Canon 20 Cases

LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO, vs ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO

SC Ruling on Canon 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility - guilty suspended for 6 months

Respondent’s claim that the attorney’s fee pertains only to the recovery of complainant’s savings deposit from Planter’s Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as complainant’s counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between the latter and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent admitted that he explained the contents of the agreement to complainant before the latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

A contingent fee is a fee charged for a lawyer’s services only if the lawsuit is successful or is favorably settled out of court

ATTY ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N. PASTOR, Petitioners, vs. ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER, ELIZABETH R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES, TERESITA REYES, JOSE REYES and ANTONIO REYES, Respondents.

SC Ruling on Canon 20.01

Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent fees for their professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law.

Contingent Fees

A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.

However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness,47 such that under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees.

Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable.

Thus, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court partly states:

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. – An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. x x x. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefore unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or reasonableness.49 It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.50

In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation paid (including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no full blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances. Its reduction is, therefore, in order. This is in accordance with our ruling in the earlier case of Tanhueco v. De Dumo51, where we reduced the amount of attorney’s fees from sixty percent (60%) to fifteen percent (15%), for being excessive and unreasonable.

It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and Pastor must be equitably reduced. In the opinion of this Court, the yield that corresponds to the percentage

share of the Zuzuarreguis in the P19.50 per square meter just compensation paid by the NHA must be returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor.

The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to P19,583,878.00. This amount must therefore be divided between the Zuzuarreguis, on the one hand, and Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other. The division must be pro rata. The amount of P17.00 that should go to the Zuzuarreguis represents 87.18% of the P19.50 per square meter just compensation, The P2.50 per square meter that was to go to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other hand, represents 12.82%.

The Zuzuarreguis are entitled to the yield equal to 87.18% of the P19,583,878.00, while Attys. Roxas and Pastor are entitled to 12.82% of said amount. The amount corresponding to 87.17% of P19,583,878.00 is P17,073,224.84. This is the yield that the Zuzuarreguis are entitled to. Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other hand, are entitled to P2,510,653.16.

Attys. Roxas and Pastor, in the opinion of this Court, were not shortchanged for their efforts for they would still be earning or actually earned attorney’s fees in the amount of P6,987,078.75 (P4,476,425.59 + P2,510,653.16).

The amount of P17,073,224.84 must therefore be returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor to the Zuzuarreguis. They can take this out from the yield in the amount of P19,583,878.00 which they have appropriated for themselves.

FACTS:

In 1977, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriation proceedings against the Zuzuarreguis, petitioners in G.R. No. 152104, for

parcels of land belonging to the the petitioners situated in Antipolo, Rizal. This case was lodged before the RTC, Branch 141, Municipality of Makati. On 25 May 1983, said case was ordered archived6 by Branch 141. About a month before the aforecited case was ordered archived, the Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, to represent them in Civil Case No. 26804. This was sealed by a Letter-Agreement dated 22 April 1983.

A Motion to Set Case for Hearing, dated 14 February 1984, was filed by Attys. Roxas and Pastor in Civil Case No. 26804. The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued. On 29 October 1984, a Partial Decision was rendered fixing the just compensation to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis at P30.00 per square meter. The NHA filed a Motion for Reconsideration9 dated 23 November 1984 praying that the Partial Decision be reconsidered and set aside, and a new one rendered lowering the amount of just compensation in accordance with applicable laws. Pending resolution thereof, a Joint Special Power of Attorney was executed by Antonio De Zuzuarregui, Jr., Enrique De Zuzuarregui and Pacita Javier, in favor of Attys. Roxas and Pastor.

On 22 November 1985, a Special Power of Attorney was executed by Beatriz Zuzuarregui vda. De Reyes in favor of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas, Santiago Pastor and Basilio H. Toquero.

On 10 December 1985, a Letter-Agreement was executed by and between Antonio Zuzuarregui, Jr., Pacita Javier and Enrique De Zuzuarregui, on the one hand, and Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago Pastor, on the other. The said Letter-Agreement reads:

"Dear Atty. Roxas & Atty. Pastor:

This will confirm an amendment to our agreement regarding your attorney’s fees as our

lawyers and counsels for the Zuzuarregui’s properties expropriated by National Housing Authority covering ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE (179) HECTARES

We hereby confirm and agree that we are willing to accept as final and complete settlement for our 179 hectares expropriated by NHA a price of SEVENTEEN PESOS (P17.00) per square meter, or for a total of THIRTY MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P30.4 Million), all payable in NHA Bonds."

Resolution was issued by the NHA stating that the Zuzuarregui property would be acquired at a cost of P19.50 per square meter; that the Zuzuarreguis would be paid in NHA Bonds, subject to the availability of funds; and that the yield on the bonds to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis shall be based on the Central Bank rate at the time of payment.

As a result of the aforesaid NHA Resolution, a Compromise Agreement was executed between the Zuzuarreguis and the NHA. The Compromise Agreement, stipulated among other things, that the just compensation of the Zuzuarregui properties would be at P19.50 per square meter payable in NHA Bonds. In a Decision dated 20 December 1985, the RTC approved the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties.

On 27 December 1985, the NHA Legal Department released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas, in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis, the amount of P20,000,000.00 in NHA Bearer Bonds as "partial payment for several parcels of land with a total area of 1,790,570.36 square meters located in Antipolo, Rizal." On even date, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas delivered NHA Bonds to Antonio De

Zuzuarregui in the amount of P15,000,000.00. On 04 February 1986, the amount of P34,500,000.00 in Bearer Bonds was again released by the NHA to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis. On 14 February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis issued a receipt for receiving the amount of P30,070,000.00. This receipt included the P15,000,000.00 given to them last 27 December 1985. Again on 17 February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis, through Beatriz Zuzuarregui vda. De Reyes, issued another receipt for the amount of P450,000.00 in NHA bonds.18 The total amount in NHA bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the records show that the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to P30,520,000.00 in NHA bonds.

Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by the NHA was P54,500,000.00.

On 25 August 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, demanding that the two lawyers deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA.

Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered that the amount that they got seems huge from the surface, but it just actually passed their hands, as it did not really go to them

On 29 September 1987, the Zuzuarreguis informed the two lawyers that their services as counsels of the Zuzuarreguis (except Betty) in the expropriation proceedings filed by the NHA, was being formally terminated. They then filed a civil action for Sum of Money and Damages

against the NHA, Jose B. H. Pedrosa, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas and Atty. Santiago N. Pastor. The Zuzuarreguis demanded that the yield on the NHA bonds be turned over to them.

Nonetheless, such was dismissed by the courts and sided with the two lawyers. But the CA reversed it. Defendants-Appellees Roxas and Pastor are hereby ordered to return to plaintiffs-appellants the amount of P12,596,696.425, the balance from the P17,073,122.70, received as yield from NHA bonds after deducting the reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of P4,476,426.275.

VALENTIN C. MIRANDA, - versus- ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO

SC Ruling on Canon 20 suspended for 6 months

In collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that “a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.” It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his services. At the outset, respondent should have informed the complainant of all the fees or possible fees that he would charge before handling the case and not towards the near conclusion of the case. This is essential in order for the complainant to determine if he has the financial capacity to pay respondent before engaging his services.

Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the payment of additional professional fees on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit has no merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract but recoverable by him from his client." The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. In the present case, the parties had already entered into an agreement as to the attorney's fees of the respondent, and thus, the principle of quantum meruit does not fully find application because the respondent is already compensated by such agreement.

Respondent's inexcusable act of imposing unwarranted fees in exchange for the release of said title deserve the imposition of disciplinary sanction.

Facts:

Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of a parcel of land at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. In 1994, complainant initiated Land Registration Commission Case for the registration of the aforesaid property. The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275. During the course of the proceedings, complainant engaged the services of respondent Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said case when his original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez, figured in a vehicular accident.

Complainant and respondent agreed that complainant was to pay respondent Twenty Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and Two Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee. Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him, as evidenced by receipts duly signed by the latter. During the last hearing of the case, respondent demanded the additional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for the preparation of a memorandum, which he said would further strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus twenty percent (20%) of the total area of the subject property as additional fees for his services.

Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was contrary to their agreement. Moreover, complainant co-owned the subject property with his siblings, and he could not have agreed to the amount being demanded by respondent without the knowledge and approval of his co-heirs. As a result of complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's demands, the latter became furious and their relationship became sore.

On January 12, 1998, the Decision granted the petition for registration, which Decision was declared final and executory in an Order dated June 5, 1998. On March 24, 2000, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) sent complainant a copy of the letter addressed to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Las Piñas City, which transmitted the decree of registration and the original and owner's duplicate of the title of the property.

On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the owner's duplicate of the Original Certificate of Title. He was surprised to discover that the same had already been claimed by and released to respondent on March 29, 2000. On May 4, 2000, complainant talked to respondent on the phone and asked him to turn over the owner's duplicate of the OCT, which he had claimed without complainant's knowledge, consent and authority. Respondent insisted that complainant first pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property equivalent to 378 square meters, in exchange for which, respondent would deliver the owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again, complainant refused the demand, for not having been agreed upon.

The complainant reiterated his demand for the return of the owner's duplicate of the OCT. On June 11, 2000, complainant made the same demand on respondent over the telephone. Respondent reiterated his previous demand and angrily told complainant to comply, and threatened to have the OCT cancelled if the latter refused to pay him.

Complainant learned that on April 6, 2000, respondent registered an adverse claim on the subject OCT wherein he claimed that the agreement on the payment of his legal services was 20% of the property and/or actual market value. To date, respondent has not returned the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 to

complainant and his co-heirs despite repeated demands to effect the same.

SPOUSES MANUEL C. RAFOLS, JR. and LOLITA B. RAFOLS, vs. ATTY. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR.

SC Ruling on Canon 20

To begin with, the respondent’s denial of knowledge of the transaction between the complainants and Judge Dizon, Jr. was not only implausible, but also unsubstantiated. It was the respondent himself who had introduced the complainants to the judge. His act of introducing the complainants to the judge strongly implied that the respondent was aware of the illegal purpose of the judge in wanting to talk with the respondent’s clients. Thus, we unqualifiedly accept the aptness of the following evaluation made in the OBC’s Report and Recommendation, viz:

xxx Being the Officer of the Court, he must have known that meeting litigants outside the court is something beyond the bounds of the rule and that it can never be justified by any reason. He must have known the purpose of Judge Dizon in requesting him to meet the complainants-litigants outside the chamber of Judge Dizon. By his overt act in arranging the meeting between Judge Dizon and complainants- litigants in the Coffee Shop of the East Royal Hotel, it is crystal clear that he must have allowed himself and consented to Judge Dizon’s desire to ask money from the complainants-litigants for a favorable decision of their case which was pending before the sala of Judge Dizon.

Secondly, the respondent’s insistence that he did not see the complainants’ act of handing the money to the judge is unbelievable. In his comment, the respondent even admitted having himself received the P80,000.00 from

the complainants, and having kept P30,000.00 of that amount pursuant to the instruction of the judge as a token of the friendship between him and the judge. The admission proved that the respondent had known all along of the illegal transaction between the judge and the complainants, and belied his feigned lack of knowledge of the delivery of the money to the judge.

FACTS:

The complainants were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6209 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in General Santos City, wherein they sought the cancellation of a deed of sale. Civil Case No. 6209 was assigned to Branch 37 of the RTC, presided by Judge Dizon, Jr. The complainants were represented by the respondent, paying to him P15,000.00 as acceptance fee.

On December 22, 1997, at 9:30 a.m., the respondent visited the complainants at their residence and informed complainant Manuel that the judge handling their case wanted to talk to him. The respondent and Manuel thus went to the East Royal Hotel’s coffee shop where Judge Dizon, Jr. was already waiting. The respondent introduced Manuel to the judge, who informed Manuel that their case was pending in his sala. The judge likewise said that he would resolve the case in their favor, assuring their success up to the Court of Appeals, if they could deliver P150,000.00 to him. As he had no money at that time, Manuel told the judge that he would try to produce the amount. The judge then stated that he would wait for the money until noon of that day. Thus, Manuel left the coffee shop together with the respondent, who instructed Manuel to come up with the money before noon because the judge badly needed it. The two of them went to a lending institution, accompanied by Allan Rafols, but Manuel was told there that only

P50,000.00 could be released the next day. From the lending institution, they went to the complainants’ shop to look for Ditas Rafols, Allan’s wife, who offered to withdraw P20,000.00 from her savings account.

On their way to the bank, Manuel, Allan and Ditas dropped off the respondent at the hotel for the latter to assure Judge Dizon, Jr. that the money was forthcoming. Afterwards, Ditas and Manuel withdrew P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 from their respective bank accounts, and went back to the hotel with the cash. There, they saw the judge and his driver, who beckoned to them to go towards the judge’s Nissan pick-up then parked along the highway in front of the hotel. Manuel alighted from his car and approached the judge. Manuel personally handed the money to the judge, who told Manuel after asking about the amount that it was not enough. Thereafter, Manuel entered the hotel’s coffee shop and informed the respondent that he had already handed the money to the judge.

On December 24, 1997, at about 6:00 a.m., the respondent again visited the complainants. He was on board the judge’s Nissan pick-up driven by the judge’s driver. The respondent relayed to the complainants the message that the judge needed the balance of P100,000.00 in order to complete the construction of his new house in time for the reception of his daughter’s wedding. However, the complainants managed to raise only P80,000.00, which they delivered to the respondent on that same day.

On January 20, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called up the complainants’ residence and instructed their son to request his parents to return his call, leaving his cell phone number. When Manuel returned the call the next day, the judge instructed Manuel to see him in his office. During their meeting in his chambers, the judge demanded the balance of P30,000.00. Manuel

clarified to the judge that his balance was only P20,000.00 due to the previous amount given being already P80,000.00. The judge informed him that the amount that the respondent handed was short. Saying that he badly needed the money, the judge insisted on P30,000.00, and even suggested that the complainants should borrow in order to raise that amount.

On January 22, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called the complainants to inquire whether the P30,000.00 was ready for pick up. After Manuel replied that he was ready with the amount, the judge asked him to wait for 20 minutes. The judge and his driver later arrived on board his Nissan pick-up. Upon instructions of the judge’s driver, the complainants followed the Nissan pick-up until somewhere inside the Doña Soledad Estate, Espina, General Santos City. There, the judge alighted and approached the complainants and shook their hands. At that point, Manuel handed P30,000.00 to the judge. The judge then told Manuel that the RTC judge in Iloilo City before whom the perpetuation of the testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido was made should still testify as a witness during the trial in his sala in order for the complainants to win. The judge persuaded the complainants to give money also to that judge; otherwise, they should not blame him for the outcome of the case.

The complainants were forced to give money to the judge, because they feared that the judge would be biased against them unless they gave in to his demands. But when they ultimately sensed that they were being fooled about their case, they consulted Larry Sevilla, their mediamen friend, and narrated to Sevilla all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. They agreed that the details should be released to the media. The exposẻ was published in the Newsmaker, a local newspaper.

Thereafter, the respondent and Judge Dizon, Jr. made several attempts to appease the complainants by sending gifts and offering to return a portion of the money, but the complainants declined the offers.

According to the complainants, the respondent demanded P25,000.00 as his expenses in securing the testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido in Iloilo City to be used as evidence in their civil case. In addition, the respondent requested the complainants to borrow P60,000.00 from the bank because he wanted to redeem his foreclosed Isuzu Elf, and because he needed to give P11,000.00 to his nephew who was due to leave for work abroad.

TERESITA D. SANTECO, complainant, vs. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE, respondent.

SC Ruling on Canon 20 suspended for 5 yrs

respondent violated Canon 20 when she discontinued her legal services for complainant without any notice of withdrawal and even ignored the issuances of the Commission for her to answer the complaint filed against her.

Aggravating her gross negligence in the performance of her duties, respondent abruptly stopped appearing as complainant’s counsel even as proceedings were still pending – with neither a withdrawal nor an explanation for doing so. This was in gross violation of the following:

CANON 22. A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. (Italics supplied)

It must be remembered that while the right of the client to terminate the relation is absolute, i.e., with or without cause,[25] the right of the attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted.[26] Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination.[27] He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.[28]

The grounds wherein a lawyer may withdraw his services are well-defined,[29] and the abruptness of respondent’s withdrawal hardly fits into any of them. Be that as it may, whether or not a lawyer has a valid cause for withdrawing from a case, he can not just do so

and leave the client out in the cold unprotected.[30] An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the lawyer should see to it that the name of the new counsel is recorded in the case.[31]

Facts:

Complainant was the defendant in an action for ejectment filed with Branch 62 of the Makati City Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC). On March 3, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment against her. Thereafter, she filed a supersedeas bond with the Clerk of Court of the Makati MTC.

During the pendency of the ejectment case, complainant filed an action to Declare Deed of Absolute Sale Null and Void and for Reconveyance with Damages with Branch 147 of the Makati City Regional Trial Court.

On or before March 1998, complainant terminated the services of her then counsel and engaged the services of respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance as her counsel de parte in both cases. Complainant agreed to and did pay respondent P12,000.00 as acceptance fee for her services.

Complainant paid respondent the sums of P1,500.00 and P500.00 respectively in full satisfaction of their acceptance fee. However, respondent refused to issue to complainant the corresponding receipts therefor, despite demands to do so.

The Presiding Judge of Branch 147 of the Makati City RTC expunged from the record the

testimony of a witness for complainant, who was one of the plaintiffs therein.[4] Respondent, as her counsel, filed a “Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order of July 6, 1998.”[5] The motion was denied by the trial court in an Order dated June 30, 1999.[6] Thereafter, on August 27, 1999,[7] Civil Case No. 97-275 was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Respondent filed a “Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order of August 27, 1999.”[8]

Subsequently, respondent made representations with complainant that she was going to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-275. For the proposed service, respondent charged complainant the total sum of P3,900.00, which the latter paid. Complainant personally verified with the docket section of the Court of Appeals whether or not a petition for certiorari was filed. She was dismayed to discover that no such petition had been filed.

The respondent took from her the official receipt and pictures of the torn-down structures which were the subject of Civil Case No. 50988 evidencing her deposit of the supersedeas bond. Respondent obtained the same under the pretext that she needed them in the motion for the withdrawal of complainant’s deposit.

Respondent told her to go to the court to claim the check for the supersedeas bond and have the same encashed with the Landbank. However, upon verification with the MTC, she discovered that there was no such check and that she needs to present the official receipt to withdraw said deposit. She tried to recover the official receipt from respondent but the latter kept avoiding her.

BUN SIONG YAO, Complainant vs. ATTY. LEONARDO A. AURELIO, Respondent.

SC Ruling on Canon 21 6 months suspension

It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney and his client is a fiduciary one.6 Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.7

Notwithstanding the veracity of his allegations, respondent’s act of filing multiple suits on similar causes of action in different venues constitutes forum-shopping, as correctly found by the investigating commissioner. This highlights his motives rather than his cause of action. Respondent took advantage of his being a lawyer in order to get back at the complainant. In doing so, he has inevitably utilized information he has obtained from his dealings with complainant and complainant’s companies for his own end.

Facts:

The complainant since 1987 retained the services of respondent as his personal lawyer, whos is a stockholder and the retained counsel of Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation and Solar Textile Finishing Corporation of which complainant is a majority stockholder. Complainant purchased several parcels of land using his personal funds but were registered in the name of the corporations upon the advice of respondent. The respondent, who was also the brother in-law of complainant’s wife, had in 1999 a disagreement with the latter and thereafter respondent demanded the return of his investment in the corporations but when complainant refused to pay, he filed eight charges for estafa and falsification of commercial documents against the complainant and his wife and the other officers of the corporation. The respondent also filed a complaint against complainant for alleged non-compliance with the reportorial requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City and another complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon City for alleged violation of Section 75 of the Corporation Code. The respondent also filed a similar complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.

The series of suits filed against complainant and his wife is a form of harassment and constitutes an abuse of the confidential information which respondent obtained by virtue of his employment as counsel. Complainant argued that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he filed several suits not only against the complainant and the other officers of the corporation, but also against the two corporations of which he is both a stockholder and retained counsel.

Respondent claimed that he handled several labor cases in behalf of Solar Textile Finishing

Corporation; that the funds used to purchase several parcels of land were not the personal funds of complainant but pertain to Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation; that since 1999 he was no longer the counsel for complainant or Solar Textile Finishing Corporation; that he never used any confidential information in pursuing the criminal cases he filed but only used those information which he obtained by virtue of his being a stockholder.

He further alleged that his requests for copies of the financial statements were ignored by the complainant and his wife hence he was constrained to file criminal complaints for estafa thru concealment of documents; that when he was furnished copies of the financial statements, he discovered that several parcels of land were not included in the balance sheet of the corporations; that the financial statements indicated that the corporations suffered losses when in fact it paid cash dividends to its stockholders, hence, he filed additional complaints for falsification of commercial documents and violation of reportorial requirements of the SEC.

MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, Complainants,

vs.

ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL, Respondent.

SC Ruling on Canon 22 Suspended 3 months

As to respondent’s conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely fell short of the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner Villadolid, respondent had not been quite candid in his dealings with the accused or complainants. The Court notes that though respondent represented to the accused that he had changed his office address, still, from the examination of the pleadings14 he filed, it can be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as that known to complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondent’s office would have received the Court’s Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that situation was to at least inform the client of the adverse resolution since they had constantly called respondent’s office to check the status of the case. Even when he knew that complainants had been calling his office, he opted not to return their calls.

Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of complainants may have been about the letter he sent PO3 Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as counsel of the case. However, though aware of such likelihood, respondent still did not return their calls. Had he done so, he and complainants could have threshed out all unresolved matters between them.

Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have informed this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he had already given instructions to his clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the accused.

Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave them instructions on how to go about respondent’s withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case. Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence to respondent’s naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in their stand that they did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed the ad cautelam petition. He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written conformity of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.15

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the

principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or from a good cause.16

Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated without adequate or proper remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently disputed such claim when they attached in their position paper filed before the IBP a machine validated deposit slip in the amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings account of one Jaime Portugal with account number 7186509273.19 Respondent has neither admitted nor denied having claimed the deposited amount.

The Court also rejects respondent’s claim that there was no formal engagement between the parties and that he made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper consideration. In the words of then Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta:20

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.21

Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:

A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the

relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. x x x 22

Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.

Facts:

On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin (eventually petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the accused) were involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two individuals and the serious injury of another. As a result, Informations were filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. After due trial, the Sandiganbayan2 found the accused guilty of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide.

At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the accused. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration.3 Pending

resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002.

Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent telephone calls they made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went to respondent’s last known address only to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding address.

More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to personally verify the status of the ad cautelam petition as they had neither news from respondent about the case nor knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a Resolution4 dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees.

Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest5 had already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing.

In his Comment,6 respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes that he was not the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.

Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere effort and in true spirit of the Lawyer’s Oath did he file the Motion for Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly irregular character, respondent also made informal but urgent and personal representation with the members of the Division of the Sandiganbayan who promulgated the decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts he put into the case of the accused, his other professional obligations were neglected and that all these were done without proper and adequate remuneration.

As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He stresses that the last day of filing of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review,7 seeking an additional thirty (30) days to file the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition by registered mail and paid the corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the reglementary period.

Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the "herculean" efforts he made in assisting the accused for almost a year after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He considered the fact that it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the effect of his handling the case on his other equally important professional obligations; the lack of adequate financial consideration for handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United States to explore further professional opportunities. He then decided to formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person between respondent and complainants, explaining his

decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for the letter.

Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case and endorsed the Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court. Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be difficult to find a new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as respondent. Respondent suggests this might have been the reason for the several calls complainants made to his office.