Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 173915 February 22, 2010

IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE, Petitioners,

vs.

HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of

Branch 60, Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, and VITA N. KALASHIAN,

Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure, as amended, filed by petitioners Irene and Reynaldo Sante

assailing the Decision2 dated January 31, 2006 and the Resolution

3 dated June 23,

2006 of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

87563. The assailed decision affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 60, denying their motion to dismiss the complaint

for damages filed by respondent Vita Kalashian against them.

The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:

On April 5, 2004, respondent filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for

damages4 against petitioners. In her complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5794-R,

respondent alleged that while she was inside the Police Station of Natividad,

Pangasinan, and in the presence of other persons and police officers, petitioner

Irene Sante uttered words, which when translated in English are as follows, "How

many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin bitch!" Bert refers to Albert Gacusan, respondents friend and one (1) of her hired personal security guards detained at the said station and who is a suspect in the

killing of petitioners close relative. Petitioners also allegedly went around Natividad, Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the

suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent prayed that petitioners be held

liable to pay moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as

exemplary damages; P50,000.00 attorneys fees; P20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss5 on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial

Court in Cities (MTCC) and not the RTC of Baguio, that had jurisdiction over the

case. They argued that the amount of the claim for moral damages was not more

than the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary

damages should be excluded in computing the total claim.

On June 24, 2004,6 the trial court denied the motion to dismiss citing our ruling in

Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation.7

The trial court held that the total claim of respondent amounted to P420,000.00

which was above the jurisdictional amount for MTCCs outside Metro Manila. The

trial court also later issued Orders on July 7, 20048 and July 19, 2004,

9 respectively

reiterating its denial of the motion to dismiss and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed on August 2, 2004, a Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition,10

docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85465, before the Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, on July 14, 2004, respondent and her husband filed an Amended

Complaint11

increasing the claim for moral damages from P300,000.00 to

P1,000,000.00. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss with Answer Ad Cautelam

and Counterclaim, but the trial court denied their motion in an Order12

dated

September 17, 2004.

Hence, petitioners again filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition13

before the

Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87563, claiming that the trial court

committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the complaint

to increase the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. The

case was raffled to the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals.

On January 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division, promulgated a

decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 85465, as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of [the] Regional

Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 60, in rendering the assailed Orders dated June 24,

2004 and July [19], 2004 in Civil Case No. 5794-R the instant petition for

certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Orders are hereby ANNULLED and SET

ASIDE. Civil Case No. 5794-R for damages is ordered DISMISSED for lack of

jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.14

The Court of Appeals held that the case clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the

MTCC as the allegations show that plaintiff was seeking to recover moral damages

in the amount of P300,000.00, which amount was well within the jurisdictional

amount of the MTCC. The Court of Appeals added that the totality of claim rule

used for determining which court had jurisdiction could not be applied to the

instant case because plaintiffs claim for exemplary damages was not a separate and distinct cause of action from her claim of moral damages, but merely

incidental to it. Thus, the prayer for exemplary damages should be excluded in

computing the total amount of the claim.

On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals, this time in CA-G.R. SP No. 87563,

rendered a decision affirming the September 17, 2004 Order of the RTC denying

petitioners Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam. In the said decision, the appellate court held that the total or aggregate amount demanded in the complaint constitutes

the basis of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals did not find merit in petitioners posture that the claims for exemplary damages and attorneys fees are merely incidental to the main cause and should not be included in the computation of the

total claim.

The Court of Appeals additionally ruled that respondent can amend her complaint

by increasing the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00,

on the ground that the trial court has jurisdiction over the original complaint and

respondent is entitled to amend her complaint as a matter of right under the Rules.

Unable to accept the decision, petitioners are now before us raising the following

issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART

OF THE (FORMER) SEVENTEENTH DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS WHEN IT RESOLVED THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT OF BAGUIO CITY BRANCH 60 HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE FOR DAMAGES AMOUNTING TO

P300,000.00;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON

THE PART OF THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE OF THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BAGUIO BRANCH 60 FOR ALLOWING THE

COMPLAINANT TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT (INCREASING THE

AMOUNT OF DAMAGES TO 1,000,000.00 TO CONFER JURISDICTION

OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY

OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED AT THE COURT OF APPEALS,

SEVENTH DIVISION, DOCKETED AS CA G.R. NO. 85465.15

In essence, the basic issues for our resolution are:

1) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case? and

2) Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing the

amendment of the complaint?

Petitioners insist that the complaint falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the

MTCC. They maintain that the claim for moral damages, in the amount of

P300,000.00 in the original complaint, is the main action. The exemplary damages

being discretionary should not be included in the computation of the jurisdictional

amount. And having no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, the RTC

acted with grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the amendment of the

complaint to increase the claim for moral damages in order to confer jurisdiction.

In her Comment,16

respondent averred that the nature of her complaint is for

recovery of damages. As such, the totality of the claim for damages, including the

exemplary damages as well as the other damages alleged and prayed in the

complaint, such as attorneys fees and litigation expenses, should be included in determining jurisdiction. The total claim being P420,000.00, the RTC has

jurisdiction over the complaint.

We deny the petition, which although denominated as a petition for certiorari, we

treat as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in view of the issues

raised.

Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,17

as amended by Republic Act No.

7691,18

states:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

x x x x

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of

whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in

such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the

abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).

Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7691 further provides:

SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional

amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos

(P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be

adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided,

however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional

amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to

Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).

Relatedly, Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99 was issued declaring that the first

adjustment in jurisdictional amount of first level courts outside of Metro Manila

from P100,000.00 to P200,000.00 took effect on March 20, 1999. Meanwhile, the

second adjustment from P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 became effective on February

22, 2004 in accordance with OCA Circular No. 65-2004 issued by the Office of the

Court Administrator on May 13, 2004.

Based on the foregoing, there is no question that at the time of the filing of the

complaint on April 5, 2004, the MTCCs jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to P300,000.00.

But where damages is the main cause of action, should the amount of moral

damages prayed for in the complaint be the sole basis for determining which court

has jurisdiction or should the total amount of all the damages claimed regardless of

kind and nature, such as exemplary damages, nominal damages, and attorneys fees, etc., be used?

In this regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-9419

is instructive:

x x x x

2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the

jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as

amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely

incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases

where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of

action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction

of the court. (Emphasis ours.)

In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the recovery

of damages for the alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally

sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent by

reason of petitioners utterance while they were at a police station in Pangasinan. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the

complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts

constituting the plaintiffs causes of action.20 It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that respondents main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages,

attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the

complaint.1avvphi1

In Mendoza v. Soriano,21

it was held that in cases where the claim for damages is

the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim

shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. In the said case, the

respondents claim of P929,000.06 in damages and P25,000 attorneys fees plus P500 per court appearance was held to represent the monetary equivalent for

compensation of the alleged injury. The Court therein held that the total amount of

monetary claims including the claims for damages was the basis to determine the

jurisdictional amount.

Also, in Iniego v. Purganan,22

the Court has held:

The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is

the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction

of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from different

causes of action.

x x x x

Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the Court

of Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

Lastly, we find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the

Court of Appeals in affirming the RTCs order allowing the amendment of the original complaint from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a

petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. While it is a basic

jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has

no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to

confer jurisdiction on the court,23

here, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction over the

original complaint and amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of

right.24

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, for lack of merit. The Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 2006 and June 23, 2006,

respectively, are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 60

is DIRECTED to continue with the trial proceedings in Civil Case No. 5794-R

with deliberate dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 176492 October 20, 2014

MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner,

vs.

LEONARDO V. NONATO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Review filed by petitioner Marietta N.

Barrido questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated November

16, 2006, and its Resolution2 dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235.

The CA affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofBacolod City,

Branch 53, dated July 21, 2004, in Civil Case No. 03-12123, which ordered the

partition of the subject property.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: In the course of the marriage

of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were

able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting ofa house

and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March

15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological

incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the

property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on

January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal

Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.

Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had

already been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise

moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction,

the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September 17, 2003, applying

Article 129 of the Family Code. It ruled in this wise:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered,

ordering the conjugal property of the former Spouses Leonardo and Marietta

Nonato, a house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361 located at Eroreco,

Bacolod City, which was their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to the defendant

Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the common children

choose to remain.

Furthermore, defendants counterclaim is hereby granted, ordering plaintiff to pay defendant P10,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish and unnecessary

inconvenience brought about by this suit; and an additional P10,000.00 as

exemplary damages to deter others from following suit; and attorneys fees of P2,000.00 and litigation expenses of P575.00.

SO ORDERED.4

Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. On July 21, 2004, the

Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the

MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a

reversible error in adjudicating the subject property to Barrido. Its dispositive

portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated September 17, 2003 is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered

ordering the parties:

(1) to equitably partition the house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361;

(2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount

advanced by them in payment of the debts and obligation of TCT No. T-

140361 with Philippine National Bank;

(3) to deliver the presumptive legitimes of Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo

Nonato pursuant to Article 51 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.5

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision on November 16, 2006. It held

that since the propertys assessed value was only P8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCCs jurisdiction. Also, although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the FamilyCode, instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its decision still

correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property. Barrido filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack of merit.

Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via a Petition for Review. She

assigned the following errors in the CA Decision:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

MTCC HAD JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT CASE.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

LOT COVERED BY TCT NO. T-140361 IS CONJUGAL AFTER BEING SOLD

TO THE CHILDREN, JOSEPH LEO NONATO AND JOSEPH RAYMUND

NONATO.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

ARTICLE 129 OF THE FAMILY CODE HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE

PRESENT CASE, ON THE ASSUMPTION

THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.6

The petition lacks merit.

Contrary to Barridos contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of

possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on

real property.7 Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 1298 provides:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and

Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit

Trial Courts shall exercise:

x x x x

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or

possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the

propertyor interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)or,

in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty

thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,

attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property

shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A.

No. 7691)9

Here, the subject propertys assessed value was merely P8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed the required limit of P20,000.00 for civil actions

outside Metro Manila tofall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the

lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.

The records reveal that Nonatoand Barridos marriage had been declared void for psychological incapacity under Article 3610 of the Family Code. During their

marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property

relations. Although Article 12911 provides for the

procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147

specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses property relations. Article 147 reads:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live

exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or

under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal

shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry

shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived

together shall be presumed tohave been obtained by their joint efforts, work or

industry, and shall beowned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a

party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property

shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's

efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the

property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent

of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the

party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common

children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or

their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving

descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent

party.1wphi1 In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the

cohabitation.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering

no illegal impedimentto marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and

wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage.12 It is clear,

therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be

capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband

and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is

void. Here, all these elements are present.13 The term "capacitated" inthe first

paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract

marriage.14 Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the

part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with each other as

husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36

of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.15

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work

and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any property

acquired during the union is prima faciepresumed to have been obtained through

their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property

shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts

consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.16 Efforts in the

care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to

the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work

or industry.17

In the analogous case of Valdez,18 it was likewise averred that the trial court failed

to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a

situation where a marriage is declared void ab initiobecause of psychological

incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the contract of marriage.The

Court held that the court a quodid not commit a reversible error in utilizing Article

147 of the Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses own the family home

and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the

liquidation and partition of the property that they owned in common, the provisions

on coownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail.19 The rules which are

set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal

partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable

marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between

common-law spousesor spouses of void marriages.20

Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during

the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained

by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal

shares. Barrido, however, claims that the ownership over the property in question

is already vested on their children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the

title to the property still being registered in the names of the former spouses, said

document of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary public. It must be noted

that without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private and cannot be

converted into a public document,21 making it inadmissible in evidence unless

properly authenticated.22 Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution

and authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position

paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato

and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-

ownership.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals, dated November 16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated

January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*

Associate Justice

Acting Chairperson