01-Flare Description, Design & Specifications

100/Document Code: SPI/OPE/FLR

FLARING

)(Flare & Burn Pit Flare Description, Design and Specifications )(Flare & Burn Pit

.T.T.F00.Rev

:

03 / / 8831

:

51 / / 8831

:

: : . . . .

2 | Page

: 1- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------5 2- --------------------------------------------6 3- )11------------- (Detailed Description of a Flare System 1-3 )( )11------------------------------------------- (Relief Devices 1-1-3 )11------------------------------------------- (General Definitions 2-1-3 )14---------------------------- (Pressure Relief Devices 3-1-3 ) ( )15----------------------- (Blow Down valves 4-1-3 )15-------------------------- (Pressure Control Valve) (PCV 5-1-3 )15---------- (Remotely Operated Valves) (...ROV, XV, HIC 2-3 . )16--------- (Segregation of Fluids to be flared 3-3 )17------------------------------------------ (Flare Drum 4- ---------------------------------------81 1-4 )18----------------------------------------------------- (Flares Tips 1-1-4 )19--------------------------------------------- (Pipe Flare 2-1-4 )22-------------------------------------------- ( Sonic Flare 3-1-4 ) ( ))24------------------- (Ground Flare (Multiple Tips 4-1-4 )25-- (Ground Flare with Combustion Chamber

3 | Page

2-4 )26------------------------------------------------ (Cold Vent 3-4 )27------------------------------------------------------------ (Burn Pit 4-4 )28-------------------------------------------------------- (Burner 5- )29-------------------------------------------- (Associated Equipment 1-5 )29------------------------------------------ (Flare Drum 2-5 ) ( )31---------------------------------------------- (Headers 3-5 )33------------------------------ (Hydraulic & Gas Seals 1-3-5 )34------------------------------------- (Hydraulic Seals 2-3-5 )35--------------------------------------------- (Gas Seals 4-5 )37------------------------------------------- (Purge Gas System 1-4-5 )37-------------------------------- (Mechanism of Air Ingress 2-4-5 )39--------------------------------------------------- (Purge Gas 5-5 ) ( )40-------------------- (Pilots & Ignition System 6-5 )42--------------------------------------- (Fuel & Power Supply

4 | Page

1- ) (Flare . : . . . . . )( ) (. . . .

5 | Page

2- 1 . . ) (Waste gases . ) (Knockout Drum . ) ( . ) (Level Controller Alarm) (LCA . . )( .

6 | Page

7 | Page

) (Water seal . . )(Sight Glass

) (SG . 65 C . . ) ( Flow Indicator)(FI ) (Quality Register) (QR ) (Pressure Indicator) (PI . : . . ) (Drain Tank . H2S 90 C . . )()The Flare Head (Tip

. / .

8 | Page

. . . ) 2 ( . ) (Flow Recorder Controller) (FRC ) (Flow Indicator) (FI . . . ) (Pressure Controller) (PC . : (a . ) ( .(b

. . ) ( )( . 3 . ) (Pilot Flame .

9 | Page

Page | 10

3- )(Detailed Description of a Flare System

: ) ) ( ...( ) (Knockout Drum) (K.O.D ) ( ) ( ) ...(

1-3 )( )(Relief Devices

.1-1-3 )(General Definitions )(Maximum Allowable Working Pressure) :(MAWP

)125 (API RP MAWP . . . ) ( .

11 | Page

Page | 12

: )(Set Pressure

. . . . 01 . 3 .

): (ACCUMULATION . . 01 )125 (API RP 12 .

31 | Page

) ) (BACK PRESSURE (: . : : . ) ( . . : . .

2-1-3 )(Pressure Relief Devices

: ) (Conventional Type . 01 . ) (Balanced Type . 05 . ) (Pilot Operated PRV . 05 .41 | Page

) ( )(Rupture discs

1 API RP 520 part . : )(Thermal Relief valves

. . )( .

3-1-3 ) ( )(Blow Down valves

)( . )( ) (Emergency shut Down) (ESD .

4-1-3 )(Pressure Control Valve) (PCV

) ( . .5-1-3 )(Remotely Operated Valves) (...ROV, XV, HIC DCS

) (Distributed Control System . - ) (XVS) ( Hand operated Valves ) (Hand Indication Controller) (HIC.51 | Page

.2-3 . )(Segregation of Fluids to be flared

: )( . : . . )( . ) (Hydrate Formation . . . 01 H2S . ) ( . .61 | Page

. .3-3 )(Flare K.O.Drum

.

71 | Page

4- )(Different Types & Fields of Application of Flare Devices

:

Flare Tip Cold Vent Burn Pit Burner

1-4 )(Flares Tips

. .

: ) (

81 | Page

1-1-4 )(Pipe Flare

4 . 5.0 6.0 ) ( 3.0 . . . . . . .

91 | Page

Page | 20

) ( )(Forced Draught (Air Assisted) Tips

. . . )(Pipe Flare with Water Injection

. . . . )(Pipe Flare with High pressure Gas Injection

. . . . )(Pipe Flare with Steam Injection

. . 12 | Page

. . .

2-1-4 )( Sonic Flare

. . . 4 01 ) 4 5 ( . . . ) P ( )( .

22 | Page

)(Advantages & Drawbacks

:

: )(Advantages

) ( . ) ( . . .

: )(Drawbacks

) 2 3 ( ) ( ) (Low Pressure) (LP . ) ( .

32 | Page

.

3-1-4 ) ( ))(Ground Flare (Multiple Tips

) ( 5.1 . / . . . . . . . ) (. . .

42 | Page

4-1-4 )(Ground Flare with Combustion Chamber

) (Forced Draught .) 5( : . . :

)( : ) ( .

52 | Page

.

2-4 )(Cold Vent

. ) (Dispersion .

62 | Page

: ) (Tip ) ( ) ( . 8.0 . .3-4 )(Burn Pit

. : . . . . . .

72 | Page

: : . ) (.

: . . . .

4-4 )(Burner

) (Liquefied Natural Gas) LNG (

82 | Page

5- )(Associated Equipment 1-5 )(Flare K.O.Drum

2 . : " " ) (Golden Rain . )(Design Considerations

. ) ( ) ( . . ) ( ) (Mist Eliminators . . .

92 | Page

) (Length/ Diameter) (L / D . . . . : . . . 1 ) (1bar 5.3 ) (3.5 barg. )125 (API RP (High High Level) HH . )(Vapor Space

. )1 2 2 1( . . . .

03 | Page

(LSHH) HH ) ESD ( . LSHH ) (Vortex .2-5 ) ( )(Headers

:- ) (PSVS , BDVS , PCVS

. )(Lines upstream the Relief devices

-

. ) 6( ) ( . ) (Pressure Safety Valve) (PSV PSV 3 PSV ) ( ) (Chattering . . - ) (BDV 2 .

13 | Page

) (

) ( ) (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) LPG ( 0C . ) ( . )( Lines downstream the relief devices

2 . ) 6 ( . .23 | Page

PSV ) (One line size PSV. )) (Block Valves ( ) 1 ( . ) ...( . . . . .3-5 )(Hydraulic & Gas Seals

) :(Annubar ) (Pitot tube .

1

33 | Page

) (

. ) ( . .

: 1-3-5 )(Hydraulic Seals

. . )( . . . 0 C . .

-

-

43 | Page

.

2-3-5 )(Gas Seals

: )(Static inverted gas seals )(Dynamic baffle seals )(Double purge baffle seals

. ) ( . .- .

53 | Page

Page | 36

4-5 )(Purge Gas System

.

1-4-5 )(Mechanism of Air Ingress - )(Steady State Conditions

: . . . ) (Laminar Flow .

73 | Page

: . . . . )) (Wind induced eddies ( . )(Sub atmospheric pressure within the flare system : )(Wind speed : )(stack Diameter : )(Gas Density

) ( ) (Buoyancy .- )( Transient Conditions

:83 | Page

. )(Recommissioning of stack after plant maintenance

)(Rapid temperature change

. . . . )(Vacuum within the flare Headers

2-4-5 )(Purge Gas

. . )92( . 93 | Page

. 59 . ) (associated gas

. . . .

5-5 ) ( )(Pilots & Ignition System

. . . . .

)(Pilot Burners

. .

04 | Page

2 3 4

"8 "63 "01 "63

. ) (Stainless steel . . . 8 01 ) .(8 -10 Nm /h .

) ( )(Pilot Ignition

. 001 051 . .

14 | Page

)( . .

) ( ) IR /UV / (Infera Red / Ultera Violet ) ( .

) (Weather Proof . . . ) ( .

6-5 )(Fuel & Power Supply

) ( . . ) (D.C .

24 | Page

200/Document Code: SP1/OPE/FLR

) (

).Flare Protection Measures (Radiation, Vibration, etc

.T.T.F00.Rev

:

62 / / 8831

:

71 / / 8831

:

: :

2 | Page

: 4----------------------------- Flare Protection Measure --- 0-1 4---------------------------------------- Flare Unit Capacity--- 1-1 5----------------- Feedstock Characteristics--- 2-1 6------------------------------------(Utility Characteristics) --- 3-1 7----------------------------------------(Utility Consumption)--- 4-1 7---------------------------------------------(Radiation Modeling)--- 5-1 9----------------------------- Flare Gas Analysis --- 6-1 10-------------------------------------(Spectrophotometric)--- 1-6-1 10-------------------------------------------------- UV Fluorescence ---2-6-1 11------------------------------------------------------ Chmiluminescence ---3-6-1 11------------------------------------------ (FID) Flame Ionization Detector---4-6-1 11----------------------------------------------- Photo lonization Detector ---5-6-1 12---------------------------------Gas Chromatography (GC) ---6-6-1 12-------------------------------------Mass Spectrometry ---7-6-1 12----------------------------------Electrochemical Cell ---8-6-1 13-------------------------------------------------- UV/Visible Diode Array ---9-6-1 13----------------------------------------------- Paramagnetic Device --- 01-6-1 Page | 3

Flare Protection Measure ).(Radiation, Vibration, etc

0-1 ) (

Flare Unit Capacity

1-1

) (HP Flare (Booster Gas Compression Station) BGCS 1107000 kg/h . 02 03 . .

4 | Page

Feedstock Characteristics

2-1 :

1 851088.0 845550.0 790600.0 054000.0 134000.0 720000.0 810000.0 100000.0 069130.0 809810.0 093600.0 000000.0 300000.0 500000.0 400000.0 448078.0 171650.0 975700.0 335000.0 105000.0 920000.0 910000.0 100000.0 049530.0 842120.0 221700.0 000000.0 400000.0 600000.0 400000.0

689978.0 735550.0 932600.0 294000.0 054000.0 720000.0 810000.0 100000.0 459130.0 109810.0 3833600.0 000000.0 300000.0 500000.0 400000.0 507078.0 261650.0 796700.0 475000.0 015000.0 820000.0 810000.0 100000.0 439530.0 242120.0 411700.0 000000.0 400000.0 600000.0 400000.0

5 | Page

Design Flow Rate Normal Purge Rate Purge Gas Only

1107000 kg/hr

70C 42.81

Normal Temperature MW)Minimum Operating Temperature -13C (Blow Down )Maximum Operating Temperature 350C (Fire Case

) ( ) (

) (:Pressure at Supplier Package Inlet )5.0 barg (Confirmed by Supplier

)(Utility Characteristics

3-1

) (Fuel Gas 1 ..1 Fuel Gas is line Gas, Composition

10 barg & 85C 11 barg & 85C

5.0 barg & 15C 7.8 barg & 32C

: :

6 | Page

)(Utility Consumption ) (3Nm3/hr 5kW(400V-50Hz-3ph )(12Nm3/hr _____

4-1

3.5kW(400V-50Hz-3ph

)(Radiation Modeling

5-1

531 2 4.73 kW/m . :21.60 kW/m 21.99 kW/m 24.73 kW/m 26.31 kW/m 29.47 kW/m

7 | Page

:Wind Speed Relative Humidity Ambient Temperature 2Background Solar Radiation 1.04 kW/m 16.0 m/s %53 48 C

)(

. (Gas/Liquid Chromatography) GLC H2S ) (RSH . ) H2S 15 ppm(. . Air Quality Monitoring ) (Fixed or Portable ) (Vendor . ) (Vibration HP ) (Sonic Flare Tip ) (Design Flow Rate 1107000kg/hr ) (Vendor .

8 | Page

Flare Gas Analysis

6-1

. . . . ) ( ) ( . .1. Spectrophotometric 2. UV Fluorescence 3. Chemiluminescence )4. Flame Ionization Detector (FID )5. Photo Ionization Detector (PID )6. Gas Chromatography (GC 7. Mass Spectrometry 8. Electrochemical Cell 9. UV/ Visible Diode Array 10. Paramagnetic Device

9 | Page

) (Portable . . .

1-6-1 )(Spectrophotometric

. ) (IR) (Infra- Red ) (UV) (Ultra- Violet. ) (Cell . ) ( . . . ) (Co )4 (CH .

UV Fluorescence

2-6-1

)2 (SO . 012 . 2 SO 053 .

01 | Page

Chemiluminescence

3-6-1

UV Fluorescence .

(FID) Flame Ionization Detector

4-6-1

. . . FID . ) (H2S )2 (SO.

Photo Ionization Detector

5-6-1

. FID PID ) (Portable . )4 (CH .

11 | Page

Gas Chromatography

6-6-1 )(GC

. GC . . FID GC . .

Mass Spectrometry

7-6-1

. . .

Electrochemical Cell

8-6-1

. - . - . .

21 | Page

UV/ Visible Diode Array

9-6-1

. ) ( .

Paramagnetic Device

01-6-1

. Paramagnetic. .

31 | Page


PIPELINE FLARING METHODS FOR SOUR GAS PIPELINE

.T.T.F20.Rev

:

02 / / 8831

:

51 / / 8831

:

: : 5 IGAT . . . .

2 | Page

61 5 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- FLARE SYSTEM

0-61 1-61

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5

2-61 )5 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (OVERVIEW 5 ------------------------------------------------ Unit Interface

3-61 4-61 1-4-61

7------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Process Description

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 77--------------------------------------------------------------- Flare Unit Capacity )8 -------------------------------- (Feed Stock Characteristics

2-4-61

3-4-61

4-4-61 )9 --------------------------------------------------------- (Utility Characteristics )10 ------------------------------------------------------------ (Utility Consumption

5-4-61 6-4-61 5-61 1-5-61

)10 ---------------------------------------------------------------- (Radiation Modeling )12 ----------------------------------------------------------- (Process Flow Description

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2114 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Main Equipment 14 ---------------------------------------------------------- Flare k. o. Drum

2-5-61

1-2-5-61 2-2-5-61 6-61

15 --------------------------------------------------------------- Flare Package

21 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Process Control 21 --------------------------------------------------------------- Unit Control Summary

1-6-61 3 | Page

22 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Signal List 22 ----------------------------------------------------- Package Signal List 22 ------------------------------------- Flare k.o.drum Signal list

2-6-61

1-2-6-61

2-2-6-61 7-61 1-7-61

23 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Safety Information

23 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Alarms 23 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Safety Value 23 -------------------------------------------------------------------- Safety Consideration 23 ---------------------------------------------------- General Safety Practices

2-7-61

3-7-61

1-3-7-61 2-3-7-61

24 -------------------------------------------------------------------- Flaring Events 25 ------------------------------------------------------------------- Gas purging

3-3-7-61 4-3-7-61

25----------------------------------------------------------------- Temperature Variations 25------------------------------------------------------- Pilot Flame Monitoring )26 ------------------------------------------------------------- (Flare Pictures

5-3-7-61 8-61

9-61 )31 42 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- (Appendix )43------------------------------------------------------ (Flare Incidents

01-61

4 | Page

FLARE SYSTEM

0-61 1-61

) 041( 4 )4 (BGCS . .

)(OVERVIEW

2-61

041 ) (High Pressure Flare . ) (Header . ) (Knock Out Drum .

Unit Interface

3-61 Inlet Streams : 455:

) / ( / 221:5 | Page

Outlet Streams

321:

:

.

6 | Page

Process Description

4-61 1-4-61

. ) (Tip ) (HP Flare Tip . . ) (Sonic . ) (Sub Sonic . (Sonic Flare) HP (Pressure Safety Valve) PSV (Blow Down Valve) BDV . )101- k.o.drum .(140-D . k.o.drum )601- (140-FL .

Flare Unit Capacity

2-4-61

) (HP Flare BGCS

) (Booster Gas Compression Station 1107000 kg/h . 02 03 . .

7 | Page

)(Feed Stock Characteristics

3-4-61 :

1 851088.0 845550.0 790600.0 054000.0 134000.0 720000.0 810000.0 100000.0 069130.0 809810.0 093600.0 000000.0 300000.0 500000.0 400000.0 448078.0 171650.0 975700.0 335000.0 105000.0 920000.0 910000.0 100000.0 049530.0 842120.0 221700.0 000000.0 400000.0 600000.0 400000.0

689978.0 735550.0 932600.0 294000.0 054000.0 720000.0 810000.0 100000.0 549130.0 109810.0 383600.0 000000.0 300000.0 500000.0 400000.0 507078.0 261650.0 796700.0 475000.0 015000.0 820000.0 810000.0 100000.0 439530.0 242120.0 411700.0 000000.0 400000.0 600000.0 400000.0

8 | Page

Design Flow Rate Normal Purge Rate

1107000 kg/hr Purge Gas Only 70C

) ( ) (

Normal Temperature MW 42.81

)Minimum Operating Temperature -13C (Blow Down )Maximum Operating Temperature 350C (Fire Case

) (:Pressure at Supplier Package Inlet )5.0 barg (Confirmed by Supplier

)(Utility Characteristics

4-4-61

) (Fuel Gas 1 ..1 Fuel Gas is line Gas, Composition

10 barg & 85C 11 barg & 85C

5.0 barg & 15C 7.8 barg & 32C

: :

9 | Page

)(Utility Consumption ) (3Nm3/hr 5kW(400V-50Hz-3ph )(12Nm3/hr _____

5-4-61

3.5kW(400V-50Hz-3ph

)(Radiation Modeling

6-4-61

531 2 4.73 kW/m . :21.60 kW/m 21.99 kW/m 24.73 kW/m 26.31 kW/m 29.47 kW/m

01 | Page

:Wind Speed Relative Humidity Ambient Temperature 2Background Solar Radiation 1.04 kW/m 16.0 m/s %53 48 C

)(

. (Gas/Liquid Chromatography) GLC H2S ) (RSH . ) H2S 15 ppm(.

11 | Page

)(Process Flow Description

5-61 1-5-61

)31 (Appendix

UFD P & ID ) 31(

. 1.107.000 kg/hr .

:Flare k.o. Drum Flare Package

)601-(140-FL)101-(140-D

63 )101- k.o. drum (140-D . )101- k.o. drum (140-D ) (Closed Drain ) (2-CD-1408304-A2A1-P . ) (LP Fuel Gas ) 221( ) (Purge Gas 21 | Page

. . . 2 )101- k.o. drum (140-D 63 . )(2-LFG-1221105/07-A1AV-P

63

)(2-LFG-1408203-A1AV-P

) (Globe Valve . )101- k.o. drum (140-D )400- (FT )100- (FV )400- (FO ) (Purging Fuel Gas . )400- (TT )100- (FV . )400- (FO . . ) 2 (2-LFG-122125-A1AV-P) 4(4-FHD-1408301-A2G1-P )100- (FV .

31 | Page

1 ) (LP (PCV) Self Actuated Pressure

) ( . 1 . ) (LPG . ) (LPG ) (Fuel Gas . ITAS .

Main Equipment

2-5-61 1-2-5-61 Flare k. o. Drum

) (ID.HH : 3500.16000.mm.mm ) (Vent ) (Drain . 200-) XV k.o. drum ( High Low )100- (LT . 200-XV

. ) ( )101- k.o. drum (140-D Closed Drain Burn Pit ) 2 (2-CD-1408304-A2A1-P .

41 | Page

101-140-D )3500 X16000 (mm X mm 15 barg 0.1-6 barg 150C 70C YES

Flare k.o. drum .)280-(602-002-PR-DT 2-2-5-61 Flare Package

) (Sonic Flare Tip .

51 | Page

)(Elevated Flare

063 . :70 m )36 (Nominal )Riser 36 (Nominal

) (

3-4-61 . Flare Stack

-

. 66 63 . ) Carbon Steel ASTM A 516 Gr . 60 (NACE 9.5mm 3mm

6 .

61 | Page

NACE/HIC W.N.150# R.F.125AARH ASME B16.74 CI A NACE/HIC NACE _____ ASTM A516 Gr.60N ASTM A350 Gr. LF2 N ASTM A105 N ASTM A106 Gr. B N 52001 EN S 275 JR EN 63 63 1 2 3 4 5

ASME B 16.47 TYPE A 5.61ANSI B WN-RF #051 R.F.125AARH #051 R.F.250AARH ____ #051 R.F.250AARH 1 63 1

WN-RF ____

1 1 1

2 074 DIA 2

2 3 4

5.61ANSI B

____

. ) 81( )81 (Appendix

71 | Page

Flare Tip

-

3700 mm Stainless Steel

) ASTM A 240 Gr.310S (NACE 2200 kg . 63 013 IT-SFT in AISI .)(Flare Tip Ignition Package

NACE ANSI 150# W.N- R.F.(ANSI )B16.47B CI A ______ ASTM A240 Gr.310 S 2ASTM A350 Gr. LF :Crome / Alumel Socket 006 Inconel :Crome / Alumel Socket 006 Inconel :Crome / Alumel Socket 006 Inconel ASTM A240 Gr.310 S 01 63 0036 K-Lg 0035 K-Lg 0074 K-Lg )( 4 1 2

3

______

4

______ NACE

5 6

)40-610-(602-002-ITS-DV

.

81 | Page

) (Control Module . .)(IGNITION CONTROL PANEL

. ) ( 551 . 4 . ) (Liquefied Petroleum Gas .

Pilot Burners

-

. . 2 / ) (Venturi . 1-2 bar . 1016 ) (Stainless Steel . .

91 | Page

High Energy Power Supply

-

953/853/753.24. E .Flame Detection

- ) (

k . )( . )( Aviation Lights

-

. ) ( . .

02 | Page

Process Control

6-61

P & IDS ) 31( )31 (Appendix

Unit Control Summary

1-6-61

/ 100-FV 100-FV 100-XV

021/05

/

400- TT/

_____

400-FT

054/051

100- LT/

)400- (TT )100- (FV ) (Purge Gas . )400- (FO . 200-) XV k .o. drum ( )(High Liquid Level

) (Low Liquid Level )100- (LT .

12 | Page

Signal List Package Signal List/

2-6-61 1-2-6-61 TAL-001 A/B TAL-002 A/B TAL-003 A/B TAL-004 A/B 100-XAF 200-PDI 200-PI 200-FI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Flare k.o.drum Signal list/

2-2-6-61 400-PT 100-LT 200-LT 300-LT 400-TT 1 2 3 4 5

22 | Page

Safety Information Alarms

7-61 1-7-61

/ 4 200- XV 1

50 mm 150 mm 700 mm 450 mm

/

300-LALL 300-LAL 200-LAHH 200-LAH

Safety Value

2-7-61

) (Blow dawn .

Safety Consideration General Safety Practices

3-7-61 1-3-7-61

. . )( .

32 | Page

. . : )( ) ( . ) ( . . . .

2-3-7-61 Flaring Events

. . .

42 | Page

3-3-7-61 Gas purging

. LP Fuel Gas . . ) ( . ) (k .o. drum ) (Fuel Gas .

4-3-7-61 Temperature Variations

) ( / . .

5-3-7-61 Pilot Flame Monitoring

) (Control Center Television) (CCTV . .

52 | Page

8-61 )(Flare Pictures

1-

2- ) (

62 | Page

3- K.O. Drum

4- 72 | Page

5-

6- 82 | Page

7-

8-

92 | Page

9-

01- 03 | Page

11-

21-

13 | Page

31-

41- 23 | Page

51-

61-

33 | Page

71-

81- 43 | Page

91-

02- 53 | Page

12-

22-

63 | Page

32-

42-

73 | Page

52-

62- 21 83 | Page

72-

82-

93 | Page

92-

03- 21 04 | Page

13-

23- 14 | Page

(Appendix 13) 9-61

Page | 42

National Iranian Gas Company IGAT V Gas Compressor StationsNIGCDOCUMENT TITLEOPERATING MANUAL FOR BGCS 4 PROJ. STATION

DOCUMENT No.DISC. DOC. SEQ. REV. Page 326 of 329

602

554

PR

OM

001

E01

APPENDIX 13: PFD and P&ID for Flare System

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 6, 7 & 8

IGAT V GAS COMPRESSOR STATIONS

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 6, 7 & 8

IGAT V GAS COMPRESSOR STATIONS

01-61 )(Flare Incidents

34 | Page

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (2248A)

EPA 300-N-00-014 (revised)

Volume 3, Number 9

Enforcement AlertOffice of Regulatory Enforcement

October 2000

Frequent, Routine Flaring May Cause Excessive, Uncontrolled Sulfur Dioxide ReleasesPractice Not Considered Good Pollution Control Practice; May Violate Clean Air Act

F

laring is an engineering practice that provides for process equip ment to immediately release gases to a

About Enforcement AlertEnforcement Alert is published periodically by the of Regulatory Office Enforcement to inform and educate the public and regulated community of environmental important enforcement issues, recent and significant trends enforcement actions.This information should help the regulated community and prevent anticipate of federal violations environmental law that could otherwise lead to enforcement action. Reproduction and wide of this dissemination publication are encouraged. For information on obtaining additional copies of this publication, contact the editor listed below.

device (a flare) where they can be quickly and safely in cinerated. The proper use of flares is a good engineering practice because flares can prevent damages, fires and explo sions, and inju ries to employ ees. Flar ing also converts noxious and odorous gases released in emergencies to less hazardous and objectionable emissions by the burning of the gases. But EPA investigations sug gest that flaring frequently in routine, occurs nonemergency situations or is used to bypass pollution con trol equipment. This results in unacceptably high releases of sulfur dioxide and other noxious pol lutants and may violate the requirement that companies operate their facilitiesEditors Note: To clarify sulfur dioxide reporting requirements, this issue contains slight revisions to the sections, Diagnos ing, Preventing Excess Flaring, located on page 3 and EPCRA Reporting Re quirements for Flaring Incidents on page 4. Please disregard the earlier issue.

Frequent and routine use of flares may not be good air pollution control practice for reducing emissions. (Photograph courtesy of Kaldair Inc.)

Eric V. Schaeffer Director, Office of Regulatory Enforcement Editor: Virginia Bueno (202) 564-8684 [email protected] (Please Email all address and name changes or subscription requests for this newsletter.)

in a manner consistent with good air pollution practices for minimizing emis sions. New clean fuels requirements will lead to the removal of even greater

Continued on page 2

This publication is found on the Internet at http://www.epa.gov/oeca/ore/enfalert

Enforcement AlertContinued from page 1amounts of sulfur from feed stocks. Companies should ensure they have adequate capacity to treat these pollut ants without resorting to excess flar ing. Good pollution control practices in clude: 1. Procedures to diagnose and prevent malfunctions; and 2. Adequate capacity at the back end of the refinery to process acid gas. At petroleum refineries, flares are used in a variety of process areas to prevent hydrocarbons and waste gases from being released directly to the at mosphere. Since hydrocarbons are the primary product at refineries, compa nies should make every effort to avoid sending their products up in flames. Flares, however, are also used to com bust acid gasa highly concentrated waste stream of hydrogen sulfide gas (up to 90 percent pure)and sour wa ter stripper gas (about 30 percent pure). Sulfur Recovery Plants (SRPs) nor mally process hydrogen sulfide gas and sour water stripper gas. A sulfur re covery plant is a refinery process for producing elemental sulfur for sale but is also a part of the refinerys air pollu tion control systems. The process con verts 95 percent or more of these hy drogen sulfide gases into elemental sul fur while reducing emissions to insig nificant levels. Use of a flare for com busting acid gas instead of processing it in the SRP produces very large un controlled releases of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and effectively bypasses the per mitted and monitored SRP emission point. While the flare is designed to prevent the direct release of the very toxic and odoriferous hydrogen sulfide dur ing malfunctions at the SRP, EPA has documented situations of regular or rou tine use of flares for acid gas incinera tion instead of the expected reliance on the flare only for emergencies. One day of acid gas flaring can eas ily release more SO2 than is released in a single year of permitted SRP activity. On numerous occasions, EPA has un covered information on acid gas flar ing incidents that shows that 100 tons or more of SO2 can be released in such flaring within a 24-hour period. A moderately sized Claus sulfur recov ery plant (approximately 100 long tons of sulfur recovered per day capacity) that is subject to the New Source Per formance Standards and properly op erated with its pollution control device should emit no more than 250 parts per million of SO 2, a rate that corre sponds to a little less than 100 tons annually.

Hydrocarbon Flaring Considered Fuel Gas Combustion Subject to NSPSThe NSPS defines fuel gas to be any gas generated and combusted at a refinery and identifies flares as NSPS affected facilities. EPAs letter to Koch Petroleum Company (Dec. 2, 1999) provides a detailed explanation of the various types of gases subject that are to NSPS requirements because they meet the definition of fuel gas (see http://www.epa.gov/oeca/ore/aed). The NSPS exempts flaring of fuel gas from the standards for sulfur oxides and monitoring requirements only when there is a process upset or an emergency malfunction. (40 C.F.R.Section 60.104(a)(1)). This plain En glish exemption applies only to true emergencies, and the Agency ex pects other flaring to be monitored and comply with applicable emission limits. EPA believes that many affected facilities at petroleum refineries may not be in compliance with applicable NSPS requirements (fuel gas monitor ing and emission limits for fuel gas combustion devices) because of their routine reliance on flaring to control releases of hydrocarbons. The Agency also believes that, as with acid gas flaring, good air pollution control prac tices include investigating the causes of flaring events and taking corrective action to avoid or reduce the probability of their recurrence. One way to address these potential compliance issues may be through the proper design, operation and maintenance of flare gas recovery systems.

Health Dangers From Sulfur DioxideFlaring H2S can produce high am bient concentrations of SO2. Short-term exposures to elevated SO2 levels while at moderate exertion may result in re duced lung function accompanied by such symptoms as wheezing, chest tightness, or shortness of breath in asth matic children and adults. Other effects associated with longer-term exposures to high concentrations of SO 2, com bined with high levels of particulate mat ter, can result in respiratory illness, al terations in the lungs defenses, and ag gravation of existing cardiovascular dis ease. Those at risk include individuals with cardiovascular disease or chronic lung disease, as well as children and the elderly.

Acid Gas FlaringRoutine or nonemergency flaring

Continued on page 3October 2000 2

Enforcement AlertContinued from page 2of acid gas is directing that gas away from the recovery plant, combusting it at a flare and releasing sulfur dioxide to the atmosphere. Acid gas flaring is not a federally permitted operation and should typically only occur during a malfunction (a sudden, infrequent, and not reasonably preventable failure of equipment or processes to operate in a normal or usual manner) (40 C.F.R. Section 60.2). In EPAs experience, fre quent and repetitive acid gas flaring is often not due to malfunctions. Acid gas flaring that is routine or preventable vio lates the NSPS requirement for operat ing consistent with Good Air Pollution Control Practices to minimize emis sions at refineries with NSPS fuel gas combustion devices and affected facili ties including SRPs (40 C.F.R.Section 60.11(d)). ment may result in hydrocarbons or other contaminants entering the acid gas stream. Hydrocarbons can be very dis ruptive to the short- and long-term op eration of the SRP. Historically, not much effort has been put into investi gating and correcting the root cause of contamination or upsets. Instead, inci dents have been simply reported as malfunctions. EPA, believes that re peated malfunctions for the same cause, generally, could be predicted and prevented. If flaring results from a pre ventable upset, EPA believes that it does not represent good air pollution control practices and that it may violate the CAA.

BP Amoco Reduces SO2 Emissions from Flaring Nearly 75%rom 1993 to 1995, the BP Amoco facility in Oregon, Ohio, experienced an annual av erage of 16 flaring incidents and released approximately 180 tons of SO2 . Under the procedures outlined in a Consent Decree with EPA, BP Amoco has been able to reduce that amount to an insignifi cant number (three flaring events in 1999 released a total of 49 tons of SO2) and each event was attrib utable to a true malfunction as defined in NSPS. This was accom plished through equipment and op erational changes that eliminated the root causes of such flaring. The protocol in the consent decree (http://www.epa.gov/oeca/ore/aed) serves as a model in balancing the concerns of Good Engineering Practice and good Pollution Con trol Practices for any flaring of acid gas or sour water stripper gas.

F

Diagnosing, Preventing Excess FlaringRepeated or regularly occurring in cidents of flaring can be anticipated and should not be classified as malfunc tions. For example, regularly switch ing between high and low sulfur crude may cause fluctuations of the acid gas feed to the SRP. This can create opera tional problems for the SRP and/or its pollution control equipment, resulting in a perceived need to flare. These upsets should be addressed through im proved operational control systems, im proved and frequent training of operators, and continued optimal perfor mance of the SRP, not by bypassing or flaring acid gas and sour water stripper gas. Another cause of flaring is inad equate capacity of the SRP and its as sociated tail gas unit (TGU) to process all the acid gas at the refinery. Refiner ies should ensure that their units have the capacity and can handle variable vol umes that may occur during different production levels. Refineries should implement the fol lowing procedures to ensure that flar ing results only from a true emergency or malfunction:

Chain Reaction: Upstream Upsets May Result in Downstream MalfunctionsProperly designed, operated and maintained SRPs can typically receive and treat all acid gas produced at the refinery (most also are designed to treat sour water stripper gas). These gases should not be flared except under emer gency or malfunction conditions. Upsets in upstream process equip-

The Agency also believes that, as with acid gas flaring, good air pollution control practices include investigating the causes of flaring events and taking corrective action to avoid or reduce the probability of their recurrence.

Conduct a root-cause analysis of each flaring incident to identify if any equipment and/or operational changes are necessary to eliminate or minimize that cause so as to reduce or avoid fu ture flaring events. As appropriate, cor rective measures should be taken and implemented. If the analysis shows that the same cause has happened before, the incident should not be considered a malfunction and corrective measures should be taken to prevent future oc currences;

Ensure there is adequate ca pacity at the SRP and TGU. Redun dant units can prevent flaring by allowContinued on page 43

October 2000

United States Environmental Protection Agency Office of Regulatory Enforcement (2248A) 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20460 Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300

EnforcementAlert newsletter

Continued from page 3ing one unit to operate if the other needs to be shut down for maintenance or an upset; and

ity to assess whether the flaring incident was caused by a true malfunction, which is considered acceptable engineering practices. A reference procedure for evaluating if good air pollution practices are being used when future acid gas flaring events occur can be found in the Consent Decree, C.A. No. 3:97CV7790 N.D. Ohio, entered May 5, 1999 (see http://www.epa.gov/oeca/ore/aed). For more information, contact Patric McCoy at U.S. EPAs Region 5 office in Chicago at (312) 886-6869,

Prepare an accurate estimate of the total SO2 released (using clear calculation procedures) for each acid gas flaring incident.Identifying the root cause of the flaring incident gives the refinery the opportunity to fix the problem before it happens again. It also enables the facil-

E-mail: [email protected]; and regarding federally permitted release questions, contact Ginny Phillips, Office of Regulatory Enforcement, Toxics and Pesticides Enforcement Division at (202) 564-6139,Email: [email protected].

Useful Compliance Assistance ResourcesCAA Applicability Determination Index: http://www.epa.gov/oeca/eptdd/adi.html Technology Transfer Network http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ Office of Regulatory Enforcement: http://www.epa.gov/oeca/ore/ RCRA Online: http://www.epa.gov/rcraonline/ Compliance Assistance Centers: http://www.epa.gov/oeca/mfcac.html Audit Policy Information: http://www.epa.gov/oeca/ore/ apolguid.html Small Business Gateway: http://www.epa.gov/smallbusiness/

EPCRA Reporting Requirements for Flaring IncidentsEPCRA Section 304 requires that unpermitted releases of extremely hazardous substances in excess of their reportable quantity be reported immediately to the State Emergency Response Commission and Local Emergency Planning Committee.The flaring of hydrogen sulfide may require reporting if more than 500 pounds (the reportable quantity) of SO2 are released within a 24-hour period. The Clean Air Act recognizes that accidents, malfunctions, start ups and shut downs may cause excess emissions even when the facility has implemented reasonable measures to avoid them. However, it is still important to alert emergency response personnel when these releases occur, as even short periods of flaring can emit large quantities of SO2. For example, a medium-sized refinery with an SRP that processes 500 tons of acid gas each day could release as much as 40 tons of SO2 at the flare in only one hour, more than 150 times the reportable quantity.

Recycled/Recyclable. Printed with Soy/Canola Ink on paper that contains at least 30% recycled fiber

KeySpan Strachan Gas Plant 11-35-37-9W5M Flaring Incidents, January 23-25, 2001EUB Staff Post-Incident Analysis and Recommendations

September 14, 2001

Alberta Energy and Utilities Board

ALBERTA ENERGY AND UTILITIES BOARD KeySpan Strachan Gas Plant 11-35-37-9W5M Flaring Incidents, January 23-25, 2001 September 14, 2001

Published by Alberta Energy and Utilities Board 640 5 Avenue SW Calgary, Alberta T2P 3G4 Telephone: (403) 297-8311 Fax: (403) 297-7040 Web site:

ContentsExecutive Summary .....................................................................................................................................iii 1 2 Purpose and Scope.................................................................................................................................. 1 Background ............................................................................................................................................ 1 2.1 January 23, 2001, Event................................................................................................................... 1 2.2 January 25, 2001, Event................................................................................................................... 1 2.3 Health Issues .................................................................................................................................... 2 2.4 Follow-up to the Flaring Events ...................................................................................................... 2 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................ 2 Action Taken ......................................................................................................................................... 4 EUB Enforcement ................................................................................................................................. 5

3 4 5

Appendices 1 Area Map................................................................................................................................................ 7 2 Guideline for Loss of Electrical Power Supply .................................................................................... 11 3 Loss of DEA Circulation Guideline ..................................................................................................... 17

KeySpan Strachan Gas Plant Flaring Incidents, January 23-25, 2001 i

ii KeySpan Strachan Gas Plant Flaring Incidents, January 23-25, 2001

Executive SummaryThe Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (EUB) investigated two flaring events that occurred at the KeySpan Strachan Gas Plant on January 23 and 25, 2001. The first event was caused by a power failure that required a plant shutdown and start-up and resulted in approximately 90 thousand cubic metres (10 m3) (3 million standard cubic feet [mmscf]) of gas being flared, with a hydrogen sulphide (H2S) concentration averaging 17.3 per cent. The second event resulted from a sweetening process pump failure and resulted in approximately 1040 103 m3 (37 mmscf) gas being flared, with a maximum H2S concentration of 0.01 per cent, until the plant restored its capability to process gas to sales specifications. The EUB investigated the two flaring events with respect to the following matters:

background and cause of the flaring incidents; addition of fuel gas to flared sour gas1 or acid gas;2 plant operating procedures during emergency flaring incidents; plume dispersion modelling of the January 23 event; results of the air monitoring recorded during the incidents; need for mobile monitoring during flaring incidents; and public notification requirements of industry during flaring incidents.

The results of the investigation are discussed in Section 3 of this report. The EUB believes that KeySpan responded to the incidents in a timely and professional manner. However, for the January 23 event, KeySpan added sufficient fuel gas during the initial part of the event but cut fuel gas to the flare system while the acid gas meter was still showing a flow rate, resulting in a noncompliance. It cannot be determined whether the meter was measuring acid gas flow or water vapour. The fuel gas to flare was cut by KeySpan to save its power boilers, which are critical for winter operations. Written operating procedures have since been developed, submitted, and reviewed by the EUB. The intent of these procedures is to prevent a similar occurrence in the future. The EUB expects that fuel gas to the flare system will be controlled so that the heating value of 12 megajoules per cubic metre (MJ/m3) of flared gas is met and ambient air quality guidelines at ground level are not exceeded. KeySpan has now demonstrated that the control over the fuel gas will ensure that the minimum heating value to the flare is maintained. KeySpan now has also confirmed that controls are also in place to ensure that a minimum heating value of 12 MJ/m3 is maintained when gas is flared. KeySpan has completed dispersion modelling for the January 23 event using the CALPUFF dispersion model and incorporating hour-by-hour wind direction and speed,1 2

Sour gas is natural gas containing H2S. Acid gas is sour gas with a high concentration of H2S.KeySpan Strachan Gas Plant Flaring Incidents, January 23-25, 2001 iii

which predicted a concentration of 11 parts per billion (ppbv) east of the plant. This concurs with the two one-hour exceedances of 12 ppbv recorded on a stationary air monitoring trailer located 4 kilometres (km) northeast of the plant. During this event the model also which predicted that a concentration of 39 ppbv H2S could have occurred in a very small area approximately 1 km northwest of the plant. These exceedances were likely due to not adding sufficient fuel gas for the entire period that gas was flared. There was no contravention associated with the second event, which occurred on January 25. This gas was low in H2S content and did not result in any ambient exceedances. KeySpan has since put in place written procedures to prevent a similar occurrence.

iv KeySpan Strachan Gas Plant Flaring Incidents, January 23-25, 2001

1

Purpose and ScopeThis report on the KeySpan Strachan Gas Plant flaring incidents contains the EUBs principal observations and recommendations. It is part of the EUBs follow-up to ensure that

pertinent information relating to the event is examined, the cause of the problem is identified and understood, and corrective action to prevent a similar recurrence is implemented.

2

Background2.1 January 23, 2001, Event On January 23, 2001, at approximately 4:30 p.m., the KeySpan Strachan Gas Plant (see map in Appendix 1) experienced a power failure due to a third-party backhoe severing a power feed line while working at the adjacent Sunpine Forest Products facility. Flaring was required to safely take the plant down and start back up once the electrical power was restored. KeySpan notified the EUBs Red Deer Field Centre of the incident at approximately 5:00 p.m. Once the power was restored, the plant was started back up, which required more flaring. The plant was back on line by 1:30 a.m., January 24. Alberta Environment received one call from a resident during the flaring incident. No public complaints were received by the EUB regarding the January 23 event. 2.2 January 25, 2001, Event On January 25, 2001, at approximately 3:15 a.m., a high-pressure diethanolamine pump in the sweetening section of the plant shut down due to a seal failure. By the time the pump was blocked in and a standby pump was started by KeySpan, the elevated hydrogen sulphide (H2S) levels in the gas stream leaving the sweetening section of the plant resulted in KeySpan directing the sales gas stream to flare. This flaring took place downstream of the molecular sieve water absorption towers. During the 12 minutes it took to switch pumps, the molecular sieve water absorption towers had adsorbed enough H2S that they required regeneration. The regeneration process requires a substantial flow rate of sweet gas for an extended period of time. The H2S content of the gas being flared was approximately 80 parts per million (ppm) at the start and gradually reduced to sales specification amounts of less than 16 ppm. At 8:30 a.m. on January 25, KeySpan notified the EUBs Red Deer Field Centre of the flaring incident. The EUB travelled to the plant in response to the six public complaints that were received by the Field Centre. Upon arrival at the plant, it was noted that KeySpan was in the process of contacting area residents to inform them of the situation. As with the first flaring event on January 23, KeySpan did not consider the controlled flaring of gas a reason to activate its emergency response plan and only notified some local residents as a courtesy action.

KeySpan Strachan Gas Plant Flaring Incidents, January 23-25, 2001 1

During the flaring incident on January 25, KeySpan was in contact early in the morning with a local resident who had transported her three children to the Rocky Mountain House Hospital with symptoms she thought may have been caused by the flaring at the plant. At 10:45 a.m. the EUB declared the event an internal government level-1 emergency. The EUB contacted Disaster Services, Alberta Environment, Workplace Health and Safety, and the David Thompson Health Region (DTHR). KeySpan agreed with the EUBs recommendation and called out a mobile air monitoring unit to survey the area for any possible fugitive emissions. No exceedances of Alberta Ambient Air Quality Guidelines (AAAQG) were detected by the mobile air monitor or the stationary air monitors. The gas plant sales gas was at sales specification by 12:10 p.m. on January 25. The flared gas stream was directed to sales and the flaring ceased. The resident who took her children to the hospital and KeySpan have continued to stay in contact with each other. 2.3 Health Issues The EUB also had several follow-up conversations with the family of the children taken to hospital. The family expressed concern about H2S, SO2, and hydrocarbon emissions. The EUB explained that any health concerns and questions fall within the jurisdiction of the DTHR and as such should be directed to the DTHR Medical Officer. The EUB, however, did offer to organize and participate in any future joint meetings with the family, KeySpan, and other government agencies to ensure that all parties have a common understanding of the events and concerns. All the other complainants were called back and informed about the causes of the flaring events. 2.4 Follow-up to the Flaring Events The EUB representative requested and received preliminary plant process flowcharts, flared volumes, and H2S compositions of the flared gas during the two flaring incidents on January 25, 2001. On February 6, 2001, the EUB met with KeySpan to review the two flaring incidents and outline the action items and information required by the EUB to determine if KeySpan took the appropriate action during these events and if current regulations and expectations were met. Section 4 describes the improvements KeySpan has made to prevent future similar incidents.

3

ConclusionsThe EUB reviewed the facts regarding the two flaring incidents and arrived at the following conclusions: 1) The cause of the first flaring incident on January 23 was third-party damage to the plants main electrical power feed line, resulting in the plant having to shut down and flare gas. Gas also had to be flared during the ensuing start-up.

2 KeySpan Strachan Gas Plant Flaring Incidents, January 23-25, 2001

2) The plants uninterruptible power system (UPS), the utility backup generator, and the MCC 1 backup generator operated satisfactorily during the power outage on January 23. 3) During the event on January 23, KeySpan cut fuel gas when flow through the acid gas meter was still being measured. While the flow may have been water vapour, the EUB expects that when there is a reasonable likelihood that H2S could be flared, fuel gas will be added to the flare to maintain a minimum heating value of 12 megajoules per cubic metre (MJ/m3). KeySpan must ensure that a sufficient volume of fuel gas is available to supply the flare system in emergency situations. During the January 23 event, fuel gas to the flare was manually shut off in an effort to keep the power boilers operational after the amine contactors had been blocked in and shutdown valves had been activated. KeySpan has since developed and submitted a written procedure to ensure that the minimum heating value will be met when gas is flared. A copy of this procedure is in Appendix 2. 4) KeySpan has not demonstrated that the control over the fuel gas will ensure that the minimum heating value to the flare is maintained. While the ratio of fuel gas to acid gas would appear to have been sufficient in the early stage of the January 23 incident before the fuel gas was turned off, KeySpan has also stated that the amount of fuel gas added was not based on ratio directly or feedback of another pertinent parameter. This means that the fuel gas valve is sized for the intended maximum flow rate only. Guide 60: Upstream Petroleum Industry Flaring Guide requires that sufficient fuel gas be added to the flare system to ensure that a minimum 12 MJ/m3 heating value is maintained when any gas is flared. 5) The second flaring event, caused in part by the amine pump seal failure on January 25, may or may not have been associated with the power failure and subsequent plant shutdown of January 23. There had been no indications that the pump seal had problems prior to the incident. 6) It is evident that the volume of gas flared during the second incident on January 25 could have been reduced if proper operating procedures had been in place and followed in the 12-minute period it took to switch the amine pumps. When gas from the amine sweetening section needs to be flared due to high H2S content, it should be flared from a point upstream of the dehydration molecular sieve towers to prevent their fouling. KeySpan has developed and submitted a written procedure to address this concern. A copy of this procedure is in Appendix 3. 7) The volume and rate of gas flared at the plant during the January 25 incident were due mainly to regenerate the mole sieve beds. This procedure was recommended by Van Waters & Rogers Limited, the supplier of the material, who discussed this procedure with the manufacturer. 8) During the flaring event on January 23, two one-hour average ambient H2S concentrations, each of 12 parts per billion (ppbv), which are an exceedance of the AAAQG, were observed at a KeySpan monitoring station located 4 kilometres (km) northeast of the plant. These exceedances were likely due to the failure to add sufficient fuel gas to the flare system during the event.


9) The EUB requested that KeySpan conduct modelling of the January 23/24 flaring event. The dispersion modelling was conducted by an independent third party and the report was submitted to the EUB on May 14, 2001. The consulting company modelled this event using the CALPUFF dispersion model. Modelling was conducted using conservative, worst-case scenario data, which predicted a maximum groundlevel concentration of 39 ppbv of H2S to the northwest and later a concentration of 11 ppbv to the east of the gas plant due to this event. This correlates with the two exceedances recorded on the stationary air monitoring trailer located 4 km northeast of the plant. The current AAAQG is 10 ppbv. The EUB has reviewed the input parameters for this modelling work and is satisfied with the model and the inputs used. 10) In accordance with current Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) guidelines, which have been adopted by the EUB as minimum requirements, KeySpans emergency response plan for this facility does not require resident notification during a level-1 emergency response. With respect to the January 23 and January 25 flaring incidents, KeySpan did not consider either to be a level-1 emergency response situation. It is noted that KeySpan made courtesy calls to nearby residents (18) during the January 25 flaring incident, informing them of the situation. KeySpan also issued a press release after the January 25 event and held a public meeting for area residents to discuss the incidents.

4

Action TakenKeySpan was directed to develop written operating procedures for plant staff to follow in the event of similar events at the Strachan gas plant or other associated facilities. These procedures have been developed and reviewed with KeySpans operating staff. Copies of the procedures were submitted to the EUB and have addressed the EUBs concerns. KeySpan has provided the EUB with an internal written guideline on when mobile monitoring should be requested in the event of future incidents. The EUB has reviewed these guidelines and encourages this approach. KeySpan has reviewed the Strachan plants control of fuel gas to the flare system and has demonstrated that controls are in place to ensure that heating values of gas flared will meet the minimum 12 MJ/m3 during all flaring events. This information was provided to the EUB. KeySpan has developed a guideline to ensure that a hard copy of the alarm log will be saved when future major incidents occur. This guideline was provided to the EUB and it addressed the EUBs concerns. KeySpan has identified to the EUB and committed to contact those residents within the emergency planning zone who would like to be contacted by KeySpan prior to or during major flaring events. KeySpan has agreed to provide a timetable confirming that similar procedures are in place to ensure sufficient heating values at all other KeySpan sour facilities in the province. This will be forwarded to the Red Deer Field Centre by September 21, 2001.


5

EUB EnforcementThe EUB regards the failure to add sufficient fuel gas to the acid gas flare as a major level-2 noncompliance event. As indicated in the report, KeySpan has put in place procedures to address the noncompliance and prevent a similar recurrence. A second major noncompliance in the same inspection category on a provincial basis within a twelve-month period will result in the EUB escalating KeySpan to a major level-3 noncompliance. Level-3 enforcement will result in full or partial suspension of the noncompliant facility. Enforcement will be in accordance with Informational Letter (IL) 99-4: EUB Enforcement Process, Generic Enforcement Ladder, and Field Surveillance Enforcement Ladder. The EUB will audit future flaring events at the Strachan plant to ensure that the commitments made by KeySpan are adhered to.



Appendix 1Area Map


Appendix 2Guideline for Loss of Electrical Power Supply






Appendix 3Loss of DEA Circulation Guideline





SOUR GAS FLARING OPERATION CHECKLIST

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02 / / 8831

:

51 / / 8831

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2 | Page

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6 ---------------------------------------------------- Ignition and Control Panel 1-2-8-61 6 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Pilot Burner 7----------------------------------------- Start- up Procedure and Checks 7 ------------------------------------------------------- HP Flare System 8 ------------------ Liquid Fill- up of HP Flare k.o.drum 9 ----------------------------- Purge- Out of Collection

2-2-8-61

3-8-61

1-3-8-61

2-3-8-61 ( Purge- Out) 3-3-8-61 4-3-8-61 5-3-8-61 9-61

10------------------------------------------------------------- Ignition of the Pilot 14------------------------------------------------------------------ Fuel Gas Checks

16 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Normal Operation 16 ---------------------------------------------------- Routine Duties and Checks 16 -------------------------------- Normal Flare Operation Procedure

1-9-61

2-9-61 1-2-9-61 2-2-9-61 )( 3-2-9-61

16 ------------------------------------------------------ Hydrocarbon Purge 17 ----------------------------------------------- Inert Gas (Nitrogen) Purge

17 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Pilot Operation 17 ----------------------------------------------------- Items for Special Attention 17 --------------------------------------------------- Ice/ Hydrate Formation

3-9-61

1-3-9-61 / Page | 3

18--------------------------------------------------------------------- Operation Modes 18 --------------------------------------------------------------- Continuous Flaring 18 -------------------------------------------- Depressurization/Blow Down

4-9-61

1-4-9-61

2-4-9-61 / 01-61 1-01-61

19 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Maintenance

19 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- General Notes 23-------------------------------------------------------- Maintenance Program

2-01-61 11-61

24--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Shut Dawn 24 ------------------------------------------- Overall Operating Considerations

1-11-61 2-11-61

24------------------------------------------------------------------------- Normal Shutdown 24 --------------------------------------------------

1-2-11-61 /

26 ------- Disposal of Hydrocarbon Remaining Equipment 2-2-11-61 26 ------------------------------------------------------------------- Emergency Shutdown

3-11-61

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START- UP

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) ( 001% . 5 ) (Purge Gas . ) (Shut Down ) (Man Ways ) (Purge . .

2-3-8-61 ) (k. o.dram Liquid Fill- up of HP Flare k.o.drum

) (k. o.dram Low Low . .

8 | Page

3-3-8-61 ) (Purge- Out :Purge- Out of Collection Header

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1- HS ) OFF( . ) (Purge. ) (Purge .

Operational Faults

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41 | Page

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51 | Page

Normal Operation Routine Duties and Checks

9-61 1-9-61

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Normal Flare Operation Procedure Hydrocarbon Purge

2-9-61 1-2-9-61

.

61 | Page

Inert Gas (Nitrogen) Purge

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5 barg . )( 5 barg .

Items for Special Ice/ Hydrate Formation

3-9-61 16-9-3-1Attention /

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71 | Page

Operation Modes Continuous Flaring

4-9-61 1-4-9-61 .

Depressurization/Blow Down

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. ) (ESD1) (Total Plant Shut Down . . .

81 | Page

Maintenance General Notes

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. .

Piping and Plate For Flare Tip

4-

) (Stainless Steel . .

12 | Page

I.T.A.S. Accessories

I.T.A.S

1- . . .2- Box EEx-d

. Flare Stack and Derrick Structure For Elevated Flare

. . 1- .2- - ) ( .

22 | Page

Connections Piping Along Flare

. .Instruments

. . .

Maintenance Program

2-01-61 : 21 42 42

32 | Page

Shut Dawn

11-61

1 ESD ESDO (Fire & Gas) F & G Low Low Low Low High High k.o.drum

. ESD ESD ) 6( )6 (Appendix

Overall Operating Considerations

1-11-61

. ) (S/D ) (S/D .

Normal Shutdown

2-11-61 1-2-11-61 /

.

42 | Page

: LPG . 0.5 barg . 200 - PDT . k.o.drum ) (Closed Drain . )( ) (Purge . . LPG .

Normal Flare Shutdown Procedure

. . . )2 (N . ) (ON . ) (Purge )2 (N . ) (Spades .52 | Page

.

2-2-11-61 Disposal of Hydrocarbon Remaining Equipment

.

Emergency Shutdown

3-11-61

ESD . )1(ESD

ESD 1 High High )101- k.o.drum (140-D . ESD .

)4(ESD

ESD4 Low Low )4101- k.o.drum (10-D . ESD 200- XV .62 | Page


BURNING SOUR LIQUID HYDROCARBONS IN BURN PIT

.T.T.F10.Rev

:

02 / / 8831

:

51 / / 8831

:

: : 5 IGAT . . . .

2 | Page

:

5---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Burn Pit System

0-71

5------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1-71 6 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unit Interface

2-71

7 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Process Description 3-71 7 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------7 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unit Capacity 8 ---------------------------------------------------------- Feedstock Characterteristics 9 ----------------------------------------------------- Battery Limit Conditions

1-3-71

2-3-71

3-3-71

(4-3-71 ) 5-3-71 6-3-71 7-3-71

10------------------------------------------------------------------ Utility Condition 11--------------------------------------------------------------- Utility Consumption

11-------------------------------------------------------------------- Radiation Modeling 12-------------------------------------------------------------- Process flow Description

8-3-71 1-8-3-71

12 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------13 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Main Equipment 13 ----------------------------------------------------------- Ignition Control Panel 13 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Pilot Burners 13 ---------------------------------------------------- High Energy Power Supply

9-3-71

1-9-3-71 2-9-3-71

3-9-3-71

Page | 3

14---------------------------------------------------------- Flame Detection

(4-9-3-71 ) 5-9-3-71

14----------------------------------------------------------------- Aviation Lights

15--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Process Control 4-71 15 -------------------------------------------------------------- Package Signal List

1-4-71

15---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Safety Information 5-71 16------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Safety Valve 16 -------------------------------------------------------------------- Safety Consideration

1-5-71

2-5-71

Page | 4

Burn Pit System

0-71 1-71

/ ) suction k.o.drum k.o.drum k.o.drum ( . ) (Burn Pit 3 )101- (142-U . 3 . ) (Burn Pit .

5 | Page

Unit Interface

2-71 455 221 041

Inlet Streams

Suction k.o.drum ) 1 2 3 4()(Burn Pit

k.o.drum LFG k.o.drum

Outlet Streams

6 | Page

Process Description

3-71 1-3-71

.

Unit Capacity

2-3-71 :

k.o.drum ) (BGCS ) (Burn Pit . ) (Burn Pit 2 . . ) (Burn Pit .

Flow

6000 kg/hr

LHV

Normal Vent Rate Purge Gas Only 50 C MW 68 ) (%0.8: H2S Viscosity Density 0.23 cp 3700 kg/m 10800 kcal/kg

7 | Page

Feedstock Characterteristics

3-3-71 :

1 851088.0 845550.0 790600.0 054000.0 134000.0 720000.0 810000.0 100000.0 069130.0 809810.0 093600.0 000000.0 300000.0 500000.0 400000.0 448078.0 171650.0 975700.0 335000.0 105000.0 920000.0 910000.0 100000.0 049530.0 842120.0 221700.0 000000.0 400000.0 600000.0 400000.0

689978.0 735550.0 932600.0 294000.0 054000.0 720000.0 810000.0 100000.0 459130.0 109810.0 3833600.0 000000.0 300000.0 500000.0 400000.0 507078.0 261650.0 796700.0 475000.0 015000.0 820000.0 810000.0 100000.0 439530.0 242120.0 411700.0 000000.0 400000.0 600000.0 400000.0

8 | Page

Battery Limit Conditions

4-3-71 ) (

) 0.2 barg (15 barg 150 C -29 C

CS/6mm ) (

9 | Page

Utility Condition

5-3-71

10 barg & 85 C

5.0 barg & 15 C )(LFG

) (24.78

94.5 57.0 01.0 01.0 20.0 20.0 02.3 01.2 97.0

000.001 : : 100.0

01 | Page

Utility Consumption

6-3-71 ) (Burn Pit : ):(Burn Pit6 Nm3/hr

:

3 Nm3/hr

: ) (

)1kW (400V- 50 Hz- 3 ph

Radiation Modeling

7-3-71

) (Burn Pit :21.6kW/m 21.99kW/m 24.73kW/m 26.31kW/m 29.47kW/m

11 | Page

:Wind Speed Relative Humidity Ambient Temperature 2Background Solar Radiation 1.04 kW/m 16.0 m/s %53 52.2 C

)(

. ) (Gas/Liquid Chromatography H2S ) (RSH . ) H2S 15 ppm(.

Process flow Description

8-3-71 1-8-3-71 490 -) P & ID No. 602- 554- PI 41( )41 (Appendix

) (Burn Pit . 3 ) (Burn Pit .

21 | Page

2 )(LFG- 1221124-AIAV-P

. ) (burn pit .

Main Equipment Ignition Control Panel

9-3-71 1-9-3-71

(Burn

) Pit . ) (Flame Front )( 511 ) (Burn Pit . ) (Burn Pit .

Pilot Burners

2-9-3-71

) (Burn Pit . ) (Burn Pit . ) (Burn Pit . ) ( 2 .

High Energy Power Supply

3-9-3-71

953/853/753.24. E .31 | Page

Flame Detection

4-9-3-71 ) (

K . ) (Burn Pit .

Aviation Lights

5-9-3-71

. ) (Burn Pit .

41 | Page

Process Control

4-71

P & ID ) (602-554-PR-PI-094) (Burn Pit )41( )41 (Appendix

Package Signal List/

1-4-71 100-TAL 200-TAL 100-PAL 100-FAL 100-XAL 200-PDAH 1 2 3 4 5 6

51 | Page

Safety Information Safety Valve

5-71 1-5-71

.

Safety Consideration

2-5-71

) (Start- Up . . I.T.A.S. S.P.A .

I.T.A.S. S.P.A . . I.T.A.S. S.P.A . .61 | Page

I.T.A.S. S.P.A .

CAUTION

. 06 .

71 | Page

National Iranian Gas Company IGAT V Gas Compressor StationsNIGCDOCUMENT TITLEOPERATING MANUAL FOR BGCS 4 PROJ. STATION

DOCUMENT No.DISC. DOC. SEQ. REV. Page 327 of 329

602

554

PR

OM

001

E01

APPENDIX 14: P&ID for Burn Pit System


SOUR LIQUID HYDROCARBONS BURNING OPERATION CHECKLIST

.T.T.F00.Rev

:

02 / / 8831

:

51 / / 8831

:

: : . . . .

2 | Page

:

5 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Start-Up 5 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Pre- Commissioning 6---------------------------- Pre- Commissioning/Starting Checks

6-71

1-6-71

1-1-6-71 /

6Burner Swivel Assembly Pre- Commissioning/ Starting Checks 2-1-6-71 / 6 ---------------------------------------------------- Ignition and Control Panel 6 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Pilot Burner 7 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Line Purge 7 ------------------------------------------------------- Pre Start- Up Checklist

3-1-6-71

4-1-6-71

5-1-6-71

2-6-71 3-6-71 1-3-6-71

8 -----------------------------------------------Start- Up Procedure and Checks

8------------------------------------------------------------------------ Pilot Start- Up 11 ----------------------- Pilot Putting Out Emergency Condition

2-3-6-71 3-3-6-71 7-71

11 ------------------------------------------------------------------ Operational Faults

13 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Normal Operation 13 ----------------------------------------------------- Routine Duties and

Documents

01-Flare Description, Design & Specifications