso demonsrae ha Deleuze was in ac a firm believer inhe powers o inuiive knowledge To his end I will presen

Deleuzersquos accouns o hree imporan noions ha appearedhroughou his early work he ideas o mahesis universalisBergsonian inuiion as a mehod and he ranscenden ex-ercise o he aculies The second par o he essay is devoedo Sellars and atemps o show ha his amous myh o hegiven is nohing else han inuiive knowledge isel Threedifferen accouns o his myh are presened namely heones ound in ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo4

ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo5 and ldquoThe Carus Lecures o

3 Ray Brassier ldquoAgains an Aesheics o Noiserdquo Transizone nY htpny-webberansizoneagains-aesheics-noisehml (accessed July 15 2013)4 Wilrid Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo in Science Pe-cepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991)5 Wilrid Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo htpwwwdiexcomsellarsskhml (accessed January 22 2013) Published in Acion Knowledgeand Realit Sudies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars ed Hecor-Neri Casantildeeda(Indianapolis Bobbs-Merrill 1975) 295-347 originally presened as The

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

95

Wilrid Sellarsrdquo6 The hird and final par concludes he essay by saging a conronaion beween hese wo ormidableopponens

Deleuze Mahesis Univesalis Intutonranscendental Emprcsm

For Deleuze ldquohe world o represenaionrdquo is no a philoso-pherrsquos world7 I migh be a scienisrsquos world i cerainly is aechnicianrsquos poliicianrsquos journalisrsquos and bureaucrarsquos world bu he only engagemen wih i worhy o a philosopherrsquosime is learning how o escape i The main reasons or De-

leuzersquos philosophical disrus in his world are neiher newnor paricularly original and neiher is his plan o escapePossibly he cleares and mos sraighorward expressiono Deleuzersquos views on his accoun can be ound in his firspublished ex on Bergson

One says ha science gives us a knowledge o hings ha i is hereore

in a cerain relaion wih hem and philosophy can renounce is rivalry

wih science can leave hings o science and presen isel solely in a

criical manner as a reflecion on his knowledge o hings On heconrary view philosophy seeks o esablish or raher resorean ohe

relaionship o hings and hereore an ohe knowledge a knowledge

and a relaionship ha precisely science hides rom us o which i

deprives us because i allows us only o conclude and o iner wihou

ever presening giving o us he hing in isel8

To undersand his passage ully i is bes o supplemen i

Machete Foundaion Lecures or 1971 a he Universiy o Texas6 Wilrid Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Process The CarusLecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo Te Monis (1981) 641 3-907 Gilles Deleuze Difference and Repeiion rans Paul Paton (New YorkColumbia Universiy Press 1994) xix8 Gilles Deleuze ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquo in Dese Islands and Ohe Texs 983089983097983093983091-983089983097983095983092 ed David Lapoujade rans Michael Taormina (New York Semioex(e)2004) 23 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

96

wih anoher quoe rom one o Deleuzersquos earlies publishedwriings ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo

Scienific mehod is explanaion To explain is o accoun or a hing

hrough somehing oher han isel hellip A he oher exreme philo-

sophical mehod is descripion in he wides sense o he word i is

ha reflexive analysis whereby he sensible world is described as he

represenaion o he cognizing subjecmdashha is o say here once again

i receives is saus rom somehing oher han isel9

Deleuzersquos argumen is seducively simple science and phi-losophy (o represenaion) give us a knowledge o hings

only hrough somehing oher han he hing isel Thereorehey canno give us he knowledge o he hing isel An oherkind o knowledge is necessary in order o ge us a he hingisel Oher o represenaional or mediaed knowledge isimmediae knowledge Thereore only immediae knowledgecan give us knowledge o he hing isel This is he generalsrucure o Deleuzersquos argumen agains represenaional andin avour o inuiive knowledge Depending on he conexhe erms may vary bu is basic srucure remains he same

hroughou Deleuzersquos enire opusTo confirm his claim and dispel he possible objecion ha

he quoes above come rom Deleuzersquos early exs which dono necessarily express his own views i will suffice o akea closer look a one imporan and well known passage romDiffeence and Repeiion considered by many o be Deleuzersquossingle mos imporan philosophical work and also he firs

book in which Deleuze expressly speaks in his own name Byhe end o chaper one eniled ldquoDifference in Iselrdquo Deleuze

amously claims We have conrased represenaion wih a differen kind o ormaion

The elemenary conceps o represenaion are he caegories defined

9 Gilles Deleuze ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo rans Robin MackayCollapse (2007) 3 147 Deleuzersquos ex was originally published as an inroduc-ion o Jean Malati de Monereggiorsquos Eacuteudes sur la Mahegravese ou anarchie ehieacuteachie de la science (Paris Ediions Du Griffon DrsquoOr 1946)

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

97

as he condiions o possible experience These however are oo general

or oo large or he real The ne is so loose ha he larges fish pass

hrough hellip Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o

real experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which

differ in kind rom he caegories10

I does no ake much effor o noice he similariy wih heprevious argumen represenaion can give us knowledge ohe real only hrough he caegories Caegories are by defini-ion general while he real is singular Thereore represena-ion canno give us knowledge o he real An oher kind oknowledge is necessary Oher o general conceps are singular

conceps and only he later can give us knowledge o he realDeleuze hen has saged prety much he same argumenagains represenaion ha he has saged in avour o im-mediae knowledge rom his earlies wriings up o Diffeenceand Repeiion Le us briefly analyse he srucure o hisargumen I consiss o wo pars he firs criical par layshe basis or he second consrucive par Alhough i migh be ineresing o quesion he criical par o he argumeni will be bes o leave ha aside or now and ocus insead

on is consrucive par which is much more imporan ormy presen purpose

Deleuzersquos conclusion o he criical par o he argumenpresens he firs premise o he second consrucive par inorder o ge a he knowledge o he hing iselhe real anoher kind o knowledge is necessary This oher knowledgeis supposed o be immediae and o consis o he creaionand applicaion o some kind o singular conceps concepsappropriae o he hing iselhe real In order o learn more

abou his ohe knowledge i is necessary o reurn o he exsmenioned above

Alhough i was one o Deleuzersquos earlies published wri-ings laer explicily disowned by him along everyhing elsepublished beore 1953 ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquomigh very well be he mos revealing ex by Deleuze when

10 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 68

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

98

i comes o he quesion o wha his ohe knowledge is sup-posed o be The shor answer would be mahesis universalisBu hen wha is mahesis univesalis According o Deleuzehe opposiion o science and philosophy has opened upa undamenal dualism wihin knowledge he Caresiandualism beween res exensa and res cogians11 Mahesis uni-versalis (universal knowledge or universal science) nameshe desire o overcome his dualism and accomplish a ldquouniyo knowledgerdquo12 This uniy is ldquohe uniy o lie iselrdquo ldquoLieis he uniy o he soul as he idea o he body and o he body as he exension o he soulrdquo13 Accordingly ldquomahesisdeploys isel a he level o lie o living man i is fis and

foremos a hinking of incarnaion and of individualitrdquo14

Buhow does mahesis atain his knowledge o incarnaion andindividualiy As we have seen boh science and philosophyreduce he sensible objec o an objec o hough In ordero overcome his dualiy o he objec o hough and hesensible objec he mehod o mahesis mus reduce ldquohisobjec o hough back o he sensible quaniy o qualiyrdquo15 I achieves his hrough he deploymen o he symbol whichpresens precisely ldquoa sensible objec as he incarnaion o

an objec o houghrdquo his sensible objec being ldquohe veryincarnaion o knowledgerdquo16 And finally ldquohe symbol is heideniy he encoune o he sensible objec and he objec ohough The sensible objec is called symbol and he objeco hough losing all scienific significaion is a hieroglyphor a cipher In heir ideniy hey orm he conceprdquo17

Wihou geting ino all he deails ha a complee accouno his ex would require his shor and condensed exposiion

11 Deleuze ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo 14212 Ibid 14213 Ibid 14314 Ibid my emphasis15 Ibid 15016 Ibid17 Ibid 150ndash51

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

99

o only a ew o is aspecs is more han enough o clearly showha mahesis universalis indeed is Deleuzersquos oher knowledgeDefined as a knowledge o incarnaion and individualiymahesis univesalis responds perecly o our earlier descrip-ion o Deleuzersquos ohe knowledge as an immediae knowledgeo he hing isel Furhermore his ex provides a clue aso how his singular knowledge migh be possible by way oconceps ormed hrough he deploymen o symbols

In his various wriings on Bergson his oher knowledge figures under he name o inuiion In ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquoDeleuze explicily pis inuiion agains science conraryo science which ldquoallows us only o conclude and o iner

wihou ever presening giving o us he hing in iselrdquo iis ldquoin and hrough inuiion ha somehing is presened isgiven in person insead o being inerred rom somehingelse and concludedrdquo18 Bu in Deleuzersquos reading o Bergsoninuiion is no o be undersood in he ordinary sense o heword Tha is inuiion is ldquoneiher a eeling an inspiraionnor a disorderly sympahy bu a ully developed mehodone o he mos ully developed mehods in philosophyrdquo amehod capable o esablishing philosophy as an ldquoabsoluely

lsquoprecisersquo discipline as precise in is field as capable o beingprolonged and ransmited as science isel isrdquo19 A quesionimmediaely springs o mind one ha Deleuze cerainlyacknowledges ldquoHow is inuiionmdashwhich primarily denoesan immediae knowledge (connaissance)mdashcapable o orminga mehod once i is acceped ha he mehod esseniallyinvolves one or several mediaionsrdquo20 As an answer o hisquesion Deleuze firs saes ha alhough Bergson ofen doespresen inuiion ldquoas a simple acrdquo his simpliciy ldquodoes no

exclude a qualiaive and virual mulipliciyrdquo ollowing whichhe ormulaes ldquohree differen sors o acs ha deerminehe rulesrdquo o inuiion as a mehod ldquoThe firs concerns he

18 Deleuze ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquo 2319 Gilles Deleuze Begsonism rans Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam(New York Zone Books 1991) 13-14 original emphasis20 Ibid 13-14

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

100

saing and creaing o problems he second he discoveryo genuine differences in kind he hird he apprehensiono real imerdquo21 The mos ineresing aspec is addressed inhe second rule which presens inuiion as a mehod ha

ldquorediscovers he rue differences in kind or ariculaions ohe realrdquo22 The mos concise accoun o his crucial aspec oinuiion as a mehod is o be ound in Deleuzersquos ex ldquoBerg-sonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo

Inuiion suggess isel as a mehod o difference or division o divide

whaever is composie ino wo endencies This mehod is somehing

oher han a spaial analysis more han a descripion o experience

and less (so i seems) han a ranscendenal analysis I reaches hecondiions o he given bu hese condiions are endency-subjecs

which are hemselves given in a cerain way hey are lived Wha is

more hey are a once he pure and he lived he living and he lived

he absolue and he lived Wha is essenial here is ha his ground is

expeienced and we know how much Bergson insised on he empirical

characer o he eacutelan vial Thus i is no he condiions o all possible

experience ha mus be reached bu he condiions o real experience

Schelling had already proposed his aim and defined philosophy as

a superior empiricism his ormulaion also applies o BergsonismThese condiions can and mus be grasped in an inuiion precisely

because hey are he condiions o real experience because hey are

no broader han wha is condiioned because he concep hey orm is

idenical o is objec hellip Reason mus reach all he way o he individual

he genuine concep all he way o he hing and comprehension all

he way o ldquohisrdquo23

The firs hing o noe wih regard o his quoe is ha i un-

equivocally reveals ha despie being a mehod and hereoreinvolving various mediaions inuiion sill remains an es-

21 Deleuze Begsonism 13-1422 Ibid 2123 Gilles Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo in Dese Islands andOher Texs 983089983097983093983091-983089983097983095983092 ed David Lapoujade rans Michael Taormina (NewYork Semioex(e) 2004) 35-36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

101

senially immediae aculy Le us summarise as a mehod odifference and division ha is a mehod capable o dividinghe composies ino wo endencies inuiion is able o reachhe condiions o he given or real experience These condi-ions are variously named by Deleuze ldquoendency-subjecsrdquo

ldquopurerdquo ldquohe livingrdquo ldquohe absoluerdquo and ldquohe groundrdquo Deleuzersquosclaim ha hese condiions ldquocan and mus be grasped ininuiionrdquo simply reieraes his previous claims ha hesecondiions are ldquohemselves given in a cerain wayrdquo ldquolivedrdquo and

ldquoexperiencedrdquo Thereore proclaiming i o be a mehod in noway excludes he immediacy o inuiion As Deleuze pus ihimsel ldquoInuiion has become mehod or raher mehod has

been reconciled wih he immediaerdquo24

Secondly his quoeconfirms once more ha or Deleuze he aim o philosophyis he knowledge o he hing isel or he individual andha his knowledge is atainable by consrucing a singularor ldquouniquerdquo concep ldquoidenical o is objecrdquo25 Finally hequoe above reveals no only ha Deleuzersquos philosophicalprojec as explicaed in Diffeence and Repeiion is bes readas a coninuaion o Bergsonrsquos own projec bu also in whichrespecs Deleuze depars rom i To demonsrae boh hese

claims i is necessary o urn our atenion o Diffeence andRepeiion isel

Wih regard o he firs claim some o he mos imporanpassages in Difference and Repeiion are saed in viruallyhe exac same erms as hose ound in he quoe above Onewell-known passage in paricular sands ou in his respec

Empiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics an apodicic

discipline only when we apprehend direcly in he sensible ha which

can only be sensed he very being o he sensible difference poenialdifference and difference in inensiy as he reason behind qualiaive

diversiy I is in difference ha movemen is produced as an ldquoeffecrdquo

ha phenomena flash heir meaning like signs The inense world o

differences in which we find he reason behind qualiies and he being

o he sensible is precisely he objec o a superior empiricism This

24 Deleuze Begsonism 3225 Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo 36

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Speculations V

102

empiricism eaches us a srange ldquoreasonrdquo ha o he muliple chaos

and difference (nomadic disribuions crowned anarchies)26

I we add o his quoe he already cied claim rom he endingo he firs chaper o Diffeence and Repeiion ha philosophyshould search or he condiions o real experience and nomerely possible experience i becomes quie obvious haDeleuze makes in his own name virually he very same claimsas hose he atribues o Bergson in he passage quoed aboverom ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo Wha hen doesDeleuze reain rom Bergson Firs and oremos Deleuzeclearly has no relinquished Bergsonrsquos belie in he power o

inuiion o immediaely apprehend he condiions o realexperience ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal andaesheics an apodicic discipline only when we apprehenddirecly in he sensible ha which can only be sensedrdquo (myemphasis) Likewise Deleuze reains he idea ha inuiionis a mehod o difference ie ha which inuiion direclyapprehends is diffeence ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo or

ldquohe very being o he sensiblerdquo is ldquodifference poenial di-erence and difference in inensiyrdquo or simply ldquohe inense

world o differencesrdquo I is in his world o differences ha

we mus find he lived realiy o a sub-represenaive domain I i

is rue ha represenaion has ideniy as is elemen and similariy

as is uni o measure hen pure presence such as i appears in he

simulacrum has he lsquodisparaersquo as is uni o measuremdashin oher words

always a difference o difference as is immediae elemen27

Add o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o ldquohe immediaerdquo

wih he ldquosub-represenaiverdquo28 and here can be no moredoub or Deleuze ldquohe inense world o differencesrdquo or

ldquosub-represenaive domainrdquo is ldquoa pure presencerdquo ldquoa livedrealiyrdquo or simply ldquohe immediaerdquo

26 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 56-5727 Ibid 6928 Ibid 56

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

103

Le us now address he second quesion in which respecdoes Deleuze depar rom Bergson The passage rom

ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo quoed earlier is ogrea assisance here In a seemingly ofand remark ahe beginning o he passage Deleuze makes he ollowingclaim inuiion as a mehod is ldquomore han a descripion oexperience and less (so i seems) han a anscendenal analysisrdquo(my emphasis) I is my conenion ha Deleuzersquos accouno he ranscenden or superior exercise o he aculies aspresened in Diffeence and Repeiionrsquos cenral chaper ldquoTheImage o Thoughrdquo is precisely he anscendenal version oBergsonrsquos inuiion as a mehod ha Deleuze invokes in his

quoe In order o confirm his claim le me briefly oulinehe basic conours o Deleuzersquos accoun o he ranscendenexercise o he aculies

Deleuze amously saes ldquoSomehing in he world orces uso hink This somehing is an objec no o recogniion buo a undamenal encoune rdquo29 The firs characerisic o heobjec o his encouner is ldquoha i can only be sensedrdquo30 Fol-lowing his Deleuze variously reers o ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo as ldquohe signrdquo ldquohe being o he sensiblerdquo ldquoha by

which he given is givenrdquo and he ldquoseniendumrdquo31 Furhermorei is imporan o highligh ha his objec o he encouneris ldquoimpercepible (insensible) rom he poin o view o anempirical exercise o he senses in which sensibiliy graspsonly ha which could also be grasped by oher aculies andis relaed wihin he conex o a common sense o an objecwhich also mus be apprehended by oher aculiesrdquo32 Con-rary o is empirical exercise hus defined ldquosensibiliy inhe presence o ha which can only be sensed (and is a he

same ime impercepible) finds isel beore is own limi hesign and raises isel o he level o a ranscenden exercise

29 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 139 original emphasis30 Ibid 13931 Ibid 139-4032 Ibid 140

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

104

o he lsquonhrsquo powerrdquo33 Once sensibiliy has been raised o isranscenden exercise by is encouner wih he seniendum i

ldquoorces memory o remember he memoandum ha which canonly be recalledrdquo34 hereby raising memory o a ranscendenexercise o is own Finally memory in is urn

orces hough o grasp ha which can only be hough he cogiandum

or noeeon he Essence no he inelligible or his is sill no more han

he mode in which we hink ha which migh be somehing oher han

hough bu he being o he inelligible as hough his were boh he

final power o hough and he unhinkable35

According o Deleuze wha is revealed by his ldquoranscendendisjoined or superior exercise o he aculiesrdquo is preciselyheir ldquoranscendenal ormrdquo36 For in order o avoid racinghe ranscendenal orm o he aculies rom heir empiricalexercise as Kan does Deleuze claims ha

each aculy mus be borne o he exreme poin o is dissoluion a

which i alls prey o riple violence he violence o ha which orces

i o be exercised o ha which i is orced o grasp and which i alone

is able o grasp ye also ha o he ungraspable (rom he poin o viewo is empirical exercise)37

I is a his poin ha each aculy ldquodiscovers is own uniquepassionrdquo38 or is ranscendenal orm

As I have emphasised hough always begins wih anencouner wih he seniendum Bu wha is his paradoxi-cal elemen ha can only be sensed ye is impercepible ahe same ime This elemen which orces sensibiliy o is

ranscenden exercise is33 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14034 Ibid 14135 Ibid36 Ibid 14337 Ibid38 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

105

inensiy undersood as pure difference in isel as ha which is a once

boh impercepible or empirical sensibiliy which grasps inensiy only

already covered or mediaed by he qualiy o which i gives rise and

a he same ime ha which can be perceived only rom he poin o

view o a ranscendenal sensibiliy which apprehends i immediaely

in he encouner39

Thus or Deleuze hough always begins wih an immediaeapprehension o difference in isel Deleuze could hardly

be any more explici abou his belie in he idea o inuiiveknowledge The noion o he ranscenden exercise o heaculies represens nohing less han Deleuzersquos atemp o

give a properly ranscendenal accoun o his age-old philo-sophical idealOne las remark is in order I migh be objeced ha I am

equivocaing by eliding he disincion beween houghand knowledge As he objecion migh go no only doesDeleuze ake over he Kanian disincion beween houghand knowledge bu he is also expressly criical o he noiono ldquoknowledgerdquo hroughou he book This is o course rueBu i is also quie obvious ha ldquohoughrdquo in Difference and

Repeiion has almos he exac same uncion as ldquomahesisuniversalisrdquo and ldquoan oher knowledgerdquo have in his earlierexs I he accoun given above o he ranscenden exerciseo he aculies were no enough by isel his claim could beurher reinorced by highlighing he ac ha on variousoccasions hroughou he book Deleuze explicily invokes boh ldquoan esoeric knowledgerdquo40 and ldquomahesis universalisrdquo41 isel To esablish even sronger ies beween Deleuzersquos earlierexs and Diffeence and Repeiion in his regard le me quoe

rom he preace o he book

Empiricism is by no means a reacion agains conceps nor a simple

appeal o lived experience On he conrary i underakes he mos

39 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14440 Ibid 15 24241 Ibid 181 190 199

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

106

insane creaion o conceps ever seen or heard Empiricism is a mysi-

cism and a mahemaicism o conceps bu precisely one which reas

he concep as objec o an encouner as a here-and-now or raher as

an Erewhon rom which emerge inexhausibly ever new differenly

disribued ldquoheresrdquo and ldquonowsrdquo42

Similar o his earlier work Deleuze here explicily invokeshe creaion o conceps idenical o heir objecs as he goalo philosophy Furhermore his idenificaion o empiricismwih ldquoa mysicism and a mahemaicism o concepsrdquo urherencourages he conclusion ha ldquoranscendenal empiricismrdquoisel is or Deleuze jus anoher name or mahesis univesalis

or inuiion as a mehod

Sellars Te Myth of Te Gven

Around he same ime as Gilles Deleuze was invoking hemyhical powers o mahesis univesalis Bergsonian inuiionand ranscendenal empiricism Wilrid Sellars was waginghis lielong batle agains ldquohe myh o he givenrdquo on he oherside o he Alanic By no means was Sellars he firs nor

will he be he las philosopher o ace his myhical creaurein an open field o batle Bu he may very well be is mosenacious opponen o dae Wha made Sellarsrsquos atack on hemyh o he given so powerul was his recogniion o is highlyproean naure As he amously saes a he very beginningo ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo

Many hings have been said o be ldquogivenrdquo sense conens maerial

objecs universals proposiions real connecions firs principles

even givenness isel And here is indeed a cerain way o consruinghe siuaions which philosophers analyze in hese erms which can

be said o be he ramework o givenness This ramework has been a

common eaure o mos o he major sysems o philosophy includ-

ing o use a Kanian urn o phrase boh ldquodogmaic raionalismrdquo and

ldquoskepical empiricismrdquo I has indeed been so pervasive ha ew i any

42 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion xx

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 3: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

94

ar worh speaking o This is no o dismiss arrsquos relevance or philoso-

phymdashar rom imdashbu merely o express reservaions abou he kind o

philosophical aesheicism which seems o wan o hold up ldquoaesheic

experiencerdquo as a new sor o cogniive paradigm wherein he Modern

(pos-Caresian) ldquorifrdquo beween knowing and eeling would be overcome3

Alhough i has recenly been aken up again by cerain ac-ions o conemporary coninenal philosophy he endencyha Brassier describes here is nohing new In ac i has along and noble heriage daing back all he way o he earlyRomanics Deleuzersquos criique o discursive reason and hisappeal o inuiive knowledge on he one hand coupled wih

he srong alliance he has orged wih ar and aesheics onhe oher reveal him as a direc successor o he philosophicallegacy o early Romanicism Wha beter way o challengeDeleuzersquos Romanic atemp a overcoming he dualism oknowing and eeling han o conras i wih Sellarsrsquos raional-is upholding o is necessiy and irreducibiliy

This essay is divided ino hree pars The firs par atempso demonsrae ha Deleuze was in ac a firm believer inhe powers o inuiive knowledge To his end I will presen

Deleuzersquos accouns o hree imporan noions ha appearedhroughou his early work he ideas o mahesis universalisBergsonian inuiion as a mehod and he ranscenden ex-ercise o he aculies The second par o he essay is devoedo Sellars and atemps o show ha his amous myh o hegiven is nohing else han inuiive knowledge isel Threedifferen accouns o his myh are presened namely heones ound in ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo4

ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo5 and ldquoThe Carus Lecures o

3 Ray Brassier ldquoAgains an Aesheics o Noiserdquo Transizone nY htpny-webberansizoneagains-aesheics-noisehml (accessed July 15 2013)4 Wilrid Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo in Science Pe-cepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991)5 Wilrid Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo htpwwwdiexcomsellarsskhml (accessed January 22 2013) Published in Acion Knowledgeand Realit Sudies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars ed Hecor-Neri Casantildeeda(Indianapolis Bobbs-Merrill 1975) 295-347 originally presened as The

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

95

Wilrid Sellarsrdquo6 The hird and final par concludes he essay by saging a conronaion beween hese wo ormidableopponens

Deleuze Mahesis Univesalis Intutonranscendental Emprcsm

For Deleuze ldquohe world o represenaionrdquo is no a philoso-pherrsquos world7 I migh be a scienisrsquos world i cerainly is aechnicianrsquos poliicianrsquos journalisrsquos and bureaucrarsquos world bu he only engagemen wih i worhy o a philosopherrsquosime is learning how o escape i The main reasons or De-

leuzersquos philosophical disrus in his world are neiher newnor paricularly original and neiher is his plan o escapePossibly he cleares and mos sraighorward expressiono Deleuzersquos views on his accoun can be ound in his firspublished ex on Bergson

One says ha science gives us a knowledge o hings ha i is hereore

in a cerain relaion wih hem and philosophy can renounce is rivalry

wih science can leave hings o science and presen isel solely in a

criical manner as a reflecion on his knowledge o hings On heconrary view philosophy seeks o esablish or raher resorean ohe

relaionship o hings and hereore an ohe knowledge a knowledge

and a relaionship ha precisely science hides rom us o which i

deprives us because i allows us only o conclude and o iner wihou

ever presening giving o us he hing in isel8

To undersand his passage ully i is bes o supplemen i

Machete Foundaion Lecures or 1971 a he Universiy o Texas6 Wilrid Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Process The CarusLecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo Te Monis (1981) 641 3-907 Gilles Deleuze Difference and Repeiion rans Paul Paton (New YorkColumbia Universiy Press 1994) xix8 Gilles Deleuze ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquo in Dese Islands and Ohe Texs 983089983097983093983091-983089983097983095983092 ed David Lapoujade rans Michael Taormina (New York Semioex(e)2004) 23 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

96

wih anoher quoe rom one o Deleuzersquos earlies publishedwriings ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo

Scienific mehod is explanaion To explain is o accoun or a hing

hrough somehing oher han isel hellip A he oher exreme philo-

sophical mehod is descripion in he wides sense o he word i is

ha reflexive analysis whereby he sensible world is described as he

represenaion o he cognizing subjecmdashha is o say here once again

i receives is saus rom somehing oher han isel9

Deleuzersquos argumen is seducively simple science and phi-losophy (o represenaion) give us a knowledge o hings

only hrough somehing oher han he hing isel Thereorehey canno give us he knowledge o he hing isel An oherkind o knowledge is necessary in order o ge us a he hingisel Oher o represenaional or mediaed knowledge isimmediae knowledge Thereore only immediae knowledgecan give us knowledge o he hing isel This is he generalsrucure o Deleuzersquos argumen agains represenaional andin avour o inuiive knowledge Depending on he conexhe erms may vary bu is basic srucure remains he same

hroughou Deleuzersquos enire opusTo confirm his claim and dispel he possible objecion ha

he quoes above come rom Deleuzersquos early exs which dono necessarily express his own views i will suffice o akea closer look a one imporan and well known passage romDiffeence and Repeiion considered by many o be Deleuzersquossingle mos imporan philosophical work and also he firs

book in which Deleuze expressly speaks in his own name Byhe end o chaper one eniled ldquoDifference in Iselrdquo Deleuze

amously claims We have conrased represenaion wih a differen kind o ormaion

The elemenary conceps o represenaion are he caegories defined

9 Gilles Deleuze ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo rans Robin MackayCollapse (2007) 3 147 Deleuzersquos ex was originally published as an inroduc-ion o Jean Malati de Monereggiorsquos Eacuteudes sur la Mahegravese ou anarchie ehieacuteachie de la science (Paris Ediions Du Griffon DrsquoOr 1946)

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

97

as he condiions o possible experience These however are oo general

or oo large or he real The ne is so loose ha he larges fish pass

hrough hellip Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o

real experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which

differ in kind rom he caegories10

I does no ake much effor o noice he similariy wih heprevious argumen represenaion can give us knowledge ohe real only hrough he caegories Caegories are by defini-ion general while he real is singular Thereore represena-ion canno give us knowledge o he real An oher kind oknowledge is necessary Oher o general conceps are singular

conceps and only he later can give us knowledge o he realDeleuze hen has saged prety much he same argumenagains represenaion ha he has saged in avour o im-mediae knowledge rom his earlies wriings up o Diffeenceand Repeiion Le us briefly analyse he srucure o hisargumen I consiss o wo pars he firs criical par layshe basis or he second consrucive par Alhough i migh be ineresing o quesion he criical par o he argumeni will be bes o leave ha aside or now and ocus insead

on is consrucive par which is much more imporan ormy presen purpose

Deleuzersquos conclusion o he criical par o he argumenpresens he firs premise o he second consrucive par inorder o ge a he knowledge o he hing iselhe real anoher kind o knowledge is necessary This oher knowledgeis supposed o be immediae and o consis o he creaionand applicaion o some kind o singular conceps concepsappropriae o he hing iselhe real In order o learn more

abou his ohe knowledge i is necessary o reurn o he exsmenioned above

Alhough i was one o Deleuzersquos earlies published wri-ings laer explicily disowned by him along everyhing elsepublished beore 1953 ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquomigh very well be he mos revealing ex by Deleuze when

10 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 68

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

98

i comes o he quesion o wha his ohe knowledge is sup-posed o be The shor answer would be mahesis universalisBu hen wha is mahesis univesalis According o Deleuzehe opposiion o science and philosophy has opened upa undamenal dualism wihin knowledge he Caresiandualism beween res exensa and res cogians11 Mahesis uni-versalis (universal knowledge or universal science) nameshe desire o overcome his dualism and accomplish a ldquouniyo knowledgerdquo12 This uniy is ldquohe uniy o lie iselrdquo ldquoLieis he uniy o he soul as he idea o he body and o he body as he exension o he soulrdquo13 Accordingly ldquomahesisdeploys isel a he level o lie o living man i is fis and

foremos a hinking of incarnaion and of individualitrdquo14

Buhow does mahesis atain his knowledge o incarnaion andindividualiy As we have seen boh science and philosophyreduce he sensible objec o an objec o hough In ordero overcome his dualiy o he objec o hough and hesensible objec he mehod o mahesis mus reduce ldquohisobjec o hough back o he sensible quaniy o qualiyrdquo15 I achieves his hrough he deploymen o he symbol whichpresens precisely ldquoa sensible objec as he incarnaion o

an objec o houghrdquo his sensible objec being ldquohe veryincarnaion o knowledgerdquo16 And finally ldquohe symbol is heideniy he encoune o he sensible objec and he objec ohough The sensible objec is called symbol and he objeco hough losing all scienific significaion is a hieroglyphor a cipher In heir ideniy hey orm he conceprdquo17

Wihou geting ino all he deails ha a complee accouno his ex would require his shor and condensed exposiion

11 Deleuze ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo 14212 Ibid 14213 Ibid 14314 Ibid my emphasis15 Ibid 15016 Ibid17 Ibid 150ndash51

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

99

o only a ew o is aspecs is more han enough o clearly showha mahesis universalis indeed is Deleuzersquos oher knowledgeDefined as a knowledge o incarnaion and individualiymahesis univesalis responds perecly o our earlier descrip-ion o Deleuzersquos ohe knowledge as an immediae knowledgeo he hing isel Furhermore his ex provides a clue aso how his singular knowledge migh be possible by way oconceps ormed hrough he deploymen o symbols

In his various wriings on Bergson his oher knowledge figures under he name o inuiion In ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquoDeleuze explicily pis inuiion agains science conraryo science which ldquoallows us only o conclude and o iner

wihou ever presening giving o us he hing in iselrdquo iis ldquoin and hrough inuiion ha somehing is presened isgiven in person insead o being inerred rom somehingelse and concludedrdquo18 Bu in Deleuzersquos reading o Bergsoninuiion is no o be undersood in he ordinary sense o heword Tha is inuiion is ldquoneiher a eeling an inspiraionnor a disorderly sympahy bu a ully developed mehodone o he mos ully developed mehods in philosophyrdquo amehod capable o esablishing philosophy as an ldquoabsoluely

lsquoprecisersquo discipline as precise in is field as capable o beingprolonged and ransmited as science isel isrdquo19 A quesionimmediaely springs o mind one ha Deleuze cerainlyacknowledges ldquoHow is inuiionmdashwhich primarily denoesan immediae knowledge (connaissance)mdashcapable o orminga mehod once i is acceped ha he mehod esseniallyinvolves one or several mediaionsrdquo20 As an answer o hisquesion Deleuze firs saes ha alhough Bergson ofen doespresen inuiion ldquoas a simple acrdquo his simpliciy ldquodoes no

exclude a qualiaive and virual mulipliciyrdquo ollowing whichhe ormulaes ldquohree differen sors o acs ha deerminehe rulesrdquo o inuiion as a mehod ldquoThe firs concerns he

18 Deleuze ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquo 2319 Gilles Deleuze Begsonism rans Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam(New York Zone Books 1991) 13-14 original emphasis20 Ibid 13-14

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

100

saing and creaing o problems he second he discoveryo genuine differences in kind he hird he apprehensiono real imerdquo21 The mos ineresing aspec is addressed inhe second rule which presens inuiion as a mehod ha

ldquorediscovers he rue differences in kind or ariculaions ohe realrdquo22 The mos concise accoun o his crucial aspec oinuiion as a mehod is o be ound in Deleuzersquos ex ldquoBerg-sonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo

Inuiion suggess isel as a mehod o difference or division o divide

whaever is composie ino wo endencies This mehod is somehing

oher han a spaial analysis more han a descripion o experience

and less (so i seems) han a ranscendenal analysis I reaches hecondiions o he given bu hese condiions are endency-subjecs

which are hemselves given in a cerain way hey are lived Wha is

more hey are a once he pure and he lived he living and he lived

he absolue and he lived Wha is essenial here is ha his ground is

expeienced and we know how much Bergson insised on he empirical

characer o he eacutelan vial Thus i is no he condiions o all possible

experience ha mus be reached bu he condiions o real experience

Schelling had already proposed his aim and defined philosophy as

a superior empiricism his ormulaion also applies o BergsonismThese condiions can and mus be grasped in an inuiion precisely

because hey are he condiions o real experience because hey are

no broader han wha is condiioned because he concep hey orm is

idenical o is objec hellip Reason mus reach all he way o he individual

he genuine concep all he way o he hing and comprehension all

he way o ldquohisrdquo23

The firs hing o noe wih regard o his quoe is ha i un-

equivocally reveals ha despie being a mehod and hereoreinvolving various mediaions inuiion sill remains an es-

21 Deleuze Begsonism 13-1422 Ibid 2123 Gilles Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo in Dese Islands andOher Texs 983089983097983093983091-983089983097983095983092 ed David Lapoujade rans Michael Taormina (NewYork Semioex(e) 2004) 35-36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

101

senially immediae aculy Le us summarise as a mehod odifference and division ha is a mehod capable o dividinghe composies ino wo endencies inuiion is able o reachhe condiions o he given or real experience These condi-ions are variously named by Deleuze ldquoendency-subjecsrdquo

ldquopurerdquo ldquohe livingrdquo ldquohe absoluerdquo and ldquohe groundrdquo Deleuzersquosclaim ha hese condiions ldquocan and mus be grasped ininuiionrdquo simply reieraes his previous claims ha hesecondiions are ldquohemselves given in a cerain wayrdquo ldquolivedrdquo and

ldquoexperiencedrdquo Thereore proclaiming i o be a mehod in noway excludes he immediacy o inuiion As Deleuze pus ihimsel ldquoInuiion has become mehod or raher mehod has

been reconciled wih he immediaerdquo24

Secondly his quoeconfirms once more ha or Deleuze he aim o philosophyis he knowledge o he hing isel or he individual andha his knowledge is atainable by consrucing a singularor ldquouniquerdquo concep ldquoidenical o is objecrdquo25 Finally hequoe above reveals no only ha Deleuzersquos philosophicalprojec as explicaed in Diffeence and Repeiion is bes readas a coninuaion o Bergsonrsquos own projec bu also in whichrespecs Deleuze depars rom i To demonsrae boh hese

claims i is necessary o urn our atenion o Diffeence andRepeiion isel

Wih regard o he firs claim some o he mos imporanpassages in Difference and Repeiion are saed in viruallyhe exac same erms as hose ound in he quoe above Onewell-known passage in paricular sands ou in his respec

Empiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics an apodicic

discipline only when we apprehend direcly in he sensible ha which

can only be sensed he very being o he sensible difference poenialdifference and difference in inensiy as he reason behind qualiaive

diversiy I is in difference ha movemen is produced as an ldquoeffecrdquo

ha phenomena flash heir meaning like signs The inense world o

differences in which we find he reason behind qualiies and he being

o he sensible is precisely he objec o a superior empiricism This

24 Deleuze Begsonism 3225 Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo 36

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Speculations V

102

empiricism eaches us a srange ldquoreasonrdquo ha o he muliple chaos

and difference (nomadic disribuions crowned anarchies)26

I we add o his quoe he already cied claim rom he endingo he firs chaper o Diffeence and Repeiion ha philosophyshould search or he condiions o real experience and nomerely possible experience i becomes quie obvious haDeleuze makes in his own name virually he very same claimsas hose he atribues o Bergson in he passage quoed aboverom ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo Wha hen doesDeleuze reain rom Bergson Firs and oremos Deleuzeclearly has no relinquished Bergsonrsquos belie in he power o

inuiion o immediaely apprehend he condiions o realexperience ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal andaesheics an apodicic discipline only when we apprehenddirecly in he sensible ha which can only be sensedrdquo (myemphasis) Likewise Deleuze reains he idea ha inuiionis a mehod o difference ie ha which inuiion direclyapprehends is diffeence ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo or

ldquohe very being o he sensiblerdquo is ldquodifference poenial di-erence and difference in inensiyrdquo or simply ldquohe inense

world o differencesrdquo I is in his world o differences ha

we mus find he lived realiy o a sub-represenaive domain I i

is rue ha represenaion has ideniy as is elemen and similariy

as is uni o measure hen pure presence such as i appears in he

simulacrum has he lsquodisparaersquo as is uni o measuremdashin oher words

always a difference o difference as is immediae elemen27

Add o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o ldquohe immediaerdquo

wih he ldquosub-represenaiverdquo28 and here can be no moredoub or Deleuze ldquohe inense world o differencesrdquo or

ldquosub-represenaive domainrdquo is ldquoa pure presencerdquo ldquoa livedrealiyrdquo or simply ldquohe immediaerdquo

26 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 56-5727 Ibid 6928 Ibid 56

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

103

Le us now address he second quesion in which respecdoes Deleuze depar rom Bergson The passage rom

ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo quoed earlier is ogrea assisance here In a seemingly ofand remark ahe beginning o he passage Deleuze makes he ollowingclaim inuiion as a mehod is ldquomore han a descripion oexperience and less (so i seems) han a anscendenal analysisrdquo(my emphasis) I is my conenion ha Deleuzersquos accouno he ranscenden or superior exercise o he aculies aspresened in Diffeence and Repeiionrsquos cenral chaper ldquoTheImage o Thoughrdquo is precisely he anscendenal version oBergsonrsquos inuiion as a mehod ha Deleuze invokes in his

quoe In order o confirm his claim le me briefly oulinehe basic conours o Deleuzersquos accoun o he ranscendenexercise o he aculies

Deleuze amously saes ldquoSomehing in he world orces uso hink This somehing is an objec no o recogniion buo a undamenal encoune rdquo29 The firs characerisic o heobjec o his encouner is ldquoha i can only be sensedrdquo30 Fol-lowing his Deleuze variously reers o ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo as ldquohe signrdquo ldquohe being o he sensiblerdquo ldquoha by

which he given is givenrdquo and he ldquoseniendumrdquo31 Furhermorei is imporan o highligh ha his objec o he encouneris ldquoimpercepible (insensible) rom he poin o view o anempirical exercise o he senses in which sensibiliy graspsonly ha which could also be grasped by oher aculies andis relaed wihin he conex o a common sense o an objecwhich also mus be apprehended by oher aculiesrdquo32 Con-rary o is empirical exercise hus defined ldquosensibiliy inhe presence o ha which can only be sensed (and is a he

same ime impercepible) finds isel beore is own limi hesign and raises isel o he level o a ranscenden exercise

29 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 139 original emphasis30 Ibid 13931 Ibid 139-4032 Ibid 140

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Speculations V

104

o he lsquonhrsquo powerrdquo33 Once sensibiliy has been raised o isranscenden exercise by is encouner wih he seniendum i

ldquoorces memory o remember he memoandum ha which canonly be recalledrdquo34 hereby raising memory o a ranscendenexercise o is own Finally memory in is urn

orces hough o grasp ha which can only be hough he cogiandum

or noeeon he Essence no he inelligible or his is sill no more han

he mode in which we hink ha which migh be somehing oher han

hough bu he being o he inelligible as hough his were boh he

final power o hough and he unhinkable35

According o Deleuze wha is revealed by his ldquoranscendendisjoined or superior exercise o he aculiesrdquo is preciselyheir ldquoranscendenal ormrdquo36 For in order o avoid racinghe ranscendenal orm o he aculies rom heir empiricalexercise as Kan does Deleuze claims ha

each aculy mus be borne o he exreme poin o is dissoluion a

which i alls prey o riple violence he violence o ha which orces

i o be exercised o ha which i is orced o grasp and which i alone

is able o grasp ye also ha o he ungraspable (rom he poin o viewo is empirical exercise)37

I is a his poin ha each aculy ldquodiscovers is own uniquepassionrdquo38 or is ranscendenal orm

As I have emphasised hough always begins wih anencouner wih he seniendum Bu wha is his paradoxi-cal elemen ha can only be sensed ye is impercepible ahe same ime This elemen which orces sensibiliy o is

ranscenden exercise is33 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14034 Ibid 14135 Ibid36 Ibid 14337 Ibid38 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

105

inensiy undersood as pure difference in isel as ha which is a once

boh impercepible or empirical sensibiliy which grasps inensiy only

already covered or mediaed by he qualiy o which i gives rise and

a he same ime ha which can be perceived only rom he poin o

view o a ranscendenal sensibiliy which apprehends i immediaely

in he encouner39

Thus or Deleuze hough always begins wih an immediaeapprehension o difference in isel Deleuze could hardly

be any more explici abou his belie in he idea o inuiiveknowledge The noion o he ranscenden exercise o heaculies represens nohing less han Deleuzersquos atemp o

give a properly ranscendenal accoun o his age-old philo-sophical idealOne las remark is in order I migh be objeced ha I am

equivocaing by eliding he disincion beween houghand knowledge As he objecion migh go no only doesDeleuze ake over he Kanian disincion beween houghand knowledge bu he is also expressly criical o he noiono ldquoknowledgerdquo hroughou he book This is o course rueBu i is also quie obvious ha ldquohoughrdquo in Difference and

Repeiion has almos he exac same uncion as ldquomahesisuniversalisrdquo and ldquoan oher knowledgerdquo have in his earlierexs I he accoun given above o he ranscenden exerciseo he aculies were no enough by isel his claim could beurher reinorced by highlighing he ac ha on variousoccasions hroughou he book Deleuze explicily invokes boh ldquoan esoeric knowledgerdquo40 and ldquomahesis universalisrdquo41 isel To esablish even sronger ies beween Deleuzersquos earlierexs and Diffeence and Repeiion in his regard le me quoe

rom he preace o he book

Empiricism is by no means a reacion agains conceps nor a simple

appeal o lived experience On he conrary i underakes he mos

39 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14440 Ibid 15 24241 Ibid 181 190 199

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Speculations V

106

insane creaion o conceps ever seen or heard Empiricism is a mysi-

cism and a mahemaicism o conceps bu precisely one which reas

he concep as objec o an encouner as a here-and-now or raher as

an Erewhon rom which emerge inexhausibly ever new differenly

disribued ldquoheresrdquo and ldquonowsrdquo42

Similar o his earlier work Deleuze here explicily invokeshe creaion o conceps idenical o heir objecs as he goalo philosophy Furhermore his idenificaion o empiricismwih ldquoa mysicism and a mahemaicism o concepsrdquo urherencourages he conclusion ha ldquoranscendenal empiricismrdquoisel is or Deleuze jus anoher name or mahesis univesalis

or inuiion as a mehod

Sellars Te Myth of Te Gven

Around he same ime as Gilles Deleuze was invoking hemyhical powers o mahesis univesalis Bergsonian inuiionand ranscendenal empiricism Wilrid Sellars was waginghis lielong batle agains ldquohe myh o he givenrdquo on he oherside o he Alanic By no means was Sellars he firs nor

will he be he las philosopher o ace his myhical creaurein an open field o batle Bu he may very well be is mosenacious opponen o dae Wha made Sellarsrsquos atack on hemyh o he given so powerul was his recogniion o is highlyproean naure As he amously saes a he very beginningo ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo

Many hings have been said o be ldquogivenrdquo sense conens maerial

objecs universals proposiions real connecions firs principles

even givenness isel And here is indeed a cerain way o consruinghe siuaions which philosophers analyze in hese erms which can

be said o be he ramework o givenness This ramework has been a

common eaure o mos o he major sysems o philosophy includ-

ing o use a Kanian urn o phrase boh ldquodogmaic raionalismrdquo and

ldquoskepical empiricismrdquo I has indeed been so pervasive ha ew i any

42 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion xx

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 4: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

95

Wilrid Sellarsrdquo6 The hird and final par concludes he essay by saging a conronaion beween hese wo ormidableopponens

Deleuze Mahesis Univesalis Intutonranscendental Emprcsm

For Deleuze ldquohe world o represenaionrdquo is no a philoso-pherrsquos world7 I migh be a scienisrsquos world i cerainly is aechnicianrsquos poliicianrsquos journalisrsquos and bureaucrarsquos world bu he only engagemen wih i worhy o a philosopherrsquosime is learning how o escape i The main reasons or De-

leuzersquos philosophical disrus in his world are neiher newnor paricularly original and neiher is his plan o escapePossibly he cleares and mos sraighorward expressiono Deleuzersquos views on his accoun can be ound in his firspublished ex on Bergson

One says ha science gives us a knowledge o hings ha i is hereore

in a cerain relaion wih hem and philosophy can renounce is rivalry

wih science can leave hings o science and presen isel solely in a

criical manner as a reflecion on his knowledge o hings On heconrary view philosophy seeks o esablish or raher resorean ohe

relaionship o hings and hereore an ohe knowledge a knowledge

and a relaionship ha precisely science hides rom us o which i

deprives us because i allows us only o conclude and o iner wihou

ever presening giving o us he hing in isel8

To undersand his passage ully i is bes o supplemen i

Machete Foundaion Lecures or 1971 a he Universiy o Texas6 Wilrid Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Process The CarusLecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo Te Monis (1981) 641 3-907 Gilles Deleuze Difference and Repeiion rans Paul Paton (New YorkColumbia Universiy Press 1994) xix8 Gilles Deleuze ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquo in Dese Islands and Ohe Texs 983089983097983093983091-983089983097983095983092 ed David Lapoujade rans Michael Taormina (New York Semioex(e)2004) 23 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

96

wih anoher quoe rom one o Deleuzersquos earlies publishedwriings ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo

Scienific mehod is explanaion To explain is o accoun or a hing

hrough somehing oher han isel hellip A he oher exreme philo-

sophical mehod is descripion in he wides sense o he word i is

ha reflexive analysis whereby he sensible world is described as he

represenaion o he cognizing subjecmdashha is o say here once again

i receives is saus rom somehing oher han isel9

Deleuzersquos argumen is seducively simple science and phi-losophy (o represenaion) give us a knowledge o hings

only hrough somehing oher han he hing isel Thereorehey canno give us he knowledge o he hing isel An oherkind o knowledge is necessary in order o ge us a he hingisel Oher o represenaional or mediaed knowledge isimmediae knowledge Thereore only immediae knowledgecan give us knowledge o he hing isel This is he generalsrucure o Deleuzersquos argumen agains represenaional andin avour o inuiive knowledge Depending on he conexhe erms may vary bu is basic srucure remains he same

hroughou Deleuzersquos enire opusTo confirm his claim and dispel he possible objecion ha

he quoes above come rom Deleuzersquos early exs which dono necessarily express his own views i will suffice o akea closer look a one imporan and well known passage romDiffeence and Repeiion considered by many o be Deleuzersquossingle mos imporan philosophical work and also he firs

book in which Deleuze expressly speaks in his own name Byhe end o chaper one eniled ldquoDifference in Iselrdquo Deleuze

amously claims We have conrased represenaion wih a differen kind o ormaion

The elemenary conceps o represenaion are he caegories defined

9 Gilles Deleuze ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo rans Robin MackayCollapse (2007) 3 147 Deleuzersquos ex was originally published as an inroduc-ion o Jean Malati de Monereggiorsquos Eacuteudes sur la Mahegravese ou anarchie ehieacuteachie de la science (Paris Ediions Du Griffon DrsquoOr 1946)

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

97

as he condiions o possible experience These however are oo general

or oo large or he real The ne is so loose ha he larges fish pass

hrough hellip Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o

real experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which

differ in kind rom he caegories10

I does no ake much effor o noice he similariy wih heprevious argumen represenaion can give us knowledge ohe real only hrough he caegories Caegories are by defini-ion general while he real is singular Thereore represena-ion canno give us knowledge o he real An oher kind oknowledge is necessary Oher o general conceps are singular

conceps and only he later can give us knowledge o he realDeleuze hen has saged prety much he same argumenagains represenaion ha he has saged in avour o im-mediae knowledge rom his earlies wriings up o Diffeenceand Repeiion Le us briefly analyse he srucure o hisargumen I consiss o wo pars he firs criical par layshe basis or he second consrucive par Alhough i migh be ineresing o quesion he criical par o he argumeni will be bes o leave ha aside or now and ocus insead

on is consrucive par which is much more imporan ormy presen purpose

Deleuzersquos conclusion o he criical par o he argumenpresens he firs premise o he second consrucive par inorder o ge a he knowledge o he hing iselhe real anoher kind o knowledge is necessary This oher knowledgeis supposed o be immediae and o consis o he creaionand applicaion o some kind o singular conceps concepsappropriae o he hing iselhe real In order o learn more

abou his ohe knowledge i is necessary o reurn o he exsmenioned above

Alhough i was one o Deleuzersquos earlies published wri-ings laer explicily disowned by him along everyhing elsepublished beore 1953 ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquomigh very well be he mos revealing ex by Deleuze when

10 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 68

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Speculations V

98

i comes o he quesion o wha his ohe knowledge is sup-posed o be The shor answer would be mahesis universalisBu hen wha is mahesis univesalis According o Deleuzehe opposiion o science and philosophy has opened upa undamenal dualism wihin knowledge he Caresiandualism beween res exensa and res cogians11 Mahesis uni-versalis (universal knowledge or universal science) nameshe desire o overcome his dualism and accomplish a ldquouniyo knowledgerdquo12 This uniy is ldquohe uniy o lie iselrdquo ldquoLieis he uniy o he soul as he idea o he body and o he body as he exension o he soulrdquo13 Accordingly ldquomahesisdeploys isel a he level o lie o living man i is fis and

foremos a hinking of incarnaion and of individualitrdquo14

Buhow does mahesis atain his knowledge o incarnaion andindividualiy As we have seen boh science and philosophyreduce he sensible objec o an objec o hough In ordero overcome his dualiy o he objec o hough and hesensible objec he mehod o mahesis mus reduce ldquohisobjec o hough back o he sensible quaniy o qualiyrdquo15 I achieves his hrough he deploymen o he symbol whichpresens precisely ldquoa sensible objec as he incarnaion o

an objec o houghrdquo his sensible objec being ldquohe veryincarnaion o knowledgerdquo16 And finally ldquohe symbol is heideniy he encoune o he sensible objec and he objec ohough The sensible objec is called symbol and he objeco hough losing all scienific significaion is a hieroglyphor a cipher In heir ideniy hey orm he conceprdquo17

Wihou geting ino all he deails ha a complee accouno his ex would require his shor and condensed exposiion

11 Deleuze ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo 14212 Ibid 14213 Ibid 14314 Ibid my emphasis15 Ibid 15016 Ibid17 Ibid 150ndash51

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

99

o only a ew o is aspecs is more han enough o clearly showha mahesis universalis indeed is Deleuzersquos oher knowledgeDefined as a knowledge o incarnaion and individualiymahesis univesalis responds perecly o our earlier descrip-ion o Deleuzersquos ohe knowledge as an immediae knowledgeo he hing isel Furhermore his ex provides a clue aso how his singular knowledge migh be possible by way oconceps ormed hrough he deploymen o symbols

In his various wriings on Bergson his oher knowledge figures under he name o inuiion In ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquoDeleuze explicily pis inuiion agains science conraryo science which ldquoallows us only o conclude and o iner

wihou ever presening giving o us he hing in iselrdquo iis ldquoin and hrough inuiion ha somehing is presened isgiven in person insead o being inerred rom somehingelse and concludedrdquo18 Bu in Deleuzersquos reading o Bergsoninuiion is no o be undersood in he ordinary sense o heword Tha is inuiion is ldquoneiher a eeling an inspiraionnor a disorderly sympahy bu a ully developed mehodone o he mos ully developed mehods in philosophyrdquo amehod capable o esablishing philosophy as an ldquoabsoluely

lsquoprecisersquo discipline as precise in is field as capable o beingprolonged and ransmited as science isel isrdquo19 A quesionimmediaely springs o mind one ha Deleuze cerainlyacknowledges ldquoHow is inuiionmdashwhich primarily denoesan immediae knowledge (connaissance)mdashcapable o orminga mehod once i is acceped ha he mehod esseniallyinvolves one or several mediaionsrdquo20 As an answer o hisquesion Deleuze firs saes ha alhough Bergson ofen doespresen inuiion ldquoas a simple acrdquo his simpliciy ldquodoes no

exclude a qualiaive and virual mulipliciyrdquo ollowing whichhe ormulaes ldquohree differen sors o acs ha deerminehe rulesrdquo o inuiion as a mehod ldquoThe firs concerns he

18 Deleuze ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquo 2319 Gilles Deleuze Begsonism rans Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam(New York Zone Books 1991) 13-14 original emphasis20 Ibid 13-14

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

100

saing and creaing o problems he second he discoveryo genuine differences in kind he hird he apprehensiono real imerdquo21 The mos ineresing aspec is addressed inhe second rule which presens inuiion as a mehod ha

ldquorediscovers he rue differences in kind or ariculaions ohe realrdquo22 The mos concise accoun o his crucial aspec oinuiion as a mehod is o be ound in Deleuzersquos ex ldquoBerg-sonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo

Inuiion suggess isel as a mehod o difference or division o divide

whaever is composie ino wo endencies This mehod is somehing

oher han a spaial analysis more han a descripion o experience

and less (so i seems) han a ranscendenal analysis I reaches hecondiions o he given bu hese condiions are endency-subjecs

which are hemselves given in a cerain way hey are lived Wha is

more hey are a once he pure and he lived he living and he lived

he absolue and he lived Wha is essenial here is ha his ground is

expeienced and we know how much Bergson insised on he empirical

characer o he eacutelan vial Thus i is no he condiions o all possible

experience ha mus be reached bu he condiions o real experience

Schelling had already proposed his aim and defined philosophy as

a superior empiricism his ormulaion also applies o BergsonismThese condiions can and mus be grasped in an inuiion precisely

because hey are he condiions o real experience because hey are

no broader han wha is condiioned because he concep hey orm is

idenical o is objec hellip Reason mus reach all he way o he individual

he genuine concep all he way o he hing and comprehension all

he way o ldquohisrdquo23

The firs hing o noe wih regard o his quoe is ha i un-

equivocally reveals ha despie being a mehod and hereoreinvolving various mediaions inuiion sill remains an es-

21 Deleuze Begsonism 13-1422 Ibid 2123 Gilles Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo in Dese Islands andOher Texs 983089983097983093983091-983089983097983095983092 ed David Lapoujade rans Michael Taormina (NewYork Semioex(e) 2004) 35-36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

101

senially immediae aculy Le us summarise as a mehod odifference and division ha is a mehod capable o dividinghe composies ino wo endencies inuiion is able o reachhe condiions o he given or real experience These condi-ions are variously named by Deleuze ldquoendency-subjecsrdquo

ldquopurerdquo ldquohe livingrdquo ldquohe absoluerdquo and ldquohe groundrdquo Deleuzersquosclaim ha hese condiions ldquocan and mus be grasped ininuiionrdquo simply reieraes his previous claims ha hesecondiions are ldquohemselves given in a cerain wayrdquo ldquolivedrdquo and

ldquoexperiencedrdquo Thereore proclaiming i o be a mehod in noway excludes he immediacy o inuiion As Deleuze pus ihimsel ldquoInuiion has become mehod or raher mehod has

been reconciled wih he immediaerdquo24

Secondly his quoeconfirms once more ha or Deleuze he aim o philosophyis he knowledge o he hing isel or he individual andha his knowledge is atainable by consrucing a singularor ldquouniquerdquo concep ldquoidenical o is objecrdquo25 Finally hequoe above reveals no only ha Deleuzersquos philosophicalprojec as explicaed in Diffeence and Repeiion is bes readas a coninuaion o Bergsonrsquos own projec bu also in whichrespecs Deleuze depars rom i To demonsrae boh hese

claims i is necessary o urn our atenion o Diffeence andRepeiion isel

Wih regard o he firs claim some o he mos imporanpassages in Difference and Repeiion are saed in viruallyhe exac same erms as hose ound in he quoe above Onewell-known passage in paricular sands ou in his respec

Empiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics an apodicic

discipline only when we apprehend direcly in he sensible ha which

can only be sensed he very being o he sensible difference poenialdifference and difference in inensiy as he reason behind qualiaive

diversiy I is in difference ha movemen is produced as an ldquoeffecrdquo

ha phenomena flash heir meaning like signs The inense world o

differences in which we find he reason behind qualiies and he being

o he sensible is precisely he objec o a superior empiricism This

24 Deleuze Begsonism 3225 Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo 36

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Speculations V

102

empiricism eaches us a srange ldquoreasonrdquo ha o he muliple chaos

and difference (nomadic disribuions crowned anarchies)26

I we add o his quoe he already cied claim rom he endingo he firs chaper o Diffeence and Repeiion ha philosophyshould search or he condiions o real experience and nomerely possible experience i becomes quie obvious haDeleuze makes in his own name virually he very same claimsas hose he atribues o Bergson in he passage quoed aboverom ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo Wha hen doesDeleuze reain rom Bergson Firs and oremos Deleuzeclearly has no relinquished Bergsonrsquos belie in he power o

inuiion o immediaely apprehend he condiions o realexperience ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal andaesheics an apodicic discipline only when we apprehenddirecly in he sensible ha which can only be sensedrdquo (myemphasis) Likewise Deleuze reains he idea ha inuiionis a mehod o difference ie ha which inuiion direclyapprehends is diffeence ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo or

ldquohe very being o he sensiblerdquo is ldquodifference poenial di-erence and difference in inensiyrdquo or simply ldquohe inense

world o differencesrdquo I is in his world o differences ha

we mus find he lived realiy o a sub-represenaive domain I i

is rue ha represenaion has ideniy as is elemen and similariy

as is uni o measure hen pure presence such as i appears in he

simulacrum has he lsquodisparaersquo as is uni o measuremdashin oher words

always a difference o difference as is immediae elemen27

Add o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o ldquohe immediaerdquo

wih he ldquosub-represenaiverdquo28 and here can be no moredoub or Deleuze ldquohe inense world o differencesrdquo or

ldquosub-represenaive domainrdquo is ldquoa pure presencerdquo ldquoa livedrealiyrdquo or simply ldquohe immediaerdquo

26 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 56-5727 Ibid 6928 Ibid 56

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

103

Le us now address he second quesion in which respecdoes Deleuze depar rom Bergson The passage rom

ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo quoed earlier is ogrea assisance here In a seemingly ofand remark ahe beginning o he passage Deleuze makes he ollowingclaim inuiion as a mehod is ldquomore han a descripion oexperience and less (so i seems) han a anscendenal analysisrdquo(my emphasis) I is my conenion ha Deleuzersquos accouno he ranscenden or superior exercise o he aculies aspresened in Diffeence and Repeiionrsquos cenral chaper ldquoTheImage o Thoughrdquo is precisely he anscendenal version oBergsonrsquos inuiion as a mehod ha Deleuze invokes in his

quoe In order o confirm his claim le me briefly oulinehe basic conours o Deleuzersquos accoun o he ranscendenexercise o he aculies

Deleuze amously saes ldquoSomehing in he world orces uso hink This somehing is an objec no o recogniion buo a undamenal encoune rdquo29 The firs characerisic o heobjec o his encouner is ldquoha i can only be sensedrdquo30 Fol-lowing his Deleuze variously reers o ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo as ldquohe signrdquo ldquohe being o he sensiblerdquo ldquoha by

which he given is givenrdquo and he ldquoseniendumrdquo31 Furhermorei is imporan o highligh ha his objec o he encouneris ldquoimpercepible (insensible) rom he poin o view o anempirical exercise o he senses in which sensibiliy graspsonly ha which could also be grasped by oher aculies andis relaed wihin he conex o a common sense o an objecwhich also mus be apprehended by oher aculiesrdquo32 Con-rary o is empirical exercise hus defined ldquosensibiliy inhe presence o ha which can only be sensed (and is a he

same ime impercepible) finds isel beore is own limi hesign and raises isel o he level o a ranscenden exercise

29 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 139 original emphasis30 Ibid 13931 Ibid 139-4032 Ibid 140

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

104

o he lsquonhrsquo powerrdquo33 Once sensibiliy has been raised o isranscenden exercise by is encouner wih he seniendum i

ldquoorces memory o remember he memoandum ha which canonly be recalledrdquo34 hereby raising memory o a ranscendenexercise o is own Finally memory in is urn

orces hough o grasp ha which can only be hough he cogiandum

or noeeon he Essence no he inelligible or his is sill no more han

he mode in which we hink ha which migh be somehing oher han

hough bu he being o he inelligible as hough his were boh he

final power o hough and he unhinkable35

According o Deleuze wha is revealed by his ldquoranscendendisjoined or superior exercise o he aculiesrdquo is preciselyheir ldquoranscendenal ormrdquo36 For in order o avoid racinghe ranscendenal orm o he aculies rom heir empiricalexercise as Kan does Deleuze claims ha

each aculy mus be borne o he exreme poin o is dissoluion a

which i alls prey o riple violence he violence o ha which orces

i o be exercised o ha which i is orced o grasp and which i alone

is able o grasp ye also ha o he ungraspable (rom he poin o viewo is empirical exercise)37

I is a his poin ha each aculy ldquodiscovers is own uniquepassionrdquo38 or is ranscendenal orm

As I have emphasised hough always begins wih anencouner wih he seniendum Bu wha is his paradoxi-cal elemen ha can only be sensed ye is impercepible ahe same ime This elemen which orces sensibiliy o is

ranscenden exercise is33 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14034 Ibid 14135 Ibid36 Ibid 14337 Ibid38 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

105

inensiy undersood as pure difference in isel as ha which is a once

boh impercepible or empirical sensibiliy which grasps inensiy only

already covered or mediaed by he qualiy o which i gives rise and

a he same ime ha which can be perceived only rom he poin o

view o a ranscendenal sensibiliy which apprehends i immediaely

in he encouner39

Thus or Deleuze hough always begins wih an immediaeapprehension o difference in isel Deleuze could hardly

be any more explici abou his belie in he idea o inuiiveknowledge The noion o he ranscenden exercise o heaculies represens nohing less han Deleuzersquos atemp o

give a properly ranscendenal accoun o his age-old philo-sophical idealOne las remark is in order I migh be objeced ha I am

equivocaing by eliding he disincion beween houghand knowledge As he objecion migh go no only doesDeleuze ake over he Kanian disincion beween houghand knowledge bu he is also expressly criical o he noiono ldquoknowledgerdquo hroughou he book This is o course rueBu i is also quie obvious ha ldquohoughrdquo in Difference and

Repeiion has almos he exac same uncion as ldquomahesisuniversalisrdquo and ldquoan oher knowledgerdquo have in his earlierexs I he accoun given above o he ranscenden exerciseo he aculies were no enough by isel his claim could beurher reinorced by highlighing he ac ha on variousoccasions hroughou he book Deleuze explicily invokes boh ldquoan esoeric knowledgerdquo40 and ldquomahesis universalisrdquo41 isel To esablish even sronger ies beween Deleuzersquos earlierexs and Diffeence and Repeiion in his regard le me quoe

rom he preace o he book

Empiricism is by no means a reacion agains conceps nor a simple

appeal o lived experience On he conrary i underakes he mos

39 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14440 Ibid 15 24241 Ibid 181 190 199

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

106

insane creaion o conceps ever seen or heard Empiricism is a mysi-

cism and a mahemaicism o conceps bu precisely one which reas

he concep as objec o an encouner as a here-and-now or raher as

an Erewhon rom which emerge inexhausibly ever new differenly

disribued ldquoheresrdquo and ldquonowsrdquo42

Similar o his earlier work Deleuze here explicily invokeshe creaion o conceps idenical o heir objecs as he goalo philosophy Furhermore his idenificaion o empiricismwih ldquoa mysicism and a mahemaicism o concepsrdquo urherencourages he conclusion ha ldquoranscendenal empiricismrdquoisel is or Deleuze jus anoher name or mahesis univesalis

or inuiion as a mehod

Sellars Te Myth of Te Gven

Around he same ime as Gilles Deleuze was invoking hemyhical powers o mahesis univesalis Bergsonian inuiionand ranscendenal empiricism Wilrid Sellars was waginghis lielong batle agains ldquohe myh o he givenrdquo on he oherside o he Alanic By no means was Sellars he firs nor

will he be he las philosopher o ace his myhical creaurein an open field o batle Bu he may very well be is mosenacious opponen o dae Wha made Sellarsrsquos atack on hemyh o he given so powerul was his recogniion o is highlyproean naure As he amously saes a he very beginningo ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo

Many hings have been said o be ldquogivenrdquo sense conens maerial

objecs universals proposiions real connecions firs principles

even givenness isel And here is indeed a cerain way o consruinghe siuaions which philosophers analyze in hese erms which can

be said o be he ramework o givenness This ramework has been a

common eaure o mos o he major sysems o philosophy includ-

ing o use a Kanian urn o phrase boh ldquodogmaic raionalismrdquo and

ldquoskepical empiricismrdquo I has indeed been so pervasive ha ew i any

42 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion xx

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 5: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

96

wih anoher quoe rom one o Deleuzersquos earlies publishedwriings ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo

Scienific mehod is explanaion To explain is o accoun or a hing

hrough somehing oher han isel hellip A he oher exreme philo-

sophical mehod is descripion in he wides sense o he word i is

ha reflexive analysis whereby he sensible world is described as he

represenaion o he cognizing subjecmdashha is o say here once again

i receives is saus rom somehing oher han isel9

Deleuzersquos argumen is seducively simple science and phi-losophy (o represenaion) give us a knowledge o hings

only hrough somehing oher han he hing isel Thereorehey canno give us he knowledge o he hing isel An oherkind o knowledge is necessary in order o ge us a he hingisel Oher o represenaional or mediaed knowledge isimmediae knowledge Thereore only immediae knowledgecan give us knowledge o he hing isel This is he generalsrucure o Deleuzersquos argumen agains represenaional andin avour o inuiive knowledge Depending on he conexhe erms may vary bu is basic srucure remains he same

hroughou Deleuzersquos enire opusTo confirm his claim and dispel he possible objecion ha

he quoes above come rom Deleuzersquos early exs which dono necessarily express his own views i will suffice o akea closer look a one imporan and well known passage romDiffeence and Repeiion considered by many o be Deleuzersquossingle mos imporan philosophical work and also he firs

book in which Deleuze expressly speaks in his own name Byhe end o chaper one eniled ldquoDifference in Iselrdquo Deleuze

amously claims We have conrased represenaion wih a differen kind o ormaion

The elemenary conceps o represenaion are he caegories defined

9 Gilles Deleuze ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo rans Robin MackayCollapse (2007) 3 147 Deleuzersquos ex was originally published as an inroduc-ion o Jean Malati de Monereggiorsquos Eacuteudes sur la Mahegravese ou anarchie ehieacuteachie de la science (Paris Ediions Du Griffon DrsquoOr 1946)

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

97

as he condiions o possible experience These however are oo general

or oo large or he real The ne is so loose ha he larges fish pass

hrough hellip Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o

real experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which

differ in kind rom he caegories10

I does no ake much effor o noice he similariy wih heprevious argumen represenaion can give us knowledge ohe real only hrough he caegories Caegories are by defini-ion general while he real is singular Thereore represena-ion canno give us knowledge o he real An oher kind oknowledge is necessary Oher o general conceps are singular

conceps and only he later can give us knowledge o he realDeleuze hen has saged prety much he same argumenagains represenaion ha he has saged in avour o im-mediae knowledge rom his earlies wriings up o Diffeenceand Repeiion Le us briefly analyse he srucure o hisargumen I consiss o wo pars he firs criical par layshe basis or he second consrucive par Alhough i migh be ineresing o quesion he criical par o he argumeni will be bes o leave ha aside or now and ocus insead

on is consrucive par which is much more imporan ormy presen purpose

Deleuzersquos conclusion o he criical par o he argumenpresens he firs premise o he second consrucive par inorder o ge a he knowledge o he hing iselhe real anoher kind o knowledge is necessary This oher knowledgeis supposed o be immediae and o consis o he creaionand applicaion o some kind o singular conceps concepsappropriae o he hing iselhe real In order o learn more

abou his ohe knowledge i is necessary o reurn o he exsmenioned above

Alhough i was one o Deleuzersquos earlies published wri-ings laer explicily disowned by him along everyhing elsepublished beore 1953 ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquomigh very well be he mos revealing ex by Deleuze when

10 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 68

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Speculations V

98

i comes o he quesion o wha his ohe knowledge is sup-posed o be The shor answer would be mahesis universalisBu hen wha is mahesis univesalis According o Deleuzehe opposiion o science and philosophy has opened upa undamenal dualism wihin knowledge he Caresiandualism beween res exensa and res cogians11 Mahesis uni-versalis (universal knowledge or universal science) nameshe desire o overcome his dualism and accomplish a ldquouniyo knowledgerdquo12 This uniy is ldquohe uniy o lie iselrdquo ldquoLieis he uniy o he soul as he idea o he body and o he body as he exension o he soulrdquo13 Accordingly ldquomahesisdeploys isel a he level o lie o living man i is fis and

foremos a hinking of incarnaion and of individualitrdquo14

Buhow does mahesis atain his knowledge o incarnaion andindividualiy As we have seen boh science and philosophyreduce he sensible objec o an objec o hough In ordero overcome his dualiy o he objec o hough and hesensible objec he mehod o mahesis mus reduce ldquohisobjec o hough back o he sensible quaniy o qualiyrdquo15 I achieves his hrough he deploymen o he symbol whichpresens precisely ldquoa sensible objec as he incarnaion o

an objec o houghrdquo his sensible objec being ldquohe veryincarnaion o knowledgerdquo16 And finally ldquohe symbol is heideniy he encoune o he sensible objec and he objec ohough The sensible objec is called symbol and he objeco hough losing all scienific significaion is a hieroglyphor a cipher In heir ideniy hey orm he conceprdquo17

Wihou geting ino all he deails ha a complee accouno his ex would require his shor and condensed exposiion

11 Deleuze ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo 14212 Ibid 14213 Ibid 14314 Ibid my emphasis15 Ibid 15016 Ibid17 Ibid 150ndash51

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

99

o only a ew o is aspecs is more han enough o clearly showha mahesis universalis indeed is Deleuzersquos oher knowledgeDefined as a knowledge o incarnaion and individualiymahesis univesalis responds perecly o our earlier descrip-ion o Deleuzersquos ohe knowledge as an immediae knowledgeo he hing isel Furhermore his ex provides a clue aso how his singular knowledge migh be possible by way oconceps ormed hrough he deploymen o symbols

In his various wriings on Bergson his oher knowledge figures under he name o inuiion In ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquoDeleuze explicily pis inuiion agains science conraryo science which ldquoallows us only o conclude and o iner

wihou ever presening giving o us he hing in iselrdquo iis ldquoin and hrough inuiion ha somehing is presened isgiven in person insead o being inerred rom somehingelse and concludedrdquo18 Bu in Deleuzersquos reading o Bergsoninuiion is no o be undersood in he ordinary sense o heword Tha is inuiion is ldquoneiher a eeling an inspiraionnor a disorderly sympahy bu a ully developed mehodone o he mos ully developed mehods in philosophyrdquo amehod capable o esablishing philosophy as an ldquoabsoluely

lsquoprecisersquo discipline as precise in is field as capable o beingprolonged and ransmited as science isel isrdquo19 A quesionimmediaely springs o mind one ha Deleuze cerainlyacknowledges ldquoHow is inuiionmdashwhich primarily denoesan immediae knowledge (connaissance)mdashcapable o orminga mehod once i is acceped ha he mehod esseniallyinvolves one or several mediaionsrdquo20 As an answer o hisquesion Deleuze firs saes ha alhough Bergson ofen doespresen inuiion ldquoas a simple acrdquo his simpliciy ldquodoes no

exclude a qualiaive and virual mulipliciyrdquo ollowing whichhe ormulaes ldquohree differen sors o acs ha deerminehe rulesrdquo o inuiion as a mehod ldquoThe firs concerns he

18 Deleuze ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquo 2319 Gilles Deleuze Begsonism rans Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam(New York Zone Books 1991) 13-14 original emphasis20 Ibid 13-14

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

100

saing and creaing o problems he second he discoveryo genuine differences in kind he hird he apprehensiono real imerdquo21 The mos ineresing aspec is addressed inhe second rule which presens inuiion as a mehod ha

ldquorediscovers he rue differences in kind or ariculaions ohe realrdquo22 The mos concise accoun o his crucial aspec oinuiion as a mehod is o be ound in Deleuzersquos ex ldquoBerg-sonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo

Inuiion suggess isel as a mehod o difference or division o divide

whaever is composie ino wo endencies This mehod is somehing

oher han a spaial analysis more han a descripion o experience

and less (so i seems) han a ranscendenal analysis I reaches hecondiions o he given bu hese condiions are endency-subjecs

which are hemselves given in a cerain way hey are lived Wha is

more hey are a once he pure and he lived he living and he lived

he absolue and he lived Wha is essenial here is ha his ground is

expeienced and we know how much Bergson insised on he empirical

characer o he eacutelan vial Thus i is no he condiions o all possible

experience ha mus be reached bu he condiions o real experience

Schelling had already proposed his aim and defined philosophy as

a superior empiricism his ormulaion also applies o BergsonismThese condiions can and mus be grasped in an inuiion precisely

because hey are he condiions o real experience because hey are

no broader han wha is condiioned because he concep hey orm is

idenical o is objec hellip Reason mus reach all he way o he individual

he genuine concep all he way o he hing and comprehension all

he way o ldquohisrdquo23

The firs hing o noe wih regard o his quoe is ha i un-

equivocally reveals ha despie being a mehod and hereoreinvolving various mediaions inuiion sill remains an es-

21 Deleuze Begsonism 13-1422 Ibid 2123 Gilles Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo in Dese Islands andOher Texs 983089983097983093983091-983089983097983095983092 ed David Lapoujade rans Michael Taormina (NewYork Semioex(e) 2004) 35-36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

101

senially immediae aculy Le us summarise as a mehod odifference and division ha is a mehod capable o dividinghe composies ino wo endencies inuiion is able o reachhe condiions o he given or real experience These condi-ions are variously named by Deleuze ldquoendency-subjecsrdquo

ldquopurerdquo ldquohe livingrdquo ldquohe absoluerdquo and ldquohe groundrdquo Deleuzersquosclaim ha hese condiions ldquocan and mus be grasped ininuiionrdquo simply reieraes his previous claims ha hesecondiions are ldquohemselves given in a cerain wayrdquo ldquolivedrdquo and

ldquoexperiencedrdquo Thereore proclaiming i o be a mehod in noway excludes he immediacy o inuiion As Deleuze pus ihimsel ldquoInuiion has become mehod or raher mehod has

been reconciled wih he immediaerdquo24

Secondly his quoeconfirms once more ha or Deleuze he aim o philosophyis he knowledge o he hing isel or he individual andha his knowledge is atainable by consrucing a singularor ldquouniquerdquo concep ldquoidenical o is objecrdquo25 Finally hequoe above reveals no only ha Deleuzersquos philosophicalprojec as explicaed in Diffeence and Repeiion is bes readas a coninuaion o Bergsonrsquos own projec bu also in whichrespecs Deleuze depars rom i To demonsrae boh hese

claims i is necessary o urn our atenion o Diffeence andRepeiion isel

Wih regard o he firs claim some o he mos imporanpassages in Difference and Repeiion are saed in viruallyhe exac same erms as hose ound in he quoe above Onewell-known passage in paricular sands ou in his respec

Empiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics an apodicic

discipline only when we apprehend direcly in he sensible ha which

can only be sensed he very being o he sensible difference poenialdifference and difference in inensiy as he reason behind qualiaive

diversiy I is in difference ha movemen is produced as an ldquoeffecrdquo

ha phenomena flash heir meaning like signs The inense world o

differences in which we find he reason behind qualiies and he being

o he sensible is precisely he objec o a superior empiricism This

24 Deleuze Begsonism 3225 Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo 36

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Speculations V

102

empiricism eaches us a srange ldquoreasonrdquo ha o he muliple chaos

and difference (nomadic disribuions crowned anarchies)26

I we add o his quoe he already cied claim rom he endingo he firs chaper o Diffeence and Repeiion ha philosophyshould search or he condiions o real experience and nomerely possible experience i becomes quie obvious haDeleuze makes in his own name virually he very same claimsas hose he atribues o Bergson in he passage quoed aboverom ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo Wha hen doesDeleuze reain rom Bergson Firs and oremos Deleuzeclearly has no relinquished Bergsonrsquos belie in he power o

inuiion o immediaely apprehend he condiions o realexperience ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal andaesheics an apodicic discipline only when we apprehenddirecly in he sensible ha which can only be sensedrdquo (myemphasis) Likewise Deleuze reains he idea ha inuiionis a mehod o difference ie ha which inuiion direclyapprehends is diffeence ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo or

ldquohe very being o he sensiblerdquo is ldquodifference poenial di-erence and difference in inensiyrdquo or simply ldquohe inense

world o differencesrdquo I is in his world o differences ha

we mus find he lived realiy o a sub-represenaive domain I i

is rue ha represenaion has ideniy as is elemen and similariy

as is uni o measure hen pure presence such as i appears in he

simulacrum has he lsquodisparaersquo as is uni o measuremdashin oher words

always a difference o difference as is immediae elemen27

Add o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o ldquohe immediaerdquo

wih he ldquosub-represenaiverdquo28 and here can be no moredoub or Deleuze ldquohe inense world o differencesrdquo or

ldquosub-represenaive domainrdquo is ldquoa pure presencerdquo ldquoa livedrealiyrdquo or simply ldquohe immediaerdquo

26 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 56-5727 Ibid 6928 Ibid 56

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

103

Le us now address he second quesion in which respecdoes Deleuze depar rom Bergson The passage rom

ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo quoed earlier is ogrea assisance here In a seemingly ofand remark ahe beginning o he passage Deleuze makes he ollowingclaim inuiion as a mehod is ldquomore han a descripion oexperience and less (so i seems) han a anscendenal analysisrdquo(my emphasis) I is my conenion ha Deleuzersquos accouno he ranscenden or superior exercise o he aculies aspresened in Diffeence and Repeiionrsquos cenral chaper ldquoTheImage o Thoughrdquo is precisely he anscendenal version oBergsonrsquos inuiion as a mehod ha Deleuze invokes in his

quoe In order o confirm his claim le me briefly oulinehe basic conours o Deleuzersquos accoun o he ranscendenexercise o he aculies

Deleuze amously saes ldquoSomehing in he world orces uso hink This somehing is an objec no o recogniion buo a undamenal encoune rdquo29 The firs characerisic o heobjec o his encouner is ldquoha i can only be sensedrdquo30 Fol-lowing his Deleuze variously reers o ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo as ldquohe signrdquo ldquohe being o he sensiblerdquo ldquoha by

which he given is givenrdquo and he ldquoseniendumrdquo31 Furhermorei is imporan o highligh ha his objec o he encouneris ldquoimpercepible (insensible) rom he poin o view o anempirical exercise o he senses in which sensibiliy graspsonly ha which could also be grasped by oher aculies andis relaed wihin he conex o a common sense o an objecwhich also mus be apprehended by oher aculiesrdquo32 Con-rary o is empirical exercise hus defined ldquosensibiliy inhe presence o ha which can only be sensed (and is a he

same ime impercepible) finds isel beore is own limi hesign and raises isel o he level o a ranscenden exercise

29 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 139 original emphasis30 Ibid 13931 Ibid 139-4032 Ibid 140

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Speculations V

104

o he lsquonhrsquo powerrdquo33 Once sensibiliy has been raised o isranscenden exercise by is encouner wih he seniendum i

ldquoorces memory o remember he memoandum ha which canonly be recalledrdquo34 hereby raising memory o a ranscendenexercise o is own Finally memory in is urn

orces hough o grasp ha which can only be hough he cogiandum

or noeeon he Essence no he inelligible or his is sill no more han

he mode in which we hink ha which migh be somehing oher han

hough bu he being o he inelligible as hough his were boh he

final power o hough and he unhinkable35

According o Deleuze wha is revealed by his ldquoranscendendisjoined or superior exercise o he aculiesrdquo is preciselyheir ldquoranscendenal ormrdquo36 For in order o avoid racinghe ranscendenal orm o he aculies rom heir empiricalexercise as Kan does Deleuze claims ha

each aculy mus be borne o he exreme poin o is dissoluion a

which i alls prey o riple violence he violence o ha which orces

i o be exercised o ha which i is orced o grasp and which i alone

is able o grasp ye also ha o he ungraspable (rom he poin o viewo is empirical exercise)37

I is a his poin ha each aculy ldquodiscovers is own uniquepassionrdquo38 or is ranscendenal orm

As I have emphasised hough always begins wih anencouner wih he seniendum Bu wha is his paradoxi-cal elemen ha can only be sensed ye is impercepible ahe same ime This elemen which orces sensibiliy o is

ranscenden exercise is33 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14034 Ibid 14135 Ibid36 Ibid 14337 Ibid38 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

105

inensiy undersood as pure difference in isel as ha which is a once

boh impercepible or empirical sensibiliy which grasps inensiy only

already covered or mediaed by he qualiy o which i gives rise and

a he same ime ha which can be perceived only rom he poin o

view o a ranscendenal sensibiliy which apprehends i immediaely

in he encouner39

Thus or Deleuze hough always begins wih an immediaeapprehension o difference in isel Deleuze could hardly

be any more explici abou his belie in he idea o inuiiveknowledge The noion o he ranscenden exercise o heaculies represens nohing less han Deleuzersquos atemp o

give a properly ranscendenal accoun o his age-old philo-sophical idealOne las remark is in order I migh be objeced ha I am

equivocaing by eliding he disincion beween houghand knowledge As he objecion migh go no only doesDeleuze ake over he Kanian disincion beween houghand knowledge bu he is also expressly criical o he noiono ldquoknowledgerdquo hroughou he book This is o course rueBu i is also quie obvious ha ldquohoughrdquo in Difference and

Repeiion has almos he exac same uncion as ldquomahesisuniversalisrdquo and ldquoan oher knowledgerdquo have in his earlierexs I he accoun given above o he ranscenden exerciseo he aculies were no enough by isel his claim could beurher reinorced by highlighing he ac ha on variousoccasions hroughou he book Deleuze explicily invokes boh ldquoan esoeric knowledgerdquo40 and ldquomahesis universalisrdquo41 isel To esablish even sronger ies beween Deleuzersquos earlierexs and Diffeence and Repeiion in his regard le me quoe

rom he preace o he book

Empiricism is by no means a reacion agains conceps nor a simple

appeal o lived experience On he conrary i underakes he mos

39 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14440 Ibid 15 24241 Ibid 181 190 199

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Speculations V

106

insane creaion o conceps ever seen or heard Empiricism is a mysi-

cism and a mahemaicism o conceps bu precisely one which reas

he concep as objec o an encouner as a here-and-now or raher as

an Erewhon rom which emerge inexhausibly ever new differenly

disribued ldquoheresrdquo and ldquonowsrdquo42

Similar o his earlier work Deleuze here explicily invokeshe creaion o conceps idenical o heir objecs as he goalo philosophy Furhermore his idenificaion o empiricismwih ldquoa mysicism and a mahemaicism o concepsrdquo urherencourages he conclusion ha ldquoranscendenal empiricismrdquoisel is or Deleuze jus anoher name or mahesis univesalis

or inuiion as a mehod

Sellars Te Myth of Te Gven

Around he same ime as Gilles Deleuze was invoking hemyhical powers o mahesis univesalis Bergsonian inuiionand ranscendenal empiricism Wilrid Sellars was waginghis lielong batle agains ldquohe myh o he givenrdquo on he oherside o he Alanic By no means was Sellars he firs nor

will he be he las philosopher o ace his myhical creaurein an open field o batle Bu he may very well be is mosenacious opponen o dae Wha made Sellarsrsquos atack on hemyh o he given so powerul was his recogniion o is highlyproean naure As he amously saes a he very beginningo ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo

Many hings have been said o be ldquogivenrdquo sense conens maerial

objecs universals proposiions real connecions firs principles

even givenness isel And here is indeed a cerain way o consruinghe siuaions which philosophers analyze in hese erms which can

be said o be he ramework o givenness This ramework has been a

common eaure o mos o he major sysems o philosophy includ-

ing o use a Kanian urn o phrase boh ldquodogmaic raionalismrdquo and

ldquoskepical empiricismrdquo I has indeed been so pervasive ha ew i any

42 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion xx

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 6: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

97

as he condiions o possible experience These however are oo general

or oo large or he real The ne is so loose ha he larges fish pass

hrough hellip Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o

real experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which

differ in kind rom he caegories10

I does no ake much effor o noice he similariy wih heprevious argumen represenaion can give us knowledge ohe real only hrough he caegories Caegories are by defini-ion general while he real is singular Thereore represena-ion canno give us knowledge o he real An oher kind oknowledge is necessary Oher o general conceps are singular

conceps and only he later can give us knowledge o he realDeleuze hen has saged prety much he same argumenagains represenaion ha he has saged in avour o im-mediae knowledge rom his earlies wriings up o Diffeenceand Repeiion Le us briefly analyse he srucure o hisargumen I consiss o wo pars he firs criical par layshe basis or he second consrucive par Alhough i migh be ineresing o quesion he criical par o he argumeni will be bes o leave ha aside or now and ocus insead

on is consrucive par which is much more imporan ormy presen purpose

Deleuzersquos conclusion o he criical par o he argumenpresens he firs premise o he second consrucive par inorder o ge a he knowledge o he hing iselhe real anoher kind o knowledge is necessary This oher knowledgeis supposed o be immediae and o consis o he creaionand applicaion o some kind o singular conceps concepsappropriae o he hing iselhe real In order o learn more

abou his ohe knowledge i is necessary o reurn o he exsmenioned above

Alhough i was one o Deleuzersquos earlies published wri-ings laer explicily disowned by him along everyhing elsepublished beore 1953 ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquomigh very well be he mos revealing ex by Deleuze when

10 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 68

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Speculations V

98

i comes o he quesion o wha his ohe knowledge is sup-posed o be The shor answer would be mahesis universalisBu hen wha is mahesis univesalis According o Deleuzehe opposiion o science and philosophy has opened upa undamenal dualism wihin knowledge he Caresiandualism beween res exensa and res cogians11 Mahesis uni-versalis (universal knowledge or universal science) nameshe desire o overcome his dualism and accomplish a ldquouniyo knowledgerdquo12 This uniy is ldquohe uniy o lie iselrdquo ldquoLieis he uniy o he soul as he idea o he body and o he body as he exension o he soulrdquo13 Accordingly ldquomahesisdeploys isel a he level o lie o living man i is fis and

foremos a hinking of incarnaion and of individualitrdquo14

Buhow does mahesis atain his knowledge o incarnaion andindividualiy As we have seen boh science and philosophyreduce he sensible objec o an objec o hough In ordero overcome his dualiy o he objec o hough and hesensible objec he mehod o mahesis mus reduce ldquohisobjec o hough back o he sensible quaniy o qualiyrdquo15 I achieves his hrough he deploymen o he symbol whichpresens precisely ldquoa sensible objec as he incarnaion o

an objec o houghrdquo his sensible objec being ldquohe veryincarnaion o knowledgerdquo16 And finally ldquohe symbol is heideniy he encoune o he sensible objec and he objec ohough The sensible objec is called symbol and he objeco hough losing all scienific significaion is a hieroglyphor a cipher In heir ideniy hey orm he conceprdquo17

Wihou geting ino all he deails ha a complee accouno his ex would require his shor and condensed exposiion

11 Deleuze ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo 14212 Ibid 14213 Ibid 14314 Ibid my emphasis15 Ibid 15016 Ibid17 Ibid 150ndash51

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

99

o only a ew o is aspecs is more han enough o clearly showha mahesis universalis indeed is Deleuzersquos oher knowledgeDefined as a knowledge o incarnaion and individualiymahesis univesalis responds perecly o our earlier descrip-ion o Deleuzersquos ohe knowledge as an immediae knowledgeo he hing isel Furhermore his ex provides a clue aso how his singular knowledge migh be possible by way oconceps ormed hrough he deploymen o symbols

In his various wriings on Bergson his oher knowledge figures under he name o inuiion In ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquoDeleuze explicily pis inuiion agains science conraryo science which ldquoallows us only o conclude and o iner

wihou ever presening giving o us he hing in iselrdquo iis ldquoin and hrough inuiion ha somehing is presened isgiven in person insead o being inerred rom somehingelse and concludedrdquo18 Bu in Deleuzersquos reading o Bergsoninuiion is no o be undersood in he ordinary sense o heword Tha is inuiion is ldquoneiher a eeling an inspiraionnor a disorderly sympahy bu a ully developed mehodone o he mos ully developed mehods in philosophyrdquo amehod capable o esablishing philosophy as an ldquoabsoluely

lsquoprecisersquo discipline as precise in is field as capable o beingprolonged and ransmited as science isel isrdquo19 A quesionimmediaely springs o mind one ha Deleuze cerainlyacknowledges ldquoHow is inuiionmdashwhich primarily denoesan immediae knowledge (connaissance)mdashcapable o orminga mehod once i is acceped ha he mehod esseniallyinvolves one or several mediaionsrdquo20 As an answer o hisquesion Deleuze firs saes ha alhough Bergson ofen doespresen inuiion ldquoas a simple acrdquo his simpliciy ldquodoes no

exclude a qualiaive and virual mulipliciyrdquo ollowing whichhe ormulaes ldquohree differen sors o acs ha deerminehe rulesrdquo o inuiion as a mehod ldquoThe firs concerns he

18 Deleuze ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquo 2319 Gilles Deleuze Begsonism rans Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam(New York Zone Books 1991) 13-14 original emphasis20 Ibid 13-14

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

100

saing and creaing o problems he second he discoveryo genuine differences in kind he hird he apprehensiono real imerdquo21 The mos ineresing aspec is addressed inhe second rule which presens inuiion as a mehod ha

ldquorediscovers he rue differences in kind or ariculaions ohe realrdquo22 The mos concise accoun o his crucial aspec oinuiion as a mehod is o be ound in Deleuzersquos ex ldquoBerg-sonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo

Inuiion suggess isel as a mehod o difference or division o divide

whaever is composie ino wo endencies This mehod is somehing

oher han a spaial analysis more han a descripion o experience

and less (so i seems) han a ranscendenal analysis I reaches hecondiions o he given bu hese condiions are endency-subjecs

which are hemselves given in a cerain way hey are lived Wha is

more hey are a once he pure and he lived he living and he lived

he absolue and he lived Wha is essenial here is ha his ground is

expeienced and we know how much Bergson insised on he empirical

characer o he eacutelan vial Thus i is no he condiions o all possible

experience ha mus be reached bu he condiions o real experience

Schelling had already proposed his aim and defined philosophy as

a superior empiricism his ormulaion also applies o BergsonismThese condiions can and mus be grasped in an inuiion precisely

because hey are he condiions o real experience because hey are

no broader han wha is condiioned because he concep hey orm is

idenical o is objec hellip Reason mus reach all he way o he individual

he genuine concep all he way o he hing and comprehension all

he way o ldquohisrdquo23

The firs hing o noe wih regard o his quoe is ha i un-

equivocally reveals ha despie being a mehod and hereoreinvolving various mediaions inuiion sill remains an es-

21 Deleuze Begsonism 13-1422 Ibid 2123 Gilles Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo in Dese Islands andOher Texs 983089983097983093983091-983089983097983095983092 ed David Lapoujade rans Michael Taormina (NewYork Semioex(e) 2004) 35-36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

101

senially immediae aculy Le us summarise as a mehod odifference and division ha is a mehod capable o dividinghe composies ino wo endencies inuiion is able o reachhe condiions o he given or real experience These condi-ions are variously named by Deleuze ldquoendency-subjecsrdquo

ldquopurerdquo ldquohe livingrdquo ldquohe absoluerdquo and ldquohe groundrdquo Deleuzersquosclaim ha hese condiions ldquocan and mus be grasped ininuiionrdquo simply reieraes his previous claims ha hesecondiions are ldquohemselves given in a cerain wayrdquo ldquolivedrdquo and

ldquoexperiencedrdquo Thereore proclaiming i o be a mehod in noway excludes he immediacy o inuiion As Deleuze pus ihimsel ldquoInuiion has become mehod or raher mehod has

been reconciled wih he immediaerdquo24

Secondly his quoeconfirms once more ha or Deleuze he aim o philosophyis he knowledge o he hing isel or he individual andha his knowledge is atainable by consrucing a singularor ldquouniquerdquo concep ldquoidenical o is objecrdquo25 Finally hequoe above reveals no only ha Deleuzersquos philosophicalprojec as explicaed in Diffeence and Repeiion is bes readas a coninuaion o Bergsonrsquos own projec bu also in whichrespecs Deleuze depars rom i To demonsrae boh hese

claims i is necessary o urn our atenion o Diffeence andRepeiion isel

Wih regard o he firs claim some o he mos imporanpassages in Difference and Repeiion are saed in viruallyhe exac same erms as hose ound in he quoe above Onewell-known passage in paricular sands ou in his respec

Empiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics an apodicic

discipline only when we apprehend direcly in he sensible ha which

can only be sensed he very being o he sensible difference poenialdifference and difference in inensiy as he reason behind qualiaive

diversiy I is in difference ha movemen is produced as an ldquoeffecrdquo

ha phenomena flash heir meaning like signs The inense world o

differences in which we find he reason behind qualiies and he being

o he sensible is precisely he objec o a superior empiricism This

24 Deleuze Begsonism 3225 Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo 36

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Speculations V

102

empiricism eaches us a srange ldquoreasonrdquo ha o he muliple chaos

and difference (nomadic disribuions crowned anarchies)26

I we add o his quoe he already cied claim rom he endingo he firs chaper o Diffeence and Repeiion ha philosophyshould search or he condiions o real experience and nomerely possible experience i becomes quie obvious haDeleuze makes in his own name virually he very same claimsas hose he atribues o Bergson in he passage quoed aboverom ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo Wha hen doesDeleuze reain rom Bergson Firs and oremos Deleuzeclearly has no relinquished Bergsonrsquos belie in he power o

inuiion o immediaely apprehend he condiions o realexperience ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal andaesheics an apodicic discipline only when we apprehenddirecly in he sensible ha which can only be sensedrdquo (myemphasis) Likewise Deleuze reains he idea ha inuiionis a mehod o difference ie ha which inuiion direclyapprehends is diffeence ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo or

ldquohe very being o he sensiblerdquo is ldquodifference poenial di-erence and difference in inensiyrdquo or simply ldquohe inense

world o differencesrdquo I is in his world o differences ha

we mus find he lived realiy o a sub-represenaive domain I i

is rue ha represenaion has ideniy as is elemen and similariy

as is uni o measure hen pure presence such as i appears in he

simulacrum has he lsquodisparaersquo as is uni o measuremdashin oher words

always a difference o difference as is immediae elemen27

Add o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o ldquohe immediaerdquo

wih he ldquosub-represenaiverdquo28 and here can be no moredoub or Deleuze ldquohe inense world o differencesrdquo or

ldquosub-represenaive domainrdquo is ldquoa pure presencerdquo ldquoa livedrealiyrdquo or simply ldquohe immediaerdquo

26 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 56-5727 Ibid 6928 Ibid 56

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

103

Le us now address he second quesion in which respecdoes Deleuze depar rom Bergson The passage rom

ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo quoed earlier is ogrea assisance here In a seemingly ofand remark ahe beginning o he passage Deleuze makes he ollowingclaim inuiion as a mehod is ldquomore han a descripion oexperience and less (so i seems) han a anscendenal analysisrdquo(my emphasis) I is my conenion ha Deleuzersquos accouno he ranscenden or superior exercise o he aculies aspresened in Diffeence and Repeiionrsquos cenral chaper ldquoTheImage o Thoughrdquo is precisely he anscendenal version oBergsonrsquos inuiion as a mehod ha Deleuze invokes in his

quoe In order o confirm his claim le me briefly oulinehe basic conours o Deleuzersquos accoun o he ranscendenexercise o he aculies

Deleuze amously saes ldquoSomehing in he world orces uso hink This somehing is an objec no o recogniion buo a undamenal encoune rdquo29 The firs characerisic o heobjec o his encouner is ldquoha i can only be sensedrdquo30 Fol-lowing his Deleuze variously reers o ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo as ldquohe signrdquo ldquohe being o he sensiblerdquo ldquoha by

which he given is givenrdquo and he ldquoseniendumrdquo31 Furhermorei is imporan o highligh ha his objec o he encouneris ldquoimpercepible (insensible) rom he poin o view o anempirical exercise o he senses in which sensibiliy graspsonly ha which could also be grasped by oher aculies andis relaed wihin he conex o a common sense o an objecwhich also mus be apprehended by oher aculiesrdquo32 Con-rary o is empirical exercise hus defined ldquosensibiliy inhe presence o ha which can only be sensed (and is a he

same ime impercepible) finds isel beore is own limi hesign and raises isel o he level o a ranscenden exercise

29 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 139 original emphasis30 Ibid 13931 Ibid 139-4032 Ibid 140

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Speculations V

104

o he lsquonhrsquo powerrdquo33 Once sensibiliy has been raised o isranscenden exercise by is encouner wih he seniendum i

ldquoorces memory o remember he memoandum ha which canonly be recalledrdquo34 hereby raising memory o a ranscendenexercise o is own Finally memory in is urn

orces hough o grasp ha which can only be hough he cogiandum

or noeeon he Essence no he inelligible or his is sill no more han

he mode in which we hink ha which migh be somehing oher han

hough bu he being o he inelligible as hough his were boh he

final power o hough and he unhinkable35

According o Deleuze wha is revealed by his ldquoranscendendisjoined or superior exercise o he aculiesrdquo is preciselyheir ldquoranscendenal ormrdquo36 For in order o avoid racinghe ranscendenal orm o he aculies rom heir empiricalexercise as Kan does Deleuze claims ha

each aculy mus be borne o he exreme poin o is dissoluion a

which i alls prey o riple violence he violence o ha which orces

i o be exercised o ha which i is orced o grasp and which i alone

is able o grasp ye also ha o he ungraspable (rom he poin o viewo is empirical exercise)37

I is a his poin ha each aculy ldquodiscovers is own uniquepassionrdquo38 or is ranscendenal orm

As I have emphasised hough always begins wih anencouner wih he seniendum Bu wha is his paradoxi-cal elemen ha can only be sensed ye is impercepible ahe same ime This elemen which orces sensibiliy o is

ranscenden exercise is33 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14034 Ibid 14135 Ibid36 Ibid 14337 Ibid38 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

105

inensiy undersood as pure difference in isel as ha which is a once

boh impercepible or empirical sensibiliy which grasps inensiy only

already covered or mediaed by he qualiy o which i gives rise and

a he same ime ha which can be perceived only rom he poin o

view o a ranscendenal sensibiliy which apprehends i immediaely

in he encouner39

Thus or Deleuze hough always begins wih an immediaeapprehension o difference in isel Deleuze could hardly

be any more explici abou his belie in he idea o inuiiveknowledge The noion o he ranscenden exercise o heaculies represens nohing less han Deleuzersquos atemp o

give a properly ranscendenal accoun o his age-old philo-sophical idealOne las remark is in order I migh be objeced ha I am

equivocaing by eliding he disincion beween houghand knowledge As he objecion migh go no only doesDeleuze ake over he Kanian disincion beween houghand knowledge bu he is also expressly criical o he noiono ldquoknowledgerdquo hroughou he book This is o course rueBu i is also quie obvious ha ldquohoughrdquo in Difference and

Repeiion has almos he exac same uncion as ldquomahesisuniversalisrdquo and ldquoan oher knowledgerdquo have in his earlierexs I he accoun given above o he ranscenden exerciseo he aculies were no enough by isel his claim could beurher reinorced by highlighing he ac ha on variousoccasions hroughou he book Deleuze explicily invokes boh ldquoan esoeric knowledgerdquo40 and ldquomahesis universalisrdquo41 isel To esablish even sronger ies beween Deleuzersquos earlierexs and Diffeence and Repeiion in his regard le me quoe

rom he preace o he book

Empiricism is by no means a reacion agains conceps nor a simple

appeal o lived experience On he conrary i underakes he mos

39 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14440 Ibid 15 24241 Ibid 181 190 199

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Speculations V

106

insane creaion o conceps ever seen or heard Empiricism is a mysi-

cism and a mahemaicism o conceps bu precisely one which reas

he concep as objec o an encouner as a here-and-now or raher as

an Erewhon rom which emerge inexhausibly ever new differenly

disribued ldquoheresrdquo and ldquonowsrdquo42

Similar o his earlier work Deleuze here explicily invokeshe creaion o conceps idenical o heir objecs as he goalo philosophy Furhermore his idenificaion o empiricismwih ldquoa mysicism and a mahemaicism o concepsrdquo urherencourages he conclusion ha ldquoranscendenal empiricismrdquoisel is or Deleuze jus anoher name or mahesis univesalis

or inuiion as a mehod

Sellars Te Myth of Te Gven

Around he same ime as Gilles Deleuze was invoking hemyhical powers o mahesis univesalis Bergsonian inuiionand ranscendenal empiricism Wilrid Sellars was waginghis lielong batle agains ldquohe myh o he givenrdquo on he oherside o he Alanic By no means was Sellars he firs nor

will he be he las philosopher o ace his myhical creaurein an open field o batle Bu he may very well be is mosenacious opponen o dae Wha made Sellarsrsquos atack on hemyh o he given so powerul was his recogniion o is highlyproean naure As he amously saes a he very beginningo ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo

Many hings have been said o be ldquogivenrdquo sense conens maerial

objecs universals proposiions real connecions firs principles

even givenness isel And here is indeed a cerain way o consruinghe siuaions which philosophers analyze in hese erms which can

be said o be he ramework o givenness This ramework has been a

common eaure o mos o he major sysems o philosophy includ-

ing o use a Kanian urn o phrase boh ldquodogmaic raionalismrdquo and

ldquoskepical empiricismrdquo I has indeed been so pervasive ha ew i any

42 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion xx

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 7: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

98

i comes o he quesion o wha his ohe knowledge is sup-posed o be The shor answer would be mahesis universalisBu hen wha is mahesis univesalis According o Deleuzehe opposiion o science and philosophy has opened upa undamenal dualism wihin knowledge he Caresiandualism beween res exensa and res cogians11 Mahesis uni-versalis (universal knowledge or universal science) nameshe desire o overcome his dualism and accomplish a ldquouniyo knowledgerdquo12 This uniy is ldquohe uniy o lie iselrdquo ldquoLieis he uniy o he soul as he idea o he body and o he body as he exension o he soulrdquo13 Accordingly ldquomahesisdeploys isel a he level o lie o living man i is fis and

foremos a hinking of incarnaion and of individualitrdquo14

Buhow does mahesis atain his knowledge o incarnaion andindividualiy As we have seen boh science and philosophyreduce he sensible objec o an objec o hough In ordero overcome his dualiy o he objec o hough and hesensible objec he mehod o mahesis mus reduce ldquohisobjec o hough back o he sensible quaniy o qualiyrdquo15 I achieves his hrough he deploymen o he symbol whichpresens precisely ldquoa sensible objec as he incarnaion o

an objec o houghrdquo his sensible objec being ldquohe veryincarnaion o knowledgerdquo16 And finally ldquohe symbol is heideniy he encoune o he sensible objec and he objec ohough The sensible objec is called symbol and he objeco hough losing all scienific significaion is a hieroglyphor a cipher In heir ideniy hey orm he conceprdquo17

Wihou geting ino all he deails ha a complee accouno his ex would require his shor and condensed exposiion

11 Deleuze ldquoMahesis Science and Philosophyrdquo 14212 Ibid 14213 Ibid 14314 Ibid my emphasis15 Ibid 15016 Ibid17 Ibid 150ndash51

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

99

o only a ew o is aspecs is more han enough o clearly showha mahesis universalis indeed is Deleuzersquos oher knowledgeDefined as a knowledge o incarnaion and individualiymahesis univesalis responds perecly o our earlier descrip-ion o Deleuzersquos ohe knowledge as an immediae knowledgeo he hing isel Furhermore his ex provides a clue aso how his singular knowledge migh be possible by way oconceps ormed hrough he deploymen o symbols

In his various wriings on Bergson his oher knowledge figures under he name o inuiion In ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquoDeleuze explicily pis inuiion agains science conraryo science which ldquoallows us only o conclude and o iner

wihou ever presening giving o us he hing in iselrdquo iis ldquoin and hrough inuiion ha somehing is presened isgiven in person insead o being inerred rom somehingelse and concludedrdquo18 Bu in Deleuzersquos reading o Bergsoninuiion is no o be undersood in he ordinary sense o heword Tha is inuiion is ldquoneiher a eeling an inspiraionnor a disorderly sympahy bu a ully developed mehodone o he mos ully developed mehods in philosophyrdquo amehod capable o esablishing philosophy as an ldquoabsoluely

lsquoprecisersquo discipline as precise in is field as capable o beingprolonged and ransmited as science isel isrdquo19 A quesionimmediaely springs o mind one ha Deleuze cerainlyacknowledges ldquoHow is inuiionmdashwhich primarily denoesan immediae knowledge (connaissance)mdashcapable o orminga mehod once i is acceped ha he mehod esseniallyinvolves one or several mediaionsrdquo20 As an answer o hisquesion Deleuze firs saes ha alhough Bergson ofen doespresen inuiion ldquoas a simple acrdquo his simpliciy ldquodoes no

exclude a qualiaive and virual mulipliciyrdquo ollowing whichhe ormulaes ldquohree differen sors o acs ha deerminehe rulesrdquo o inuiion as a mehod ldquoThe firs concerns he

18 Deleuze ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquo 2319 Gilles Deleuze Begsonism rans Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam(New York Zone Books 1991) 13-14 original emphasis20 Ibid 13-14

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

100

saing and creaing o problems he second he discoveryo genuine differences in kind he hird he apprehensiono real imerdquo21 The mos ineresing aspec is addressed inhe second rule which presens inuiion as a mehod ha

ldquorediscovers he rue differences in kind or ariculaions ohe realrdquo22 The mos concise accoun o his crucial aspec oinuiion as a mehod is o be ound in Deleuzersquos ex ldquoBerg-sonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo

Inuiion suggess isel as a mehod o difference or division o divide

whaever is composie ino wo endencies This mehod is somehing

oher han a spaial analysis more han a descripion o experience

and less (so i seems) han a ranscendenal analysis I reaches hecondiions o he given bu hese condiions are endency-subjecs

which are hemselves given in a cerain way hey are lived Wha is

more hey are a once he pure and he lived he living and he lived

he absolue and he lived Wha is essenial here is ha his ground is

expeienced and we know how much Bergson insised on he empirical

characer o he eacutelan vial Thus i is no he condiions o all possible

experience ha mus be reached bu he condiions o real experience

Schelling had already proposed his aim and defined philosophy as

a superior empiricism his ormulaion also applies o BergsonismThese condiions can and mus be grasped in an inuiion precisely

because hey are he condiions o real experience because hey are

no broader han wha is condiioned because he concep hey orm is

idenical o is objec hellip Reason mus reach all he way o he individual

he genuine concep all he way o he hing and comprehension all

he way o ldquohisrdquo23

The firs hing o noe wih regard o his quoe is ha i un-

equivocally reveals ha despie being a mehod and hereoreinvolving various mediaions inuiion sill remains an es-

21 Deleuze Begsonism 13-1422 Ibid 2123 Gilles Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo in Dese Islands andOher Texs 983089983097983093983091-983089983097983095983092 ed David Lapoujade rans Michael Taormina (NewYork Semioex(e) 2004) 35-36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

101

senially immediae aculy Le us summarise as a mehod odifference and division ha is a mehod capable o dividinghe composies ino wo endencies inuiion is able o reachhe condiions o he given or real experience These condi-ions are variously named by Deleuze ldquoendency-subjecsrdquo

ldquopurerdquo ldquohe livingrdquo ldquohe absoluerdquo and ldquohe groundrdquo Deleuzersquosclaim ha hese condiions ldquocan and mus be grasped ininuiionrdquo simply reieraes his previous claims ha hesecondiions are ldquohemselves given in a cerain wayrdquo ldquolivedrdquo and

ldquoexperiencedrdquo Thereore proclaiming i o be a mehod in noway excludes he immediacy o inuiion As Deleuze pus ihimsel ldquoInuiion has become mehod or raher mehod has

been reconciled wih he immediaerdquo24

Secondly his quoeconfirms once more ha or Deleuze he aim o philosophyis he knowledge o he hing isel or he individual andha his knowledge is atainable by consrucing a singularor ldquouniquerdquo concep ldquoidenical o is objecrdquo25 Finally hequoe above reveals no only ha Deleuzersquos philosophicalprojec as explicaed in Diffeence and Repeiion is bes readas a coninuaion o Bergsonrsquos own projec bu also in whichrespecs Deleuze depars rom i To demonsrae boh hese

claims i is necessary o urn our atenion o Diffeence andRepeiion isel

Wih regard o he firs claim some o he mos imporanpassages in Difference and Repeiion are saed in viruallyhe exac same erms as hose ound in he quoe above Onewell-known passage in paricular sands ou in his respec

Empiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics an apodicic

discipline only when we apprehend direcly in he sensible ha which

can only be sensed he very being o he sensible difference poenialdifference and difference in inensiy as he reason behind qualiaive

diversiy I is in difference ha movemen is produced as an ldquoeffecrdquo

ha phenomena flash heir meaning like signs The inense world o

differences in which we find he reason behind qualiies and he being

o he sensible is precisely he objec o a superior empiricism This

24 Deleuze Begsonism 3225 Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo 36

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Speculations V

102

empiricism eaches us a srange ldquoreasonrdquo ha o he muliple chaos

and difference (nomadic disribuions crowned anarchies)26

I we add o his quoe he already cied claim rom he endingo he firs chaper o Diffeence and Repeiion ha philosophyshould search or he condiions o real experience and nomerely possible experience i becomes quie obvious haDeleuze makes in his own name virually he very same claimsas hose he atribues o Bergson in he passage quoed aboverom ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo Wha hen doesDeleuze reain rom Bergson Firs and oremos Deleuzeclearly has no relinquished Bergsonrsquos belie in he power o

inuiion o immediaely apprehend he condiions o realexperience ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal andaesheics an apodicic discipline only when we apprehenddirecly in he sensible ha which can only be sensedrdquo (myemphasis) Likewise Deleuze reains he idea ha inuiionis a mehod o difference ie ha which inuiion direclyapprehends is diffeence ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo or

ldquohe very being o he sensiblerdquo is ldquodifference poenial di-erence and difference in inensiyrdquo or simply ldquohe inense

world o differencesrdquo I is in his world o differences ha

we mus find he lived realiy o a sub-represenaive domain I i

is rue ha represenaion has ideniy as is elemen and similariy

as is uni o measure hen pure presence such as i appears in he

simulacrum has he lsquodisparaersquo as is uni o measuremdashin oher words

always a difference o difference as is immediae elemen27

Add o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o ldquohe immediaerdquo

wih he ldquosub-represenaiverdquo28 and here can be no moredoub or Deleuze ldquohe inense world o differencesrdquo or

ldquosub-represenaive domainrdquo is ldquoa pure presencerdquo ldquoa livedrealiyrdquo or simply ldquohe immediaerdquo

26 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 56-5727 Ibid 6928 Ibid 56

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

103

Le us now address he second quesion in which respecdoes Deleuze depar rom Bergson The passage rom

ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo quoed earlier is ogrea assisance here In a seemingly ofand remark ahe beginning o he passage Deleuze makes he ollowingclaim inuiion as a mehod is ldquomore han a descripion oexperience and less (so i seems) han a anscendenal analysisrdquo(my emphasis) I is my conenion ha Deleuzersquos accouno he ranscenden or superior exercise o he aculies aspresened in Diffeence and Repeiionrsquos cenral chaper ldquoTheImage o Thoughrdquo is precisely he anscendenal version oBergsonrsquos inuiion as a mehod ha Deleuze invokes in his

quoe In order o confirm his claim le me briefly oulinehe basic conours o Deleuzersquos accoun o he ranscendenexercise o he aculies

Deleuze amously saes ldquoSomehing in he world orces uso hink This somehing is an objec no o recogniion buo a undamenal encoune rdquo29 The firs characerisic o heobjec o his encouner is ldquoha i can only be sensedrdquo30 Fol-lowing his Deleuze variously reers o ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo as ldquohe signrdquo ldquohe being o he sensiblerdquo ldquoha by

which he given is givenrdquo and he ldquoseniendumrdquo31 Furhermorei is imporan o highligh ha his objec o he encouneris ldquoimpercepible (insensible) rom he poin o view o anempirical exercise o he senses in which sensibiliy graspsonly ha which could also be grasped by oher aculies andis relaed wihin he conex o a common sense o an objecwhich also mus be apprehended by oher aculiesrdquo32 Con-rary o is empirical exercise hus defined ldquosensibiliy inhe presence o ha which can only be sensed (and is a he

same ime impercepible) finds isel beore is own limi hesign and raises isel o he level o a ranscenden exercise

29 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 139 original emphasis30 Ibid 13931 Ibid 139-4032 Ibid 140

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

104

o he lsquonhrsquo powerrdquo33 Once sensibiliy has been raised o isranscenden exercise by is encouner wih he seniendum i

ldquoorces memory o remember he memoandum ha which canonly be recalledrdquo34 hereby raising memory o a ranscendenexercise o is own Finally memory in is urn

orces hough o grasp ha which can only be hough he cogiandum

or noeeon he Essence no he inelligible or his is sill no more han

he mode in which we hink ha which migh be somehing oher han

hough bu he being o he inelligible as hough his were boh he

final power o hough and he unhinkable35

According o Deleuze wha is revealed by his ldquoranscendendisjoined or superior exercise o he aculiesrdquo is preciselyheir ldquoranscendenal ormrdquo36 For in order o avoid racinghe ranscendenal orm o he aculies rom heir empiricalexercise as Kan does Deleuze claims ha

each aculy mus be borne o he exreme poin o is dissoluion a

which i alls prey o riple violence he violence o ha which orces

i o be exercised o ha which i is orced o grasp and which i alone

is able o grasp ye also ha o he ungraspable (rom he poin o viewo is empirical exercise)37

I is a his poin ha each aculy ldquodiscovers is own uniquepassionrdquo38 or is ranscendenal orm

As I have emphasised hough always begins wih anencouner wih he seniendum Bu wha is his paradoxi-cal elemen ha can only be sensed ye is impercepible ahe same ime This elemen which orces sensibiliy o is

ranscenden exercise is33 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14034 Ibid 14135 Ibid36 Ibid 14337 Ibid38 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

105

inensiy undersood as pure difference in isel as ha which is a once

boh impercepible or empirical sensibiliy which grasps inensiy only

already covered or mediaed by he qualiy o which i gives rise and

a he same ime ha which can be perceived only rom he poin o

view o a ranscendenal sensibiliy which apprehends i immediaely

in he encouner39

Thus or Deleuze hough always begins wih an immediaeapprehension o difference in isel Deleuze could hardly

be any more explici abou his belie in he idea o inuiiveknowledge The noion o he ranscenden exercise o heaculies represens nohing less han Deleuzersquos atemp o

give a properly ranscendenal accoun o his age-old philo-sophical idealOne las remark is in order I migh be objeced ha I am

equivocaing by eliding he disincion beween houghand knowledge As he objecion migh go no only doesDeleuze ake over he Kanian disincion beween houghand knowledge bu he is also expressly criical o he noiono ldquoknowledgerdquo hroughou he book This is o course rueBu i is also quie obvious ha ldquohoughrdquo in Difference and

Repeiion has almos he exac same uncion as ldquomahesisuniversalisrdquo and ldquoan oher knowledgerdquo have in his earlierexs I he accoun given above o he ranscenden exerciseo he aculies were no enough by isel his claim could beurher reinorced by highlighing he ac ha on variousoccasions hroughou he book Deleuze explicily invokes boh ldquoan esoeric knowledgerdquo40 and ldquomahesis universalisrdquo41 isel To esablish even sronger ies beween Deleuzersquos earlierexs and Diffeence and Repeiion in his regard le me quoe

rom he preace o he book

Empiricism is by no means a reacion agains conceps nor a simple

appeal o lived experience On he conrary i underakes he mos

39 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14440 Ibid 15 24241 Ibid 181 190 199

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

106

insane creaion o conceps ever seen or heard Empiricism is a mysi-

cism and a mahemaicism o conceps bu precisely one which reas

he concep as objec o an encouner as a here-and-now or raher as

an Erewhon rom which emerge inexhausibly ever new differenly

disribued ldquoheresrdquo and ldquonowsrdquo42

Similar o his earlier work Deleuze here explicily invokeshe creaion o conceps idenical o heir objecs as he goalo philosophy Furhermore his idenificaion o empiricismwih ldquoa mysicism and a mahemaicism o concepsrdquo urherencourages he conclusion ha ldquoranscendenal empiricismrdquoisel is or Deleuze jus anoher name or mahesis univesalis

or inuiion as a mehod

Sellars Te Myth of Te Gven

Around he same ime as Gilles Deleuze was invoking hemyhical powers o mahesis univesalis Bergsonian inuiionand ranscendenal empiricism Wilrid Sellars was waginghis lielong batle agains ldquohe myh o he givenrdquo on he oherside o he Alanic By no means was Sellars he firs nor

will he be he las philosopher o ace his myhical creaurein an open field o batle Bu he may very well be is mosenacious opponen o dae Wha made Sellarsrsquos atack on hemyh o he given so powerul was his recogniion o is highlyproean naure As he amously saes a he very beginningo ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo

Many hings have been said o be ldquogivenrdquo sense conens maerial

objecs universals proposiions real connecions firs principles

even givenness isel And here is indeed a cerain way o consruinghe siuaions which philosophers analyze in hese erms which can

be said o be he ramework o givenness This ramework has been a

common eaure o mos o he major sysems o philosophy includ-

ing o use a Kanian urn o phrase boh ldquodogmaic raionalismrdquo and

ldquoskepical empiricismrdquo I has indeed been so pervasive ha ew i any

42 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion xx

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 8: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

99

o only a ew o is aspecs is more han enough o clearly showha mahesis universalis indeed is Deleuzersquos oher knowledgeDefined as a knowledge o incarnaion and individualiymahesis univesalis responds perecly o our earlier descrip-ion o Deleuzersquos ohe knowledge as an immediae knowledgeo he hing isel Furhermore his ex provides a clue aso how his singular knowledge migh be possible by way oconceps ormed hrough he deploymen o symbols

In his various wriings on Bergson his oher knowledge figures under he name o inuiion In ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquoDeleuze explicily pis inuiion agains science conraryo science which ldquoallows us only o conclude and o iner

wihou ever presening giving o us he hing in iselrdquo iis ldquoin and hrough inuiion ha somehing is presened isgiven in person insead o being inerred rom somehingelse and concludedrdquo18 Bu in Deleuzersquos reading o Bergsoninuiion is no o be undersood in he ordinary sense o heword Tha is inuiion is ldquoneiher a eeling an inspiraionnor a disorderly sympahy bu a ully developed mehodone o he mos ully developed mehods in philosophyrdquo amehod capable o esablishing philosophy as an ldquoabsoluely

lsquoprecisersquo discipline as precise in is field as capable o beingprolonged and ransmited as science isel isrdquo19 A quesionimmediaely springs o mind one ha Deleuze cerainlyacknowledges ldquoHow is inuiionmdashwhich primarily denoesan immediae knowledge (connaissance)mdashcapable o orminga mehod once i is acceped ha he mehod esseniallyinvolves one or several mediaionsrdquo20 As an answer o hisquesion Deleuze firs saes ha alhough Bergson ofen doespresen inuiion ldquoas a simple acrdquo his simpliciy ldquodoes no

exclude a qualiaive and virual mulipliciyrdquo ollowing whichhe ormulaes ldquohree differen sors o acs ha deerminehe rulesrdquo o inuiion as a mehod ldquoThe firs concerns he

18 Deleuze ldquoBergson 1859ndash1941rdquo 2319 Gilles Deleuze Begsonism rans Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam(New York Zone Books 1991) 13-14 original emphasis20 Ibid 13-14

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

100

saing and creaing o problems he second he discoveryo genuine differences in kind he hird he apprehensiono real imerdquo21 The mos ineresing aspec is addressed inhe second rule which presens inuiion as a mehod ha

ldquorediscovers he rue differences in kind or ariculaions ohe realrdquo22 The mos concise accoun o his crucial aspec oinuiion as a mehod is o be ound in Deleuzersquos ex ldquoBerg-sonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo

Inuiion suggess isel as a mehod o difference or division o divide

whaever is composie ino wo endencies This mehod is somehing

oher han a spaial analysis more han a descripion o experience

and less (so i seems) han a ranscendenal analysis I reaches hecondiions o he given bu hese condiions are endency-subjecs

which are hemselves given in a cerain way hey are lived Wha is

more hey are a once he pure and he lived he living and he lived

he absolue and he lived Wha is essenial here is ha his ground is

expeienced and we know how much Bergson insised on he empirical

characer o he eacutelan vial Thus i is no he condiions o all possible

experience ha mus be reached bu he condiions o real experience

Schelling had already proposed his aim and defined philosophy as

a superior empiricism his ormulaion also applies o BergsonismThese condiions can and mus be grasped in an inuiion precisely

because hey are he condiions o real experience because hey are

no broader han wha is condiioned because he concep hey orm is

idenical o is objec hellip Reason mus reach all he way o he individual

he genuine concep all he way o he hing and comprehension all

he way o ldquohisrdquo23

The firs hing o noe wih regard o his quoe is ha i un-

equivocally reveals ha despie being a mehod and hereoreinvolving various mediaions inuiion sill remains an es-

21 Deleuze Begsonism 13-1422 Ibid 2123 Gilles Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo in Dese Islands andOher Texs 983089983097983093983091-983089983097983095983092 ed David Lapoujade rans Michael Taormina (NewYork Semioex(e) 2004) 35-36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

101

senially immediae aculy Le us summarise as a mehod odifference and division ha is a mehod capable o dividinghe composies ino wo endencies inuiion is able o reachhe condiions o he given or real experience These condi-ions are variously named by Deleuze ldquoendency-subjecsrdquo

ldquopurerdquo ldquohe livingrdquo ldquohe absoluerdquo and ldquohe groundrdquo Deleuzersquosclaim ha hese condiions ldquocan and mus be grasped ininuiionrdquo simply reieraes his previous claims ha hesecondiions are ldquohemselves given in a cerain wayrdquo ldquolivedrdquo and

ldquoexperiencedrdquo Thereore proclaiming i o be a mehod in noway excludes he immediacy o inuiion As Deleuze pus ihimsel ldquoInuiion has become mehod or raher mehod has

been reconciled wih he immediaerdquo24

Secondly his quoeconfirms once more ha or Deleuze he aim o philosophyis he knowledge o he hing isel or he individual andha his knowledge is atainable by consrucing a singularor ldquouniquerdquo concep ldquoidenical o is objecrdquo25 Finally hequoe above reveals no only ha Deleuzersquos philosophicalprojec as explicaed in Diffeence and Repeiion is bes readas a coninuaion o Bergsonrsquos own projec bu also in whichrespecs Deleuze depars rom i To demonsrae boh hese

claims i is necessary o urn our atenion o Diffeence andRepeiion isel

Wih regard o he firs claim some o he mos imporanpassages in Difference and Repeiion are saed in viruallyhe exac same erms as hose ound in he quoe above Onewell-known passage in paricular sands ou in his respec

Empiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics an apodicic

discipline only when we apprehend direcly in he sensible ha which

can only be sensed he very being o he sensible difference poenialdifference and difference in inensiy as he reason behind qualiaive

diversiy I is in difference ha movemen is produced as an ldquoeffecrdquo

ha phenomena flash heir meaning like signs The inense world o

differences in which we find he reason behind qualiies and he being

o he sensible is precisely he objec o a superior empiricism This

24 Deleuze Begsonism 3225 Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo 36

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Speculations V

102

empiricism eaches us a srange ldquoreasonrdquo ha o he muliple chaos

and difference (nomadic disribuions crowned anarchies)26

I we add o his quoe he already cied claim rom he endingo he firs chaper o Diffeence and Repeiion ha philosophyshould search or he condiions o real experience and nomerely possible experience i becomes quie obvious haDeleuze makes in his own name virually he very same claimsas hose he atribues o Bergson in he passage quoed aboverom ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo Wha hen doesDeleuze reain rom Bergson Firs and oremos Deleuzeclearly has no relinquished Bergsonrsquos belie in he power o

inuiion o immediaely apprehend he condiions o realexperience ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal andaesheics an apodicic discipline only when we apprehenddirecly in he sensible ha which can only be sensedrdquo (myemphasis) Likewise Deleuze reains he idea ha inuiionis a mehod o difference ie ha which inuiion direclyapprehends is diffeence ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo or

ldquohe very being o he sensiblerdquo is ldquodifference poenial di-erence and difference in inensiyrdquo or simply ldquohe inense

world o differencesrdquo I is in his world o differences ha

we mus find he lived realiy o a sub-represenaive domain I i

is rue ha represenaion has ideniy as is elemen and similariy

as is uni o measure hen pure presence such as i appears in he

simulacrum has he lsquodisparaersquo as is uni o measuremdashin oher words

always a difference o difference as is immediae elemen27

Add o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o ldquohe immediaerdquo

wih he ldquosub-represenaiverdquo28 and here can be no moredoub or Deleuze ldquohe inense world o differencesrdquo or

ldquosub-represenaive domainrdquo is ldquoa pure presencerdquo ldquoa livedrealiyrdquo or simply ldquohe immediaerdquo

26 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 56-5727 Ibid 6928 Ibid 56

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

103

Le us now address he second quesion in which respecdoes Deleuze depar rom Bergson The passage rom

ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo quoed earlier is ogrea assisance here In a seemingly ofand remark ahe beginning o he passage Deleuze makes he ollowingclaim inuiion as a mehod is ldquomore han a descripion oexperience and less (so i seems) han a anscendenal analysisrdquo(my emphasis) I is my conenion ha Deleuzersquos accouno he ranscenden or superior exercise o he aculies aspresened in Diffeence and Repeiionrsquos cenral chaper ldquoTheImage o Thoughrdquo is precisely he anscendenal version oBergsonrsquos inuiion as a mehod ha Deleuze invokes in his

quoe In order o confirm his claim le me briefly oulinehe basic conours o Deleuzersquos accoun o he ranscendenexercise o he aculies

Deleuze amously saes ldquoSomehing in he world orces uso hink This somehing is an objec no o recogniion buo a undamenal encoune rdquo29 The firs characerisic o heobjec o his encouner is ldquoha i can only be sensedrdquo30 Fol-lowing his Deleuze variously reers o ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo as ldquohe signrdquo ldquohe being o he sensiblerdquo ldquoha by

which he given is givenrdquo and he ldquoseniendumrdquo31 Furhermorei is imporan o highligh ha his objec o he encouneris ldquoimpercepible (insensible) rom he poin o view o anempirical exercise o he senses in which sensibiliy graspsonly ha which could also be grasped by oher aculies andis relaed wihin he conex o a common sense o an objecwhich also mus be apprehended by oher aculiesrdquo32 Con-rary o is empirical exercise hus defined ldquosensibiliy inhe presence o ha which can only be sensed (and is a he

same ime impercepible) finds isel beore is own limi hesign and raises isel o he level o a ranscenden exercise

29 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 139 original emphasis30 Ibid 13931 Ibid 139-4032 Ibid 140

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

104

o he lsquonhrsquo powerrdquo33 Once sensibiliy has been raised o isranscenden exercise by is encouner wih he seniendum i

ldquoorces memory o remember he memoandum ha which canonly be recalledrdquo34 hereby raising memory o a ranscendenexercise o is own Finally memory in is urn

orces hough o grasp ha which can only be hough he cogiandum

or noeeon he Essence no he inelligible or his is sill no more han

he mode in which we hink ha which migh be somehing oher han

hough bu he being o he inelligible as hough his were boh he

final power o hough and he unhinkable35

According o Deleuze wha is revealed by his ldquoranscendendisjoined or superior exercise o he aculiesrdquo is preciselyheir ldquoranscendenal ormrdquo36 For in order o avoid racinghe ranscendenal orm o he aculies rom heir empiricalexercise as Kan does Deleuze claims ha

each aculy mus be borne o he exreme poin o is dissoluion a

which i alls prey o riple violence he violence o ha which orces

i o be exercised o ha which i is orced o grasp and which i alone

is able o grasp ye also ha o he ungraspable (rom he poin o viewo is empirical exercise)37

I is a his poin ha each aculy ldquodiscovers is own uniquepassionrdquo38 or is ranscendenal orm

As I have emphasised hough always begins wih anencouner wih he seniendum Bu wha is his paradoxi-cal elemen ha can only be sensed ye is impercepible ahe same ime This elemen which orces sensibiliy o is

ranscenden exercise is33 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14034 Ibid 14135 Ibid36 Ibid 14337 Ibid38 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

105

inensiy undersood as pure difference in isel as ha which is a once

boh impercepible or empirical sensibiliy which grasps inensiy only

already covered or mediaed by he qualiy o which i gives rise and

a he same ime ha which can be perceived only rom he poin o

view o a ranscendenal sensibiliy which apprehends i immediaely

in he encouner39

Thus or Deleuze hough always begins wih an immediaeapprehension o difference in isel Deleuze could hardly

be any more explici abou his belie in he idea o inuiiveknowledge The noion o he ranscenden exercise o heaculies represens nohing less han Deleuzersquos atemp o

give a properly ranscendenal accoun o his age-old philo-sophical idealOne las remark is in order I migh be objeced ha I am

equivocaing by eliding he disincion beween houghand knowledge As he objecion migh go no only doesDeleuze ake over he Kanian disincion beween houghand knowledge bu he is also expressly criical o he noiono ldquoknowledgerdquo hroughou he book This is o course rueBu i is also quie obvious ha ldquohoughrdquo in Difference and

Repeiion has almos he exac same uncion as ldquomahesisuniversalisrdquo and ldquoan oher knowledgerdquo have in his earlierexs I he accoun given above o he ranscenden exerciseo he aculies were no enough by isel his claim could beurher reinorced by highlighing he ac ha on variousoccasions hroughou he book Deleuze explicily invokes boh ldquoan esoeric knowledgerdquo40 and ldquomahesis universalisrdquo41 isel To esablish even sronger ies beween Deleuzersquos earlierexs and Diffeence and Repeiion in his regard le me quoe

rom he preace o he book

Empiricism is by no means a reacion agains conceps nor a simple

appeal o lived experience On he conrary i underakes he mos

39 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14440 Ibid 15 24241 Ibid 181 190 199

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Speculations V

106

insane creaion o conceps ever seen or heard Empiricism is a mysi-

cism and a mahemaicism o conceps bu precisely one which reas

he concep as objec o an encouner as a here-and-now or raher as

an Erewhon rom which emerge inexhausibly ever new differenly

disribued ldquoheresrdquo and ldquonowsrdquo42

Similar o his earlier work Deleuze here explicily invokeshe creaion o conceps idenical o heir objecs as he goalo philosophy Furhermore his idenificaion o empiricismwih ldquoa mysicism and a mahemaicism o concepsrdquo urherencourages he conclusion ha ldquoranscendenal empiricismrdquoisel is or Deleuze jus anoher name or mahesis univesalis

or inuiion as a mehod

Sellars Te Myth of Te Gven

Around he same ime as Gilles Deleuze was invoking hemyhical powers o mahesis univesalis Bergsonian inuiionand ranscendenal empiricism Wilrid Sellars was waginghis lielong batle agains ldquohe myh o he givenrdquo on he oherside o he Alanic By no means was Sellars he firs nor

will he be he las philosopher o ace his myhical creaurein an open field o batle Bu he may very well be is mosenacious opponen o dae Wha made Sellarsrsquos atack on hemyh o he given so powerul was his recogniion o is highlyproean naure As he amously saes a he very beginningo ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo

Many hings have been said o be ldquogivenrdquo sense conens maerial

objecs universals proposiions real connecions firs principles

even givenness isel And here is indeed a cerain way o consruinghe siuaions which philosophers analyze in hese erms which can

be said o be he ramework o givenness This ramework has been a

common eaure o mos o he major sysems o philosophy includ-

ing o use a Kanian urn o phrase boh ldquodogmaic raionalismrdquo and

ldquoskepical empiricismrdquo I has indeed been so pervasive ha ew i any

42 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion xx

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 9: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

100

saing and creaing o problems he second he discoveryo genuine differences in kind he hird he apprehensiono real imerdquo21 The mos ineresing aspec is addressed inhe second rule which presens inuiion as a mehod ha

ldquorediscovers he rue differences in kind or ariculaions ohe realrdquo22 The mos concise accoun o his crucial aspec oinuiion as a mehod is o be ound in Deleuzersquos ex ldquoBerg-sonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo

Inuiion suggess isel as a mehod o difference or division o divide

whaever is composie ino wo endencies This mehod is somehing

oher han a spaial analysis more han a descripion o experience

and less (so i seems) han a ranscendenal analysis I reaches hecondiions o he given bu hese condiions are endency-subjecs

which are hemselves given in a cerain way hey are lived Wha is

more hey are a once he pure and he lived he living and he lived

he absolue and he lived Wha is essenial here is ha his ground is

expeienced and we know how much Bergson insised on he empirical

characer o he eacutelan vial Thus i is no he condiions o all possible

experience ha mus be reached bu he condiions o real experience

Schelling had already proposed his aim and defined philosophy as

a superior empiricism his ormulaion also applies o BergsonismThese condiions can and mus be grasped in an inuiion precisely

because hey are he condiions o real experience because hey are

no broader han wha is condiioned because he concep hey orm is

idenical o is objec hellip Reason mus reach all he way o he individual

he genuine concep all he way o he hing and comprehension all

he way o ldquohisrdquo23

The firs hing o noe wih regard o his quoe is ha i un-

equivocally reveals ha despie being a mehod and hereoreinvolving various mediaions inuiion sill remains an es-

21 Deleuze Begsonism 13-1422 Ibid 2123 Gilles Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo in Dese Islands andOher Texs 983089983097983093983091-983089983097983095983092 ed David Lapoujade rans Michael Taormina (NewYork Semioex(e) 2004) 35-36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

101

senially immediae aculy Le us summarise as a mehod odifference and division ha is a mehod capable o dividinghe composies ino wo endencies inuiion is able o reachhe condiions o he given or real experience These condi-ions are variously named by Deleuze ldquoendency-subjecsrdquo

ldquopurerdquo ldquohe livingrdquo ldquohe absoluerdquo and ldquohe groundrdquo Deleuzersquosclaim ha hese condiions ldquocan and mus be grasped ininuiionrdquo simply reieraes his previous claims ha hesecondiions are ldquohemselves given in a cerain wayrdquo ldquolivedrdquo and

ldquoexperiencedrdquo Thereore proclaiming i o be a mehod in noway excludes he immediacy o inuiion As Deleuze pus ihimsel ldquoInuiion has become mehod or raher mehod has

been reconciled wih he immediaerdquo24

Secondly his quoeconfirms once more ha or Deleuze he aim o philosophyis he knowledge o he hing isel or he individual andha his knowledge is atainable by consrucing a singularor ldquouniquerdquo concep ldquoidenical o is objecrdquo25 Finally hequoe above reveals no only ha Deleuzersquos philosophicalprojec as explicaed in Diffeence and Repeiion is bes readas a coninuaion o Bergsonrsquos own projec bu also in whichrespecs Deleuze depars rom i To demonsrae boh hese

claims i is necessary o urn our atenion o Diffeence andRepeiion isel

Wih regard o he firs claim some o he mos imporanpassages in Difference and Repeiion are saed in viruallyhe exac same erms as hose ound in he quoe above Onewell-known passage in paricular sands ou in his respec

Empiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics an apodicic

discipline only when we apprehend direcly in he sensible ha which

can only be sensed he very being o he sensible difference poenialdifference and difference in inensiy as he reason behind qualiaive

diversiy I is in difference ha movemen is produced as an ldquoeffecrdquo

ha phenomena flash heir meaning like signs The inense world o

differences in which we find he reason behind qualiies and he being

o he sensible is precisely he objec o a superior empiricism This

24 Deleuze Begsonism 3225 Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo 36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

102

empiricism eaches us a srange ldquoreasonrdquo ha o he muliple chaos

and difference (nomadic disribuions crowned anarchies)26

I we add o his quoe he already cied claim rom he endingo he firs chaper o Diffeence and Repeiion ha philosophyshould search or he condiions o real experience and nomerely possible experience i becomes quie obvious haDeleuze makes in his own name virually he very same claimsas hose he atribues o Bergson in he passage quoed aboverom ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo Wha hen doesDeleuze reain rom Bergson Firs and oremos Deleuzeclearly has no relinquished Bergsonrsquos belie in he power o

inuiion o immediaely apprehend he condiions o realexperience ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal andaesheics an apodicic discipline only when we apprehenddirecly in he sensible ha which can only be sensedrdquo (myemphasis) Likewise Deleuze reains he idea ha inuiionis a mehod o difference ie ha which inuiion direclyapprehends is diffeence ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo or

ldquohe very being o he sensiblerdquo is ldquodifference poenial di-erence and difference in inensiyrdquo or simply ldquohe inense

world o differencesrdquo I is in his world o differences ha

we mus find he lived realiy o a sub-represenaive domain I i

is rue ha represenaion has ideniy as is elemen and similariy

as is uni o measure hen pure presence such as i appears in he

simulacrum has he lsquodisparaersquo as is uni o measuremdashin oher words

always a difference o difference as is immediae elemen27

Add o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o ldquohe immediaerdquo

wih he ldquosub-represenaiverdquo28 and here can be no moredoub or Deleuze ldquohe inense world o differencesrdquo or

ldquosub-represenaive domainrdquo is ldquoa pure presencerdquo ldquoa livedrealiyrdquo or simply ldquohe immediaerdquo

26 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 56-5727 Ibid 6928 Ibid 56

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

103

Le us now address he second quesion in which respecdoes Deleuze depar rom Bergson The passage rom

ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo quoed earlier is ogrea assisance here In a seemingly ofand remark ahe beginning o he passage Deleuze makes he ollowingclaim inuiion as a mehod is ldquomore han a descripion oexperience and less (so i seems) han a anscendenal analysisrdquo(my emphasis) I is my conenion ha Deleuzersquos accouno he ranscenden or superior exercise o he aculies aspresened in Diffeence and Repeiionrsquos cenral chaper ldquoTheImage o Thoughrdquo is precisely he anscendenal version oBergsonrsquos inuiion as a mehod ha Deleuze invokes in his

quoe In order o confirm his claim le me briefly oulinehe basic conours o Deleuzersquos accoun o he ranscendenexercise o he aculies

Deleuze amously saes ldquoSomehing in he world orces uso hink This somehing is an objec no o recogniion buo a undamenal encoune rdquo29 The firs characerisic o heobjec o his encouner is ldquoha i can only be sensedrdquo30 Fol-lowing his Deleuze variously reers o ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo as ldquohe signrdquo ldquohe being o he sensiblerdquo ldquoha by

which he given is givenrdquo and he ldquoseniendumrdquo31 Furhermorei is imporan o highligh ha his objec o he encouneris ldquoimpercepible (insensible) rom he poin o view o anempirical exercise o he senses in which sensibiliy graspsonly ha which could also be grasped by oher aculies andis relaed wihin he conex o a common sense o an objecwhich also mus be apprehended by oher aculiesrdquo32 Con-rary o is empirical exercise hus defined ldquosensibiliy inhe presence o ha which can only be sensed (and is a he

same ime impercepible) finds isel beore is own limi hesign and raises isel o he level o a ranscenden exercise

29 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 139 original emphasis30 Ibid 13931 Ibid 139-4032 Ibid 140

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Speculations V

104

o he lsquonhrsquo powerrdquo33 Once sensibiliy has been raised o isranscenden exercise by is encouner wih he seniendum i

ldquoorces memory o remember he memoandum ha which canonly be recalledrdquo34 hereby raising memory o a ranscendenexercise o is own Finally memory in is urn

orces hough o grasp ha which can only be hough he cogiandum

or noeeon he Essence no he inelligible or his is sill no more han

he mode in which we hink ha which migh be somehing oher han

hough bu he being o he inelligible as hough his were boh he

final power o hough and he unhinkable35

According o Deleuze wha is revealed by his ldquoranscendendisjoined or superior exercise o he aculiesrdquo is preciselyheir ldquoranscendenal ormrdquo36 For in order o avoid racinghe ranscendenal orm o he aculies rom heir empiricalexercise as Kan does Deleuze claims ha

each aculy mus be borne o he exreme poin o is dissoluion a

which i alls prey o riple violence he violence o ha which orces

i o be exercised o ha which i is orced o grasp and which i alone

is able o grasp ye also ha o he ungraspable (rom he poin o viewo is empirical exercise)37

I is a his poin ha each aculy ldquodiscovers is own uniquepassionrdquo38 or is ranscendenal orm

As I have emphasised hough always begins wih anencouner wih he seniendum Bu wha is his paradoxi-cal elemen ha can only be sensed ye is impercepible ahe same ime This elemen which orces sensibiliy o is

ranscenden exercise is33 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14034 Ibid 14135 Ibid36 Ibid 14337 Ibid38 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

105

inensiy undersood as pure difference in isel as ha which is a once

boh impercepible or empirical sensibiliy which grasps inensiy only

already covered or mediaed by he qualiy o which i gives rise and

a he same ime ha which can be perceived only rom he poin o

view o a ranscendenal sensibiliy which apprehends i immediaely

in he encouner39

Thus or Deleuze hough always begins wih an immediaeapprehension o difference in isel Deleuze could hardly

be any more explici abou his belie in he idea o inuiiveknowledge The noion o he ranscenden exercise o heaculies represens nohing less han Deleuzersquos atemp o

give a properly ranscendenal accoun o his age-old philo-sophical idealOne las remark is in order I migh be objeced ha I am

equivocaing by eliding he disincion beween houghand knowledge As he objecion migh go no only doesDeleuze ake over he Kanian disincion beween houghand knowledge bu he is also expressly criical o he noiono ldquoknowledgerdquo hroughou he book This is o course rueBu i is also quie obvious ha ldquohoughrdquo in Difference and

Repeiion has almos he exac same uncion as ldquomahesisuniversalisrdquo and ldquoan oher knowledgerdquo have in his earlierexs I he accoun given above o he ranscenden exerciseo he aculies were no enough by isel his claim could beurher reinorced by highlighing he ac ha on variousoccasions hroughou he book Deleuze explicily invokes boh ldquoan esoeric knowledgerdquo40 and ldquomahesis universalisrdquo41 isel To esablish even sronger ies beween Deleuzersquos earlierexs and Diffeence and Repeiion in his regard le me quoe

rom he preace o he book

Empiricism is by no means a reacion agains conceps nor a simple

appeal o lived experience On he conrary i underakes he mos

39 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14440 Ibid 15 24241 Ibid 181 190 199

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Speculations V

106

insane creaion o conceps ever seen or heard Empiricism is a mysi-

cism and a mahemaicism o conceps bu precisely one which reas

he concep as objec o an encouner as a here-and-now or raher as

an Erewhon rom which emerge inexhausibly ever new differenly

disribued ldquoheresrdquo and ldquonowsrdquo42

Similar o his earlier work Deleuze here explicily invokeshe creaion o conceps idenical o heir objecs as he goalo philosophy Furhermore his idenificaion o empiricismwih ldquoa mysicism and a mahemaicism o concepsrdquo urherencourages he conclusion ha ldquoranscendenal empiricismrdquoisel is or Deleuze jus anoher name or mahesis univesalis

or inuiion as a mehod

Sellars Te Myth of Te Gven

Around he same ime as Gilles Deleuze was invoking hemyhical powers o mahesis univesalis Bergsonian inuiionand ranscendenal empiricism Wilrid Sellars was waginghis lielong batle agains ldquohe myh o he givenrdquo on he oherside o he Alanic By no means was Sellars he firs nor

will he be he las philosopher o ace his myhical creaurein an open field o batle Bu he may very well be is mosenacious opponen o dae Wha made Sellarsrsquos atack on hemyh o he given so powerul was his recogniion o is highlyproean naure As he amously saes a he very beginningo ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo

Many hings have been said o be ldquogivenrdquo sense conens maerial

objecs universals proposiions real connecions firs principles

even givenness isel And here is indeed a cerain way o consruinghe siuaions which philosophers analyze in hese erms which can

be said o be he ramework o givenness This ramework has been a

common eaure o mos o he major sysems o philosophy includ-

ing o use a Kanian urn o phrase boh ldquodogmaic raionalismrdquo and

ldquoskepical empiricismrdquo I has indeed been so pervasive ha ew i any

42 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion xx

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 10: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

101

senially immediae aculy Le us summarise as a mehod odifference and division ha is a mehod capable o dividinghe composies ino wo endencies inuiion is able o reachhe condiions o he given or real experience These condi-ions are variously named by Deleuze ldquoendency-subjecsrdquo

ldquopurerdquo ldquohe livingrdquo ldquohe absoluerdquo and ldquohe groundrdquo Deleuzersquosclaim ha hese condiions ldquocan and mus be grasped ininuiionrdquo simply reieraes his previous claims ha hesecondiions are ldquohemselves given in a cerain wayrdquo ldquolivedrdquo and

ldquoexperiencedrdquo Thereore proclaiming i o be a mehod in noway excludes he immediacy o inuiion As Deleuze pus ihimsel ldquoInuiion has become mehod or raher mehod has

been reconciled wih he immediaerdquo24

Secondly his quoeconfirms once more ha or Deleuze he aim o philosophyis he knowledge o he hing isel or he individual andha his knowledge is atainable by consrucing a singularor ldquouniquerdquo concep ldquoidenical o is objecrdquo25 Finally hequoe above reveals no only ha Deleuzersquos philosophicalprojec as explicaed in Diffeence and Repeiion is bes readas a coninuaion o Bergsonrsquos own projec bu also in whichrespecs Deleuze depars rom i To demonsrae boh hese

claims i is necessary o urn our atenion o Diffeence andRepeiion isel

Wih regard o he firs claim some o he mos imporanpassages in Difference and Repeiion are saed in viruallyhe exac same erms as hose ound in he quoe above Onewell-known passage in paricular sands ou in his respec

Empiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics an apodicic

discipline only when we apprehend direcly in he sensible ha which

can only be sensed he very being o he sensible difference poenialdifference and difference in inensiy as he reason behind qualiaive

diversiy I is in difference ha movemen is produced as an ldquoeffecrdquo

ha phenomena flash heir meaning like signs The inense world o

differences in which we find he reason behind qualiies and he being

o he sensible is precisely he objec o a superior empiricism This

24 Deleuze Begsonism 3225 Deleuze ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo 36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

102

empiricism eaches us a srange ldquoreasonrdquo ha o he muliple chaos

and difference (nomadic disribuions crowned anarchies)26

I we add o his quoe he already cied claim rom he endingo he firs chaper o Diffeence and Repeiion ha philosophyshould search or he condiions o real experience and nomerely possible experience i becomes quie obvious haDeleuze makes in his own name virually he very same claimsas hose he atribues o Bergson in he passage quoed aboverom ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo Wha hen doesDeleuze reain rom Bergson Firs and oremos Deleuzeclearly has no relinquished Bergsonrsquos belie in he power o

inuiion o immediaely apprehend he condiions o realexperience ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal andaesheics an apodicic discipline only when we apprehenddirecly in he sensible ha which can only be sensedrdquo (myemphasis) Likewise Deleuze reains he idea ha inuiionis a mehod o difference ie ha which inuiion direclyapprehends is diffeence ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo or

ldquohe very being o he sensiblerdquo is ldquodifference poenial di-erence and difference in inensiyrdquo or simply ldquohe inense

world o differencesrdquo I is in his world o differences ha

we mus find he lived realiy o a sub-represenaive domain I i

is rue ha represenaion has ideniy as is elemen and similariy

as is uni o measure hen pure presence such as i appears in he

simulacrum has he lsquodisparaersquo as is uni o measuremdashin oher words

always a difference o difference as is immediae elemen27

Add o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o ldquohe immediaerdquo

wih he ldquosub-represenaiverdquo28 and here can be no moredoub or Deleuze ldquohe inense world o differencesrdquo or

ldquosub-represenaive domainrdquo is ldquoa pure presencerdquo ldquoa livedrealiyrdquo or simply ldquohe immediaerdquo

26 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 56-5727 Ibid 6928 Ibid 56

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

103

Le us now address he second quesion in which respecdoes Deleuze depar rom Bergson The passage rom

ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo quoed earlier is ogrea assisance here In a seemingly ofand remark ahe beginning o he passage Deleuze makes he ollowingclaim inuiion as a mehod is ldquomore han a descripion oexperience and less (so i seems) han a anscendenal analysisrdquo(my emphasis) I is my conenion ha Deleuzersquos accouno he ranscenden or superior exercise o he aculies aspresened in Diffeence and Repeiionrsquos cenral chaper ldquoTheImage o Thoughrdquo is precisely he anscendenal version oBergsonrsquos inuiion as a mehod ha Deleuze invokes in his

quoe In order o confirm his claim le me briefly oulinehe basic conours o Deleuzersquos accoun o he ranscendenexercise o he aculies

Deleuze amously saes ldquoSomehing in he world orces uso hink This somehing is an objec no o recogniion buo a undamenal encoune rdquo29 The firs characerisic o heobjec o his encouner is ldquoha i can only be sensedrdquo30 Fol-lowing his Deleuze variously reers o ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo as ldquohe signrdquo ldquohe being o he sensiblerdquo ldquoha by

which he given is givenrdquo and he ldquoseniendumrdquo31 Furhermorei is imporan o highligh ha his objec o he encouneris ldquoimpercepible (insensible) rom he poin o view o anempirical exercise o he senses in which sensibiliy graspsonly ha which could also be grasped by oher aculies andis relaed wihin he conex o a common sense o an objecwhich also mus be apprehended by oher aculiesrdquo32 Con-rary o is empirical exercise hus defined ldquosensibiliy inhe presence o ha which can only be sensed (and is a he

same ime impercepible) finds isel beore is own limi hesign and raises isel o he level o a ranscenden exercise

29 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 139 original emphasis30 Ibid 13931 Ibid 139-4032 Ibid 140

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Speculations V

104

o he lsquonhrsquo powerrdquo33 Once sensibiliy has been raised o isranscenden exercise by is encouner wih he seniendum i

ldquoorces memory o remember he memoandum ha which canonly be recalledrdquo34 hereby raising memory o a ranscendenexercise o is own Finally memory in is urn

orces hough o grasp ha which can only be hough he cogiandum

or noeeon he Essence no he inelligible or his is sill no more han

he mode in which we hink ha which migh be somehing oher han

hough bu he being o he inelligible as hough his were boh he

final power o hough and he unhinkable35

According o Deleuze wha is revealed by his ldquoranscendendisjoined or superior exercise o he aculiesrdquo is preciselyheir ldquoranscendenal ormrdquo36 For in order o avoid racinghe ranscendenal orm o he aculies rom heir empiricalexercise as Kan does Deleuze claims ha

each aculy mus be borne o he exreme poin o is dissoluion a

which i alls prey o riple violence he violence o ha which orces

i o be exercised o ha which i is orced o grasp and which i alone

is able o grasp ye also ha o he ungraspable (rom he poin o viewo is empirical exercise)37

I is a his poin ha each aculy ldquodiscovers is own uniquepassionrdquo38 or is ranscendenal orm

As I have emphasised hough always begins wih anencouner wih he seniendum Bu wha is his paradoxi-cal elemen ha can only be sensed ye is impercepible ahe same ime This elemen which orces sensibiliy o is

ranscenden exercise is33 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14034 Ibid 14135 Ibid36 Ibid 14337 Ibid38 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

105

inensiy undersood as pure difference in isel as ha which is a once

boh impercepible or empirical sensibiliy which grasps inensiy only

already covered or mediaed by he qualiy o which i gives rise and

a he same ime ha which can be perceived only rom he poin o

view o a ranscendenal sensibiliy which apprehends i immediaely

in he encouner39

Thus or Deleuze hough always begins wih an immediaeapprehension o difference in isel Deleuze could hardly

be any more explici abou his belie in he idea o inuiiveknowledge The noion o he ranscenden exercise o heaculies represens nohing less han Deleuzersquos atemp o

give a properly ranscendenal accoun o his age-old philo-sophical idealOne las remark is in order I migh be objeced ha I am

equivocaing by eliding he disincion beween houghand knowledge As he objecion migh go no only doesDeleuze ake over he Kanian disincion beween houghand knowledge bu he is also expressly criical o he noiono ldquoknowledgerdquo hroughou he book This is o course rueBu i is also quie obvious ha ldquohoughrdquo in Difference and

Repeiion has almos he exac same uncion as ldquomahesisuniversalisrdquo and ldquoan oher knowledgerdquo have in his earlierexs I he accoun given above o he ranscenden exerciseo he aculies were no enough by isel his claim could beurher reinorced by highlighing he ac ha on variousoccasions hroughou he book Deleuze explicily invokes boh ldquoan esoeric knowledgerdquo40 and ldquomahesis universalisrdquo41 isel To esablish even sronger ies beween Deleuzersquos earlierexs and Diffeence and Repeiion in his regard le me quoe

rom he preace o he book

Empiricism is by no means a reacion agains conceps nor a simple

appeal o lived experience On he conrary i underakes he mos

39 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14440 Ibid 15 24241 Ibid 181 190 199

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Speculations V

106

insane creaion o conceps ever seen or heard Empiricism is a mysi-

cism and a mahemaicism o conceps bu precisely one which reas

he concep as objec o an encouner as a here-and-now or raher as

an Erewhon rom which emerge inexhausibly ever new differenly

disribued ldquoheresrdquo and ldquonowsrdquo42

Similar o his earlier work Deleuze here explicily invokeshe creaion o conceps idenical o heir objecs as he goalo philosophy Furhermore his idenificaion o empiricismwih ldquoa mysicism and a mahemaicism o concepsrdquo urherencourages he conclusion ha ldquoranscendenal empiricismrdquoisel is or Deleuze jus anoher name or mahesis univesalis

or inuiion as a mehod

Sellars Te Myth of Te Gven

Around he same ime as Gilles Deleuze was invoking hemyhical powers o mahesis univesalis Bergsonian inuiionand ranscendenal empiricism Wilrid Sellars was waginghis lielong batle agains ldquohe myh o he givenrdquo on he oherside o he Alanic By no means was Sellars he firs nor

will he be he las philosopher o ace his myhical creaurein an open field o batle Bu he may very well be is mosenacious opponen o dae Wha made Sellarsrsquos atack on hemyh o he given so powerul was his recogniion o is highlyproean naure As he amously saes a he very beginningo ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo

Many hings have been said o be ldquogivenrdquo sense conens maerial

objecs universals proposiions real connecions firs principles

even givenness isel And here is indeed a cerain way o consruinghe siuaions which philosophers analyze in hese erms which can

be said o be he ramework o givenness This ramework has been a

common eaure o mos o he major sysems o philosophy includ-

ing o use a Kanian urn o phrase boh ldquodogmaic raionalismrdquo and

ldquoskepical empiricismrdquo I has indeed been so pervasive ha ew i any

42 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion xx

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 11: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

102

empiricism eaches us a srange ldquoreasonrdquo ha o he muliple chaos

and difference (nomadic disribuions crowned anarchies)26

I we add o his quoe he already cied claim rom he endingo he firs chaper o Diffeence and Repeiion ha philosophyshould search or he condiions o real experience and nomerely possible experience i becomes quie obvious haDeleuze makes in his own name virually he very same claimsas hose he atribues o Bergson in he passage quoed aboverom ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo Wha hen doesDeleuze reain rom Bergson Firs and oremos Deleuzeclearly has no relinquished Bergsonrsquos belie in he power o

inuiion o immediaely apprehend he condiions o realexperience ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal andaesheics an apodicic discipline only when we apprehenddirecly in he sensible ha which can only be sensedrdquo (myemphasis) Likewise Deleuze reains he idea ha inuiionis a mehod o difference ie ha which inuiion direclyapprehends is diffeence ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo or

ldquohe very being o he sensiblerdquo is ldquodifference poenial di-erence and difference in inensiyrdquo or simply ldquohe inense

world o differencesrdquo I is in his world o differences ha

we mus find he lived realiy o a sub-represenaive domain I i

is rue ha represenaion has ideniy as is elemen and similariy

as is uni o measure hen pure presence such as i appears in he

simulacrum has he lsquodisparaersquo as is uni o measuremdashin oher words

always a difference o difference as is immediae elemen27

Add o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o ldquohe immediaerdquo

wih he ldquosub-represenaiverdquo28 and here can be no moredoub or Deleuze ldquohe inense world o differencesrdquo or

ldquosub-represenaive domainrdquo is ldquoa pure presencerdquo ldquoa livedrealiyrdquo or simply ldquohe immediaerdquo

26 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 56-5727 Ibid 6928 Ibid 56

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

103

Le us now address he second quesion in which respecdoes Deleuze depar rom Bergson The passage rom

ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo quoed earlier is ogrea assisance here In a seemingly ofand remark ahe beginning o he passage Deleuze makes he ollowingclaim inuiion as a mehod is ldquomore han a descripion oexperience and less (so i seems) han a anscendenal analysisrdquo(my emphasis) I is my conenion ha Deleuzersquos accouno he ranscenden or superior exercise o he aculies aspresened in Diffeence and Repeiionrsquos cenral chaper ldquoTheImage o Thoughrdquo is precisely he anscendenal version oBergsonrsquos inuiion as a mehod ha Deleuze invokes in his

quoe In order o confirm his claim le me briefly oulinehe basic conours o Deleuzersquos accoun o he ranscendenexercise o he aculies

Deleuze amously saes ldquoSomehing in he world orces uso hink This somehing is an objec no o recogniion buo a undamenal encoune rdquo29 The firs characerisic o heobjec o his encouner is ldquoha i can only be sensedrdquo30 Fol-lowing his Deleuze variously reers o ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo as ldquohe signrdquo ldquohe being o he sensiblerdquo ldquoha by

which he given is givenrdquo and he ldquoseniendumrdquo31 Furhermorei is imporan o highligh ha his objec o he encouneris ldquoimpercepible (insensible) rom he poin o view o anempirical exercise o he senses in which sensibiliy graspsonly ha which could also be grasped by oher aculies andis relaed wihin he conex o a common sense o an objecwhich also mus be apprehended by oher aculiesrdquo32 Con-rary o is empirical exercise hus defined ldquosensibiliy inhe presence o ha which can only be sensed (and is a he

same ime impercepible) finds isel beore is own limi hesign and raises isel o he level o a ranscenden exercise

29 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 139 original emphasis30 Ibid 13931 Ibid 139-4032 Ibid 140

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Speculations V

104

o he lsquonhrsquo powerrdquo33 Once sensibiliy has been raised o isranscenden exercise by is encouner wih he seniendum i

ldquoorces memory o remember he memoandum ha which canonly be recalledrdquo34 hereby raising memory o a ranscendenexercise o is own Finally memory in is urn

orces hough o grasp ha which can only be hough he cogiandum

or noeeon he Essence no he inelligible or his is sill no more han

he mode in which we hink ha which migh be somehing oher han

hough bu he being o he inelligible as hough his were boh he

final power o hough and he unhinkable35

According o Deleuze wha is revealed by his ldquoranscendendisjoined or superior exercise o he aculiesrdquo is preciselyheir ldquoranscendenal ormrdquo36 For in order o avoid racinghe ranscendenal orm o he aculies rom heir empiricalexercise as Kan does Deleuze claims ha

each aculy mus be borne o he exreme poin o is dissoluion a

which i alls prey o riple violence he violence o ha which orces

i o be exercised o ha which i is orced o grasp and which i alone

is able o grasp ye also ha o he ungraspable (rom he poin o viewo is empirical exercise)37

I is a his poin ha each aculy ldquodiscovers is own uniquepassionrdquo38 or is ranscendenal orm

As I have emphasised hough always begins wih anencouner wih he seniendum Bu wha is his paradoxi-cal elemen ha can only be sensed ye is impercepible ahe same ime This elemen which orces sensibiliy o is

ranscenden exercise is33 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14034 Ibid 14135 Ibid36 Ibid 14337 Ibid38 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

105

inensiy undersood as pure difference in isel as ha which is a once

boh impercepible or empirical sensibiliy which grasps inensiy only

already covered or mediaed by he qualiy o which i gives rise and

a he same ime ha which can be perceived only rom he poin o

view o a ranscendenal sensibiliy which apprehends i immediaely

in he encouner39

Thus or Deleuze hough always begins wih an immediaeapprehension o difference in isel Deleuze could hardly

be any more explici abou his belie in he idea o inuiiveknowledge The noion o he ranscenden exercise o heaculies represens nohing less han Deleuzersquos atemp o

give a properly ranscendenal accoun o his age-old philo-sophical idealOne las remark is in order I migh be objeced ha I am

equivocaing by eliding he disincion beween houghand knowledge As he objecion migh go no only doesDeleuze ake over he Kanian disincion beween houghand knowledge bu he is also expressly criical o he noiono ldquoknowledgerdquo hroughou he book This is o course rueBu i is also quie obvious ha ldquohoughrdquo in Difference and

Repeiion has almos he exac same uncion as ldquomahesisuniversalisrdquo and ldquoan oher knowledgerdquo have in his earlierexs I he accoun given above o he ranscenden exerciseo he aculies were no enough by isel his claim could beurher reinorced by highlighing he ac ha on variousoccasions hroughou he book Deleuze explicily invokes boh ldquoan esoeric knowledgerdquo40 and ldquomahesis universalisrdquo41 isel To esablish even sronger ies beween Deleuzersquos earlierexs and Diffeence and Repeiion in his regard le me quoe

rom he preace o he book

Empiricism is by no means a reacion agains conceps nor a simple

appeal o lived experience On he conrary i underakes he mos

39 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14440 Ibid 15 24241 Ibid 181 190 199

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Speculations V

106

insane creaion o conceps ever seen or heard Empiricism is a mysi-

cism and a mahemaicism o conceps bu precisely one which reas

he concep as objec o an encouner as a here-and-now or raher as

an Erewhon rom which emerge inexhausibly ever new differenly

disribued ldquoheresrdquo and ldquonowsrdquo42

Similar o his earlier work Deleuze here explicily invokeshe creaion o conceps idenical o heir objecs as he goalo philosophy Furhermore his idenificaion o empiricismwih ldquoa mysicism and a mahemaicism o concepsrdquo urherencourages he conclusion ha ldquoranscendenal empiricismrdquoisel is or Deleuze jus anoher name or mahesis univesalis

or inuiion as a mehod

Sellars Te Myth of Te Gven

Around he same ime as Gilles Deleuze was invoking hemyhical powers o mahesis univesalis Bergsonian inuiionand ranscendenal empiricism Wilrid Sellars was waginghis lielong batle agains ldquohe myh o he givenrdquo on he oherside o he Alanic By no means was Sellars he firs nor

will he be he las philosopher o ace his myhical creaurein an open field o batle Bu he may very well be is mosenacious opponen o dae Wha made Sellarsrsquos atack on hemyh o he given so powerul was his recogniion o is highlyproean naure As he amously saes a he very beginningo ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo

Many hings have been said o be ldquogivenrdquo sense conens maerial

objecs universals proposiions real connecions firs principles

even givenness isel And here is indeed a cerain way o consruinghe siuaions which philosophers analyze in hese erms which can

be said o be he ramework o givenness This ramework has been a

common eaure o mos o he major sysems o philosophy includ-

ing o use a Kanian urn o phrase boh ldquodogmaic raionalismrdquo and

ldquoskepical empiricismrdquo I has indeed been so pervasive ha ew i any

42 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion xx

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 12: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

103

Le us now address he second quesion in which respecdoes Deleuze depar rom Bergson The passage rom

ldquoBergsonrsquos Concepion o Differencerdquo quoed earlier is ogrea assisance here In a seemingly ofand remark ahe beginning o he passage Deleuze makes he ollowingclaim inuiion as a mehod is ldquomore han a descripion oexperience and less (so i seems) han a anscendenal analysisrdquo(my emphasis) I is my conenion ha Deleuzersquos accouno he ranscenden or superior exercise o he aculies aspresened in Diffeence and Repeiionrsquos cenral chaper ldquoTheImage o Thoughrdquo is precisely he anscendenal version oBergsonrsquos inuiion as a mehod ha Deleuze invokes in his

quoe In order o confirm his claim le me briefly oulinehe basic conours o Deleuzersquos accoun o he ranscendenexercise o he aculies

Deleuze amously saes ldquoSomehing in he world orces uso hink This somehing is an objec no o recogniion buo a undamenal encoune rdquo29 The firs characerisic o heobjec o his encouner is ldquoha i can only be sensedrdquo30 Fol-lowing his Deleuze variously reers o ldquoha which can only be sensedrdquo as ldquohe signrdquo ldquohe being o he sensiblerdquo ldquoha by

which he given is givenrdquo and he ldquoseniendumrdquo31 Furhermorei is imporan o highligh ha his objec o he encouneris ldquoimpercepible (insensible) rom he poin o view o anempirical exercise o he senses in which sensibiliy graspsonly ha which could also be grasped by oher aculies andis relaed wihin he conex o a common sense o an objecwhich also mus be apprehended by oher aculiesrdquo32 Con-rary o is empirical exercise hus defined ldquosensibiliy inhe presence o ha which can only be sensed (and is a he

same ime impercepible) finds isel beore is own limi hesign and raises isel o he level o a ranscenden exercise

29 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 139 original emphasis30 Ibid 13931 Ibid 139-4032 Ibid 140

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

104

o he lsquonhrsquo powerrdquo33 Once sensibiliy has been raised o isranscenden exercise by is encouner wih he seniendum i

ldquoorces memory o remember he memoandum ha which canonly be recalledrdquo34 hereby raising memory o a ranscendenexercise o is own Finally memory in is urn

orces hough o grasp ha which can only be hough he cogiandum

or noeeon he Essence no he inelligible or his is sill no more han

he mode in which we hink ha which migh be somehing oher han

hough bu he being o he inelligible as hough his were boh he

final power o hough and he unhinkable35

According o Deleuze wha is revealed by his ldquoranscendendisjoined or superior exercise o he aculiesrdquo is preciselyheir ldquoranscendenal ormrdquo36 For in order o avoid racinghe ranscendenal orm o he aculies rom heir empiricalexercise as Kan does Deleuze claims ha

each aculy mus be borne o he exreme poin o is dissoluion a

which i alls prey o riple violence he violence o ha which orces

i o be exercised o ha which i is orced o grasp and which i alone

is able o grasp ye also ha o he ungraspable (rom he poin o viewo is empirical exercise)37

I is a his poin ha each aculy ldquodiscovers is own uniquepassionrdquo38 or is ranscendenal orm

As I have emphasised hough always begins wih anencouner wih he seniendum Bu wha is his paradoxi-cal elemen ha can only be sensed ye is impercepible ahe same ime This elemen which orces sensibiliy o is

ranscenden exercise is33 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14034 Ibid 14135 Ibid36 Ibid 14337 Ibid38 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

105

inensiy undersood as pure difference in isel as ha which is a once

boh impercepible or empirical sensibiliy which grasps inensiy only

already covered or mediaed by he qualiy o which i gives rise and

a he same ime ha which can be perceived only rom he poin o

view o a ranscendenal sensibiliy which apprehends i immediaely

in he encouner39

Thus or Deleuze hough always begins wih an immediaeapprehension o difference in isel Deleuze could hardly

be any more explici abou his belie in he idea o inuiiveknowledge The noion o he ranscenden exercise o heaculies represens nohing less han Deleuzersquos atemp o

give a properly ranscendenal accoun o his age-old philo-sophical idealOne las remark is in order I migh be objeced ha I am

equivocaing by eliding he disincion beween houghand knowledge As he objecion migh go no only doesDeleuze ake over he Kanian disincion beween houghand knowledge bu he is also expressly criical o he noiono ldquoknowledgerdquo hroughou he book This is o course rueBu i is also quie obvious ha ldquohoughrdquo in Difference and

Repeiion has almos he exac same uncion as ldquomahesisuniversalisrdquo and ldquoan oher knowledgerdquo have in his earlierexs I he accoun given above o he ranscenden exerciseo he aculies were no enough by isel his claim could beurher reinorced by highlighing he ac ha on variousoccasions hroughou he book Deleuze explicily invokes boh ldquoan esoeric knowledgerdquo40 and ldquomahesis universalisrdquo41 isel To esablish even sronger ies beween Deleuzersquos earlierexs and Diffeence and Repeiion in his regard le me quoe

rom he preace o he book

Empiricism is by no means a reacion agains conceps nor a simple

appeal o lived experience On he conrary i underakes he mos

39 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14440 Ibid 15 24241 Ibid 181 190 199

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Speculations V

106

insane creaion o conceps ever seen or heard Empiricism is a mysi-

cism and a mahemaicism o conceps bu precisely one which reas

he concep as objec o an encouner as a here-and-now or raher as

an Erewhon rom which emerge inexhausibly ever new differenly

disribued ldquoheresrdquo and ldquonowsrdquo42

Similar o his earlier work Deleuze here explicily invokeshe creaion o conceps idenical o heir objecs as he goalo philosophy Furhermore his idenificaion o empiricismwih ldquoa mysicism and a mahemaicism o concepsrdquo urherencourages he conclusion ha ldquoranscendenal empiricismrdquoisel is or Deleuze jus anoher name or mahesis univesalis

or inuiion as a mehod

Sellars Te Myth of Te Gven

Around he same ime as Gilles Deleuze was invoking hemyhical powers o mahesis univesalis Bergsonian inuiionand ranscendenal empiricism Wilrid Sellars was waginghis lielong batle agains ldquohe myh o he givenrdquo on he oherside o he Alanic By no means was Sellars he firs nor

will he be he las philosopher o ace his myhical creaurein an open field o batle Bu he may very well be is mosenacious opponen o dae Wha made Sellarsrsquos atack on hemyh o he given so powerul was his recogniion o is highlyproean naure As he amously saes a he very beginningo ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo

Many hings have been said o be ldquogivenrdquo sense conens maerial

objecs universals proposiions real connecions firs principles

even givenness isel And here is indeed a cerain way o consruinghe siuaions which philosophers analyze in hese erms which can

be said o be he ramework o givenness This ramework has been a

common eaure o mos o he major sysems o philosophy includ-

ing o use a Kanian urn o phrase boh ldquodogmaic raionalismrdquo and

ldquoskepical empiricismrdquo I has indeed been so pervasive ha ew i any

42 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion xx

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 13: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

104

o he lsquonhrsquo powerrdquo33 Once sensibiliy has been raised o isranscenden exercise by is encouner wih he seniendum i

ldquoorces memory o remember he memoandum ha which canonly be recalledrdquo34 hereby raising memory o a ranscendenexercise o is own Finally memory in is urn

orces hough o grasp ha which can only be hough he cogiandum

or noeeon he Essence no he inelligible or his is sill no more han

he mode in which we hink ha which migh be somehing oher han

hough bu he being o he inelligible as hough his were boh he

final power o hough and he unhinkable35

According o Deleuze wha is revealed by his ldquoranscendendisjoined or superior exercise o he aculiesrdquo is preciselyheir ldquoranscendenal ormrdquo36 For in order o avoid racinghe ranscendenal orm o he aculies rom heir empiricalexercise as Kan does Deleuze claims ha

each aculy mus be borne o he exreme poin o is dissoluion a

which i alls prey o riple violence he violence o ha which orces

i o be exercised o ha which i is orced o grasp and which i alone

is able o grasp ye also ha o he ungraspable (rom he poin o viewo is empirical exercise)37

I is a his poin ha each aculy ldquodiscovers is own uniquepassionrdquo38 or is ranscendenal orm

As I have emphasised hough always begins wih anencouner wih he seniendum Bu wha is his paradoxi-cal elemen ha can only be sensed ye is impercepible ahe same ime This elemen which orces sensibiliy o is

ranscenden exercise is33 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14034 Ibid 14135 Ibid36 Ibid 14337 Ibid38 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

105

inensiy undersood as pure difference in isel as ha which is a once

boh impercepible or empirical sensibiliy which grasps inensiy only

already covered or mediaed by he qualiy o which i gives rise and

a he same ime ha which can be perceived only rom he poin o

view o a ranscendenal sensibiliy which apprehends i immediaely

in he encouner39

Thus or Deleuze hough always begins wih an immediaeapprehension o difference in isel Deleuze could hardly

be any more explici abou his belie in he idea o inuiiveknowledge The noion o he ranscenden exercise o heaculies represens nohing less han Deleuzersquos atemp o

give a properly ranscendenal accoun o his age-old philo-sophical idealOne las remark is in order I migh be objeced ha I am

equivocaing by eliding he disincion beween houghand knowledge As he objecion migh go no only doesDeleuze ake over he Kanian disincion beween houghand knowledge bu he is also expressly criical o he noiono ldquoknowledgerdquo hroughou he book This is o course rueBu i is also quie obvious ha ldquohoughrdquo in Difference and

Repeiion has almos he exac same uncion as ldquomahesisuniversalisrdquo and ldquoan oher knowledgerdquo have in his earlierexs I he accoun given above o he ranscenden exerciseo he aculies were no enough by isel his claim could beurher reinorced by highlighing he ac ha on variousoccasions hroughou he book Deleuze explicily invokes boh ldquoan esoeric knowledgerdquo40 and ldquomahesis universalisrdquo41 isel To esablish even sronger ies beween Deleuzersquos earlierexs and Diffeence and Repeiion in his regard le me quoe

rom he preace o he book

Empiricism is by no means a reacion agains conceps nor a simple

appeal o lived experience On he conrary i underakes he mos

39 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14440 Ibid 15 24241 Ibid 181 190 199

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

106

insane creaion o conceps ever seen or heard Empiricism is a mysi-

cism and a mahemaicism o conceps bu precisely one which reas

he concep as objec o an encouner as a here-and-now or raher as

an Erewhon rom which emerge inexhausibly ever new differenly

disribued ldquoheresrdquo and ldquonowsrdquo42

Similar o his earlier work Deleuze here explicily invokeshe creaion o conceps idenical o heir objecs as he goalo philosophy Furhermore his idenificaion o empiricismwih ldquoa mysicism and a mahemaicism o concepsrdquo urherencourages he conclusion ha ldquoranscendenal empiricismrdquoisel is or Deleuze jus anoher name or mahesis univesalis

or inuiion as a mehod

Sellars Te Myth of Te Gven

Around he same ime as Gilles Deleuze was invoking hemyhical powers o mahesis univesalis Bergsonian inuiionand ranscendenal empiricism Wilrid Sellars was waginghis lielong batle agains ldquohe myh o he givenrdquo on he oherside o he Alanic By no means was Sellars he firs nor

will he be he las philosopher o ace his myhical creaurein an open field o batle Bu he may very well be is mosenacious opponen o dae Wha made Sellarsrsquos atack on hemyh o he given so powerul was his recogniion o is highlyproean naure As he amously saes a he very beginningo ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo

Many hings have been said o be ldquogivenrdquo sense conens maerial

objecs universals proposiions real connecions firs principles

even givenness isel And here is indeed a cerain way o consruinghe siuaions which philosophers analyze in hese erms which can

be said o be he ramework o givenness This ramework has been a

common eaure o mos o he major sysems o philosophy includ-

ing o use a Kanian urn o phrase boh ldquodogmaic raionalismrdquo and

ldquoskepical empiricismrdquo I has indeed been so pervasive ha ew i any

42 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion xx

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 14: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

105

inensiy undersood as pure difference in isel as ha which is a once

boh impercepible or empirical sensibiliy which grasps inensiy only

already covered or mediaed by he qualiy o which i gives rise and

a he same ime ha which can be perceived only rom he poin o

view o a ranscendenal sensibiliy which apprehends i immediaely

in he encouner39

Thus or Deleuze hough always begins wih an immediaeapprehension o difference in isel Deleuze could hardly

be any more explici abou his belie in he idea o inuiiveknowledge The noion o he ranscenden exercise o heaculies represens nohing less han Deleuzersquos atemp o

give a properly ranscendenal accoun o his age-old philo-sophical idealOne las remark is in order I migh be objeced ha I am

equivocaing by eliding he disincion beween houghand knowledge As he objecion migh go no only doesDeleuze ake over he Kanian disincion beween houghand knowledge bu he is also expressly criical o he noiono ldquoknowledgerdquo hroughou he book This is o course rueBu i is also quie obvious ha ldquohoughrdquo in Difference and

Repeiion has almos he exac same uncion as ldquomahesisuniversalisrdquo and ldquoan oher knowledgerdquo have in his earlierexs I he accoun given above o he ranscenden exerciseo he aculies were no enough by isel his claim could beurher reinorced by highlighing he ac ha on variousoccasions hroughou he book Deleuze explicily invokes boh ldquoan esoeric knowledgerdquo40 and ldquomahesis universalisrdquo41 isel To esablish even sronger ies beween Deleuzersquos earlierexs and Diffeence and Repeiion in his regard le me quoe

rom he preace o he book

Empiricism is by no means a reacion agains conceps nor a simple

appeal o lived experience On he conrary i underakes he mos

39 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 14440 Ibid 15 24241 Ibid 181 190 199

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Speculations V

106

insane creaion o conceps ever seen or heard Empiricism is a mysi-

cism and a mahemaicism o conceps bu precisely one which reas

he concep as objec o an encouner as a here-and-now or raher as

an Erewhon rom which emerge inexhausibly ever new differenly

disribued ldquoheresrdquo and ldquonowsrdquo42

Similar o his earlier work Deleuze here explicily invokeshe creaion o conceps idenical o heir objecs as he goalo philosophy Furhermore his idenificaion o empiricismwih ldquoa mysicism and a mahemaicism o concepsrdquo urherencourages he conclusion ha ldquoranscendenal empiricismrdquoisel is or Deleuze jus anoher name or mahesis univesalis

or inuiion as a mehod

Sellars Te Myth of Te Gven

Around he same ime as Gilles Deleuze was invoking hemyhical powers o mahesis univesalis Bergsonian inuiionand ranscendenal empiricism Wilrid Sellars was waginghis lielong batle agains ldquohe myh o he givenrdquo on he oherside o he Alanic By no means was Sellars he firs nor

will he be he las philosopher o ace his myhical creaurein an open field o batle Bu he may very well be is mosenacious opponen o dae Wha made Sellarsrsquos atack on hemyh o he given so powerul was his recogniion o is highlyproean naure As he amously saes a he very beginningo ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo

Many hings have been said o be ldquogivenrdquo sense conens maerial

objecs universals proposiions real connecions firs principles

even givenness isel And here is indeed a cerain way o consruinghe siuaions which philosophers analyze in hese erms which can

be said o be he ramework o givenness This ramework has been a

common eaure o mos o he major sysems o philosophy includ-

ing o use a Kanian urn o phrase boh ldquodogmaic raionalismrdquo and

ldquoskepical empiricismrdquo I has indeed been so pervasive ha ew i any

42 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion xx

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 15: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

106

insane creaion o conceps ever seen or heard Empiricism is a mysi-

cism and a mahemaicism o conceps bu precisely one which reas

he concep as objec o an encouner as a here-and-now or raher as

an Erewhon rom which emerge inexhausibly ever new differenly

disribued ldquoheresrdquo and ldquonowsrdquo42

Similar o his earlier work Deleuze here explicily invokeshe creaion o conceps idenical o heir objecs as he goalo philosophy Furhermore his idenificaion o empiricismwih ldquoa mysicism and a mahemaicism o concepsrdquo urherencourages he conclusion ha ldquoranscendenal empiricismrdquoisel is or Deleuze jus anoher name or mahesis univesalis

or inuiion as a mehod

Sellars Te Myth of Te Gven

Around he same ime as Gilles Deleuze was invoking hemyhical powers o mahesis univesalis Bergsonian inuiionand ranscendenal empiricism Wilrid Sellars was waginghis lielong batle agains ldquohe myh o he givenrdquo on he oherside o he Alanic By no means was Sellars he firs nor

will he be he las philosopher o ace his myhical creaurein an open field o batle Bu he may very well be is mosenacious opponen o dae Wha made Sellarsrsquos atack on hemyh o he given so powerul was his recogniion o is highlyproean naure As he amously saes a he very beginningo ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo

Many hings have been said o be ldquogivenrdquo sense conens maerial

objecs universals proposiions real connecions firs principles

even givenness isel And here is indeed a cerain way o consruinghe siuaions which philosophers analyze in hese erms which can

be said o be he ramework o givenness This ramework has been a

common eaure o mos o he major sysems o philosophy includ-

ing o use a Kanian urn o phrase boh ldquodogmaic raionalismrdquo and

ldquoskepical empiricismrdquo I has indeed been so pervasive ha ew i any

42 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion xx

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 16: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

107

philosophers have been alogeher ree o i cerainly no Kan and

I would argue no even Hegel ha grea oe o ldquoimmediacyrdquo Oen

wha is atacked under is name are only specific varieies o ldquogivenrdquo

Inuied firs principles and synheic necessary connecions were he

firs o come under atack And many who oday atack ldquohe whole idea

o givennessrdquomdashand hey are an increasing numbermdashare really only a-

acking sense daa hellip I however I begin my argumen wih an atack

on sense-daum heories i is only as a firs sep in a general criique

o he enire ramework o givenness43

Sellars clearly realises ha he various insances o he givenare only differen insaniaions o he same general rame-

work o givenness He also realises ha i we are o have anysuccess in vanquishing his myh once and or all i will be necessary o ormulae a general criique o his enireramework o givenness Unorunaely due o he naure oSellarsrsquos philosophising heavily oriened as i was owardsspecific debaes wih his conemporaries Sellars himsel neverpresened eiher a sysemaic accoun o he ramework ogivenness or he announced general criique o i Wha hedid leave behind hough was a whole hos o specific atacks

on various differen varieies o he given Alhough all ohese various criiques o differen orms o he given werepresened by way o debaes wih his analyic peers he pas-sage quoed above clearly shows ha Sellarsrsquos inended argewas much wider in scope In ligh o his our laer atemp aa Sellarsian criique o he Deleuzian ldquogivenrdquo should seema litle less unlikely han i probably appears a firs glanceHowever i we are o sage his conronaion i will firs benecessary o briefly ouline Sellarsrsquos accoun o he myh o

he given and his main argumens or rejecing i And i will be paramoun o do so in erms general enough so ha hisconronaion does no urn ino a missed encouner Threeexs will be o paricular assisance o us wih regard o hisask ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo ldquoThe Sruc-ure o Knowledgerdquo and ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics oPure Process The Carus Lecures o Wilrid Sellarsrdquo

43 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 127

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 17: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

108

Le us sar wih ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo(EPM) O he various differen ormulaions o he myho he given he one ound in chaper eigh eniled ldquoDoesEmpirical Knowledge Have a Foundaionrdquo in many ways hecenral chaper o he book is definiely he mos appropriaeor our presen purposes

The idea ha observaion ldquosricly and properly so-calledrdquo is consiued

by cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes he auhoriy o

which is ransmited o verbal and quasi-verbal perormances when

hese perormances are made ldquoin conormiy wih he semanical rules

o he languagerdquo is o course he hear o he Myh o he Given For

he given in episemological radiion is wha is aken by hese sel-auhenicaing episodes These ldquoakingsrdquo are so o speak he unmoved

movers o empirical knowledge ldquoknowings in presencerdquo which are

presupposed by all oher knowledge boh he knowledge o general

ruhs and he knowledge ldquoin absencerdquo o oher paricular maters o

ac Such is he ramework in which radiional empiricism makes

is characerisic claim ha he percepually given is he oundaion

o empirical knowledge44

Firs and oremos his passage reveals which specific ver-sion o he given is under atack no jus in his chaper buin he book as a whole i is o course he given as conceived by radiional empiricism Secondly he passage possiblypresens he mos concise accoun provided by Sellars o heempiricis given To summarise he empiricis given consissin aking cerain sel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodes givenin percepion as he oundaion o empirical knowledge and by exension as presupposed by all knowledge Clearly he

key erm here is ldquosel-auhenicaing nonverbal episodesrdquoWha Sellars denies is neiher ha hese ldquoobservings areinner episodes nor ha sricly speaking hey are nonverbal episodesrdquo45 Conrary o ill-inormed popular belie Sellars isno a reducionis and especially no wih regard o noionslike ldquoinner episodesrdquo ldquoimpressionsrdquo or ldquoimmediae experi-

44 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 169-7045 Ibid 170 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 18: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

109

encerdquo In ac he laer pars o EPM are explicily devoedo devising an accoun o hese very noions Wha Sellarsdoes deny hough is he idea ha hese episodes are o beaken as self-auhenicaing ha is ha hey have episemic auhoriy or he saus o knowledge solely in virue o heir

being percepually given This is he crucial poin o Sellarsrsquoscriique o he given

The main reasons or Sellarsrsquos denial o he given hus con-srued is o be ound in his amous definiion o knowledge

The essenial poin is ha in characerizing an episode or a sae as ha

o knowing we are no giving an empirical descripion o ha episode

or sae we are placing i in he logical space o reasons o jusiyingand being able o jusiy wha one says46

Add o his Sellarsrsquos earlier denial ha here is ldquoany awarenesso logical space prior o or independen o he acquisiion oa languagerdquo47 and he main conours o his argumen slowly

begin o emerge I awareness o he logical space o reasonsis impossible wihou he acquisiion o a language and i oknow somehing is o place i in he logical space o reasons

hen i ollows ha only ha which is linguisically srucuredcan lay claim o he saus o knowledge48 Finally insoar aswha is percepually given is no linguisically srucured iobviously canno lay claim o he saus o knowledge

In order o presen Sellarsrsquos argumen in is enirey houghi will be necessary o reurn once more o his ormulaiono he myh o he given Le us recall he claim made byradiional empiricism was no only ha wha is percepuallygiven is sel-auhenicaing bu also and jus as imporanly

ha i can serve as a oundaion o empirical knowledge

46 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 16947 Ibid 16248 Or as Rober Brandom amously pu i ldquoonly wha is proposiionallyconenul and concepually ariculaed can serve as (and sand in need) o jusificaion and so ground or consiue knowledgerdquo Rober Brandom ldquoSudyGuiderdquo in Wilrid Sellars Empiicism and he Philosophy of Mind (CambridgeHarvard Universiy Press 1997) 122

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 19: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

110

and by exension all knowledge The firs hing o noe wihregard o his claim and as Sellars emphasises himsel is ha by rejecing i Sellars does no imply ldquoha empirical knowl-edge has no oundaionrdquo49 On he conrary ldquoThere is clearlysome poin o he picure o human knowledge as resing ona level o proposiionsmdashobservaion reporsmdashwhich do nores on oher proposiions in he same way as oher proposi-ions res on hemrdquo50 In oher words by rejecing he myho he given Sellars does no rejec he idea ha inerenial

judgmens are grounded in some way on non-inerenial judgmens His noion o ldquoobservaion reporrdquo is preciselyhis kind o non-inerenial judgmen Bu on he oher

hand Sellars does insis ldquoha he meaphor o lsquooundaionrsquois misleading in ha i keeps us rom seeing ha i here isa logical dimension in which oher empirical proposiionsres on observaion repors here is anoher logical dimen-sion in which he later res on he ormerrdquo51 Wihou givinga complee accoun o Sellarsrsquos erm ldquoobservaion reporsrdquohe ollowing will have o suffice or our presen purposesaccording o Sellars even he simples observaion repor like

ldquohis is greenrdquo implies ldquoha one can have he concep o green

only by having a whole batery o conceps o which i is oneelemenrdquo52 Moreover ldquohere is an imporan sense in whichone has no concep peraining o he observable properieso physical objecs in Space and Time unless one has hemallmdashand indeed a grea deal more besidesrdquo53

Reurning o Sellarsrsquos suspicion o he meaphor o ldquooun-daionrdquo his beauiully writen concluding remarks onhis opic will also be he bes possible way o conclude hisshor presenaion o his views on he myh o he given as

presened in EPM

49 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17050 Ibid original emphasis51 Ibid52 Ibid 14853 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 20: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

111

Above all he picure is misleading because o is saic characer One

seems orced o choose beween he picure o an elephan which ress

on a oroise (Wha suppors he oroise) and he picure o a grea

Hegelian serpen o knowledge wih is ail in is mouh (Where does

i begin) Neiher will do For empirical knowledge like is sophisi-

caed exension science is raional no because i has a foundaion bu

because i is a sel-correcing enerprise which can pu any claim in

jeopardy hough no all a once54

I making a knowledge claim consiss o placing i in helogical space o reasons hen any and every such claim cannever be sae rom challenge and hereore canno serve as

he firm ground o knowledge as a whole Bu by he sameoken i his is he only kind o knowledge available o usmdashbyreuing he myh o he given Sellars believes he has suffi-cienly demonsraed hismdashhen here is no way o challengehis ramework as a whole The only hing here is is a slowarduous hazardous and never-ending process o esing eachand every claim pu orh This is he inglorious venure oraional knowledge

Le us now move on o Sellarsrsquos second ex under consid-

eraion here ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo55 Ineresinglyenough neiher he noion o ldquohe givenrdquo nor ha o ldquohemyh o he givenrdquo are o be ound in hese lecures a leasno explicily Bu i is precisely because o his erminologicalpeculiariy ha his ex is o paricular ineres For whileSellars may no invoke he given explicily i is quie obviousha wha he is in ac discussing is precisely anoher versiono he myh o he given And wha makes his paricularaccoun o he myh especially ineresing or our presen

purposes is he ac ha Sellars here explicily invokes ldquoin-uiive knowledgerdquo hereby unequivocally confirming hahe myh o he given indeed reers o his age-old noion

The hird and final lecure o he series eniled ldquoEpisemicPrinciplesrdquo is crucial in his regard Afer briefly conveying

54 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 170 original emphasis55 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 21: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

112

he radiional argumens or he necessiy o non-inerenial judgmens Sellars goes on o sae

We are clearly in he neighbourhood o wha has been called he ldquosel-

evidenrdquo he ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo in shor o ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo I is in

his neighbourhood ha we find wha has come o be called he foun-

daional picure o human knowledge According o his picure belies

which have inerenial reasonableness ulimaely rely or heir auhor-

iy on a sraum o belies which are in some sense sel-ceriying56

By using here almos he exac same erms o reer o inui-ive knowledge (ldquosel-evidenrdquo and ldquosel-ceriyingrdquo) as when

reerring o he given in EPM (ldquosel-auhenicaingrdquo) hispassage clearly demonsraes ha ldquohe myh o he givenrdquoand ldquoinuiive knowledgerdquo are virually synonymous or Sel-lars Likewise by being almos idenical o he discussions ohe myh o he given in EPM i surely dispels any possibledoubs le Bu only a ew paragraphs laer an even moreineresing passage appears

Now many philosophers who have endorsed a concep o inuiive

knowledge are clearly commited o he posiion ha here is a levelo cogniion more basic han believing This more basic level would

consis o a sub-concepualmdashwhere ldquosub-concepualrdquo is ar rom being

used as a pejoraive ermmdashawareness o cerain acs In erms o he

ramework skeched in he preceding wo lecures here would be a

level o cogniion more basic han hinkings or okenings o senences in

Menalesemdashmore basic in ac han symbolic aciviy lieral o analogi-

cal I would be a level o cogniion unmediaed by conceps indeed i

would be he very souce of conceps in some such way as described by

radiional heories o absracion I would be ldquodirec apprehensionrdquoo acs heir ldquodirec presencerdquo o he mind57

Sellars here clearly presens a somewha differen versiono he myh o he given o he one provided in EPM Bu

56 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 3 paragraph 1457 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 21 original emphases

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 22: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

113

here is litle doub ha i sill is he same myhical creaurewe have learned o recognise so very well Here again heclaim is ha here is some kind o non-concepual and non-inerenial knowledge ha has he saus o knowledge simply by virue o being direcly presen apprehended or giveno he mind Given ha his kind o knowledge esseniallydepends on he idea o ldquodirec apprehensionrdquo Sellars askshow is his noion o be undersood To begin o answer hisquesion Sellars noes ha ldquolsquoapprehendrsquo like lsquoseersquo is in isodinar sense an achievemen wordrdquo58 This clearly impliesha he ac o apprehending migh no be successul hais ha i migh occur wihou anyhing being apprehended

The consequences o his seemingly simple observaion arespelled ou in he nex paragraph

Many who use he meaphor ldquoo seerdquo in inellecual conexs over-

look he ac ha in is lieral sense ldquoseeingrdquo is a erm or a successul

concepual aciviy which conrass wih ldquoseeming o seerdquo No piling

on o addiional meaphors (eg ldquograspingrdquo which implies an objec

grasped) can blun his ac Now he disincion beween seeing and

merely seeming o see implies a crierion To rely on he meaphors o

ldquoapprehendingrdquo or ldquopresence o he objecrdquo is o obscure he need ocrieria or disinguishing beween ldquoknowingrdquo and ldquoseeming o knowrdquo

which ulimaely define wha i means o speak o knowledge as a co-

ec or well-ounded hinking ha somehing is he case59

To pu i in he simples possible erms knowledge necessarilyimplies some crieria by which i is o be disinguished romosensible knowledge Thereore invocaions o direc appre-hension which obviae his simple ac canno lay claim o

he saus o knowledge Finally Sellars concludes

In shor I suspec ha he noion o a non-concepual ldquodirec appre-

hensionrdquo o a ldquoacrdquo provides a merely verbal soluion o our problem

The regress is sopped by an ad hoc regress-sopper Indeed he very

58 Sellars ldquoThe Srucure o Knowledgerdquo lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 23original emphasis59 Ibid lecure 3 secion 5 paragraph 24 original emphases

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

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Speculations V

114

meaphors which promised he sough-or oundaion conain wihin

hemselves a dialecical momen which akes us beyond hem60

The las senence is worh highlighing Insead o providinga non-concepual oundaion or concepual knowledge ashey are supposed o do meaphors o direc apprehendinggrasping seeing and he like allow us o arrive a he exacopposie conclusion i somehing is o lay claim o he sauso knowledge here has o be an explici (or implici) crierion

by which his claim is o be adjudicaedTo conclude his second par o my essay le me briefly

address one las accoun o he myh o he given he one

presened by Sellars in his Carus Lecures61

In he firs lecureo he series given under he ile ldquoThe Lever o ArchimedesrdquoSellars saes his

I a person is direcly aware o an iem which has caegorial saus C

hen he person is aware o i as having caegorial saus C

This principle is perhaps he mos basic orm o wha I have casigaed

as ldquoThe Myh o he Givenrdquo To ejec he Myh of he Given is o ejec he

idea ha he caegorial srucure of he worldmdashif i has a caegorial sruc-uemdashimposes iself on he mind as a seal imposes an image on meled wax62

Thus ldquohe mos basic ormrdquo o he myh o he given consissin he idea ha he ldquocaegoial sucue of he woldrdquo is in someway direcly available or given o he mind To undersand whyhis migh be problemaic or Sellars we have o ake a looka his concepion o he caegories In Sellarsrsquos uncionalis-nominalis Kanian inerpreaion caegories are defined as

ldquohe mos generic uncional classificaions o he elemens

60 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo lecure 3 secion 5paragraph 2561 Sellars ldquoFoundaions or a Meaphysics o Pure Processrdquo62 Ibid 11-12 original emphasis

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 24: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

115

o judgmensrdquo63 This definiion o he caegories makes iobvious ha or Sellars he caegorial srucure o he worldis no somehing ha can be simply read off o he world Onhe conrary we can arrive a he caegorial srucure o heworld only as a resul o ha long slow and arduous sel-correcing raional enerprise described earlier This mighin ac be one o he mos imporan lessons o be learnedrom Sellars knowledge o he world is indeed possible bui will mos cerainly no come by some miraculous insighHard work is sill our bes be

Sellars Contra Deleuze Normatvty versus Creatvty

Now ha we have assembled all heir weapons le us ollowhese wo ormidable opponens ono he field o batle Thesakes o his conronaion are high indeed Nohing lesshan heir respecive claims o knowledge are on he linepossibly even he naure o knowledge isel Bu beore wele hem engage each oher in batle one las effor is in orderI we are o conron hese wo grea philosophers in heirguises o major represenaives o wo opposing philosophical

camps some common ground has o be ound upon whichhis conronaion is o be saged The problem o universalsmigh very well be jus wha we are looking or For i could be argued ha boh Sellars and Deleuze ashioned heir re-specive philosophies in general and accouns o knowledgein paricular precisely in response o his ancien and well-ravelled philosophical problem

Tradiionally hree ypes o answers were given o he ques-ion o he exisence o universals Plaonic realism affirmed

i nominalism denied i and concepualism (or idealism)acknowledged he exisence o universals bu merely asconceps or ideas in he mind While Deleuze could arguably

be classified in he firs realis camp Sellars is o be siuaed

63 Wilrid Sellars ldquoToward a Theory o he Caegoriesrdquo in Kanrsquos Tanscendenal Meaphysics ed Jeffrey F Sicha (Aascadero Ridgeview Publishing 2002) 329

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 25: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

116

firmly in he second nominalis one64 Le us sar once morewih Deleuze

As Deleuze ollowing Niezsche amously saed heoverurning (or reversal) o Plaonism is he principal asko modern philosophy65 Deleuzersquos soluion o he problemo universals and possibly even his philosophy as a whole is bes read in ligh o his oen repeaed pronouncemen ohis The firs hing o noe in his regard is ha his operaiono overurning is no o be conused wih a simple denial oPlaonism Quie he conrary ldquoha his overurning shouldconserve many Plaonic characerisics is no only ineviable

bu desirablerdquo66 Thereore in order o undersand Deleuzersquos

saed ambiion o overurn Plaonism i is necessary o de-ermine which aspecs o Plaorsquos sysem Deleuze reains andin wha orm and which ones he discards

I could be argued ha Plaorsquos whole philosophical enerpriseis a response o he problem o universals And his soluionis very well known To pu i in he simples possible ermsin order o accoun or he exisence o universals Plaoound i necessary o posulae an Oher world beyond hesensible world o appearances (individuals becoming im-

ages copies simulacra differences) exising in ime here isan inelligible world o essences (Universals Being FormsIdeas he One) ouside o ime The ask o philosophy henis o hink his Oher world In order o accomplish his Plaoalso had o posulae an Oher kind o knowledge beyondhe discursive inellec capable o providing knowledge ohe sensible world here is an inuiive inellec capable oimmediaely apprehending he inelligible world

Ineresingly enough Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonism

reains virually all o Plaorsquos dualisms lised above Bu i does

64 Wih regard o Deleuzersquos soluion o he problem o universals I am ol-lowing Pee Wolendalersquos accoun provided in his paper ldquoAriadnersquos ThreadTemporaliy Modaliy and Individuaion in Deleuzersquos Meaphysicsrdquo htpdeonologisicsfileswordpresscom201103deleuze-mmupd (accessed

July 15 2013)65 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 5866 Ibid

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 26: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

117

so wih he inen o abolish he undamenal Plaonic dual-ism o he sensible world o appearances and he inelligibleworld o essences For Deleuze here simply is no Oher worldhe world we live in is he only world here is And as Deleuzeand Guatari pu i ldquoi may be ha believing in his world inhis lie becomes our mos difficul ask odayrdquo67 In order oaccomplish his difficul ask Deleuze recruis he help o awhole hos o figures rom he enire hisory o philosophyArguably Immanuel Kan is he mos imporan o hese Foras he one who discovered ldquohe prodigious domain o heranscendenalrdquo Kan is hailed by Deleuze as he ldquoanalogueo a grea explorermdashno o anoher world bu o he upper

and lower reaches o his onerdquo68

I is Kanrsquos discovery o heranscendenal ha allows Deleuze o solve he problem ouniversals Ideas (or universals) do exis bu no as eernalessences in an Oher world raher hey are o be conceivedo as he condiions o experience o be ound in he lowerreaches o his world Bu conrary o Kan who conceived ohe ranscendenal in episemological erms ha is as condi-ions o possible experience Deleuze amously reconceiveshe ranscendenal in onological erms ha is as condiions

o eal experienceDeleuzersquos world hereore ruly is a reversed version o Plaorsquos

dualis universe While Deleuze reains Plaorsquos dualism o heinelligible and he sensible he insead o opposing hem aswo disinc worlds conceives o hem as wo complemenaryaspecs o his world The inelligible domain o Ideas is o

be conceived as he condiion o he sensible domain oreal experience In a similar inversion and conrary o Plaoor whom he inelligible world is o be hough in erms

o he One and he Same and he sensible world in ermso he muliple and he differen he inelligible realm oDeleuzersquos world is populaed by Ideas defined as differenialmulipliciies which are hen o be acualised in he sen-

67 Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guatari Wha is Philosophy rans Hugh Tomlin-son and Graham Burchill (New York Columbia Universiy Press 1994) 7568 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 135

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 27: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

118

sible realm as sel-idenical individuals Furhermore andagain conra Plao or whom only he inelligible world oessences is real Deleuze draws on Duns Scousrsquos docrine ohe univociy o being in order o affirm he realiy o bohhe inelligible and he sensible domains ldquoBeing is said in asingle and same sense o everyhing o which i is said buha o which i is said differs i is said o difference iselrdquo69 Finally i he overurning o Plaonism is o be compleeDeleuze has o find a principle o immanence which will al-low him o demonsrae ha he inelligible and he sensibleindeed are o be conceived as wo domains o he same worldConrary o Plaorsquos relegaion o ime o he sensible world

o appearances and he upholding o he eernal naure ohe inelligible world o essences Deleuze affirms preciselyime as he uniying principle These are he basic conourso Deleuzersquos onology

In order o hink his world Deleuze will once again ollowin Plaorsquos ooseps I we are o hink he immediae uniyo he inelligible and sensible discursive reason wih all ismediaions simply will no do Wha is needed is an oherknowledge capable o going beyond he sensible Bu his ime

conrary o Plao his beyond is no siuaed up and above hisworld bu down and below in is lower reaches Though is oapprehend direcly he inelligible he being o he sensibleor he condiions o real experience As we have seen in hefirs par o his essay hough begins wih an encouner wihhe seniendum (he being o he sensible or ha which canonly be sensed) and proceeds o hink he cogiandum (he

being o he inelligible or ha which can only be hough)Ineresingly enough in his ques or his oher knowledge

Deleuze will once again find an unlikely ally in Kan For iis precisely Kanrsquos accoun o he sublime ha Deleuze akesas a model or his accoun o he ranscenden exercise ohe aculies

The consequences o Deleuzersquos overurning o Plaonismor philosophy were revoluionary indeed Ever since Plao

69 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 36

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3535

Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 28: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

119

and up unil Kanrsquos Copernican or episemological urnmeaphysics was proverbially considered o be he queen oall sciences Aer almos wo cenuries o various atempsin he wake o Kan o disprove is possibiliy Deleuze wasone o he firs conemporary philosophers o give back omeaphysics he pride o place i deserves Bu in Deleuzersquosworld o overurned Plaonism meaphysics will find iselallied wih he mos unlikely o allies In conras o bohPlaorsquos denial o he realiy o he sensible realm on he onehand and Kanrsquos denial o he realiy o he inelligible realmon he oher Deleuzersquos affirmaion o he univociy o beingaffirming as i does he realiy o boh he sensible and he

inelligible domains breeds a new philosophical alliance beween meaphysics and aesheics In his regard Deleuzersquosamous pronouncemen on aesheics casigaing Kan andhis ranscendenal condiions o possibiliy or inroducinghe amiliar schism beween he wo senses o he erm is oa paricular significance

No wonder hen ha aesheics should be divided ino wo irreducible

domains ha o he heory o he sensible which capures only he

realrsquos conormiy wih possible experience and ha o he heory ohe beauiul which deals wih he realiy o he real in so ar as i is

refleced Everyhing changes once we deermine he condiions o real

experience which are no larger han he condiioned and which differ

in kind rom he caegories he wo senses o he aesheic become one

o he poin where he being o he sensible reveals isel in he work o

ar while a he same ime he work o ar appears as experimenaion70

This quoe expands on he already cied claim made by Deleuze

ldquoEmpiricism ruly becomes ranscendenal and aesheics anapodicic discipline only when we apprehend direcly in hesensible ha which can only be sensed he very being of hesensiblerdquo71 Wheher we wan o call Deleuzersquos philosophyan aesheical meaphysics or a meaphysical aesheics i

70 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 6871 Ibid 56-57 original emphasis

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3035

Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3535

Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 29: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

120

is quie obvious ha or Deleuze aesheics and meaphysicsare virually inerchangeable erms Bu wha he firs quoealso reveals is he imporance ha Deleuze atribues o arAdd o his Deleuzersquos earlier equaion o he work o ar wihranscendenal empiricism or he science o he sensible72 and i becomes clear ha Deleuze has orged an equallysrong bond beween ar and philosophy isel Never sincehe early Romanics has here been such a grand allianceo aesheics and meaphysics on he one hand and ar andphilosophy on he oher

Le us now urn o Sellars There is litle doub ha Sellarswas a scienific realis As he amously pu i in EPM ldquoin he

dimension o describing and explaining he world scienceis he measure o all hings o wha is ha i is and o whais no ha i is nordquo73 Bu Sellarsrsquos commimen o scienificrealism is o be inerpreed in erms o his deeper commi-men o nauralism To be is o exis in naure naure beingundersood here as he spaioemporal causal domain Scienceis he measure o all hings simply because i has proven iselime and again as he bes and mos reliable way or exploringhis spaioemporal causal realm Sellarsrsquos nominalism in

urn ollows rom his nauralism Being causally impoenuniversals or absrac eniies canno be said o exis in anymeaningul way Individuals are all here is74

I migh seem emping o read Sellars as a reducive or evenas some have done an eliminaive maerialis Bu nohingcould be urher rom he ruh I here is one hing Sellarswas always unequivocal abou i is his insisence ha hegreaes challenge acing modern philosophy oday is how

ldquoo ake boh man and science seriouslyrdquo75 The clash o he

scienific and manies images o man in he world is o be

72 Ibid 5673 Sellars ldquoEmpiricism and he Philosophy o Mindrdquo 17374 I am here ollowing Willem A deVriesrsquo characerisaion o Sellars as pre-sened in his sudy Wilfid Sellas (Chesham Acumen 2005)75 Wilrid Sellars Science and Meaphysics (Aascadero Ridgeview 1967) 1

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3035

Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3135

Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3235

Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3335

Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3535

Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 30: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

121

resolved no by reducing one o he oher or by eliminaingone alogeher bu by using hese wo images ino one se-reoscopic vision76 I philosophy is o mee his challenge i isimperaive o acknowledge boh he auhoriy o he scienificimage over he naual space of causes (he order o being orhe real order) as well as he auhoriy o he manies imageover he nomaive space of easons (he order o knowing orhe concepual order) Defining he naure o he complicaedrelaionship beween he naual and he nomaive has beenhe cenral problem o Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical enerprise

Sellarsrsquos response o his predicamen is ingenious o sayhe leas The normaive space o reasons is o be undersood

as causally reducible bu logically (concepually) irreducible ohe naural space o causes77 Insoar as concepual houghor he logical space o reasons has a maerial subsrae romwhich i arises here is nohing in principle prevening henaural sciences rom exploring i This is why or Sellars henormaive is causally reducible o he naural On he oherhand insoar as he space o reasons is essenially nomaive in characer here is nohing in principle ha he nauralsciences can each us abou i Given ha hey are empiri-

cal descripive and concerned wih wha is he case nauralsciences canno by definiion provide an accoun o heranscendenal he prescripive and wha ough o be he caseThis is why or Sellars he normaive is logically (concepually) irreducible o he naural

There is anoher sense in which he normaive can be saido be ineliminable Following Kan Sellars defines hough asessenially concepual ha is as a rule-governed aciviy Therules governing hough as Pee Wolendale pus i are o be

conceived as ldquohe undamenal norms o raionaliymdashhosenorms by which we are bound simply in virue o makingclaims a all or hose norms ha provide he condiions o

76 See Wilrid Sellars ldquoPhilosophy and he Scienific Image o Manrdquo in Sci-ence Pecepion and Realit (Aascadero Ridgeview 1991) 4-577 C James OrsquoShea Wilfrid Sellars Nauralism wih a Normaive Turn (Cam-

bridge Poliy Press 2007) 21

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3135

Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3235

Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3335

Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3435

Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3535

Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 31: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3135

Speculations V

122

he possibiliy o raionaliy iselrdquo78 Insoar as he nauralsciences are essenially raional hey are bound by hese sameundamenal norms o raionaliy This is why or Sellars henormaive is o be consrued no only as irreducible o buas consiuive o he ranscendenal condiions o empiricalknowledge ha he sciences provide o he naural domain

In claiming ha he norms o reasoning are o be consruedas he ranscendenal condiions o knowledge o he nau-ral world Sellars clearly sides wih Kan Bu on he oherhand in upholding ha he knowledge which he nauralsciences atain is a knowledge no o appearances bu ohe real order or he in-isel Sellars obviously rejecs Kanrsquos

injuncion agains he possibiliy o such a knowledge Byhe same oken Sellars cerainly does no shy away rom a-firming he possibiliy o meaphysics Ye once again sidingwih Kan Sellars clearly believed ha i meaphysics is o beanyhing more han a fligh o ancy i needs o be coupledwih episemology Or as Ray Brassier pus i ldquojus as epise-mology wihou meaphysics is empy meaphysics wihouepisemology is blindrdquo79

The ime or conronaion has finally come Le us sar i

by oregrounding he single mos imporan convicion haDeleuze and Sellars boh share hey boh firmly believe no jus in he possibiliy bu he necessiy o meaphysicsmdashiphilosophy is o be anyhing a all i has o be a meaphysicsTo describe and explain he undamenal srucure o heworld has always been and always will be he ulimae goalo philosophical hinking Bu wih regards o answering hequesion o how philosophy is o achieve his ormidablegoal Deleuze and Sellars could no be urher apar rom

one anoher

78 Pee Wolendale ldquoEssay on Transcendenal Realismrdquo htpdeonologis-icsfileswordpresscom201005essay-on-ranscendenal-realismpd 38(accessed July 15 2013)79 Ray Brassier ldquoConceps and Objecsrdquo in Te Speculaive un Coninenal

Maeialism and Realism ed Levi Bryan Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman(Melbourne R epress 2011) 49

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3235

Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3335

Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3435

Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3535

Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 32: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

123

Deleuzersquos episemology insoar as he can be said o have oneollows rom his onology In his atemp o overurn PlaonismDeleuze affirms a one world onology This world is he onlyworld here is Ye Deleuze reains Plaorsquos disincion o hesensible and he inelligible Only his ime hese disincrealms are o be conceived as wo aspecs o his world heinelligible universal virual ranscendenal Ideas consiu-ing is lower reaches and he sensible singular acual andempirical individuals he upper ones I we are o know hisworld Deleuze insiss concepual represenaional knowledgewill no do An oher knowledge is necessary a knowledgesupposedly capable o apprehending direcly he inelligible

Ideas bu also o creaing he conceps idenical o he sen-sible individuals These wo dimensions o knowledge heinuiive and he creaive are no o be conceived as disinc bu as wo sides o he same coin or wo aspecs o a singleprinciple governing hough Once again Deleuzersquos accouno hough ollows rom his accoun o being In line wih hisaffirmaion o he univociy o being Deleuze believes ha iwe are o affirm he being o hough being has o be said ohough in he same sense in which i is said o everyhing

else And as is well known he sense o being or Deleuzeis producive or creaive difference This is why Deleuze a-firms ha ldquoo hink is o creaerdquo80 Finally ollowing he earlyRomanics Deleuze finds he model or his oher knowledgein aesheic experience (or is inuiive aspec) on he onehand and arisic pracice (or is creaive aspec) on heoher By he same oken Deleuze will proclaim aesheics o

be he greaes ally o meaphysics and ar ha o philosophySellars on he oher hand unequivocally upholds he

disincion beween episemology and onology Bu his dis-incion isel is o be conceived in episemological and noonological erms81 By consruing hough as a rule-governed

80 Deleuze Diffeence and Repeiion 13581 For a much more deailed and precise accoun o his aspec o Sellarsrsquosphilosophy see Daniel Sacilotorsquos paper ldquoRealism and Represenaion Onhe Onological Turnrdquo Speculaions (2013) 4 53-62

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3535

Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 33: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3335

Speculations V

124

normaive aciviy Sellars is able o affirm boh he epise-mological difference and onological indifference o houghrom being Insoar as i is an acivit ha is somehing hawe do and no somehing ha is hough sricly speakinghas no being Bu by he same oken precisely because i isan acivit i is no o be conceived as somehing oherworldyor supernaural bu as firmly rooed in his world and inhe order o naural causaliy Thereore and in conras oDeleuzersquos program Sellars clearly shows ha upholding hedisincion beween being and hough need no imply a com-mimen o an onological dualism o some sor Tha is hedifference beween hough and being is no an onological

bu an episemological difference Sellarsrsquos onological com-mimen o nauralism and scienific realism ollows romhis episemological commimen o he disincion beween being consrued as he naural space o causes and houghconsrued as he normaive space o reasons To be or Sel-lars is o be causally efficacious and hus only a nauralismwilling o ake seriously he advances o he naural sciencescan explore he naural space o causes Ye i his naural-ism is o provide a complee accoun o his world i has o

acknowledge is normaive dimension ha is he specificiyo he normaive space o reasons Sellarsrsquos philosophy indeedis a ldquonauralism wih a normaive urnrdquo82

Deleuze and Sellars boh affirm he univociy o being Andhey boh atemp o devise an accoun o hough ha wouldno go agains his basic onological principle For Deleuzehis means ha i he disincion beween being and houghis no o be consrued as an onological dualism hough is o be said in he same sense as ha in which being is said ha

is as creaive difference Bu by consruing hough purely inonological erms Deleuze collapses he very disincion heis rying o explain making i hereby uninelligible By hesame oken Deleuzersquos ailure o acknowledge he specificiyo hough in is difference rom being leaves him wihou aproper episemology making i hereby impossible or him o

82 OrsquoShea Wilfid Sellas 3

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

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Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3535

Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 34: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3435

Matija Jelača ndash Sellars Contra Deleuze

125

jusiy his onology Finally by erasing he difference beween being and hough Deleuze migh have escaped he need oconsrue hough as an onologically disinc domain bu hehas accomplished his a a seep price indeed he price beingnohing less han idealism Ironically enough Deleuzersquos a-emp o overurn Plaonism ends up affirming Plaorsquos worsidealis excesses

In order o provide an accoun o hough ha does noviolae he principle o he univociy o being Sellars akes heexac opposie roue o he one ravelled by Deleuze For Sellarshough is expressly no o be consrued in onological ermsI we are o avoid he dangers o collapsing he disincion

beween being and hough on he one hand and o urningi ino an onological dualism on he oher i is imperaiveo conceive hough boh in is diffeence fom bu also in isrelaion o being As we have seen Sellars achieves his byconceiving hough in normaive erms as a rule-governedaciviy Though is a he same ime differen rom (logicallyirreducible o) and in relaion o (causally reducible o) beingBy securing he righs o hough in is disincion rom be-ing Sellars simulaneously secures he righs o being rom

he idealis incursions o hough This way Sellars is able ouphold a decidedly realis onology Finally insoar as henormaive space o reasons can be consrued in ranscendenalerms as consising o he very condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy Sellarsrsquos onology can be said o be a properlyranscendenal realism

Le us conclude Ulimaely he conronaion beweenDeleuze and Sellars revolves around heir conrasing viewson nomaivit While Sellarsrsquos enire philosophical edifice is

buil upon his normaive concepion o hough and knowl-edge Deleuzersquos philosophical advenure is bes described asan atemp o escape he norm-bound world o judgmenand represenaion In ac Deleuzersquos ques or an oherknowledge is nohing bu such an atemp Bu wha Deleuzeails o realise and wha Sellars makes so perecly clear isha he choice o leave he normaive space o reasons isno ours o make in he firs place To reierae once again

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3535

Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons

Page 35: 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

7232019 04 Jelaca Sellars Contra Deleuze on Initutive Knowledge

httpslidepdfcomreaderfull04-jelaca-sellars-contra-deleuze-on-initutive-knowledge 3535

Speculations V

Wolendalersquos pronouncemen insoar as we make any claimsa all we are bound by he undamenal norms o raionaliyhe very norms ha provide he condiions o he possibiliyo raionaliy isel Unless one is willing o leave behind heclaim o raionaliy isel here simply is no way ou o henormaive space o reasons