02.09 - DIX, Robert H. 1989. “Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America.”

7/29/2019 02.09 - DIX, Robert H. 1989. Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America.

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Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America

Author(s): Robert H. DixSource: Comparative Politics, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Oct., 1989), pp. 23-37Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New YorkStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/422320

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Cleavage Structures and Party Systemsin Latin America

RobertH. Dix

In a seminal article in 1967 SeymourMartinLipset and Stein Rokkanposed a series ofcentral questions for the comparative study of party systems. The first set of questionsconcerned the genesis of the system of cleavages within the nationalcommunity,includingthe timingof theirappearanceand their relative salience and durability.A second groupofquestions focused on the translationof cleavages into stable party systems, includingthequestionof why conflictinginterestsandideologies in some cases favored the emergenceofbroadaggregativecoalitions, and in othersfragmentation.The final set of questionsbore onthe behavior of voters within the various party systems. What were the characteristicsofthose voters mobilized by the several parties, and how did economic and social changetranslate nto changes in the strengthsandstrategiesof the parties?The authorsstressed thatall these and related questions were to be addresseddiachronically,that is, in historicalperspective.'While Lipset and Rokkan, as well as most of the many others who have asked similarcomparativequestions,have focused almostexclusively on the competitive party systemsofEurope and the Anglo-Saxon diaspora (the United States, Australia, Canada, and NewZealand),it seems high time thatquestions ike those raised for industrialized ountriesnowalso be posed for LatinAmerica,particularly ince Latin America constitutesthe area of theworldthatmost closely approximateshedevelopedWest in culture,levels of economic andsocial development,2and experience with competitive party systems. Only by examiningsuch questions outside the regions of the ancestral homes of political parties and partysystems can we expand our generalizationsabout the historical developmentof politicalpartiesbeyondthe evidence of a particularime andplace. It is also at least highly plausiblethat Latin America's experience with the construction of systems of competitive partypolitics will provemorerelevantto the futuretrajectoryof suchpolitics in otherpartsof theso-called Third World than will thatof the developedWest.This articleis an attempt o begin the systematic analysisof thatexperience.3Among thequestions we pose will be the following. Has the developmentof western party systemsprovento be the prototype or the evolution of competitive party systems in LatinAmerica?Whatare thekinds of partiesand thepatternsof competitionamongparties n LatinAmerica,and how have they emergedover time? Have the West's past experienceswith the onset ofmass politics and the politics of industrialization been more or less replicated incontemporaryLatin America?How mightone account for any differences?Whatfollows isthereforemeantessentially as an exploratoryexercise in delineatingsome broadpatternsofsimilarityand difference between the party systems of Latin America and the developedWest.At the same time, our enterprisewill be a good deal more modest in scale and in

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ComparativePolitics October1989

supportivedetail thanthatundertaken y LipsetandRokkan. In partthis is a function of therelativepaucityor unevenness of the kinds of reliable electoraldata, opinion surveys, andsingle countrystudiesconcerningLatin Americain comparison o what is available for theso-called western or industrializedcountries. Too, the electoral process in Latin Americafrequentlysuffersfrom constraints hathamperanalysis. Parties(sometimesmajorones as,at times, theAmericanPopularRevolutionaryAlliance, APRA, in Peru)maybe barred rompresentingcandidates,or fraud and other controlsmay obscurefully accurateresults, as inMexico, not to mentionParaguay.The democraticexperiencehas also been briefer, morerecent, and more sporadicin the Latin Americancase and has often been interruptedbyperiodsof militaryand other authoritarianule that have effectively suspendedcompetitivepolitics altogether. Moreover, Latin America's parties may come and go with startlingrapidity and may form ever-changingalliances or combinationsof sometimes confusingcomplexity. Some have barelydeserved the designation "party" o begin with. Finally, andperhapsmost fundamental,parties by no means encompass the full spectrumof groupscompetingfor governmentalpower. In many Latin American countriesthe armed orces orguerrilla insurgencies, on occasion allied with one or anotherpolitical party or even aforeign country, employ armedforce to compete for power, necessarily makingelectionsless definitive than has usually been true of western Europe, North America, andAustralasia.4

Nonetheless, it is our purposeto expandthe comparativehorizons of the studyof partysystems by incorporating he Latin American experience, particularly n regard to thedevelopment of those systems over time and the impact on them of the onset of masspolitics.Patterns of Party DevelopmentAt firstglancethehistoriccleavage lines of LatinAmericanpolitics wouldappearroughlytoparallel those of the European past, albeit with notable time lags: the center versus theperiphery,the secularizingstate versus the church,the landed elite versus commercial andindustrial nterests,andfinally, in the wake of all the others, the class struggleof workersagainsttheiremployers.5Thus throughoutmost of the nineteenthcentury,andwell into thetwentieth n manycases, thepoliticaldivisions of Latin Americatendedpredominantlyo bethose of conservatives versus liberals, althoughthey bore other names in some places andalmost everywhereshowed a markedpropensityfor factionalism and fragmentation,oftencenteredaroundparticularndividuals,families, or regions. The conservativepartiestendedto reflect the interests and attitudes of those who favored strong central government,protectionof the Catholicchurch and its social and economic prerogatives,and defense ofthe interestsof traditional andowners.Liberals,on the otherhand, could usually be foundadvocating federalism, disestablishmentof the church, and the defense of commercialinterests,often includingthe advocacyof free trade.6One contrast to the European patternwas that the ethnic, cultural, and interreligiousdimensions of politics in much of the West were largely absent in the southernAmericas.Thus, while center-periphery truggles led in some places (Argentinaand Colombia, forexample)to almostendemic civil war for much of the nineteenthcentury,theydid not entail24


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Robert H. Dix

strugglesbetweennationalandprovincialor subnational ultureswith different anguagesorreligious attitudesas they did, say, in Norway, France, Spain, Belgium, and Canada.Norwas the conflict over the churchever amongdifferentreligionsin the LatinAmerican case.As in southernEurope, the questions relatedratherto church control over education, theregistration f birthsanddeaths, and, not least, theownershipof land, with liberalstypicallywantingto open up entailed church estates to the operationof market orces.However, there is a more important onsideration or the understanding f contemporaryLatin Americanparty systems andtheircontrastswith westernpatterns.Forif westernpartysystemsevolved more or less incrementally,with partiesbased on newly salientcleavages'being added to the existing system, in time shuntingaside partiesfounded on previouslyprominentcleavages, reducing them to minor party status, or interactingwith them incomplex ways, this has been the case only exceptionallyin Latin America.

Chile's party system, until its effective suspension by the militarycoup of September1973, did substantially ollow the classic continentalEuropeanpattern.7 n Argentina,too,the currentgoverning party, the RadicalCivic Union (UCR), traces its roots to the 1890s.Ecuadorand Panamahave also exhibited some evolutionarycontinuity, albeit much moretentatively.However, in these countriesthe fragmentation nd even virtualdisappearance fthe traditionalparties and the volatility of newer ones have tended to blur the patterns,characteristicof Chile and Argentina,whereby new parties were added to the system inresponse to newly mobilized classes. Effectively, theircurrentparty alignmentsconstitutenew party systems.Yet the great majorityof Latin America's party systems do not fall into the kind ofevolutionary pattern typical of the West. Thus, in a pattern that might be dubbed"discontinuous," he partiesandpartysystemsof perhapsa dozen LatinAmericancountrieshave emergedmoreor less de novo, usuallyaftera revolutionor a long periodof dictatorialrule, with few perceptible inks to the prerevolutionary r predictatorialpast.8Most of thetraditionalconservative and liberal parties simply ceased to exist, leaving no visibleprogeny.True, in a few instancesone can find some tracesof linkage. Thus in the Braziliancasethe tiny RepublicanPartyof the post-1946 republiccould trace its lineage to the dominantRepublicansof the Old Republic(1889-1930), and some of the ruralpolitical bosses of anearlier era became pillars of the later so-called Social DemocraticParty (PSD).9 Yet theparties,as well as the party system, of thepre-1930periodwere essentially destroyedby theadventof GetulioVargasto powerin 1930. Whendemocracywas restored n 1945, the newpartysystem bore little resemblanceto the old.Rather, then, than the Europeanmodel of party development suggested by Lipset andRokkan,wherebytheprincipaldifferencesamong contemporary artysystemscan be tracedto distinctive configurations of early cleavages (center-periphery, church-state, andlandowners-commercial/industrialnterests), variations among many of Latin America'sparty systems reflect divergentresponses to the expanded political mobilizationof the lastseveral decades.Just as striking, thoughfewer in number,are those "continuous"Latin Americanpartysystems (Colombia, Honduras,Paraguay,and Uruguay)that simply have not evolved orchanged much at all over time, despite their countries' marked increases in social andpolitical mobilization and the emergenceof new social classes. Liberalsand conservatives

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-or factions and splintersthereof--still predominate,as they have since the last century,andwhile thirdpartiesof some significancehave from time to time emerged, they have sofar scarcely shaken the party alignments inherited from history. Not least, partyidentification endsto be intenseand to have deep roots in the distantpast. Thus Paul Lewisportrays a Paraguay where "party identification is practically universal," where"membershipn one of them is almostalways a lifetime commitment,"andwhere to switchpartyallegiancesconnotes virtual treason to one's friendsandfamily.10The trajectoryof partysystem development n Latin Americahas thereforedifferedfromthat of thedevelopedWest in partbecause the formerhas largelylacked the cultural,ethnic,and interreligiouscleavages that have characterized he latter, but most of all because thevagariesof political historyhave in the LatinAmericancase all but eradicated hose partiesthat took form priorto the onset of mass politics (or, in several othercases, paradoxicallyforestalledthe emergenceof new parties altogetherby freezing in place the historic partypattern).Only in a handfulof instances,notablyChile and, less clearly, Argentina,has partydevelopmenteven roughlyfollowed the westernmodel.

The Advent of Mass PoliticsIf boththenatureandsignificanceof thepatternsof cleavage thatprevailedpriorto the onsetof mass politics mark the developmentof Latin America's party systems as differentfromthose of the industrializedwesterncountries, the coming of industrialization nd universalsuffragelikewise had quitedivergent impacts.In the westerncase (albeitwith the notableexceptionsof the United States and Canada)the admissionof the middle and workingclasses to effective political participation n thesecond half of the nineteenthand early decades of the twentiethcenturysaw the attendantformationof partiesthat have been variouslytermed"partiesof integration,""class-massparties,"or "socialistworking-classparties."Socialist andCommunistpartieswere typicalof the new style of party.11 deologicallysuch class-masspartiestended to be Marxist,or atleast to adhereto programs hatspelledout quite explicitly the desirabilityof a futurewherethe state owned the means of production.The focus was on the class struggle, and theappealsof such partieswere primarily o the organizedindustrialworkingclass.The coming of universal suffrage and high levels of political mobilization in LatinAmerica,on the otherhand, some decades laterthan in theEuropean ase, did noteventuatein the kind of class-masspartiesfamiliar fromthe industrializingperiodin the West, but insomethingit seems fair to call a Latin American version (or ratherseveralversions) of the"catch-all"party. Indeed, such catch-allparties,broadlyconceived, have continued to bethe predominant ype of party in the Latin America of the 1980s. In most contemporaryLatin American party systems, single class parties (whetherworking class or bourgeois)have tended to be relatively peripheral,or mere adjunctsto party systems that insteadrevolve aroundan axis of one or more multiclassparties.The catch-allpartyis one thateschews dogmatic ideology in the interestsof pragmatismand rhetoricalappeals to "the people," "the nation," "progress," "development,"or thelike, that electorally seeks (and receives) the supportof a broad spectrumof voters thatextends the party'sreachwell beyondthat of one social class or religiousdenomination,and26


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that develops ties to a variety of interest groups instead of exclusively relying on theorganizationaland mobilizationalassets of one (such as laborunions).In short,whereas the catch-allpartycame into prominence n Europe n the postindustrialera of developmentandin the wake of a politics substantially tructured y partieswiththeir

principal oots in, andappealsto, one or anothersocial class (orreligiousdenomination), heLatinAmericancatch-allpartyhas surgedto the front as the preeminentpartyform duringthe industrializingstage of developmentand in lieu of (prior to?) the emergenceof classpartiesof the Europeanstripe.'2Apartfrom broad characteristics hattogethermark them as catch-all,'3thereare, to besure, distinctions among Latin American catch-all parties as well. Some are essentiallypersonalisticinstrumentsof caudillos, often but not necessarily military in background.Examples include Argentina's Peronists, Peru's National Odrifsta Union (UNO), thepoliticalvehicle of formermilitarydictatorGeneral ManuelOdria, and Ecuador's NationalVelasquistaFederation(FNV), the partythat served as the political instrumentof the lateJose MariaVelasco Ibarra.Still otherstendto be more structured ndenduring,with a moreconsistent democratic vocation. The programs and ideologies of such parties, whilesometimescouchedinitiallyin dogmaticterms,very quicklybecome highly pragmatic n aneffort to attractbroad, multiclass supportand confrontthe real problemsof governing.14Examplesare numerous,but include Peru's APRA, Venezuela's DemocraticAction (AD),Costa Rica's Partyof NationalLiberation(PLN), and the DominicanRevolutionaryParty(PRD). Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and Bolivia's NationalRevolutionaryMovement(MNR) (at any ratepriorto its fragmentation)would also fit thiscategoryof catch-all party. Yet a thirdtype of Latin American catch-allpartytends to besquarelybasedon the middle class and to be led by uppermiddle class professionals.Infact,it may begin as a "bourgeois" party. But when such parties successfully reach out topeasants,workers,or slum dwellers, as Chile's ChristianDemocratsdid in the 1960s, or toa broaderelectorate,as Argentina'sRadicals have in the 1980s underthe leadershipof RaulAlfonsin or as Peru's PopularAction Party(AP) once did under formerpresidentFernandoBelatindeTerry, they go beyond a single-class constituency to become genuine catch-allparties.

Notwithstanding he differences among them, all merit the designationcatch-all in thatthey are pragmaticor eclectic in programand ideology, multiclass in their support,andorientedto broad-basedelectoral appeals thatgo beyond the mobilizationof a committedconstituency. In contradistinction o the patternof western party development, catch-allparties, ratherthan the class-mass party, have generallybeen the immediatesuccessors totraditional lite-centeredpartiesandpolitics in LatinAmerica.

The EvidenceElectoralreturns roma varietyof countries--some of it based on ecological evidence, someon surveydata-as well as evidence on the social compositionof partyleadershipconfirmthe generalargument.In Venezuela, two parties, the social democraticAD and the social ChristianCOPEI,have togetherwon at least 85 percentof the vote since 1973. Yet demographicvariables do

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not account for the voting intentions of the Venezuelanelectorate. If one were to select atrandomone hundredHerrera COPEI)supporters ndplace themin a room, andthenrepeatthis procedurewith Pinerua(AD) supporters,the two groups would look very similar."5Polls in two states (one carriedby AD, the other by COPEI) prior to the 1978 electionshowed each partyto be favoredby a significantproportionof each economic stratum:noless than25 percentand no more than 45 percentfor eitherparty n every one of four socialcategories (upper,middle, working, and poor).'6 Clearly, both qualify as catch-allparties.Similarly,a 1976 surveyin Costa Rica foundthatvoting for the NationalLiberationParty(PLN), that country's dominant party, was only slightly related to such variables asrural-urban esidence, housing conditions (a surrogatefor social class), and age. Partyidentification ied to events of the brief 1948 civil war appeared o be a far betterpredictorof the PLN vote.7

Even such parties as Argentina's Peronists (today formally known as the JusticialistParty),while perhapsappealingdisproportionatelyo the workingclass, are, when looked atmoreclosely, in realityquite heterogeneousandgenuinelymulticlass.Thusbetween26 and49 percentof the lower middleclass (in the federalcapital)voted for Peronistcandidates nthe five elections between 1960 and 1973. In fact, the proportionof the uppermiddleclass,as well as of theupperclass, votingfor Peronrangedas highas 31 and 30 percentrespectivelyin September1973. The Radicals, too, though getting somewhat more supportfrom themiddleclass (both lower and upper)thanelsewhere, rangedratherevenly across the socialspectrum,with 22 percentof the workingclass vote and 28 percentof the upperclass votein the September1973 election.'8The leadershipof catch-allpartiesconfirms their socially eclectic nature.Some, such asArgentina's Peronists, Colombia's ANAPO, Peru's National Odrifsta Union, and theshort-livedmovement thatadhered o the politicalbannerof formerChilean dictatorCarlosIbdifiez el Campoin the 1950s, were not only led by formermilitaryofficers but, at least intheirformativestages, had a numberof active or retiredmilitaryofficers in otherprominentleadershippositions.19Landownersand businessmen have also made up significantproportionsof the nationalleadershipof manycatch-allparties.Forthe Peronists,12 percentof their egislators n 1946and 20 percentin 1963 were landowners,20while industrialistswere among the prominentconfidants and advisersof Peron's first regime, despite its allegedly working-classbase.21While Venezuela's AD drew disproportionatelectoral strength rom ruralareas as well asfrom organizedlabor, especially duringthe 1960s, its foundersand top leadershipcadreshave largely been comprised of lawyers, educators, medical doctors, and professionalpoliticians.22Bolivia's MNR in its heyday showed a similarpattern.23Some scholars, like Gliucio Ary Dillon Soares, have argued that the politics ofdevelopmentare thepolitics of class andideology and that Brazilduring he years 1946-64,priorto a militarycoup thatrestructuredhe party system, was a case in point. Thus in theelection of 1960 there was a clear and consistent tendency for voter preferencesfor theNationalDemocraticUnion (UDN) to decline and for the BrazilianLaborParty(PTB) toincreaseas one "descended" he occupational cale frompersonswithprofessionalandhighlevel administrativeobs to unskilled manualworkers. At the same time, it shouldbe notedthatneitherthe PTB northe UND foundmajority avor in any social grouping n what wasthen a genuinely multiparty system and that the support of each was in reality quite28


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heterogeneous.Thus amongmanualsupervisoryworkersthe UDN held 32.5 percentof theparty preferences, and the PTB only 28.5 percent. Indeed, the UDN had more than 18percentsupportamong "unskilledmanual"workers and more than 20 percentamong the"skilledmanual"category,while the PTB had over 10 percentof the electoralallegianceofthe top two social categories.24In fact, rather than a class party in any usual sense, anddespite its name, the PTB was essentially a vehicle by which such elitist politicians asGetulio Vargas and Joao Goulartsought to control organized labor to the government'sadvantage.The most heterogeneous among the major parties, the PTB, attractedwealthylandowners,middlelevel governmentemployees, artisans,membersof the new urbanupperclass, and leftist intellectuals, as well as an importantrural following in the states ofAmazonasand Rio Grandedo Sul.25

Following the end of military rule in 1985, the Party of the Brazilian DemocraticMovement(PMDB) has at least temporarilybecome the overwhelminglypreponderantandclearly multiclass) party in Brazil, winning more than half the seats in the chamberofrepresentativesn the election of 1986. Meanwhile,the heirs to the traditionof the old PTBhave divided into two parties, while a third, more authenticallyWorkers'Party(PT), hasformed as well.26 None has so far prosperedelectorally.Parties such as Argentina'sPeronistsandBrazil's PTB have surelyhad somethingof theclass partyaboutthem, notablyin the disproportionate upportreceived from the workingclass. Yet the heterogeneityof such parties-both in their electoral supportand in theirleadership--andthe failure of the majorityof the workingclass to support hemclearlymarkthem as somethingother than a typical Europeanworking-class party. Often they can bebettercategorizedas catch-allpartiesin Kirchheimer'smeaningof the term.Indeed, evidence concerningthe social base and leadershipof party after party-withPeru's APRA, Chile's ChristianDemocrats, and Mexico's PRI only the most prominentamong them-could be invoked by way of furtherdemonstrating hat throughoutmost ofLatin America the catch-all party has tended to preempt the class-mass party as thepredominantpartyform.

Latin America's Non-Catch-All PartiesThere are of course a numberof non-catch-allpartiesin LatinAmericain the 1980s. Theyinclude the Communistpartiesof the hemisphere,as well as a myriadof Marxistvariantsandsplintergroupsthatretaina highly ideologicalcontentanddirecttheirappeals especiallyto workers, althoughsometimes to peasantsor nonproletarianlum dwellers as well. TheCommunistsare the single party in Cuba and, prior to the 1973 coup that broughtthemilitary o power,were an important resence n Chile, regularlywinningbetween 11 and 16percentof the vote in congressionalelections in the years between 1961 and 1973.27 Somemightalso wish to classifyNicaragua'sSandinistasas a Marxistpartydominant n its system,althoughits membershipand appeals are broader than those of most class-mass parties.Elsewhere, althoughCommunistpartiesexist--legally or not--in every country, they aregenerallymarginal o electoralpolitics.

There is also a scatteringof "bourgeois"partiesthatappeallargelyto businessor middleclass constituencies, some strictly regional or provincial parties (Argentinahas had a29


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number,for example), occasional partiesrepresentingvarious narrowlydefined issues orcauses, and a host of partiescenteringon the ambitionsof an individualor clique that makelittle real effort to develop a broad-basedappeal.Parties such as these generallyhave beeneitherquite small or ephemeralor both.Partiesof rathergreatersignificancethat also do not fall strictly nto the catch-allcategoryare for the most partof one or two types. The first is the traditional"vertical"partythatcontinuesto dominatesuchpolitical systemsas the Colombian,Uruguayan,Honduran,andParaguayan.Yet in key respects they resemble catch-all parties, or provide a functionalsurrogate or them. They arenonideologicalandpragmatic,and they successfully mobilizethe supportof a broadarrayof groupsand social classes, fromlandownersandindustrialiststo shopkeepers, peasants, and workers.They are perhaps ess than catch-all, on the otherhand,in that at election time they rely moreon the mobilizationof committedconstituencieslinked to the partyby clientelisticties or by a kind of inherited oyalty than on searchingoutnew supportersamongthe uncommittedandundecided.A second varietyof partythat falls outside the catch-alldesignationeven while exhibitingcertainof its attributes ncludes certainpartiesor coalitions of the left. Some of these arebreakawaysfrom the Communistparty (for example, the Movement toward Socialism,MAS, in Venezuela); others, like the Broad Front that has participated n Uruguayanelections both before and after the recent period of militaryrule (1973-84), contain theCommunistsas one element but include as well such partiesas the ChristianDemocrats.Such partiesor electoral fronts are a good deal more ideological thanthe typical catch-allparty and tend to appeal to a more restricted social base. Yet they often garnerproportionatelymore supportfrom the middle and even upperclasses than they do fromworkers,28while populistic appealsoften takeprecedenceover the mobilizationof union orother class constituencies. In fact, Chile's Socialist Party, presumptivelyone of LatinAmerica's clearestexamplesof a class-mass party,has at varioustimes in its historytakenon many of the attributesof populism.29These parties, too, then, although not strictlycatch-allparties, sharecertain of theirqualities.If not all significantLatin Americanparties fall under the catch-all rubric,neitherarecatch-all parties equally dominant in all party systems. The traditional or so-calledcontinuouspartysystems have had little place for them.30And the pre-1973 Chileanpartysystem (as well as its presumptivepostmilitarysuccessor) saw a catch-all party like theChristianDemocratssharing he politicalstage with significantpartiesof bothworking-classandbourgeoisorientation.Yet it remains the case that the pragmatic, multiclass party is overwhelmingly thepredominantpartytype in the LatinAmerica of the 1980s. Indeed, in the greatmajorityofLatinAmericancountriesone or more such partiesgarner he largerproportionof the vote.Aroundthem, moreoften thannot, the whole system of partiesrevolves. Moreover,as wehave noted, even the traditional erticalparties,as well as a varietyof putativeclass partiesor coalitions, manifestdistinct catch-allaspects or tendencies. Thus it seems clear thatthepreponderantparty form in contemporaryLatin America comes considerably closer toreflectingthe characteristics f the catch-allpartythan to replicating he more ideological,class-centeredmass partiesof the West's initial decades of mass mobilization. If the masspolitics of an industrializingEuropetended to be exclusivist in class and group terms, inLatinAmericathey have insteadbeen mainly inclusivist.30


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RobertH. DixSomeExplanations

Why is it, though,that in Latin America nclusivistpartieshave provento be thearchetypical artiesof the era of industrializationnd massmobilizationnsteadof theclass-exclusivistartiesmoretypicalof the western xperience?Why, in short,has theclass-massparty ailed,at least so far, to playmuchof a role in the politicsof LatinAmerica?It mightseemplausibleo suggest hat herehas been anincentive o formbroad-basedmulticlass artiesnLatinAmerica's residentialystemsn ordero maximizehechancesof capturingheall-importantfficeof chiefexecutive.Theremaybe somethingo this-acomparison f congressionalnd presidentiallections does show some tendency orpresidentialandidaciesobe fewer han he numberf competingongressionalarty latesin the sameelection.Thedifferences notusually reat,however-theincentiveocoalesceis seldomstrongenoughto preventmultiplecandidaciesor the office of president."3Moreover,uchcoalescence s does occur s usually emporary,oiningdistinct artiesorelectoralpurposes nly, anddoes notas a rule lead to the long-termmerger f parties.Political xplanations ust n thiscase,it seems,givewayto sociological nes.However, xplanationsuchas relative ffluence ndthe absence f feudalism ndrigidstatusbarriers rior o the adventof industrialization--amonghe explanations sedtoaccountor the absence f classpartiesnthe UnitedStates32-can otverywellbe used oaccount or the relativeweakness f suchpartiesn LatinAmerica.Neitheraffluencenorrelative ocialequalityanbesaid o havebeenhallmarksf the LatinAmericanondition.Certainly, t least a number f theLatinAmerican ountries reurban,ndustrial,ndliteratenougho havesizable,articulate orkinglassespotentiallyapable f forminghebasisof class-centeredoliticalparties.To takeonlythe"uppermiddlencome" ountriesamonghembyWorldBankcriteriaChile,Brazil,Panama,Uruguay,Mexico,Argentina,andVenezuela),hey range n the mid 1980sfrom 69 to 85 percenturban exceptforPanama,which is only 50 percenturban).Thecomparableange or today's"industrialmarket conomies"s 56 percentAustria)o 92 percentGreatBritain).33ontemporaryLatinAmericas thereforeirtuallysurban s thenow-developedWest,andcertainlymoreso than he Westwasata comparabletageof industrialization.Dataon industrialmploymentor 1980, meanwhile, how that between25 and 34percent f the labor orce in the sameLatinAmericanountriess employedn industry(againwith Panama s an exceptionat 18 percent).The comparableangefor today's"industrialmarket conomies" s 29 to 44 percent,a meaningful, et hardlydrastic,difference.34hus,whileLatinAmerica'swork orce s less "industrial"han hoseof the"industrialconomies,"heproportionf industrial orkersnat eastanumber f theLatinAmerican ountries s surely high enoughto sustain class-masspartiesof the kindcharacteristicf earlier tagesof theWest's ndustrialization.The nature nd imingof socialmobilizationnLatinAmerica asnonethelesseenquitedifferentromthatof Europe.Whereasn the industrializedWestthoseemployedn thesecondaryector,in industry ndrelatedoccupations,ucceededagriculturalndotherprimaryectoremployments numerically redominant,n LatinAmericahetertiary rservice ectorhasdoneso. Secondaryector mploymentasneverpredominatedn Latin

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America,andpresumablyneverwill; as agricultural mploymentdeclines, the service sectorhas expandedmore rapidly. The massive inmigrationto Latin America's cities in recentdecadeshas to some extentfoundemployment n industry,of course, butdomesticservices,(often temporary)constructionwork, and petty entrepreneurship ave absorbed the bulk.The more advanced countries of today's Latin America, still far from fully industrial,yetwith the agricultural ector a rapidlydiminishingproportionof the work force, have seentheirservice sectorsreachproportionsapproaching hose of the postindustrialWest.35Individuals so employed are much less susceptible to union organization andclass-orientedpolitical appeals in the western sense than are industrial workers. Indeed,evidence from a number of Latin American (and other) countries shows that the urbanmigrants,so often residentsof the shantytowns hatring the burgeoningcities, tend to seetheirpresentand future n termsof individual,rather han class or group, mobility, therebyadheringto what AlejandroPorteshas called a "migrantethic."36 Their demands tend tocenter on acquiringa bit of land on which to constructa dwelling andon such amenitiesassewers andtransportationor theirbarrios,rather han on grievancesagainsta factoryboss,muchless againstthecapitalistsystemitself. Such is not the kind of social situation n whichclass solidaritythrives.The union movement, moreover, even where it has been quite large and robust, as inArgentinaandVenezuela,has been socially veryheterogeneous,containinghighproportionsof white collar workers.The latterarenot necessarily ess militant-the contrary s often thecase-but the diversityof perspectivesand of class outlooks of, say, teachers,governmentemployees, and metallurgicalworkers has a tendency to dilute the kind of tightly knitworking-classsubcultures hat once flourished n the industrial ountries. Thus in Argentinaas of 1970 only four of the largestseventeen unions were industrial metallurgical,textile,garment, and automotiveworkers), one was comprised of railroadworkers, and two ofworkers n construction.All of the otherswere either white collar unions (includingtwo ofthe three largest, teachers and commercial employees) or workers and employees ofgovernmentor services of variouskinds.37In some countries the campesinos have been politically mobilized as well, almost intandem with the industrialproletariat, n societies where agricultural mployment, thoughdeclining, is still important.Indeed, a number of the catch-all parties--Venezuela's AD,Mexico's PRI, and Bolivia's MNR among them-have had peasants as a principalorganizationaland electoral supportbase, despite their close ties to industrialand mininglabor and the urbanmiddle class.Takentogether,these facts makeclearthatthe industrialworkingclass has comprisedbutone element, andnot necessarilythe most important,available for mass mobilization n thenewly industrializing ountriesof LatinAmerica.Generallyunderemployedurbanmigrants,an expandingclass of white collar workers, and campesinoshave also constitutedgroupsavailable for mobilizationandelectoralappeals. Any partythat seeks to win a plurality,letalone a majority,of the vote has had to encompassthem, or a substantialpartof them, aswell, yet their demands and outlooks have seldom been those of a Marxian industrialproletariat.Latin America's would-be industrialists and the modernizers among middle classprofessionals were meanwhile impelled by their own weakness in competition withtraditional anded and commercial elites and by their common interests in developmentto32


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Robert H. Dixseek politicalallies amongsuchgroups, therebyaddinganother ngredient o atleast some ofthe political coalitions we have termed catch-allparties. As noted earlier, such individualsare frequently ound amongthe leaders of such partiesin LatinAmerica.Still otherfactorsmightbe adduced o help accountfor the weaknessof class-masspartiesin Latin Americaand the correspondingprevalenceof the multiclass catch-allparty duringLatin America'sindustrializingphase, amongthemthe fact that the workingclass tendedtobe granted he suffragerelativelyearlyand "fromabove," by elites seekingpoliticalallies orpursuinga strategyof cooption, thus precludinga prolonged consciousness-raising trugglefor political participation.38Yet the fundamentaldeterminant f the difference in the types of partiesthrownup by thetwin processes of industrialization nd the introductionof mass suffrage in LatinAmericaand the West, respectively, would seem to lie in the heterogeneouscomposition of the"masses" in Latin America, in contrastto the high salience of class conscious industrialworkers n the West, andthe consequent ncentive for political leaders to form broad-basedpartiesto encompassthem.Therefore the situation of Latin American countries as late developers (or "late-latedevelopers," as AlbertHirschmanhas called them)," particularly he telescoping of theirurbanizingand industrializingprocesses and the alliance of diverse groups and classesbehind certain broadgoals of developmentand nationalism,seems best to accountfor thecontrasts n the natureof westernandLatinAmericanmasspartiesduring heearlyto middlelevels of theirrespectiveeras of industrialization.

ConclusionWe have arguedthat, broadlyspeaking, the developmentof Latin Americanparty systemshas diverged from that of the now-developed West in two fundamentalrespects. First,whereas in the western case early patternsof cleavage andpartydevelopmentcast the basicmold for contemporaryparty systems, with the (albeit important)partisanmanifestationsofthe worker-employeecleavage subsequentlyappended o them, in the LatinAmericancasethis has been trueonly in a small minorityof instances(notablyin Chile andArgentina).Inmost Latin Americancountriesthe partypast has been renderedlargely irrelevantto thepresent by history. The majority of Latin American party systems (here calleddiscontinuous)at best bear only traces of a past that precedes the contemporaryera ofeconomic development,urbanization,and universalsuffrage. (On the otherhand, in a fewLatin Americancountries with so-called continuousparty systems the original form of thepartysystem has paradoxicallybecome set in concrete,as it were, seemingly resistant o theimpactof rapideconomic and social change and broadenedpolitical participation.)Our second principal argumenthas been that, when mass politics did appearin LatinAmerica, they tendedto take the form of the inclusive, multiclasspartyof rathereclectic,pragmatic deology andappeals.Even those systems where the partiesof an earlier era stillhold sway may be said to be dominatedby partiesof a multiclassappealand ideologicalpragmatism,even while their origins and structuresmay differ from the purerversions ofcatch-all parties.The partiesof integration or class-mass parties)so familiar in Europeanpolitics duringits era of economic developmentand mass politics have, by and large, not

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ComparativePolitics October /989

appeared n LatinAmerica. Ourargument hereforesupportsLeon Epstein'scontentionthat"large-membershipworking-class partiesare a product occurring only at certainstages ofsocial developmentin certainnations."4WhereasEpstein saw such conditionsas receding in contemporaryEurope,41 it may bethat in Latin America(as in the United States, albeit for differentreasons)they have neverreally arrived, and may not do so in the future. In fact, it might be suggested that thecatch-allpartieswhichKirchheimeraw as havingsucceededthe class-massparty n postwarEurope in tandem with the advent of "postindustrial" ociety simply appearedin LatinAmerica without the interveningstage, for reasons rootedin the natureandtiming of LatinAmerica'sprocess of late development.By the same token, thereare manifestdifferences between Europe'scatch-allpartiesandthe LatinAmericanversions of such parties, reflectingtheir distinctorigins and styles andabove all the distinct functionsthey have performed n their respective societies and timeframes.If most of the West's catch-allpartieshave evolved fromthe socialist or religious partiesof the prewar period, most of Latin America's parties have been created de novo, theconsequenceof traumaticbreaks n theirpartysystems (although he ChristianDemocratsofChile had their origin in the youth wing of the Conservative party, while Argentina'sRadicals, which emergedin the late nineteenthcenturyto challengethe dominantoligarchyof the day, arguablyonly in the 1980s have evolved into a full-fledgedcatch-allparty).Typically, they have centered aroundkey personalities,not only in theirformativeyears,but often for a long time thereafteras well. Victor Radl Haya de la Torre(APRA, Peru),R6mulo Betancourt(AD, Venezuela), Jose (Pepe) Figueres (PLN, Costa Rica), and JuanPeron (Justicialistsor Peronists, Argentina)are but a few of those founding fatherswhoremainedleaders of their parties for decades. Unusual in the western case, among LatinAmerica's catch-all parties-even the most institutionalized among them-dominantpersonalitieshavefrequentlyplayedmajorroles andprovideda significant coheringelementto otherwisequite opposinggroupsand classes.42Rather hanconfronting he problemsandconditions of postindustrialsocieties, the policies and programsof the Latin Americancatch-all partieshave tended to be the agents of economic developmentand to stress themobilizationof "the people" above or across deep-seatedcleavages in supportof broadnational, even nationalist,goals. The Latin American versions of this type of partyhavetherefore tended to play a mobilizationalrole with respectto the entry of new groupsintopolitical life, a role more akinto the class-masspartiesof westernexperience. Indeed,evensuch non-catch-allpartiesor coalitionsas Uruguay'sBroadFrontandChile's Socialists haveat times shown marked tendencies toward class and group inclusion (that is, towardpopulism),rather hantoward the exclusivism of strictlyclass-basedparties.Most important,whereas Kirchheimer'scatch-all parties were a largely postindustrialphenomenon, reflectingthe assuagingof class tensions and the consolidationof the welfarestate, along with a certain "bourgeosification"of the working class, Latin America'scatch-allpartieshaveemergedrelativelyearlyin the industrializingprocess andin the initialstages of mass politics.We end by affirming the conclusion of Ergun Ozbudun, summing up a volume thatexaminedcompetitiveelections in a varietyof developingcountries: arfrombeingconfinedto postindustrialocieties, "catch-allpartiesseem to be the norm,rather han the exception,34


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RobertH. Dix

in ThirdWorld countries."43The point is even more critical for politics than for scholarlyunderstandingof political institutionsin developing countries, at least if Ozbudunis alsocorrect n arguingthat "thesuccess of democraticpolitics in developingsocieties is stronglyassociated with the presenceof broadly-based,heterogeneous,catch-all parties,"44a pointwith which we would agree but which we have not directly sought to develop here. Evenmore thanit is the politics of class and ideology, the politics of developmentis the politicsof cross-class coalitions and programmatic ragmatism.

NOTESI wish to thankmy colleague John Ambleras well as two anonymousreadersfor theirperceptivesubstantiveand

editorialsuggestionson the draftof this article.1. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: AnIntroduction," n SeymourM. Lipset and Stein Rokkan,eds., Party Systemsand VoterAlignments New York: TheFree Press, 1967), pp. 1-64.'2. Cf. WorldBank, WorldDevelopmentReport1987 (New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 1987), pp. 202-3. LatinAmericain the context of this articleencompassesthe nineteenindependent ountriesof the westernhemispherewithan Iberianheritageandcolonial background.3. Of course, this is not literally the beginning of all cross-nationalstudy of party systems in Latin America.However, seldom have such studiessought explicitly andsystematically o address he questionsraisedhere, and noneof which I am aware has endeavored,except perhapsin passing, to analyze the evolution of Latin Americanpartysystems in juxtapositionto the experienceof the West. Among the previous comparativestudies of Latin Americanparty systems is Ronald McDonald, Party Systems and Elections in Latin America (Chicago: Markham, 1971),currently being revised and updated for a new edition. A comprehensive and very useful compilation ofcountry-by-country,party-by-partydescriptions is Robert J. Alexander, ed., Political Parties in the Americas:Canada, LatinAmericaand the WestIndies, 2 vols. (Westport:GreenwoodPress, 1982).4. The classic statementof the tentativenessof Latin Americanpolitical systems is CharlesAnderson,Politics andEconomic Change in LatinAmerica(Princeton:Van Nostrand, 1967), chap. 4.5. See Lipset andRokkan, "CleavageStructures."6. Of course liberalsandconservatives were not always consistent in what they advocated. Liberals, for example,once in power, often became staunchpromotersof centralauthority, n practiceat least, if not in doctrine.Moreover,there were indeed conservative merchants and liberal landowners. In fact, the very designations conservative andliberal at times appearedto be mere labels, adoptedby one or another caudillo in order to enhance his image orlegitimacy.7. Conservatives and Liberals(with their various factions and permutations)were by 1857 supplementedby theRadicals (much in the Frenchtraditionof thatdesignation), then by the Democrats, a small "petit bourgeois" party(1887), the Communists(1921), the Socialists (1933), and much later, in partas a breakawayof the Conservatives'youth wing, the Christian Democrats, not to mention a myriad of other, mostly ephemeral, parties of varyingideological hues. The Conservativesand Liberalsmergedto help form the NationalPartyin 1966.8. In a case like Brazil, such traumaticinterruptionhas occurred several times, first when the Liberals andConservativesof theempire disappearedwith the adventof therepublic n 1889, then when the dictatorshipof GetulioVargas putan end to the Old Republic in the 1930s, andagain when the authorsof a militarycoup broughtan end tothe party system of the Second Republic in 1964 and effectively decreed a two-party system comprised of agovernmentpartyandan opposition. In an effort to divide its oppositionthe militarysubsequently 1979) opened thesystem to a varietyof partiesthat have competedunder civilian rule since 1985.9. See RiordanRoett, Brazil:Politics in a PatrimonialSociety, rev. ed. (New York:Praeger,1978), pp. 65 and 69.Despite the name, the PSD was not a social democraticpartyin the European ense.10. PaulH. Lewis, ParaguayunderStroessner ChapelHill:Universityof NorthCarolinaPress, 1980), pp. 145-50.For a comparablediscussion concerningColombia and its "hereditaryhatreds"that led to some 200,000 deaths ininterpartisan iolence as late as 1946-1966, see RobertH. Dix, The Politics of Colombia(New York:Praeger, 1987),pp. 92-94. For Uruguaysee JuanRial, "The UruguayanElections of 1984: A Triumphof the Center," in Paul W.

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ComparativePolitics October1989Drake and EduardoSilva, eds., Elections and Democratization n LatinAmerica, 1980-1985 (San Diego: Center forIberian and Latin AmericanStudies, Universityof California,San Diego, 1986), pp. 262--64.

11. For these termssee, respectively, SigmundNeumann,Modern Political Parties (Chicago: Universityof ChicagoPress, 1956); Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformationof the Western European Party Systems," in JosephLaPalombara nd MyronWeiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1966), pp. 177-200; and Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New Brunswick:Transaction, 1980). Analogous in some respects were parties like Germany's Catholic Zentrum, where religionreplacedsocial class as an integrating orce.12. The classic depictionof the catch-all partyis found in Kirchheimer.I do not mean to imply that there were noimportantpartieswith a multiclassfollowing in prewarEurope(for example, GreatBritain'sConservatives),nor thatall of Europe'sputativeclass partiesappealedalmostexclusively to the industrialworkingclass (France'sSocialists didnot, for example). Rather, tendencies and contrastsare at issue, the centralquestion being why Latin America hasfailed to develop sizable Communistpartiesor such ideological, working-class-oriented artiesas the prewarSocialDemocratsof Sweden or Germanyand the Laborpartiesof Great BritainandNorway.13. The use of the term catch-allis not criticalhere, as long as the point is carried hatLatinAmerica's mass partiestend to be cross-classandnonideological n nature. Some Latin Americanistsmight preferthe termpopulistto refer tomany (although perhapsnot all) such parties.14. For an excellentexampleof thisprocesswithregard o Peru'sAPRA, see FrederickB. Pike, TheModernHistoryof Peru (New York:Praeger,1967), and GrantHilliker, The Politics of Reform n Peru: TheApristaand OtherMassParties (Baltimore:The JohnsHopkinsUniversity Press, 1971).15. RobertE. O'Connor, "TheElectorate,"in HowardPenniman,ed., Venezuelaat the Polls (Washington,D.C.:AmericanEnterprise nstitute, 1980), pp. 86-87.16. Ibid., pp. 80-81.17. Mitchell A. Seligson, "Costa Rica and Jamaica," in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun, eds., CompetitiveElections in Developing Countries(Washington,D.C.: AmericanEnterprise nstitute, 1987), p. 171.18. Peter G. Snow, Political Forces in Argentina,rev. ed. (New York:Praeger, 1979), pp. 36-39.19. See RobertH. Dix, "Populism:Authoritarian nd Democratic," Latin American Research Review, 20 (1985),33.20. Snow, p. 32.21. Jose Luis de Imaz, Los Que Mandan(Albany:State UniversityPress of New York, 1970), p. 17.22. JohnW. Martz, Accidn Democrdtica(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1966), pp. 195ff.23. ChristopherMitchell, TheLegacy of Populismin Bolivia (New York:Praeger, 1977), pp. 17-19 and 26-28.24. GlducioAry Dillon Soares, "The Politics of Uneven Development," in Lipset andRokkan,eds., p. 187.25. Roett, Brazil, p. 67.26. Most of the PT's leaders are blue collar workers, a rare occurrence n Latin America; see MargaretE. Keck,"GreatExpectations:The Worker'sParty in Brazil (1979-1985)," paper prepared or the Thirteenth InternationalCongressof the Latin American Studies Association, Boston, October 1986.27. ArturoValenzuela, Origins and Characteristicsof the Chilean Party System:A Proposalfor a ParliamentaryForm of Government,Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center Latin American Program, 1985),Table 1.

28. ThusO'Connor found in a two-provincestudyof the 1978 Venezuelanelection that, while 8 percenteach of theupper and middle stratasupported he left, only 6 percent of the working class and 3 percent of the poor did so(O'Connor,p. 81). CharlesG. Gillespie found a similarpattern or Uruguay;see his "Activists andFloating Voters:The UnheededLessons of Uruguay's 1982 Primaries," n Drake andSilva, eds., p. 234.29. See Paul W. Drake, Socialism and Populismin Chile, 1932-52 (Urbana:Universityof Illinois Press, 1978). In1952, for example, the majoritywing of the divided Socialists, togetherwith an eclectic arrayof partiesandpolitical"movements,"backed the presidentialcandidacyof formermilitarydictator(1927-31) Carlos Ibfilez del Campo.30. A conspicuous, if short-lived,exceptionto this generalization lourished n Colombiain the late 1960s andearly1970s. The NationalPopularAlliance (ANAPO), essentially the political vehicle of former dictatorGeneralGustavoRojas Pinilla, won 39 percentof the vote, and nearly the presidency, in 1970 in a multicandidateelection with apopulisticappealandstrong support rom the urbanmasses, plus the supportof a numberof ruralareas, all of themdisaffected from the then-reigningpower-sharingagreementbetween the Conservative and Liberalpartiescalled theNational Front. Significantly, and attestingto the strengthof traditionalparty loyalties in Colombia, ANAPO at itspeak functioned not as a formally separate party(though it became one in 1971), but as a combinationof dissident

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RobertH. Dixfactions of the two major parties. When in 1970 Rojas Pinilla himself ran for president, he did so under theConservative abel; see RobertH. Dix, "PoliticalOppositionsunderthe NationalFront," in R. AlbertBerry, RonaldG. Hellman, and MauricioSolatin, eds., Politics of Compromise New Brunswick:TransactionBooks, 1980), pp.140-64. ANAPO has since virtuallyfaded from sight.31. The cross-national variance is considerable in this respect. Pre-1973 Chile was at one extreme: there weretypicallythreeor fourpresidentialcandidatesbutmanymore congressionalslates, with many minorpartiesexplicitlyor tacitlybackingone of the majorpartycandidacies. In Peru n 1980, on theotherhand,there were fifteen presidentialcandidaciesand fifteen congressionalslates;cf. SandraL. Woy-Hazelton, "TheReturnof PartisanPolitics in Peru,"in Stephen M. Gorman, ed., Post-RevolutionaryPeru (Boulder:Westview Press, 1982), p. 55. More typical thaneitherof these cases are Costa Rica and Venezuela, where the two leading candidatesas a rule garner8-10 percentmoreof the vote thando theirrespective congressionalslates and there are usually two or threemore partiesseekingrepresentationn congress thantherearepresidentialcandidates.32. Cf. Epstein, Political Parties, chap. 6.33. WorldBank, WorldDevelopmentReport1987, p. 267.34. Ibid., p. 265.35. Ibid.36. AlejandroPortes, "Urbanization ndPolitics in LatinAmerica,"Social Science Quarterly,52 (December 1971),

697-720; see also Joan M. Nelson, Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in Developing Nations (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardCenterfor InternationalAffairs, 1969).37. JuanM. Villareal, "Changes n ArgentineSociety: The Heritageof Dictatorship," n MonicaPeraltaRamos andCarlosH. Waisman, eds., FromMilitaryRule to LiberalDemocracy in Argentina(Boulder:Westview Press, 1987),p. 95.38. Cf. Epstein, concerningthe relevance of this factor in the case of the United States.39. AlbertO. Hirschman,"Underdevelopment,Obstacles to the Perceptionof Change, andLeadership,"Daedalus,97 (Summer 1968), 925-37.40. Epstein, p. 132.41. Thatthe decline of class politics in Europemayhavebeen exaggerated s suggestedin ibid., pp. 368-74; see alsoSteven Wolinetz, "The Transformation f WesternEuropeanPartySystems Revisited," WestEuropeanPolitics, 2(January1979), 4-28.42. France'sCharlesde Gaulle was in a sense such a leader. However, he consideredhimself above, or apart rom,political parties,even those that adhered o his cause or invokedhis name;he personallyspent little time buildingorleadinghis own party.43. Ergun Ozbudun, "InstitutionalizingCompetitive Elections in Developing Societies," in Myron Weiner andErgunOzbudun, eds., p. 405.44. Ibid.

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Documents

02.09 - DIX, Robert H. 1989. “Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America.”