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The Problem of Evil in the Holocaust: Two Jewish Responses Mark Maller

The Holocaust is one of the most challenging tragedies to justify for the problem of evil, assuming the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and loving God. Jewish responses to this mass annihilation vary from incomprehension, divine retribution, a test of faith and intellectual silence. Considering the huge literature on the Holocaust, the problem of evil as a specific approach has not been fully explained and evaluated. This paper critically questions the responses and explanations of Emil Fackenheim and Richard Rubenstein, two major Jewish scholars, though they developed no theodicies. It fills the gap of significant criticism of their theologies in the literature. The paper defends their view that no religious or spiritual answers are possible for the Holocaust, and no cogent reasons exist why God permitted the deaths of six million Jews (including 1.5 million children.) Rubenstein’s alternative view of mystical radical theology is also analyzed. Contrary to Fackenheim, the Holocaust and a myriad of other moral evils show that God does not love or is clearly not all loving.

FACKENHEIM

Fackenheim was the leading and influential rabbi and philosopher who fully discussed and attempted to explain the Holocaust within Judaism and the Bible. Born in Germany, he escaped from a concentration camp and wrote extensively on the Holocaust. Although he does not formulate his ideas specifically on the problem of evil, the paper focuses on this perspective of his philosophy. His philosophy is rooted in steadfast faith, including in the Midrash, and a somewhat non-literal interpretation of the Torah, assuming that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and eternally loving. He does not define these attributes, like other theologians and philosophers of religion who neglect (and ought to) clarify their meanings. The existence of God is presupposed; his fideism does not necessitate rational discourse or arguments for the existence of the Supreme Being. Fackenheim believes that the Holocaust is beyond comprehension and meaning, yet he derives much historical and ethical meaningfulness from this event. He cannot imagine why a good God could or would permit these unthinkable evils, and therefore he could not develop a theodicy. Certainly, no answers can be found in his theological philosophy, influenced from Martin Buber’s I-Thou relation to God, who was silent on the Holocaust. From Scripture Fackenheim accepts that God reveals Himself as a divine Presence, notably with Moses at Mount Sinai and at the Red Sea. This is an astonishing real revelation that occurred; it does not spring from the perceiver’s imagination, and is not subject to verification and objective knowledge. Through faith, he believes in God’s Presence at Mount Sinai and Red Sea because it is insufficient evidence that He is always present in history. These memorable events could have been miraculous exceptions or possibly

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parables. His concept of God is of providence, yet he emphasizes divine Presence from the past and yet still possible in the present. This commanding Presence manifests itself in the world, and he calls them root experiences because they form the Tradition, and are relived or reenacted by Jews every generation, such as Passover. Other Jewish historical events are epoch making that challenge beliefs in root experiences, e.g., Auschwitz. Other examples of these two types of experiences would help clarify the distinction. Moreover, he presents no argument to show that God is present in history; and this metaphysical reason would solidify the foundation of his thought. In To Mend The World, (Tikkun Olam) he rightly argues that the Shoah represents a” total rupture” with the Judeo-Christian values, and as Irving Greenberg said, a radical counter-testimony to Christianity and Judaism. Like most Jewish theologians, he expects and demands faith in God, rather than belief from evidence, and it is pervasive throughout Jewish theology from the origins of the Torah to the present. In his early work he claimed that historical evidence, such as murders, cannot rebut staunch faith, but in his later work, he states that his greatest doctrinal change is the view that “at least Jewish faith is, after all, not absolutely immune to all empirical events.”1 This represents a slight shift from strict fideism to accepting important relevant crises in the world. This more agreeable position is the central issue of post-Holocaust thought; otherwise, Jewish faith would overlook the challenge of contemporary events. His theology is almost entirely based on faith and interpretations of Midrash, and owes much to twentieth century Jewish philosophers and his keen sensitivity to the Shoah. The importance of this cannot be over-emphasized for religious- philosophical thought, contrary to critics, but unfortunately, he opines, philosophers either have ignored it or have chosen not to write on it. Sartre was one exception that Fackenheim quotes from, who wrote with sympathy about French Jews during and after the war in Anti-Semite and Jew. It is society, not the decree of God that has made him a Jew and brought the Jewish problem into being. And he is forced to make his choices entirely within the perspective set by this problem, and it is in and through the social that he chooses even his own existence…we are all bound to the Jew because anti-Semitism leads straight to National Socialism.2

Sartre misleads his readers with the last statement in that everyone is not bound to the Jew, nor does anti-Semitism lead straight to the Nazi regime, but it seemed so when he wrote this. It is also evident that Christians are not bound or necessarily dependent on the Jews or contemporary Judaism. Assuming God, if He exists, was present, Jewish and Christian scholars cannot agree why he permitted the Shoah or if a valid reason would or could potentially exist. Fackenheim rejects all the reasons offered by theists, and strongly opposes the idea that it was divine punishment, (Deuteronomy 28-25) as it is unimaginable that Hitler was doing God’s work. Divine retribution was the most common response throughout Jewish theology, but today it is almost unanimously rejected as a viable post-Holocaust theodicy.3 Fackenheim also denies that it was a test of faith, considering all the innocent children killed, and no test could justify this slaughter for any faith. The story of Job cannot be useful here partly because it is an illogical analogy from one suffering soul who was saved by God to six million. Contrary to some apologists, such as Richard Swinburne, absolutely no present or future value or good will be obtained that could compensate for this. Some future good, such as providing opportunities to develop excellent moral virtues is a terrible answer. Thus, the Holocaust has no meaning in religion or any theology, which means that all or almost all deaths were absurd and meaningless. Some Jewish martyrs who chose death or had some decision regarding their

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demise might be excluded, but the dehumanizing method in which they died remains absurd and devoid of dignity. The only meanings of this event are the implications and influences it has in history (broadly defined), social and criminal psychology, absolutist morality and artistic expression. Professor Yehoshua rightly states, The Jewish people’s terrible sacrifice in the Holocaust was for no purpose…those whom the concentration camp flames consumed did not die for any idea, for any world view; they did not meet their deaths for the continued existence of the Jewish people or for its imminent redemption…if we were confronted with the choice: no Holocaust and therefore no State of Israel, I doubt that any of us would dare say: Let there be a Holocaust so that the State of Israel can be established.4

Importantly, the Shoah was historically unique, but not particularly the most special or tragic, nor does it diminish other mass deaths, such as Hiroshima. The Holocaust is the final astonishment and point of No Return for the loving personal God for Rubenstein, Jewish skeptics and agnostics. Fackenheim recognizes that it is very difficult to establish theological uniqueness. From all the reasons that have been given for historical uniqueness for uniqueness, these are the most relevant.5 A). Jews were killed because of their being, their very existence and not for anything they did or failed to do. The motive was not for territorial gain, due to xenophobia, to win a war or greed. They were not even considered human and were totally dispensable like lowly animals. The intent was incomprehensibly evil for the sake of evil, murder for its own sake unmitigated and “demonic”.6 This is the most essential reason why the event is unique. Fackenheim notes that hope never did as much harm during this catastrophe, and never has hope been so necessary for Jews afterward. B) Genocides are generally within one nation’s history, but this tragedy was part of European or human history. Hitler extended his murder power to Holland, France, Poland, Italy and other nations. Without weapons to fight back, they were helpless against their enemies. Eventually, he would have eliminated Jews from all Europe. Fackenheim believes it was not genocide in the typical common usage of the word.C) This is the first and only genocide that utilized mass industrial technology to murder its victims. Germany was the leading industrial nation in Europe in that time, and used this technological power to its maximum potential with efficiency, and speed, and mass production of processing murder. It turned the industrial revolution into a radical counter-purpose by producing grotesque bodies and body parts for incineration, or useful salvage such as gold teeth. The machines reduced the bodies to anonymous rubble and ash. For the first time since World War I, mass deaths through technology became a new shocking discovery-- the machine turns human beings into nothingness. D) In all genocides, victims are killed because of race, religious beliefs, sects or nationality. The Nazis did not care which Jews were theists, atheists, or national origin, and their propaganda held that they were a sub-human inferior race. The Nazis killed anyone who had at least one grandparent who was Jewish. Having a Jewish grandparent does not make one Jewish, not according to Jewish law; a person is Jewish if his/her mother is Jewish. Jews were defined biologically by a pseudo-scientific theory. Some families were killed who had converted or were mixed Jewish and non-Jews of various kinds. Entire families received the death sentence even if they had no religion, practiced Christianity or another religion; the Nazis did not made these distinctions. About one-third of the whole Jewish people were killed mainly because of the religion of their ancestors.

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In the camps it made no difference whether you were Dr. Edith Stein, who had become a Carmelite nun, or a Hasidic rabbi. All Jews were slaughtered without distinction. Even baptism provided no escape. It must be sadly noted that the pathetic attempts of the Jewish community to see the six million as martyrs is a tragic albeit understandable misperception.7.

Martyrdom suggests that victims have a life/death choice and they choose death rather than relinquish their religion. Scholars disagree on whether the Jews were martyrs, but surely, the religious ones were such because they refused to deny their faith when they died. The Holocaust is such a tremendous epoch-making event, and in particular, the ‘Kingdom of Night’ that non-religious Jews are likely to question the existence of God. Fackenheim is committed, above all, to the idea that Jewish people cannot and dare not reject God who was present during the Holocaust. He is most famous for his 614th commandment; Jews are forbidden to hand Hitler posthumous victories. This moral rule is an important deontological imperative and a universal decree. He states, They are commanded to survive as Jews, lest the Jewish people perish. They are commanded to remember the victims of Auschwitz lest their memory perish. They are forbidden to despair of man and his world, and to escape into either cynicism or otherworldliness, lest they cooperate in delivering the world over to the forces of Auschwitz. Finally, they are forbidden to despair of the God of Israel, lest Judaism perish…One possibility, however, is wholly unthinkable. A Jew may not respond to Hitler’s attempt to destroy Judaism by himself cooperating in its destruction. In ancient times, the unthinkable Jewish sin was idolatry. Today it is to respond to Hitler by doing his work.8

His 614th commandment may be restated—1 Hitler’s purpose was to destroy Jews and their belief in God (Judaism.)2 Jews do not want Hitler to succeed in his purpose.3 If Jews stop believing in God then Hitler’s purpose is accomplished. 4 If Hitler’s purpose was accomplished it would be a posthumous victory for him.5 Jews must not grant Hitler a posthumous victory.6 Jews must not stop believing in God.

Judaism must continue and flourish. Conclusion. If Jews despair of God or deny His existence indirectly and/or covertly, they would be contributing to Hitler’s mission, and this is strictly forbidden. Thus, in order for Judaism to survive and flourish, Jews have a duty to affirm their faith in God. However, premise (3) is not necessarily true in that his primary intention was to destroy Jews and secondly, the religion. Fackenheim should distinguish between despair of humans and the world, and despair of God that is radically different. Jews and Christians alike share a despair of the social-political world and the weaknesses of human nature or humanity that may not affect their religious views at all. Conservative and Orthodox theists may anguish over religious alienation among believers, strife, excessive assimilation, and loss of traditional social values, and remain core supporters of their faith and religious institutions. Despair of the world and “man” reflects an existentialist theme does not entail despair about God, and the reverse is true. Despair over God does not usually accompany despair with “man”. Despite his spiritual existentialist theme, it is a misunderstanding to use this label or categorize his thought as such. He strongly rejects Rubenstein’s ‘escape into cynicism’ or otherworldliness that relinquishes the Jewish faith.

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Fackenheim’s position is most relevant to moderate and Reform Jewish theists but unnecessary to some Orthodox Jews who did not alter their covenant with God because they believe the tragedy does not require a special discussion. Their faith was always a moral and religious imperative, thus this commandment has less influence among them. Critics may argue that this is a psychological strategy for evading serious reflection or hiding from potentially threatening truths. Other Jews consider the Holocaust divine retribution for Jewish assimilation into society, for not respecting the Torah, punishment for sins, among other reasons. Fackenheim is right to reject vehemently this answer because Jews have done nothing to warrant a murderous retribution. As a Reform rabbi, he directed his message to the liberal and Conservative members who are likely to question God, though some Reform Jews are close to secularism and detached from this imperative. He uses broad generalizations such that he does not specify Jewish denominations and the types, intensity or variety of Jewish beliefs. In any case, it is a commanding social- ethical maxim for most members of Jewish communities, and yet does not address these concerns. Firstly, he asserts that ‘ (all) Jews are forbidden to hand Hitler posthumous victories’ by relinquishing their faith, and while this is certainly an important normative rule, it does not entail that every individual Jew must follow this imperative. By asserting the class of Jews, one assumes that this includes the totality or all; Fackenheim did not mean some. But what is true for the whole is not necessarily true for every individual within it. Some Jews would not be permitting Hitler or Nazism posthumous victories by disbelieving in God, disregarding synagogue and yet observing Jewish holy days .They still regard themselves as Jews. The terms ‘all’ and ‘every’ are unstated. Clearly, secular Jews who were agnostic or atheist prior to the Holocaust remained nonbelievers, and they should not be regarded as permitting Hitler posthumous victories. Similarly, consider the statement: Rabbis are upholders of the Jewish faith. This is true; however, some rabbis are secular or very humanist, and others like Richard Rubenstein, rejected Jewish faith in the transcendent God. Secondly, it is likely that God (if He exists) prefers that Jews believe in Him by studying the Torah or for other spiritual reasons. I think that not permitting Hitler a posthumous victory would be a minor and insubstantial reason by itself, but Jews believe for many reasons less significant and cogent than this one. The question why theists believe and whether this matters or is significant to God is an interesting metaphysical and psychological issue for another discussion. Thirdly, a minority of American secular Jews neither believes in God nor disbelieves. It is not an active issue to them, nor do they consider themselves agnostic or atheists because they never think about God. They would not say that God is dead either, thus Fackenheim’s imperative is irrelevant to their beliefs and practical lives. Rabbi Sherwin Wine writes, In the century of the Holocaust, after twenty centuries of unprovoked Jew hatred, the experience of the Jewish people points to the absence of God…No good God would arrange or allow a Holocaust of six million victims. A thousand glorious resurrections would never provide moral compensation. If Jewish history has any message about the nature of the universe, it is that the universe is indifferent to our suffering or happiness, that it cares nothing about the moral concerns of the human struggle. The Jewish experience points to the absurdity of the world…the cosmic implication of Jewish history is that you cannot rely on the kindness of the universe…and there is no messianic guarantee that we will achieve what we strive to achieve.9

It is feasible that God who permitted the Holocaust is neither wholly good nor loving, and seemingly unworthy of worship and great reverence. Whether God was there or not present, His

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putative love was absent and revealed total indifference or neutrality. Wine’s humanist despair and cynicism may be even greater than Rubenstein’s philosophy. The secular humanists, atheists, and other philosophers, have long argued that humans are alone in the universe..10 Alone in anguish and frightened, the theist’s turn toward God for hope is futile, insofar as they are praying to an indifferent being or no entity, goes the argument. Synagogue, atonement, liturgy, and a divine Afterlife would be without spiritual meaning, though they bring forth significant social and psychological values and gratification. Interestingly, Fackenheim agrees with Greenberg’s astute evaluation that the cruelty and killing by the Nazis raise the critical question whether those who remain theists after the Holocaust should dare talk about a loving good God without making a mockery of the Jews who suffered. Philosophers (of religion) and theologians should address this question in their work, he says. It would be very audacious to glow and tell a Holocaust survivor that God is wonderful and loves all European Jews, and accept this as a true statement.

* * * * Generally, Fackenheim’s philosophy integrates deeply held faith and a non-analytic style that is unpersuasive to secular Jews and is open to these criticisms--- One implication is that it is difficult to understand the meaning of divine love or goodness for God, especially with terrible moral evil, but Jews, they say, should still not reject Him. Divine love may be incomprehensible, but if believers admit this epistemological limitation and reluctance, they should also admit to not understanding omnipotence and omniscience. In which case, God’s nature becomes more unknowable and the theist must rely solely on simple faith. Psalms 147-5 states that God is absolute power, full of power, infinite power, and wisdom beyond comprehension or reckoning.9 Because of the Holocaust, it is very difficult to show and insist that God possesses these attributes or aspects of His being. Furthermore, to argue that He loves every human that ever existed even in prehistory is incredulous and implausible to skeptics. How does God finely distinguish between loving the man but not his actions? In ancient times, it was easier for the ignorant masses to believe in an all- loving God when their whole world centered on the Middle East and Europe. What could be the real meaning or value for this putative love for an astronomical number of beings in the universe? Although divine love and omnipotence are incomprehensible or difficult to understand, Jews (and non-Jews) nevertheless, accept them without question. These attempts to comprehend God’s mind will inevitably fail because they are beyond human knowledge. Nor can it be argued that God was hiding, eclipsed (Martin Buber) or unable know about millions of murders because this diminishes His omniscience. Contrary to Eliezer Berkovits, to state that the face of God was hidden is another unsatisfying illogical answer that cannot explain God’s lack of involvement. Moreover, it is strange and abstruse why God would be hidden (hester panim) in that this descriptor has only a vague figurative meaning. So also, Buber’s concept of a divine ‘eclipse’ is inadequate and evasive. Michael Morgan points out that Fackenheim had used the image of the eclipse of God with Auschwitz, and then decided that the idea that God was temporarily absent was unsatisfactory. “It does not take seriously enough the horrifying possibility that the absent God may never return…”as Fackenheim states, ‘what if our present is without hope?’ The traditional doctrine of the divine eclipse cannot endure this possibility, and yet no honest encounter with Auschwitz can a priori deny it.”11 Strongly influenced by Buber, Fackenheim understands the subtle problems in I-Thou theology and attempts to overcome them. Although Buber’s theology is attractive to some Jews and Christians, it will not persuade skeptics or non-believers at all.10

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He knows that the 614th commandment alone is insufficient as a sole reason for the majority of theistic Jews; its intent is to support or sustain beliefs rather than instill them or persuade non-believers. If he had developed a cogent theodicy to complement his work—one that Jews would value and study—it would have been very beneficial but this was impossible. No religious consolation exists. Certainly, this respectable standpoint is preferable to another flawed weak attempt to resolve the problem of evil. Moreover, he denies the view that the state of Israel is God’s compensation; though the U.K. and U.S. intended it as compensatory for the Holocaust when it was created. Israel is not a divine gift or a miraculous fate for the Jewish people. The Messianic hope that died during the Holocaust was resurrected because of Israel, he claims.12 (Miraculously, the Messiah should have arrived then, if he is going to come at all.) Furthermore, if God did not answer the prayers of Jews, other victims, and their friends and supporters during the Holocaust, it seems questionable that He will answer the ones he is supposed to hear every minute of the year. Why would He ignore the Holocaust victims but save or rescue others of less suffering and agony? Furthermore, He did not save countless Jews and Christians from wars, persecution and the Inquisition. But perhaps He primarily answers prayers for tangible and non tangible goods? One might then assert the unjust strange idea that He will grant non-life threatening wishes but will not save innocent lives from terrible deaths. One could then say to God, “thanks for our baby, but no thanks for allowing my wife to die!” He quotes Elie Wiesel’s story about a group of Jews praying in a synagogue during the war, and a pious Jew tells them not to be so loud because God will hear and know there’s still a few Jews left alive in Europe. Unlike Nietzsche’s madman, God will not only ignore their prayers but will allow or enable them to be sent to Auschwitz. In this sardonic story, the horror is not that God is dead but that He lives and will punish them for their mere existence. In this light, it is evident that the belief that Jews are God’s chosen people is absurd. Fackenheim provides no argument for his free will position and instead merely assumes it on faith. He presupposes human freedom (like most philosophic theologians) though determinism or fatalism might be attractive alternatives for understanding the Holocaust. If the event was inevitable or destined for reasons unknown, then nothing humans could have been done would have prevented it. If it was causally controlled, it would have been difficult yet possible to prevent it; but this still does not provide a satisfying solution to the problem of evil. God’s foreknowledge of these historical deterministic forces should have stopped or prevented the Holocaust. It follows that the Holocaust occurred because either God is not totally omnipotent, omniscient, or was uninterested in stopping it----the latter is more likely than the other possibilities. However, soft determinism also influences individual choices of the Nazis-- and the Jews who chose to remain rather than flee to a safe nation when it was possible. That is, arguably, all human actions have causes but some actions are caused from the individual’s past choices, his or her personality and the sort of person he/she has become. Sadistic Germans desiring extreme power might choose to work in concentration camps. Nevertheless, Fackenheim’s assumption is that humans and God freely choose their actions, for the former only up to a given point. God is free to do anything logically possible, but cannot change mathematical or geometrical laws. Minimally, He could have permitted and enabled sufficient conditions whereby an individual’s free (or caused) choice would have assassinated Hitler. If an enemy agent had the opportunity to assassinate Hitler and he refused, lacked the courage, or was inept, he/she would be seriously blamed for misconduct and would be morally reprehensible, perhaps court-martialed. God must be held to a higher standard than a regular soldier. The individual has the opportunity to be an Allied hero or an inept coward, and with millions of lives at stake, one must hope he/she chooses the former. Thus, it is ultimately God’s free choice to act or do nothing, as

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well as the soldier, if he chooses cowardice or courage. However, since the only attempt to assassinate Hitler failed, God apparently permitted this free or soft deterministic act and did not enable the particular conditions whereby the soldier would succeed. However, this comparison may be too anthromorphic in that God is obviously no ordinary “bystander”. Katz rightly argues that the free will defense is difficult to maintain when used in a Jewish theodicy. “Why, given the exaggeratedly high cost of human freedom, God did not once again, as He had in the past, step into the flow of events and say, ’Enough.”13 He notes that if He miraculously saved the Jews at the Red Sea, then why did He not save them from a far more terrible catastrophe? Obviously, Hitler was worse than the Pharaoh, Auschwitz more disastrous than drowning, and one small miracle of divine free will could have saved millions. To answer, as Orthodox theologian Berkovits does, that God was showing self-restraint and His Presence ‘would destroy history’ is an implausible evasive reply. This would indeed be a strange time to show self-restraint. Two immediate skeptical answers are that He no longer performs miracles, or more likely, the story is a parable or has only a figurative meaning. In future post-Holocaust thought, Fackenheim is very concerned that it will be forgotten or assimilated into something else, and non-Jews will ignore it as if it never existed. Educated people tend to remember the history of their own religion or specific ethnicity, and most of them have only a superficial knowledge of that. When the event occurs far from one’s home in foreign land, the likelihood of long-term remembrance diminishes greatly or disappears. Americans and people internationally are unlikely to remember or have interest in genocide in Armenia, Ukraine Cambodia and the same is true for inhabitants of these nations. Lack of education and accurate information, poverty, anti-Semitism and apathy are some of the causes for this ignorance.

We remember the Holocaust; we are inspired by the martyrdom and the resistance: and then the inspiration quickly degenerates into this, that every dogma, religious or secular, is restored as if nothing happened (my italics.) However, the unredeemed anguish of Auschwitz must be ever-present with us, even as it is past for us. Yom Ha-Shoah cannot now, or ever after, be assimilated to the ninth of Av.14

He is more realistic here and shows less faith in others than in his earlier works. Today is not the time of optimism or wishful evaluations of the human race. It is highly doubtful that the Holocaust has shaken the faith of many Christians and other faiths because for them, the event is either irrelevant or a nonfactor, as if it never happened. They believe it is problematic for Jews and Judaism, though not as a human tragedy, and others are Holocaust deniers or have no knowledge of it. It is more likely they would question their faith if a million or more members of their religion or ethnicity become genocide victims. For some their egoistic attitude suggests that they would rather that six million humans die from some distant nation than one member of their extended family or a friend’s death. The totality of genocide deaths is also probably irrelevant to theists. Sadly, if the number of deaths in the Holocaust were triple or quadruple (or more) would make little or no difference to at least half the world’s population. It is startling to realize that if such genocides occurred more frequently still would probably not significantly alter beliefs of ardent theists. Attempts to reconcile their cognitive dissonance will assuage the conflict between these great evils and their belief in God. Jews and other theists might explain it as divine retribution or merely as a mystery, if they think of it at all. In one hundred years, it is plausible that the Shoah will be

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remembered with much less importance and prominence, similar to World War I, as the general public forgets what happened and why, and regrettably another horror tragedy substitutes for it. It is ironic that Fackenheim emphasizes the meaninglessness and lack of divine purpose of the Holocaust, and yet he wrote books and devoted his life to it: certainly, it has much meaning for the social sciences and ethical theory and practice.

2. RUBENSTEIN

Fackenheim strongly opposes the radical theology of Rabbi Richard Rubenstein, who in 1966 declared the ‘Death of God’ in his controversial masterful book After Auschwitz. Fackenheim gently criticizes his philosophy, and Rubenstein writes respectfully with praise about Fackenheim that reflects a mutual Jewish bond. Nietzsche was the original starting point for his argument that the Holocaust shows that Jews can no longer believe in God, and yet Rubenstein thinks they still should not sever their connection from Judaism and its culture. Jewish scholarship has sharply criticized him like a renegade, but his radical voice should not be ignored. He does not address or discuss the problem of evil as such, because after the death of God of history, the world is without absolute meaning; human existence has only the secular meanings attributed to it. Human choices, values and meanings are not derived from a providential God, and He has no power to answer prayers, perform miracles, change human free will, or prevent evils. Therefore, strictly there is no problem of evil as traditionally understood for him. Furthermore, the concept of God, he says, is like a Rorschach test, in which individuals project their feelings, fears and thoughts into the amorphous black inkblot image. Theologians, regardless of their religious commitment, communicate their inner (spiritual) world they believe others will share.15 The concept of God is highly subjective even from leading theologians, which reveals their own spiritual vision, and he includes himself and Fackenheim. Most importantly,

…The death of God is not something that has happened to God. It is a cultural event experienced by men and women, many of whom remain faithful members of their religious communities. No longer able to believe in a transcendent God who is sovereign over human history and who rewards and punishes men and women according to their deserts, they nevertheless render homage to that God in the rituals and liturgy of their community of their inheritance…Their experience of the death of God rests upon their loss of faith in the transcendent God of history…16 (my italics)

He distinguishes the death of God from the statement ‘God is dead’, but he asserts that He died at Auschwitz. Jews, generally, do not use that phrase orally or in writing, but it is a reflective acceptance of a fearful truth, and for ardent theists it is a major rupture in their belief system and lives. Since belief in God is no longer possible, Rubenstein instead turned to Buddhism and paganism for spiritual support and a mystical God who he thinks is more consistent with the facts of human biology and psychology. He discusses this mystical approach in the first edition of After Auschwitz and explains it more in his 1992 edition. This paper shall describe only the basics of his theory. In place of the God from Scripture, he pictures this being as a divine source, ground or

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Absolute. ‘Ground of Being’ is borrowed from Paul Tillich and ‘Absolute’ is from Hegel’s influential Phenomenology of Spirit. This Being is imminent in the world and not in history as Fackenheim believes. Imagine each individual as a wave in the ocean that represents God. The wave is merely temporary, passing quickly into the Absolute Ocean, which represents the womb. As ground and source, God creates as does a mother, in and through her own very substance. As ground of being, God participates in all the joys and sorrows of the drama of creation, which is at the same time the deepest expression of the divine life. God’s unchanging unitary life and that of the cosmos’s ever-changing, dynamic multiplicity ultimately reflect a single unitary reality…If creation is understood as the self- unfolding of God’s life, so to speak, then the process itself may be a vast cosmic detour originating in the nothingness of God …17

Buddhism connected with Kabbalah with Hegelian influences, is an unusual possibly incoherent western and eastern worldview. A disproportionate number of Jews, compared to other religions have embraced Buddhism since the Sixties counterculture because Buddhism is not inconsistent with it, and they are able to keep their faith and practice Judaism at the same time. Buddhism is adopted as a worldview by a great many Jews (and Christians) who have become dissatisfied with their religion. Belief in Buddhist non-theism and meditation is considered compatible with traditional theism in theory and practice. Bluntly, Buddhism expects less obedience to principles and practices from believers than conservative western religions. Rubenstein continues, “in this conception, God is spoken of as the Holy Nothingness, das Heilige Nichts, and in Kabbalah, as the En-Sof, that which is without limit or end. God, thus designated, is regarded as the Ground or Source of all existence.”18 He indicates a distinction between nothing as absence of something and Nothingness, which is full and rich, the source of all that exists. He hypostatizes the term by turning this abstraction into a thing or real being, and never develops it into a complete metaphysical theory, though this was not his intention. Fundamentally, Rubenstein fails to see that Holy Nothingness is an oxymoron at best and an unviable derogatory name for the Supreme Being at worst that few Jews or Christians would accept. If something is holy then it stands that it is not Nothingness (or an aspect of it) whatever that means; it is equally incredulous that ‘Nothingness’ refers to that which is holy. In order to avoid obscure ambiguity and hypostatization, statements with nothingness as a subject should be minimized in philosophy and religious discourse. Rubenstein and mystics would object that Holy Nothingness is unknowable and ineffable, but assuming this is true, then no logical philosophical/religious discourse is possible and this invites blind faith—two very unattractive alternatives for the Jewish people and certainly for me. It is highly questionable that Jews will accept this Buddhist understanding or conception of the Ultimate source of everything, nor is this a spiritual consolation for the death of God. One hopes for a spiritual middle point between the transcendent traditional God and Rubenstein’s vision that reverts to mysticism and Buddhist religious philosophy. Furthermore, the ground of being is a very ambiguous and vague metaphor that connotes numerous interpretations.’ Being’ as a subject in itself has been rejected as fallacious reification by some analytic philosophers who argue that the meaning of being is a pseudo problem that merely obfuscates the language.

* * * * Rubenstein’s influences are wide and varied, from Hegel’s religious thought to Nietzsche, Paul Tillich (who he heard lecture), Thomas Altizer and conservative Protestantism-- “deeply and persistently”. He accepts the death of God idea from Tillich and he acknowledges his debt to

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Nietzsche, but not the latter’s ethics and other aspects of his philosophy. Although his philosophy is partly developed from the existentialists, namely Camus’ idea of the absurd life, and Sartre’s philosophy and literature, it is not very influenced from Sartre’s ontology because he misinterprets his concept of God. Contrary to Rubenstein, Sartre did not say God is dead, nor speak of the death of God, except by a character in “The Devil and the Good Lord” that does not represent his true thought. 19 Hegel influenced Fackenheim, Rubenstein and Sartre all in different ways, positively and negatively. Because of the death of God, he asserts that contemporary Jews are absurd, tragic and free. This broad hasty generalization is stated without argument or explanation perhaps because he is writing for the educated public and philosophers. Clearly, Jews are free within limitations, depending on their socio-economic situation and other factors, but surely not absurd or tragic. He intended to say that their theistic beliefs are now absurd or tragic, assuming they still believe in the Biblical God. However, the death of God is no victory for Jewish atheists. Moreover, atheists reject the existence of the Supreme Being, thus the death of God is redundant and unnecessary to them. Jewish atheism offers no ways of actively participating with other Jews in the wisdom, the aspirations, the remembrances, and the insights of earlier generations…it is the atheist who may fail to see that it is precisely the ultimate hopelessness and gratuity of the human predicament which calls forth our strongest need for religious community.20 He opposes secular humanists and atheists because of their disconnection with Judaism. Jewish atheists are divorced from their religious culture but it represents a new beginning for them, in that their faithfulness is merely an appearance. Moreover, he hopes that they maintain their Jewish self-identity after the disconnection from synagogue, Scripture, their religious culture, and atonement. Rubenstein is too sanguine. Atheists might not believe that the human predicament is hopeless, nor will they see the need for religious community, and they would ignore traditional Jewish Biblical wisdom and insights as useless or irrelevant to their lives. Some secular Jews audaciously claim that God Himself should seek atonement with them for the Holocaust and their personal evils. Rubenstein desires his concept of Judaism in two very contrasting ways: reject God as transcendent being, but still engage in the rituals and the sacred for moral reasons and to sustain the Tradition--- a position that appears self-contradictory in that Jews would be merely showing the appearance of belief.. 3. Conclusion The death of God perspective shows a radically different vision of God, a worldview that is very disturbing, fearful and uninviting for Jews. In the normative sense, he is right to argue that Jews cannot and ought not believe in a loving powerful God after the Holocaust, despite Fackenheim’s 614th Commandment which is an insufficient reason for Rubenstein. They both argue correctly that no plausible answer or justification exists from religion or spirituality for the Holocaust, (especially its excessive violence) and though neither addresses the problem of evil directly, it is evident that it is unsolved and unsolvable to them. This position is very agreeable, but it is very likely that God is not all loving or that love is not an aspect of His existence. This paper shows that Fackenheim and Rubenstein claim that it is very difficult and/or impossible to believe in the loving God who permits a Holocaust, though they widely diverge in their theologies. Fackenheim’s ultimate goal to mend the world is an impossible dream for the indefinite future. A nontraditional compromise would put to

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rest the problem of evil, notably a deist being who departed long ago, a God who is neither good nor evil, or minimally, an exquisite intelligence that impartially governs the universe. Considering all the responses to the problem of evil, bluntly stated, Jewish (and Christian) theists are out of valid answers.

NOTES

1 .Fackenheim, Emil. To Mend the World. (New York: Schocken Books, 1982) 13 My view is skeptical evidentialist. 2. Sartre, Jean-Paul. Anti-Semite and Jew (New York: Schocken Books, 1948) 134, 151 3. Sherwin, Byron L. Studies in Jewish Theology ( Portland: Vallentine Mitchell, 2007) 50 4. Yehoshua, A.B. “Between Right and Right” in ed. Kogel, Renee and Katz, Zin. Judaism in aSecular Age. ( New York: KATV Publishing House, 1995) 359 5. Katz, Steven T. Post-Holocaust Dialogues. ( New York: Schocken Books, 1983) 212 He mentions several good reasons for uniqueness. Reasons 2 and 4 are included. 6. Morgan, Michael L. Beyond Auschwitz: Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought in America.( Oxford: New York, 2001) 1747. Phillips, D.Z. The Problem of Evil & the Problem of God, in Richard Rubenstein and Elie Weisel, “An Exchange” in Roth, John K. and Berenbaum, Michael ed., Holocaust, Religious andPhilosophical Implications. (New York: Paragon House, 1998) 356.8. Fackenheim, Emil. God’s Presence in History. ( Jason Aronson:Northvale,NJ.,1997)He has no argument. Another version is in Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 2nd.ed. 1992 180

9. Wine, Sherwin. “A Humanistic Perspective” in ed. Kogel, Renee and Katz, Zin. Judaism in a Secular Age. (New York: KATV Publishing House, 1995)10. Most Jewish conservatives and religious philosophers are reluctant to believe that God is unloving or not all good; they are mystified and silent regarding God and the Shoah. Some accept that He may be less loving but they remain strongly Jewish anyway.11. Morgan, M. Beyond Auschwitz. 16712. Fackenheim, Emil L. What is Judaism? (New York: Summit Books, 1987) 26913. Katz, Stephen. The Impact of the Holocaust on Jewish Theology. ( New York: New York University Press, 2005) 3614. Fackenheim, Emil L. To Mend the World. New York: Schocken Books, 1982) 310 15. Rubenstein, Richard L. After Auschwitz 2nd ed .( Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1992) 25116. Ibid. 29417. Ibid. 302-30318. Ibid. 298 19. In Sartre’s Being and Nothingness the death of God is not an issue. God is central to his ontology as a hypothetical being and the ultimate desire of Being For-Itself. Sartre’s rejection of God’s existence is not connected to the death of God or Nietzsche’s thought. Rubenstein writes, ‘For Sartre, the time of the Death of God is one of overwhelming irony”. After Auschwitz 25820. Rubenstein 238 In his review of After Auschwitz, Rabbi Arnold Jacob Wolf writes

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appreciatively, “I wish with all my heart that this book did not have to be written, but it did and Dr.Rubenstein has made himself an indispensable teacher…”

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Bible. New Living Translation and JPS Tanakh Hebrew Jewish Bible.Buber, Martin. I and Thou. New York: Scribners, 1972Eisen, R. “Midrash in Emil Fackenheim’s Holocaust theology”, Harvard Theological Review(July 2003) Fackenheim, Emil. God’s Presence in History. Northvale, NJ.: Jason Aronson, 1997_________________ To Mend the World. New York: Schocken Books,. 1982_________________, What Is Judaism? New York: Summit Books, 1987Katz, Steven T. The Impact of the Holocaust on Jewish Theology. New York: New York University Press, 2005.____________, Post-Holocaust Dialogues. New York: New York University Press, 1983.Kaufman, William E. Contemporary Jewish Philosophers. New York: Reconstructionist Press, 1976.Morgan, Michael L. Beyond Auschwitz. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.Phillips, D.Z. The Problem of Evil & the Problem of God. Minneapolis: First Fortress Press, 2005.Roth, John K. and Berenbaum, Michael, Holocaust: Religious & Philosophical Implications, New York: Paragon House, 1998.Rubenstein, Richard L. After Auschwitz. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966. _________________, After Auschwitz. 2nd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1992.

_________________, and Roth, John K. Approaches to History 2nd ed. Louisville: Westminister John Knox Press, 2003.Sartre, Jean-Paul. Anti-Semite and Jew. trans George Becker. New York: Schocken Books, 1948______________ Being and Nothingness. trans. Hazel Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library,1956.Sherwin, Byron. L. Studies in Jewish Theology. Portland: Vallentine Mitchell, 2007.Wine, Sherwin. “A Humanistic Perspective” In Judaism in a Secular Age, ed. by Renee Kogel and Zin Katz. New York: KATV Publishing House, 1995Yehoshua, A.B. “Between Right and Right” In Judaism in a Secular Age.