005_HREBINIAK, JOYCE - Organizational Adaptation Desbloqueado

7/30/2019 005_HREBINIAK, JOYCE - Organizational Adaptation Desbloqueado

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Organizational Adapta-t ion: Strategic Choiceand EnvironmentalDeterminismLawrence G . HrebiniakandW illiannF. Joyce

Th e prevailing assum ption in recent literature is thatstrategic choice and environmental determinism representmutually exclusive, competing explanations of organiza-tional adap tation. The present paper, in contrast, arguesthat choice and determ inism are independent variablesthat can be positioned on two sep arate continua to developa typolo gy of organizational ad aptation. The interactions ofthese variables result in four ma in types : (1) natural selec-tion, with min imu m choice and adaptation or selection out,(2) differentiation, with high choice and high environm en-tal determinism and adaptation within co nstraints, (3)strategic choice, with m axim um choice and adaptation bydesign , and (4) und ifferentiated choice, with increme ntalchoice and adap tation by chanc e. These types influencethe nu mb er and forms of strategic options of organiza-tions, the decisional em phasis on mean s or ends, politicalbehavior and confUct, and the search activities of the orga -nization in its environm ent.

1985 by Cornell University.

One of the m ost pervasive and central arguments in recenttreatm en ts of organizational adaptation concerns w heth er it ismanagerially or e nvironme ntally de rived (Astley and Van deVen, 1983). At issue is a view of ad aptation as a processreflecting choice and selection versus one in wh ich it is anecessary reaction to pere mp tory e nvironme ntal forces (Child,1972; Aldrich, 1979). In analogous term s, the issue is one ofthe prep otency of voluntarism or external determ inism in thestrategic change process (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Thepresent paper argues that classifying change as either organi-zationally or environmen tally determ ined is misleading anddiverts research inquiry away fr om the critical interactivenature of organization-environment relationships in theadaptation process.CHOICE VERSUS DETERMINISMAstley and Van de Ven 's (1983) recent exh austive reviewsuggests amajor difference in current theory b etw ee n adeterministic and a voluntarlstic orientation in theories of orga-nizational adaptation. One of the d imension s in their typologyis a continuum ranging from determinism t o voluntarism,wh ich is divided to place major scho ols of organizational analy-sis into tw o m utually exclusive catego ries. W hile their place-me nt of schools of analysis in one category or the other isintended solely to classify them , it clearly implies the e ithe ro rnature of the deba te on the p repotency of voluntarism orde term inism . Major approaches to the issue of strategicchange or adaptation em phasize mutua lly exclusive and differ-en t ends of wh at is really a single continuum .A related imp lication in the existing iiterature is the assum ptionthat a binary distinction be tween choice and determ inismcaptures the reality of organizational behavior and change. Aspopular and intuitively pleasing as these categories m ay be . areliance on one or the other directs attention a way fro m thefact that both are essential to an accurate description oforganizational adap tation. The impo rtant conceptual and prac-


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The term "a dap tation " in the current litera-ture is employed in a numbe r of wavs .ranging simply from "change," includingboth proactive and reactive behavior (Milesand Snow, 1978), to a more specific de-notat ion of "re action" to environmentalforces or demands (Astlev and Van de Ven,1983). The usage in this paper is m oreconsistent with the former meaning, in -dicating change that o btains as a resuft ofaligning organizational capabilities with en-vironmental contingencies (Hrebiniak andJoyce. 1964). This view allows forproa c-tive or reac tive organizational behavior inantiapation of or reaction to exogenous

w ith individual interpretations of t he m , and the resultant deci-sions or actions. Asttey and Van de Ven (1983 ; 267), forexamp le, concluded that the interesting research questionsabout complex organizations wou ld (1) admit to both de termi-nistic and voluntaristic vie ws , and (2) juxtapose tho se vie ws tostudy their interactions and reciprocal interdep enden ceover t ime .The same view is expressed by W eick (1979). w ho argued thatcon struction of mu tually exclusive categories, reliance on uni-directional causation, and focus ing on origins and termination sof variables such as "ch o ic e" are problem atic and distorting fortheo rist and practitioner alike. Wha t is critical is an ability to"thin k in circ les " (Weick. 1979: 52). to investigate the processof interac tion or m utual cau sation, as a reciprocal relationshipbetween two sets of variables unfolds. The important researchissue of voluntarism versus determ inism is the relationshipbetw een them and how their interactions and resultant ten-sions culmina te in changes over tim e. The issue is how choiceis both a cause and a consequence of environmental influ-ence s, as cause and consequence interact and conflict toresult in noticeable organizational adaptations.A similar view is expressed in studies on pow er (e.g., Dahl,1963; Jacobs, 1974; Pfefferand Saiancik. 1978; Pfeffer,1981), in wh ich the underlying depende ncies or relative vulner-abilities of organization and environm ent interact to createtension s and produce both organizational and en vironme ntalchange . The implicit pow er m odel is one of influenc e andcountervailing power, and the relative pow er of organizationand environm ent, i.e., external stakeholders, over time is thekey to explaining the prep otency of choice or dete rmin ism inthe adap tation process. If high organizational pow er sugge stsgreater choice, wh ile higher pow er of stakeholders results ingreater environmental de terminism , the occasion of a power-ful organization con fronting equa lly pow erfu l stakeholders indi-cates that high choice and high dete rmin ism may co exist.The purpose of this paper is to develop this interactive v iew ofthe a daptation process in organizations.'' Following the adviceand lead of As tley and Van de Ven (1983), Weick (1979), andothe rs (Jacobs, 1974). it is argued tha t: (1) choice and deter-min ism are not at oppo site ends of a single continuum ofeffec t bu t in reality represent tw o inde pende nt variables, and(2) the interaction or interdepend ence of the tw o m ust bestudied to explain organizational behavior. The paper deve lopsa typolog y of strategic decision making that facilitates th estudy of the interactions b etwe en vo luntarism and determi-nism. It also allows fo ra needed integra tion of the diverse anddisparate literatures in organization theory, m anag em ent, andeconom ics, wh ich currently focus on the prepotency either ofchoice or environmental d eterminism in the adaptationprocess.TYPOLOGY OF ADAPTATIONThe prese nt argum ent is that organizational choice and en-vironmental determ inism can be posit ioned as independentvariables in the ad aptation process. Individuals and the ir institu-tions can choose in decision-making circu ms tance s; they can


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OrgmiizationiUAd^r ta^nenvironme nt, thereby purposively creating their ow n measureof reality and delimiting their o w n decisions (Chiid, 1972 ;W eick, 1979). On the other hand, discernible features of theactual environm ent are also imp ortant; structural characteris-tics of industries or domains and various niches ciearly exist,som e of w hich are intractable to control by individuals and theorganizations. At times the effects of these are peremptory(Hannan and Freeman, 19 77; Aldrich, 1 979; Porter, 1980); atother times they must at least be considered in the strategicdecisions of organizations. Using tw o separate, indepen dentfactors emphasizes that choice and determinism m ust interacor coalesce to define a causal fabric or contex t either nurturanof any given organizational variation or hostile to it (Emery andTrist, 1965).This approach follow s logically from the ope n-system s theo ryof organizations (Miller, 1965; von B ertalanffy, 1968). An o pesystem tends toward a state of dynamic equilibrium w ith itsenvironment through the continuous exchange of materials,data, and energy. Both the sys tem and its environm ent canaffect this process of exchange and transform ation, sugges t-ing their independence and the importance of their interactiveeffec ts. M ore importantly, open syste ms are characterized byequifinality, that is, the sam e outco me s can be achieved inmu ltiple way s, wit h different resources, diverse transforma-tion processes, and various me thods or mea ns. Even if it isassum ed that the environment of an open system is highlydeterm inistic, co ntrolling fully and precisely the ends or out-com es that are tolerated, organizational choice is still possibledue to the control over and selection of the m eans by wh ichthe prescribed outcom es may be achieved. Even in the mo stconstraining and debilitating case of environm ental determ i-nism, equifinality indicates that organizational choice nonetheless exists as a separate, independe nt variable important to thdevelopment of a dynamic equilibrium with the external en-vironment. Choice, then, can be separated fro m environm entdete rm inism in a logical way , as a necessary de fining charac-teristic of the organization as an open sy stem .The purpose of the follow ing d iscussion is to examine the t w ovariables in interaction. Choice and determ inism can be represented on axes ranging from low to high as sho wn in Figure 1Each axis denotes variance on levels of assertiveness andpotential to influence o thers (Daft and Weick, 1984). Thequadrants help to define the d oma in and scope of pow er in threlationship be twe en organization and environme nt (Dahl,1963) and the relative vulnerab ility o f each in an interactivesetting (Jacobs, 1974; Pfeffer, 1981).Ouadrant I basically show s the conditions or assum ptionsunderlying the p opulation ecology, natural selection approachto adaptation low strategic choice and high environmentaldeterminism (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; A ldrich, 1979), inwh ich it is argued that organizations enjoy virtually no controlover exogenous factors. Adaptation is determ ined fro m with-out, as the e nvironm ent selects organizations and allows only


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ngura 1 .

Low

A X .^ ^ I I J S t ra t ^ i c Cho iceX , Maximum choiceAdaptation by design

IV Undifferentiated ChoiceIncremental choiceAdaptation by chance

II CNfferantiation or FocusDifferentiated choiceAdaptation with in constraints

> s ^ 1 Natural SelectionAk Minim um choiceAdaptation or selection ou t

\ . BLow ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINISM

High

Examples o\ Quadrant I situations mc\u6eorganiza tions v^/ork-ing under conditions labeled as perfectly competitive. Viewedin the long run, individual firm s exercise little discretion, be-cause market or com petitive forces determine the "fair" returnthat an organization can achieve. P rices are dictated by amarket in wh ich dem and is perfectly elastic. Differentiatingproducts to com man d prem ium prices and excess profits isdifficult, if not im poss ible. Firms tbat do not keep abreast oftechnological and mark et changes find co sts rising above ahorizontal dem and cu rve, clearly threatening survival. QuadrantI wo uld include many small organizations, those sellingcom mod ity-type products, and simple system s (Herbst, 1957;Aldrich, 1979), as w ell as large organizations w ith und ifferenti-ated products or services, confronted w ith low entry and exitbarriers and with no way of achieving a lasting c omp etitiveadvantage (Bain, 1957; Porter, 1980).Quadrant I c%r\ also include organizations in imp erfec tly com -petitive niches. The niche is importan t because it defines apopulation of organizations that face similar, if not identical,political and econom ic c onstraints. The oHgopoly that is tied toa given niche and finds adaptation to other niches im poss iblebecause of e ntry barriers and resource cons traints is highly


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Salancik, 1978; Porter, 1980). Strategic choice and d eviantorganizational behavior are difficult because of this dep en-dency , resulting in high environm ental control over theorganization.Managerial action is obviously lim ited and constrained in orga-nizations falling in Quadrant 1. but individuals may still try toexercise options that m itigate against peremp tory en vironmental dem ands . Purposeful organizational actions, including technological discoveries and other innovations, can substantiallyalter the ability to com pete under Quadrant I conditions andaffect com petitive advantage. It is also possible that an orga-nization under Quadrant I conditions wil l exercise strategicchoice and attempt to change its domain, task environm ent, oindustry. Such an attem pt, of course, depends on these factorand on wh eth er or not there are exit barriers in the organiza-tion's current domain, the he ight of entry barriers in the newenvironment, the transferability of resources to new ventures,and the political-economic c ontext within w hich such astrategic choice is made (Dahl, 1963; Thom pson , 1967; Porte1980; Pfeffer, 1981).At the oppos ite extrem e in Figure 1 are organizations existingunder the more m unificent and benign conditions of Quadrant111, marked by high orgar}izational choice and low envirorimental determinism. Strategic choice dete rmin es organizationaldoma in or task environ me nt, so that autono my and control arethe rule rather than the excep tion. In Quadrant III, resourcedependenc ies are not very problematic (Law rence, 1981), andwh en powe r is viewed as the obverse of dependency, orga-nizations enjoy an influence over othe rs in their task environ-m ent (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer, 1981). The organizations inQuadrant HI confront a pluralistic environment in which moveme nt within and between niches or market segm ents is notseverely con strained by exit or entrance barriers. Because ofthe lack of problematic dep endencies on scarce resources andfe w political constraints, the organization can purposely enactdefine, and othe rwise affect its domain and the exoge nouscond itions under which it desires to comp ete (Levine andW hite, 19 61 ; Rumeit, 1979; Weick, 1979; Snow and Hrebin-iak, 1980). Under condition s in Quadrant (11, adaptation is bydesign. Qrganizational innovations and proactive behavior areeasier, due to the benign environm ent (Lawrence, 1981). and"pro sp ecto rs" (Miles and Snow, 1978) are more likely toem erge, due to the conditions favoring determ inism andchoice.M os t of the literature on adaptation has focused on Q uadrantsI (Natural Selection) and HI (Strategic Choice). Yet there are t wadditional but relatively neg lected sets of conditions tha t canexpand our understanding of dec ision m aking and the organiztional adaptation process.in Quadrant il. both strategic choice and environm ental deter-minism are high, defining a turbulent context for adaptation(Emery and Trist. 1965). Under these c onditions, there arecertain clear exogenous factors tha t affect decision mak ing,but the organization nonetheless enjoys choice despite the


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me ntal conditions severely constrain certain outcom es or be-haviors but allow leew ay and choice in others ; and organiza-tions included in multiple niches or domains, each w ith its ow nconstraints, opportunities, and population of com petingorganizations.Perhaps the clearest examples of organizations in Quadrant IIare large firms in highly regulated industries, wh ich are typi-cally closely regulated in such diverse areas as product charac-teristics, representations of performance, capital require-me nts, and legal constraints on the means of conductingbusines s. Yet individual choice of strategy is paradoxically high,due to factors such as size, ma rket struc ture (e.g., high con-centration), multiple means or methods of achieving desiredoutcom es, and low resource dependency on external sources.Such organizations are able to follo w differentiation or focusstrategies (Porter, 1980), choose m arket niches or segm entswith in the constraints laid dow n by the environm ent, or pursueeffec tive gen eric strategies, despite external forces (Berle andMe ans, 1932; Miles and Snow , 1978; Porter, 1980; Snow andHrebiniak, 1980). For example. M iles and Cam eron (1982)discussed h ow large companies tn one industry, desp ite gov-ernm ent regulation, controls, and mandatory warnings to con-sumers about the detrimental effects of their products, posi-t ioned themselves so as to follow differentiation and focusstrategies and affect their markets through extensive advertis-ing, marketing, and lobbying.Quadrant II also includes organizations included in mu ltipleniches, wit h each characterized by a different set of con-straints, opportunities, and competing organizations. A multi-produc t or mu ltidivisional organization with produc ts orbusinesses having htt\e market and technological relatednesswith in or across industries (Rum elt, 1974; Hrebiniak andJoyce, 1984), as we ll as varying levels or types of concen tra-t ion, com petit ion, dem and characteristics, and price elastici-t ies, wo uld very likely confront the co nditions of Quadrant II.Desp ite the clear impact and peremptory nature of environ-mental factors in some niches, the organization still enjoysautonomy and a favorable position in others. S imijarly, a m ulti-unit organization in differen t environm ental niches or marke ts.but wi th fairly high interdependence across the units due tocom m on technologies or vertical integration requirements,would reflect this condition of varying constraints, opportuni-ties, and com pe tition. The coordinated, centralized strategiesand simultaneous decentralization of business units in hetero-geneous setting s that characterize global com pe tition (Porter,1980) are indicative of this typ e of strategic se tting.The last exam ples emphasize an impo rtant point about prob-lem s of level of analysis, even in the analysis of /nfraorganiza-tiona! decisions . A quasi-autonom ous unit in a larger organiza-tion can confront a totally different set of exogenous m arketfactors than another unit in the sam e organization, althoughthe larger organization is certainly an "e xo ge no us " factor in theenvironmental surveillance and strategic decisions of the twounits. This dependence of the subsystem on the supersystemof which it is an integral if semiautonom ous part highlights tw o


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Organbcationri AdafitslHmconditions of subsy stems vis-a-vis each other and the largersys tem (Katzand Kahn, 1966; Williamson, 1975; Ho feran dSchende l. 1978). The parts or subs ystem s of the wh ole orga-nization may be placed in different q uadrants in Figure 1. withth e net effect tha t strategic choice and environm ental factorsdetermine the placement of the whole organization or systemof which the subs ystem is part. Both whole organizations andindepende nt subu nits may be used in the analysis; at bothlevels, choice and determ inism are central to the definition ofstrategic conte xt and the factors related to adaptation.The essential point is that external cons traints and high en-vironmental determinism need not necessarily prevent indi-vidual choice and impact on strategic adaptation. Althoughadaptation and choice occur with in constraints (Figure 1),organizations in Quadrant II nonetheless can develop variousstrategic options.Quad rant IV in Figure 1 is a relatively "placid" situation (Emeryand Trist, 1965) characterized by low strategic choice and lowenvironmental determinism; organizations included here tendto lack strategic choice, desp ite a paucity of external con-straints. Change can be labeled adaptation by chance, sinceorganizations apparently e xhibit no coh erent strategy to takeadvantage of fortuitous environmental conditions.Because Q uadrant IV organizations and ele me nts of their taskenviron me nt both appear reluctant, unw illing, or unable tocreate dependencies and exercise influence, a research focuson organizations in this con text clearly can result in suchrecently discussed phenomena as "m uddling th rou gh " and"garbage ca n" desc riptions of organizational behavior (Lind-blom, 1965; March and Qlsen, 1976; W eick, 1979). W henorganizations have no apparent strategic thrust, it is possible todism iss rationality as a guiding principle of organizational be-havior and to replace it with arationality and even capricious-ness to explain action over t ime. But amore likely and logicalexplanation of Quadrant IV organizations may simply be thatthey have an array of internal strengths and com petences thatare inappropriate to external opportun ities and conditions. If theprocess of strategy form ulation is based in part on the align-ment of internal capabilities with exogenous contingencies(Chandler, 1962; Rum elt, 1974; M arch , 198 1; Hrebiniak andJoyce, 1984), it is reasonable to argue that an inappropriate m ior insufficient num ber of internal capabilities w ill prevent orga-nizations from acting, despite the benignity, munificence , orlack of threat of the environm ent. In this view , the task of theorganization is to d evelop the cap abilities or distinctive com petence s needed to take advantage of environmental conditionsand thereby alter and escape from the conditions of Q uadrantIV (Quinn, 1980). Because the prevailing conditions of Quad-rant IV ultimately can result in the creation of dependencies oralterations favoring the relative influence of either organizationor environm ent, adaptation by chance is still an apt descriptionof wh at appears to be a relatively unstable context for decisionmak ing, action, and the exercise of power.Tw o studies (Miles and Snow , 1978; Snow and Hrebiniak,


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wh ich intema! capabilities or distinctive co mpe tences are notdevelope d to take advantage of a benign environme nt. Butorganizations facing few env ironm ental constraints or peremp-tory extem al contingencies m ust act to develop and benefitfrom a com petitive advantage or distinctive co mp etence, for alack of purpos ive action leads to poorer performance relative toothers exhibiting more aggressive behavior (Porter, 1980;Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980). Such mact^on also heightens th epossibility that com petitors and other task environm ent ele-me nts will create a sufficient number of new problematicdependencies to mo ve the organization to Ouadrant 1 in Figure1 (Porter, 1980). In essence . Quadrant IV is unstable , forcingthe organization to seek movem ent to another domain.The presen t analysis suggests that the adaptation process isdynamic; o\fm t ime, an organization's p osition m ay shift as aresult of strategic choices or changes in the external environ-me nt. To use W eber's (1947,1967) term , a "str ug gle " be-tw ee n organization and environm ent un folds as differentactors emerge, control over scarce resources fluctuates , andpow er bases shift in tim e. His discussion also sugge sts thatthe ou tcom e of this struggle depends in part on the effective-ness of organizational decision making. The present analysisindicates that: (1) control over scarce resources is central tothe relationship betw ee n choice and dete rm inism , and (2)strateg ic choice is possible in all quadrants o f Figure 1,although the qualitative nature and impact of the decisionprocess certainly varies with the organization-environmentcontext.The underlying implications of the typology a bout pow er andits effects on the types of decisions or choices are show n inFigure 1 . In Quadrant 1 of Figure 1, choices are possible b utlimited because of th e organization's lack of resources andpow er vis-^-vis the environm ent; in Ouadrant II, choice is highbut selective or "differentiated" because of the high counter-vailing power and resources of the e nviron me nt; in OuadrantIII, the organization's resource dependencies are the low estand the num ber of strategic options the highest; under condi-tions of Quadrant IV, organizational choices are incremental,due to a lack of the resources necessary to allow taking fulladvantage o f a benign env ironment.RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS OF TYPOLOGYTable 1 presents so me of the research implications of thetypology and sugge sts the issues or problems associated w ithorganizational adaptation as control over scarce resources andpow er bases fluctuates betw een organizational and environ-mental dominance.Types of organ izational choice. As suggested above, typesof organizational choice vary across the different quadrants ofthe typology. Minim um choice is found in Quadrant I. Whileseverely constrained, organizations in this Ouadrant are not"ina ctive " in a "natural evolutio n" over time (Astley and Van deVen, 1983: 247), nor are they com pletely at the mercy ofexternal influences, as natural selection approaches wo uldsugge st (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; A ldrich, 1979). Max-


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Table!Effact of Four Otnanixational T^ws inChoice-Datamuirin T^iology m i (^anizationiM VariabtesVar iab le

ChoiceNumber ofstrategic choicesDecision emphasis

Generic strategies

Q uadrant I Q uadran t itH igh determ in ism High determ in ismLow choice H igh choiceMin imumFewMeans

Defender,cost leaderAutonom y, innovation Lowjextemalconstraints)Political behavior,confl ictSearch

Low-HTiedium

Solution-driven

DifferentiatedMedium-highPrimary m eansSecondary ends{efficiency concerns)DifferentiationFocus analyzerMedium

High(interorganizational)Solution-driven;some slack search

Quadrant 111Low de te rm in ismHigh choiceMax imumHjghPrimary endsSecondary means{effectiveness concerns)DifferentiationFocus prospectorHigh

HighOnterorganizational)Slack search

Quadrant IVLow determin ismLow choJceIncrementalFewMeans-ends

ReactorLo w{internal constrainLow

Problematic

1972; We ick, 1979). The introduction of differentiated (Quad-rant II) and incremental (Quadrant IV) choice, however, pre-sents additional imp lications for research, as sho wn in Table 1Num ber and type of strategic options. From the argumentsabout choice, it follow s that the num ber and type of strategicoptions w ou ld vary across the typology . There are fe w viablestrategic op tions in Quadrants 1 and iV, but for differentreason s; extem al constraints delimit choice in Quadrant I,whereas internal factors inhibit decision making in Quadrant IThe num ber of options is highest in Quadrant III and. one couargue, fairly high in Quadrant II, wh ere choice coexists withexternally generated constraints. But the types of choice wha t organizations can control and affect varies significantbetween Quadrants II and III, despite the high number ofstrategic options available in each case. These significantdifference s, as we ll as others in Table 1, can be highlighted anunderscored by focusing on tw o critical compon ents of deci-sion making, i.e., means and ends (Simon, 1976; Thom pson ,1967) and on the notion of eq uifinatity in open systems (Miller1965; von Bertalanffy, 1968).Emphasis on m eans and ends. Table 1 suggests that theconstrained choice of Quadrant I really reflects control overmeans. The " simp le s ys tem " (Herbst, 1957) or firm in a highlcom petitive, atomistic industry con fronts many givens, mostnotably, constraints on or lack of co ntrol over m arkets, prices,demand, and even profitability (the "fair return") (Bain, 195 7;Stonier and Hague, 1961). W hatever choice exists focusesprimarily on means, different techniques to transform inputs oproduce outputs in more e fficient w ays so as to achieve som eexcess pro fit or even a short-lived comp etitive advantage(Bain, 1957). Industry structure allows for som e control overintraorganizational p rocess but not over extraorganizational


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tions can pursue in regulated indu stries, but the organizationnonetheless enjoys high choice over means or m ethods ofcom pe tition. Equifinality sugg ests that regulated or controlledends can be attained in different w ays, m ost notably, w ithdifferen t inputs, strategies, or activities and with various initialstates or conditions (Miller, 1965; von Bertalanffy, 1968; Milesand Snow, 1978; Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980); differentiatedchoice and m ultiple strategies are possible. In Quadrant 111, incontrast, the p rimary strategic emph asis is on ends rather thanme ans. In such a benign en vironm ent, organizations are free todevelop new products, services, customers, and markets andto diversify into areas of endeavor that are related or unrelatedto existing areas of emph asis. There is a concern w ith meansor efficiency , of course , but the overriding empha sis in orga-nizations in Quadrant III is likely to be m ore on cons iderationsof "e ffec tive ne ss" ; to borrow from Barnard (1938), QuadrantIII organizations are freer to focus on the right things ratherthan having to do prespecif ied things right. The primary organi-zational task in Quadrant II is to maneuver around externallyimpo sed p rescriptions and proscriptions ; in Quadrant Ifl, thefocu s is more on goals and exercising discretion to o ptimizevalued organizational outcom es.Generic s trategies. The research done on generic strategies(Miles and Snow, 19 78; Porter, 1980; Snow and Hrebiniak,1980) suggests a relationship between predominant strategyand quadrant location. Cost leaders or defend ers are likely topredo minate in Quadrant I. Differentiation and focus strategiesare m os t likely in Quadrants 11 and 111, but the incidence ofanalyzers and prospectors wo uld vary betwee n those tw oquadran ts. Analyzers are m ore cau tious, often relying on care-ful analysis of environm ental trend s and a conseq uent delay incommitt ing themselves to a new environmental niche, be-havior consistent w ith Quadrant II cond itions; the risk-taking,creativity, and innovation of the prospector are clearly mo stconsistent with the m unif icent conditions of Quadrant 111. Theunstable reactor, characterized by no clear agreem ent on out-comes, uncrystallized or problematic relations between meansand ends (Thom pson, 1967), and a lack of focuse d strategy orclear me mb ership in a strategic group (Porter, 1980), wo uldappear to be m ost likely to flourish under the cond itions ofQuadrant IV.Political behavior and conflicts. Table 1 suggests differentimplications for research on political behavior and conflicts.The wo rk of M arch and Simon (1958), Lawrence and Lorsch(1967), Sherif et al. (1961), and others sugge sts that severityand type of con flict vary w ith similarity of goals, perceptions ofsuperordinate outcom es, and the existence of co mm on focusfor enmity and competit ive vigor. This would suggest lowconflict in Quadrant IV, characterized by few clear intraorgani-zational differenc es, and som e externally directed co nflict inQuadrant I. Qne could hypothesize high conflict for both Quad-rant II and 111 organizations, but for d ifferent reasons. Conflict inQuadrant II wo uld be in large part externally directed becauseof the exogenous factors and stakeholders w hos e powe r orcon trol is a problem for the organization. Intraorganizationalcon flict wo uld be low because of the supe rordinate nature ofthe externally generated exigencies or depende ncies (Dahl,


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Orgm izat ionri Adaptat ionlikely to be higher in Quadrant 111, whe re fe w external con-straints exist and internal com petit ion for resources and influ-ence is the more probable con tributor to conflict.Search processes. In the prese nt typology, search processesare not consistent with the popular binary distinction b etw eenstrategic choice and environmental determ inism in the litera-ture, which basically suggests high effective search versuslow, ineffective search at the tw o e xtremes of a single con-t inuum. The present analysis sugge sts that both the amou ntand qualitative nature of search vary across the typ ology(March , 1 98 1 ; Hrebiniak and Joyc e, 1 984). In Quadrant I,search is probably not lo w or impo tent, as the populationecoiogists or environmental determinists argue. Rather, searchis more likely to be high but "so lution d riven ," directed towa rdthe solution of spe cific problems, e.g., lowe ring cost curvesand increasing efficiency to co mp ete or survive under perfectlycom petitive conditions (M arch, 1 981). Facing a host of prob-lema tic depende ncies, the organization actively seeks ways tolessen the control or influence of environmental forces.In Q uadrant III, by con trast, search is also high but is qua lita-tively different than in Quadrant I: externally gen erated con-straints and depen dencies are few er, if they ex ist, and the tim ein wh ich to make strategic decisions is longer and less prob-lema tic. The adaptation and imp lem entation horizons arelonger (M arch, 1 98 1 ; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984), allowing fora more relaxed approach to search activities, wh at Ma rch(1981) calls "slack s ea rch ." Search is not driven by the que stfor im me diate solutions that marks the search activity in Quad-rant I. Slack search is less tied to specific organizational needsor pressures and is even apt occasionally to rese mb le a pro-cess of "dab blin g" or nondirected activity.In Quadrant II, search wo uld be both solution-driven and slacksearch. The problematic nature of the environmen t dem andsthat so lution-driven search be high, as the organizationattem pts to gain control over key environm ental stakeholdersand contingencies or reduce their impact. But organizationalchoice is simu ltaneously high, w ith con trol over some ends buprimarily over m eans or internal processe s. Some d abbling ispossible, the refore , as the organization engages in slacksearch and experim entation in areas in wh ich it enjoys co ntroland influence. In Quadrant IV, search is problema tic, becauseof the organization's inability to take advantage of a benign,placid e nvironmen t.Other variables undo ubtedly can be identified and variations inthem predicted as a func tion o f organizational location in Figur1. The purpose of this paper, howeve r, is not to provide anexhau stive coverage of such variables bu t to stress the use ful-ness of the typology develope d in explaining the relationbetwee n choice and determinism.

DISCUSSIONThe m ost obvious co nclusion of this study is that the inter-dependence and interactions be twee n strategic choice andenvironmental determinism define adaptation; each is insuffi-


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A se cond and related condusion is that adaptation is a dynamicprocess ^ a t is the result of the relative strength and type ofpow er or dependency b etwe en organization and environmen t.The forces of Figure 1 are not static; ac tions by organizationsand environme ntal elements that underlie the differentstrategic conte xts are potentially im portant for the creation oralteration of depend encies or relative vulnerabilities tha t wiltaffect future actions and decisions (Jacobs. 1974; Lawrence,1981). Changes result from the interaction b etwe en choiceand determinism (Weber, 1 947.1967). the interplay of variouspolitical and econ om ic force s (Dahl, 1963), and the interplaybetwee n m eans and ends ov ert im e (Thompson, 1967; March,1981). Both strategic choice and environmental determinismprovide thrusts for change; each is both a cause and a co n-sequence of the other in the adaptation proce ss. To under-stand this dynamic change phenom enon, it is necessary to"think in circles" (Weick. 1979), to investigate the reciprocityof relationships between organization and environment, and tostudy the mutual causation that obtains.Viewing adaptation as a dynam ic process reveals that for anygiven organization, eleme nts or variables related to strategicchoice and environmental determ inism exist simultaneously,in Quadrant I of Figure 1, the environm ent is prepotent, butstrategic decisions are directed tow ard th e alteration of depe n-dencies and the m ovem ent of the organization, at minim um ,towa rd Quadrant I I . In Quadrant II , both th e organization andenvironmental eleme nts have power; analysis of internal andexogenou s forces reveals that each side is vulnerable in som eareas but simultaneo usly is able to create depende ncies inothe rs. Any given organization in Quadrant II could be ex-pected to a ttem pt to reduce its vulnerabilities throug h (1)competitive actions to differentiate further its products orservices, build entry barriers or reduce exit barriers, or reduceproblematic dependencies on suppliers or customers (Porter,1980); or (2) political actions such as co llusion, coopera tion, orco-optation to absorb or diffuse important environmental ele-ments (Dahl, 1963; Thompson, 1967). Environmental ele-m en ts competitors, regulators, consumers in turn, exer-cise their influence in similar attem pts to retain or increasecom petitive or political advantage. The net result of theseinteractions is that organizations m ay rem ain in Quadrant II,gain additional influence ove rtheir environmen t and move toQuadrant il l, or lose power and move tow ard the relativelydisadvantageous cond itions of Quadrant I. W hatever th e actualevolution , the essential point is that adaptation is a dynamicprocess that is bo th organizationally and environmentallyinspired.A final imp ortant implication of the presen t analysis is thatsimple mode ls relying on the conceptual construction ofmutually exclusive, competing explanations of cause andeffect may not be sufficient to capture the complexity andrichness of organizational behavior. The discussion of theresearch implications (Table 1) of the present typology sug-gests the com plexity and interdependence of im portant vari-ables and decision processes as a func tion of both choice anddeterm inism . Contrary to the need to recognize this com plex-


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Organizational Adi^tatkHitional adaptation is the sut^ec t of inquiry in organizationalbehavior, managem ent, and econom ics, wh ich emphasizedifferent and often com peting assumptions, foci, and explanations of cause and effect. W hat is needed is a greater emphasis on integration rather than differen tiation of view s. Re-search needs to be more concerned wit h reducing conceptuaor theoretical barriers be twe en disciplines and literatures andthe con seque nt em phasis on eclectic approaches to explainorganizational behavior.

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