· Web viewDoes trade interdependence reduce conflict among autocracies? Since World War II, the world is experiencing an unprecedented decrease in conflicts, an increase in the

Running head: Winning Coalition Causal Mechanism in the Trade-Peace Theory1

Credence to the Winning Coalition Causal Mechanism in the Trade-Peace Theory

Fernando, S, Mendez.

Florida State University

Winning Coalition Causal Mechanism in the Trade-Peace Theory2

Theoretical Debate

Does trade interdependence reduce conflict among autocracies? Since World War II, the world is

experiencing an unprecedented decrease in conflicts, an increase in the number of democratic states, and

an increase in economic interdependence; leading scholars to search for the causal mechanism for this

phenomenon, one of which is that an increase in economic interdependence produces a decrease in

initiation of interstate conflicts. However, scholars have found conflicting results in statistical studies of

empirical data and formal model studies. This leads to the conclusion that, only in democracies there is

statistically significant correlation between trade and a decrease in conflicts. This study suggests that the

conflicting results of those studies in regards to trade and its effect on conflicts contained in the annals of

social sciences could be explained by the utilization of measurements that are not a proper reflection of

the internal structures of all regime types. By selecting states classified as non-democratic and

differentiating those on winning coalition size, it should provide direct evidence amongst autocracies to

the effect that winning coalition size has on conflict initiation when trade is present.

Literature review

There is a plethora of studies with regards to conflict which aim to ascertain what causes conflict

and what prevents it. Montesquieu (1900) claimed famously, ‘Peace is the natural effect of trade. Two

nations who traffic with each other become reciprocally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying,

the other has an interest in selling.’ Globalization has increased foreign direct investment for the past half

of a century and this has exacerbated the interest of individuals and the government itself on the economic

wellbeing of the countries being invested in, further decreasing the probability of armed conflict (Gartzke,

Li, and Boehmer 2001; and Polachek, Seiglie, and Xiang 2007). However, there are inherent issues in this

theory that are not properly addressed: Whether the causal effects are due to exit cost or opportunity cost,

the endogeneity of the relation between trade and conflict, and the Trade-Peace Theory effects on all

types of regimes.


Exit cost causal mechanism is where a state utilizes the benefit from trade received by the non-

belligerent state as an increase in the range of the request placed by the belligerent state. Therefore, trade

may create an unbalanced exit cost and dyadic conflict, because a state that is benefiting more from trade

is susceptible to its trade partner, who can coerce a change in the dyadic status quo (Keohane, 1977). Exit

cost is addressed by Timothy M. Peterson (2013) by using a strategic commodity variable such as fuels,

iron, steel, industrial machinery, and arms. Yet, these strategic commodities lack the resonance of

universally essential commodities, leaning more towards developing or developed states necessities. His

finding is that unilaterally high exit cost increases the probability of higher levels of conflict, while a high

exit cost from both party decreases the likelihood of conflict. All findings are more pronounced when

analyzed with the variable of strategic commodities. However, the exit cost mechanism does not account

for the alternatives available to the belligerent state, such as opportunity cost of peace and the subsequent

economic benefit of continuing peace, both of which have an impact on the range of bargaining (Solomon

Polachek and Jun Xiang January 2010). To address this, some studies utilize game theory framework in

conjunction with exit cost and opportunity cost. Polachek and Xiang (2010) argue that the opportunity

cost of conflict is the causal mechanism for an inverse trade-conflict relation in a game theory framework,

indicating that the states do not to rely on signaling. Polachek and Xiang (2010) postulate a theoretical

basis argument in the context of simplified models. They find that states are less likely to fight for “fear”

of losing the benefit of economic interdependence. They also conclude there is a negative correlation in

the amount of benefit from trade for each dyad and the likelihood of conflict. By including opportunity

cost of continuing trade, they provide theoretical basis to refute exit cost causal mechanism in the

coercion or signaling studies and provide support to the empirical evidence in today’s literature.

Evident in the Trade-Peace Theory are the three types of endogeneity issues, where there is a

confounding variable causing both the independent and dependent variable. Second, where some

variables or factors that are dependent on time. Lastly, where there is a reverse causality between the

independent and independent variable. To test the issues of time, studies such as Keshk, Pollins, &


Reuveny (2004) and Kim & Rousseau (2005) incorporate years of peace to account for the endogeneity,

but they fail to account for the size of the country and the distance between dyadic. This causes the trade

variable to account for the previously mentioned omitted variables and produce an invalid result. In Oneal

and Russett (2010) the endogeneity issue of confounding variables in regards to trade and conflict is

addressed by incorporating the gravity model, which includes the size of the nation and the distance

between the states into the analysis of conflict. In economic terms, the sizes of the nations are

proportional to the quantities supplied and quantities demanded, the sizes is also proportional to possible

military capabilities. The distance between the nations is correlated to the cost of performing trade as well

as the cost of engaging in conflict. Additionally, Oneal and Russett (2010) account for the reverse

causality by performing simultaneous equations that capture the reciprocal effects of trade and conflict.

Thus, by incorporating these previously omitted variables and performing simultaneous equations Oneal

& Russett (2010) reaffirm the trade-peace theory by finding evidence of reduced likelihood of conflict

when trade is present.

The last issue that is not always address, or, when it is address, the results are not always

statistically significant is Trade-Peace Theory effects on all types of regimes. For instance, the study of

Gelpi and Grieco (2008) accounts for almost every single variable that could potentially affect the

dependent variable and introduces the idea that trade has a different effect(s) on democracy and

autocracy. They find that trade does not impact autocratic leaders’ disposition for conflict. In the case of

mixed regime type there is a restraining effect from trade. However, it is not statistically significant.

Lastly, democracies are statistically significantly associated with a decrease in likelihood for military

conflict and are even less likely to engage in military conflict with trade being present. Gelpi and Grieco

(2008) conclude that to a higher degree than trade, the type of regime affects the probability of initiating

conflict.

The findings in Gelpi and Grieco (2008) might be caused by the nature of the classification of

regime types. The variable for regime type is not necessarily a valid measurement for winning coalition


size, which is the basis for their theory in regards to the difference between democracy and autocracies.

They utilize polity III which is a 9 variable measurement of governments: binary for autocracy or

democracy measured across eight indicators of political authority: regulation of executive recruitment,

competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, monocratism, constraints on

the chief executive, regulation of political participation, competitiveness of political participation, and

centralization of state authority (Jaggers, 1996). Which reflects more accurately winning coalition in

democracy and autocracy but fails to assess the winning coalition of mixed regimes.

Theoretical argument

This paper ascertains the relationship between winning coalition, defined as those who support is

necessary for victory or continuation of power within a state, and trade dependency, defined as the level

of dyadic trade as a portion of GDP, effect on the probability of conflict initiation classified by

identifying the first state to threaten or to use militarized force. The causal mechanism that explains why

there are different types of regimes based on the independent variable of winning coalition is established

by modernization theory. The second independent variable can be explained by Stolper-Samuelson’s

theorem and Rybczynski theorem’s under the frame of Heckscher-Olin theorem. Lastly, the dependent

variable can be explained by the selectorate theory.

According to an abundance of literature and empirical evidence regarding to modernization

theory, it provides causal mechanism to explain the process by which states become different type of

governance. Modernization and democracy are symptoms of changes within a country based on

industrialization. Once the development of industrialization is set in motion, factors of socioeconomic

nature begin to increase: occupational specialization, urbanization, education levels, life expectancy, and

economic growth. This creates a self-reinforced mechanism and institutions that increase the probability

of sustain democratic government. While modernization theory predating the fall of the Soviet Union was

mostly correct, it lacked essential caveats to the causal mechanism. First, it is not only a matter of per-


capita GDP, exemplified by the case study of Qatar, but also a matter of shift in production from labor

intensive goods to capital intensive goods. Second, the process of modernization is not linear. It has

inflection points at different levels that must have a catalyst to be overcome (Welzel, 2009). Lastly, the

shift in production must provide a credible exit strategy for its citizens and the government must be

dependent to its citizens; therefore production of non-movable resources such as oil or precious minerals

do not provide the means for citizens to have bargaining power within their government to request

democratic institutions, and a state that is not dependent on their citizen has no inclination to oblige their

requests regardless of their exit strategy (Ross, 2001).

The second independent variable, comes together under the frame of Heckscher-Olin theorem,

Stolper-Samuelson theorem and Rybczynski theorem explaining that the reason why states trade is due to

comparative advantage differences. These are defined as the ability for a nation to produce goods and

services at a lower opportunity cost than others. Five main factors go into the differences in trade when

comparing states. First factor is the differences in production function, which is the output of production

given the factors input to the production process or in laymen’s terms the efficiency of production. The

second factor is differences in relative endowment: the land, labor, and capital allocated within the state

that can be used in production. It is important to note that different production utilize intensively of

different factors. The third factor is different return of scale for production, defined as the increased in

output given an increase in input. Fourth factor is the taste of consumers, which is the preference of

people for a given product. The last factor is the distortion of trade such as: taxes subsidies, imperfect

competition, and barriers to entry (Keith, 1995).

The selectorate theory introduced by Bueno de Mesquita (2003) explains the dependent variables

effect on the independent variable. Bueno de Mesquita (2003), describes three components of the

individuals in any given state: disenfranchised, selectorate, and winning coalition. The disenfranchised

are defined as those who live within the state but do not have input into the selection of political leaders.

Historically, slaves were the prime examples. The selectorate are defined as those who can choose the


government’s leadership and that enjoy benefits given by the government. The winning coalition is

defined as a subset of people within the selectorate that can leverage the political selection to their favor.

The theory centralizes on how the proportions of winning coalition to the selectorate produce different

types of constrains and how these constrains modify political behavior under the auspice of Political

Ambition Theory. These theories state that the primary goal of politicians and heads of states is to remain

in power (Bueno de Mesquita & James Morrow, 1990). To do so, leaders must satisfy their winning

coalition. In cases where the winning coalition is small, such as autocracies, the leader will use private

goods to satisfy the coalition. When the winning coalition is large, such as democracies, the leader will

use public goods to satisfy the coalition (Olson, 1993). Furthermore, political leaders make foreign policy

decisions with both domestic, as well as international threats to their continuation of power in mind (Ray,

2014).

The effects of trade, embodied in studies that include international trade and globalization,

establish a solid foundation that indicates that the quality of life and human development are positively

correlated to an increase in trade (Sirgy, Lee, Miller, & Sirgy, 2004). Therefore, the theories presented in

the theoretical argument provide the causal mechanism, founded in empirical evidence, that, in a

democracy where winning coalition is the largest, general trade has the greatest impact to the survival of

political leaders over all other types of regimes. This is due to the inability of democratic political leaders

to remunerate the winning coalition for the losses incurred by military conflict (Grieco, 2008). Eloquently

expressed by Immanuel Kant “democratic states would be inherently peaceful simply and solely because

in these states, citizens rule the polity and bear the costs of wars” (Doyle, 1983).

The literature establishes that democracies are less likely to initiate military conflict than

autocracies, however these binary measurements of governments are the ends of the spectrum of winning

coalitions. Thus, regardless of the accuracy and validity they provide to the democratic peace, they fail to

ascertain the causal mechanism behind the theory, which is the winning coalition size. Extrapolating the

literature consensus guided by the theoretical argument, this research asserts that the benefit of trade in


autocratic states is the same benefit as those enjoyed by democracies. Thus, an increase in trade

interdependence should increase the opportunity cost and decrease the probability of initiating conflict.

However, as is unlike in a democracies, in an autocracies the winning coalition size varies substantially;

producing diverse levels of incentive for the leaders. The opportunity cost for leaders in autocracy should

be positively correlated to the size of the winning coalition within the states, thus producing a negative

correlation to the probability of the conflict initiation.

Base on the theoretical argument we conclude that countries have a varied levels of winning

coalition size based on the dependence of the state to its citizen, and the citizen ability to shift their

resources to another country. Regardless of the winning coalition size, countries trade with each other

because differences between them make the purchase of certain product or service more economical

rather than producing it themselves. Lastly, international trade benefits the general population by creating

employment and reducing the prices of goods. Thus, when a country depends on its citizens and their

citizens have a credible exit strategy such as in the case of Singapore we expect it to have a large winning

coalition size. On the contrary such as in the case of Iraq we expect it to have a low winning coalition

size. Furthermore, we expect that in cases of large winning coalition size and high trade, such as

Singapore, the leadership will be less likely to initiate conflict because the leadership are susceptible to be

replaced, unlike the Iraqis example.

This study will focus on autocracies by making a distinction between winning coalition’s size to

be able to observe the effect of trade on the probability within autocracies to initiate a military conflict.

Basing the study on theoretical support, while controlling for the issues of endogeneity, will provide

further evidence to the causal mechanism for democratic peace and the causal mechanism of the

selectorate theory.


Hypothesis

The marginal effect of autocratic winning coalition size and trade dependence is negatively

related to the initiation of conflict.

Data and Research design

This study is based on the study by Gelpi and Grieco (2008), not to refute it, but with the purpose

of giving credence to the winning coalition causal mechanism in the trade-peace theory. Thus it will

employ as much of the data and research design as possible to replicate the results of Gelpi and Greco

under the lens of winning coalition. The initiation of militarized dispute will be tested on a sample of

directed interstate dyad years from 1950 to 1992. All data with the exception of trade dependence and

winning coalition size will be generated using EUGene data management program (Scott Bennett, 2008).

Initiation of Militarized Dispute

The dependent variable is the initiation of militarized dispute by the challenger state (State A)

against the target state (State B) during a given year. We coded the initiation of militarized disputes on the

basis of the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Inter-State Disputes (MID) dataset. We identify the

first state to threaten or to use military force as the initiator of the dispute. If the State A initiated a dispute

against the State B in a particular year, this variable takes on a value of 1; a value of 0 is coded otherwise.


State A and State B Trade Dependence

Because of the important debates over the construction of trade-dependence measures, we

conducted our analyses on both the Oneal & Russett and Barbieri datasets. Following Oneal & Russett,

we code each country's trade dependence as the level of dyadic trade as a proportion of GDP. That is, for

the State A we calculate:

With the challenger identified as “State A”. Then, to determine the State B's trade dependence on

the State A, we calculate the same ratio but with the State B identified as “State A”.

Joint Trade Dependence

This interaction term allows us to estimate changes in the impact of State A trade dependence as a

function of the State B's level of trade dependence. The variable is calculated as State As’ trade

dependence

In addition to the variables of central theoretical interest for our analysis, we also included a

number of control variables that have become standard in the study of militarized conflict.

Relative Military Capabilities

We code this measure as the proportion of dyadic military capabilities controlled by the State A.

That is, we calculate:


Difference in Alliance Patterns

We measure common security interests through the similarity of alliance portfolios (Bueno de

Mesquita, 1981; Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman, 1992). We calculate the alliance similarity 'S' score

between each state and the United States (Signorino & Ritter, 1999). We then measure the difference in

security interests between the State A and defender as the absolute value of the difference in these

similarity scores. This variable ranges from a minimum of 0 (reflecting identical portfolios) to a

maximum of 2 (indicating diametrical opposed security ties).

Major-power Dyad

Our measure of major-power status takes on a value of 1 if either state in the dyad is a major

power. It is coded 0 otherwise. For the period 1950-92, the major powers are the United States,

Russia/USSR, the Peoples Republic of China, Britain, and France.

Contiguous Dyad

This dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if the states share a border (including colonial

borders) or are separated by less than 150 miles of water. A value of 0 is coded otherwise.

Log of Distance Between Capitals

This variable is the natural log of the distance between capital cities of the two states in the dyad.

Because of their tremendous size and their access to both the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, distances to the

United States, Canada, and Russia/USSR are calculated to the nearest major port city in those countries.


Peace Years Consistent with Beck, Katz &Tucker (1998), we correct for temporal dependence in this

binary time-series cross-sectional analysis by accounting for the number of years that have elapsed since

the previous conflict. We model the impact of time with a series of coefficients that create a spline

function.

Peace Years

Consistent with Beck, Katz &Tucker (1998), we correct for temporal dependence in this binary

time-series cross-sectional analysis by accounting for the number of years that have elapsed since the

previous conflict. We model the impact of time with a series of coefficients that create a spline function.”

(Grieco, 2008)


Data Analysis

Linear Regression

initiate Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] Trade Dep A 0.3861270 0.2008628 1.92 0.055 -0.00757 0.779828Trade Dep B 0.0452603 0.1556877 0.29 0.771 -0.25989 0.350415Trade Dep Join 0.4024284 0.8023853 0.50 0.616 -1.17029 1.975141Trade Dep A 0 (omitted) Winning Co A -0.0171045 0.007691 -2.22 0.026 -0.03218 -0.00203 TDA & WCA -1.0837640 0.3256465 -3.33 0.001 -1.72205 -0.44548 Winning Co A 0 (omitted) Winning Co B 0.0122199 0.0059813 2.04 0.041 0.000496 0.023944 WCA &WCB 0.0121480 0.0123536 0.98 0.325 -0.01207 0.036362 Military Capa 0.0130837 0.0024883 5.26 0.000 0.008206 0.017961Alliance diff 0.0737175 0.0068580 10.75 0.000 0.060276 0.08716Major Power 0.1196326 0.0079647 15.02 0.000 0.104021 0.135244Border 0.3657929 0.0129203 28.31 0.000 0.340469 0.391117Ln Capital Dist -0.0204087 0.0020121 -10.14 0.000 -0.02435 -0.01646Peace Year 1 -0.0263063 0.0014274 -18.43 0.000 -0.0291 -0.02351Peace Year 2 0.0017134 0.0007053 2.43 0.015 0.000331 0.003096Peace Year 3 -0.0009989 0.0004276 -2.34 0.019 -0.00184 -0.00016Peace Year 4 0.0002116 0.0002770 0.76 0.445 -0.00033 0.000755_cons 0.2701195 0.0178282 15.15 0.000 0.235175 0.305064

Regression of Winning Coalition & Trade Dependence Number of obs = 28,523F(16, 28506) = 136.32Prob > F = 0.0000R-squared = 0.3154Root MSE = 0.16482


The regression’s F-statistic is F=136.32. This clearly exceeds the critical value to reject the null

hypothesis that all of the model coefficients are 0. In this case, we find that the regression is statistically

significant. The entry labeled R-Squared measures the proportion of variance in the dependent variable

(initiate) that can be explained by the independent variables (Trade Dep A, Trade Dep B, Trade Dep Join,

Winning Co A, TDA & WCA, Winning Co B, WCA &WCB, Military Capa, Alliance diff, Major Power,

Border, Ln Capital Dist, Peace Year 1, Peace Year 2, Peace Year 3, Peace Year 4). R-Squared is a

measure of the strength of association of the regression as a whole expressed as a percentage from 0 to 1,

in this regression the R-Squared is 0.3154.

Variables

State A trade dependence (Trade Dep A) has a Coefficient of 0.386127. It indicates that for every

unit increase in (Trade Dep A) the dependent variable (initiate) will increase by 0.386127 holding all

other variables constant. This variable has a P-value of 0.055, thus the effect of State A trade dependence

is statistically significant.

State B trade dependence (Trade Dep B) has a Coefficient of 0.0452603. It indicates that for

every unit increase in (Trade Dep B) the dependent variable (initiate) will increase by 0.0452603 holding

all other variables constant. This variable has a P-value of 0.771. The results indicate that in autocracies

the dependence of the State B states does not have a statistically significant effect in the initiation of

conflict.

Joint trade dependence (Trade Dep Join) has a Coefficient of 0.4024284, it indicates that for

every unit increase in (Trade Dep Join) the dependent variable (initiate) will increase by 0.4024284 with a

P-value of 0.616.


Winning coalition of the State A (Winning Co A) has a Coefficient of -0.0171045 together with a

P-value of 0.026. These values indicate that although Winning Co A has a low negative marginal effect

on the likelihood of conflict initiation, it is statistically significant. This means that as winning coalition

size increases, the probability of conflict initiation decreases, supporting the hypothesis presented in this

paper.

However my complete hypothesis ascertains the relation of winning coalition conjointly with

trade dependence effect on the initiation of conflict. To do this we have created (TDA & WCA).

Combination of State A trade dependence with state A Winning coalition (TDA & WCA) has a

Coefficient of -1.083764 and a P-value of 0.001. This variable has the highest coefficient in the model,

and is statistically significant. This provides clear support for my hypothesis, discussed in the conclusion

of the variable analysis.

Combination of state A Winning coalition with state B Winning coalition (WCA &WCB) has a

Coefficient of .012148 and a P-value of 0.325.

The regression model shows that important factors attributed to the initiation of conflicts are not

sufficient to ascertain the phenomenon in autocracies. Only when there is a combination of State A trade

dependence with State A Winning coalition (TDA & WCA), we are able to find a statistically significant

negative correlation in regards to the initiation of conflict amongst non-democratic states. This means that

as winning coalition size increases together with trade dependence, the probability of conflict initiation

decreases, supporting the hypothesis that the marginal effect of autocratic winning coalition size and trade

dependence is negatively related to the initiation of conflict.


Margins

Next, I describe the substantive effect of the variables of interest by calculating the expected

probability of conflict initiation for different values of winning coalition size and State A trade

dependence. The first model shows, the effects of State A trade dependence on conflict initiation as

winning coalition size varies from 0 to 1. For a winning coalition size of 0, an increase in State A trade

dependence increases the probability of conflict initiation by about .386. For a winning coalition size of

1, an increase in State A trade dependence decreases the probability of conflict initiation. Clearly

showing that the effect of increasing State A trade dependence as winning coalition increases has a

statistically significant negative expected probability of conflict initiation.

-1-.5

0.5

1E

ffect

s on

Lin

ear P

redi

ctio

n

0 .25 .5 .75 1winning coalition State A

Average Marginal Effects of ordepa with 95% CIs


The second model shows, the effects of winning coalition size as trade dependence increases. For

a State A trade dependence of 0, an increase in winning coalition size decreases the probability of conflict

initiation by about -0.0102744. For a State A trade dependence of 0.06, an increase in winning coalition

size decreases the probability of conflict initiation by about -0.0753002. Clearly showing that as trade

dependence increases an increase in winning coalition size has an increasingly statistically significant

negative expected probability of conflict initiation.

-.1-.0

50

Effe

cts

on L

inea

r Pre

dict

ion

0 .005 .01 .015 .02 .025 .03 .035 .04 .045 .05 .055 .06challenger trade dep, or

Average Marginal Effects of w1 with 95% CIs


Cross tabulation

Cross tabulation of Low Trade Dependence & Winning Coalition

High Trade Dep A = 0initiate

WCA >= .75 Not Initiated Initiated Total

Small 17,189 451 17,640 17,188.5 451.5 17,640.0

Large 4,166 110 4,276 4,166.5 109.5 4,276.0Total 21,355 561 21,916

21,355.0 561.0 21,916.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0034 Pr = 0.953

When trade dependence is low, there is no difference in conflict initiation between countries with

large and small winning coalitions.

Cross tabulation of High Trade Dependence & Winning Coalition

High Trade dep A = 1initiate

WCA >= .75 Not Initiated

Initiated Total

Small 4,746 515 5,261 4,768.1 492.9 5,261.0

Large 1,242 104 1,346 1,219.9 126.1 1,346.0Total 5,988 619 6,607

5,988.0 619.0 6,607.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 5.3691 Pr = 0.020

When trade dependence is high, states with a large winning coalition are less likely than states

with a small winning coalition to initiate conflict.


Conclusion

Democracies are less likely to initiate military conflict than autocracies. However, conflicting

results in the literature failed to establish a causal model that sufficiently explained the phenomenon

across all types of regimes. This study found contradicting evidence to the exit cost/opportunity cost

causal mechanism for the Trade-Peace Theory, because each individual trade dependence variables where

positively correlated to the initiation of conflict. Additionally, even though that years of peace, size of the

country, and the distance between dyadic were accounted for, thus eliminating the endogeneity issue of

trade and conflict by incorporating the gravity model, each individual trade dependence variables where

not statistically significant. This lack of statistical significance of all the trade dependence variables,

makes it difficult to determine any conclusions about the states trade dependence in relation to the

initiation of conflict. The classification of regime types in categorical variable based on factors that where

outside the causal mechanism of winning coalition was failing to ascertain the causal mechanism of the

Trade-Peace Theory effects on all types of regimes. This study tried to ascertain the causal mechanism by

selecting states classified as non-democratic and differentiating those on winning coalition size to test the

hypothesis that the winning coalition size and trade dependence within autocracies are negatively

correlated to the probability of the initiation of conflict. To answer the question, “does trade

interdependence reduce conflict among autocracies?”, the evidence presented provides support to the

negative correlated effect that winning coalition size has on conflict initiation when trade is present

among autocracies. Diving into the data provides supporting examples for the findings. For example, an

autocracy with high trade dependence that is likely to initiate conflict is Russia. In the data there were 50

observations of conflict initiation by Russia. Conversely, Bahama and Singapore are two examples of

autocratic countries with high trade dependence that are not likely to initiate conflict. In the data there


were 59 observations that met the criteria for Bahama and 97 observation for Singapore whit out any

observations of conflict initiation. Trade dependence is negatively correlated with the likelihood of

initiating conflict on all types of regime, with the caveat that the winning coalition is the causal

mechanism for the phenomenon.


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