TodayisWednesday,July01,2015

RepublicofthePhilippinesSUPREMECOURT

Manila

FIRSTDIVISION

G.R.No.177467March9,2011

PFIZER,INC.AND/ORREYGERARDOBACARRO,AND/ORFERDINANDCORTES,AND/ORALFREDMAGALLON,AND/ORARISTOTLEARCE,Petitioners,vs.GERALDINEVELASCO,Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDODECASTRO,J.:

ThisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule45oftheRulesofCivilProceduretoannulandsetasidetheResolution1datedOctober23,2006aswellastheResolution2datedApril10,2007bothissuedbytheCourtofAppeals inCAG.R.SPNo.88987entitled, "Pfizer, Inc.and/orReyGerardoBacarro,and/orFerdinandCortes,and/or Alfred Magallon, and/or Aristotle Arce v. National Labor Relations Commission Second Division andGeraldineVelasco."TheOctober23,2006ResolutionmodifieduponrespondentsmotionforreconsiderationtheDecision3 dated November 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals by requiring PFIZER, Inc. (PFIZER) to payrespondentswagesfromthedateoftheLaborArbitersDecision4datedDecember5,2003untilitwaseventuallyreversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals. The April 10, 2007 Resolution, on the other hand, deniedPFIZERsmotionforpartialreconsideration.

Thefactsofthiscase,asstatedintheCourtofAppealsDecisiondatedNovember23,2005,areasfollows:

PrivaterespondentGeraldineL.VelascowasemployedwithpetitionerPFIZER,INC.asProfessionalHealthCareRepresentativesince1August1992.Sometime inApril2003,Velascohadamedicalworkup forherhighriskpregnancyandwassubsequentlyadvisedbedrestwhichresultedinherextendingherleaveofabsence.Velascofiledhersick leavefor theperiodfrom26Marchto18June2003,hervacation leavefrom19Juneto20June2003,andleavewithoutpayfrom23Juneto14July2003.

On26 June2003,whileVelascowas still on leave,PFIZER through itsAreaSalesManager, hereinpetitionerFerdinandCortez,personallyservedVelascoa"ShowcauseNotice"dated25June2003.Asidefrommentioningabout an investigation on her possible violations of companywork rules regarding "unauthorized deals and/ordiscounts in money or samples and unauthorized withdrawal and/or pullout of stocks" and instructing her tosubmitherexplanationonthematterwithin48hoursfromreceiptof thesame,thenoticealsoadvisedherthatshe was being placed under "preventive suspension" for 30 days or from that day to 6 August 2003 andconsequentlyorderedtosurrenderthefollowing"accountabilities"1)CompanyCar,2)SamplesandPromats,3)CRF/ER/VEHICLE/SOA/POSAP/MPOAandotherrelatedCompanyForms,4)CashCard,5)CaltexCard,and6)MPOA/TPOA Revolving Travel Fund. The following day, petitioner Cortez together with one Efren Darianoretrievedtheabovementioned"accountabilities"fromVelascosresidence.

In response,Velascosenta letteraddressed toCortezdated28June2003denying thecharges. Inher letter,VelascoclaimedthatthetransactionwithMercuryDrug,MagsaysayBranchcoveredbyhercheck(no.1072)intheamountofP23,980.00wasmerelytoaccommodatetwoundisclosedpatientsofacertainDr.RenatoManalo.Insupportthereto,VelascoattachedtheDoctorsletterandtheaffidavitofthelatterssecretary.

On12July2003,Velasco receiveda "SecondShowcauseNotice" informingherofadditionaldevelopments intheir investigation.According to thenotice,acertainCarlitoJomenexecutedanaffidavitpointing toVelascoasthe one who transacted with a printing shop to print PFIZER discount coupons. Jomen also presented textmessages originating from Velascos company issued cellphone referring to the printing of the said coupons.

Again,Velascowasgiven48hours tosubmitherwrittenexplanationon thematter.On16July2003,Velascosenta letter toPFIZERviaAboitizcourierserviceasking foradditional time toanswer thesecondShowcauseNotice.

Thatsameday,VelascofiledacomplaintforillegalsuspensionwithmoneyclaimsbeforetheRegionalArbitrationBranch.Thefollowingday,17July2003,PFIZERsentheraletterinvitinghertoadisciplinaryhearingtobeheldon22July2003.VelascoreceiveditunderprotestandinformedPFIZERviathereceivingcopyofthesaidletterthatshehadlodgedacomplaintagainstthelatterandthattheissuesthatmayberaisedintheJuly22hearing"canbetackledduringthehearingofhercase"oratthepreliminaryconferencesetfor5and8ofAugust2003.ShelikewiseoptedtowithholdansweringtheSecondShowcauseNotice.On25July2003,Velascoreceiveda"ThirdShowcauseNotice,"togetherwithcopiesoftheaffidavitsoftwoBranchManagersofMercuryDrug,askingher for her commentwithin 48 hours. Finally, on 29 July 2003,PFIZER informedVelasco of its "ManagementDecision"terminatingheremployment.

On5December2003,theLaborArbiterrendereditsdecisiondeclaringthedismissalofVelascoillegal,orderingherreinstatementwithbackwagesandfurtherawardingmoralandexemplarydamageswithattorneysfees.Onappeal,theNLRCaffirmedthesamebutdeletedtheawardofmoralandexemplarydamages.5

ThedispositiveportionoftheLaborArbitersDecisiondatedDecember5,2003isasfollows:

WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrendereddeclaringthatcomplainantwasillegallydismissed.Respondentsareorderedtoreinstatethecomplainanttoherformerpositionwithoutlossofseniorityrightsandwithfullbackwagesandtopaythecomplainantthefollowing:

1. Fullbackwages(basicsalary,companybenefits,allallowancesasofDecember5,2003intheamountof P572,780.00)

2. 13thMonthPay,Midyear,Christmasandperformancebonusesintheamountof P105,300.00

3. Moraldamagesof P50,000.00

4. Exemplarydamagesintheamountof P30,000.00

5. AttorneysFeesof10%oftheawardexcludingdamagesintheamountof P67,808.00.

Thetotalawardisintheamountof P758,080.00.6

PFIZERappealedtotheNationalLaborRelationsCommission(NLRC)but itsappealwasdeniedvia theNLRCDecision7datedOctober20,2004,whichaffirmedtheLaborArbitersrulingbutdeletedtheawardfordamages,thedispositiveportionofwhichisasfollows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal and the motion praying for the deposit in escrow ofcomplainantspayrollreinstatementareherebydeniedandtheDecisionoftheLaborArbiterisaffirmedwiththemodificationthattheawardofmoralandexemplarydamagesisdeletedandattorneysfeesshallbebasedontheawardof13thmonthpaypursuanttoArticleIIIoftheLaborCode.8

PFIZER moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied for lack of merit in a NLRC Resolution9 datedDecember14,2004.

Undaunted,PFIZER filedwith theCourt ofAppeals a special civil action for the issuanceof awrit ofcertiorariunderRule65of theRulesofCourt toannulandsetasidetheaforementionedNLRCissuances. InaDecisiondatedNovember23,2005,theCourtofAppealsupheldthevalidityofrespondentsdismissalfromemployment,thedispositiveportionofwhichreadsasfollows:

WHEREFORE, the instantpetition isGRANTED.TheassailedDecisionof theNLRCdated20October2004aswellasitsResolutionof14December2004isherebyANNULEDandSETASIDE.HavingfoundtheterminationofGeraldine L. Velascos employment in accordance with the two notice rule pursuant to the due processrequirementandwithjustcause,hercomplaintforillegaldismissalisherebyDISMISSED.10

Respondent filed aMotion forReconsiderationwhich theCourt ofAppeals resolved in theassailedResolutiondatedOctober23,2006whereinitaffirmedthevalidityofrespondentsdismissalfromemploymentbutmodified

itsearlierrulingbydirectingPFIZERtopayrespondentherwagesfromthedateoftheLaborArbitersDecisiondatedDecember5,2003uptotheCourtofAppealsDecisiondatedNovember23,2005,towit:

INVIEWWHEREOF,thedismissalofprivaterespondentGeraldineVelascoisAFFIRMED,butpetitionerPFIZER,INC.isherebyorderedtopayherthewagestowhichsheisentitledtofromthetimethereinstatementorderwasissueduntilNovember23,2005,thedateofpromulgationofOurDecision.11

RespondentfiledwiththeCourtapetitionforreviewunderRule45oftheRulesofCivilProcedure,whichassailedtheCourtofAppealsDecisiondatedNovember23,2005andwasdocketedasG.R.No.175122.Respondentspetition,questioningtheCourtofAppealsdismissalofhercomplaint,wasdeniedbythisCourtsSecondDivisioninaminuteResolution12datedDecember5,2007,thepertinentportionofwhichstates:

Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari, the Courtresolves to DENY the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed judgment towarranttheexerciseofthisCourtsdiscretionaryappellatejurisdiction,andforraisingsubstantiallyfactualissues.

On theotherhand,PFIZERfiled the instantpetitionassailing theaforementionedCourtofAppealsResolutionsandofferingforourresolutionasinglelegalissue,towit:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a serious but reversible error when it ordered Pfizer to payVelascowagesfromthedateoftheLaborArbitersdecisionorderingherreinstatementuntilNovember23,2005,whentheCourtofAppealsrendereditsdecisiondeclaringVelascosdismissalvalid.13

Thepetitioniswithoutmerit.

PFIZERargues that,contrary to theCourtofAppealspronouncement in itsassailedDecisiondatedNovember23,2005,therulinginRoquerov.PhilippineAirlines,Inc.14 isnotapplicable in thecaseatbar,particularlywithregardtothenatureandconsequencesofanorderofreinstatement,towit:

The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate adismissedemployeeentitleshimtopaymentofhissalarieseffectivefromthetimetheemployerfailedtoreinstatehimdespitetheissuanceofawritofexecution.Unlessthereisarestrainingorderissued,itisministerialupontheLaborArbitertoimplementtheorderofreinstatement.Inthecaseatbar,norestrainingorderwasgranted.Thus,itwasmandatoryonPALtoactuallyreinstateRoqueroorreinstatehiminthepayroll.Havingfailedtodoso,PALmustpayRoquerothesalaryheisentitledto,asifhewasreinstated,fromthetimeofthedecisionoftheNLRCuntilthefinalityofthedecisionoftheCourt.15(Emphasessupplied.)

It is PFIZERs contention in itsMemorandum16 that "there was no unjustified refusal on [its part] to reinstate[respondent] Velasco during the pendency of the appeal,"17 thus, the pronouncement inRoquero cannot bemadetogovernthiscase.DuringthependencyofthecasewiththeCourtofAppealsandpriortoitsNovember23,2005Decision,PFIZERclaimed that ithadalready required respondent to report forworkonJuly1,2005.However, according to PFIZER, it was respondent who refused to return to work when she wrote PFIZER,through counsel, that shewas opting to receive her separation pay and to avail of PFIZERs early retirementprogram.

InPFIZERsview,itshouldnolongerberequiredtopaywagesconsideringthat(1)ithadalreadypreviouslypaidanenormoussumtorespondentunderthewritofexecutionissuedbytheLaborArbiter(2)itwasallegedlyreadytoreinstaterespondentasofJuly1,2005butitwasrespondentwhounjustifiablyrefusedtoreportforwork(3)itwouldpurportedlybetantamounttoallowingrespondenttochoose"payrollreinstatement"whenbylawitwastheemployer which had the right to choose between actual and payroll reinstatement (4) respondent should bedeemed to have "resigned" and therefore not entitled to additional backwages or separation pay and (5) thisCourtshouldnotmechanicallyapplyRoquerobutrathershouldfollowthedoctrineinGenuinov.NationalLaborRelationsCommission18whichwassupposedly"moreinaccordwiththedictatesoffairnessandjustice."19

Wedonotagree.

At the outset, we note that PFIZERs previous payment to respondent of the amount of P1,963,855.00(representingherwagesfromDecember5,2003,orthedateoftheLaborArbiterdecision,untilMay5,2005)thatwassuccessfullygarnishedundertheLaborArbitersWritofExecutiondatedMay26,2005cannotbeconsideredin its favor. Not only was this sum legally due to respondent under prevailing jurisprudence but also thiscircumstancehighlightedPFIZERs unreasonable delay in complyingwith the reinstatement order of theLaborArbiter.Aperusaloftherecords,includingPFIZERsownsubmissions,confirmedthatitonlyrequiredrespondent

toreportforworkonJuly1,2005,asshownbyitsLetter20datedJune27,2005,whichisalmosttwoyearsfromthetimetheorderofreinstatementwashandeddownintheLaborArbitersDecisiondatedDecember5,2003.

As far back as 1997 in the seminal case of Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. National Labor RelationsCommission,21 theCourtheldthatanawardororderofreinstatement is immediatelyselfexecutorywithouttheneedfortheissuanceofawritofexecutioninaccordancewiththethirdparagraphofArticle22322oftheLaborCode.Inthatcase,wediscussedinlengththerationaleforthatdoctrine,towit:

TheprovisionofArticle223 isclear thatanaward [by theLaborArbiter] for reinstatementshallbe immediatelyexecutory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution forreinstatement. The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediatelyenforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution asprerequisitesfortheexecutionofareinstatementawardwouldcertainlybetrayandruncountertotheveryobjectand intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. Anapplicationforawritofexecutionanditsissuancecouldbedelayedfornumerousreasons.Amerecontinuanceorpostponementofascheduledhearing,forinstance,oraninactiononthepartoftheLaborArbiterortheNLRCcould easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purposeenvisionedbyArticle223. Inotherwords, if the requirementsofArticle224 [including the issuanceofawrit ofexecution]weretogovern,aswesodeclaredinMaranaw,thentheexecutorynatureofareinstatementorderorawardcontemplatedbyArticle223willbeundulycircumscribedandrenderedineffectual.Inenactingthelaw,thelegislature ispresumed tohaveordainedavalidandsensible law,onewhichoperatesno further thanmaybenecessarytoachieveitsspecificpurpose.Statutes,asarule,aretobeconstruedinthelightofthepurposetobeachievedand theevilsought tobeprevented.xxx In introducinganewruleon thereinstatementaspectofalabordecisionunderRepublicActNo.6715,Congressshouldnotbeconsideredtobeindulginginmeresemanticexercise.xxx23(Italicsintheoriginalemphasisandunderscoringsupplied.)

Inthecaseatbar,PFIZERdidnotimmediatelyadmitrespondentbacktoworkwhich,accordingtothelaw,shouldhavebeendoneassoonasanorderorawardofreinstatementishandeddownbytheLaborArbiterwithoutneedfor the issuance of a writ of execution. Thus, respondent was entitled to the wages paid to her under theaforementioned writ of execution. At most, PFIZERs payment of the same can only be deemed partialcompliance/executionoftheCourtofAppealsResolutiondatedOctober23,2006andwouldnotbarrespondentfrombeingpaidherwagesfromMay6,2005toNovember23,2005.

ItwouldalsoseemthatPFIZERwaitedfortheresolutionofitsappealtotheNLRCand,onlyafteritwasorderedby the Labor Arbiter to pay the amount of P1,963,855.00 representing respondents full backwages fromDecember5,2003up toMay5,2005,didPFIZERdecide torequirerespondent toreportback toworkvia theLetterdatedJune27,2005.

PFIZER makes much of respondents noncompliance with its return towork directive by downplaying thereasons forwarded by respondent as less than sufficient to justify her purported refusal to be reinstated. InPFIZERs view, the returntowork order it sent to respondent was adequate to satisfy the jurisprudentialrequisitesconcerningthereinstatementofanillegallydismissedemployee.

ItwouldbeusefultoreproduceherethetextofPFIZERsLetterdatedJune27,2005:

DearMs.Velasco:

Pleasebeinformedthat,pursuanttotheresolutionsdated20October2004and14December2004renderedbytheNationalLaborRelationsCommissionandtheorderdated24May2005issuedbyExecutive LaborArbiterVitoC.Bose, you are required to report forwork on 1 July 2005, at 9:00a.m.,atPfizersmainofficeat the23rdFloor,AyalaLifeFGUCenter,6811AyalaAvenue,MakatiCity,MetroManila.

Pleasereporttotheundersignedforabriefingonyourworkassignmentsandotherresponsibilities,includingtheappropriaterelocationbenefits.

Foryourinformationandcompliance.

Verytrulyyours,

(Sgd.)Ma.EdenGraceSagisi

LaborandEmployeeRelationsManager24

Toreiterate,underArticle223oftheLaborCode,anemployeeentitledtoreinstatement"shalleitherbeadmittedback toworkunder thesame termsandconditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at theoptionoftheemployer,merelyreinstatedinthepayroll."

Itisestablishedinjurisprudencethatreinstatementmeansrestorationtoastateorconditionfromwhichonehadbeenremovedorseparated.Thepersonreinstatedassumesthepositionhehadoccupiedpriortohisdismissal.Reinstatementpresupposesthatthepreviouspositionfromwhichonehadbeenremovedstillexists,orthatthereisanunfilledpositionwhichissubstantiallyequivalentorofsimilarnatureastheonepreviouslyoccupiedbytheemployee.25

Applyingtheforegoingprincipletothecasebeforeus,itcannotbesaidthatwithPFIZERsJune27,2005Letter,inbelatedfulfillmentoftheLaborArbitersreinstatementorder,ithadshownaclearintenttoreinstaterespondenttoher formerpositionunderthesametermsandconditionsnor toasubstantiallyequivalentposition.Tobeginwith,thereturntoworkorderPFIZERsentrespondentissilentwithregardtothepositionortheexactnatureofemployment that itwanted respondent to takeupasof July 1, 2005.Even ifweassume that the jobawaitingrespondent in thenew location isof thesamedesignationandpaycategoryaswhatshehadbefore, it isplainfrom the text of PFIZERs June 27, 2005 letter that such reinstatement was not "under the same terms andconditions"asherpreviousemployment,consideringthatPFIZERorderedrespondenttoreporttoitsmainofficein Makati City while knowing fully well that respondents previous job had her stationed in Baguio City(respondents place of residence) and it was still necessary for respondent to be briefed regarding her workassignmentsandresponsibilities,includingherrelocationbenefits.

TheCourt is cognizant of the prerogative ofmanagement to transfer an employee fromone office to anotherwithinthebusinessestablishment,providedthatthereisnodemotioninrankordiminutionofhissalary,benefitsandotherprivilegesandtheactionisnotmotivatedbydiscrimination,madeinbadfaith,oreffectedasaformofpunishmentordemotionwithoutsufficientcause.26Likewise,themanagementprerogativetotransferpersonnelmustbeexercisedwithoutgraveabuseofdiscretionandputting tomind thebasicelementsof justiceand fairplay.Theremustbenoshowingthatitisunnecessary,inconvenientandprejudicialtothedisplacedemployee.27

The June 27, 2005 returntowork directive implying that respondent was being relocated to PFIZERsMakatimainofficewouldnecessarilycausehardshiptorespondent,amarriedwomanwithafamilytosupportresidinginBaguioCity.However,PFIZER,astheemployer,offerednoreasonorjustificationfortherelocationsuchasthefillingupofrespondentsformerpositionandtheunavailabilityofsubstantiallyequivalentpositioninBaguioCity.Atransferofworkassignmentwithoutanyjustificationtherefor,evenifrespondentwouldbepresumablydoingthesamejobwiththesamepay,cannotbedeemedfaithfulcompliancewiththereinstatementorder.Inotherwords,in this instance, there was no real, bona fide reinstatement to speak of prior to the reversal by the Court ofAppealsofthefindingofillegaldismissal.

InviewofPFIZERsfailuretoeffectrespondent'sactualorpayrollreinstatement,itisindubitablethattheRoqueroruling is applicable to the case at bar. The circumstance that respondent opted for separation pay in lieu ofreinstatement as manifested in her counsels Letter28 dated July 18, 2005 is of no moment. We do not seerespondents letter as taking away the option frommanagement to effect actual or payroll reinstatement but,ratherunderthefactualmilieuofthiscase,wheretheemployerfailedtocategoricallyreinstatetheemployeetoher formeror equivalent positionunder the same terms, respondentwasnot obliged to complywithPFIZERsambivalent returntowork order. To uphold PFIZERs view that it was respondent who unjustifiably refused toworkwhenPFIZERdidnotreinstatehertoherformerposition,andworse,requiredhertoreportforworkunderconditionsprejudicial toher, is toopen thedoors topotential employerabuse.Foreseeably, anemployermaycircumvent the immediately enforceable reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter by crafting returntoworkdirectivesthatareambiguousormeanttoberejectedbytheemployeeandthendisclaimliabilityforbackwagesduetononreinstatementbycapitalizingontheemployeespurportedrefusal towork. Insum, theoptionof theemployertoeffectactualorpayrollreinstatementmustbeexercisedingoodfaith.

Moreover,whiletheCourthasupheldtheemployersrighttochoosebetweenactuallyreinstatinganemployeeormerelyreinstatinghiminthepayroll,wehavealsointhepastrecognizedthatreinstatementmightnolongerbepossibleundercertaincircumstances.InF.F.MarineCorporationv.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,29wehadtheoccasiontostate:

It iswellsettledthatwhenapersonis illegallydismissed,heisentitledtoreinstatementwithout lossofseniorityrights and other privileges and to his full backwages. In the event, however, that reinstatement is no longerfeasible,or if theemployeedecidesnotbe reinstated, theemployershallpayhimseparationpay in lieuof

reinstatement.Sucharuleislikewiseobservedinthecaseofastrainedemployeremployeerelationshiporwhenthework or position formerly held by the dismissed employee no longer exists. In sum, an illegally dismissedemployeeisentitledto:(1)eitherreinstatementifviableorseparationpayifreinstatementisnolongerviable,and(2)backwages.30(Emphasissupplied.)

Similarly,wehavepreviouslyheld thatanemployeesdemand forseparationpaymaybe indicativeofstrainedrelationsthatmay justifypaymentofseparationpay in lieuof reinstatement.31This isnot tosay,however, thatrespondent is entitled to separation pay in addition to backwages. We stress here that a finding of strainedrelationsmustnonethelessstillbesupportedbysubstantialevidence.32

Inthecaseatbar,respondentsdecisiontoclaimseparationpayoverreinstatementhadnolegaleffect,notonlybecause there was no genuine compliance by the employer to the reinstatement order but also because theemployer chose not to act on said claim. If it was PFIZERs position that respondents act amounted to a"resignation"itshouldhaveinformedrespondentthatitwasacceptingherresignationandthatinviewthereofshewasnotentitledtoseparationpay.PFIZERdidnotrespondtorespondentsdemandatall.As itwas,PFIZERsfailure toeffect reinstatementandaccept respondents offer to terminateheremployment relationshipwith thecompanymeantthat,priortotheCourtofAppealsreversalintheNovember23,2005Decision,PFIZERsliabilityforbackwagescontinuedtoaccruefortheperiodnotcoveredbythewritofexecutiondatedMay24,2005untilNovember23,2005.

Lastly, PFIZER exhorts the Court to reexamine the application of Roquero with a view that a mechanicalapplicationofthesamewouldcauseinjusticesince,inthepresentcase,respondentwasabletogainpecuniarybenefitnotwithstanding thecircumstanceof reversalby theCourtofAppealsof the rulingsof theLaborArbiterand theNLRC therebyallowing respondent toprofit from thedishonestyshecommittedagainstPFIZERwhichwas thebasis for her termination. In its stead,PFIZERproposes that theCourt apply the ruling inGenuino v.NationalLaborRelationsCommission33which itbelieves tobemore inaccordwith thedictatesof fairnessandjustice.Inthatcase,wecanceledtheawardofsalariesfromthedateofthedecisionoftheLaborArbiterawardingreinstatementinlightofoursubsequentrulingfindingthatthedismissalisforalegalandvalidground,towit:

Anentthedirectiveof theNLRCin itsSeptember3,1994DecisionorderingCitibank"topaythesalariesduetothecomplainantfromthedateitreinstatedcomplainantinthepayroll(computedatP60,000.00amonth,asfoundbytheLaborArbiter)uptoanduntilthedateofthisdecision,"theCourtherebycancelssaidawardinviewofitsfindingthatthedismissalofGenuinoisforalegalandvalidground.

Ordinarily,theemployerisrequiredtoreinstatetheemployeeduringthependencyoftheappealpursuanttoArt.223,paragraph3oftheLaborCode,whichstates:

xxxx

If thedecisionof the laborarbiter is later reversedonappealupon the finding that theground fordismissal isvalid, thentheemployerhastheright torequirethedismissedemployeeonpayroll reinstatement torefundthesalariess/hereceivedwhilethecasewaspendingappeal,or itcanbedeductedfromtheaccruedbenefitsthatthedismissedemployeewasentitledtoreceivefromhis/heremployerunderexisting laws,collectivebargainingagreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was reinstated to work during thependencyoftheappeal,thentheemployeeisentitledtothecompensationreceivedforactualservicesrenderedwithoutneedofrefund.

Considering thatGenuinowas not reinstated to work or placed on payroll reinstatement, and her dismissal isbased on a just cause, then she is not entitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no. 3 of the fallo of theSeptember3,1994NLRCDecision.34(Emphasessupplied.)

Thus, PFIZER implores theCourt to annul the award of backwages and separation pay aswell as to requirerespondenttorefundtheamountthatshewasabletocollectbywayofgarnishmentfromPFIZERasheraccruedsalaries.

ThecontentioncannotbegivenmeritsincethisquestionhasbeensettledbytheCourtenbanc.

In therecentmilestonecaseofGarciav.PhilippineAirlines, Inc.,35 theCourtwrote finis to thestrayposture inGenuinorequiringthedismissedemployeeplacedonpayrollreinstatementtorefundthesalariesincaseafinaldecisionupholdsthevalidityofthedismissal.InGarcia,weclarifiedtheprincipleofreinstatementpendingappealduetotheemergenceofdifferingrulingsontheissue,towit:

Onthisscore,theCourt'sattentionisdrawntoseeminglydivergentdecisionsconcerningreinstatementpendingappeal or, particularly, the option of payroll reinstatement. On the one hand is the jurisprudential trend asexpoundedina lineofcasesincludingAirPhilippinesCorp.v.Zamora,whileon theother is therecentcaseofGenuino v.National LaborRelationsCommission. At the core of the seeming divergence is the application ofparagraph3ofArticle223oftheLaborCodexxx.

xxxx

Theviewasmaintainedinanumberofcasesisthat:

xxx[E]veniftheorderofreinstatementoftheLaborArbiterisreversedonappeal,itisobligatoryonthepart of the employer to reinstate and pay thewages of the dismissed employee during the period ofappealuntilreversalbythehighercourt.Ontheotherhand, if theemployeehasbeenreinstatedduringtheappealperiodandsuchreinstatementorder is reversedwith finality, theemployee isnot required to reimbursewhateversalaryhereceivedforheisentitledtosuch,moresoifheactuallyrenderedservicesduringtheperiod.(Emphasisintheoriginalitalicsandunderscoringsupplied)

In other words, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled toreceivewagespendingappealuponreinstatement,whichisimmediatelyexecutory.Unlessthereisarestrainingorder,it isministerialupontheLaborArbitertoimplementtheorderofreinstatementanditismandatoryontheemployertocomplytherewith.

TheoppositeviewisarticulatedinGenuinowhichstates:

If thedecisionof the laborarbiter is later reversedonappealupon the finding that theground fordismissal isvalid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement torefundthesalaries[he]receivedwhilethecasewaspendingappeal,or itcanbedeductedfromtheaccruedbenefits that thedismissedemployeewasentitled to receive from [his]employerunderexisting laws,collectivebargaining agreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was reinstated to workduringthependencyoftheappeal,thentheemployeeisentitledtothecompensationreceivedforactualservicesrenderedwithoutneedofrefund.

Considering thatGenuinowas not reinstated to work or placed on payroll reinstatement, and her dismissal isbased on a just cause, then she is not entitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no. 3 of the fallo of theSeptember3,1994NLRCDecision.(Emphasis,italicsandunderscoringsupplied)

Ithas thusbeenadvanced that there isnopoint in releasing thewages topetitionerssince theirdismissalwasfoundtobevalid,andtodosowouldconstituteunjustenrichment.

PriortoGenuino,therehadbeennoknownsimilarcasecontainingadispositiveportionwheretheemployeewasrequiredtorefundthesalariesreceivedonpayrollreinstatement.Infact,inacatenaofcases,theCourtdidnotordertherefundofsalariesgarnishedorreceivedbypayrollreinstatedemployeesdespiteasubsequentreversalofthereinstatementorder.

The dearth of authority supportingGenuino is not difficult to fathom for it would otherwise render inutile therationaleofreinstatementpendingappeal.

xxxx

x x x Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State may authorize an immediateimplementation,pendingappeal,ofadecisionreinstatingadismissedorseparatedemployeesince thatsavingact is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, acontinuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and hisfamily.36

Furthermore, inGarcia, the Court went on to discuss the illogical and unjust effects of the "refund doctrine"erroneouslyespousedinGenuino:

Evenoutsidethetheoreticaltrappingsofthediscussionandintothemundanerealitiesofhumanexperience,the"refunddoctrine"easilydemonstrateshowafavorabledecisionbytheLaborArbitercouldharm,morethanhelp,adismissedemployee.Theemployee, tomakebothendsmeet,wouldnecessarilyhave touseup thesalariesreceived during the pendency of the appeal, only to end up having to refund the sum in case of a finalunfavorabledecision.Itismirageofastopgapleadingtheemployeetoariskycliffofinsolvency.1 a v v p h i1

Advisably,thesumisbetterleftunspent.Itbecomesmorelogicalandpracticalfortheemployeetorefusepayrollreinstatement and simply find work elsewhere in the interim, if any is available. Notably, the option of payrollreinstatement belongs to the employer, even if the employee is able and raring to return to work. Prior toGenuino, it isunthinkableforonetorefusepayrollreinstatement.Inthefaceofthegrimpossibilities,theriseofconcernedemployeesdecliningpayrollreinstatementisonthehorizon.

Further,theGenuino rulingnotonlydisregards thesocial justiceprinciplesbehind therule,butalso institutesaschemeundulyfavorabletomanagement.Undersuchscheme,thesalariesdispensedpendentelitemerelyserveasabondposted in installmentby theemployer.For in theeventofa reversalof theLaborArbiter'sdecisionordering reinstatement, the employer gets back the same amountwithout having to spend ordinarily for bondpremiums.Thiscircumvents, ifnotdirectlycontradicts,theproscriptionthatthe"postingofabond[evenacashbond]bytheemployershallnotstaytheexecutionforreinstatement."

InplayingdownthestraypostureinGenuinorequiringthedismissedemployeeonpayrollreinstatementtorefundthesalariesincaseafinaldecisionupholdsthevalidityofthedismissal,theCourtrealignsthepropercourseoftheprevailingdoctrineonreinstatementpendingappealvisvistheeffectofareversalonappeal.

xxxx

TheCourtreaffirmstheprevailingprinciplethateveniftheorderofreinstatementoftheLaborArbiterisreversedonappeal, it isobligatoryon thepartof theemployer to reinstateandpay thewagesof thedismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. x x x.37 (Emphasissupplied.)

In sum, the Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement pending appeal necessitates that it must beimmediatelyselfexecutorywithoutneedforawritofexecutionduringthependencyoftheappeal,ifthelawistoserveitsnoblepurpose,andanyattemptonthepartoftheemployertoevadeordelayitsexecutionshouldnotbeallowed.Furthermore,we likewise restateour ruling thatanorder for reinstatemententitlesanemployee toreceivehisaccruedbackwages from themoment the reinstatementorderwas issuedup to thedatewhen thesamewasreversedbyahighercourtwithout fearof refundingwhathehadreceived. Itcannotbedenied that,underourstatutoryandjurisprudentialframework,respondentisentitledtopaymentofherwagesfortheperiodafterDecember5,2003untiltheCourtofAppealsDecisiondatedNovember23,2005,notwithstandingthefindingthereinthatherdismissalwaslegalandforjustcause.Thus,thepaymentofsuchwagescannotbedeemedasunjustenrichmentonrespondentspart.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolution dated October 23, 2006 as well as theResolution dated April 10, 2007 both issued by the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 88987 are herebyAFFIRMED.

SOORDERED.

TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTROAssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

RENATOC.CORONAChiefJusticeChairperson

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.AssociateJustice

MARIANOC.DELCASTILLOAssociateJustice

JOSEPORTUGALPEREZAssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant toSection13,ArticleVIII of theConstitution, I certify that the conclusions in theaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

RENATOC.CORONAChiefJustice

Footnotes

1Rollo,pp.4244.

2Id.at6566.

3 Id. at 307323 pennedbyAssociate JusticeRosmariD.CarandangwithAssociate JusticesAndresB.Reyes,Jr.andMoninaArevaloZenarosa,concurring.

4Id.at187201.

5Id.at307310.

6Id.at201.

7 Id. at 234248 penned by NLRC Commissioner Ernesto C. Verceles with Presiding CommissionerLourdesC.JavierandCommissionerTitoF.Genilo,concurring.

8Id.at247.

9Id.at265266.

10Id.at322323.

11Id.at43.

12Rollo(G.R.No.175122),p.238.

13Id.at403.

14449Phil.437(2003).

15Id.at446.

16Rollo,pp.394415.

17Id.at405.

18G.R.Nos.14273233and14275354,December4,2007,539SCRA342.

19Rollo,p.411.

20Id.at304.

21345Phil.1057(1997).

22Inanyevent,thedecisionoftheLaborArbiterreinstatingadismissedorseparatedemployee,insofarasthe reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. Theemployeeshalleitherbeadmittedbacktoworkunderthesametermsandconditionsprevailingpriortohisdismissalorseparationor,attheoptionoftheemployer,merelyreinstatedinthepayroll.Thepostingofabondbytheemployershallnotstaytheexecutionforreinstatementprovidedherein.

23PioneerTexturizingCorporationv.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,supranote21at10751076.

24Rollo,p.304.

25AsianTerminals,Inc.v.Villanueva,G.R.No.143219,November28,2006,508SCRA346,352.

26NorkisTradingCo.,Inc.v.Gnilo,G.R.No.159730,February11,2008,544SCRA279,289.

27Urbanes,Jr.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.138379,November25,2004,444SCRA84,95.

28Rollo,pp.305306.

29495Phil.140(2005).

30Id.at159.

31F.R.F.Enterprises,Inc.v.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,313Phil.493,502(1995).

32GoldenAceBuildersv.Talde,G.R.No.187200,May5,2010.

33Supranote18.

34Id.at363364.

35G.R.No.164856,January20,2009,576SCRA479.

36Id.at488491.

37Id.at491493.

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