Deliverable FactsheetDate:

Deliverable Harmonized Literature Review

Working Package 5

Partner responsible WUR

Other partners participating UOC

Nature P

Dissemination level RE

Delivery date according to DoW

Actual delivery date

Finalization date 12/2009

Relevant Task(s):

Brief description of the deliverable

This is an interpretative review encompasses a wide range of research and reports that relate to impacts of pesticide use. The purpose of this review is to assist policymakers in identifying the scope of knowledge on the topic of pesticide use and its potential for management through policies, programs and economic incentives/penalties.

Followed methodology / framework applied

Review

Target group(s)

EU policy makers

Key findings / results

- Pesticide policies should not aim at reducing pesticide use but at achieving a shift to the use of lower risk pesticides.

- Farmland biodiversity conservation should be an integral part of any pesticide regulatory framework.

- More research on identifying the exact impacts of pesticides can help policy makers in developing effective pesticide policies.

- The establishment of a wide EU pesticide regulatory framework should be based on a variety of measures and take into account the regional characteristics and the differences between pesticide products.

Interactions with other WPs deliverables / joint outputs

WP no. Relevant tasks Partner(s) involved Context of interaction1 1.1 UOC Review and integration of Deliverable 1.1

1

3 3.1 SLU Review and integration of Deliverable 3.1

4 4.1 INRA Review and integration of Deliverable 4.1

5 5.1 WU Review and integration of Deliverable 5.1

6 6.1 UCY Review and integration of Deliverable 6.1

7 7.1 UNWE Review and integration of Deliverable 7.1

2

Project no. 212120

Project acronym: TEAMPEST

Project title:

Theoretical Developments and Empirical Measurement of the

External Costs of Pesticides

Collaborative Project

SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME

THEME 2

Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, and Biotechnology

Title of Deliverable: Harmonized Literature review

Due date of deliverable:

Actual submission date: 15 December 2009

Start date of project: 1st May 2008 Duration: 36 months

Lead contractor for this deliverable: WUR

Version:

Confidentiality status:

EXTENDED SUMMARY

This is an interpretative review encompasses a wide range of research and reports that relate

to impacts of pesticide use. One major strand of this review addresses the consequences of

pesticide use as it impacts a) farm yields, efficiency and productivity, b) the health and well

being of farmers and those living in rural areas; c) the environment and the ecological

systems surrounding agriculture; and d) consumers of agricultural production. A second

major strand addresses the policy mechanisms at our disposable to manage pesticide use as it

impacts the broader scope of society. These mechanisms relate to environmental policies and

regulations targeting the use of pesticides through the use of taxes, and other economic

instruments that can influence behaviour at the farm level as well as the programs and

institutions to educate pesticide users on alternatives to pesticides and hybrid methods for

pest management.

The purpose of this review is to assist policymakers in identifying the scope of knowledge on

the topic of pesticide use and its potential for management through policies, programs and

economic incentives/penalties. By identifying an accurate assessment of the external costs of

agricultural pesticide use, the intent is to stimulate the thinking on the relevant EU policies

with the development tools for designing a socially optimal tax and levy scheme aimed at the

reduction of pesticide use to its socially optimal level. Particular attention is focused on the

interaction between production decisions and biodiversity loss, reduction of environmental

quality and impacts of agricultural and environmental policy on pesticides use. This review is

organized along the four major themes.

Economic Growth and the Environment

During the last decades, there is a considerable increase in the global level of production of

goods and services. This economic growth that was brought about mainly by technological

innovations has its impact on the environment. The over-exploitation of natural resources has

resulted in environmental degradation but, on the other hand, the development of pollution

abatement technologies promises to ease these environmental problems. Sustainable

economic growth is of primary importance in sustaining human needs and protecting the

1

natural habitat. This major theme can be partitioned into macro and micro (disaggregated or

decision maker level) perspectives.

Pesticides and Consumers’ Perceptions

Plant protection products constitute one of the most important agricultural inputs. As a

damage- and risk-reducing input, these products are widely used and their demand is

inelastic. Their stochastic nature (productivity and climatic conditions, pest arrival) is related

to uncertainty on the application timing and method. Additionally, pesticide application is

related to various externalities that call for an immediate orthological use of these chemical

substances. Pesticide risk valuation studies in conjunction with Integrated Pest Management

(IPM) strategies are providing the means of alleviating the above mentioned externalities.

Plant protection products may pose a threat to consumer health if residues of these substances

remain in the final product intended for consumption. For this reason, each EU member-

country makes one or more national authorities responsible for monitoring and controlling the

presence of pesticide residues in food products of plant origin, such as fruit, vegetables,

cereals, and processed products of plant origin, including baby foods. In addition to

monitoring residue levels in food products, several other measures protect consumers from

pesticide use, such as pesticide residue monitoring in drinking water. Consumers may also be

at risk if the use of PPPs is carried out near certain locations accessed by the general public,

such as schools, parks, and public places.

Biodiversity& Pesticide Use

Biodiversity is a concept that comprises the totality of species in an area. Its conservation has

received great importance in recent years, as its loss can be irreversible and can damage the

ecosystem value and reduce farm productivity. European agri-environmental schemes

constitute an initiative towards biodiversity conservation. Pesticide use can impact the

ecosystem by disturbing the balance of insect species (pests and beneficials) present along

with the potential impact on surface and groundwater sources, soil organisms, the pollenators

in the region, and the sanctuaries for other members of the environment. This section

2

addresses the notion of biodiversity as an aggregate environmental asset to be taken into

consideration as part of broader challenge of managing pesticide use.

With the productivity gains and cost reductions realized by pesticide use, there are several

disadvantages that relate to the broader ecosystem, genes and species in a region, which

constitutes the region’s biodiversity. Pesticide overuse or use at the crop edges which

constitute forage and nesting habitats for farmland fauna can reduce biodiversity. Non-target

plant species that benefit farmland fauna can also extinct due to competition for nutrients

with target species. Precise use of pesticides can address these problems.

Pesticide Policies & Regulations

Many international and national policies are trying to regulate pesticide use as consumers are

becoming more aware of pesticide externalities and demand pesticide free agricultural

products and cleaner and safer natural habitat.

The current level of food production is already causing serious environmental problems.

Important efforts towards regulating pollution have been made in industrialized countries in

the form of increasingly stringent environmental regulations. Although much of the

environmental regulations are directed at industrial production, agriculture is affected as well,

especially from pesticide regulations and clean water acts.

European Union is struggling to implement coherent pesticide regulations in an effort to

protect public health and the environment. Regulations on the marketing of plant protection

products, maximum residue levels and the thematic strategy on the sustainable use of

pesticides compose the puzzle of the European pesticide policy.

The imposition of a tax or levy scheme is not a costless procedure and its entire regulatory

cost creates uncertainty concerning the optimal time that has to be imposed. In an initial

period there is uncertainty about the stage of the world. Environmental externalities have not

still fully documented and the external costs have not been quantified precisely. Therefore,

policy makers are not sure whether they must introduce a tax now or to wait for further

3

information and introduce it later. Imposing a tax at an early period can prove to be more

costly as there are no precise indicators of external costs. This absence of knowledge can lead

a policy maker to delay his intervention and to wait to identify the exact external costs and

reflect them in the prices of the different commodities by imposing a suitable tax. Therefore,

delaying reduces somehow the economic risk of imposing a tax scheme. On the other hand

waiting can prove to be costly in cases of irreversible damages.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................................3

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms.........................................................................................4

List of Boxes, Figures, and Tables.............................................................................................7

1 INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................91.1 Benefits and Costs of Over-application of Pesticides................................................91.2 Pesticide Advantages and Disadvantages................................................................141.3 Pesticides and related EU projects...........................................................................16

1.3.1 FOOTPRINT, HAIR, and ENDURE...................................................................17

2 ECONOMIC GROWTH & THE ENVIRONMENT........................................................252.1 Macroeconomic Impacts..........................................................................................25

2.1.1 Environmental Kuznets Curve.............................................................................252.1.2 Agricultural Intensification..................................................................................282.1.3 Global Trade.........................................................................................................322.1.4 Political Environment...........................................................................................33

2.2 Microeconomic Impacts...........................................................................................342.2.1 Agricultural Firms................................................................................................352.2.2 Households...........................................................................................................382.2.3 Institutions............................................................................................................392.2.4 Political Environment...........................................................................................40

2.3 Human Health..........................................................................................................41

3 FACTORS AFFECTING PESTICIDE USE AND CONSUMER PERCEPTION..........443.1 Supply Side..............................................................................................................44

3.1.1 Productivity and Pesticide Use.............................................................................443.1.2 Pesticide Externalities..........................................................................................463.1.3 Pesticide Risk Valuation......................................................................................483.1.4 Uncertainty in Agriculture...................................................................................493.1.5 Pesticide Sales in European Countries.................................................................523.1.6 Trends in EU PPP Use.........................................................................................523.1.7 EU Measures for Managing PPP Use..................................................................543.1.8 Pesticide Demand Elasticity.................................................................................653.1.9 Damage Control Specification.............................................................................673.1.10 Integrated Pest Management and Alternative Cropping Systems......................68

3.2 Factors Affecting Adoption of Organic and Low-Input Systems............................883.2.1 Farmer decision making.......................................................................................883.2.2 Financial considerations.......................................................................................893.2.3 Personal and family considerations......................................................................933.2.4 Natural Influences, Agro Ecosystems, and the Farm...........................................973.2.5 Social factors........................................................................................................99

3.3 Consumers’ Perceptions.........................................................................................1023.3.1 Protecting the Consumers..................................................................................1023.3.2 Consumers’ Perceptions of Health and Environmental Risks...........................105

5

4 BIODIVERSITY AND PESTICIDE USE......................................................................1274.1 Biodiversity Defined..............................................................................................1274.2 Farmland Biodiversity............................................................................................1284.3 Biodiversity & Irreversibility.................................................................................1304.4 European Agri-Environmental Schemes for Conserving and Promoting Biodiversity and Safeguarding the Environment................................................................1314.5 Environmental indicators.......................................................................................136

4.5.1 Pesticide indicators.............................................................................................1464.6 Valuing Biodiversity..............................................................................................160

4.6.1 Biodiversity & Agricultural Productivity...........................................................1624.6.2 Policy Implications, Gaps and Overlaps............................................................164

5 PESTICIDE POLICIES AND REGULATION..............................................................1655.1 Competitiveness & Environmental Regulations....................................................1675.2 Pesticide Taxation and Other Economic Instruments............................................168

5.2.1 Theoretical background......................................................................................1695.2.2 Tax Policy..........................................................................................................177

5.3 EU Pesticide Policies.............................................................................................1855.4 Pesticide-Reduction Policies of EU and Non-EU Countries.................................197

5.4.1 EU and national regulation.................................................................................2055.4.2 Voluntary schemes.............................................................................................208

5.5 US Pesticide Policies..............................................................................................209

6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS, GAPS, OVERLAPS, & GENERAL REMARKS.............2156.1 Economic Growth and the Environment................................................................2156.2 Pesticide Use and Consumers’ Perceptions...........................................................2156.3 Biodiversity and Pesticide Use...............................................................................2156.4 Pesticide Policies and Regulation..........................................................................215

7 CONCLUDING REMARKS..........................................................................................215

8 APPENDIX.....................................................................................................................216

6

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS$ Dollar€ EuroAC Active SubstanceADI Acceptable Daily IntakeADSCOR ADditive SCORingArfD Maximum Reference DoseBDM Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Mechansim for eliciting minimum seller pricesBMPs Best Management PracticesCA DPR California Department of Pesticide RegulationCAPER Concerted Action on Pesticide Environmental Risk indicatorsCAS/EC Chemical Abstracts Service/European CommissionCBS Statistical Agency of The NetherlandsCCME Canadian Council of Ministers of the EnvironmentCE Choice ExperimentsCMR Cause Cancer and have Mutagenic or Reproductive Effects

CO2 Carbon DioxideCVM Contingent Valuation MethodD Demand CurveDPSIR Driving force Pressure State Impact Response modelEC European CommissionECPA European Crop Protection AssociationED Endocrine DisruptorsEEA European Environmental AgencyEFSA European Food Safety AuthorityEIL Economic Injury LevelEISA The European Initiative for Sustainable Development in AgricultureEKC Environmental Kuznets CurveEM Experimental MarketsENDURE European Network for the Durable Exploitation of Crop Protection StrategiesEPA US Environmental Protection AgencyEQS European Quality StandardsEU European UnionEUROSTAT European Statistical AgencyFA Frequency ApplicationFFDCA Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (US)FIFRA Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (US)FOOTPRINT Functional Tools for Pesticide Risk Assessment and ManagementFOOT-CRS FOOTPRINT Catchment and Regional ScalesFOOT-FS FOOTPRINT Farm ScaleFOOT-NES FOOTPRINT National and EU ScalesFOOT-PPDB FOOTPRINT Pesticide Properties DatabaseFPR Free of Pesticide ResiduesFQPA Food Quality Protection ActFRUITNET Registered trademark, which stems from a Belgian initiative (for apples)FVO The Food and Veterinary Office (of the European Commision)GLP Good Laboratory PracticesGMOs Genetically Modified Organisms

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HAIR HArmonised environmental Indicators for pesticide RiskHC Human CapitalHP Hedonic PricesHSE Health and Safety Executive (UK)ICM Integrated Crop ManagementIFM Integrated Farm ManagementIOBC International Organization for Biological ControlIP Integrated ProductionIPM Integrated Pest ManagementITP Income Turning PointIUCN World Conservation UnionKemI Swedish Chemicals Agency LDS Low-dose systemsLEAF Linking Environment and Farming (UK)LZ Lichtenberg and ZilbermanMAC Maximum Concentration in Drinking WaterMEC Marginal Externality CostMJP-G Multi Year Program for Crop ProtectionMP Market PricesMPC Marginal Private CostMRL Maximum Residue LevelMSC Marginal Social CostNAP National Action PlanNOK Norwegian KronaOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentPBT Persistent Bioaccumulative and Toxicp-EMA Pesticide Impact IndicatorPERI Pesticide Environmental Risk IndicatorPFPTM Pesticide Free Production TM?POP Persistent Organic PollutantPPP Plant Protection ProductPREC Pesticide Regulation and Evaluation CommitteePSD Pesticide Safety Directorate (UK)PSR Pressure State Response modelPTI Pesticide Toxicity IndexRASFF Rapid Alert System for Food and FeedREXTOX Ratio of EXposure to TOXicityRP Revealed PreferencesSK Swedish KronaSLU Swedish University of Agricultural SciencesSP Stated PreferencesSTG British Pound SterlingSYSCOR SYnergistic SCORingTCM Travel Cost MethodsTFA The Food AllianceTGD Technical Guidance DocumentTOPPS Training the Operators to Prevent Pollution from Point Sources projectUAA Utilized Agricultural AreaUK United Kingdom

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UNEP United Nations Environment ProgramUS United StatesVAT Value Added TaxvPvB very Persistent and very BioacummulativeWQI Water Quality IndexWRI World Research InstituteWTP Willingness to PayWTA Willingness to Accept

9

LIST OF BOXES, FIGURES, AND TABLES

BOXES

Box 1. Alternatives to Pesticides: A Few Examples

Box 2: The Complexity of Decision Making in Low-input Systems—An Illustration

Box 3. Definitions Related to Environmental Indicators

FIGURES

Figure 1. Location of Sampling Sites within The Swedish Pesticide Monitoring Programme

Figure 2. EKC Meta-analysis Features

Figure 3. EKC Problems

Figure 4. Agricultural Intensification and Inputs Use

Figure 5. Environmental Impacts of Agricultural Intensification

Figure 6. Agricultural Sustainability

Figure 7. Aspects of Global Trade

Figure 8. Interactions of Political Environment

Figure 9. Productivity and Input Use

Figure 10. Structural Changes

Figure 11. Drivers of Farmers’ Environmental Awareness

Figure 12. Households and Environmental Awareness

Figure 13. Services Provided by Institutions

Figure 14. Impacts of Pesticide Use on Agricultural Productivity

Figure 15. Pesticide Externalities

Figure 16. Uncertainty and Pesticide Use

Figure 17. Total Pesticide Consumption: EU15, EU25, 1992-2003

Figure 18. Use of PPPs at an EU-15 level (1992-2003)

Figure 19: In-conversion and Organic Land and Holdings in Europe

Figure 20: Use of Organic and In-Conversion Land in Europe

Figure 21. Techniques for Economic Valuation

Figure 22. Farmland Bird Index (EU-25)

Figure 23. Possible Forms of the Income-Environmental Degradation Relationship

Figure 24. DPSIR for Surface Water

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Figure 25. The Process of Building an Indicator for Pesticides

Figure 26. Diffuse and Point Sources of Pesticides to Water

Figure 27. Methodologies for Economic Valuation of Biodiversity

Figure 28. Porter Hypothesis

Figure 29. Textbook Example of an Externality Tax

Figure 30. Pesticide Policies at an EU Level in Equivalence with Aspects of Pesticide Use

Figure 31. Cut-off Criteria for Placing PPPs on the Market

Figure 32. Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) in EU

Figure 33. The Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides

Figure 34. A Contour of US Pesticide Policy under the Food Quality Protection Act

TABLES

Table 1. Total Sales of Pesticides in European Countries (t of active ingredient)

Table 2. Summary of Tools and Measures Focusing On Farmers

Table 3. Summary of General Measures Aimed at Reducing Pesticide Use

Table 4. Pesticide Demand Elasticity Estimates

Table 5: Uptake of ICM in the EU (1995-1998)

Table 6: Summary of EISA members

Table 7: Areas and Crops Certified by LEAF

Table 8: Main Influences on Farmer Decision Making

Table 9. Summary of Tools and Measures Focusing on the Consumer

Table 10. Summary of Tools and Measures Focusing on the Environment

Table 11. Pesticide Use, Biodiversity and Agricultural Productivity

Table 12: Summary of Pesticide Taxes and Fees in EU Countries

Table 13. Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides: Main Objectives and

Possible Solutions

Table 14. Pesticide Policies in Some European Countries

11

1 INTRODUCTION

This review encompasses a wide range of research and reports that relate to impacts of

pesticide use. One major strand of this review addresses the consequences of pesticide use as

it impacts a) farm yields, efficiency and productivity, b) the health and well being of farmers

and those living in rural areas; c) the environment and the ecological systems surrounding

agriculture; and d) consumers of agricultural production. A second major strand addresses

the policy mechanisms at our disposable to manage pesticide use as it impacts the broader

scope of society. These mechanisms relate to environmental policies and regulations

targeting the use of pesticides through the use of taxes, and other economic instruments that

can influence behaviour at the farm level as well as the programs and institutions to educate

pesticide users on alternatives to pesticides and hybrid methods for pest management.

The purpose of this review is to assist policymakers in identifying the scope of knowledge on

the topic of pesticide use and its potential for management through policies, programs and

economic incentives/penalties. By identifying an accurate assessment of the external costs of

agricultural pesticide use, the intent is to stimulate the thinking on the relevant EU policies

with the development tools for designing a socially optimal tax and levy scheme aimed at the

reduction of pesticide use to its socially optimal level.

1.1 BENEFITS AND COSTS OF OVER-APPLICATION OF PESTICIDES

This section provides a brief introduction to the positive and negative effects generated by the

application of pesticides in modern agriculture, as documented in the literature. It also

summarizes some of the reasons why farmers may overuse them. The aim here is not to

12

provide an in-depth analysis of this topic but rather to set the background for the discussion in

sections that follow and highlight certain key points to increase understanding of issues

pertaining to pesticide use.

Despite the fact that the emphasis in discussions is often (and must be) on the negative effects

of pesticide use, one cannot disregard their many benefits for agricultural production.

Pesticides are commonly known to reduce yield losses, improve the quality of agricultural

foods, and control the possible spread of diseases to humans and animals. As Cooper and

Dobson (2007) point out, knowledge of pesticides’ benefits serves as a counterweight against

their hazardous effects, thereby helping to offer a more comprehensive and balanced view on

the subject.

In their study, the authors document a number of benefits generated by pesticide use and

distinguish between those that are direct and easily identified (primary) and those that

materialize in the longer term and are somewhat more difficult to observe (secondary).

Primary benefits include improved crop yields and better crop quality, geographical

containment of pests, and reduced human disturbances and suffering. Secondary benefits are

less obvious and include increased workforce productivity, increased farmer revenues, food

safety and security, and less migration towards urban areas.1 Overall, a total of 26 primary

and 31 secondary benefits are identified.

In general, one can find good reasons justifying the use of pesticides as inputs in the

agricultural industry. Nevertheless, it is equally the case that severe side-effects to both

humans and the environment are caused by these chemicals because they are used in large

1 On identifying the primary and secondary benefits of pesticide use, Cooper and Dobson (2007) differentiate them from the effects of pesticide use, the latter being the immediate outcomes, such as pest and disease control.

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quantities and at an increasing pace. This has led some authors to go as far as to describe

pesticides as poisons that are deliberately released into the environment for the purpose of

controlling pests, but that contaminate the soil and water and destroy the farmland

ecosystems in the end. Furthermore, farmers and agricultural workers directly exposed to

them are poisoned, while pesticide residues that remain in the crops eventually enter the

human food chain and cause numerous human health hazards (Carvalho, 2006; Travisi and

Nijkamp, 2008; Mourato et al., 2000; Wilson and Tisdell, 2001).

Assessments of these negative externalities show that considerable costs are generated from

pesticide use. According to Pretty et al. (2000), the total external cost for UK agriculture in

1996 was equal to 2,343 STG million, with a significant proportion of this reflecting harmful

effects caused by pesticide use. In the US, approximately 500 million kilos of more than 600

different types of pesticides are used each year, generating a cost of $10 billion (Pimentel and

Greiner, 1997; Pimentel, 2005). According to Pimentel (2005), the environmental and social

costs from pesticide use in the US can result in poisoning and deaths of domestic animals and

birds, contamination of ground and surface water and agricultural products, loss of beneficial

natural parasites and predators, loss of crops and much more. Furthermore, it is argued that a

vicious cycle can be caused when insect pests, weeds and plant pathogens develop resistance

to these substances, chemical companies respond by developing new types of pesticides, and

farmers over-apply the ones currently in use (Carvalho, 2006; Pimentel, 2005).

When reviewing the hazards posed by pesticides to both human health and the environment,

one question that arises is why the volume of pesticide applications often exceeds ordinary or

recommended proportions. Clearly, agrochemicals help increase agricultural production and

protect crops from numerous threats. Nevertheless, looking at the negative externalities

14

associated with their use, it is plausible to ask: Why do farmers over-apply these substances?

A number of possible explanations are provided in a study by Wilson and Tisdell (2001). One

such explanation is ignorance or lack of information on the topic. Farmers may not be fully

educated on the issues of pesticide-related effects, or may not realise the difficulties involved

in sustaining longer-term pesticide use. Even if they are informed about the longer term costs

of their actions, farmers may be in a situation where they feel “forced” to use pesticides in

production to avoid short-term economic losses. This farmer behaviour can also arise from

the scarcity, high cost, or unavailability of pesticide alternatives (Wilson, 1988). Box 1

provides a brief description of a few of the most popular non-chemical methods of plant

protection.

Sheriff (2005) focuses on the general topic of the over-application of nutrients by farmers,

and explores the reasons behind this phenomenon. One explanation he suggests is that

farmers perceive the quantities of nutrients which agronomic advisors suggest as too

conservative, and over-apply these substances thinking that this will increase output and

maximise profits. In the case of pesticides, the logic behind over-application is that under-

application may not be effective, resulting in large losses due to a very bad crop. Instead of

risking a total loss of their crop in the current year from pesticide underuse, the farmers

choose to take the longer term risk of contamination from pesticide (Pearce and Koundouri,

2003). Another reason for pesticide overuse is the high cost of alternative forms of pest

control; farmers may adopt a profit-maximising policy of selecting the cheapest substance

that would do the job. Other reasons for over-applying pesticides may include pre-empting

uncertain factors that can have a negative effect on agricultural production (i.e. the weather),

and the underestimating the benefits or the overestimating the difficulties associated with the

adoption of new (environmentally friendly and user-friendly) technologies and techniques.

15

In conclusion, despite pesticides’ contribution to agricultural productivity, the damages they

cause are not only severe but also multidimensional. Consequently, the use of different types

of pesticides often implies a trade-off between more output and profits (mainly in the short-

run) and a variety of short- and long-run damages to the environment and/or human health

(Mourato et al., 2000; Florax et al.; 2005, Newman et al., 2006). Therefore, regulating

pesticide use is of vital importance to individual countries, regions and the whole world.

BOX 1. Alternatives to Pesticides: A Few Examples

In recent years, a number of alternatives to pesticides have emerged. One alternative that has been around for more than a decade is Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). The term GMO generally refers to organisms whose genetic material has been altered in order to exhibit attributes that are not usually theirs. In the case of agriculture, GMOs are plants which have been genetically modified so that they develop certain traits, such as resistance to pests and endurance to bad weather conditions, as well as increased nutritional value. Although this is a quite new and revolutionary approach, conventional plant improvement techniques have also been around for the past half a century (Pingali and Traxler, 2002).2

Organic agriculture presents another alternative to pesticide use. This form of agriculture avoids the use of agrochemicals and promotes the cultivation of food free of synthetic substances (Carvalho, 2006). This method relies on biological pest control (in other words, control of pests through their natural enemies, such as predators, parasitoids and pathogens). This type of non-chemical plant protection has the downside of being more labour intensive, thus incorporating higher labour costs than conventional farming methods. As a result, organic food products tend to be relatively expensive unaffordable to some consumers.

Perhaps one of the most promising alternatives to the use of pesticides can be found in Integrated Pest Management (IPM) programs. IPM is defined by the United States Environmental Protection Agency as an environmentally sensitive pest-management approach that combines information about the life cycles of pests and their interaction with the environment with available pest control method. IPM’s goal is to manage the damages caused by pests in the most economically efficient way and with the least possible hazard to people and the environment.3 Both developed as well as developing countries have undertaken such programs, mostly due to concerns about the environmental and human health hazards associated with pesticide use (Cuyno et al., 2001). The use of the various IPM practices varies by the type of crop involved (Osteen and Livingston, 2006), and contrary to the application of expensive chemical pesticides, IPM offers the prospects of lower costs of production and higher profitability, while at the same time raising agricultural productivity and reducing health and environmental damages (Dasgupta et al., 2006; Cuyno et al., 2001).

2 Conventional plant breeding approaches involve crossing plants with different genetic backgrounds over several cycles in order to create new varieties with improved characteristics.3 More information available at: http://www.epa.gov/opp00001/factsheets/ipm.htm

16

Lastly, Best Management Practices (BMPs) are defined by the United States Environmental Protection Agency as schedules of activities, prohibitions of practices, maintenance procedures and other management practices that aim to prevent or reduce and control the pollution of surface or ground water from nutrients, pesticides and sediment. The adoption rates of these practices by agricultural producers differ across crops, practices and geographical areas (Valentin et al., 2004).

17

1.2 PESTICIDE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

Many would argue that pesticides are the most valuable tools among the available methods to

protect crops from pathogens, viruses, animal pests and weeds (Matthews, 2006; Zimdahl,

2007; Eleftherohorinos, 2008). Pesticides are particularly valuable because they offer

numerous advantages over other methods. Pesticide use is flexible in its application and can

be conserving in the use of other inputs relative to the impact on preserving yields given the

energy and labor requirements to apply the material. The pesticide material is effective and

reliable against the difficult to control pathogens, animal pests. Its application can have

positive environmental impacts in terms of using herbicides to control weeds reduces the

need for cultivation that increases soil erosion and land degradation, the protection of pets

and humans from pest infestations. In addition, pesticide application can prevent problems

such as the use of herbicides prevents weeds to establish in gardens and lawns, the treatment

of export and import produce prevents the spread of pests, and the treatment of stored

products prevents pest attack and destruction during storage.

The misuse, abuse and overuse of pesticides have been linked with a number of negative

consequences, including:

1) adverse effects on non-target organisms (reduction of beneficial species),

2) poisoning hazards and other health effects to operators (they can occur through

excessive exposure if safe handling procedures are not followed and protective

clothing not worn),

3) public concern over pesticide residues in fresh fruit and vegetables, in feed for

livestock or in water used (it can be a consequence of a) direct application of a

18

chemical to the food or feed source, b) presence of transferred pollutants in the

environment, and c) biomagnification of the chemical along a food chain),

4) water pollution from mobile pesticides,

5) air pollution from volatile pesticides,

6) development of resistant pathogens, animal pests and weeds,

7) injury to non-target plants from herbicide drift,

8) injury to rotational crops from herbicide residues remaining in the field,

9) crop injury due to high rate or wrong application time, or

10) reduced efficacy due to low rate, wrong application time or unfavorable

environmental conditions prevailing at and after pesticide application (Kent, 2009;

Eleftherohorinos, 2008).

These undesirable effects can be reduced or eliminated if the pesticides are used correctly,

safely and accurately by well-trained and competent applicators.

Pesticides have been classified worldwide as irreplaceable (Jorgensen et al., 1999;

Anonymous, 2000; Turner et al., 2008) and, according to Oerke and Dehne (2004) and Oerke

(2006), the availability and diversity of food for all people – at least for the poor – would be

endangered if crops were produced without chemical control. Although the reliance of crop

production on chemical control may be reduced in some cases, the pesticide-free production

would be a disaster in other crops, especially fruits and vegetables (Knutson et al., 1997).

This is because (a) genetic resistance is often overcome by animal pests and pathogens, (b)

the efficacy and reliability of biocontrol agents is limited, and (c) today manual weed control

cannot be expected from farmers in most regions. Thus, the use of synthetic pesticides is

often unavoidable and its significance is projected to increase, especially in developing

countries. However, an increase in the efficacy of pest control does not depend on an increase

19

in the amount of pesticides used; rather, efficacy depends primarily on the targeted

application of suitable products when needed, based on the knowledge of the farmers and

advisors.

1.3 PESTICIDES AND RELATED EU PROJECTS

Simulation models are often used for calculating pesticide concentrations at higher

aggregation levels. This is probably because there are no other realistic alternatives. For small

catchments monitoring data may be used but at larger scales, such as regional, national or

international levels, monitoring requires too many resources and is therefore unrealistic to do.

Simulation also has the advantage of being flexible enough to allow analysis of many

different circumstances with different economic, climatic and geographic conditions, issues

of interest to policymakers. Simulated concentrations under different conditions are

combined with the threshold values of specific pesticides to obtain information on the

potential risk pesticides pose to the environment.

1.3.1 FOOTPRINT, HAIR, AND ENDURE

FOOTPRINT is a research project funded by the European Commission as part of the 6th

Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP6). Fifteen partner

institutions in nine EU countries are involved in the FOOTPRINT project, which started in

January 2006 and is planned to be finished in June 2009. The purpose of the project is to

develop computer tools that can be used to evaluate and reduce risks of pesticides impact on

water resources in the EU. The project aims to reach different users and is therefore

20

developing three different tools that are being designed to operate at different scales. These

are FOOT-NES, which focuses on the national and European scales; FOOT-CRS, which

focuses on catchment and regional scales; and FOOT-FS, which focuses on a farm scale.

Although the tools work at different scales, they share the same underlying structure and are

based on the same scientific foundations. Each of these tools can be used to identify possible

contamination pathways at different scales in the landscape and which areas in the

agricultural landscape contribute the most to contamination of water resources. FOOTPRINT

can also generate site-specific recommendations on how to reduce transport of pesticides to

water and estimate the level of pesticides being transported to surface water and groundwater.

(FOOTPRINT, 2008)

Pesticide parameters (characteristics) related with General information, Physico-chemical

properties, Environmental Fate, Ecotoxicology and Human Health can be found in the

FOOTPRINT (Functional Tools for Pesticide Risk Assessment and Management) Pesticide

Properties Database (FOOTPRINT PPDB, www.eu-footprint.org). The database contains

data regarding all pesticides and selected metabolites found in Annex I of Regulation (EC)

No 396/2005. About 650 active substances and 200 metabolites are included in the list.

This database provides the following information for 650 pesticide active substances used in

the EU and worldwide:

• General information (common and chemical names, language translations, chemical

group, formula, structures, pesticide type, CAS/EC numbers and data related to country

registration).

• Physico-chemical data (solubility, vapour pressure, density, dissociation constants,

melting point and information on degradation products).

21

• Environmental fate data [octanol-water partition constant (Log P), Henry’s law

constant, degradation rates in soil, sediments and water (half-life, DT50), the Freundlich

sorption coefficient (Kf) and the organic-carbon sorption constant (Koc)].

• Human health information [World Health Organisation toxicity classifications,

Acceptable Daily Intake (ADI), Maximum reference dose (ArfD), toxicity to mammals,

other exposure limits and toxicity endpoints, plus the EC risk and safety classifications,

maximum concentration in drinking water (MAC)].

• Ecotoxicology (acute and chronic toxicity data for a range of fauna and flora, as well as

information on bioaccumulation).

Additional information like alternative chemical names and a list of which EU member states

where the active substances are registered can also be found.

FOOTPRINT is developed for aquatic environments and is well-suited to the existing data on

aquatic threshold values at national and EU levels. Pesticide Toxicity Index (PTI), and hence

the environmental risks from pesticides, can therefore be calculated in a consistent way by

combining FOOTPRINT and the threshold values for aquatic environments.

Harmonised environmental and human health risk indicators for the pesticides used in EU

and worldwide can be found in HAIR (HArmonised environmental Indicators for pesticide

Risk) PROJECT database (http://www.rivm.nl/rvs/risbeoor/ Modellen/HAIR.jsp). This tool

includes environmental fate and exposure data, and the resulting acute and chronic risks for

aquatic and terrestrial organisms, groundwater, public health (including pregnant women) and

applicators of the pesticides. In particular, this database provides information on GIS,

compound properties, usage/sales, terrestrial indicators, aquatic indicators, groundwater

indicators, consumer indicators, and occupational indicators. The project supports community

policies for sustainable agriculture by providing a harmonised European approach for

22

indicators of the overall risk of pesticides. It integrates European scientific expertise on the

use, emissions and environmental fate of pesticides and their impact on agro-ecosystems and

human health. The indicators provide new and powerful assessment tools for monitoring and

managing the overall risks of pesticides. This contributes directly to Agenda 2000 aims for

sustainable agriculture, and to the 6th Environment Action Programme’s Thematic Strategy

on the Sustainable Use of Plant Protection Products.

Pesticide data useful for our project are not available yet from the ENDURE Network of

Excellence Program, since this project started recently. However, it is worth mentioning that

the overall objective of this EU-funded project (2007-2010) is to restructure European

research and development efforts on the use of plant protection products and establish the

new entity as a world leader in crop protection, with the development and implementation of

sustainable pest-control strategies. This includes a focus on rationalising and reducing

pesticide inputs, as well as on mitigating inherent risks through a greater exploitation of

alternative technologies, and basing control strategies on a more cohesive knowledge of the

ecology, behaviour and genetics of pest organisms. The operational and structural objectives

of the network are:

To overcome fragmentation in crop protection research and development within Europe

through the design and implementation of a joint programme of research on crop

protection as well as through the creation of a virtual crop-pest control laboratory.

To reinforce the R&D capacities needed in Europe to improve the basic understanding

of crop pest systems and to develop durable pest-control strategies.

To progress towards a transnational entity aimed at reducing and optimising pesticides

inputs by encouraging durable integration of the leading European crop protection

23

institutions, forming the nucleus of excellence around and from which institutions and

researchers can integrate their activities.

To create a European centre of reference for supporting public policy makers,

regulatory bodies, stakeholders and extension services.

To increase mobility of researchers and joint use of facilities, equipment and tools.

To ensure the spreading of excellence and support training to facilitate the adoption of

safer and more environmentally friendly crop-protection approaches.

One of the major benefits with FOOTPRINT is its pesticide database, which, compared to

other databases such as the HAIR database, is considered very transparent. Here the best

pesticide data available are brought together in a single dataset, which is updated on a regular

basis. The database has been developed by the Agriculture & Environment Research Unit

(AERU) at the University of Hertfordshire as a part of the FOOTPRINT project and contains

a lot of information regarding environmental fate and ecotoxicological properties for a large

number of pesticides as well as their metabolites. The database is well documented and

transparent, as information for each pesticide can be traced back to the sources. This database

is probably the most extended one there is today and it has, according to the FOOTPRINT

webpage, already become a reference in Europe as well as the rest of the world.

(FOOTPRINT, 2008)

The best available information about pesticide properties are from papers produced as part of

the EU review process, and information found in these documents forms an important part of

the FOOTPRINT database. When EU documents are missing, information from other

references have been used instead. This information has, for instance, been collected from

various national government departments, different research projects and manufacturers’

safety datasheets. Each data item is tagged with a code in order to show the origin of the data.

24

The tag also includes a quality score, ranking from 1 (low) to 5 (high), which represents the

developer’s faith in the quality of the data.

The FOOTPRINT model gives possibilities to build different scenarios, altering different

farm management practices, climate and geographical conditions to calculate exposure to

pesticide. The FOOTPRINT project is an ongoing project and the three tools are not yet fully

developed and are therefore not ready to be used by the general public. They will be available

for free at the end of the project (June 2009). However, a test version of the FOOT-FS model

is already circulating and it is possible to use it among FOOTPRINT partners. FOOTPRINT

has the potential to give the best estimates of pesticide exposure.

1.3.1.1 VALIDATION OF FOOTPRINT

In general, the process of validation is important for developing good indicators. A

monitoring programme in a catchment in Östergötland, located in the southern part of

Sweden, measures pesticide concentrations in surface waters and can be used to test and

evaluate the simulated concentrations from the FOOTPRINT model. For this purpose,the

FOOTPRINT model can be run with the information known for the catchment in

Östergötland (such as crops, management practices and pesticide management) and then

compare the modelled pesticide concentrations with the ones measured in reality in the

catchment. This kind of test against real data has yet not been done for the FOOTPRINT

model.

SWEDISH NATIONAL MONITORING PROGRAMME

The calculation of total exposure through any simulation model faces complications. It is

therefore important to test and validate the FOOTPRINT model. Swedish monitoring data

25

from a catchment in Sweden can be used to validate and test the simulated data from

FOOTPRINT.

Within the Swedish national monitoring programme, conducted by the Swedish University of

Agricultural Sciences (SLU) on behalf of the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency,

water samples are collected on a regular basis in four monitoring catchments. In 1990 water

sampling started in catchment M 42 (Skåne). This sampling was enlarged in 2002 to also

include the three catchments: N 34 (Halland), E 21 (Östergötland) and O 18 (Västergötland).

These areas, called type areas, represent bigger geographical areas with different weather

conditions, soil types and cultivation patterns in some of the most agricultural-dominated

locations in Sweden (Figure 1). In these catchments, samples of surface water, sediment and

shallow groundwater are taken automatically on a weekly basis from May until October.

Samples from surface water are taken automatically every 80th minute and are then collected

on a weekly basis. The concentration in one sample does thereby represent the average

concentration for one week. The water samples are then analyzed for about 90 different

substances (herbicides, insecticides and fungicides) that are commonly used, prone for

leaching, have low threshold values and/or are included in the Water Framework Directive

(2000/60/EG) as a prioritized substance. The results of the environmental monitoring

programme are published annually by SLU.

According to the most recent report (reflecting 2007 data), most of the substances analyzed

for are not found in any of the samples taken. If they are detected, however, the sample

concentration in most cases is found to be under its threshold value. In 2007, 30-45 % of the

analyzed substances were found in the surface water samples and 19 substances were found

in concentrations above their threshold values. Most of the detections above the threshold

26

values were from the herbicides diflufenican and MCPA. A good knowledge of background

information like pesticide use, water flow and precipitation in these areas, combined with

these analyses of regularly taken water samples thereby gives a good documentation of the

state of the environment as well as the trends (Adielsson and Kreuger, 2008).

Figure 1. Location of Sampling Sites within the Swedish Pesticide Monitoring Programme

Source: Kreuger and Adielsson, 2008

Annual interviews with farmers operating in these catchments has provided the monitoring

programme with a lot of information on crops, fertilization and pesticide use (type of

pesticide, dosage and time) in these areas. This kind of information provides a possibility to

link management practices and pesticide use to occurrence in the aquatic environment.

Catchment E 21 is located in the county of Östergötland, one of the most intensively

cultivated regions in Sweden. The catchment comprises about 1,700 hectares, 89 % of which

is arable land. The dominant soil type is loam. Water sampling started here in spring 2002

27

and since then has been taken during May-October with about 20 samples per year. The

agricultural practices within this catchment are dominated by cereal crops. Other crops

cultivated in the area are oil plants, potatoes, peas and grass ley (Kreuger and Adielsson,

2008).

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2 ECONOMIC GROWTH & THE ENVIRONMENT

During the last decades, the global level of production of agriculturally related goods and

services has increased considerably. This economic growth, brought about mainly by

technological innovations, has had its impact on the environment. While the over-exploitation

of natural resources has resulted in environmental degradation, on the other hand, the

development of pollution abatement technologies promises to ease these environmental

problems. Sustainable economic growth is of prime importance in supporting human needs

and protecting the natural habitat.

2.1 MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS

Global economic growth has both positive and negative impacts on the environment. An

overview of the environmental Kuznets Curve studies can shed light on this relationship.

World trade and international policies and agreements play an important role in the process of

economic growth. Global policies and world trade can increase agricultural intensification,

leading to environmental pressure. Conversely, global agreements have proven to be an

effective approach toward addressing environmental problems that are often transnational and

require a collective response. Global trade can also provide the means for transferring cleaner

technologies.

2.1.1 ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE

29

The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis proposes that there is an inverted U-

shaped relationship between economic performance and environmental pollution, which

suggests that an economy is associated with lower levels of pollution after clearing an income

threshold. Simon Kuznets’s name was attached to the curve by Grossman and Krueger

(1993), who noted its resemblance to Kuznets’s inverted-U shaped relationship between

income inequality and development.

A number of empirical studies have examined the EKC for various time periods, regions and

pollutants. The early EKC studies are Grossman and Krueger (1993), Shafik and

Bandyopadhyay (1992), Selden and Song (1994), Panayotou (1993) and Cropper and

Griffiths (1994), which found that the inverted U-shaped relationship is monotonically

increasing or decreasing.

Stern (2004) and Dasgupta et al. (2002) have undertaken comprehensive reviews and

discussions of these empirical studies have shown that there is no single relationship between

environmental degradation and income that concerns all types of pollutants, time periods and

regions. Meta-analysis is a statistical approach that models related empirical studies by

synthesizing their results in a statistical framework. The EKC meta-analyses of Cavlovic et

al. (2000) and Li et al. (2007) indicate that study methods, estimation techniques, data

characteristics and pollution categories all affect the presence or absence of the EKC, its

shape and the income turning points (ITPs) (Figure 2). It is important to note that many

studies that dealt with anthropogenic greenhouse gases (e.g. CO2) did not manage to find

ITPs or an improved environment-income relationship.

30

Presence/Absence of EKC

EKC Shape

ITPs

Affected

Study Methods/Characteristics

Estimation Techniques

Data Characteristics

Pollution Categories

Time Periods

Regions

Income Elasticity

International Trade

Scale

Urban Air Quality

Aggregate Emissions

Greenhouse Gases

Biological Indicators

Hazardous Waste

No single relationship between environmental degradation and income

Figure 2. EKC Meta-analysis Features

Stern et al. (1994) critiques the EKC on the following grounds (Figure 3): a) the assumption

of unidirectional causality from economy to environment; b) the assumption that

environmental quality is not affected by changes in trade relationships; c) data problems (data

on environmental problems are of poor quality); d) econometric problems (simultaneity); e)

asymptotic behavior; f) the mean-median income problem; and g) and the isolation of some

EKCs from EKCs for other environmental problems.

31

EKC Problems

Unidirectional causality

Environmental quality and trade

Data problems

Econometric problems

Asymptotic behavior

Mean-median income

EKCs’ isolation

Figure 3. EKC Problems

Managi (2006) adds to this list of concerns that the empirical EKC studies do not examine

carefully the mechanisms of the inverted U-shaped relationship. The use of a time trend is not

an efficient tool to fully reflect technological progress, and the inclusion of technological

variables seems to be of utmost importance in capturing productivity and technological

progress factors.

2.1.2 AGRICULTURAL INTENSIFICATION

Agricultural Intensification refers to an increase in the productivity of resources (e.g., land,

water) in order to produce more output in a given area (Tiffen et al., 1994). In this respect,

attention is given to the way the inputs are used, how this use affects the environment, and if

a sustainable agricultural intensification is a feasible target.

32

Increased Production Intensity Increase of Labor-Capital Inputs

Environmental Degradation Agricultural Output

Green Revolution Machinery

Irrigated Area, Fertilizers, Pesticides

2.1.2.1 INPUT USE

Agricultural intensification constitutes one of the most important global changes of the

twentieth century (Matson et al., 1997). Hazell and Wood (2008) report a significant rise of

the intensity of agricultural production during the second half of the last century.

Figure 4. Agricultural Intensification and Inputs Use

Agricultural intensification is defined as “increased average input of labor or capital on a

smallholding, either cultivated land alone, or on cultivated and grazing land, for the purpose

of increasing the value of output per hectare” (Tiffen et al., 1994). Figure 4 depicts the

trajectory and impacts of inputs use under agricultural intensification. Agricultural machinery

and irrigated areas have roughly doubled during the last few decades (Pretty, 2007). The

tremendous increase in input use has had many advantages and disadvantages. The “Green

Revolution” of the 1960s brought the high-yielding seeds that boosted agricultural

33

Environmental Impacts

Increased erosion

Biodiversity loss

Soil problems

Water pollution

Groundwater

Water aquifers

Eutrophication

Lower fertility

Air pollutionPesticides

Increased machinery use

production. The use of fertilizers increased substantially during the second half of the last

century, but their use declined in recent years (Stoate et al., 2001). Pesticide use also

increased during the same period, but has led to a slight decline in crop damage in the recent

years. Sexton et al. 2007 state that despite the existence of alternatives to chemical pesticides

(e.g., GM crops, biological control), the pesticide industry sales total $32 billion with the

annual pesticide application levels estimated at 5 billion pounds.

2.1.2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURE

Figure 5. Environmental Impacts of Agricultural Intensification

Agricultural intensification has significant impacts on the environment (Figure 5). Among the

negative consequences are increased erosion, reduced biodiversity, lower soil fertility,

eutrophication and chemical residuals in food. Nitrogen and phosphorus runoff from the use

of fertilizers can contaminate freshwater aquifers and other marine ecosystems, while

34

Agricultural Sustainability

Theoretical Basis

Resilience

Persistence

Characteristic Goals

Environmental Stewardship

Farmers’ Prosperity

Farm Profitability

Practices

Environmental Friendliness

Effective

Easily Accessible

groundwater can also be contaminated from leaching nitrates and pesticides. In addition, the

use of pesticides can lead to air pollution. Modern arable land management with increased

mechanization and farm size, simplification of crop rotations, and loss of non-crop features

has led to soil deterioration and decreased biodiversity (Stoate et al., 2001).

2.1.2.3 AGRICULTURAL SUSTAINABILITY

Figure 6. Agricultural Sustainability

Agricultural sustainability implies a way of thinking as well as of using agricultural practices.

Figure 6 presents the theoretical basis of this concept, its characteristic goals and practices.

Agricultural sustainability includes the concepts of resilience and persistence. Resilience is

the capacity of systems to endure stress, while persistence refers to systems’ capacity to

continue over long periods. Among the goals of sustainable agriculture are environmental

stewardship, prosperity of farming communities, and farm profitability. The core of

sustainable agriculture is the development of agricultural technologies and practices that will

35

Global Trade

Transfer of Goods and Services

Combat Hunger Variety of Products Environmental PressureDelinking Production-Consumption“Clean” Technologies

be easily accessible and effective for farmers and will not have adverse impacts on the

environment. Emphasis is given to the long-term ability of farmers to obtain inputs and

manage resources like labor and also to the long-term effects of practices on the environment.

Therefore, sustainable agricultural systems are those that focus on the optimal use of

environmental resources and services without damaging these assets (Altieri, 1995; Tilman et

al., 2002; Kesavan and Swaminathan, 2008).

2.1.3 GLOBAL TRADE

Figure 7. Aspects of Global Trade

Global trade plays an important role in global economic growth, serving as the means of

transferring goods and services that can stimulate all kinds of economic activities (Figure 7).

Furthermore, trade liberalization has the potential to combat hunger and provides people with

the opportunity to consume products that cannot be grown in their regions. On the other hand,

trade liberalization contributes to environmental pressure by trading non-renewable

resources, endangering species, and leading to changes in land use and excessive use of

chemical inputs in order to satisfy the increasing demand for specific products. Dasgupta et

36

al. (2001) report that agricultural trade liberalization has led to increased pesticide use in

Brazil, particularly in export crops.

Trade liberalization and direct investment enables industries to transfer their production units

to countries with more lenient environmental regulations (Panayotou, 2003). Therefore, there

has been an uncoupling of production and consumption of resource-intensive and polluting

products. Finally, global trade provides a unique chance to combat environmental pressure by

technology transfer through foreign direct investment (Dinda, 2004).

2.1.4 POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Figure 8. Interactions of Political Environment

Political environment plays an important role not only in the economic growth of a country or

a union of countries but also in the effort to protect the environment (Figure 8). Panayotou

37

Economic Growth

Environmental Protection

Political Environment

(2003) states that the relationship between income and the environment varies across political

systems, with environmental quality tending to be lower in non-democratic regimes.

Democratization can have beneficial effects on environmental quality and economic growth

through the introduction of more secure property rights and accounting of benefits for public

goods.

Many countries are participating in global environmental agreements such as the Kyoto

protocol and/or unions with common environmental policies (e.g., European Union). These

agreements are important in promoting the effort to reduce environmental externalities, as

most of the environmental problems are not restricted within the borders of a country but

concern many nations simultaneously and require joint abatement efforts. Sometimes

participation in the pre-mentioned agreements is not unanimous; some countries consider that

some of the agreements can pose a burden on their economic growth, as abatement policies

can bring economic losses for industries and other sectors.

2.2 MICROECONOMIC IMPACTS

Additional insight into the relationship between economic growth and the environment is

gleaned by focusing on the decision makers’ level of analysis. Agricultural entrepreneurs and

consumers have their own special contributions to the growth-environment relationship.

Additionally, institutions and regional policies play a major role in decision making and

therefore affect both economic growth and environmental quality.

2.2.1 AGRICULTURAL FIRMS

38

Productivity Growth

Increased Use of Agricultural Inputs

Soil Quality Crop Losses Product Quality Free Labor Fuel Use

Figure 9. Productivity and Input Use

A large range of positive outcomes can result from the use of agrochemicals, but adverse

impacts to human health and the environment are a related consequence. Agricultural

productivity experiences a significant increase as inputs use increases.

Some of the impacts of this increase are summarized in Figure 9. The increased use of

fertilizers and pesticides improves not only the quality of soil but secures crops from insects

and herbs. Not only does production increase, but also farmers can obtain high-quality

products that can have a positive impact on their revenues. Additionally, the use of herbicides

frees labor that was used for weeding and now can be allocated to other agricultural practices.

In general, technological advances like new and high quality seeds, more efficient pesticides

and machinery, in conjunction with a wide range of information on agricultural practices that

farmers can receive (e.g., extension services), have contributed in a significant rise in

agricultural productivity.

39

Structural Changes

Scale Crops Capital Education Technologies

Figure 10. Structural Changes

During the second half of the last century, agricultural firms faced great changes (Figure 10).

Increased farm size and mechanization were predominant features in a process of

intensification that had to satisfy the increased demand for agricultural outputs. In an effort to

maximize their yields and to cultivate those crops that yielded higher revenues, the more

progressive farmers tended to move toward a simplified arable system (Nassauer and

Westmacott, 1987). For Europe, the simplification of arable systems led to a decline in

landscape diversity with consequences on biodiversity and crop productivity (Meeus, 1993).

In the last decades, a number of factors have driven farmers to become more aware of the

environmental externalities of their agricultural practices (Figure 11). Agricultural extension

services have provided farmers with new information and knowledge, enabling them to

enhance their agricultural activities and maximize their revenues while protecting the

environment. Furthermore, young farmers with better knowledge are entering the agricultural

sector and investing in new technologies and practices. In this direction, increasing farm size

appears to be a positive factor as it provides the economies of scale for adopting new

technologies and machines.

40

Influx of Young/Innovative Farmers

Changes in Consumers’ Preferences

Political Environment

Drivers of Farmers’ Environmental Awareness

Extension Services

Figure 11. Drivers of Farmers’ Environmental Awareness

The over-reliance of agricultural production on agrochemicals has caused several adverse

effects on the environment and human health. Changes in consumer demand for

environmentally friendly and chemical-free products have induced a tendency toward a

structural change in the agricultural sector. Responding to this demand and to the additional

expertise (from the extension services and other training) in the externalities that their

practices can cause, agricultural producers are trying to apply “cleaner” agricultural practices

and more sustainable production systems. Furthermore, policies aiming to mitigate the

negative externalities of agriculture oblige producers to follow “cleaner” agricultural

practices.

41

Households

Low Income

High Income

Demand for Envir. Quality: Low

“Survival”

Demand for Envir. Friendly Products

Pressure for Envir. Regulations

Donations to Envir. Organizations

2.2.2 HOUSEHOLDS

Figure 12. Households and Environmental Awareness

As people become richer and achieve higher living standards, they care more about a cleaner

natural habitat (Dinda, 2004). Poor people have little demand for environmental quality,

simply because their first priority is obtaining the essential goods in order to survive (Figure

12). Roca (2003) states that after a particular level of income, the willingness to pay for

environmental quality rises by a greater proportion than income. Higher-income consumers

tend to spend more money on environmentally friendly products, donate money to

environmental organizations, and create pressure for environmental regulations.

Consumers’ preferences have led to a market-oriented production, as farmers plan their

production according to the market needs and demand. Therefore, household and consumer

preferences play a significant indirect role in transformations in rural areas, such as

agricultural intensification and changes in the labor economy. Many of these transformations,

42

Institutional Services

Technological AdvancesBetter Understanding of Environmental ProblemsPractical SolutionsExtension Services

like the increased use of chemical inputs and the simplification of the agricultural landscapes,

are leading to serious environmental problems such as biodiversity loss and water pollution.

2.2.3 INSTITUTIONS

Figure 13. Services Provided by Institutions

Economics and social institutions play an important role in the process of economic growth

(Rodrik et al., 2004). Their intervention, regulations, proposals and training services can

prove to be beneficial in the race to achieving sustainable economic growth. Some of the

most important services that are provided by institutions are depicted in Figure 13.

Institutions have promoted the technological advances that have alleviated various problems

(e.g., the Green Revolution played a significant role in reducing the number malnourished

people around the world). The higher demand for environmental quality can be the driver for

the establishment of environmental institutions that will clarify the respective problems and

will provide practical solutions (Panayotou, 2003).

High-quality institutions can contribute to a more sustainable economic growth and reduce

the threat to the environment. For instance, Panayotou (1997) has shown the reduction of

43

greenhouse gas emissions have results from the improvements in the quality of institutions

that exhibit a respect for contracts, the extent of government corruption, and efficiency of

bureaucracy.

For the agricultural sector, institutions can shape and influence farmers’ practices. Extension

services constitute the link between institutions and farmers. Agricultural institutions offer

training sessions that inform producers on how to use the different inputs and agricultural

machinery, the existence of new technologies, and the protection of the environment.

2.2.4 POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The political environment plays a leading role in the way that different societies deal with the

environment. Furthermore, the economic performance of a society is significantly affected by

the political system and institutions (North, 1991).

Agricultural policies and regulations can influence input choice and use at the farm level. For

instance, the European Union has banned some types of pesticides and has issued rules for

the sustainable use of other types of pesticides. Moreover, policy interventions like subsidies

can have significant impacts at a regional level. To increase their profits, farmers many times

abandon traditional crops that fit more to certain landscapes and climatic conditions simply

because a subsidy encourages production of another crop that is promising. This crop

switching can have devastating effects on the ecosystem as some new crops can prove to be

resource intensive.

On the other hand, policy initiatives like extension services enable farmers to enlarge their

knowledge on issues like good agricultural practices and the environment.

44

2.3 HUMAN HEALTH

Pesticides are classified as general-use and restricted-use pesticides. The general-use

pesticides are relatively non-toxic to humans, whereas the restricted-use pesticides are more

toxic to humans and require a warming label, precautionary handling procedures, and a

special permit for their use. However, any pesticide product, general- or restricted-use, must

be registered with the EU Commission (Directive 91/414) or the US Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) in order to insure that no unreasonable adverse effects to human

health or the environment occur.

The registration of a pesticide is a scientific, legal and administrative process (Monaco et al.,

2002; US EPA, 2009; European Communities, 2004). During this process, a wide variety of

potential human health and environmental effects associated with the use of a product is

assessed, considering the particular site or crop on which it is to be used, the amount,

frequency, and timing of its use, and the recommended storage and container disposal

practices. Results from tests conducted according to specific guidelines and under recognised

good laboratory practices (GLP) should be provided for registration. These results determine

whether a pesticide has the potential to cause adverse effects on humans, wildlife, fish, or

plants, including endangered species and non-target organisms, as well as possible

contamination of surface water and groundwater from leaching, runoff, and spray drift. A

pesticide is registered only if it is determined that it can be used to perform its intended

function without unreasonable adverse effects on humans or the environment.

Some of the most important scientific data needed for a pesticide registration are the

following (Monaco et al., 2002; US EPA, 2009; EU Commission, 2004):

45

Efficacy data (from laboratory and field trials indicating that the pesticide is effective

for the stated purpose).

Wildlife (animals, birds, microorganisms, honeybees, earthworms, Collembola, other

arthropod, other macro-organisms, mesocosm) and aquatic (fish, aquatic

invertebrates, aquatic plants, algae) acute toxicology data (acute (short-term effect),

subacute, and chronic (long-term effect) toxicity).

Health issues data (carcinogen, endocrine disrupter, reproduction/development

effects, acetyl cholinesterase inhibitor, neurotoxicant, respiratory tract irritant, skin

irritant, eye irritant).

Environmental fate and residue chemistry data (field stability, rate of degradation and

its breakdown (degradation) products, movement of the pesticide to ground and

surface waters, and potential for crop residues).

The increased use of pesticides during the last five decades has successfully protected crops

from pathogens (fungi, bacteria), animal pests (insects, mites, nematodes, rodents, birds,

slugs, snails) and weeds and resulted in increased yield of the best possible quality produces.

However, considerable public concern has resulted from their inappropriate use which has

been linked with adverse effects on human health (worker exposure during pesticide

application and consumer exposure to pesticide residues found in fresh fruit, vegetables and

drinking water) and on the environment (water and air contamination, toxicity on non-target

organisms) (Burger et al., 2008; Mariyono, 2008). These concerns led the European Union to

develop a Thematic Strategy on Sustainable Use of Pesticides (Commission of the European

Communities, 2006) and agricultural scientists to develop alternative crop management

systems in order to minimize the negative effects of conventional, pesticide-based farming to

the environment, workers and consumers’ health.

46

3 FACTORS AFFECTING PESTICIDE USE AND CONSUMER PERCEPTION

3.1 SUPPLY SIDE

Plant protection products constitute one of the most important agricultural inputs. As a

damage- and risk-reducing input, these products are widely used and their demand is

inelastic. Their stochastic nature (productivity and climatic conditions, pest arrival) is related

to uncertainty on the application timing and method. Additionally, pesticide application is

related to various externalities that call for an immediate orthological use of these chemical

substances. Pesticide risk valuation studies in conjunction with Integrated Pest Management

(IPM) strategies are providing the means of alleviating the above mentioned externalities.

3.1.1 PRODUCTIVITY AND PESTICIDE USE

Pesticides are active substances that enable farmers to control different pests or weeds,

constituting one of the most important inputs in agricultural production (Commission of the

European Communities, 2006). A large range of positive outcomes result from the use of

pesticides related to agricultural productivity (Figure 14).

47

Impacts of pesticide use on agricultural productivity

Secure crop yields

Combat hunger (developing world)

Improve health-nutrition (developing world)

Improve crop yields

Higher quality products

Higher farm revenues

Other

Reduce drudgery of weeding

Reduce fuel use for weeding

Faster and more efficient control of invasive species

Figure 14. Impacts of Pesticide Use on Agricultural Productivity

The potential benefits are particularly important in developing countries where crop losses

contribute to hunger and malnutrition (Anon, 2004). Therefore, pesticides can help in

securing crop yields, and thus they can combat hunger in these countries and improve the

populations’ health and nutrition. Additionally, improving crop yields and product quality

results in increased farm and agribusiness revenues. As weeds are the major constraint

reducing yields in many crops, herbicides are the most widely used type of pesticides. Anon

(2003) reports that the United States would have experienced a $13.3 billion loss in farm

income in 2003 if herbicides had not been used. Cooper and Dobson (2007) refer to a number

of benefits due to pesticide use. Among them are the improved shelf life of the produce,

reduced drudgery of weeding that frees labor for other tasks, reduced fuel use for weeding,

invasive species control, increased livestock yields and quality, and garden plants protection.

48

Pesticide Externalities

Health Effects

Irritations (skin, eyes, etc.)

Poisonings

Environmental Effects

Pest-disease proliferation

Resistance

Fishery losses

Chemical residuals in food

Loss of beneficial predators

Deaths

Bee poisonings/reduced pollination

Biodiversity loss

However, the benefits of pesticide use should always be evaluated in comparison with the

benefits and costs of other pest control methods (Edwards-Jones, 2008). Pesticide use may

have clear advantages in some occasions like ease of use and speed of control. But the use of

other pest control methods such as biocontrol agents or mechanical means may be preferable

in specific cases, and farmers and society should select the most appropriate method by

considering its benefits and costs.

3.1.2 PESTICIDE EXTERNALITIES

Figure 15. Pesticide Externalities

With the advent of Carson’s (1962) alert on the risks of pesticide use, the significant negative

externalities produced by continuous use of chemical inputs such as pesticides have been

broadly documented in the scientific literature (Pimentel et. al., 1992; Pimentel and Greiner,

49

1997). Figure 15 distinguishes between two categories of pesticide externalities: health and

environmental externalities. Pesticides are used not only in agriculture, but they are also

applied for landscaping, on sporting fields, for road and railway side weed control, in public

building maintenance and other activities. These substances can be dangerous for human

health when the degree of exposure exceeds the safety levels. This exposure can be direct

(such as the exposure of farm workers applying pesticides to various crops) or indirect (such

as exposure to consumers consuming agricultural products containing chemical traces or even

bystanders near application areas). Exposure to pesticides is responsible for various short-

and long-term ailments and even deaths (Wilson and Tisdell, 2001). This fact is supported

from Food and Agriculture Organization data (2008) that show that tens of thousands of

farmers each year are affected by exposure to pesticides. The largest number of poisonings

and deaths is recorded in developing countries, as most of the time farmers in these countries

do not use the appropriate protective equipment. In developed countries, farmers apply

pesticides from within closed environments, such as tractors or airplanes. In developing

countries, many of the farmers are small-scale operators who use hand sprayers and lack

protective equipment; therefore, they come into direct contact with pesticides.

Additionally, the excessive and uncontrolled use of pesticides can pose serious and

irreversible environmental risks and costs. Fauna and flora have been adversely affected,

while the decline of the number of beneficial pest predators has led to the proliferation of

different pests and diseases (Pimentel and Greiner, 1997). Certain pesticides applied to crops

eventually end up in ground and surface water. In surface water like streams and lakes,

pesticides can contribute to fishery losses in several ways (Pimentel et al., 1992). High

chemical concentrations can kill fish directly or indirectly (by killing the insects that serve as

fish food source). Moreover, the extensive use of pesticides has often resulted in the

50

development of pesticide-resistant weeds and pests, a result that can trigger farmers to

increase pesticide application further. Pimentel et al. (1992) mention many adverse

consequences from the overuse of pesticides, such as animal poisoning, contaminated

products, destruction of beneficial natural predators and parasites, bee poisoning and reduced

pollination, and crop and biodiversity losses.

3.1.3 PESTICIDE RISK VALUATION

There are many difficulties in calculating the economic value of reducing pesticide risk. Over

the last two decades, many attempts have been made to value pesticide risks. The meta-

analysis of Florax et al. (2005) and Travisi et al. (2006) provide a good overview of the

literature on pesticide risk valuation. These analyses have shown that the literature is very

diverse, providing willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates not only for various human health

risks, but also for environmental risks. However, the majority of studies estimate WTP for the

negative externalities on human health. Furthermore, the WTP estimates vary widely, as

some studies have found higher WTP for human safety than environmental quality (Foster

and Mourato, 2000), while others have shown higher WTP for environmental quality than for

food safety and human health (Balcombe et al., 2007). This mixed evidence is attributed to

the use of different valuation techniques and to differences among the available biomedical

and ecotoxicological data. Foster and Mourato (2000) provide a conjoint analysis of pesticide

risks by estimating the marginal value of risk reduction for human health and bird

biodiversity. Additionally, Schou et al. (2006) and Travisi and Nijkamp (2008) used a choice

experiment approach to estimate the economic value of reduced risks from pesticide use. The

latter approach was also used by Chalak et al. (2008), whose study found high WTP for

reduced pesticide use for both environmental quality and consumer health. Moreover, this

51

Uncertainty

Pest Arrival

Pesticide Productivity

Farmers’ Profits

Extent of Workers’ Exposure

Climatic Conditions

Resistance

Durability

Application timing

Application precision

study indicates the presence of heterogeneity in people’s preferences for pesticide reduction

in relation to environmental quality and food safety.

3.1.4 UNCERTAINTY IN AGRICULTURE

As pest arrival is an uncertain event and pesticide productivity varies across time and space,

farmers’ profits are also uncertain (Figure 16). This uncertainty can lead to overuse of

pesticides relative to the private or social optimum.

In an effort to avoid crop losses, risk-averse farmers apply pesticides at an early stage when

the pest population may not be at its peak. This action can induce extra costs as additional

pesticide doses are applied. On the other hand, waiting and monitoring the pest population

and applying pesticides when full information is available may cost extra money from crop

losses during the monitoring stages. Norgaard (1976) states that the major motivation for

pesticide application is the provision of some “insurance” against damage. Therefore,

uncertainty in the pest-pesticide system leads to a higher and more frequent use of pesticides.

52

Figure 16. Uncertainty and Pesticide Use

Moreover, there is uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of pesticides. Many times, farmers

lack full knowledge of the relation between pesticides and pest mortality (Feder, 1979). The

effectiveness of pesticides can be influenced by fluctuations of temperature, wind and

humidity conditions. Therefore, the uncertainty is high not only due to the fact that the pest

population can vary with changes in climatic conditions but also these changes can alter the

effect of pesticides as every chemical product has different durability. Feder (1979) shows

that an increase in the degree of uncertainty due to pest damage will cause an increase in the

volume of pesticide use. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1994) consider three scenarios of

uncertainty: a) uncertainty about crop growth conditions only; b) uncertainty about pest

damage only; and c) uncertainty about both growth conditions and pest damage. Their

findings support the conventional view that when there is uncertainty due to pest damage,

pesticides are likely to be risk-reducing inputs. However, the literature reports mixed findings

on the role of risk aversion. When both pest populations are high and growth conditions are

favorable, pesticides will be risk increasing as they increase the variability of harvests

(increase output under good growth conditions). Gotsch and Regev’s (1996) study for

Switzerland shows that fungicides for wheat producers have a risk-increasing effect on farm

revenues. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) have shown that pesticides may be risk-

increasing inputs even if a federal government provides crop insurances that act as a

substitute for additional pesticide applications.

53

Countries 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

EU (15 countries) 301217 348958 355527 352904 332807 327642 : : : : : :

Belgium1040

3 9276 9861 9521 9953 8845 9204 8822 9186 9776 : :Austria 3566 3690 3341 3419 3563 3133 3080 3386 3302 3404 : :Denmark 3669 3675 3619 2788 2747 2890 2722 : : : : :Estonia 118 197 191 184 306 329 329 322 357 393 467 459Finland 912 999 1164 1141 1146 1424 1620 1667 1489 1431 1645 :

France9788

910979

210775

312050

19469

49963

58244

87452

47609

97826

57161

27725

5

Germany3208

0 30721 33644 302313033

12788

52953

13016

42875

32951

2 : :

Greece 9870 9034 11479 101531113

11111

1 : : : : : :Hungary 6865 5314 6230 5795 5473 6431 8232 : : : : :Ireland 1782 2356 2534 2102 2133 2486 2796 2913 3104 2776 2874 :

Italy4805

0 84796 84526 820487983

17634

69471

18670

58429

28507

38145

0 :Latvia : : : : 284 369 339 418 597 733 2239 1052Luxembourg 357 332 430 421 : : : : : : : :Malta : : : : 184 217 222 243 : : : :

Netherlands 9847 10399 10721 10196 9655 7987 8073 7868 9071 9309 94101074

0Norway 706 754 954 796 378 518 818 658 824 511 690 :

Poland 9420 9501 8699 8469 8848 88551035

8 7184 87261603

91710

21530

3

Portugal1245

6 12750 14365 153961546

91549

11743

51704

61693

81634

61570

31668

9Slovenia : : : : 1469 1399 1164 1361 1560 1348 : :

Spain3323

6 34023 35070 336143459

73570

0 : : : : : :

Sweden 1529 1608 1629 1698 1652 1738 1711 2049 942 1527 1707 :United Kingdom

24433 24489 25382 25299

23601

23526

23526

22564

23463

23601

21151 :

:=Not available                        

Table 1. Total Sales of Pesticides in European Countries (tons of active ingredient)Source: Eurostat (2008)

Saha et al. (1997) report the importance of considering the stochastic nature of both the

damage control and the production function, in order to avoid overestimation of the marginal

54

productivity of damage control inputs. Furthermore, pesticide productivity is affected by the

level of the developed resistance. The more resistant the pest population, the higher the use of

the damage control agents (pesticides) until resistance is sufficiently pervasive and alternative

damage control measures are more cost effective.

3.1.5 PESTICIDE SALES IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The main users of pesticides at a European level are Italy, France, Spain, Germany and the

United Kingdom (Table 1). On the other hand, the lower positions are shared amongthe

Scandinavian countries that appear to have the lowest amount of pesticide purchases. In most

of the countries, pesticide sales during the period 1996-2007 appear to experience slight

fluctuations, but in general it can be concluded that either they increased slightly or remained

at the same level. Among the exceptions are Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Greece, where

pesticide sales increased, and Denmark, France and Germany, where considerable reductions

have been achieved. The increased pesticide sales in the above mentioned countries can be

attributed to the fact that the economic growth that they are experiencing is translated into

agricultural intensification in the rural areas with increased use of production inputs like

pesticides. Different climatic conditions around Europe are responsible for differences in the

types of pesticides used. Northern European countries that have humid climatic conditions

use more herbicides and fungicides (Appendix, Table 1, 2) while Mediterranean countries use

mainly insecticides (Appendix, Table 3), as the warm climate is responsible for a plethora of

insects. The sales of other pesticides (Appendix, Table 4) such as growth regulators and wood

preservatives have a small share in comparison to insecticides and herbicides.

3.1.6 TRENDS IN EU PLANT PROTECTION PRODUCT USE

55

Upon reviewing the trajectory of pesticide use in European Union (EU), Eurostat (2008)

trends are presented separately for EU-15 countries and EU-25 countries as data for the latter

were obtained after 2000. While total pesticide use increased steadily during the 1990’s, after

a period of stabilization at the end of 1990’s, pesticide use started to decrease (Figure 17).

Total pesticide consumption in EU

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Tonn

es o

f act

ive

ingr

edie

nt

EU-15

EU-25

Figure 17. Total Pesticide Consumption: EU15, EU25, 1992-2003Source: Eurostat (2008)

Figure 18 illustrates the use of different plant protection products (PPPs) at the EU-15 level.

The most widely used type of pesticide is fungicides, followed by herbicides, other PPPs

(growth regulators, wood preservatives, rodenticides), and insecticides. The use of fungicides

increased in the mid-1990’s but after this period continuously decreased. This decrease can

be attributed to in a shift to substances active at low dosages, dryer climatic conditions at the

56

Northern EU countries during the last years, and increasing information and knowledge at the

farm level (extension services, IPM) that leads to the application of more environmentally

friendly agricultural practices.

Use of different PPPs at an EU-15 level

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

160000

180000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Tonn

es o

f act

ive

ingr

edie

nt

Insecticides

Herbicides

Fungicides

Other PPPs

Figure 18. Use of PPPs at an EU-15 level (1992-2003)Source: Eurostat (2008)

Herbicide use followed an increasing trajectory until a decrease after 2002, while the use of

other PPPs increased in the mid-1990’s but after this period remained at the same level.

Finally, insecticide use seems to have followed a steady path throughout the period 1992-

2003. The EU enlargement and the data availability after 2000 have contributed to an

increase in the use of all PPPs. However, the years after 2000 show a stabilizing or a

decreasing trend in the use of all types of pesticides.

3.1.7 EU MEASURES FOR MANAGING PLANT PROTECTION PRODUCT USE

57

In addition to EU-level measures, member-countries of the EU have established national

policies, tools, and instruments for the purpose of managing the use of plant protection

products. This section discusses a number of such instruments, focusing on the farmers

applying pesticides mainly as professionals but also as amateurs.

3.1.7.1 FARMER TRAINING

All countries across the EU promote the training and education of farmers. This approach is

essential in more than one ways. Firstly, it aims at ensuring that farmers are fully aware of the

consequences of over-application or, generally, misguided application of pesticides.

Secondly, farmers become aware of alternatives to pesticides for plant protection and new

cultivation techniques. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, training courses teach farmers

to make careful selections with regard to inputs in their production process.

Of course, across EU member-countries, farmer training and education is carried out in

different ways. In addition to mandatory training courses, countries provide a variety of other

tools to raise the farmers’ level of expertise in pesticide handling and their awareness about

the risks surrounding their use. Several countries have promoted, in addition to their official

laws, Codes of Good Agricultural Practice (for example Cyprus, Malta, the UK, Bulgaria,

Slovenia, Germany, and Romania)4. The latter typically includes a set of formal guidelines

for the proper use of pesticides by farmers, so as to ensure human and animal health, and

environmental quality. These guidelines primarily seek to ensure that farmers apply the

correct type of pesticide, to the correct type of crop, at the correct dosage, using the correct

application procedure. The instructions also provide useful information regarding spraying,

mixing of different types of pesticides, disposal of empty pesticide containers, necessary

4 Cyprus: Ministry of Agriculture, Malta: Ministry for Rural Affairs and the Environment, UK, Germany and Slovenia: OECD (2006), Bulgaria and Romania: Black Sea NGO Network (website).

58

precautions to be taken prior to and during the application of pesticides, and other

instructions regarding their safe use. These codes seek to ensure farmer health and a high

level of food quality, with no (or the least possible) pesticide residues.

An interesting example of such guidelines can be found in Finland, where farmer training

received particular attention when the Balanced Crop Protection project took place between

2000 and 2006. During this time a team of scientists, advisors, and members of the

agricultural industry worked together to produce a series of booklets that provided directions

for balanced protection for 24 different types of crops and also one book addressing crop

protection in ecological farming. These booklets provided useful information to farmers,

covering issues such as selecting the right variety of crop, the right field, the right crop

rotation, and the right crop protection method. Farmers were required to purchase the booklet

covering the crops they grew and, as a result, their training was promoted substantially (Autio

and Hynninen, 2007).

Several European countries, including Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the

UK and Poland have, at times, established “demonstration farms” where farmers can observe

various cultivation methods and practices and alternative ways through which they can

protect their crops without damaging the environment. Demonstration farms may differ from

one country to another due to different climates, or the types of agricultural products each

country produces. Nevertheless, the basic idea underlining their implementation is that

demonstrating to farmers what they should do is generally more effective than simply

instructing them.5

5 Germany: OECD (2006), Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the UK and Poland: Balsari and Marucco (2008).

59

The internet has also proven to be an efficient way to channel knowledge and provide useful

tools to pesticide users, in terms of both legislation and general information about the use of

plant protection products. All member-states of the EU have at least one website providing

this sort of information, and, in addition, a regularly updated register of authorised plant

protection products and active substances. Public access to information is also strongly

promoted throughout the EU.

Professional users of PPPs in the EU are generally required to possess a certificate of

knowledge in order to purchase and use certain types of highly toxic substances. The

procedures for obtaining such certificates may differ from one member-state to another, but

the basic idea is the same; that is, in order to be allowed to use (at least certain types of very

toxic) plant protection products, users first need to acquire a certain level of knowledge about

the use and properties of these substances, so as to be fully aware of all their effects. It is

generally the case that these certificates are only valid over a certain period. In the

Netherlands, for example, certificates of professional users are reviewed every five years

(OECD, 2006). Similarly, in France and Finland, farmers must attend obligatory re-training

every five years.6

3.1.7.2OTHER FARMER SUPPORT MEASURES

Another form of farmer support comes through the creation of advice systems, information

systems, decision support systems, discussion groups and any other forms of additional

guidance and consultancy to farmers, even after they have completed a training course and/or

received a certificate. The UK, Denmark, Sweden and Germany, for example, have

6 Finland: Autio and Hynninen, 2007, France: Duclay and Casala, 2007.

60

implemented such systems (OECD, 2006). Providing farmers with proper guidance is

essential because it typically prevents them from breaking the rules. Information systems may

also be useful in informing the agricultural sector about what equipment is available in the

market. In France, for example, measures are taken so that the most efficient equipment

receives wide publicity, and those working in the farming sector are well informed as to

which equipment offers them the best protection (Duclay and Casala, 2007).

Policies targeting the education of farmers are complemented by policies seeking to ensure

farmer safety. Pesticide use creates risks to human health, and for the farmer, the primary

cause of these risks comes from direct exposure to the chemicals during their application.

Because health problems for farmers (or any user for that matter) may result from exposure, it

is mandatory in EU member-countries for all application equipment to be thoroughly tested

prior to use and, also, to be regularly tested after certain periods of time.

The procedures followed for checking plant protection application equipment and the time

between checks vary from one country to another. In Germany, for example, the testing of

spraying equipment is performed every two years (OECD, 2006). In France, minimum

quality standards for new or second-hand spraying equipment sold have been imposed, and

measures are taken to improve the quality of application equipment through regular

inspections (Duclay and Casala, 2007). Similarly, in Slovenia and the Czech Republic

application equipment intended for professional use is subject to obligatory assessment prior

to being placed on sale, and is thereafter subject to frequent obligatory checks to verify its

technical condition.7 There are cases when, if spraying equipment does not meet certain

standards, or if violations have occurred, corrective actions may take place, such as the

7 Slovenia: OECD (2006), Czech Republic: European Commission, The Food and Veterinary Office, Country Profile of the Czech Republic (from website).

61

imposition of fines (in Estonia, for example, fines up to €962 may be imposed), or warnings

or official reports may be issued (as in Belgium). In Bulgaria and Latvia tests may be

performed without prior warning.8 In Cyprus there is currently no law that regulates the

testing of application equipment, but an EU directive is expected to be adopted in 2009,

which will make it mandatory for spraying equipment to be tested every three years

(Lyssandrides, 2008).

In general, all efforts focusing on farmer training and support in the EU have in common the

goal of making farmers take into consideration the health and environmental effects of

pesticide applications, and therefore make careful decisions and avoid excessive and

unnecessary use of plant protection products. Training courses and advice services are two

very effective channels trough which alternative methods of crop protection (other than the

chemical ones) can be promoted. Thus, in cases where the application of chemical substances

is necessary, applications are promoted subject to “need-based” and “minimum-necessary”

principles.

Table 2 summarises the measures implemented in EU countries to make farmers use

pesticides correctly.

Table 2. Summary of Tools and Measures Focusing On Farmers

Farmer training and education

Requirement for professional users to obtain certificate of knowledge in order to be allowed to use (at least certain) pesticides on a professional basis

Review of certificates after certain time periods

8 European Commission, The Food and Veterinary Office, Country Profiles of Estonia, Belgium, Bulgaria and Latvia.

62

Publication of Codes of Good Agricultural Practice by national authorities

Printed instructions on specific issues and other forms of formal guidelines

Demonstration farms

Easy access to information (i.e., via the internet)

Regularly updated registers of authorised pesticides and active ingredients

Advice and information systems/consultancy

Decision support systems

Discussion groups

Promotion of best technical (application and protection) equipment

Mandatory checks of application equipment prior to being placed on the market, prior to use and also at frequent time periods

Setting of quality standards for application equipment

Imposition of fines in cases of non-compliance

3.1.7.3OTHER REGULATORY MEASURES

A major task in the effort to achieve a sustainable pesticide use in Europe is the creation of

detailed databases on the use of plant protection products and their various impacts. To this

end, it is a legal obligation for farmers in the EU to keep records of the plant protection

products they use. Records generally include information about individual applications, the

commercial names of the plant protection products that were used, as well as their active

substances, the type of crop to which each product was applied, the reasons for which the

applications took place, the dosages and application methods, the application dates, and the

harvest dates. Keeping these records not only provides the basis for establishing an effective

national monitoring network, but can also be a useful guide to the future use of pesticides as

it helps farmers review their previous applications and improve their future plant protection

63

activities. A summary of non-economic measures employed to limit pesticide applications is

presented in Table 3.

Distributors and sellers of plant protection products in all EU member-countries are also

required to keep records of their sales. In the Czech Republic, for example, it is obligatory,

since 2004, for all entities producing or placing pesticides on sale to provide detailed data on

the volume of sales of individual pesticides to the State Phytosanitary Administration (UN,

Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development).

Similarly, in Belgium, sellers are required to complete special forms when selling a product

intended for professional use (European Commission - FVO: Country Report of Belgium,

2007). In Slovenia, marketers of plant protection products must establish and keep records on

the quantities of purchased and sold PPPs, as well as evidence of stocks, and report these

quantities to the competent authority (OECD, 2006).

It is also a general rule in EU member-countries that the marketing of plant protection

products is restricted to persons who fulfil several conditions with regard to technical and

professional knowledge on the use and properties of PPPs. Therefore, only persons acquiring

a certificate of such knowledge are allowed to sell plant protection products (at least those

intended for professional use) within the EU. In addition to obtaining a certificate, sellers

must complete training courses. Products intended strictly for professional use may only be

sold in specialised shops that meet certain criteria in order to be authorised with selling

permits. These shops are subject to regular inspections. With this in mind, efforts are being

made across EU countries to establish the separation of pesticides into those intended for

professional and those intended for amateur use.9

9 EC-FVO Country Profiles; OECD (2006).

64

Regarding authorisation of plant protection products, each EU country has its own authorities

responsible for evaluating and assessing the quality of PPPs (the content of their active

substances and their physicochemical properties) and publishing a regularly updated register

of authorised PPPs and their active substances.10 When a country does not have competent

staff for toxicological or ecotoxicological assessments or assessments of environmental fate

and behaviour, as is the case in Cyprus, authorisations are granted on the basis of

authorisations in other member-countries (European Commission - FVO: Country Report of

Cyprus, 2008). In some cases an administrative fee is charged for the authorisation.

The marketing and use of PPPs is controlled by authorities appointed to carry out controls at

all levels, including the production, packaging, storage, distribution, imports, selling, and use

of PPPs. The control is carried out by trained inspectors of the national authority responsible

for monitoring. The monitoring authorities may support inspectors by issuing frequently

updated procedure manuals (as in Latvia – EC – FVO, 2008), and guidelines, instructions and

training programs (as in Poland – source EC – FVO, 2007). At selling points, controls may

include checks regarding the presence of unauthorised PPPs at storage facilities and the

user’s certificate validation. At the user level, checks are made for the possession and use of

unauthorised PPPs, the storage of PPPs, the existence of proper application and protection

equipment, and the proper maintenance of spraying records.

Although competent authorities prepare the national plans for scheduled checks and

inspections, additional random checks may be carried out under special conditions raising

suspicion (as in Bulgaria – EC – FVO, 2007). Fines may also be imposed on violators (as in

the Czech Republic – EC – FVO, 2008). National plans may also be carried out at a regional

10 Detailed information about the national authorities responsible for the authorisation of pesticides in each member state is available on the European commission website, FVO Country Profiles section at http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/country_profiles_en.cfm

65

level so as to better capture specific local aspects, as is the case with Latvia (European

Commission - FVO: Country Report of Latvia, 2008).

Research and development in the field of plant protection is also strongly supported in the

EU. Research conducted in EU member-countries covers several aspects of this issue,

including risk reduction (Germany), spraying techniques, need-based crop protection, organic

farming and pesticide alternatives (Sweden), minimising pesticide use through biological

rather than chemical controls and improved targeting of pesticides (United Kingdom),

creating risk indicators (Sweden, Hungary), development of Low Dose Systems (LDS) and

improvement of spraying techniques (the Netherlands), and development of forecasting and

advice systems for diseases (the Netherlands). More information about this is given in OECD

(2006).

66

Table 3. Summary of General Measures Aimed at Reducing Pesticide Use

Creation of databases on pesticide applications

Requirement for farmers to keep detailed records of pesticide applications (individual applications, commercial names of used PPPs and their active substances, type of crop to which the pesticide was applied, reasons for applying the pesticide, dosages, application methods, application and harvest dates, etc.)

Requirement for sellers and distributors to keep records of sales

Pesticide marketing restricted only to certified shops

Requirement for sellers to possess a certificate of knowledge

Requirement for sellers to go through training courses

PPPs intended for professional use to be strictly sold in specialised and licensed shops

Separation of PPPs into those intended for professional and amateur use

National authorities responsible for authorising PPPs and active substances and publishing a regularly updated register

Controls on the marketing and use of PPPs at several levels (production, packaging, storage, distribution, import, selling, use/farm level) by national authorities

Training of the inspectors of monitoring authorities

Additional help for inspectors by national authorities (procedure manuals, guidelines, instructions, training programs)

Random inspections to ensure compliance at any given time

Imposition of fines to violators of national laws

Research and development in a wide array of topics (pesticide alternatives, risk reduction, spraying techniques, use reduction methods, risk indicators, creation of forecasting and advice systems, etc.)

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3.1.8 PESTICIDE DEMAND ELASTICITY

The calculation of pesticide demand elasticities is important in order to design an EU-wide

regulatory framework for levies on pesticides. If pesticide demand is inelastic the tax or levy

introduced will not affect pesticide use significantly but it will create revenues that can be

reimbursed to the agricultural sector. Table 4 presents a review of the pesticide demand

elasticity estimates of European countries and the United States. A general conclusion based

on this table is that the price elasticity of demand for pesticides is quite low (in most of the

cases), indicating that pesticide use is indifferent to pesticide price increases. Inelastic

demand can mean that there is a lack of knowledge among farmers on alternative production

practices, that there is a strong intention towards risk-aversion, or even that behavioral

factors like professional pride derived from weed-free fields affect pesticide demand.

Another important point is that the more specific the pesticide (fungicides, insecticides), the

higher the elasticity of demand is. The reason behind this is that there are not so many

substitutes to these specific products, resulting in difficulty for farmers who wish to adjust

their agricultural practices.

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Table 4. Pesticide Demand Elasticity Estimates Study Country/Region Elasticity

Aaltink (1992) Netherlands -0.13 to -0.39

Antle (1984) USA -0.19

Bauer et al. (1995) German regions, wheat -0.02

Brown & Christensen (1981) USA -0.18

Carpentier (1994) France, arable farms -0.3

DHV & LUW (1991) Netherlands -0.2 to -0.3

Dubgaard (1987) Denmark -0.3 (threshold approach)

Dubgaard (1991) Denmark -0.7 (herbicides)

Dubgaard (1991) Denmark -0.8 (fungicides + insecticides)

Ecotec (1997) UK -0.5 to -0.7 (herbicides)

Elhorst (1990) Netherlands -0.3

Falconer (1997) UK (East Anglia arable production) -0.1 to -0.3

Gren (1994) Sweden -0.4 (fungicides)-0.5 (insecticides)-0.9 (fungicides)

Johnsson (1991) Sweden -0.3 t0 -0.4 (pesticides)

Komen et al. (1995) Netherlands -0.14 to -0.25

Lichtenberg et al. (1988) USA -0.33 to -0.66

McIntosh & Georgia (USA) -0.11Williams (1992)

Oskam et al. (1992) Netherlands -0.1 to -0.5 (pesticides)

Oskam et al. (1997) EU -0.2 to -0.5 (pesticides)

Oude Lansink (1994) Netherlands, arable farms -0.12

Oude Lansink & Netherlands -0.48 (pesticides)Peerlings (1995)

Papanagioutou (1995) Greece -0.28

Petterson et al. (1989) Sweden -0.2

Rude (1992) Sweden -0.22 to -0.32

Russell et al. (1995) UK (Northwest) -1.1 (pesticides in cereals)

SEPA (1997) Sweden -0.2 to -0.4

Schulte (1983) Three German regions -0.23 to -0.65

Villezca-Becerra & Texas & Florida (USA) -0.16 to -0.21Shumway (1992)

Source: Hoevenagel & van Noort (1999); Falconer & Hodge (2000); Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (1998)

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3.1.9 DAMAGE CONTROL SPECIFICATION

The concept of damage abatement input was first introduced by Hall and Norgaard (1973)

and Talpaz and Borosh (1974). Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986) were the first to specify

production functions that are consistent with the concept that pesticides are damage

abatement input that have an indirect effect on output rather than a direct yield-increasing

effect. The use of damage control inputs can have both positive and negative effects on

output like the development of pest resistance that can lead to decreased output even if there

is increasing use of pesticides. Damage control inputs reduce damage from natural causes

and, except for pesticides, this class of production inputs include windbreaks, buffer zones

and antibiotics. The damage control framework proposed by Lichtenberg and Zilberman (LZ)

(1986) has important economic value. This framework enabled economists and policy makers

to observe that the (then standard) Cobb-Douglas formulations were resulting in an upward

bias in the optimal pesticide use estimations (underuse of pesticides) while recent evidence

suggests an overuse. Additionally, the damage control specification accounts for changes in

pesticide productivity and enables the prediction of producers’ behavior. Pest resistance

initially triggers farmers to apply more pesticides until alternative damage control measures

become more cost effective. The LZ damage control specification was applied by Babcock et

al. (1992), Carrasco-Tauber and Moffit (1992), Chambers and Lichtenberg (1994) and Oude

Lansink and Carpentier (2001). The results are mixed with some studies indicating overuse of

pesticides and others underuse.

Although in general the LZ specification has been successfully applied and constitutes a

considerable innovation, some authors have expressed various critiques. Oude Lansink and

Carpentier (2001) have shown that in a quadratic production function the lack of

differentiation between damage abatement inputs and productive inputs does not lead to

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overestimation of the marginal product as Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986) argued.

Additionally, they separate inputs into those that increase productivity and those that reduce

damage and assume that there is an interaction between damage abatement and other

production inputs, where the LZ specification precludes these interactions. Oude Lansink and

Silva (2004) challenge the assumption of a nondecreasing damage control function and

assumptions imposed on parameters in the damage control model.

3.1.10 INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT AND ALTERNATIVE CROPPING SYSTEMS

Since the mid 1940’s chemical control has become the most widely used form of pest

management, and many growers rely heavily on pesticides to deal with pest problems. These

systems are characterised by routine, preventative treatments, often using broad spectrum

and/or highly persistent active ingredients. The use of pre-emergence herbicides is a common

feature of such systems, and is useful as an illustration of the general approach. The treatment

is applied regardless of weed species or population. If the active ingredient is broad spectrum,

the product is effective against a broad spectrum of weeds, and it remains in the environment

for long periods – often several months (Anon, 2007). This is equally true of other pests and

situations such as the routine application of fungicides for late blight, or insecticides against

aphids or the addition of nematicides to irrigation water. In addition to preventative

treatments, pesticides are also seen as the main solution to problems when they do arise.

Crops are therefore often treated without regard to important factors such as the magnitude of

the problem; the susceptibility of the predominant pest lifecycle stage; the stage of crop

development; and the presence or absence of natural enemies. As with preventative

treatments the active ingredients of choice are often broad spectrum, in order to treat several

problems with one application.

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The many problems caused by over reliance on pesticides, both in terms of their impact on

human health and the environment, are well documented and are not discussed further as part

of this review, but many documents are available from the PSD Website

(www.pesticides.gov.uk). As a result of these problems, and pressure from consumers,

retailers and governments, there has been a move towards reducing pesticide use, by

combining several approaches into pest management systems.

3.1.10.1 INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT

DEFINITION, CONCEPTS, AND METHODS

Integrated Pest Management (IPM) aims at farming with a relatively low input of plant

protection products and a very high efficiency of their use. Based on ecological, sociological

and economic factors, it emphasizes the development of alternative pest control practices

(genetic, biological, mechanical, and cultural). Allen and Bath (1980) claim that the

definition of IPM is “extremely pluralistic,” pointing out that some disciplines see pesticides

as the dominating element of IPM, while others focus on natural enemies and mechanical and

cultural practices. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines IPM as

“an effective and environmentally sensitive approach to pest management that relies on a

combination of common-sense practices.” Information on the life cycle of different pests and

their interaction with the environment has a central role in an IPM program. This information

is used in conjunction with existing pest control practices to address the problem of crop

losses due to pests, in an environmentally friendly and economically viable way.

IPM constitutes a mixture of pest control methods and decisions at the farm level. EPA

expresses the method as consisting of four steps. The first is setting action thresholds (pest

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levels) at which pests can pose an economic threat and therefore action needs to be taken. In

the second step, farmer has to monitor and identify the pests of his/her field. This step is

essential as it enables farmers to recognize innocuous and beneficial species, to judge if there

is a real need to use pesticides, and if it seems necessary to use some type of pesticide, to use

the correct one. In the third step, methods/practices should be undertaken to prevent pests

from becoming a threat. Among these methods are cultural methods like crop rotation and

planting of pest-resistant varieties. Only in the fourth and final step should rigorous action be

taken. Initially, less risky control methods (e.g., mechanical control) are chosen, but when

farm operators identify that they are not effective enough, then additional control methods

can be employed (e.g. targeted spraying of pesticides).

IPM systems were first developed in the late 1950’s in the United States and have continued

to be improved and extended to a wide range of situations and geographical locations ever

since. They rely first and foremost on cultural, physical and biological controls to prevent

problems arising and consider pesticide use to be the last resort.

However, much of the literature and research work has focused on the role of pesticides

within IPM systems, and in particular developing techniques that eliminate unnecessary or

unjustified applications. The concept of economic thresholds was one of the first systems

developed to help growers do this. It was first proposed in the late 1950’s by Stern et al.

(1959). It is based on the premise that the amount of damage a particular pest causes to a

particular crop can be determined by measuring the level of pest incidence in sample areas of

the field. The cost of a particular pest management intervention is then ascertained. By

combining these two pieces of information, it is possible to calculate the level of pest

incidence above which the benefit of protecting the crop outweighs the cost of the control

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measure. This is called the economic injury level (EIL) and can be used to make a decision

on whether or not to spray. The basic concept has been modified and improved upon many

times over the last 50 years, for example: to apply it to preventative measures (Stejskal,

2003); to deal with, or at least define, uncertainty (Peterson and Hunt, 2003); and to take

account of natural enemy populations (Benson, 1997). In addition pest-damage relationships

have been identified for key pests on many crops, including soybean (Stone and Pedigo,

1972), tomatoes (Torres-Vila et al., 2003), potatoes (Connell, T. R et al., 1991), protected

crops (Sanchez et al., 2007) and strawberries (Tuovinen and Parikka, 1997).

A second approach to using pesticides in IPM systems involves taking the characteristics of

the pesticide and its application into account to minimise its impact on non-target species and

the wider environment. This is sometimes described as “biorational” pesticide use (Perfect,

2000). Broadly speaking, there are two elements to this approach:

1) Choosing the right pesticide: The ideal pesticide from an IPM perspective is both

specific to the target organism and non-persistent. Many products with these qualities are

biologically based, for example microbial pesticides (Dent, 2000) and insect pheromones

(van Emden, 1989). However, synthetic pesticides also vary widely in terms of their

specificity and persistence. The International Organisation for Biological Control (IOBC) has

developed guidance for growers by classifying protection measures (which includes non-

chemical methods as well as pesticides) into color-coded lists (Boller et al., 2004). The Green

List contains non-chemical approaches and plant protection products considered to be low

risk in terms of several characteristics, including: toxicity to humans, natural enemies and

other non target organisms; their potential for environmental pollution; the risk of causing

secondary pest resurgence and resistance problems; selectivity and persistence; necessity of

use; and the amount of incomplete or missing information. The Yellow List contains those

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pesticides that do not qualify for the Green List, but their use is justified because, for

instance, they are important for resistance management or are deemed necessary for precisely

defined and exceptionally difficult cases. The Red List substances are considered to be

particularly hazardous. IPM practitioners should obviously be aiming for measures on the

green list and the Yellow List in exceptional circumstances.

2) Applying pesticides selectively: Pesticides can be made to be more selective by applying

them in ways that are less likely to expose non-target species. For example, by applying

treatments when pests are at the most susceptible stage in their life cycle; by avoiding periods

when important natural enemy populations are at their peak; by using appropriate

formulations and application systems, such Low and Ultra-Low Volume application

equipment, electrostatic sprayers; and by employing other approaches that ensure that the

placement of pesticides leads to maximum exposure of the pest and minimal exposure of non-

target species and the environment (Dent, 2000).

UPTAKE OF IPM SYSTEMS

The degree to which IPM systems have been adopted varies widely in different parts of the

world. Governments in a number of developing countries have embraced IPM

enthusiastically, and its implementation is a major focus of the extension and advisory

services in those countries. For example, the FAO Community IPM programme in South East

Asia trained over 2 million rice farmers between 1990 to 1999 in the region, using the Farmer

Field School approach (Pontius et al., 2002). This and similar programmes in many other

parts of the world have been able to demonstrate significant reductions in pesticide use on

several different crops, while maintaining yields and thus increasing profitability (van den

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Berg and Jiggins, 2007; Pontius et al., 2002; Sherwood, 2000; Kanoute et al., 1999;

Bradshaw and Parham, 1996; Simpson and Owens, 2002).

In Europe, IPM uptake has been greatest among horticultural growers. This has been

especially true of top fruit and protected cropping producers (Gordon, 2008; Cross et al.,

2001; Solomon et al., 2000; Bradshaw and Parham, 1996; van Lenteren et al., 1992),

although there are some exceptions, notably hops, where insurance spraying remains

widespread (Bradshaw and Parham, 1996). This sector has experienced a range of pesticide-

related problems, including resistant pest populations, secondary pest resurgence, and

unacceptably high pesticide residues. It has therefore embraced biological control, which has

meant that growers have had to carefully consider the type of pesticides and the timing of

applications to prevent decimation of the previously introduced natural enemy populations.

In other sectors, however, the approach has not been adopted to the same extent. This is

partly due to a lack of understanding of basic concepts. Bradshaw and Parham (1996),

working in the UK, found that many arable producers had no clear idea of what constituted

an IPM system and therefore held no strong views on its effectiveness. In other cases, the

principles are clearly understood, but the system fails to take key factors into account.

Czapar et al. (1997), for instance, found that the use of economic thresholds to make weed

control decisions was low among soybean producers in Illinois. Part of the problem was that

most growers perceived the main issue with weeds to be interference with harvest rather than

competition with the crops, making the economic injury level (EIL) calculations less than

relevant.

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In addition to these broader issues, there are a range of specific problems identified. One of

the major difficulties is that the EIL approach tends to relate to one particular pest on one

particular crop, whereas growers usually have to deal with a complex of species, making it

difficult for them to make sense of the economic thresholds. As a result, they often revert to

calendar spraying (Dent, 2000). There is also room for error during the collection of field

data and care needs to be taken to ensure that when data is collected from the field, the

sampling system is robust enough to reflect the true pest population. Many sampling systems

take very little account of several factors that might affect pest populations, for instance, the

presence or absence of natural enemies, and how sprays might exacerbate problems through

secondary pest resurgence (van Emden, 1989). In addition, Czapar et al. (1997) found that the

time required for scouting the fields and gaps in growers’ pest identification skills were also

contributors to the low uptake.

THE ROLE OF DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS

One of the problems underpinning the use of IPM is that growers have to make complex

decisions, based on a large number of factors that are sometimes extremely variable. A large

number of decision support systems have been developed to address this issue. Fore example,

systems have been developed to address: oil and seed rape diseases (Gladders et al., 2006);

late blight in potato (Rohrig et al., 2000); EUCABLIGHT Website); arable production (arable

DS website); organic conversion (Padel, 2001a); and optimal use of nitrogen and other

nutrients (EU-ROTATE Website; MANNER Website).

Basically, these systems assimilate raw data from a variety of sources such as weather data,

price information, farm specific data, output from pest monitoring, and forecasting networks

(Finch et al., 1996) (www.rothamsted.bbsrc.ac.uk/examine) (Rohrig et al., 2000) and many

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more. Once this data is assimilated, sophisticated computer software processes and interprets

it and presents it in a form that is useful to growers.

Evidence suggests that these systems have the potential to significantly increase the uptake of

IPM and other types of integrated systems and therefore bring about equally significant

reductions in pesticide use (Offer et al., 2005; Rohrig et al., 2000). However, the relatively

few studies on the extent to which these decision support systems have been taken up by

growers suggest that their usage remains low (Offer and Gibbons, 2006; Parker, 2005; Parker

and Campion, 1997). Some fundamental issues, such as problems with collecting good farm

data, are not addressed by decision support tools. In addition, collecting data from external

sources and ensuring it is up to date is a challenge, particularly when it is subject to frequent

changes such as weather and price information. For cost-benefit type calculations, there is an

added difficulty because the model has to estimate the prices that will be attained after

harvest, which can be several months after the point at which decisions have to be made

(Offer et al., 2005). Additional time also has to be spent learning the necessary skills to run

such programmes.

In summary, many of the decision support systems available do not deliver sufficient benefit

for the money and time required to use them. A number of actions can be taken to encourage

wider use of these systems (Offer and Gibbons, 2006; Offer et al., 2005; Parker, 2005; Parker

and Campion, 1997), including:

Publicising their availability more widely.

Providing training for new users and ongoing support. Making tools available on the

internet and expecting farmers and their advisors to access them has not proved a

successful strategy (Offer et al., 2005). Training workshops are an expensive way of

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getting products out, but they are by far the most successful and provide valuable

opportunities for developers and end users to interact.

Ensuring that the questions the systems seek to answer are the same ones that need

addressing for growers. This can be achieved by involving growers and advisors at an

early stage in the development of the system.

Providing more benefit for less investment of time.

Integrating data sources and system programmes better, so that price and weather

data, for example, can be imported into the system quickly and easily, and the need to

re-enter data that has already been used elsewhere is minimised.

3.1.10.2 INTEGRATED CROP MANAGEMENT (ICM)

DEFINITION, CONCEPTS AND METHODS

IPM systems are very much focused on the management of insect pests, pathogens and

weeds. Integrated Crop Management (ICM) embraces the principles of IPM, but takes one

step back by integrating the management of individual crops and crop production strategies to

provide benefits such as pest control and the maintenance of soil fertility. It is difficult to

formally define ICM without losing the essence of the approach, and this has led to working

definitions being developed in a particular context, a large number which are provided by

Bradley et al. (2002). Essentially the concept recognises that within a crop, one aspect of

management can impact positively, either directly or indirectly, on another. For example,

good soil and soil fertility management produces a well-balanced and well-structured soil at

the right pH. This promotes good vigorous growth of young plants, which, with optimal

water management, smother out weeds and enables plants to tolerate attacks from pests and

diseases, which in turn reduces reliance on pesticides.

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While ICM systems have the potential to be lower input, this is by no means always the case.

Indeed, Bradley et al. (2002) are quite clear that “modern techniques are an important

component of ICM and this reflects a key point of difference in comparison to organic

farming, which can be thought of, at least in principle if not always in practice, as rejecting

modern techniques such as artificial inputs.”

UPTAKE OF ICM METHODS

There are a number of ICM projects and initiatives in the EU. Bradley et al. (2002) carried

out the most recent and comprehensive review of ICM systems in the EU, although they

emphasised that theirs was not an exhaustive study. They identified two broad categories of

systems: those that have been established for research purposes and those that have been set

up and run commercially. They identified 10 research projects and 42 commercial initiatives.

Together, they cover a wide range of arable and horticultural crops, although further analysis

shows that the research-driven projects tended to focus more on arable systems, while the

commercial systems were based more on horticultural enterprises.

The focus of all these systems was very clearly on efficient use of fertiliser and pesticide

inputs, and all projects included protocols and guidelines on these aspects of crop

management. In contrast, cultural controls such as soil husbandry and cultivation techniques,

variety selection, and crop rotation were addressed in only half the schemes studied and post-

harvest and irrigation issues in about a third.

The most recent published information on the uptake of ICM systems in Europe appears to be

from data collected between 1995 to 1998 (depending on member state), and published by the

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European Crop Protection Association (ECPA) (Table 5). ECPA is currently investigating

whether more up- to-date information is available.

Table 5: Uptake of ICM in the EU (1995-1998)

Member State Area of ICM (ha)

Total UAA (ha) ICM Area as Proportion of Total UAA

Austria 608,097 3,423,000 17.8%Belgium 7,140 1,382,000 0.5%Denmark 637,100 2,764,000 23.0%Finland 14,390 2,150,000 0.7%France 133,000 30,169,000 0.4%Germany 225,070 17,327,000 1.3%Greece 268 3,465,000 0.0%Ireland 19,187 4,434,000 0.4%Italy 159,381 15,256,000 1.0%Netherlands 29,970 1,848,000 1.6%Portugal 57,969 3,942,000 1.5%Spain 38,507 29,377,000 0.1%Sweden 157,138 3,109,000 5.1%UK 1,554,203 15,858,000 9.8%EU Total 3,641,420 15 134,631,000 2.7%

Note: The area of ICM is sourced from ECPA and total UAA is sourced from The Agricultural Situation in the Community and refers to 1997, the last year for which data are available. The year for each Member State is unknown, although is believed to be between 1995 and 1998. The true area of ICM is therefore likely to have increased. The true area will also be underestimated because there will be farmers using ICM techniques who are not registered in official schemes.

Source: Bradley et al., 2002

There was considerable variation between member states. The UK had, by far, the largest

land area, at about 1.5 million hectares (ha), while in Greece the area was practically

negligible (only 268 ha). However, this is likely to be an underestimate as it only includes

growers in a recognised scheme. There are likely to be many more who have adopted the

principles and practices but are not part an ICM scheme (de Buck et al., 2001).

As discussed above, there is no one definition of ICM, and therefore there are significant

differences in term of the practices at farm level both between countries and between

schemes operating in the same country.

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3.1.10.3 INTEGRATED PRODUCTION SYSTEMS

DEFINITION, CONCEPTS AND METHODS

If ICM takes a broader systems view than IPM, then Integrated Production (IP) systems, or

Integrated Farming Systems as they are also called, take an even broader view. Whereas ICM

tends to focus on the management within an individual crop, IP systems work across the

entire farming system. The IOBC originally set out the principles of IP in 1992. These have

been updated a number of times, the most recent revision being in 2004 (Boller et al., 2004).

These guidelines are now widely accepted and are the basis of many IP systems today

(Neumeister, 2007).

Boller et al. (2004) define IP as “a farming system that produces high quality food and other

products by using natural resources and regulating mechanisms to replace polluting inputs

and to secure sustainable farming.” It places emphasis on: a holistic approach, involving the

entire farm as the basic unit; the central role of agro ecosystems; well-balanced nutrient

cycles; and the welfare of animals. The preservation and improvement of soil fertility and a

diversified environment and the observation of ethical and social criteria are essential

components. Biological, technical and chemical methods are carefully balanced, taking into

account the protection of the environment, profitability and social requirements.

UPTAKE OF IP SYSTEMS

There are number of recognised IP schemes in Europe. The European Initiative for

Sustainable Development in Agriculture (EISA) links seven national schemes (outlined in

Table 6). In addition to the EISA network, there are a number of other schemes such as

FRUITNET for pomme fruit in Belgium; Leguambiente covering a wide range of crops in

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Italy; SAIO for Fruit in Switzerland; and IP-SUISSE covering other sectors such as arable

and livestock products in Switzerland (Neumeister, 2007).

Collectively these schemes involve large numbers of growers. However, detailed information

on the number and areas of crops involved is difficult to obtain for many countries. LEAF

provided data for their UK and international operations, which is presented by crop and per

country in Table 7. EISA is currently investigating whether data is available for others

countries and projects.

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Table 6: Summary of EISA members

Name Country Description/ aimsFARRE Forum de l ’Agriculture Raisonnée Respectueuse de l ’Environnement

France Formed in 1993 to promote integrated farming as a means of securing a return for farmers; meeting consumer demands; and caring for the environment. The FARRE Farm Exchange Network provides a platform for an exchange of views and the opportunity to communicate with the non-farming public. By November 2001, the Farm Exchange Network consisted of 350 demonstration farms in 52 different regions of France.

FILLFördergemeinschaft IntegrierteLandbewirtschaftung Luxemburg

Luxemburg Promotes Integrated Farming Systems in Luxemburg through brochures, analyses, demonstration farms and participation in exhibitions. Label guarantees high quality products, produced with respect for nature and environment.

FNLFördergemeinschaft Nachhaltige Landwirtschaft

Germany Promote a better understanding between urban and rural areas by informing the public about the importance of agriculture and the significance of rural areas and communities;

Promote and communicate the scientific and technological basis of sustainable development in agriculture;

Encourage best practices; Act as communicator and liaison partner for sustainable development in agriculture;

and Improve the image of farming, its products and its competitiveness.

LEAF (Linking Environment and Farming)

UK Charity helping farmers improve their environmental and business performance and create a better public understanding of farming .Develops and promotes Integrated Farm Management (IFM) in the UK Demonstrates IFM to farmers and non-farmers through a network of 40 LEAF

Demonstration Farms, Helps farmers to adopt IFM, Helps to influence policy, Collaborates, and Operates internationally.

Odling i Balans Sweden Reduce environmental impacts of cropping, produce high-quality agricultural products

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and develop a resource-efficient agriculture which is economically viable, Demonstrate to the farmers, decision makers and the public how to manage agriculture

with respect for both human health and the environment, Demonstrate practices which can be undertaken on most farms and that will result in

considerable improvements, and Invite organisations, companies and authorities to work united with the aim of

promoting an environmentally adjusted and resource efficient agriculture. Österreichische Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Integrierten Pflanzenschutz (Austrian Working Group for Integrated Pest Management)

Austria • Promotes the cultivation and sowing of extensively resistant and resistant varieties in conjunction with a balanced crop rotation and soil care

• Adher to the harmful threshold principle in the implementation of phytosanitary measures

• Use of forecasting models and warning systems in pest control• Conduct ongoing monitoring and control of plant canopies with the aim of the

occurrence of diseases and pests recognize in time• Elaborate on the cultivation and environmental control strategies in light of applicable

state environmental programs• Targeted to the applicable laws oriented plant use• Promotion of documentation and recording models that are used for traceability of plant

protection measures• Promoting wide-ranging high quality technical advice• Management of public discussions on plant protection issues• Promotion of sustainable production conducive to efforts in the area of integrated pest

management

Source: EISA website (www.sustainable-agriculture.org)

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Country Total area (Ha) No. Farmers Main Farm TypesCosta Rica 3648 6 HorticultureEgypt 3563 10 HorticultureFrance 292 5 General cropping, horticultureItaly 185 6 HorticultureJersey 286 3 Cereals, horticultureKenya 1180 8 HorticultureMorocco 465 1Peru 650 1 HorticulturePoland 577 4 CerealsSouth Africa 3,654 9 HorticultureSpain 4,055 20 Horticulture, dairyUK 179,407 362 Horticulture; cereals, mixed

cropping, dairy USA 202 1 HorticultureTotal 198,163 437

Table 7: Areas and Crops Certified by LEAF

Source: Personal communication, Jeremy Boxhall, LEAF

3.1.10.4 LOW-INPUT AND ORGANIC SYSTEMS

DEFINITION, CONCEPTS AND METHODS

Low-input systems share the same, holistic integrated approach as IP systems but by

definition use very few, or no, inputs. Organic farming is one of the most widely

recognised low-input systems. It has a clear definition that is protected in EU law

(Council Regulation EC 834/2007 and Commission Regulation EC 889/2008) and a

formal certification system which is recognised by producers, governments and

consumers alike. Low-input farming systems rely on biological cycles and systems to

drive production. For example, nitrogen fixing legumes (either as a pure stand or part

of grass ley) and animal manures replace nitrogen fertilisers. They rely on the action

of soil microbes to make the nutrients available to plants, so that the maintenance of a

healthy well-structured, biologically active soil underpins the entire system. Self

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sufficiency is a guiding principle, not only in terms of plant nutrients, but animals

also. Ideally all the feed is grown on the farm itself, reducing reliance on purchased

feeds, although many systems, especially in pig and poultry production, fall short of

the ideal.

Pest and disease management relies almost entirely on non-chemical approaches.

Where pesticides are used, they tend to be biologically based, specific and non

persistent. However, as systems become more holistic, it becomes harder to identify

specific pest-management practices. In an IPM system, crop rotation is a strategy to

reduce damage from soil-borne pests and disease. That is also true for a low-input

system, but most low-input growers would see fertility building as an equally

important, if not more important, role.

UPTAKE OF ORGANIC SYSTEMS

There is good data on the area of organic land and the number of organic and in-

conversion producers in Europe, specifically the EU 15, Switzerland and Norway

(Lampkin et al., 2007).

The amount of land and the number of organic holdings has increased significantly in

nearly all countries studied. Across the regions studied, the total land area has

increased by a factor of 2.8, from 2.0 million ha in 1997 to 5.56 million ha in 2006.

The number of holdings rose from about 88,200 to 162,650 over the same period

(Figure 19), although as a proportion of total UAA, it remains small (4%). All

countries showed rapid increase in organically managed land in the late 1990’s and

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early in the 21st century, and the reasons for this are discussed in detail in the next

section (3.2—Factors Affecting Adoption of Organic and Low-Input Systems).

In some countries, however, the rate of increase appears to be slowing down (France,

the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland) and in other countries, the area

has started to decline (Denmark, Finland, UK). The pattern in Italy is less clear as

areas have fluctuated quite widely between 2000 and 2006.

Grassland and forage crops have seen an almost three-fold increase from 1.2 million

ha in 1997 to 3.5 million ha in 2006 (Figure 20), while cereals increased by 275% in

the same period, partly in response to the increased demand for organic grain to

support the expanding organic livestock sector. The area of organic horticultural crops

(including vegetables, olives, vines, fruits and nuts remains small (446,041 ha in

2006), but there has nevertheless been substantial growth in this sector (230% over

the 10-year period the study covers).

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Figure 19: In-conversion and Organic Land and Holdings in Europe

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Mill

ion

hect

ares

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Thou

sand

hol

ding

s

Land area HoldingsSource: Lampkin et al 2007

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Figure 10: Use of Organic and In-Conversion Land in Europe

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Thou

sand

hec

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Grass/forage Cereals Proteins Vegetables Other arable Olives Vines Fruit/nuts Other crops

Source: Lampkin et al 2007

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3.2 FACTORS AFFECTING ADOPTION OF ORGANIC AND LOW-INPUT

SYSTEMS

A myriad of forces converge to influence farmers’ willingness and ability to adopt innovative

farming methods such as organic and low-input systems. An understanding of the factors

that influence farmers’ willingness to adopt lower input approaches to pest management is

vital to achieving pesticide reduction goals. Before discussing decision making specifically

related to pest management issues, it is necessary to consider its place in relation to the wider

farm business. Pests, diseases and weeds are not the only thing on a farmer’s mind, and

researchers ignore this at their peril.

Understanding how people make business decisions has been a subject of research for many

years. Economic theory often assumes that people seek to maximise the benefit to themselves

or their businesses, that money is a reasonable measure of that benefit, and that therefore

most decisions are guided by the desire to maximise profit. This may fit reasonably well for

business in general, but it is very clear that this underlying assumption does not always hold

true for farming (Edwards-Jones, 2006; Wilcock et al., 1999). That is not to say that farmers

are not motivated by profit – they clearly are and have to be to stay in business – but there are

a large number of other and equally important factors that make the business of farming

fundamentally different than that of, say, manufacturing machine parts.

The main influences on farmer decision making are summarised in Table 8, (Edwards-Jones,

2006; Garforth and Rehman, 2005; de Buck et al., 2001; Wilcock et al., 1999), and the rest of

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this section considers pest-management systems and the adoption of low-input and organic

systems within this framework.

Table 8: Main Influences on Farmer Decision Making

Category ExamplesFinancial Costs and benefits

Market demand and prices Support payments

Personal and family Attitude to the environment Attitude to risk and innovation Age, education, gender and personality

Natural influences and farm resources

Weather Agro-ecosystem Farm size, enterprises, resources; infrastructure

Social factors & professional relationships

Local culture and attitude of friends and colleagues

Sources of informationPolicy and regulation Statutory legislation and regulation

Support schemes

A key factor in the decision to adopt lower inputs is setting a clear common goal at which

producers are aiming (de Lauwere et al., 2004). Organic systems have an advantage in that

the end point is clearly defined, but as we have discussed earlier, there is a certain amount of

vagueness and confusion surrounding the terms IPM and ICM, and this causes problems.

3.2.1 FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

The financial health of a farming business is a critical factor in farmer decision making, and

long-term viability is a major factor in any type of decision making (Midmore et al., 2001;

Bradshaw and Parham, 1996). These forces often enter as constraints to change farming

systems and certainly enter the calculus of measuring the potential gains of introducing a new

system against the costs of switching and installing the system.

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3.2.1.1 COSTS AND BENEFITS

For farmers considering low-input systems, the perception that new technologies and pest-

management strategies are either more expensive or less effective is a major barrier to their

adoption. This was clearly identified in studies of farmers’ willingness to adopt IPM and ICM

approaches (de Buck et al., 2001; Bradshaw and Parham, 1996). The increased costs of

labour and the potentially high levels of investment in other areas is an important barrier to

adoption. However, the performance of organic compared to conventional systems has been

studied in some detail. Data collected in England and Wales in 2006/7, for instance, showed

that for all sectors, organic systems were similar or better than comparable conventional

systems (Jackson et al., 2008). With regard to arable systems, this was due to a combination

of reduced inputs, increased prices and good organic premiums.

Midmore et al. (2001) found that farmers from all sectors were uncertain whether organic

farms were indeed more profitable. The recent increase in the costs of conventional inputs

over the last year, in particular fertiliser, is likely to have an impact on the relative

performance of organic versus conventional systems (in favour of organic systems). Moakes

and Lampkin (2009) identified this as a strong motive for organic conversion among Welsh

farmers.

A number of researchers have shown that the availability of premiums after conversion to

organic is a strong motive, particularly for the crop-based systems (Serra et al., 2008;

Midmore et al., 2001). Further evidence of this can be found in studies of the uptake of IPM

and ICM systems where a lack of premiums, combined with perceptions that ICM and IPM

were more costly, were significant barriers to adoptions (de Lauwere et al., 2004; de Buck et

al., 2001).

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A significant shift in the motivations of farmers converting to organic systems has been

identified by several authors. The early adopters of organic farming were driven almost

entirely by environmental concerns, but from the mid -1990’s onwards, economic and

professional motives became increasingly important (Moakes and Lampkin, 2009; Bayliss

and Clay, 2006). Midmore et al. (2001) and Serra et al. (2008) found that some farmers who

were experiencing financial difficulties saw conversion as a way of staying in business, and

Midmore et al. (2001) noted that more profitable conventional farmers were less likely to

convert.

3.2.1.2 AVAILABILITY OF SUPPORT PAYMENTS

The availability of organic support payments is clearly a very strong motive for many farmers

converting to organic in recent years in many European countries (Moakes and Lampkin,

2009; Serra et al., 2008; Lampkin et al., 2007; Bayliss and Clay, 2006; Midmore et al., 2001),

although this is not always the case (Midmore et al., 2001; Burton et al., 1999). However,

many of these farmers are livestock producers. While many are growing arable crops for

fodder, they are predominantly grass-based systems and are operating under very different

financial conditions than arable or horticulture based systems.

As discussed above, for crop-based systems, market demand and the availability of premiums

after conversion is probably a stronger financial motive than the availability of government

support (Midmore et al., 2001). The recent introduction of significantly higher payments for

horticulture and, to a lesser extent, arable crops has not increased the proportion of these

types of farms undergoing conversion in line with the livestock sector in Wales (unpublished

data, Welsh Assembly Government).

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3.2.1.3 MARKETS

Strong market demand can be a powerful incentive for growers to adopt lower input systems

(Neumeister, 2007; Anon, 2005, 2001; Midmore et al., 2001; Bradshaw and Parham, 1996).

On the other hand, uncertainty about the market and prices is an equally strong reason not to

adopt these systems (de Lauwere et al., 2004; de Buck et al., 2001; Midmore et al., 2001)

With specific regard to pesticides, a number of surveys have highlighted growing concerns

among consumers about the level and the type of residues found in food (Anon, 2005, 2001).

A number of Integrated Production systems have developed labels, and the relationships

between supermarkets and specific schemes have greatly increased grower participation.

Specific examples include LEAF and Waitrose in the UK (personal communication, Jeremy

Boxhall); FRUITNET and the supermarket Delhaize-Le-Lion in Belgium; SUISSE IP market

their products to all major retailers and food processors in Switzerland; and Laurus

supermarkets in the Netherlands. (Neumeister, 2007). Rather than forming direct

relationships with a specific scheme, the Co-op in the UK has set pesticide reduction goals

for all its suppliers and has created lists of prohibited and restricted pesticides; this approach

has had a massive, and positive, impact in terms of agricultural reform (Cannell, 1997)

In terms of the organic market, global sales reached £19.3 billion in 2006 (Organic Monitor,

2006, cited in Williamson, 2007). The European market is the largest in terms of value

(Williamson, 2007), but the proportion of the total food market varies from country to

country within Europe. For instance, in 2006, the last year for which data is available, 6% of

food sales were organic in Switzerland and Austria, 4.5 % in Denmark, and 1.6% in the UK.

In 2006, demand was still increasing in several countries, such as Switzerland, where demand

grew by 5% in that year, 10% in Austria and the Netherlands and 18% in Germany

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(Williamson, 2007). The organic market has been affected by the economic downturn in

2008/9, but a clear picture of the extent and which sectors are affected most has yet to

emerge.

The motives for buying organic food are many and complex. Hamm and Gronefeld (2004)

identified several reasons, including: nature conservation and environmental protection; food

safety and health; animal welfare; taste; regional origin; and GMO free. Food safety and

health was the dominant buying argument across most nations (Serra et al., 2008; Hamm and

Gronefeld, 2004). This partly has to do with pesticide and pesticide residues, but also

encompasses animal health problems such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (commonly

known as mad-cow disease) and foot and mouth disease. Concern for the environment was

rated the second most important reason for purchase and taste, the third. The others were

important in particular countries, but over all were ranked low.

3.2.2 PERSONAL AND FAMILY CONSIDERATIONS

The is also the imprecise nature of factors influencing the decisions that largely revolve

around the farmer and his/her household’s attitudes toward and perspectives about the larger

environment they inhabit. Farmers see themselves as stewards of the environment as they

manage the environmental assets of land, water and the local ecological system to generate a

livelihood for themselves and their families. They must also mange the risk associated with

farming activities and the organic and low-input farming systems are no exception as these

systems can be subject to greater risk than conventional ones, in addition to the risk involved

in switching systems. And finally, farmers and their families are part of the social fabric with

their actions impact their own living environment.

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3.2.2.1 ATTITUDE TO THE ENVIRONMENT

Because farmers have a direct impact on the environment and vice versa, attitudes to the

environment have a huge impact on decision making. A number of studies looking at the

motivations of those adopting organic farming found that growers placed great significance

on the importance of sustainable farming and the environment (de Buck et al., 2001;

Midmore et al., 2001; Burton et al., 1999; Bradshaw and Parham, 1996), although this was

not universally true (de Lauwere et al., 2004). Bradley et al. (2002) also found that uptake of

ICM and IPM systems were highest in countries where environmental awareness is highest,

such as Denmark and Austria. This is also reflected in the adoption of organic farming

systems in these countries (Lampkin et al., 2007).

Aversion to pesticides and agrochemicals is a specific motivation for conversion to organic

farming particularly among the pioneering producers who started converting in the 1970’s

and 80’s (de Lauwere et al., 2004; de Buck et al., 2001; Midmore et al., 2001). In many cases

this was part of a more general belief that high-input systems are inherently unsustainable,

that they would not be able to feed the world population in the long term, and that organic

farming could (Midmore et al., 2001; Burton et al., 1999). This is countered by equally strong

views from conventional growers that effective pest, disease and weed management is not

possible without pesticides (de Buck et al., 2001; Midmore et al., 2001), and that organic

farming alone is not capable of meeting the world population’s food needs (Midmore et al.,

2001; Burton et al., 1999). While recent years have seen a shift in motivation towards more

business and professional factors, environmental drivers remain very important (Moakes and

Lampkin, 2009; Bayliss and Clay, 2006; Midmore et al., 2001).

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Bradshaw and Parham (1996) found that producers using high pesticide inputs placed a

higher priority on maximising yield and quality and minimising impacts on human health and

residues. In contrast IPM and ICM growers were more concerned about minimising the

impacts on the environment and working to protocols and guidelines. Further analysis of

those that expressed concern for the environment showed that growers tended to focus on

issues they perceived to be under their direct control, such as reducing spray drift and

contamination of ditches and surface water, rather than wider issues such as groundwater

contamination, persistence in soils and the impact on non-target organisms (Bradshaw and

Parham, 1996). These latter issues can be addressed to some degree by taking biorational

approaches to pesticide use, but the implication is that growers did not appear to consider this

to be within their power.

3.2.2.2 ATTITUDE TO RISK

Despite living and working in an inherently uncertain environment, farmers are generally risk

averse (Wilcock et al., 1999) This is manifested in a range of behaviours, including:

abhorrence of debt, taking out of insurance, diversification, spreading risk, contract selling,

and taking off-farm work. Most significantly for this study, it also means that farmers are

generally slow to adopt new, unproven ideas, and this applies equally to ICM and IPM

techniques as it does to organic conversion (de Buck et al., 2001; Wilcock et al., 1999;

Bradshaw and Parham, 1996).

Whether organic and low-input systems are intrinsically more risky than conventional

systems is under debate. There are a number of reasons why the risk could be higher for low-

input systems, for example a lack of recourse remedial actions such as pesticide applications

(Serra et al., 2008; Midmore et al., 2001). Higher variability of yields, quality and prices are

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other factors (de Lauwere et al., 2004; Lampkin and Padel, 1994). However, analysis of long-

term experiments suggests that external factors, rather than the management system itself,

determine the yields (Lampkin and Padel, 1994). Indeed there are many features of organic

systems that could make them less risky, such as more diverse systems, which spread risk

across a wider spectrum of enterprises, and the benefits that this has for pest and disease

management. In addition, there are positive benefits to organic production, including

premium prices (most of the time) and government support in the form of organic aid

schemes.

What is clear is that organic farming is perceived to be riskier, and in terms of farmers’

decision making, the perception may be more important than reality. Organic farmers

perceived themselves to be less risk averse than their conventional counterparts. They saw

themselves as innovators, in terms of their entrepreneurial spirit as well as their willingness to

take on new approaches, and were therefore taking more risk (Serra et al., 2008; Koesling et

al., 2004; Wilcock et al., 1999; Lampkin and Padel, 1994). Pest, disease and weed issues

were only identified as a minor part of the overall risk management strategy for organic

farmers. This is in direct contrast to many conventional farmers to whom the non-availability

of pesticides is one the major barriers to conversion (Serra et al., 2008), and who perceived

routine spraying as one of the main risk-reduction strategies.

Whether or not established organic systems are more risky than conventional systems, there

is little doubt that the conversion period carries with it some risks. Moakes and Lampkin

(2009) identified several reasons why this might be so. New skills and techniques need to be

mastered (new marketing approaches; new crop and livestock production practices; new

enterprises; new manure management practices), and the likelihood of mistakes occurring,

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particularly at the beginning of the learning curve, is increased. In addition, there are some

changes in the system, such as variations and reductions in yield or increased labour

requirements, that may make this period more risky than an established organic system.

The perception of increased risk is not limited to the adoption of low-input organic systems.

de Buck et al. (2001) examined the reasons why arable farmers in the Netherlands did, or did

not, move from high input to ICM systems. Researchers worked with a select group of

“innovator farmers” who, under the guidance of research and extension staff, showed that

significant reductions could be made in pesticide and other inputs, and in this regard it was a

successful project. However, it was not taken up more widely among the general farming

population, because ICM was perceived to be more risky and more labour intensive without

any reflection of this in the prices received.

3.2.2.3 AGE, EDUCATION, AND GENDER

Padel (2001b), who studied the relevance of the adoption-diffusion models of innovation in

the context of organic farming, found that certainly the first innovators and early adopters

were younger, had a higher level of formal education, had less farming experience, and were

less concerned about acceptance by the local community compared to conventional farmers.

Much of this is supported by other studies, but Burton et al. (1999) did not find any

correlation between the level of education and the adoption of organic farming among

horticultural producers in the UK. They did, however, find evidence that women are 17 times

more likely than men to adopt organic farming. Fisher (1989) cited in Padel (2001b) also

found this to be the case, particularly if the health of the family was a factor in the decision to

convert, but it is not a theme that comes through strongly in the wider literature.

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3.2.3 NATURAL INFLUENCES, AGRO ECOSYSTEMS, AND THE FARM

The characteristics of the farm and local environment play a major role in the decision to

adopt organic and low-input systems. For example, organic farms have to give careful

consideration to how the soil type and structure would affect weed burdens. Heavy soils in

wet areas will limit the scope for mechanical weeding, for instance, and the use of herbicides

might make the production of certain crops such as maize possible in conventional systems,

where it would not be for organic systems.

The degree of complexity within the farming system is also a very important factor. In

general terms, the lower input and the more integrated a system becomes, the more complex

it becomes. These systems are therefore more knowledge- intensive and require more

management time compared to high-input systems. This is illustrated by the example in Box

2.

Box 2. The Complexity of Decision Making in Low-input Systems—An Illustration

As discussed earlier, routine preventative treatments are characteristics of high-input systems, and this illustration uses the example of a pre-emergence herbicide for weed control in maize.

Bayer Cropscience’s Cadou Star can be taken as a typical herbicide of its type. It is effective against a wide range of weed species (annual and perennial) and remains so for over two months after application. It is sprayed between sowing and germination, typically within four days of sowing. The only real decision on the part of the farmer is whether to apply it all.

Contrast this to a low-input or organic system. Growers have to think much more carefully about whether to grow maize in the first place. The soil type is important; in a relatively free draining, dry soil, a deep rooting vigorous crop like maize stands a good chance of out-competing the weeds early in the season. In a heavier soil, where water is not a limiting factor, the chances are not as good. The place of maize in the rotation is very important. From a weed perspective, it should ideally follow a weed-suppressing crop, in a field with a relatively small seed bank. From a soil fertility standpoint, maize is a very hungry crop, and with no recourse to synthetic fertilisers, it needs to be grown at point in the rotation where fertility is at its highest. The use of a stale seed bed would need to be considered. Decisions on mechanical weeding need to be made on systems and strategy (pre-emergence “blind harrowing”, post-emergence springtime weeding, inter-row hoeing, flame weeding – or a

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combination of all of them) and timing. A delicate balance exists between keeping weed competition down to an acceptable level and ensuring the crop is sufficiently well developed to withstand mechanical weeding. Weather and soil conditions must also allow the farmer to work the land when the critical day arrives. Or perhaps the need for mechanical weeding could be reduced by under sowing the established crop to smother out weeds. If so, with what and at what time should it be sown to make sure it is effective, but does notitself compete with the crop?

3.2.4 SOCIAL FACTORS

A number of studies have identified social interactions as an important part of farmer

decision making, perhaps more so than in other businesses (Edwards-Jones, 2006; Wilcock et

al., 1999). An important reason for this may be that there is little or no separation between

“home” and “work”. These factors include the prestige of farmers as a group and within the

local farming community; pride in ownership of the farm; a sense of vocation; job

satisfaction; and the enjoyment of independence of decision making (Wilcock et al., 1999).

3.2.4.1 LOCAL CULTURE AND ATTITUDE OF FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES

How farmers are perceived by their peers can have a particularly strong influence on

behaviour, and the theory of the “subjective norm” suggests that farmers are constantly

checking their intentions against the actual and perceived behaviour of others (Edwards-

Jones, 2006). Czapar et al. (1997), for instance, found that soybean growers had very low

weed tolerances (and therefore very high herbicide usage), because weedy fields reflected

badly on them as producers. However, this is not universally true. Midmore et al. (2001)

found that peer pressure played very little part in the decision of English farmers to convert to

organic systems.

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Historically, conventional farmers have had a hostile perception of the organic sector, mainly

because it was perceived as taking advantage of crises and “food scares” in the conventional

sector, effectively promoting itself at the expense of the wider industry (Padel, 2001b;

Midmore et al., 2001), and this may have limited the adoption of organic farming. This issue

is not restricted to organic systems. Farmers who were demonstrating ICM strategies as part

of a project to reduce pesticide inputs in the Netherlands experienced strong disapproval from

their conventional peers because they were perceived as “having gone over to enemy” by

helping demonstrate that cost-increasing methods of pest management were feasible (de Buck

et al., 2001)

De Lauwere et al. (2004) also found that negative social pressure from other farmers,

advisors and agrochemical company representatives was a strong disincentive to convert to

organic farming. Ethnic background may also play a role, illustrated by a Welsh example. Up

until three or four years ago most of the organic farmers in Wales were of English stock, were

relative newcomers to Wales, and were therefore likely to be much less integrated and much

less concerned about the opinions of the established farming community (some of the

characteristics (Padel, 2001b) identified as typical of early innovators and early adopters in

the adoption/diffusion model). However, since about 2004, the balance has shifted

significantly, and a much higher proportion of organic farmers are now of Welsh stock. This

can be evidenced by the rapid rise in popularity of one particular certification body that trades

heavily on its Welsh identity and Welsh language provision. Started in 2003, it is now the

largest organic certification body in Wales (Personal Communication, Marilyn James).

3.2.4.2 SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND SUPPORT

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As discussed previously and illustrated by the example in Box 2, low-input systems are more

complex than high input systems, and are therefore much more information and knowledge-

intensive (Padel, 2001b; Lampkin and Padel, 1994). In addition, the assertion that growers

would be unwilling to adopt methods and systems unless and until they can be demonstrated

to be effective in terms of management and costs has been made in relation to risk and other

aspects of this review (de Buck et al., 2001; Wilcock et al., 1999). Bradshaw and Parham

(1996) noted that farmers and growers considered “keeping up with technology” as a priority

in terms of general business development. They took some encouragement from this in terms

of the potential for adopting alternatives to pesticides. They did not discuss this in terms of

systems, so whether this also implies that farmers would be more open to adopting low-input,

holistic systems is an open, but important question.

The development of a strong advisory and support network is therefore critical to increasing

the adoption of low-input systems and the reduction of pesticide use. Countries that have

achieved significant pesticide reduction, such as Denmark, Sweden and Norway, have

recognised this (Neumeister, 2007). Meanwhile poor access to high quality advice (Midmore

et al., 2001), insufficient knowledge and lack of confidence (Padel, 2001b; Bradshaw and

Parham, 1996), and the need to establish new contacts and relationships (de Lauwere et al.,

2004) are significant barriers to the adoption of organic and IPM/ ICM systems.

Several authors have noted that the sources of information used by higher-input farmers are

very different than those favoured by those managing low-input and organic systems. High-

input farmers counted advisors and representatives of agrochemical companies among their

most favoured sources of information, while low-input and organic farmers relied chiefly on

other farmers (de Buck et al., 2001; Burton et al., 1999).

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Lesinsky and Veverka (2006) set out what they considered to be the principle requirements of

an advisory and education programme, which would deliver reductions in pesticide use as

follows:

Independent of vested interests, such as agrochemical companies

Targeted on IPM methods and best practice

Focused on alternatives to pesticide use

Practical in its approach

Farmer led

Underpinned by a national action plan with target for pesticide use reduction

Based on regular training meetings and events

Many of these characteristics are features of successful knowledge transfer service in many

areas and regions, including Wales (Little, 2007), the Netherlands (Neumeister, 2007; de

Lauwere et al., 2004; de Buck et al., 2001), and Demark (Neumeister, 2007).

3.3 CONSUMERS’ PERCEPTIONS

Plant protection products may pose a threat to consumer health if residues of these substances

remain in the final product intended for consumption. For this reason, each EU member-

country makes one or more national authorities responsible for monitoring and controlling the

presence of pesticide residues in food products of plant origin, such as fruit, vegetables,

cereals, and processed products of plant origin, including baby foods.11 The procedures

11 Frozen and dried food products may also be monitored. Detailed information about the national authorities responsible for monitoring pesticide residues in each member state is available on the European commission website, FVO Country Profiles section at http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/country_profiles_en.cfm

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involved in residue monitoring usually require the authority responsible to examine samples

from each category of foodstuffs and ensure that pesticide residues, if any, do not exceed the

Maximum Residue Levels that apply for the specific product. The same authority is also

required to prepare a monitoring plan specifying the products to be sampled, the number of

samples to be taken, and the substances for which they will be tested. The sampling

procedures tend to vary from one crop to another and are generally based on risk analysis and

previous experience. Checks and inspections may take place at various levels such as at

wholesale and retail level, at the import level, or even at the farm level.

When non-compliant samples are identified, various measures may come into effect.

In Belgium, products suspected of non-compliance with the minimum pesticide residue

requirement are seized so that they do not enter the market, and all non-compliant

samples are assessed to see if they pose a risk to the consumer (European Commission -

FVO: Country report of Belgium, 2007). Thereafter, actions are taken so that the

violation is verified and its cause identified, and the producer or importer is placed

under more strict controls.

In the Czech Republic, additional sampling (outside the national programme) may

occur in cases of detected violations or consumer complaints, and in addition to

precautionary measures, such as the withdrawal of the suspected products from the

market, fines may be imposed (European Commission - FVO: Country report of the

Czech Republic, 2008).

In Greece, when non-compliance is detected, a dossier is sent to the head office (which

can directly impose sanctions) and the public prosecutor. Violators are restricted from

supplying the products until further testing is accomplished (European Commission -

FVO: Country report of Greece, 2008).

In Poland, depending on the nature of the violation of pesticide laws, follow-up

measures may include prosecution, imposition of fines, referrals to a court of justice

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(when health risks are identified), withdrawals of the products from the market, or

seizure and destruction of the products (European Commission - FVO: Country report

of Poland, 2008).

In addition to monitoring residue levels in food products, several other measures protect

consumers from pesticide use, such as pesticide residue monitoring in drinking water (Table

9). Some of these measures were mentioned earlier, in the discussion of how farmers should

be encouraged to avoid water contamination with pesticides at point sources.

Consumers may also be at risk if the use of PPPs is carried out near certain locations accessed

by the general public, such as schools, parks, public places, domestic locations, and so on.

Within this context, measures are taken by EU countries to ban or restrict the application of

PPPs near these types of areas. It is also important for consumers to be informed about the

risks related to the presence of chemical residues in the products they buy. Information

campaigns are on the way in many EU countries to raise awareness, e.g., through the internet.

Another effective method of ensuring consumer safety is the labelling of agricultural products

at selling points to ensure transparency about the agricultural practices (e.g., organic) by

which they are produced can be.

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Table 9. Summary of Tools and Measures Focusing on the Consumer

Monitor and control of pesticide residues in food products of plant origin

Setting of Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs)

Measures to deal with non-compliant products (i.e., withdrawal of suspected products from the market, seizure of the whole lot, stricter controls to violators, etc.

Residue monitoring in drinking water sources

Prohibition of pesticide applications near residential areas, parks, schools, and other public places

Information campaigns to raise consumer awareness

Creation of internet websites to provide information to consumers

Introduction of labels so that consumers can easily identify the methods by which products are produced (i.e., through organic farming)

3.3.1 CONSUMERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

Over the last two decades, an economic literature on pesticide risk valuation has emerged.

The willingness to pay (WTP) estimates available in this literature typically refer to the

negative effects on human health and the damage to environmental agro-ecosystems.

Using risk valuation literature, Florax et al. (2005) considered that the monetary value of a

reduction in pesticide usage and the related dangers can be revealed as the aggregate of

individuals’ WTP for pesticide risk reduction or, instead, the willingness to accept (WTA) a

reward for exposure to improved pesticide risk levels. Consumers’ WTP (and WTA)

reproduce preferences, perceptions and attitudes towards risk and these values are affected by

the decision to lower existing levels of pesticide usage.

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HC - Approach

Risk valuation

Environmental Risks Human Health Risks

WTP - Approach

Revealed Preferences Stated Preferences

Conjoint AnalysisContingent ValuationTravel Cost MethodHedonic PricingMarket Pricing

Experimental Economics

Figure 21. Techniques for Economic Valuation(Adapted from: Pearce and Seccombe-Hett, 2000; Travisi et al., 2006; Shogren et Lusk, 2007)

Much work has been done in economics to appraise consumers’ valuations of environmental

characteristics. Economists have employed several methods to determine how consumers

value the environmental characteristics of foodstuffs. Figure 21 presents a simplified

framework based on Pearce and Seccombe-Hett (2000) and Travisi et al.(2006). The two

articles propose to report techniques for economic valuation of an environmental good. Two

main categories appear: revealed preferences and stated preferences. The latter were defined

as the preferences shown by a respondent to a question and the former stand for the

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preferences deduced from the behaviour of a person when choosing between goods and their

willingness to accept to tolerate a loss (Pearce and Seccombe-Hett, 2000)12.

The experimental economics approach was placed on the figure as a third category, to

materialise the idea of Shogren and Lusk (2007) when considering this approach as

combining the advantages of both revealed and stated preference methods.

The stated preferences approach has often been used through conjoint analysis and contingent

valuation in studies associated to human health risks within food safety literature. These

works’ main target may be the health risks associated with pesticide residues in fresh food,

namely in those countries where food safety policies are a top priority. They can also be

marketing oriented when dealing with consumers’ WTP for certified residue-free products.

Nowadays the studies are also being extended to pesticide health risks for farmers in

developing countries. There has also been some work done (Mourato et al., 2000; Schou et

al., 2002) that analysed simultaneously the effects of pesticides on both human health and

environment.

On the contrary, not many works have included revealed preferences techniques – travel cost

methods (TCM), market prices (MP) and hedonic prices (HP). Hammitt (1993) uses MP to

estimate a range of pesticide risks for consumers. Beach and Carlson (1993), on the other

hand, use HP in order to value herbicide risk reduction for groundwater.

12 It is interesting to note that both articles do not classify all the methodologies in the same categories. In the article by Pearce and Seccombe-Hett it is considered that the random utility models are used by revealed preference methods while in Travisi et al. (2006) it is considered as belonging to the stated preference methods. In fact, random utility models can be used by both approaches, since the random utility models can handle both real data and data derived from hypothetical markets.

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The experimental economics analysis is a method that puts people in an active market

environment dealing with real money and real products. It creates an awareness of the real

opportunity cost when evaluating the products. This evaluation provides, in a direct form, a

set of heterogeneous WTP values that in theory represent the real value for the produce.

Experimental markets provide the consumers with exchange mechanisms [Vickrey’s second

price auction, Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism] by creating incentives for

them to ponder over what they will actually pay for the good or service. Originally, these

mechanisms were designed to characterize individual preferences for risk taking in a context

of monetary lotteries. Nowadays, they are used to elicit values for real goods and services and

also to elicit homegrown preferences, including preferences for risk, and the search for new

goods and services. Experimental markets have been used for a wide variety of food

attributes, namely safety related ones, for instance reductions in pesticides risk (Roosen et al.,

1998; Rozan et al., 2004), in pathogen risk (Hayes et al., 1995), and in the use of food

irradiation (Shogren et al., 1999).

This section offers a review of the most important literature on the stated preference methods,

not only the ones concerning consumer health and safety issues associated with the presence

of pesticides but also the ones addressing environmental problems.

3.3.1.1 STATED-PREFERENCE APPROACH

The main principles of the experimental economics approach are then reviewed, after which

two examples of WTP for pest-management are given – one for a fresh product and one for a

processed product. The first works regarding consumers’ concerns about pesticide reduction

were carried out based on surveys (Hammitt, 1990; Misra, Huang and Ott 1991; Huang,

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1993; Eom, 1994; and Horowitz, 1994). Most of these studies have used stated-preference

methods in order to estimate the consumers’ perception of risk associated with pesticides use.

The pioneer work of Hammitt (1990) focuses on organic products by comparing them with

the conventional ones, bearing in mind the consumer’s point of view. Consumers’ choice

between organically (without pesticides) and conventionally grown produce is examined.

Exploratory focus-group discussions and questionnaires propose that consumers who

purchase organically grown produce believe it is substantially less hazardous than the

conventional alternative and are willing to pay significant premiums to obtain it (a median

50% above the cost of conventional produce). The value of risk reduction implied by this

incremental willingness to pay is not high relative to estimates for other risks, since the

perceived risk reduction is relatively large. Organic-produce consumers also appear more

likely than conventional-produce consumers to mitigate other ingestion-related risks (e.g.,

contaminated drinking water) but less likely to use automobile seatbelts.

Misra, Huang and Ott (1991) use primary data collected from a survey conducted in the state

of Georgia to analyze consumer preferences for testing and certification of fresh produce and

consumer willingness to pay for fresh produce that is certified as free of pesticide residues

(FPR). An ordered probit model was estimated to identify the impacts of various exogenous

variables on the probability of consumers' willingness to pay for a number of alternative price

premiums. The results indicate that consumers' willingness to pay differs with respect to a

number of factors. The study concludes that most of the consumers recommend testing and

certification, but they oppose large price markups for certified-FPR fresh produce.

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After this work, Huang (1993) highlighted that the link between risk perception and

willingness to pay is not empirically significant. He proposed to estimate a simultaneous

equation model in order to take into account interactions between risk perception, attitude and

behavioural intentions. This paper develops a theoretical model that places a simultaneous

structure among three psychological and behavioral constructs to analyze consumer risk

perceptions, attitudes, and behavioral intentions. To validate the above mentioned model they

performed a survey of Georgia consumers. Regarding risk perceptions, respondents were

asked to rank three top food concerns from a list of 10 items (including “food grown using

pesticides”). With regard to the “attitude” variable, respondents had to select from among

four different statements the one that best described their opinions about the use of chemical

pesticides. As for the willingness to pay, survey participants were asked to indicate if they

were actually willing to pay a higher price for fresh produce without pesticides and, if yes,

how much more. Results suggest that risk perceptions have a positive and significant effect

on consumers' attitudes toward pesticide use, which in turn influence their risk perceptions

and willingness-to-pay for residue-free fresh produce and vice versa. The linkage between

risk perceptions and willingness-to-pay, however, is not as empirically significant as

expected. Results suggest that education programs addressing the food safety issues need to

target female, black, middle-aged, and less educated consumers.

Eom (1994) proposes an analysis of consumer preferences with respect to health risks

inherent to pesticide residues. The author develops a new approach for integrating consumers'

risk perceptions with stated purchase behavior when consumption decisions must be made

with incomplete information. The application involves health risks from exposure to pesticide

residues on fresh produce. Unlike traditional food demand analysis, the approach treats

produce choices as discrete outcomes, resulting in a random utility model.

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Prior to this, a survey was carried out to collect the pilot data necessary to implement a

discrete choice model from which the random utility model was derived. The information

thus collected was about expenditures from different food categories, contingent choice,

subjective attitudes toward risks from pesticide residues, and other economic and

demographic factors. Only a subset of this survey information was analysed by the authors

(the one regarding contingent discrete choice responses).

Empirical results from the pilot survey suggest a clear linkage between perceptions and

behavior in response to new risk information. Consumers' stated preferences for safer

produce were primarily influenced by price differences and perceived risks, not by the

technical risk information provided alone. However, the linkage between behavior and

valuation was less clear cut. The risk/price tradeoffs entailed by contingent discrete choices

indicate high price premiums for small risk reductions and little variation in price premium

across alternative risk reductions.

Horowitz (1994) studied the actual preferences for pesticide regulation. His analysis, based

on a random telephone survey of households, indicates a distinct preference for pesticide

regulation over an alternative risk-reduction proposal (auto exhaust regulation) when both

regulations are hypothesized to cost the same and save the same number of lives. Such

preference has a surprisingly broad demographic base. However, when the potential numbers

of lives saved are different under the two programs, almost 71% of the subjects preferred the

regulation that saved the most lives, regardless of the risk source.

Buzby, Fox, Ready and Crutchfield (1998) explored three valuation techniques that place a

monetary value on food safety risk reductions. For each, a case study was presented: (1) a

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contingent valuation (CV) survey on pesticide residues, (2) an experimental auction market

for a chicken sandwich with reduced risk of Salmonella, and (3) a cost-of-illness analysis for

seven foodborne pathogens. The authors consider that microbial pathogens and pesticide

residues in food pose a financial burden to society which can be reduced by incurring costs to

reduce these food safety risks. The estimates from the above-mentioned techniques can be

used in cost/benefit analysis for policies that reduce food safety risks.

To reveal the willingness to pay for a reduction in exposure to pesticide residues on fresh

products, a contingent choice scenario was used in the CV survey. They used two survey

versions and defined, in both, two different types of store (A and B). In both surveys, Store A

does not test any of its fresh produce for pesticides residues. Store B either tests all of its

fresh produce and rejects any that does not meet the government standard (survey one) or

rejects any with pesticides residues (“pesticide-free store” in survey two). As well as being

told about store characteristics, the respondents were also informed about mortality risk from

consuming fresh produce sold in the different stores. This information was meant to show the

subjective beliefs of the consumers. The results showed a wide variability in subjective belief

about the danger posed by pesticides residues on fresh produce.

The results of the CV survey demonstrated that the price differential was a significant

determinant of store choice, with higher price differentials favouring store A (the cheaper

store).

Hammitt and Graham (1999) reviewed the existing literature on CV studies of reductions in

health risk, finding that most studies were poorly designed to assess the sensitivity of stated

valuations to changes in risk magnitude. They considered that efficient investments in health

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protection require valid estimates of the public's willingness to forgo consumption for

diminished probabilities of death, injury, and disease and that stated valuations of risk

reduction are not valid measures of economic preference if the valuations are insensitive to

probability variation. The authors presented new empirical results from telephone surveys

designed to provide internal and external tests of how WTP responds to size of risk reduction.

The effect of variations in instrument design on estimated sensitivity to magnitude is

examined. Overall, estimated WTP for risk reduction is inadequately sensitive to the

difference in probability, that is, the magnitude of the difference in WTP for different

reductions in risk is typically smaller than suggested by standard economic theory. They

proposed additional research to improve methods for communicating changes in risk and

rigorous validity checks within future studies of stated WTP to reduce risk.

Baker (1999) used a conjoint analysis to evaluate consumer responses to hypothetical apple

products in a nationwide survey. Product characteristics included price, quality, pesticide use

levels and the corresponding cancer risk, and type of government inspection. Consumers

expressed a broad preference for reduced pesticide usage. Four market segments were

identified corresponding to consumers: (1) those who had a strong preference for food safety,

(2) those who exhibited a more balanced desire for all product characteristics, (3) those who

were extremely price sensitive, and (4) those who had a strong preference for product quality.

Results suggest that consumers in these segments differ based on demographic and

psychographic characteristics. The author regarded this information as useful to produce

marketers in marketing produce that better meet consumers' needs. He also considered

extremely valuable to participants in the food marketing system, a better understanding of

how consumers differ by market segment. In fact, food producers, processors, and retailers do

require a deeper and more detailed understanding of consumer preferences, vis-à-vis their

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socioeconomic characteristics, in order to develop products and marketing strategies that

effectively target individual consumer needs. Baker seeks to identify more clearly unique

traits and values exhibited by consumers in the different segments by evaluating consumers

in four separately defined market segments, based on both socioeconomic and value

characteristics.

Mourato, Ozdemiroglu, and Foster (2000) estimated the economic impacts of pesticide use on

human health and on the environment to gather information on the structure of a possible

pesticide tax and on the design of an “environmentally friendly” bread product. The relative

importance of these different impacts is determined by what individuals are prepared to pay

to avoid a case of human illness and a unit of environmental damage, measured by bird

species in decline. Willingness to pay is estimated using a contingent ranking approach, a

variant of the standard contingent valuation method, which is capable of tackling the

multidimensional effects associated with pesticide applications. The results suggest that

consumers would be willing to pay substantial price markups for environmentally friendly

bread loaves and, consequently, that a case could be made for a substantial pesticide tax,

preferably differentiated by product type. It is also shown that individuals are on average only

willing to accept between seven to eight cases of human illness to save an entire bird species.

Brethour and Weersink (2001) used the physical risk assessment approach combined with

contingent valuation survey results on consumers' willingness to reduce pesticide risk. They

analyzed the trade-off between pesticide use levels and abatement costs. The reduction in

external costs associated with the changes in pesticide use in Ontario agriculture between

1983 and 1998 was 188 dollars per household. The environmental benefits were largely due

to the reduction in the level of high-risk and moderate-risk pesticides.

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Loureiro, McCluskey and Mittelhammer (2002) used a double-bounded logit model to assess

the mean willingness to pay for eco-labeled apples. The eco-label analyzed in this study is

certified by The Food Alliance (TFA), a non-profit third-party certifying organization based

in Portland, Oregon. They concluded that female respondents with children and strong

environmental and food safety concerns are more likely to pay a premium for eco-labeled

apples. However, the estimated premium is small (about 5 cents per pound over an initial

price of 99 cents), reflecting the overall difficulty with garnering a premium based on

"environmentally sound" practices.

Cranfield and Magnusson (2003) undertook a contingent valuation survey to determine if

Canadian consumers would pay a premium for Pesticide Free Production TM (PFPTM) food

products. This technique emphasizes reduced pesticide use in conjunction with increased

reliance on producer knowledge of agronomic practices that mitigate weed, insect and disease

pressure. Over 65 percent of respondents would be willing to pay a one to ten percent

premium relative to a conventional food product. Five percent of respondents would be

willing to pay more than a 20 percent premium. Health and environmental concerns,

willingness to switch grocery stores, and youth are important characteristics of consumers

who would be willing to pay higher premiums. Distribution channels geared towards health

food stores (or health food centers within grocery stores) are likely targets for PFPTM food

products.

Florax, Travisi and Nijkamp (2005) reviewed the empirical valuation literature on pesticide

risk exposure and developed a taxonomy of environmental and human health risks associated

with pesticide usage. A meta-analysis was then used to investigate the variation in

willingness to pay estimates for reduced pesticide risk exposure. The authors considered that

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the monetary value of a reduction in pesticide usage and the related dangers can be revealed

as the aggregate of individuals’ WTP for pesticide risk reduction or, instead, the WTA a

reward for exposure to improved pesticide risk levels. Consumers’ WTP (and WTA)

reproduce preferences, perceptions and attitudes toward risk, and these values are affected by

the decision to lower existing levels of pesticide usage.

Their findings showed that the WTP for reduced risk exposure is 15 per cent greater for

medium risk levels, and 80 per cent greater for high, as compared with low risk levels. The

income elasticity of reduced pesticide risk exposure is generally not significantly different

from zero. Stated preferences approaches based on choice experiments and revealed

preferences provide lower WTP estimates than contingent valuation techniques. Survey

design, type of safety device (eco-labelling, integrated pest management or bans) and chosen

payment vehicle are important drivers of the valuation results.

Chalak, Balcombe, Bailey and Fraser (2008) present results from two choice experiments

(CE) designed to take account of the different negative externalities associated with pesticide

use in agricultural production. For cereal production, the most probable impact of pesticide

use is a reduction in environmental quality. For fruit and vegetable production, the negative

externality is on consumer health. Using latent class models, they find evidence of the

presence of preference heterogeneity in addition to reasonably high willingness to pay

estimates for a reduction in the use of pesticides for both environmental quality and consumer

health. To place their WTP estimates in a policy context, they converted them into an

equivalent pesticide tax by type of externality. The tax estimates suggest that pesticide taxes

based on the primary externality resulting from a particular mode of agricultural production

are a credible policy option that warrants further consideration.

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3.3.1.2 EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS

Mainly, the studies presented in the former section have concluded that there is a prime for

the environmental characteristics of food stuffs. As Florax et al. (2005) highlight, the value

interval for these environmental primes is large. Thus, it is necessary to use methodologies

that are not solely based upon the consumers’ statements but that, instead, analyse their real

buying behaviours.

The main purpose of this section is to present some works within experimental economics

that assess the value of some environmental characteristics.

In studies of this nature, the individuals are in a laboratory environment in which a simplified

economical situation is reproduced. One of the major advantages of this technique is that one

can control the whole variable set influencing the economical decisions. Smith (1980) and

List (2006) show that laboratory behaviour is a good indicator of behaviour in the field. The

incentive and revealing mechanisms (Vickrey and BDM being the most commonly used)

allow the consumers to make an effective decision.

Experimental economics has come a long way since the 1960s. It was natural, then, that some

experimental studies should propose to analyse WTP for environmentally friendly produce.

These are revealed-preference methods based on protocols specifying rules relating to a

precise auction mechanism. To the best of our knowledge, Roosen, Fox, Hennessy, Schreiber,

(1998) were the first to analyse WTP for pesticide-free produce in experimental economics.

They adapted a protocol already used in experimental economics (notably by Shogren et al.

(1994) and Melton et al. (1996)) and used Vickrey auctions as an effective procedure for

revealing preferences.

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In this procedure, participants have a bag of conventionally farmed apples and are then

invited to bid for four alternative bags of apples. Two of the bags contain apples grown

without one particularly widespread pesticide but with other neuroactive pesticides. The other

two bags contain apples produced without neuroactive pesticides (but other pesticides may

have been used). For each treatment type, one of the bags contains apples that look just like

the apples in the bag given out initially, and the other bag contains apples that look less

appealing. The quality of the apples is therefore defined in two regards: their visual

appearance and their safety for health. Information about the specificities of the produce is

given to participants at the beginning of the experiment. The participants are told that one bag

of apples, selected at the end of the experiment, will be for sale. After three rounds of the

auction, an additional item of information is revealed to the participants. They are told more

precisely of the particularities of products grown using neuroactive pesticides and the

increased production costs inherent in using alternative pesticides. After the sixth round of

the auction, participants are told that the next round will be the final one and the products will

be sold off. Data analysis shows that WTP for produce free from neuroactive pesticides is

significantly higher than for conventional produce and that the inferior appearance of the

apples has a significant (negative) effect on WTP.

Loureiro, McCluskey and Mitthelhammer (2003) used an economic experiment in

conjunction with a survey to analyze whether consumers' hypothetical willingness-to-pay

responses are effective predictors of actual market behaviour. They conducted a survey in

which consumers were asked about their hypothetical willingness-to-pay and preferences for

eco-labeled apples in comparison with organic and regular apples. After the survey,

consumers received coupons with a randomly assigned discount for each apple type, in order

to match actual behaviours and survey answers. They model revealed preferences as a

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function of socio-demographic characteristics and instrumental variables that represent the

intensity of stated preferences. Their findings show that consumers who state that they are

willing to pay a premium, which is equal to or greater than a positive lower bound, have a

higher likelihood of actually buying the product in question. This implies that consumers'

actions in the economic experiment validate their survey responses.

Bougherara (2003) appraises consumers’ WTP for eco-products through an experiment on

eco-labeled orange juice. The aim of the experiment is to evaluate WTP for three orange

juices: standard, organically farmed, and environmentally friendly. The participants are

divided into two groups. One group reveals their WTP by the BDM procedure, classically.

The participants are then provided with information about the meaning of “organically

farmed” and “environmentally friendly” and they are asked to reveal their WTP anew. The

second group reveals its WTP once only after reading the information on the organically

farmed label and information about what makes the produce environmentally friendly. This

study shows that organic product and environmentally friendly product are invariably valued

more highly than standard product. Revealing the information has no impact on the valuation

of the standard product.

In a similar experimental context Rozan, Stenger and Willinger (2004) assessed WTP for the

controlled heavy metal content label. This too was to determine the impact of information on

the significance of labeling and the impact on health. The sample was divided into two

groups. The first group elicited WTP by using the second price auction and the second group

revealed WTP by using BDM procedure. Unlike Bougherara (2003), Rozan et al. (2004)

showed that revealing information about health risks did not affect the valuation of the

labeled product but did cause a loss of value for the conventional product.

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3.3.1.3 WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR PEST-MANAGEMENT OF A FRESH PRODUCT

The European fruit and vegetable sector has experienced important changes during the last

few years. Producers had to meet the challenges, not only of global competition within the

European market, but also of the strong concentration process in retailing. Consequently,

these products are now differentiated by cultivars, origins and appearances, as well as by

companies’ production and processing methods.

Combris et al. observe a lot of denominations of origin, retailer labels or private brands in

order to signal the differentiation to the consumers who are often willing to pay large price

premiums for products with specific attributes. The authors use a protocol based on an

experimental auction in order to improve the understanding of how different attributes of

fruits can interact and affect consumers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP). Taking the example of

the pear industry in Portugal, this protocol is applied to both non-certified and certified

products. For this last category of products, the aim is to show the role of two kinds of

“labels” in order to convey to consumers the information on attributes of: (1) a collective

label with a denomination of origin (namely the “Rocha do Oeste” pear) and (2) a premium

retail label (namely the well-known “Fileira Qualidade Carrefour”, Carrefour’s Quality

Lines). The main result obtained was that “food safety” is an important issue for these

certifications, but it cannot excel sensory attributes. Consumers are not ready to compromise

on taste.

The purpose of this experiment was to improve the assessment of the relative influences of

different attributes on the consumers’ WTP for a product. Following the typology of Nelson

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(1970) and Darby and Karny (1973), the experiment aimed to compare the relative influences

of search attributes (which are directly observable, like the “appearance” of pears, for

example), experience attributes (which are usually unknown before consumption, like the

“taste”, for example), and credence attributes (which cannot be evaluated directly by

consumers, like “food safety”, for example).

Following Caswell et al. (2002), the three main attributes that we consider in our experiment

—appearance, taste, and food safety—are “intrinsic,” that is related to the physical

characteristics of the product. However, in the food area, there are a lot of extrinsic cues

which are searchable and closely related to the marketing and differentiation strategies of the

producers. According to Caswell et al. (1992) and Grunert (2005), information in the form of

labels could contribute to the comprehensiveness and accuracy of consumers' evaluation of

search, experience and credence attributes.

In the case of credence attributes, extrinsic cues play an important role in informing the

consumers, who can “believe in” or “give credence to” the signals without being able to

directly test or verify the credence quality itself. Consumers have a tendency to rely on

simple indicators such as brand name, retailer reputation and labelling in their evaluations.

For example, an eco-label is a credible label that identifies environmentally preferable

products based on an environmental impact assessment of the product compared to other

products in the same category. Consumers are generally unable to measure quality attributes

such as the impact of production practices on environment, but they may make inferences

about these attributes from extrinsic quality indicators and cues such as brand names.

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In this context, research on country-of-origin effects has established that consumers may use

origin information as a quality cue (Stefani et al., 2006). Certification of origin can also

transmit information on health and safety issues, namely if it certifies the so-called

“Integrated Pest Management”. Thus, certification of origin can act as a private brand in

order to differentiate products. It increases product attractiveness and assures the consumer

on more than one attribute simultaneously.

3.3.1.4 WTP FOR QUALITY ATTRIBUTES

Recent studies have stated that consumers are willing to pay for different quality attributes

and for information on them. The WTP approach is, therefore, concerned with measuring ex-

ante valuations, that is, valuations performed at the moment choices are made. Researchers

also measure WTP from actual market transactions and from a variety of stated and revealed

preference methods.

A common feature in WTP studies is the use of various types of contingent valuation

methodologies to elicit WTP, including surveys, choice experiments (conjoint analysis), and

experimental markets. Stated preferences studies, like stated choice surveys, use new or

non-existent product attributes and ask consumers to make choices in a sequence of choice

scenarios. The values of different attributes are estimated by varying the product attributes

between the choice scenarios. Studies that measure consumer preferences in terms of their

WTP for different attributes and that are based on real choices and costs are denominated

revealed preference methods.

The experimental markets (EM) methods are characterised by the use of real economic

incentives. Methods with this feature are called incentive-compatible methods for eliciting

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willingness to pay (Alfnes et al., 2006). EM gives the opportunity to control the type and

timing of the information provided to participants and observe changes in bidding behaviour

(Shogren et al, 1999). A lot of research studies have used EM to assess consumers’ WTP for

different quality attributes. Examples of EM studies that evaluate search quality attributes are

the research of Melton et al. (1996) that analysed WTP for fresh pork chops and concluded

that attributes like appearance affect WTP. Also, the study of Lange et al. (2002) used EM to

reveal the WTP for Champagnes with different labels. Recently, Lund et al. (2006) used EM

to analyse the monetary value consumers put on the freshness of apples. Other researchers

have measured monetary values of experience quality attributes. Lusk et al. (2001) used an

experimental auction to investigate how variance in beef tenderness affected consumers’

valuations. Similarly, Umberger, et al. (2004) used an experimental auction to determine

consumer’s WTP for beef flavour.

Experimental markets have become an increasingly popular tool for evaluating consumer

preferences for credence attributes since the 1990’s (Fox et al., 1995; Hayes et al., 1995;

Rozan et al., 2004; Hobbs et al., 2006). Credence quality attributes, like food safety, have

been valuated using the revealed preference approach. Food safety can be treated as a

dimension of quality (Hooker et al., 1995), where safety attributes are categorised as a subset

of quality attributes including food-borne pathogens, heavy metals, pesticide residues, food

additives and veterinary residues. Measuring WTP for safety attributes has been an important

issue in agricultural economics and the different food safety attributes have led to an

important range of WTP analysis.

In early empirical studies on food safety, WTP was frequently valuated by means of

contingent valuation (CV) surveys. Some of them have focused on risk reductions from

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pesticides in food (Buzby et al., 1998), others on risk reduction from pathogen like

Salmonella (Henson, 1996). However, Shogren (1993) argued that survey methods like CV

are not a real market discipline because they don’t create an environment conducive to

accurate and reliable responses. Some other authors considered that CV of food safety

overcomes the information problem by providing objective assessments of health risk.

Other researchers employed choice experiments to calculate WTP for several food-safety

attributes. Enneking (2004) used this method to analyse the impact of a food-safety label

applied to brand products. He concluded that WTP estimates vary considerably across food

labels and that quality labeling influences a consumer’s choice behaviour. In addition, Alfnes

et al. (2003) used a choice experiment to analyse Norwegian consumers’ preferences for

domestic, imported and hormone-treated beef.

Due to the concern over the “hypothetical nature” of the stated preferences approaches,

research conducted more recently has used experimental economics procedures to elicit WTP

for food-safety attributes. This technique has been applied to a number of different food

safety attributes, including reductions in pesticides risk (Roosen et al., 1998; Rozan et al.,

2004), pathogen risk (Hayes et al., 1995), and in the use of food irradiation (Shogren et al.,

1999).

Advantages and limitations of EM in valuing food safety attributes have been discussed in the

literature. Buzby et al. (1998) used three different techniques to evaluate the costs of

foodborne illness and the benefits to society of a safer food supply. They presented a case

study for each technique: (1) CV surveys on pesticide residues, (2) EM for a chicken

sandwich with risk of contamination, and (3) one expenditure-based technique such as the

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cost-of-illness approach. They argued that valuation with a controlled environment offers

advantages like consideration of the consumer’s budget constraints, the revelation of truthful

values by the use of a reveal-mechanism, and the minimization of selection bias by recruiting

for a “generic consumer study”. Enneking (2004) criticised experimental auctions and CV

studies, on the grounds that these approaches picked out the food safety attributes as the

central survey theme. He argued that consumers’ attention is concentrated on this product

feature, resulting in an over-representation compared with real market behaviour, where food

safety is only one of several attributes.

Combris et. Al (2007) argue that consumers can and do make tradeoffs between different

quality attributes. Following Grunert (2005), they consider that the importance of different

attributes to consumers can change over time. Grunert finds that, sooner or later, it is possible

that credence attributes can lose out to experience attributes. He points out that taste and

healthiness have the same importance before consumption, but this preference may change

after consumption. Consumers can give a different importance to taste because it has now

been experienced, while healthiness is still intangible and information-based. However,

repeated purchases allow consumers to improve their knowledge about the products’ quality

and also reinforce the dissymmetry between “credence attributes” and “experience

attributes”.

Research in experimental markets, as the work of Melton et al. (1996) suggests, is unrealistic

if one measures consumer preferences for any fresh food based only on appearance without

tasting. Sharing the same point of view, Hobbs et al. (2006), used an experimental auction to

evaluate WTP for two different kinds of meat with different quality assurances. The results

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show that consumers make tradeoffs between taste and production methods attributes, and

they suggest that consumers are unlikely to compromise eating experience.

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4 BIODIVERSITY AND PESTICIDE USE

Biodiversity is a concept that comprises the totality of species in an area. Its conservation has

received great importance in recent years, as its loss can be irreversible and can damage the

ecosystem value and reduce farm productivity. European agri-environmental schemes

constitute an initiative towards biodiversity conservation. Pesticide use can impact the

ecosystem by disturbing the balance of insect species (pests and beneficials) present along

with the potential impact on surface and groundwater sources, soil organisms, the pollenators

in the region, and the sanctuaries for other members of the environment. This section

addresses the notion of biodiversity as an aggregate environmental asset to be taken into

consideration as part of broader challenge of managing pesticide use.

4.1 BIODIVERSITY DEFINED

Noss (1990) and Brock and Xepapadeas (2003) state that it is difficult to find a simple,

comprehensive and fully operational definition of biodiversity. Diversity measures are

influenced by the richness and evenness of an ecosystem. Richness is the number of species

in an ecosystem, while evenness expresses the distribution of species.

Many researchers and organizations have tried to formulate biodiversity definitions. McNeely

et al. (1990) state that biodiversity expresses the degree of nature’s variety, including species,

genes and ecosystems. The World Resources Institute (WRI), the World Conservation Union

(IUCN), and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (1992), define

biodiversity as “the totality of genes, species and ecosystems in a region.” The United

Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (1992) (Convention on Biological Diversity),

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defined biodiversity as “the variability among living organisms for all sources, including,

'inter alia', terrestrial, marine, and other aquatic ecosystems, and the ecological complexes of

which they are part: this includes diversity within species, between species and of

ecosystems.” Gaston and Spicer (2004) provide a more straightforward definition by stating

that biodiversity is “the variation of life at all levels of biological organization.”

4.2 FARMLAND BIODIVERSITY

Farmland biodiversity is mainly composed from different plant species, insects, breeding

birds, rodents and small mammals. The largest number of farmland flora and fauna is mainly

found at the field boundaries (Kleijn, 1997; Wossink et al., 1999), as they provide forage,

shelter, and reproduction sites. Field boundaries support many flowering plants and insects,

such as bees and butterflies, which are not only important for bird species but can also

contribute to plant pollination.

The intensive agriculture of the last decades has caused considerable environmental

problems, including the decline of farmland species. Species poisoning, accumulation of

chemical substances in their bodies, and transition to other organisms though the food chain

are some of the common impacts of uncontrolled agrochemical use. Some chemicals can be

directly toxic while some others can be responsible for reducing breeding success to levels

that that could not maintain populations. Pimental et al. (1992) have shown that wild birds are

subject to pesticide contamination and poisoning while Heard et al. (2003) report a 3%

annual decrease of arable weeds since 1940. Donald et al. (2000) propose that farmland birds

constitute a good indicator of overall farmland biodiversity, and their populations (in Europe)

have declined during the last decades. European Union data confirm this trend by indicating

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an overall decline of a selected group of breeding bird species dependent on agricultural land

for nesting or feeding (Figure 22).

Farmland Bird Index (Index 1990=100)

68

70

72

74

76

78

80

82

84

86

88

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

EU-25

Figure 22. Farmland bird index* (EU-25)Source: Eurostat (2008)* Indices are calculated for each species independently and are weighted equally when combined in the aggregate index using a geometric mean. Aggregated EU indices are calculated using population-weighted factors for each country and species.

Pest-control methods intend to provide an ideal habitat for crop plants by promoting better

water and nutrient absorption and access to light, but on the other hand the non-crop plants

share in these resources declines (Firbank, 2005). These non-crop plants constitute a refuge

and a source of food for many farmland birds and the winter food supply that weed seed

banks can provide is important for their survival (Siriwardena et al., 2000). Moreover,

Boatman et al. (2004) and Hawes et al. (2003) have shown that insecticide application during

the breeding season of some farmland birds could be responsible for the decline of their

populations as the supply of invertebrates for feeding chicks is reduced.

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Additionally, plant species variety has declined, as the increased use of fertilizers favors the

growth of nutrient-demanding plants that are highly competitive and impede the growth of

other species. Finally, the homogeneity of agricultural landscapes has dramatically increased

and poses a serious threat to biodiversity (Benton et al., 2003). The reasons behind this are

that many farmland species require different food resources that a homogeneous habitat

cannot provide and that the decrease of mixed-farming systems deprives small mammals and

birds from feeding and nesting sites.

Among the proposals for enhancing farmland biodiversity are crop rotation and mixed

farming systems that can provide important food reserves for birds and mammals and the

maintenance of crop edges (physical boundaries, trees, bushes and lack of spraying) that

provide forage, shelter, reproduction and over-wintering sites for the farmland fauna.

4.3 BIODIVERSITY & IRREVERSIBILITY

Agrochemicals, overexploitation of natural resources, intensification of agricultural

landscapes and trade of endangered species can have irreversible effects on biodiversity.

Experimental studies have underlined the difficulty in enhancing the botanical diversity of

fields especially after a period of intensive use that has depleted the local seed bank

(Berendse et al., 1992; Bekker et al., 1997). Results from the evaluation of European Union

agri-environmental schemes demonstrate the difficulty in enhancing farmland biodiversity

(Kleijn & Sutherland, 2003).

Dietz and Adger (2003) estimate their parabolic Kuznets curve showing that biodiversity loss

is expected to decrease and then rise with increasing income (Figure 23). However, the rising

limb cannot be of the same magnitude as the falling limb, as the species are not replenished at

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Per capita income

Biodiversity lossFalling limb Rising limb

Hyperbola

the same level. Other biodiversity indicators such as the presence of arthropods and birds

have shown positive patterns in relation with changes in agro-environmental schemes (Kruess

and Tscharntke, 2002). Thus, there is a great uncertainty concerning the optimal time of

intervention and policy makers have to weigh and monitor carefully all the costs that are

created.

Figure 23. Possible Forms of the Income-Environmental Degradation RelationshipSource: Dietz and Adger, 2002.

4.4 EUROPEAN AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL SCHEMES FOR CONSERVING AND

PROMOTING BIODIVERSITY AND SAFEGUARDING THE ENVIRONMENT

Agri-environmental schemes were introduced in European agriculture under the 2078/92

regulation. Their introduction was a response to the increasing concerns for the

environmental impacts of agricultural intensification. Among their main objectives are

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biodiversity protections, reduction of nutrient and pesticide emissions, restoring landscapes,

and preventing rural depopulation. Farmers receive payments in order to apply

environmentally friendly agricultural practices. Among the measures of agri-environmental

schemes that aim at conserving and enhancing biodiversity are conservation of headlands for

arable weeds, conservation of wet meadows, grassland and grazing extensification, botanical

management agreements, meadow bird agreements, conservation of field margin stripes and

agreements concerning wetlands and coastal habitats. Kleijn and Sutherland (2003) reviewed

the literature dealing with the effectiveness of the pre-mentioned schemes but they were

unable to express how effective these schemes are in protecting biodiversity, as some studies

indicated positive effects of agri-environmental schemes in terms of increased species

diversity while other showed negative or no effects, or both some negative and positive

effects.

A variety of measures are used throughout the EU specifically for the purpose of ensuring the

protection of the environment and preserving its quality. One such measure is the

identification of nature protected areas and, consequently, the enforcement of restrictions to

the use of pesticides near these areas. These restrictions may include the setting of maximum

limits with regard to the type, dosage amount, and methods of application of the pesticides

used near these areas. Buffer zones may also be introduced as, for example, in Belgium (von

Bol, 2007). The latter are zonal areas used to keep two or more areas some distance from

each other. Thus, buffer zones may be used to separate areas where pesticide applications

take place from protected areas. Restrictions may also be imposed on cultivation near nature

protected areas and the proximity of the application location near nature protected areas, as in

the Czech Republic (European Commission – The Food and Veterinary Office (FVO),

Country Report of the Czech Republic, 2008). Aerial spraying near these areas is also

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forbidden. In fact, aerial spraying is generally considered the least preferable pesticide

application method in the EU.

Controls are also used to sustain the use of plant protection products near water resource

areas or areas surrounding water-supply reservoirs, as water may be polluted via spray drifts,

run-offs during or after the cleaning of the application equipment, or via uncontrolled

disposal of residual pesticide solutions. The EU seeks to protect the quality of water with

respect to pesticides and the role of the EU Water Framework Directive is to provide an

integrated framework for assessment, monitoring and management of all surface waters and

groundwater, based on their ecological and chemical status.13 It should be noted, however,

that EU regulations are viewed as supplementary to national measures, as each country

designs its own (national or regional) action plans which suit specific needs associated with

its topographic and climatic conditions. For example, Belgium has its own regulations

restricting pesticide use near water catchment areas, and requiring monitoring system for

ground- and surface-water at a regional level (von Bol, 2007).

One of the most important factors leading to water contamination from PPPs is pollution

originating from point sources (Balsari and Marucco, 2008). Studies have shown that point

sources are responsible for more than 50% of water contamination from plant protection

products (Kreuger, 1998; Maillet-Mazeray et al., 2004; Neal et al., 2006). The preparation of

the mixtures, the filling of the spraying equipment, the management of the remaining mixture

at the end of the application, and the cleaning of the equipment afterwards are among the

major factors leading to point-source pollution, due to the fact that these activities tend to

take place in the same area of the farm, usually near a water source. In addition, these

13 European Commission: Agriculture and Pesticides. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/envir/index_en.htm#pesticides

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activities may be carried out several times during the farming season, and, as a result, spills

and accidental overflows may lead to liquids containing pesticides infiltrating groundwater or

surface water (Balsari and Marucco, 2008).

In 2005, a large-scale, three-year European project aimed at reducing PPP point source

contamination began. The project, named “Training the Operators to Prevent Pollution from

Point Sources” (TOPPS) sought to identify and disseminate best management practice

guidelines at a large coordinated scale in Europe, with the intention of reducing plant

protection product spills into groundwater and surface water.14 A total of 15 European

countries participated in the TOPPS project, grouped into four clusters: South (Italy,

Portugal, Spain, south of France), Mid West (Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, north of

France, UK), Nordic (Denmark, Sweden, Finland), and East (Poland, Hungary, Czech

Republic, Slovakia).

Improper disposal of obsolete, expired or no longer authorised pesticides is a major issue in

safeguarding the environment. In some cases, farmers maintain old storage facilities that

contain obsolete or banned plant protection products. These pesticides are hazardous to both

the environment and human health. It is important for countries to take initiatives (both at

national and local levels) and implement appropriate measures for the correct storage and

disposal of these products. Some initiatives are already followed by several EU countries,

especially East European countries facing severe problems from the accumulation of

hazardous obsolete or banned plant protection products.

14 TOPPS website: “Objective”. http://www.topps-life.org/web/page.asp?cust=1&lng=en&m=1&s=1

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In Bulgaria, local initiatives, with the support of the government and several private

companies, constructed new storage facilities so that obsolete pesticides can be safely

stored.15

In Lithuania, the company SAVA plans to pack obsolete pesticides into 60-litre

polyethylene or 200-litre metal containers, which, after being marked and labelled, will

be transported to Germany and incinerated by the company SAVA Gmbh & CO within

24 hours after delivery (European Commission - FVO: Country report of Lithuania,

2008).

A similar initiative took place earlier in Romania, where regional cooperation led to the

collection of a total of 2515 tons of obsolete pesticides in 218 cities. These pesticides

were then repackaged and transported to Germany where they were destroyed in an

incinerating facility for hazardous waste (European Commission - FVO: Country report

of Romania, 2007).

In the Czech Republic, farmers can apply for compensation for disposal costs

(European Commission - FVO: Country report of the Czech Republic, 2008).

In Ireland, owners of obsolete pesticides are obliged to destroy them at their own

expense. The destruction is carried out by licensed contractors. (European Commission

- FVO: Country report of Ireland, 2007).

In contrast, Luxemburg has in place a procedure by which stocks of expired or no

longer authorised plant protection products are collected free of charge by a State-

funded company (European Commission - FVO: Country report of Luxemburg, 2008).

Table 10 summarises the various policies, measures and other practices used in EU member-

countries specifically for safeguarding the environment from improper use of plant protection

products.

15 HCH Pesticide Forum Report: : http://www.wecf.eu/english/articles/2005/06/hch_forum.php

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Table 10. Summary of Tools and Measures Focusing on the Environment

Identification of areas that must be protected and enforcement of restrictions to the use of pesticides near or inside these areas (for example, setting of maximum limits with regards to the type of pesticide, dosage amount, and application method)

Introduction of buffer zones

Bans of aerial spraying

Controls on the use of pesticides near water resource areas or areas surrounding water supply reservoirs

National plans which suit country-specific needs and characteristics (topographic and climatic conditions)

Monitoring of surface and groundwater contamination levels

Actions and projects that target the prevention of point source pollution

Initiatives towards the proper disposal of obsolete pesticides

4.5 ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS

A growing concern for environmental problems over these last decades has substantially

increased the need for information on environmental quality. One way to satisfy this need is

through environmental indicators. A large body of literature exists on environmental

indicators in general and pesticide indicators in particular. The objective of this section is to

provide a general overview on this topic. The following subsection then presents the literature

on pesticide indicators.

The literature on environmental indicators is mainly interested in definitions, concepts and

methodological issues. Environmental indicators are ways of making a complex

environmental reality more transparent by processing information to be easily interpreted

(Bockstaller and Girardin, 2003; Niemeijer and de Groot, 2008; Riley 2001; and Donnelly et

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al., 2007). Box 3 presents some definitions related to environmental indicators. An indicator

is made up of specifically chosen variables that give a good view of the present state of the

environment and therefore also makes it possible to follow changes and trends over time.

These indicators may be single variables, measured or calculated within a model, of

concentrations of pollutants in different environments and are important for environmental

policy. They are hence, for example, used in the follow-up of national environmental

objectives in Sweden. Single variables indicators from data of actual nitrogen concentration

measured in the sea are, for instance, used as an indicator to follow up the objective of Zero

eutrophication. More complex composite variables, such as indices, may also function as

indicators. An index is a numerical value, made up of two or more single number variables.

In other words, single number and composite variables are different ways of measuring or

calculating environmental quality. They do, however, share the same scope of use—to

indicate the state or trends of complex systems. Therefore, the underlying assumption when

reading an environmental indicator is that it contains information on the levels, trends and

underlying causes of more complex environmental systems. For instance, pesticide

concentrations in a catchment are assumed to be an approximation of the environmental

status of the ecosystem in the entire catchment. Designing an indicator is associated with

some difficulties, as nature is complex and it is related to human activity in a complex way.

In fact, it is this complexity that generates the need for indicators.

The word “indicator” can sometimes also be used synonymously with the word “model”,

which is confusing. Models can calculate variables that are difficult to observe and measure,

and can be used to generate indicators. It is therefore the calculated variable in the model that

is the indicator, not the model itself.

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Box 3. Definitions Related to Environmental Indicators

An indicator acts as a sign or indication of something. Both single data and calculated indices can be used as indicators in order to show the pressure, state and/or trends of a system.

A model is a structured way of representing a system based on scientific knowledge and may be used to calculate environmental indicators not possible to assess or measure.

An index is a numerical value, made up of two or more variables. The calculated quotient can be used as an indicator in order to illustrate the environmental condition.

Indicators are used to identify possible environmental problems and, as mentioned above, to

fulfill national environmental objectives and adjust priorities between environmental quality

and other needs in a society. They may also function as inputs to other decentralized decision

makers such as consumers and producers. Since the early 1990’s there has been an explosion

of environmental indicators (Riley, 2001). This explosion brings with it large differences

among environmental indicators and the need for structuring and harmonizing the existing

indicators. OECD was one of the first actors to call for and to systematically contribute

methodological and conceptual work to this end (OECD, 2008).

The most prominent conclusion that emerges from the literature is that indicators have

intrinsic conflict that is difficult to solve. An environmental indicator is expected to be

scientifically sound and simple (Niemeijer and de Groot, 2008; Bockstaller and Girardin,

2003; and Falconer, 2002). However, the meaning of “scientifically sound” is not always

clear, but often it is related to its ability to correctly describe a complex environment and how

it interacts with detrimental human activities. Niemeijer and de Groot (2008) interpret this to

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mean that indicators should cover key aspects, components and gradients of pesticides impact

on the environment. To fulfill this, an environmental indicator needs to include more

information, which inevitably makes the indicator more complicated. However, since the

main purpose of an indicator is to simplify and make these complex interactions more

understandable, there is a trade-off between the need to capture these complexities and the

requirements of simplicity. Ultimately, it is a matter of balancing these two needs, taking into

consideration the purpose of indicators and the existing circumstances. The discussion below

explores the search for this balance by referring to the literature.

Indicators related to factors putting pressure on the environment can be used ex ante to alert

potential environmental risks. Others indicators, more closely related to the effect or the state

of the environment, will be more appropriated for ex post analysis to put in place correct

environment policy and evaluate these policies. Early in the 1990’s OECD developed a

causal chain framework to classify indicators (OECD, 1993). Environmental problems were

described in a simple pressure-state-response (PSR) model. Human activities put pressure on

the environment and can change the state of the environment. Efforts to revert or reduce these

changes are the society’s response to these changes. This model, or more elaborate versions

of this framework, is frequently used in the literature to structure indicators in a cause-effect

chain. Alfsen and Sæbø (1993) and Bockstaller et al. (2008) discuss the purpose of indicators

related to these cause-effect frameworks. In terms of the PSR model, indicators may give

information on the environmental pressure, the environmental state or the responses. In more

elaborate versions it is possible to identify other types of indicators. The European

Environment Agency (EEA) developed the PSR model further into the Driving Force

Pressure State Impact Response (DPSIR) model. This framework is more specific about the

causes and effects of environmental problems. Unlike the PSR model it takes into

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Driving forceAgriculture

Population growthIndustry

Consumption

ResponseWaste water treatment

Restriction on use of productsLiming

Conservation programsIncreased competition over water resources

PressurePollution concentration such as pesticides, nitrogen, phosphorus or heavy metals

StateWater quality

Death rate for algae, daphnia and fishSecchi depth

ImpactLess biodiversity

ProductivityHealth problems

consideration the driving forces behind the pressure put on the environment. The driving

forces may be population density, agriculture production, and other needs in the society that

result in emissions of pesticides or other pollutants. The DPSIR model also differentiates

between environmental impact, which refers to the state of the environment, and the impact

to the society (EEA, 1999). According to this framework, indicators may be constructed to

give information on the driving force and the impact of environmental problems. Figure 24

presents an example of DPSIR for surface water.

Figure 14. DPSIR for Surface Water

Source: Adapted from DPSIR model.

The purpose of an indicator is also closely related to the intended users, referred to as end-

users in the literature. End-users may be consumers, producers such as farmers or their

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advisers, public policy makers and scientists. End-users have different needs and therefore

demand different kind of indicators. Consumers or producers are private agents and need

health- or production-related indicators to avoid undesired private costs, in contrast to

indicators related to the state of the environment, which have public goods characteristics.

Indicators related to the state of the environment are more interesting to policy makers in

seeking to correct possible externalities. Many authors argue that a careful consideration of

end-users is crucial when developing indicators (Yli-Viikari et al., 2007; Bockstaller et al.,

2008; Mitchell et al., 1995; Crabtree and Brouwer, 1999; Girardin et al., 1999). Some authors

argue that end-users should be more involved and active in the development of indicators

(Bockstaller et al., 2008).

Apart from the purposes, existing circumstances are important for environmental indicators.

The existing circumstances to a great extent determine the method used to build an indicator,

and are therefore crucial for the choice of an indicator and its quality. Methods used to

construct indicators are usually divided into measurements or calculations based on a

combination of data derived from simulation models (Bockstaller et al., 2008; Riley 2001).

Measurements are used when the theoretical knowledge required to understand the

relationship between human activities and environmental quality is considered inadequate.

This is particularly evident for very complex environmental problems such as biodiversity

and sustainability. According to Merkle and Kaupenjonann (2000) these types of indicators

are usually not accurate enough. When the scientific knowledge on the process leading to

environmental impact is available, it is possible to improve the accurateness of indicators.

More or less complicated calculations may be used to this end. Simple calculations can be

used to add some relation between some variables such as underlying natural conditions, the

characteristic of the environmental problem, and the economic activities generating the

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environmental problems. Although these types of indicators are simple, there are concerns

that they are poor predictors (Riley, 2001). These calculations do not consider complex

systems of relations that may exist. Through models based on scientific knowledge it is

possible to include at least some complex relation to calculate indicators. These models

improve the prediction of environmental problems but tend to be difficult to use and are less

transparent.

Other circumstances determining the use of environmental indicators include data

availability. Complex models based on advanced scientific knowledge are usually data

intensive. If input data are missing, these indicators are not very useful. If the input data are

available, there are other problems to be considered. Data should cover the relevant area and

be collected in a consistent way. This may be difficult if the relevant area is a large region or

a country. For higher aggregation levels, such as the EU level, data need to be collected in

different jurisdictions and administrative entities and the difficulties do thereby increase. It is

also expected that data is available and consistent over time. Niemeijer and de Groot (2008)

are more careful on this and point out that a criterion for a good indicator is how much data it

requires relative to the data available. If good data is available then the models can be

complex and still useful. It is worth noting that as time passes and new technologies are

available, more data at relatively high qualities are made available. This helps to overcome at

least some of the difficulties mentioned above for complex and data intensive indicators.

These indicators have another disadvantage, however. They tend to be too cumbersome and

too complicated for the intended end-users. Many end-users do not have the resources in

terms of knowledge, time and capital to use and update complex indicators.

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Not very surprisingly the nature of the environmental problem plays an important role when

balancing between the degree of simplicity and scientific accuracy. The more complex the

environmental problem is, the more difficult it is to combine simplicity with scientific

accuracy. In the case of pollution, many emitters distributed across different sectors of the

economy tend to increase the complexity of the environmental problem. The problem can be

further complicated if emission sources are geographically diffuse. In the same vein, the

degree of complication is also related to the number and the distribution of recipient areas. In

these cases, to get an indicator for the overall environmental risk one has to aggregate

measures, calculations or models from different pollutants in different recipient areas at

different scales. Since generally the environmental effect is related to these differences,

aggregation is an important but difficult step in building an indicator. Aggregation requires

consistent ways of weighting pollutants’ environmental effect. This requires a lot of

information and good scientific knowledge on each pollutants’ effect on the environment and

its weight relative to other pollutants’ environmental effects.

The aggregation problem is also related to the geographical area of interests. Large

geographical areas generally include a large diversity of ecosystems, climates and other

geophysical properties. The case of aggregation over different pollutants requires consistent

ways of spatially weighting the environmental effects. As in the previous case, this spatial

consistency also demands a lot of information and knowledge. Spatial aggregation over

complex environmental problems poses great difficulties when designing indicators. Further

challenges are added when consistency over time is also required to develop indicators

intended to be used as follow ups of environmental policies.

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Complicated environmental problems at high aggregation levels are difficult to capture in

simple ways. In this case an indicator cannot represent the large diversities of the

environmental problem. It is possible, however, to somehow overcome these problems by

constructing relative indicators. Relative indicators give information on changes and trends of

the environmental problem relative to a reference state. Usually the reference state is

politically determined and may refer to historical environmental states or known

environmental thresholds. Relative indicators need reference points to give information on

how serious an environmental problem is relative to the reference state. Reference values

based on knowledge of environmental thresholds try to capture environmental risks, which

other indicators do not always do. Simple and popular types of relative indicators are indices.

An index is usually a ratio between concentration of pollutants in nature and some reference

values. Concentrations of pollutants are either monitored (i.e., measured in catchment areas)

or calculated within a model.

Relative indicators contain important information not found in indicators related only to

environmental pressure or concentrations of pollutants. The former give an indication on the

risks of pollution while the latter only measures nature’s exposure to pollution. Because risk

captures the actual damage to the ecosystem, it clearly is more interesting and is in line with

the objectives of indicators. If the relative values are based on scientific knowledge

quantifying the effects of pollutants in terms of ecological and biological losses, the indicator

will fulfill its purpose and give information on environmental quality. It is then up to the

society to determine the desired level of environmental quality given the damages indicated.

This clearly shows the task of an indicator and separates the need of information on pollution

and the economic problem of valuing these effects. There is some confusion on this issue in

the literature. Falconer (2002) discusses this issue and says that indicators ignore the relative

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social costs of different types of damages or damages to different ecosystems. However,

well-constructed indicators should only indicate environmental effects and not their values. It

is worth noting, however, that references may be related to environmental goals that have

been determined politically, and from an economic point of view this may be inefficient.

Since the political process leading to these goals may involve negotiation and compromises,

the goals are not necessarily optimal. If indicators are developed with reference values related

to such environmental goals, they may lead to inefficient allocations of resources.

Part of the scientific requirement for an indicator is that it be tested. This may be achieved

through sensitivity analysis or other validation processes. A common validation process is to

see if indicators give consistent information on environmental risk across different polluters,

time and space. The idea is that whenever the risk is high, the indicator should indicate this

for each pollutant and different areas over time. This consistency is checked against measured

pollution data or experimental data where some of these conditions are deliberately altered. A

somewhat less complicated validation process may be used when indicators are calculated or

come out from models. In such cases the resulting indicators can be compared to measures in

some representative areas and the model is calibrated to obtain more realistic indicators.

Another common validation method is to use experts that, based on their experience and

knowledge, can adjust and judge the appropriateness of indicators.

There is a large body of literature on indicators selection criteria. However, given the

objectives of the TEAMPEST project, the criteria developed by the European Environmental

Agency (EEA, 2005) seem to be the most relevant ones. The selection criteria require that

indicators should be policy relevant, can be used to see progress towards environmental

objectives, and are part of the EU priorities in environmental policy. The criteria also require

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that the indicators are methodologically well founded to be consistent over space and time,

understandable, and available at a national scale. These are clearly practical and policy-

oriented criteria, in line with the objectives of this report.

Given the complexity of environmental problems, it is not very surprising that many

environmental indicators are in use. In this section we have shown that this diversity depends

on the existing circumstances and the purpose of the indicators. In the following section we

turn to the more specific environmental indicators for pesticides.

4.5.1 PESTICIDE INDICATORS

Pesticides are, according to the EU directives 98/8/EC and 91/414/EEC, divided into biocidal

and plant protection products. Plant protection products are mainly used in order to protect

plants and plant products in agriculture, forestry and horticulture from weed, vermin and

fungi. Plant protection products are used in open systems (i.e., easily interact with ecological

systems and are spread to non-intended areas). Biocidal products are chemical or biological

pesticides that are not defined as plant protection products. They are used in many different

contexts in order to eliminate unwanted organisms such as wood preservatives, disinfectants

and anti-fouling paint. Biocidal products are mainly used with great precision in the

production process inside fabrics and plants and should, if used properly, not be spread to

non-intended areas. Plant protection products are therefore the main source of environmental

damage from the use of pesticides. The word “pesticides” is used throughout this section, but

it should noted, however ,that since this report is focused on environmental problems caused

by agricultural pesticide use, “pesticides” in this context is intended to mean specifically

plant protection products.

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Parallel to the literature on environmental indicators, the one on pesticide indicators has

expanded substantially over these last two decades (Falconer, 2002; Maud et al., 2001; Reus

et al., 2002). Similar to the general literature on environmental indicators and despite the

limited evidence of environmental problems associated with the use of pesticides, many

different types of pesticide indicators are found to be in use.

Figure 25 provides an overview of the process of building indicators. Related to the

discussion on environmental indicators in the previous section, this section first identifies

some important existing circumstances conditioning the environmental problems caused by

pesticides, separated among farm, physical, and chemical properties. The latter include only

pesticide chemical properties. Physical properties are geographical and climatic properties

describing the environmental conditions. Farm properties, including those in forestry and

horticulture, are the economic and technological properties conditioning the use of pesticides

such as pesticide management practices. The following section describes the designing of

pesticides indicators. First, in relation to pressure state response (PSR), ex ante indicators

related to the use of pesticides are discussed and then other indicators more related to the

environmental effect of pesticides use are explored.

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Chemical properties

Physical properties

Existing circumstances Information processing

Geography

Farm properties

Pesticides

Spread and concentration of pesticides in natureAggregation Indicator

Economy

Factors determining the circumstances

Climate

Figure 25. The Process of Building an Indicator for Pesticides

4.5.1.1 EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Pesticides are usually composite products and may include many active substances designed

to neutralize pests. By and large, the most important component of commercial pesticide

products is the active substance. These are chemical products designed to kill pests.

Commercially available pesticides or compounds sometimes include more than one active

substance. Each of these substances has different chemical properties, e.g. persistency,

mobility, toxicity, bioaccumulation and volatilization potential. Potential environmental

problems arising from the use of pesticides are therefore a result of a combination of multiple

dimensions of toxicity, persistency, mobility, bioaccumulation and validation potential.

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Most environmental problems are often complicated by uncertainty and thresholds. For

pesticides, yet another factor that further increases the degree of complexity is their

commercial use in the agriculture, forestry and horticulture sectors. These sectors produce

many different kinds of products that contaminate many different environments, and a large

variety of active ingredients can therefore be found in one catchment area. In agriculture,

plant rotation systems imply that many different pesticides are found in small areas. Further

complications are added to the problem when one considers that the production of pesticides

is a research-intense sector constantly feeding the market with new plant protection products.

Environmental problems caused by pesticides are numerous and dispersed over large areas.

The final environmental effect of pesticides has much to do with how pesticides are

transported from the emitters to recipients, how different environmental property may

influence their transport, and to what extent they are degraded during this process. Pesticides

that end up on the ground are normally degraded by microbes. The speed of degradation

depends on different factors, such as temperature, biological activity in the ground and

properties of the substance. Residues that are not degraded leach out from the soil to surface

or groundwater. Cracks and macro pores often present in clay soils cause fast transport down

to drainage tubes and further out to watercourses. Risk of pesticide losses from these soils to

surface waters are therefore higher than from soils dominated by silt or fine sand. There is

also a big variation in pesticide properties. Some substances are strongly bound to soil

particles and are therefore rather immobile, while other substances, not so strongly bound,

pose a higher risk to be transported down to drainage pipes and groundwater. The

environmental risk caused by the use of pesticides is usually a combination of intrinsic

properties, weather, soil type, crop type and application technique. The driving force is

usually precipitation (or irrigation) and its intensity.

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Pesticides found in water may be from specific sources or be the result of diffuse leaching

from larger areas (see Figure 26). The term “point source” sometimes describes losses from a

defined spot in the farm or the field, e.g., spillage when filling the tank. The effect of point

sources can be very serious and harmful to the environment since these losses often are very

concentrated and occur in a limited area. These kinds of losses often happen as a result of bad

management practices at the farm or in the field. In the literature of pesticides, especially in

natural sciences, this is important to differentiate from other losses, referred as “diffuse”, that

occur from the use of pesticides in larger areas, like a field. Wind drift to surrounding surface

waters of pesticides sprayed on the field or pesticides that don’t degrade until they reach

groundwater are two examples. These pesticide concentrations are much lower than the ones

from point sources but the losses do, on the other hand, often derive from several hectares.

However, from a policy point of view, all these emissions are diffuse since point sources of

the kind described above cannot be specifically targeted.

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Leakage through the soil profile Erosion/surface runoff

Diffuse losses that may happen even though the farmer follows valid regulations. Occur after application due to weather conditions, soil type, topography, pesticide type, etc.

Point sources may happen when the farmer does not follow regulations.

Application in the field – wind drift/lack of buffer zone to waterBad pesticide management at the farm – storage, filling, cleaning

Ground water Surface water

Figure 26. Diffuse and Point Sources of Pesticides to Water

Source: Adapted from Malgeryd et.al., 2008.

This section has discussed some properties of pesticides that make their environmental fate

and effect complicated. A good environmental indicator for pesticides should be able to

capture this complexity, which is the subject of the following section.

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4.5.1.2 DESIGNING PESTICIDE INDICATORS – A COMPLEX PROCESSING OF

INFORMATION

Information on pesticide properties and how they are related to each other can be measured,

estimated or based on some theoretical knowledge using simple calculations or complicated

models. This gives information on the spread and concentration of each pesticide in nature

and may be used to measure environmental risk from the use of pesticides – i.e., to develop

pesticide indicators. A common way to categorise pesticide indicators is as Pesticide Use

Indicators and Pesticide Risk Indicators.

PESTICIDE USE INDICATORS: MEASURING SPREADING AND CONCENTRATION

Pesticide Use Indicators focus on total amounts of pesticide used or frequency of application.

An application occurs when pesticides are spread or applied to a fill to kill pests. The

assumption is that number of applications rather that the total quantity used better captures

the environmental risk of using pesticides (Gravesen, 2000). Pesticide Use Indicators are

widely used throughout the world and often rely on easy, accessible statistics on pesticide

use, quantities of pesticides applied and officially authorised doses. The Danish pesticide

indicator Frequency Application (FA) is one such example. There is, however, no strong

correlation between used volumes or application rate of pesticides and concentrations found

in surface waters. Furthermore, the environmental effects of pesticides are highly dependent

on their toxicity and other chemical properties and indicators based on volumes or application

rates fail to capture these aspects. van Bol et al. (2003) correctly observe that volumes and

application rate of pesticides in theory can be correlated to pesticide use and environmental

risks if the properties of pesticides do not change and the environment exposed to these

pesticides is stable. Van Bol et al. (2003) also point out that since the properties of pesticides

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are changing, Pesticide Use Indicators will not be able to capture the environmental risks

from the use of pesticides. They also remark that Pesticide Use Indicators cannot be used

across areas, regions and countries with different geographical and environmental

characteristics. In addition, temporal comparison may also be difficult, as global warming is

expected to change the environment. Similarly, climate change is expected to affect

precipitation and run-off in many catchment areas around the globe, thereby affecting surface

water. Pesticide Use Indicators are therefore bad predictors of environmental risks from the

use of pesticides as they do not distinguish toxicity levels and other relevant chemical

properties of pesticides both at spatial and temporal scales. Indicators based on volumes and

quantities of pesticides are therefore considered to be unsatisfactory (Stenrød et al., 2008; van

Bol et al., 2003; Reus et al., 2002).

Adding some information on how pesticides are spread in the environment can considerably

improve an indicator. From the emitters, pesticides are transported to different recipient areas

through air or soil. Some of the pesticides going through the soil profile are degraded during

this process. The final impact to the aquatic environment depends partly on the residence

time of pesticides in the recipient areas. Including this knowledge, the indicator will contain

information on the environment’s actual exposure to pesticides. Indicators giving information

on exposure may simply indicate the total amount of pesticides present in the environment.

However, some indicators aggregate and weight pesticide risks according to their chemical

properties and face difficulties associated with these steps.

The difficulties of aggregation and weighting are related to the large quantities of pesticides

existing in a dynamic market where many are spread over large areas. In addition, each

pesticide has a number of properties affecting the environment. These factors make

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aggregation the most challenging step for pesticide indicators. Not surprisingly, the literature

on pesticides, compared to the general literature on environmental indicators, devotes a lot of

attention to this step. The most common way to estimate total exposure is to categorise

pesticides in different groups mainly based on a pesticide’s toxic properties. These categories

are then given different scores depending on the relative toxicity, often taking into

consideration other relevant chemical properties. More ambitious models may choose to

explicitly model toxicity by using eco-toxicological or other biological and ecological

knowledge. These types of indicators are complicated and tend to be less useful.

PESTICIDE RISK INDICATOR

Although indicators aggregating exposure levels are a considerable improvement over the

indicators based on volumes and application rate, it is still not satisfactory enough to capture

the potential risks pesticides pose to the environment. Constructing a risk indicator requires

information on the sensitivity of recipient areas to pesticides (e.g., sensitivity of aquatic

organisms in waters contaminated by different pesticides). The Pesticide Impact Indicator (p-

EMA) and the Pesticide Environmental Risk Indicator (PERI) are examples of indicators

capturing the use of pesticides and the concentrations found in water but not their potential

risk to the environment. However, there is no conflict between measuring exposure and risks;

rather, as van Hyfte et al. (2008) point out, an appropriate risk indicator should include both

exposure and the risk this constitutes to health and the environment. To develop an indicator

from measuring exposure to measure risk is yet another difficult step. A risk indicator must

solve the weighting and aggregation problems and needs to distinguish different active

ingredients and their chemical properties. Using additional biological, ecological and

toxicological knowledge, these pesticides’ effect on non-intended organisms must be

assessed in many different cases. This requires a lot of information based on good scientific

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knowledge for a large combination of situations where toxicity and concentration of

pesticides, as well as climate and geography, can vary. Despite these problems and their

complexity, aggregation and weighting is necessary when developing risk indicators. These

last two decades have witnessed increased efforts devoted to developing pesticide risk

indicators (Stenrød et al., 2008).

The complexity of designing risk indicators for pesticides tends to give complex and

therefore less user-friendly indicators. For this reason risk indicators often calculate total risk

of pesticides as sums of the individual risk caused by each pesticide (e.g., PTI). This is a

simplification that may miss some synergies or antagonisms among pesticides but may be

reasonable given the degree of complications involved in estimating pesticide risks. In

practice, the scientific knowledge on how exposure of pesticides results in environmental

effects is often brought from laboratory studies. These studies calculate threshold values on

how sensitive different key organisms are to concentration of pesticides. The most common

way to include threshold values in indicators is by building an index where pesticide

concentrations in nature are related to pesticide toxicity estimates. According to Reus et al.

(2002) and Falconer (2002) indices are often preferred by scientists. One reason for that is

that indices meet some basic methodological requirements on indicators in a relatively simple

way. The use of threshold values in indices is relatively explicit and transparent. Other ways

to consider the effect of pesticide exposure on the environment is by explicitly modelling

their effects on the environment. This tends to be cumbersome and less transparent for many

end-users.

Another aggregation problem must be acknowledged. The exposure and potential risks to the

environment due to pesticide use are conditioned by local biological, geographical and

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climatic properties in different recipient areas. The larger the geographical scales, the more

sensitive the indicators should be to these local conditions. This can be solved in two

different ways – either by designing flexible indicators accommodating particular

circumstances such as different climatic, geographic and ecological conditions, or by limiting

the scope of indicators and designing specific indicators for particular climatic, geographic

and ecological conditions. Today most efforts are devoted to developing sophisticated models

able to give flexible indicators. Unfortunately these indicators tend to be cumbersome and not

user-friendly. Accordingly little work is devoted to developing indicators specific to some

areas despite the degree of complication of pesticide environmental risks and the large

differences in climatic, geographic and ecological conditions for the geographical area of

interest. van Bol, et al. (2003) propose to develop specific and global indicators, specific

indicators to assess more detailed issues related to the region and global indicators for

national and international policy, pointing to the need for both indicator types.

The specific conditions mentioned above affect threshold values and can be important

determinants of pesticide risks. Threshold values may differ between different geographical

areas because of differences in assimilation capacities, temperature, tolerance, or history of

exposure to pesticides. This may have important implications for indicators. For instance,

threshold values are often calculated at national or international scales and may fail to capture

regional or national differences in threshold values and thereby fail to capture regional or

national differences in the risk of pesticides. This would make indices flexible enough to

capture variation in exposure, as concentration levels can be available at different scales but

are not flexible enough to capture variations in risk. Institutional factors also hamper the

ability to correct these deficiencies. The laboratory studies, which are the foundation behind

threshold values, are provided by privately owned firms. Therefore, although the results of

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these studies are available, the laboratory tests are not available for improvements or

complementary studies. These laboratory studies may also be used to improve indicators in

other respects. Falconer (2002) observes that most indicators assume that pesticide

concentrations increase environmental risks linearly (or additively) without any scientific

motivations. Access to the laboratory studies may be helpful to find more accurate relations

between indicators and pesticide concentrations. However, this is not possible as long as

access to these studies is limited.

The existing pesticide indicators seem to give different conclusions about pesticide use and

environmental risks. Reus et al. (2002) compared eight indicators used in Europe as part of

the EU-financed project CAPER (Concerted Action on Pesticide Environmental Risk

indicators). Each indicator ranked 15 pesticide applications with different crops, land use and

other environmental characteristics. The Spearman rank correlation test showed that there

were large differences in the results. These findings are supported by other similar

comparative studies (Maud et al., 2001; Greitens and Day, 2007; de Smet et al., 2005;

Stenrød et al., 2008). Stenrød et al. (2008) use a different method to compare indicators. They

used monitoring data from two catchments in Norway to evaluate the estimated

environmental risks obtained from three different indicators. They found that one indicator

was best because it better captured the environmental threats but also concluded that much of

the differences among the three indicators is explained by how they are constructed.

The overall picture of large differences in the way pesticide indicators estimate

environmental risk may be moderated if carefully investigated. One reason for these

differences is that the existing indicators define the environmental problem with pesticides

differently. Pesticides pose at least three different kinds of risks. The first is the heath risk to

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workers that may come in contact with pesticides at work. The second is the health risk to

consumers that may buy pesticide-contaminated products or get exposed to pesticides via

drinking water. The third is the environmental risk. This explains some differences in

indicators. Sometimes the impression is that indicators should include all three risks. When

indicators are used for policy purposes this may be misleading. From the economic theory of

environmental problems and externalities we know that these risks are problems of a different

nature. The first two are problems of information, as both consumers and workers have the

choice to avoid these risks if the risks are known and consumers and workers are correctly

informed of the health risks they are exposed to16. The environmental risk occurs when

pesticides are transported to areas outside of the treated area and possibly create a negative

impact on ecosystems. This is a completely different problem, as the damage does not harm

those directly involved in the transaction but a third part, i.e., individuals suffering from

pesticide-contaminated ecosystems. These individuals cannot directly choose to avoid these

damages unless they indirectly can impose their choice on others through collective action

such as regulations. These different types of risks are often mixed when pesticide indicators

are developed and may be confusing when pesticide indicators are used in policy.

Some differences are also explained by the intended end-users of pesticide indicators.

Farmers, policy makers and scientists are the most common end-users mentioned in the

literature. Reus et al. (2002) found that, out of eight different pesticide indicators, five were

developed for farmers (to advise them on pesticide use), two for policy makers, and one for

scientists. The time and capital resources available to end-users are important. Farmers have

limited resources and prefer simple indicators and may accept less accurate indicatorsIt is

16 If consumers and workers do not have information it is either because the knowledge of the risks is not available or is asymmetrically distributed, as usually producers may have the knowledge but do not reveal it. In the former case there is nothing to do until the knowledge is provided and in the latter case the most efficient policy is to regulate information rather than act through quantities or prices on the market.

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therefore not surprising that these choices will give different types of indicators and explains

some of the differences among the indicators in use today.

Pesticide indicators also differ in terms of the environmental segments (or compartments)

included in the model as well as the way pesticide transport is modelled (Reus et al., 2002,

and Stenrød et al., 2008). Most indicators include pesticide contamination to water. Pesticide

indicators for water, however, may include only surface water, only groundwater or both.

This explains some differences, but again a clear definition of the problem of interest should

help determine what to include. If human health is the main concern, the indicator should

include groundwater, which often, but not always, is used as drinking water. If the focus is on

potential environmental risks posed by pesticides, then the indicator should include surface

water. In the literature indicators often include both surface and groundwater. Reus et al.

(2002) found that seven out of eight investigated indicators for pesticides included both

surface and groundwater contaminations. It is important to note, however, that three out of

these seven give separated indicators for each compartment included. Other indicators

include pesticides contaminating soil and sometimes also pesticides contaminating the air.

There may be synergies or antagonisms among the effects on these compartments. As many

comparison studies have shown (e.g., Reus et al., 2002, and Edwards-Jones et al., 1998), this

may give large differences among indicators. Furthermore, pesticide transport from emitters

to recipient may also differ. Most indicators includes runoff, spray drift and others also

include leaching and/or drainage. These further increase the differences between the existing

indicators (Stenrød et al., 2008).

As discussed in this section, pesticide indicators can be designed in many different ways

based on the extent of aggregation. When pesticide indicators are intended to be used for

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environmental policy, they need to be aggregated over large areas and need to include a large

quantity of information. To construct this kind of indicator that assesses the potential

environmental risk may be difficult. Probably the simplest and most transparent way to solve

this problem is through indices where actual concentrations of pesticides, measured or

calculated, are related to their threshold values.

4.6 VALUING BIODIVERSITY

The economic valuation of biodiversity is among the most pressing and challenging issues

confronting today’s economists. Valuing biodiversity can serve many purposes. Biodiversity

values can be compared with economic values of alternative options, a cornerstone of any

cost-benefit analysis. Additionally, valuing biodiversity can provide useful insights in

environmental assessments, accounting and consumer behavior. A challenge in modeling

biodiversity is to identify the states of nature that summarize its value. Economists deal with

similar issues in the modeling of products in terms of their attributes.

The valuation of biodiversity can be done in different ways. Duelli (1997) valued biodiversity

by developing a conceptual “mosaic” model in which biodiversity evaluation is based on

structural landscape parameters like landscape heterogeneity, habitat diversity and meta-

community dynamics. Nijkamp et al. (2008) summarize the different methods of economic

valuation of biodiversity (Figure 27). Monetary indicators of biodiversity can be extracted

from market prices, for instance, by valuing the financial revenues from tourism to natural

parks. Revealed Preference (RP) techniques are other methods that can be applied to valuing

biodiversity. Among them are the travel cost method, the hedonic pricing method, and the

averting behavior method (Bockstael et al., 1991; Palmquist, 1991; Cropper and Freeman,

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Assessment of biodiversity benefit

Use values Non-use values

Market pricesRandom utility modelTravel costHedonic pricingAverting behaviorContingent valuationChoice modeling

Benefit transfer

1991). The emphases of these techniques lies in valuing biological resources in an indirect

way by investigating peoples’ preferences in purchasing goods that are related in some way

to environmental goods. In other words, they lack direct questions like how much a consumer

may be willing to pay to preserve a natural resource or a plant or animal species.

Figure 27. Methodologies for Economic Valuation of BiodiversitySource: Nijkamp et al. (2008)

On the other hand, Stated Preferences (SP) techniques are based on price observations of the

good to be valued. Data are collected by means of questionnaires while the best known

method of this category is the Contingent Valuation (CV) method. By using the non-use

values (as well as use values), CV enables researchers to avoid systematic bias and resulting

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underestimation of the different values. CV allows for ex ante environmental valuation,

offering greater scope and flexibility in comparison to RP techniques.

According to Nijkamp et al. (2008), the most popular techniques for valuing biodiversity are

the SP techniques, particularly CV methods. Among the reasons for this popularity are the SP

techniques’ easy format, the fact that they are more informative, and the ease of isolation of

the good in interest from other closely related goods.

4.6.1 BIODIVERSITY & AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY

Modern agricultural practices are moving towards the simplification of ecosystems.

Pesticides are widely used in an effort to optimize the growing conditions of target species

and/or to reduce those of competing species. Tilman et al. (2001) note that pesticide use may

increase two- to three-fold over the next 40 years, resulting in a further decrease of global

biodiversity. The harm to biodiversity arises from the direct toxic effects of pesticides and

their potential to reduce the number of competing plant species. The different weeds present

around or inside the parcels provide a breeding environment and a seed bank for different

species such as birds and insects that can act as beneficial predators (Firbank, 2005).

Therefore, increased intensification and further loss of the diversity of natural habitats is

considered to be among the drivers of biodiversity loss. Biodiversity is closely related to

agricultural productivity. While pesticide use may increase agricultural productivity in the

short run, productivity can be negatively impacted due to the development of resistance in the

long run. On the other hand, biodiversity seems to have a positive effect on agricultural

productivity.

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Many studies have focused on the benefits of biodiversity in agro-ecosystems’ productivity.

Di Falco and Chavas (2006) find that biodiversity can benefit farm productivity and reduce

environmental risk and yield variability under low-pesticide use. Omer et. al (2006) find that

biodiversity enhancement can have positive impacts on agricultural productivity. Tilman et

al. (2005) state that higher yields are obtained from agro-ecosystems with higher diversity

than from lower ones. While increasing the number of species on a farm may reduce

productivity levels of the main crop in the short run due to resource competition, it can

provide services such as soil nutrient enhancement and pollination that can increase

agricultural yields in the long run (Jackson et al., 2007). Furthermore, the abundance of

functionally similar plant species that respond differently to climatic randomness stimulates

resilience that improves the ability of the system to absorb disturbances and enables plants to

thrive (Holling, 1973; Naeem et al., 1994). Finally, biodiversity can improve pest control by

impeding the evolution of pest populations (difficult to spread in a genetically non-uniform

crop system, increased presence of beneficial pest predators) and consequently reducing pest

damages (Priestley and Bayles, 1980; Heisey et al., 1997).

5 PESTICIDE POLICIES AND REGULATION

As consumers become more aware of pesticide externalities and demand pesticide-free

agricultural products and cleaner and safer natural habitat, many international and national

policies are targeting the regulation of pesticide use. There is a lack of coherent policy for

pesticide reduction at EU level, and there have been several calls for this issue to be

addressed in recent years (Neumeister, 2007; Weber and Smolka, 2005). Several member

states, including Denmark (Neumeister, 2007; Neilsen, 2005), the Netherlands and

Switzerland (Neumeister, 2007), have developed and implemented their own strategies.

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While Bradley et al. (2002) questioned the significance of government policy (the

governments of France, Germany, Spain, Portugal and Finland actively supported ICM

through regulation yet saw very little uptake), policy has played a key role in pesticide

reduction in some countries. Lampkin et al. (2007) showed that the area of land under organic

management has increased rapidly over the last 10 years, and this is, in large measure, due to

the availability of organic support payments, funded through the EU. Switzerland has

sustainable agriculture clauses written into its constitution, and this is one of the factors

contributing to the high levels up adoption of organic farming in that country and payments

for extensive production of rape and cereals has also led to reduction in the non-organic

sector.

Evidence from some studies shows that pesticide-use reduction is not only possible, but

economically feasible. They also show that, to make progress, all the main stakeholders need

to be involved, including government and non-governmental organisations, farmers,

processors, retailers and consumers. In all cases pesticide use reduction strategies have set

overall targets which progressively reduce the impact of pesticides over a period time. Within

those broad targets, some such as the Netherlands have focused on particular aspects of that

impact, such as maximum residue limits (MRL) and surface water contamination. Different

strategies have different approaches but they have a number of key elements in common,

including: campaigns, research projects, advisory services, robust methods of measuring

environmental impacts of individual pesticides, and the development of national indicators.

Taxation of pesticides is also potentially an effective tool for reducing pesticide use.

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Environmental RegulationsTechnological innovations

Green payments Enhanced

Competitiveness

5.1 COMPETITIVENESS & ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS

Figure 28. Porter Hypothesis

The current level of food production is already causing serious environmental problems.

Consequently, industrialized countries have made important efforts towards regulating

pollution in the form of increasingly stringent environmental regulations. Some studies have

shown that strict environmental regulations slow productivity growth, impede technological

progress and impose extra costs to firms (Palmer et al., 1995; Jaffe et al., 1995). On the other

hand, the Porter Hypothesis states that environmental regulations press firms to innovate and

thus enhance growth and competitiveness (Figure 28) (Porter, 1991). Thus, environmental

regulations play a dual role of increasing costs and stimulating innovation.

Although many of the environmental regulations are directed at industrial production,

agriculture is impacted as well, especially from pesticide regulations and clean water acts.

Nevertheless, agriculture still constitutes one of the major contributors to global

environmental degradation (Tilman et. al, 2001).

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Much of the recent work in identifying the relationship between environmental regulations

and competitiveness has focused on the pork industry. Metcalfe (2002) examined the impacts

of environmental regulations on the competiveness of the European Union (EU), Canada and

the United States (US) by focusing on changes in the expected exports due to fluctuations in

the environmental regulation costs. The study finds that an increase in environmental

regulations in the US and Canada will not have a significant negative impact on their pork

exports. On the other hand, more stringent EU regulation will reduce EU competitiveness and

will be beneficial for US and Canada as they will increase their market share in pork

products.

In general, the literature indicates that moving toward more stringent environmental

regulations will not significantly impact competitiveness (Krissoff et al., 1996; Colyer, 2004).

Industrialized countries that seem to have an increasing number of environmental regulations

also have the capability to channel their research into developing innovations that can

minimize the cost of stringent environmental regulations. Furthermore, the US and EU enable

their agricultural sectors to remain competitive in export markets through green payments

(subsidies, tax breaks). The Porter Hypothesis is also supported by the findings of Van der

Vlist et al. (2007), which have shown that the intensification of environmental regulations

can lead to efficiency improvements.

5.2 PESTICIDE TAXATION AND OTHER ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS

Complementing various regulatory measures and policy tools aiming towards sustainable use

of pesticides are economic instruments and incentives. This section provides examples of

such instruments and incentives used in several countries both within and outside the EU,

with emphasis on pesticide taxes/levies/fees systems. The analysis begins with a brief

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literature review of the theoretical background of the design of pesticide taxes, then explores

specific examples of pesticide taxation policy inside and outside the EU.

5.2.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

There is a substantial body of literature attempting to produce solid policy recommendations

that would help countries achieve safer use of pesticides, by minimising their risks to health

and the environment. Even studies that do not directly address issues of policy or regulation

development can, nevertheless, be helpful insofar as they provide information that can be

used for strategic planning and policy design. In Europe, for example, economic valuation

has been integrated into environmental decision making, at both a pan-European and national

level (Pearce and Seccombe-Hett, 2000). Within the context of environmental policy,

economic valuation is an approach that can be used to assign a monetary value to changes in

the environment. Thus, estimates of the WTP for reductions in pesticide use (or reductions to

pesticide-related risks) can provide essential information on the levels of environmental

protection that is socially desirable, or the levels of human health risks that are socially

acceptable (Travisi et al.; 2006). As put by Florax et al. (2005) policy instruments such as

eco-labeling, integrated pest management, pesticide bans and pesticide taxes, should

preferably be related to people’s WTP to reduce pesticide risk exposure. Studies undertaken

on pesticide tax design are mostly based on WTP estimates. Before discussing this, however,

it would be helpful to outline some key issues pertaining to the design of pesticide taxes.

To begin with, it is helpful to outline the basic problem faced by a policy maker upon the

design of a pesticide tax. The textbook model for the latter is explained by Zilberman and

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Millock (1997). First, we assume that the use of pesticides generates social benefits. In Figure

29, these benefits are captured by the area under the curve D (Demand Curve). The private

costs to the farmer applying the pesticides are captured by the area under the curve MPC

(Marginal Private Cost), whereas the externality costs from pesticide use (i.e., health and

environmental damages) are captured by the area under the curve MEC (Marginal Externality

Cost). The total cost for the society (that is, the sum of private and externality costs) is

captured by the area under the curve MSC (Marginal Social Cost). Competitive equilibrium

(Qc) is given by the intersection of the MPC and D curves. However, at the corresponding

equilibrium price, the farmer only undertakes his or her private costs and none of the

externality costs from applying the pesticides. The socially optimal level of pesticide use (Q*)

is given by the point of intersection of the MSC and D curves, and the optimal pesticide tax,

as displayed in Figure 29, is equal to the distance AB, that is, equal to the marginal

externality cost at Q*.

The introduction of taxes on plant protection products can serve two purposes.

(i) It discourages excessive use of PPPs and raises user awareness about their damaging

effects, thus providing users with incentives to change their behaviour.

(ii) Tax revenues may be used to finance national actions towards more sustainable use of

pesticides.

At the same time, a levy on PPPs may have several effects and an important part of achieving

the desired ones lies with government decisions as to how to utilise tax revenues. As Oskam

et al. (1998) explain, if a levy on PPPs is successful, then the use and risks of PPPs are

reduced. If, on the other hand, the levy proves to be ineffective in reducing pesticide use, then

the tax revenues may be used for reducing environmental effects of PPPs. Therefore, the

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Price

Quantity

D

MPC

MSC

Q * Q c

A

B MEC

targeting of funds generated from the imposition of a levy plays a very significant part in the

overall effects of the levy.

Figure 29. Example of an Externality Tax

Source: Zilberman and Millock (1997)

Upon designing pesticide taxes, perhaps the most crucial implication arises from the fact that

different types of pesticides have different levels of toxicity, or, put more generally, pose

different levels of threats. Therefore, the application of a uniform tax across all agrochemical

products may not be optimal, due to the large number of active ingredients composing the

various types of pesticides, and the different levels of toxicity that these ingredients have. In

these circumstances it would be more appropriate to design a scheme of differentiated tax

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rates, based on some measure of the hazards related to each agrochemical product (Falconer,

1998). This sort of taxation is not normally intended to stop farmers from using pesticides,

but lead them away from using the more harmful types. In general, setting up an optimal tax

scheme in terms of both applicability and effectiveness can be a hard task because there is a

trade-off between economic efficiency and administrative simplicity (Falconer, 1998).

Furthermore, the design and implementation of a differentiated tax involves higher costs due

to higher information requirements and difficulties in enforcement (Sheriff, 2005).

Another choice faced by policy makers is whether to levy a tax on pesticide use or on

pesticide price. Each way has its downsides (Falconer, 1998). For example, taxing the

number of pesticide applications made can lead farmers to perform fewer but heavier

applications. Similarly, a proportional tax on price may not have the desired effect when the

most expensive agrochemicals are the ones causing less damage. In general, according to

Falconer (1998), the key in designing environmental taxes is knowledge of the relationship

between input-level and environmental damage. This relationship can be a very complicated

one and, as argued by Pearce and Koundouri (2003), so can be the pesticide tax design. For

example, the toxicity of pesticides varies not only by their chemical composition but also by

the weather conditions during which the pesticides are applied. Furthermore, given the low

price elasticity of demand for pesticides (Oskam et al., 1992) taxes may have little effect in

reducing their use, unless set at a very high rate. Complications in designing an optimal

pesticide tax scheme can also arise from issues concerning the use of tax revenues. For

example, recycling tax revenues back into agriculture may not be as effective as using them

for developing pesticide alternatives or fixing damages already done from past uses. Other

revenue limitations include the fact that ad valorem pesticide tax schemes result in lower

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revenues when the prices decrease, and users can avoid taxes by building up stocks prior to

tax increases (Falconer, 1998).

Pearce and Koundouri (2003) suggest that pesticide taxes should be expressed as the sum per

unit of toxicity-weighted ingredient. Such taxes, according to the authors, may result in

farmers moving towards less toxic pesticides, thereby reducing the overall toxicity pesticide

use, even when the level of pesticide usage remains unchanged. The problem with this type

of tax system is that the real value of the tax is eroded by inflation, and so will be the

effectiveness of the scheme to discourage the use of pesticides with highly toxic ingredients.

The remedy to this problem is an inflation adjustment of all the taxes imposed on toxicity

units.

Pretty et al. (2001), like most studies, suggest that the ideal pesticide tax would be one

placing higher costs on products causing the most harm to people and the environment. Yet

this can be difficult in the absence of a credible hazard ranking methodology. The authors

suggest ways around this problem, including grouping pesticides into clusters with similar

impacts, ad valorem taxes, or taxes imposed on the level of use. The question is, however,

what effect these taxes would have in an environment where the price elasticity of demand

for pesticides is generally low.17 Pretty et al. (2001) argue that there are reasons to believe

that this elasticity is probably higher than what estimations suggest for three reasons:

(i) The low price elasticity of demand for pesticides rests on the assumption that farmers

expect tax increases to be reversed at some point in the future. If tax increases are

perceived by farmers as permanent pesticide demand will be more responsive.

17 Some examples of the price elasticity of demand for pesticides are extracted from Rayment et al. (1998): Estimates for the Netherlands, Greece, France, Germany, Denmark and the UK are typically between -0.2 and -0.4 with some ranging up to -0.7 to -1.0.

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(ii) The correct design of a tax scheme, together with an advice and incentives plan could

increase farmer responsiveness to price changes.

(iii) Demand for pesticides can be more responsive to price changes over the long run as

innovations in agricultural practice provide farmers with more alternative methods to

protect crops.

In a more general context, another important question is what exactly the “desired” level of

PPP use is. Bürger et al. (2008) discuss this topic in an attempt to provide a theoretical

framework for making decisions about the “appropriate” level of pesticide use, defined as the

level necessary to control a pest on a crop. The authors discuss three different ways of

defining this level of pesticide use:

(i) using an agrochemical product at the proposed dosage only when a pest is detected, or as

a precautionary measure when it is thought necessary,

(ii) reducing pesticide use to the minimum necessary dictated by cost-benefit analysis, and

(iii) reducing pesticide use by optimising the cultivation system so as to lower the risk of

pest infestation.

The authors reach the conclusion that a combination of the second and third approach could

result in the smallest pesticide use intensity. In addition, they argue for defining as

“necessary” the pesticide use which is still required after all other feasible non-chemical

measures of plant protection are exhausted.

Falconer and Hodge (2001) examine the linkages between the multi-dimensionality of

ecological problems and the complexities associated with policy design. Pesticides present a

difficult problem to trace in the sense that their hazardous effects are to a large degree

uncertain in terms of extent, duration, and scale. Given this complexity, Falconer and Hodge

(2001) argue that rather than eliminating and treating each aspect of environmental quality

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problems individually, it is best to consider them all jointly, by taking a multi-dimensional

approach to policy formulation. To achieve a sustainable use of plant protection products it is

necessary to find a balance between economy, ecology and social aspects (Bürger et al.,

2008). It is therefore essential to accept the fact that there may have to be trade-offs between

these aspects, and, consequently find some compromise solution. Falconer and Hodge (2001)

suggest that the ideal policy plan would be one which creates incentives for farmers to move

towards more pesticide-free cultivation methods, rather than trying to adjust their application

habits. Within this context, the authors propose that all policy schemes should have advice

and education at the core of their strategies.

In order to provide empirical support for their arguments, Falconer and Hodge (2001) use

farm-level data from a UK cereals farm. They combine an economic model of land use and

production with a set of constructed hazard indicators for pesticides to identify the possible

trade-offs between reductions in environmental damages and the income of farmers.

Consequently they consider four economic incentive policy instruments: an ad valorem tax, a

fixed levy per spray unit, a levy per kilogram of active ingredient, and a levy based on the

pesticide hazard score (hazard assessment was made in the paper). The results show that the

different specifications of a pesticide tax have different impacts in terms of both magnitude

and direction, and may also present negative side effects. This is interpreted by the authors as

an indication that in terms of policy design, compromises may have to be made, or additional

policy instruments should be introduced.

As mentioned earlier, WTP estimates can be utilised towards the formulation of pesticide

taxes. Mourato et al. (2000) illustrate this by showing how WTP estimates can be used in the

design of a tax to avoid pesticide damage in the UK. The proposed procedure is to divide the

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aggregate WTP over a given time period by the total volume of pesticide used in crops over

the same period.18 Due to lack of detailed data two simplifying assumptions are made: (i) the

total cereal yield in the UK is allocated exclusively to bread production (the agricultural

product investigated in this study), and (ii) each loaf of bread corresponds to one unit of

damage. The uniform tax estimated in this study is 12.59 STG per kilo of pesticides. This

value represents a tax rate of 60%.

Chalak et al. (2008) work in somewhat similar fashion when they examine the public’s WTP

for reductions in the use of pesticides in agricultural production in the UK, with a view to

combatting the impact of pesticides on human health and the environment. The authors focus

on two categories of agricultural production through which pesticide use creates risks for

human health and the environment: (i) cereal production (linked to environmental effects of

pesticides) and (ii) fruit and vegetable production (linked to human health effects of

pesticides). To place their results within a policy context, the authors estimate pesticide taxes

based on their WTP estimates. More specifically, they calculate the level of a pesticide tax

required for a certain reduction in pesticide use, according to their WTP estimates for each

type of agricultural production. To do this they first make a number of simplifying

assumptions, regarding the amount of pesticides used in each type of production, the level of

environmental impact produced by each unit of final agricultural product, the level of imports

and exports of these products, and the level of consumption of agricultural products.

Thereafter, following the method employed by Mourato et al. (2000) the authors calculate the

(uniformly distributed across all pesticides) taxes required to achieve a 5% reduction in

pesticide use for each of the two types of agricultural production. Interestingly, their

estimates show that a much higher (nearly ten times as much) tax is required to reduce 18 Aggregate WTP can be calculated by multiplying the marginal WTP in terms of money per unit of agricultural product per unit of damage, by the total environmental damage figures and by the aggregate number of units of agricultural product purchased each year, adjusted by its price elasticity.

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pesticide effects on human health than that required to reduce their environmental effects.

Specifically for pesticides used in fruit and vegetable productions, the tax rate estimate is

equal to 128.9 STG per kilo of active ingredient, whereas for cereal production the related tax

estimate is only 14 STG per kilo of active ingredient.

The two studies described above present an illustration of how WTP estimates can be utilised

in the design of a uniform tax across pesticides. However, as explained in Mourato et al.

(2000) such a tax does not present farmers with an incentive to move towards using more

user- or environmentally friendly pesticides. In effect, uniformly applied pesticide taxes

cannot guarantee desired effects. To differentiate the tax, one needs a technique for

estimating the full range of effects attributed to a plant protection product, or needs to rank

pesticides according to the level of risks they pose. The survey conducted by Mourato et al.

(2000) considers respondents’ attitudes towards different kinds of damages and this gives rise

to non-uniform tax rates ranging from 11.38 STG to 13.69 STG per kilo of agrochemical

product, instead of the uniform tax 12.59 STG per kilo estimated originally.

5.2.2 TAX POLICY

Pesticide taxation has been implemented in several countries inside as well as outside the EU.

Three Scandinavian countries, namely Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, introduced pesticide

taxes as part of their efforts to reduce pesticide use. Among the three, Sweden was the first

country to establish pesticide taxation, in 1985. The Swedish system is also the simplest

among the three and works as an environmental levy per kilo of active substance. Originally

the levy was 20 Swedish Krona (SEK) per kilo of active substance, but in 2004 it was raised

to 30 SEK (PAN Europe, 2005).

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Norway introduced pesticide taxation in 1988. Originally, Norway’s taxation system was

based on a flat rate tax on the value of imported pesticides divided into a control tax (9% of

the base price) and an environmental tax (15.5% of base price) (Rørstad, 2005). In 1999 the

taxation of pesticides changed into a system of differentiated rates according to health and

environmental risks (PAN Europe, 2005; Rørstad, 2005). The new system allocates pesticides

into six tax brackets based on health and environmental risk (low, medium and high risk) and

whether they are ready or concentrated hobby products or seed treatment pesticides. The first

three refer to pesticides intended for professional use.19 The pesticide tax is calculated by

multiplying the basic tax of 20 Norwegian Krona (NOK) per hectare by the factor

corresponding to the class which the pesticide belongs to. For example, the factor for high-

risk pesticides is 8, so the tax levied on pesticides classified as high risk is 160 NOK per

hectare. In addition, to recover the cost of testing, controlling, and registering pesticides,

Norway also imposes a control tax of 16 NOK/hectare to all pesticides sold.

Denmark’s tax system does not classify pesticides by their toxicity or health and

environmental risk properties. Instead, the tax on pesticides is based on the maximum retail

price and applies higher rates to pesticides that are cheaper. The current tax rates are 53.85%

for insecticides, 33.33% for herbicides, and 33.33% for fungicides (Danish Environmental

Protection Agency, 2000). The tax is applied at the manufacturing or importing stage, but,

unlike the Norwegian pesticide tax system, tax rates do not reflect environmental and health

hazards. Also, 75% of tax revenues are returned to farmers in the form of lowered property

taxes, while the rest is used for research purposes and pesticide use reduction programs.

These provisions dampen farmers’ objections to pesticide taxation (PAN Europe, 2005).

19 In October 2004 modifications were made to the system, including increasing the classes for pesticides used professionally from three to five (PAN Europe, 2005).

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Little is known about the effectiveness of taxation in the three Scandinavian countries

discussed above because this effect cannot be separated from the effects of other measures

taken to reduce pesticide use. However, a survey in PAN Europe (2005) shows that 40% of

Norwegian farmers surveyed said that taxation has led them towards using less toxic

pesticides. Danish officials consider pesticide taxation to have contributed to a 5% decrease

in the use of pesticides; whereas in Sweden taxation is not believed to have had any

substantial effect in terms of pesticide use between 1998 and 2002.

Belgium introduced pesticide taxation on pesticides bought for agricultural use in 1998

(OECD, 2007). This tax applies to five active substances and its primary purpose is to finance

PPP registration and Belgium’s federal programme for reducing the use of pesticides and

biocides in agriculture. The tax is based on several criteria (such as health and environmental

risks, and flammability) and is paid by marketing authorisation permits. The tax was initially

low (only 0.0025 Euro per gram of active substance) and well received by farmers. However,

it has since increased to 0.395 Euro per kilo or litre of pesticide with a view to creating

stronger incentives for producers and users to turn towards safer plant protection products

(OECD, 2007).

In 2000, Italy introduced a 0.5 % flat tax on the final price of all the pesticides manufactured

and sold which (a) create cumulative risks, (b) are linked to carcinogenic effects, (c) can

cause cancer, and (d) can impair fertility. A flat tax of 1% on the final price of imported

pesticides was also introduced at the same time. The revenues collected from the tax are used

to finance the development of organic farming and quality products (PAN Europe, 2005).

France applies a tax on seven categories of pesticides as non-point sources of water pollution.

The tax rates are 0.00, 381.12, 609.80, 838.47, 1067.14, 1372.04 and 1676.94 Euro per ton of

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plant protection products, reflecting the different levels of pollution generated by each

pesticide category (OECD-EEA website).

The UK introduced in 1987 a levy on pesticide products approved by the Health and Safety

Executive (HSE) to cover the monitoring costs of pesticide use. The tax levy varies with the

sales turnover and its collection begins in September each year by requesting approved

suppliers to declare their annual turnover. For the 2007-08 period the levy rate was estimated

to be below 0.6% of gross turnover. This is, of course, very low by comparison to other EU

countries; however, as said above, the tax levy in the UK is not intended to curb pesticide use

but finance the HSE’s monitoring costs (HSE website).

In Finland pesticides are subject to a registration and control fee. The registration fee is 840

Euro payable when a pesticide product enters the market, whereas the control fee is 3.5% of

the product’s retail price (excluding VAT). The main purpose for the collection of the fee in

Finland is to cover the administrative expenses for the registration of pesticides (Parkkinen,

2008).

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Table 12: Summary of Pesticide Taxes and Fees in EU Countries

Country Year introduced Details Taxes/Levies

Belgium1,2 1998 - Tax on pesticides with primary purpose of financing PPP registration and the Federal Programme for Reduction of Pesticide Use in Agriculture and Biocides.- Tax applies to five active substances.- Tax is based on several criteria (health and environmental risks, and flammability).

- Original plan for the tax was €0,0025 per gram of active substance.- Since 1998, tax rates have been increased to up to €0,395 per kilo or litre of pesticide, to create incentives for both producers and users to turn towards safer products.

Denmark1 1992 - System based on pesticide prices.- Tax levied as percentage of the retail price of pesticides (excluding VAT).- Higher tax to cheaper pesticides.- Taxation system does not consider hazards or risks.

- Insecticides: 54% of retail price (excl VAT)- Herbicides: 33% of retail price (excl VAT)- Growth Regulators: 33% of ret. pr. (excl VAT)- Fungicides: 33% of retail price (excl VAT)

Finland5 1988 - Registration and control fee on pesticides.- Used for the purposes of covering the administrative expenses for the registration of pesticides.

- Registration fee for new product to enter the market: 840 Euro- Additional fee of 3.5% of product’s retail price (excluding VAT)

France3 - Tax on seven categories of pesticides as non-point sources of water pollution.- French tax is designed to reflect the different levels of pollution generated by each pesticide category.

- Category 1: 0.00 Euro per ton- Category 2: 381.12 Euro per ton- Category 3: 609.80 Euro per ton- Category 4: 838.47 Euro per ton- Category 5: 1067.14 Euro per ton- Category 6: 1372.04 Euro per ton- Category 7: 1676.94 Euro per ton

(Continued on next page)

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Table 12 (continued)

CountryYear intro-duced

Details Taxes/Levies

Italy1 2000 - Flat tax on all pesticides manufactured and sold with the following risks: (a) risks of cumulative effects(b) limited evidence of carcinogenic effect(c) may cause cancer(d) may impair fertility- Higher flat tax on imported pesticides.

- Flat tax: 0.5% over the final price for pesticides manufactured in Italy.- Flat tax: 1% over the final price for imported pesticides.

Norway1 1988 - Originally flat rate tax (percentage) on import value of pesticides.- In 1999 changed to a system based on health and environmental properties.- Taxation takes into account human health and environmental risks (risk reduction approach)- Emphasis on risk indicators, assessed through a series of intrinsic hazard and exposure scores.- Pesticides are sorted into different classes based on their effects on health and the environment. Each class has a different tax factor.- Goal is to reduce the use of pesticides, particularly those that pose the highest threat to human health and environment.

- Basic Tax: 20 NOK per hectare

To calculate tax for each pesticide product, basic tax is multiplied by the factor of its class:- Low health and environmental risk: 20 NOK/ha (20x1) (factor=1)- Medium health and environmental risk: 80 NOK/ha (20x4) (factor=4)- High health and environmental risk: 160 NOK/ha (20x8) (factor=8)- Seed treatment pesticides: 10 NOK/ha(20x0.5) (factor=0.5)- Concentrated hobby products: 1000 NOK/ha(20x50) (factor=50)- Ready hobby products: 3000 NOK/ha(20x150) (factor=150)Additionally a standard levy of 16 NOK/ha for all pesticides sold also applies.

Sweden1 1985 - First Scandinavian Country to impose a tax on pesticides.- Simple system.- Environmental levy per kg of active substance.

- Originally 20 SEK per kg active substance.- From 2004: 30 SEK per kg active substance.

UK4 1987 - Pesticide levy charged each year on Health and Safety Executive (HSE)-approved pesticide products, based on their sales turnover.- Levy is charged to the agrochemical industry.- Levy is intended to cover monitoring and approval costs.

For 2007/8 estimated to be below 0.6% of gross turnover.

Sources: 1 PAN Europe (2005)2 OECD (2007)3 OECD-EEA (website)4 Health and Safety Executive UK (website)5 Parkkinen (2008)

In addition to pesticide taxes and levies, an alternative economic instrument which may assist

the promotion of sustainable pesticide use is a subsidy. The use of subsidies to reduce

pesticides takes the form of financial assistance paid to users as an incentive to turn them

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towards more environmentally friendly practices. Examples of how subsidies are used in EU

countries to combat pesticide risk include the following:

The Netherlands subsidises (a) training programs in integrated pest management

initiated by farmers, (b) farmers applying mechanical weed systems and reducing

herbicide use to less than a kilo per hectare (this subsidy comes from the EU), (c) the

advertising of products certified as produced by good agricultural practices, and (d)

research related to risk reduction methods on the condition that the results are

communicated to farmers (OECD, 2006).

In Germany, a large number of farm enterprises take part in the agro-environmental

programs of the Federal Länder, which are co-financed by the EU. In addition, research

and development towards PPP risk reduction in Germany is funded by various

organisations, ministries and the Federal Länder (OECD, 2006).

In Slovenia, special financial support is provided to ecological farming, integrated

arable farming, integrated fruit growing, integrated vine growing, and integrated

vegetable growing (OECD, 2006).

In Luxemburg, farmers receive subsidies for keeping records on PPP applications, for

receiving a certification for their spraying equipment every five years, and for keeping

PPPs in safe storage (European Commission - FVO: Country report of Luxemburg,

2008).

In Austria, financial support is provided for the development of forecasting systems

(Lentsch, 2007). Belgian regions also finance research activities and support advisory

services (von Bol, 2007).

5.3 EU PESTICIDE POLICIES

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The European Union (EU) is struggling to implement coherent pesticide regulations in an

effort to protect public health and the environment. Regulations on the marketing of plant

protection products, maximum residue levels and the thematic strategy on the sustainable use

of pesticides compose the puzzle of the European pesticide policy (Figure 30). Pesticide

policies based on economic incentives (taxies, subsidies) are among the future plans of the EU

policy makers.

Pesticide policies were first introduced at an EU level in 1979. Directives 91/414/EEC and

98/8/EC on the placing of plant protection products and biocidal products, respectively, on the

market were the first to deal with the authorization of pesticides. The waste framework

directive (2006/12/EC) and the directive on hazardous waste (91/689/EEC) constitute

regulations impacting pesticide use in many ways as they establish provisions for the safe

collection/disposal of empty pesticide packages and unused or expired pesticides. The water

framework directive (2000/609/EC) and the regulation on MRLs (396/2005) address pesticide

residuals; the first identifies substances that are hazardous for water (including active

substances in plant protection products), while the second sets maximum residue levels of

active substances in food and feed. The Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of

Pesticides completes the puzzle of current pesticide policies, as it aims at regulating pesticide

use.

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Market Introduction

Use

Waste

Residues

Placing on the market of PPPs (91/414/EEC & 98/8/EC)

Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides

MRLs & Water Framework Directive

Waste Framework & Hazardous Waste Directives

Figure 30. Pesticide Policies at an EU Level in Equivalence with Aspects of Pesticide UseSource: European Commission (2007)

The European Council recently adopted a regulation concerning the placing of PPPs on the

market. The regulation contains a proposal for “cut off” criteria for the approval of active

substances based on hazard properties of the substance (Annex II 3.6-3.7) (Figure 31). The

criteria imply that it is prohibited to approve substances: a) that could cause cancer, have

mutagenic or reproductive effects unless the human exposure is negligible (known as CMR

category 1 or 2); b) that could give rise to endocrine disruptions (ED) unless the exposure to

human is negligible; c) that fulfill the criteria of being persistent organic pollutants (POPs);

and, d) that fulfill the criteria of being persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic (PBT), or very

persistent and very bioaccumulative (vPvB).

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“cut off” criteria

ED

POPs

PBT

vPvB

CMR

Figure 31. Cut-off Criteria for Placing PPPs on the Market

Furthermore, the regulation includes criteria for selecting candidates for substitution (Annex

II 4). The substances fulfilling these criteria are also identified.

Another regulation concerns the establishment of Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs), which

is “the highest levels of a pesticide residue that is legally tolerated in or on food and feed”

(European Commission, 2008). Currently there are MRLs for 315 fresh products, but these

MRLs also apply to the same products after processing. The MRLs cover approximately 1100

pesticides currently or formerly used in agriculture within and outside the EU. European Food

Safety Authority (EFSA) is responsible for holding safety assessments that concern all the

consumer groups and are based on pesticides’ toxicity, the maximum levels expected on food

and the different diets of EU consumers. Figure 32 presents the composition of the MRL

regulation, who is responsible for its enforcement, and who takes action when the MRL of a

specific product is above the legal level. The MRLs also contain: a) the EU MRLs already in

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MRLs

Composition

Enforcement

Action

EU MRLs

Member States MRLs

Low risk substances

EU multiannual control programme

Food and Veterinary Office

Community Reference Laboratories

RASSF

force before September 2008 (about 45,000); b) the recently harmonized MRLs previously set

by the Member States (about 100,000); and c) a list of low-risk substances for which MRLs

are not necessary.

The Member States are responsible for the control and enforcement of MRLs, while the EU

has some mechanisms for ensuring that the MRLs are applied in an adequate way. These

mechanisms are enforced by the EU multiannual control programme, the Food and Veterinary

Office, and the Community Reference Laboratories. Finally, if some food or feed are found to

contain excess amount of pesticide residues, then the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed

(RASFF) takes measures to protect the consumers.

Figure 32. Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) in EU

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In July 2006, the European Commission adopted the Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable

Use of Pesticides that is accompanied by an impact assessment and a legislative proposal that

will create a policy framework for pesticide use. The goal of this strategy is to minimize the

adverse effects and risks on human health and the environment from the use of pesticides

(European Commission, 2007). The strategy includes a number of measures that will be

implemented either by using existing policy frameworks or by introducing new legislation

(Figure 33). According to the European Commission (2007) these measures are: a) new

measures that cannot be integrated, fully or to a large extent, into existing instruments; b)

measures that can best be integrated into existing instruments; and, c) actions and measures

that are currently not proposed as part of the Thematic Strategy, but could be examined again

at a later stage.

Establishment of National Action Plans (NAPs) to reduce hazards, risks and dependence on

pesticides is one of the measures of the first category. These National Plans have been very

successful in the past and they will mirror the parts of the Thematic Strategy for the

sustainable use of pesticides at national level. Involvement of different stakeholders and

public participation in the preparation and implementation of the NAPs is one of the priorities

of the thematic strategy. Another measure of this initiative is the creation of a system of

awareness-raising and training of professional pesticide users, distributors and advisers. The

risks linked to the use of pesticides should become known to all the involved stakeholders and

member states should ensure that these stakeholders have access to the minimum training

required. Furthermore, the inspection of the application equipment will be compulsory. Well-

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Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides

Goal

Measures

Minimize risks of pesticides to human health+environment

New Integrated into existing instruments To be included in the future

NAPs

Training

Equipment inspection

PPP-free areas

Storage/handling

Waste management

IPM

Progress measurement

Information exchange

Compliance monitoring

Comparative assessment

Substitution principle

Residue monitoring

Epidemiological exposure studies

Environmental monitoring

Research on pesticides

VAT application

International dimension

Quantitative reduction targets

Tax/levy schemes

Prohibition of aerial spraying

Protection of aquatic environment

maintained application equipment can minimize the risks to human health and the

environment and can ensure the efficient use of pesticides.

Figure 33. The Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides

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Additionally, areas of reduced or zero pesticide use will be defined. Each member state

should indicate areas such as special protected areas (such as the Natura 2000 network), areas

that are accessed by vulnerable groups (such as playgrounds, around schools) and areas of

high public exposure (such as parks). Storage and handling of pesticides is another important

measure. Waste management should be established for unused and empty packages, while

residues from leaking spray equipment must be disposed in accordance with the rules for

hazardous waste. Other measures of the first category are: a) prohibition of aerial spraying,

the enhanced protection of the aquatic environment; b) implementation of principles of

Integrated Pest Management (IPM) by professional pesticide users; c) measurement of

progress in risk reduction through appropriate indicators; d) establishment of a system of

information exchange at community level; and e) the improvement of systems for collecting

information on distribution and use.

Among the measures that can best be integrated into existing instruments are: a) improved

systems for monitoring compliance with the legal requirements concerning pesticides; b)

comparative assessment and substitution principles; c) residue monitoring and

epidemiological exposure studies; d) environmental monitoring; e) research on pesticides; f)

application of normal Value Added Tax (VAT) rate to pesticides; and g) establishment of an

international dimension by contributing to the safe use of pesticides in third countries outside

the EU.

Finally, there are some actions and measures that presently do not constitute a part of the

Thematic Strategy but need to be examined and debated for potential future adoption. One of

them is the establishment of quantitative reduction targets. This measure requires careful

examination since its establishment can be impeded potentially by: a) the absence of direct

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links between quantities of a substance used, the risks to human health and the natural habitat

and/or b) the absence of data in several member states on current pesticide use that renders the

identification of an appropriate baseline difficult. Tax and levy schemes are another measure

that will be examined at a later stage. Taxation of pesticides will provide revenues that can be

used to finance the different pre-mentioned measures.

The protection of human health and the environment is a matter of utmost importance for the

European Commission ,and thus the EU seeks to ensure the proper marketing and use of

pesticides in order to minimise their effects on humans, animals, and the environment. It is

also among the EU goals to provide adequate and accurate information to both pesticide users

and the general public about the various issues related to the use of pesticides and their

residues in agricultural products, so as to raise awareness and encourage low-pesticide or

pesticide-free cultivation techniques. In this context, Council Directive 91/414/EEC regulates

the placing of plant protection products (PPPs) on the market. Specifically, the Directive

regulates the evaluation and approval of active substances at the EU level as well as the

authorization of plant protection products containing these substances at the member-state

level.

With regard to the evaluation and authorisation of pesticides, Directive 91/414/EEC states

that active substances cannot be used in PPPs unless included in a list of substances

authorised at the EU level.20 In 1993, an evaluation of active substances used within the EU

was undertaken by the “European Community (EC) review program for existing active

substances”. This was a four-stage program aimed at ensuring that all pesticides used

throughout the European Community meet modern safety standards.21 The programme, which 20 European Commission website: Plant Protection – Introduction http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/protection/index_en.htm21 United Kingdom’s “Pesticides Safety Directorate (PSD)”, http://www.pesticides.gov.uk/approvals.asp?

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was completed in March 2009, generally involved a review process of all active substances

used in PPPs within the EU, verifying whether or not they could be used safely for human

health and the environment. At the completion of the programme, from a total of roughly

1000 substances, 26% were approved, 7% were removed from the market (they were

identified as hazardous to human health and the environment), and 67% were eliminated from

the review process and also removed from the market.22

In addition to monitoring the marketing of plant protection products, the European Union also

seeks to ensure that the residues of pesticides that remain in all food products intended for

consumption by humans do not exceed the Maximum Residue Level (MRL). The latter is

defined by the European Commission (2008) as the highest level of a pesticide residue legally

tolerated in or on a food or feed.

Until recently, four Council Directives regulated pesticide residues in food and feed in the EU

(76/895/EEC, 86/362/EEC, 86/363/EEC and 90/642/EC), and residue legislation was a

responsibility of both member states and the Commission. In this setting, the rules that

applied for the setting of MRLs throughout the EU were somewhat complex; that is, for some

pesticides the MRLs would be set by the European Commission, whereas for others they

would be set by member-countries. Or, alternatively, for some pesticides the Commission

could set MRLs that the member-states could thereafter increase. There were also cases of

pesticides for which no MRLs were set. As a result, the MRLs that applied in the EU differed

from one member-state to another. With 27 different lists of MRLs, this setting could be very

confusing for consumers, as well as traders and importers of pesticides (European

Commission, 2008). To address this issue, as of September 2008, a new legislative framework

id=231722 European Commission website, Review Programme of existing pesticides, http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/protection/evaluation/rev_prog_exist_pest_en.htm

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on pesticide residues (Regulation (EC) No. 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the

Council) came into effect in the EU. This Regulation promotes the harmonisation and

simplification of pesticide MRLs, and is intended to ensure a higher level of consumer

protection throughout the EU. Specifically, according to the European Commission, the new

Regulation sees that MRLs go through a common EU assessment so as to ensure sufficient

protection for all consumers, including the vulnerable classes, such as children and babies.23

The efforts to sustain the use of pesticides in the EU have also been amplified through the

European Commission’s adoption of a “Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of

Pesticides”. This project was launched in 2002 and is still under development. It aims at

complementing the existing legal framework, as one of seven strategies introduced by the

European Community’s Sixth Environmental Action Programme, covering the fields of Air,

Waste Prevention and Recycling, Marine Environment, Soil, Pesticides, Natural Resources

and Urban Environment.24 The primary purpose of the pesticides thematic strategy is to fill

the legislative gap regarding the use of pesticides, and also encourage the research and

development of other, less harmful alternatives. As described earlier in this section the

existing EU policies and regulations strongly address the issues of placing pesticides in the

market and the pesticide residues in final consumption products. Within this context the actual

use of pesticides in production is somehow overlooked. This has resulted in misuses (and

overuses) of pesticides, which have in turn led to a non-declining percentage of food and feed

sample in which pesticide residues exceed MRLs, over the last ten years.25 Therefore the main

focus of the Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides is to identify a set of

23 European Commission website: Plant Protection-Pesticide Residues: http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/protection/pesticides/index_en.htm24 The Sixth Environment Action Programme of the European Community 2002-2012 – Thematic Strategies. http://ec.europa.eu/environment/newprg/strategies_en.htm25 European Commission website: Sustainable Use of Pesticides - A strategy to ensure safer use of pesticides. http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ppps/strategy.htm and Commission of the European Communities (2006).

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policy objectives and requirements that member-states will have to reach within the coming

years, in order to ensure a more sustainable use of pesticides in agricultural production and, in

a broader context, to create a more coherent and consistent overall policy framework

(Commission of the European Communities, 2006).

As shown in Table 13, the primary objectives of the Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use

of Pesticides include: (1) minimising the hazards and risks to health and the environment from

the use of pesticides; (2) improving controls on the use and distribution of pesticides; (3)

reducing the levels of harmful products, including through the application of the substitution

principle (substituting dangerous substances with safer alternatives); (4) encouraging the use

of low-input or pesticide-free crop farming; and (5) developing suitable indicators and

providing valuable feedback, so as to establish a transparent system for reporting and

monitoring the progress made.26

Possible means to reach these objectives included in the EU’s strategy include: a) developing

national plans for the reduction of risks, hazards and dependences on chemical control; b)

protecting sensitive areas; c) banning aerial spraying; d) requiring compulsory training of all

pesticide users; e) imposing penalties on users; f) introducing special levy schemes on plant

protection products; and g) harmonising the value-added tax for pesticides (Commission of

the European Communities, 2002).

Table 13. Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides: Main Objectivesand Possible Solutions

Objective Possible Solutions

(1) Minimise the hazards and risks to

- Establishment of national plans for reduction of hazards, risks and dependence on chemical control.

26 European Commission website: Sustainable Use of Pesticides – Objectives of the Thematic Strategy. http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ppps/objectives.htm, and Commission of the European Communities (2002).

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health and the environment caused by pesticide use.

- Specific protection of sensitive areas.- General ban on aerial spraying (with derogations under specific conditions).- Improved knowledge on risks through monitoring of user health, data collection on incidents, collection and analysis of economic data on PPP use and alternatives.- Technical improvements of application and protection equipment.- Further research and development (for topics such as IPM techniques, improved insurance schemes against potential crop losses, less dangerous application methods, solutions to point source pollution issues, etc.)

(2) Improve controls on the use and distribution of pesticides.

- Statistics on production, import/export, and use (reporting by producers and distributors to national authorities).- Control of spraying equipment, packaging and waste.- Reinforcement of ongoing efforts to collect data on PPP use. - Creation of a system for compulsory training, awareness raising, and certification of users.

(3) Application of the substitution principle to reduce levels of harmful active substances.

- Quicker implementation of Directive 91/414/EEC and its amendments.

(4) Encourage low-input or pesticide-free crop farming

- Promotion of alternatives to chemical PPPs through Integrated Pest Management (IPM), organic farming.- Examination of potential for use of genetic modification technology.- Promotion of Good Farming Practices.- Imposition of penalties on non-complying users.- Special levies on PPPs.- Harmonisation of VAT for PPPs.

(5) Establish a transparent system for reporting and monitoring progress by developing indicators.

- Report by member-states on risk reduction programs.- Development of suitable monitoring indicators and definition of quantitative targets.- Contribution to the OECD work on the development of harmonised indicators.

Source: Commission of the European Communities (2002).

Safeguarding environmental quality is also among the EU’s priorities. To protect the quality

of water from pesticides, the EU Water Framework Directive provides an integrated

framework for the assessment, monitoring and management of surface- and ground-water

based on their ecological and chemical status. The directive requires that measures be taken to

reduce or eliminate emissions, discharges and losses of dangerous substances, so as to protect

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surface waters. In the same context the EU also seeks to protect soil from pollution through

the dispersal of pesticides into soil, through run-off during or after the cleaning of the

application equipment, or through uncontrolled disposal of pesticides or application

equipment.27

In general, EU regulations may be viewed as a set of general guidelines that each member-

state may adopt, adjust to its own individual needs and characteristics, or use as a supplement

to its national strategies. To this extent, regarding the case of pesticides (or PPPs more

generally), EU member-countries use a wide range of tools at a national level to control the

risks associated with pesticide use. The following sections explore these tools and measures in

EU as well as non-EU countries.

5.4 PESTICIDE-REDUCTION POLICIES OF EU AND NON-EU COUNTRIES

A number of European countries have undertaken pesticide reduction programmes in the last

two decades. Table 14 summarizes these individual efforts at establishing pesticide policies

(including taxes, fees, or levies), and offers information on the policies’ impacts on pesticide

use.

27 European Commission: Agriculture and Pesticides. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/envir/index_en.htm#pesticides

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Table 14. Pesticide Policies in Some European Countries

Country Description of Pesticide Values for Pesticide Impact on Policy Taxes/Fees/Levies Pesticide Use

Sweden Environmental levy per 30 SEK/Kg Active ● Minimal/zero Kg of active substance Substance (AC) impact

(3.25 €/Kg AC) ● Increased use of low- dose pesticides

Norway Banded Tax System ● Basic Tax: 20 NOK/ha (2.6 €/ha) ● Main trend: decrease● Low toxicity products (f=1): 2.6 €/ha● Medium toxicity products (f=4): 10.4 €/ha● High toxicity products (f=8): 20.8 €/ha● Seed treatment pesticides (f=0.5): 1.3 €/ha● Concentrated hobby products (f=50): 130 €/ha● Ready to use hobby products (f=150): 390 €/ha

Denmark ● Differentiated pesticide levy ● Insecticides: 54% of retail price ● 5 to 10% decrease● Overall levy on all pesticides ● Herbicides/fungicides/growth ● Increased use of low- sold by retailers regulators: 34% of retail price dose pesticides

● Wood preservatives: 3% of gross Value

Italy ● Ban on Atrazine ● Pesticide Tax: 2% of retail price ● Minimal● Re-registration of pesticides● Sales control● Pesticide Tax

UK ● Levies to finance pesticide ● Target fee: about 5000 € _ registration ● General fee: 5719 € ● Target fee for registration of new active ingredient● General fee for industry

Switzerland ● Low Pesticide Integrated _ ● 40% decrease Production Farming Protocols● Direct payments● Minimum ecological standards● Extra subsidies

Finland ● Registration charge ● Registration charge: 2.5% _● Target fee (new active of net selling price ingredient) ● Target fee: about 1000 €

The Netherlands ● MJP-G _ ● 50% reduction● Integrated Crop Protection on certified farms

France ● Pollution tax on antiparasite _ ● Marginal Pesticides

Germany ● Crop Protection Act _ _● Pesticide Reduction Programme

Sources: Lesinsky and Veverka, (2006); PAN Europe (2005); Hoevenagel et al. (1999); OECD (2008).

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Sweden was one of the first countries to introduce a simple tax scheme based on an

environmental levy of 30 SEK (3.25 €) per kg active substance. According to Swedish

estimates, the introduction of the tax reduced the risk to human health by 77% in the 1997-

2001 period and environmental risk by 63% over the same period. However, the taxation had

minimal impact on the aggregate volume of pesticides used, but farmers substituted past

pesticides used for low-dose pesticides. On balance, the pesticide load on the environment

decreased due to technical assistance to farmers and training that led to more environmental

friendly agricultural practices. A portion of the tax revenues have been used to finance

research related to risk reduction.

Norway introduced a tax system in 1988 based on a percentage of the import value of

pesticides. In 1999, a tax system was introduced where the taxation level is banded by health

and environmental properties. The system is based on differentiated tax rates per hectare and

standard area doses. As of January 2005 the base rate is NOK 25 per hectare. There are seven

tax bands including adjuvants (no tax), seed treatment and biological pesticides (low tax),

ordinary pesticides for professional use (3 bands, differentiated according to human health

and environmental risk), and pesticides used in home gardens (2 bands, with the highest tax).

According to this hierarchy, each band corresponds to a factor f. The tax for each band is

calculated by multiplying the base rate with the respective f. Since the mid-1980s there has

been a steady decrease in the use of pesticides to about 50% of baseline levels while after the

implementation of the banded tax system there was a massive stockpiling of pesticides.

Norwegian data show that the risk to human health was decreased by 33% while the risk to

the environment decreased by 37%. One third of the tax revenues is recycled back through the

reduction programme to provide incentives for farmers to change their attitude and practices

to more environmentally friendly methods. While farmers claim the banded tax system has

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led to higher costs, the tax system has contributed to the use of pesticides less harmful for

human health and the environment. There are examples where the tax differences between

different bands are minimal and in some cases it can be more profitable to use pesticides from

higher tax bands that are not in accordance with the intentions of the policy makers. As far as

the pesticide sales are concerned, there is a decreasing trend with a considerable variation.

The Danish pesticide reduction plan started in 1986 in response to a major increase in the use

of pesticides and a large decline in farmland biodiversity. A tax scheme was initiated to

protect consumers and land workers from health risks and harmful effects to the environment.

Introduced in 1992, this system was based on taxing the retail price of various agricultural

chemicals. Currently it is 34% of retail price for herbicides, fungicides and growth regulators;

54% for insecticides; and 3% for wood preservatives. Eighty-three percent of the tax is

returned to farmers by funding a number of agricultural activities, while the remainder is

allocated to research and administrative costs. The Danish Government estimated that the

reduction in pesticide consumption ranged from 5 to 10%. Danish farmers generally accepted

pesticide taxation given there was a clear return to them in the form of lower land tax and

transparency in how the retained funds were used for funding of action plan programme

activities and research. The combined sale and consumption of plant protection products in

agriculture has declined nearly 60% between 1985 and 2000. It is difficult to separate the

impact of taxation on pesticide use from the other factors influencing farmers’ use decisions.

The decline in the pesticide consumption is largely due to a switch to low-dose agents, but a

reduction of the combined cultivated land, the increased conversion to organic farming, and

the improved pesticide technologies and management during the last decade have played a

crucial role in reducing the use of pesticides. The objective of the Pesticide Action Plan

(2004-09) is to reduce even more the pesticide use (1.7 applications per harvest year). In

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addition to the tax plan, this plan includes annual payments to farmers who do not use

pesticides, technical assistance, decision support systems, and training and approval

procedures.

After the 1986 discovery of widespread herbicide pollution of drinking water in large areas of

the North and Central Italy, subsequent measures were taken. Among them were a ban on

atrazine, re-registration of pesticides (PD 223/1998 and DLg 52/1997), and stringent control

on pesticide sales. Additionally, in 1999 a pesticide tax of 2% on the retail price was

introduced. Its revenues went to fund a nationwide publicity campaign promoting organic

products with television, newspaper, and magazines advertisements. Nevertheless, OECD

(2008) reports that pesticide use increased by 8% during the period 1990-2008. Pesticide

residues have been found in groundwater, especially in Northern Italy, while around 2% of

fruits and vegetables have been found to have residual pesticides above national standards.

There are however some positive signs like the increasing share of organic crops and the low

use of herbicides and insecticides following the introduction of low-dosage products.

The United Kingdom (UK) pesticide taxes are assessed to the agrochemical industry based on

an annual turnover of approved pesticide products, while in Italy there is a flat tax that varies

between domestic and imported pesticides. The UK industrial fee is due to cover the cost of

post-approval monitoring of plant protection products. Furthermore, in the context of national

Codes of Good Agricultural Practice, the UK has introduced a Local Environmental Risk

Assessment for Pesticides (Stoate et al., 2001). This constitutes a framework that regulates

pesticide use by encouraging some environmentally friendly agricultural practices and

restricting other agricultural practices. Among these restrictions are that farmers are not

allowed to use pesticides at field margins on arable land, as they have negative effects on the

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presence and abundance of plant and animal species (De Snoo, 1997; Chiverton and

Sotherton, 1991).

Switzerland has developed low-pesticide integrated production farming protocols covering

several major crops and animal products. Swiss direct payments require farmers to adopt

minimum ecological standards (e.g., pest warning devices, prognosis models in pesticide

decisions). Swiss farmers can enjoy extra subsidies if they have further decreases in pesticide

use. In 1994, Switzerland initiated its agri-environmental policy by identifying clear targets

that had to be completed by 2005. The agri-environmental objectives were the selective and

risk-guided use of plant protection products. The respective target was to reduce the use of

pesticides by 32% of active ingredient between 1990-92 and 2005. This target was achieved

and, among other useful insights, it was found that the main reason for pesticide presence in

water aquifers is the expansion of cereal and corn crops to land whose soil characteristics are

not suitable for this kind of crops use.

The Netherlands developed a Multi Year Programme for Crop Protection (MJP-G) in 1991,

which was the product of a constructive dialogue and negotiations between the government,

farmers’ organizations, the organization of pesticide producers, and several environmental

organizations. The main targets of this national plan were: a) the reduction of the quantity of

pesticides used; b) the reduction of the emissions of pesticides to water, air, and soil; and, c)

the reduction of the dependence on pesticides. An emphasis was placed on information and

education, research and economic incentives. The MJP-G was replaced in 2001 with a plan

called “View of Healthy Crops, Certified Cultivation at Integrated Farms” that will run until

2010. The three main goals of this plan are: a) a further decrease of pesticide use; b) a further

reduction of emissions to the environment; and, c) the improvement of compliance with the

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pesticide regulations to minimize the adverse effects on public health, agricultural workers

and the environment (van de Zande et al., 2002). The objective is to achieve these goals

through integrated crop protection on certified farms. Certified farms increase the

transparency of production processes in an era where consumers demand more reliable food

information. The target is to achieve a 95% pesticide reduction by 2010 compared with 1998.

According to OECD (2008), the use of pesticides was reduced by 50% during the period

1990-2003. The Ministry of Agriculture estimated that the agricultural sector costs of

reducing pesticide use were around € 50 million in 2003. Nevertheless, the Statistical Agency

of The Netherlands (CBS) (2006) shows that the total use of pesticides in arable and

horticultural farming was stable over the 2000-2004 period.

In France, herbicides are the most commonly used type of pesticides. Despite the volume of

farm production increasing by 2% in total over the period 1990-2004, pesticide use decreased

by 10% during the same period. Nevertheless, pesticide use continues to be higher than the

average in other OECD European countries (OECD, 2005). While there has been a decrease

in pesticide use in general, contamination of water bodies remains widespread. In 1999,

France introduced a pollution tax on antiparasite pesticides but its effects were characterized

as marginal under the framework of a general tax on polluting activities. However, it is

difficult to isolate the impacts of a pesticide tax from other policy measures (such as extension

services) or even from trends that can affect pesticide use (such as the increase of organic

crops).

Additionally, France has a well developed monitoring system of nutrients and pesticides. In

2003, several French ministries asked the Environmental Health Safety Agency and the Food

Safety Agency of the country to establish a research center that would be responsible for

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monitoring pesticide residues. One of its tasks is to gather information on pesticide residues in

different environments, to estimate levels of exposure, and to improve extension services that

will provide better and more systematic information on pesticide use.

Germany introduced a Crop Protection Act in 1998, which states that farmers should use

integrated pest control, relying on biological and biotechnical techniques, plant breeding and

other agronomical practices to reduce pesticide use to a “necessary extent” (Burger et al.,

2007), which is the extent of pesticide use that will maintain the profitability of crop

production. The Pesticide Reduction Program that followed the Crop Protection Act tried to

fill the gap of precision on the definition of the “necessary extent.” Among the measures

identified in the Pesticide Reduction Program is the development of a standardized treatment

index that measures the intensity of pesticide use in agriculture and the integration of this

index into the environmental quality assurance systems for agricultural enterprises.

5.4.1 EU AND NATIONAL REGULATION

Farmers in general have a very negative attitude towards regulation, perceiving that it

increases workload and stress levels and decreases income (Wilcock et al., 1999). Regulation

is often imposed on the farming community rather than driven by it (the notable exception

being the organic farming regulation which was developed after pressure from organic

producers). Farmers also have a somewhat ambivalent relationship with support schemes.

According to a recent study in Wales, the schemes are recognised as being vital to financial

stability of the business on the one hand, but on the other, the bureaucracy and the uncertainty

about the long-term future of the schemes are major concerns for organic farmers (Moakes

and Lampkin, 2009).

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Whatever the perception, regulation is undoubtedly a force for change. There is evidence to

suggest that if farmers are effectively forced to engage with a policy (pesticide reduction, for

example) then attitudes will change over time (Edwards-Jones, 2006; Wilcock et al., 1999).

This theory needs more robust testing, but there is some anecdotal evidence available. For

instance, one might expect that farmers who converted primarily to access support payments

might revert to conventional farming after the five-year agreement came to an end. While this

has been observed to some degree in a few individual member states and regions, such as in

Austria (Midmore et al., 2001) and Scotland (Bayliss and Clay, 2006), the general trend

across the EU 15, Norway and Sweden has been one of sustained growth (Lampkin et al.,

2007), suggesting that attitudes may have changed significantly over the lifetime of the

scheme. Midmore et al. (2001) also found that many of the apprehensions about organic faded

rapidly after the start of conversion, suggesting that some of the barriers were perceived rather

than actual.

The latest phase of the review of EU Pesticide Directive (91/414 EEC) has resulted in the

withdrawal of a number of key active ingredients. The Pesticides Safety Directive considers

that, in general terms, the impact on insect pest management is likely to be small. However,

the withdrawal of trizole fungicides are likely have a large direct impact on arable and

horticultural production (Anon, 2008b, 2008a), and the withdrawal of mancozeb in particular

will have consequences for fungicide resistance strategies. The loss of pre-emergence

herbicides will also be an issue for a number of horticultural crops such as carrots, parsnips

and onions.

Clarke et al. (2008) made a detailed study into the agronomic impact of the review and

painted a somewhat apocalyptic picture of life in UK without a number of the key pesticides

that are due to be withdrawn under the current proposal. They considered a number of

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legislative scenarios and predicted, under the least restive regime, a 20-25% loss in production

for wheat, potato and brassica production, and a 62% loss for wheat, 53% for potatoes and

77% for brassicas under the most restrictive regime. They predicted at least a doubling of the

carbon footprint, even under the least restrictive system, mostly due to the additional area that

would need to be planted to compensate for the losses. They also presented economic data to

show that, under the most restrictive system, our most basic food crops would be

uneconomical to produce. These figures are presumably based on the immediate withdrawal

of these products from high-input systems, and the assumption that the status quo in term of

the production levels of all crops needs to be maintained at all costs.

There are, of course, thousands of organic and low-input producers across the world

successfully managing pests, weeds and diseases without recourse to any of the products

whose withdrawal are apparently so problematic. This is because they have developed

systems that rely on a range of measures, each contributing a level of management, which

together deliver acceptable levels of control. Although yields are usually lower in these

systems in the UK and many parts of Europe, this is usually more closely linked with lower

abundance of nutrients rather than the lack pest and disease management.

What is abundantly clear from these studies is that the potential for the EU regulation to drive

the adoption of more integrated, more holistic and lower input system is enormous. A

tightening of chemical approvals in Denmark, ahead of the implementation of the EU review,

was an important factor in the success of its pesticide use reduction strategy, so there is

already some evidence that it is an effective approach (Neilsen, 2005). The regulation may

also stimulate the market and the development of “List 4” products, which currently includes

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bio-pesticides, insect pest pheromones, biological control agents, many of which are

compatible with integrated and low input/ organic systems (Bradshaw et al., 2003).

The changes would, of course, need to be phased in over a period of time and supported by a

strong, advisory and technical support system as described above. But managed properly the

regulation could be an important stimulus for a strategic rethink about our entire food system,

including reduced-meat diets, reduced wastage and a generally leaner food system. Looked at

from this stand point, the review is a golden opportunity, particularly in the light evidence

discussed above, to force farmers into engaging with a policy in the short term and alter

personal goals and perceptions in the longer term (Edwards-Jones, 2006; Wilcock et al.,

1999).

5.4.2 VOLUNTARY SCHEMES

There are various voluntary schemes (i.e., those not required by law) that place restrictions on

the use of pesticides. Examples include IOBC (Boller et al., 2004) ; LEAF (Leaf website),

FRUITNET in Belgium, Leguambiente in Italy, IP-SUISSE in Switzerland and organic

farming (Neumeister, 2007).

Organic farming is unique in that is has a legal definition and a set of standards, written into

EU law. These are very specific about the approach that must be taken to pest management,

and are very restrictive in terms of the few pesticides that are permitted, and the

circumstances under which they may be used (Council Regulation EC 834/2007 and

Commission Regulation EC 889/2008). Growers almost always need prior permission from

their organic certification bodies before applying these products and in the process of doing so

have to provide robust justification for their use.

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Other schemes take a slightly different approach. IOBC (Boller et al., 2004) categorise pest

management approaches and products into green and yellow lists (as discussed earlier).

Others, such as LEAF, require the grower to set out a plant protection plan, which specifies

the approach to be taken to pest management and the types of products that will be used.

There are cases where producers farm in keeping with the various standards described above

(or even above them), but choose not to join formal schemes. Burton et al. (1999) found this

to be the case among a group of horticultural producers in the UK who fully embraced

organic principles but were not registered as organic producers for a number of reasons

including: the cost of certification was seen as prohibitive; the paperwork/ record keeping

burden was felt to excessive; they resented being “told what to do” by certification bodies;

and the fact that they had a close relationship with their customers negated the need for an

organic label on their produce. Other producers found the organic standards complex,

inconsistent, frequently changing, hard to understand and bureaucratic (Midmore et al., 2001;

Burton et al., 1999).

5.5 US PESTICIDE POLICIES

The organization responsible for the regulation of pesticide use in the United States is the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA regulates pesticide use under the authority

of two federal statutes, The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and

the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).28

The FIFRA is the US federal law that provides the basis for the regulation, sale, distribution

and use of pesticides in the US It bestows on EPA the authority to assess and register

28 EPA website. Pesticides: Laws and Regulations. http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/regulating/laws.htm

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pesticides, and also to suspend or cancel the registration of a pesticide if new information

shows that its subsequent use may cause unacceptable levels of risk. In general, all pesticides

that are intended for distribution or sale in the US must be registered with the EPA. For a

pesticide to acquire a license it must be proven that its proper use will not generally cause

“unreasonable adverse effects on the environment”. The latter term is defined by FIFRA in

two ways: (a) “any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the

economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide” and (b) “a

human dietary risk from residues that result from a use of pesticide in or on any food

inconsistent with the standard under section 408 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic

Act”.

The registration procedure for a pesticide is performed after a period during which data are

collected in order to determine its effectiveness for the intended use, appropriate dosage and

hazards. After the registration of a pesticide is complete, a label is created to inform users of

its proper use.29 Depending on the reviewing procedure (different categories of pesticides go

through different review processes) the registration of a pesticide may take up to several

years.

The FFDCA gives EPA the authority to set the maximum residue levels, or tolerances for

pesticides used in foods intended for human or animal consumption. Foods in which residues

of pesticides are found over the maximum allowed level are subject to seizure by the

government. In addition, if a food product contains a pesticide for which there is no tolerance

assigned, then that food will also be subject to seizure. To set a tolerance or maximum residue

level for a pesticide, EPA takes into account, among other things, its toxicity and the toxicity

29 EPA website. Summary of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act http://www.epa.gov/regulations/laws/fifra.html

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of its break-down products, aggregate exposure to the pesticide from foods and other sources

of exposure, and any special risks that are posed to children or infants. A tolerance is

considered safe if there is reasonable certainty that aggregate exposure to the pesticide residue

will not result to any harm.30

Additional pesticide related US legislation include: (a) the Pesticide Registration

Improvement Act (PRIA) which establishes pesticide registration service fees; (b) the Food

Quality Protection Act (FQPA) which amended FIFRA and FFDCA to set stricter safe

standards for both old and new pesticides and to make uniform requirements with regards to

processed and unprocessed foods; and (c) the Endangered Species Act (ESA) through which

EPA must ensure that the pesticides it registers will not cause any harm to species identified

as endangered or threatened by the US31

Figure 34 presents the main parts of the The Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) of 1996

(USDA, 2008). The FQPA imposes uniform safety standards to residues in raw and processed

food and forces the different States to comply with the federal standards instead of develop

different ones. Pesticide residues no longer fall under the Delaney Clause (“no food additive

will be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal”). Therefore, a

uniform health-based standard is applied to all foods and risks. The Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) is responsible for reviewing all tolerances within 10 years. Anyone may

petition to establish, and modify a tolerance, if a registrant includes a summary of data with

an authorization to publish these data and information on health effects.

30 EPA website. Summary of the Federal Food Drug, and Cosmetic Act. http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/ffdca.html31 EPA website, “Pesticides: Laws and Regulations”. http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/regulating/laws.htm

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Food Quality Protection Act

Uniform national standard

General tolerance standard

Petition for tolerances

Re-evaluation of tolerances

Minor-use pesticides

Consideration of the diets of infant and children

Improve access on pesticide exposure information

Estrogenic screening program

Penalties

Figure 34. A Contour of US Pesticide Policy under the Food Quality Protection Act

Furthermore, the new regulations made it easier to register public-health pesticides (i.e., those

used to protect the public from diseases carried by insects or animals) and pesticides used on

minor crops including many fruit and vegetable crops. The new Act defines minor use as the

use of a pesticide on an animal or on a commercial crop/site if the crop is grown on less than

300,000 US acres. The new law intends to improve consumers’ access to information on

pesticide exposure by authorizing the EPA to provide a list of substitute foods for higher risk

products and distribute it to the supermarkets. Additionally, it considers the risks from

pesticide residues to infants and children. According to the law, research should be

undertaken to identify the consumption patterns of infant and children, their susceptibility to

pesticide chemicals (even in utero exposure), and the cumulative effects of pesticide residues.

211

Other provisions of the act include the development and implementation (EPA) of a screening

program for estrogenic and other endocrine effects. The aim of this program is to identify

substances that have similar effect in humans to ones produced by naturally occurring

estrogen or other endocrine effects. Finally, the law establishes penalties for any person who

introduces or trades food that contains pesticide residues above the tolerance thresholds.

California is the most important state in the value of agricultural production in the US. This

state’s Department of Pesticide Regulation (DPR) is responsible for registering pesticide

products and providing sale permissions in that state (DPR, 2008). Registration fees are as

following: a) $750 for registering a new product, b) $750 for renewing product registration,

and c) $100 for label amendment. Free of charge are the emergency exemption from

registration, the special local registration and the research authorization. Registration fees

exist also in other US states, like Florida, Oregon, Missouri, Kentucky, New Jersey,

Washington and Virginia.

The California DPR provides public access to registered pesticides, currently amounting to

13,162 products. To apply for product registration an applicant must submit an application for

registration form (including the $750 registration fee), six copies of the printed label (or

printer’s proof), data concerning the pesticide product, and a copy of the US Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA)-approved label and letter. The data concerning the pesticide product

must include: acute toxicology data, chemistry data, efficacy data, phytotoxisity data (if used

on a plant), fish and wildlife data (if applicable), volatile emissions potential data, chronic

toxicology data (if the product contains an active ingredient new to California), environmental

fate data for the first agricultural use of the active ingredient in California, and medical

management data (if the product contains an active ingredient new to California). All

212

registration applications are reviewed by DPR, DPR scientists and public agencies (notified

by DPR) that can be affected by pesticide use. The Pesticide Registration and Evaluation

Committee (PREC) provides the forum for possible concerns on pesticides registrations raised

from public agencies or even common citizens. After a product is registered, it is subject to an

annual renewal fee, a quarterly mill and risk assessment, reevaluation and data call-ins.

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6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS, GAPS, OVERLAPS, &

GENERAL REMARKS

6.1 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT

• Agricultural sustainability is a broader concept that includes the notions of resilience

and persistence.

• Environmental stewardship is an attribute of agricultural sustainability, which admits a

stronger set of pressure external to the farm decision making environment. 

• Trade liberalization and direct investment is forcing the uncoupling of production and

consumption of resource intensive and polluting products, and global trade provides

an opportunity to technology transfer of cleaner technologies. 

• Democratization can have beneficial effects on environmental quality and economic

growth through the introduction of secure property rights and accounting of benefits of

public goods.

• The over-reliance of agricultural production on agrochemicals has brought several

adverse effects on the environment and human health.

•  Changes in consumers’ behavior towards higher environmental quality like chemical-

free products have induced a tendency for a structural change in the agricultural

sector.

214

•  Policies aiming to mitigate the negative externalities of agricultural oblige producers

to follow “cleaner” agricultural practices.

•  Higher income consumers tend to spend more money on environmental friendly

products, they donate money to environmental organizations and, in general, they

create pressure for environmental regulations.

•  For the agricultural sector, institutions can shape and influence farmers’ practices.

Extension services constitute the link between institutions and farmers.

6.2 PESTICIDE USE AND CONSUMERS’ PERCEPTIONS

• The majority WTP studies estimate mixed results regarding the WTP for human safety

and environmental quality.

• Pesticide sales are much higher in comparison to pesticide consumption (EU-15).

 

• Pesticide demand elasticity studies show clearly that pesticide demand is inelastic.

 

• Need for more transparent information related to the monitoring and control of

pesticide residues in food products of plant origin, and the establishment of MRLs.

 

215

• Consumers are placing a value on how products are made and the environmental

impact of product manufacturing.

• Households’ and consumers’ preferences play a significant indirect role in

transformations in rural areas such as intensification and changes in labor economy.

 

• There is a need for measures to deal convincingly and uniformly across the EU with

non-compliant products and their use.

• Frequent pesticide residue monitoring in drinking water sources should be undertaken

and reported.

• Few studies measure the impact of pesticide applications near residential areas, parks,

schools, and other public places.

• Public education information campaigns to raise consumer awareness of pesticide

impacts – both positive and negative.

• Introduction of uniform standards for labelling so that consumers can easily identify

the methods by which products are produced (i.e., through organic farming, IPM).

6.3 BIODIVERSITY AND PESTICIDE USE

216

The above literature review on pesticide use and biodiversity has generated a number of

policy implications and highlighted the following gaps and overlaps:

The majority of WTP studies estimate WTP for reducing human health risks

(decreased presence of pesticide residues in food). There is a great variation in WTP

estimates as some studies report higher WTP estimates for human safety than

environmental quality, while other have shown the opposite.

Pesticide sales are much higher in comparison to pesticide consumption (EU-15). This

difference stems from the fact that pesticide consumption concerns pesticides that are

used in crop production, while pesticide sales include pesticides that are being sold not

only for use in agricultural production but also in forestry, horticulture, and amenity

areas (e.g., parks or sport fields).

Pesticide demand elasticity studies show clearly that pesticide demand is inelastic.

There is a great need for a more detailed investigation of the environmental and

economic impacts of pesticides.

Biodiversity valuation and pesticide risk valuation use the same methods: non-use

values, contingent valuation, and choice modeling.

Few studies exist on biodiversity valuation, although this is a growing research area.

The majority of studies measuring farmland biodiversity focus on landscape

heterogeneity on crop edges and bird populations. The evidence finds that these

populations have decreased dramatically in Europe during the last decade (Eurostat,

2008). Farming systems that increase landscape heterogeneity in conjunction with

restricted use of pesticides on crop edges benefit significantly from farmland

biodiversity.

217

Biodiversity can benefit farm productivity and reduce environmental risk and yield

variability. Implementation of biodiversity conservation policies can lead to a

sustainable agriculture. Therefore, more research should be directed towards the

formulation and practical implementation of such policies.

6.4 PESTICIDE POLICIES AND REGULATION

• Stricter environmental regulations can trigger farmers to innovate and to improve their

production efficiency.

• There are relatively few national pesticide policies that are based on economic

measures/incentives in many European countries.

•  Financial incentives and flexible policies can improve resource allocation. Subsidies

on the adoption of environmental friendly farm practices and/or levies on pesticide use

are some well known financial incentives. 

• An EU pesticide levy should be differentiated according to environmental hazards of

different pesticides and take into account the countries' specific agronomic

circumstances.

• Income support policies that focus on specific crops impact farmers’ risk attitude and

lead to increased pesticide use that has negative impact on farmland biodiversity.

– Policies that intend to enhance biodiversity should try to modify farmers’ short

run returns by alternative schemes like compensation funds.

218

– Income support policies should be re-examined by better cooperation among

policy makers, environmental scientists and agricultural economists.

•  Nevertheless, a pesticide tax alone cannot be an effective measure. A combination of

policy instruments (taxes, subsidies, training, and research) can tackle pesticide

externalities.

7 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study has reviewed the literature on the economics of pesticide use and provided an

overview of pesticide policies at an EU level. In an era that existing EU pesticide policies are

streamlined and new policies are among the future plans, this study tries to reveal the policy

message of the available evidence from the economics of pesticide use literature and to

identify information gaps from the perspective of designing socially optimal pesticide

policies.

The conventional view that pesticides are overutilized is questioned by a considerable number

of studies that have shown the opposite. If underutilization is the case and still the external

effects of pesticides cause significant harm , then pesticide policies should not aim at reducing

pesticide use but at achieving a shift to the use of lower risk pesticides. This conclusion is also

supported by the evidence of inelastic pesticide demand implying that farmers will not

abandon so easy the use of pesticides as they are considered the most effective means of crop

protection. On the contrary, a shift to less toxic products seems to be more feasible in the race

to achieving socially optimal pesticide use.

Another conventional view that is being questioned is that pesticides are risk reducing inputs.

Studies that have considered in their production process not only the pest population but also

other factors (e.g. growth conditions, political environment, other inputs) have shown that

219

pesticides are risk increasing inputs. As such studies with multidimensional production

processes are closer to reality their result should not be ignorable. Despite the risk-increasing

nature of pesticides and the resulting yield variability, producers will continue to use them if

mean yield levels are satisfactory. Therefore, pesticide policies should focus on promoting the

use of lower risk products.

Farmland biodiversity is unbreakably tied up with pesticide use and affects agricultural

productivity at a great extent. Therefore, its conservation should be an integral part of any

pesticide regulatory framework. The value of farmland biodiversity can provide useful

insights to policy makers that aim at developing socially optimal pesticide policies that are

based on economic incentives. But the evidence has shown that farmland biodiversity

valuation is an ambiguous and challenging issue in a growing research field.

Another shortcoming revealed by this research is in understanding and monitoring the exact

economic and environmental impacts of pesticides. This gap is clearly depicted in our EU

pesticide policies overview as there is a lack of pesticide policies that are based on economic

incentives. Important to notice is that in the states that this kind of policies exist what

influences users’ behavior and as a result the state of the environment is not the economic

measures themselves but other factors like extension services and appearance of safer

products and techniques. The lack of knowledge on the environmental and economic

externalities of pesticides has rendered pesticide taxes and levies a means of covering

pesticide registration costs while uncoupling them from their fundamental role of shaping

users’ behavior. Therefore, more research on identifying the exact impacts of pesticides can

help policy makers in developing effective pesticide policies.

Individual economic measures like pesticide taxes might prove ineffective in the race to

achieving socially optimal pesticide use. The establishment of a wide EU pesticide regulatory

framework, that is among the future plans of EU, should be based on a variety of measures

and take into account the regional characteristics and the differences between pesticide

products. This attempt requires the involvement of all the respective stakeholders that should

cooperate for the establishment of flexible pesticide policies taking into account the policy

implications of the scientific findings.

220

221

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8 APPENDIX

274

TABLE 1. SALES OF FUNGICIDES IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (T OF ACTIVE INGREDIENT)

Countries 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

EU (15 countries)

123395 167190 167910 167333 159093 149085 : : : : : :Belgium 2402 2582 2654 2990 3056 2302 2610 : : : : :

Denmark 631 794 770 715 614 561 574 : : : : :Germany 10404 9397 10530 9702 9642 8246 10129 10032 8045 10184 : :Estonia 26 15 13 8 21 19 29 30 30 : : :Ireland 550 698 593 415 459 430 458 627 : : : :Greece 3248 3104 4731 3707 4676 4860 : : : : : :Spain 10165 11299 11984 10978 10528 7854 : : : : : :

France 48625 64050 58807 63021 52834 54130 43351 39317 37175 35921 35957 36919Italy 25074 52638 53605 52865 52377 48523 63196 : : : : :

Latvia : : : : 57 60 69 82 97 113 339 146Luxembourg 181 182 224 186 : : : : : : : :

Hungary 1989 1591 1896 1690 1590 1691 2264 2407 2819 2612 : :Malta : : : : 105 135 136 180 : : : :

Netherlands3624 4356 5127 4564 4470 3628 3582 3230 4176 4181 3980 4709

Austria 1697 1685 1473 1393 1598 1336 1300 1712 1493 1650 : :Poland 2986 3058 2909 2583 2504 2815 3710 1944 3080 4915 5124 4697

Portugal 9746 9397 10475 11274 10855 11561 13322 12954 12459 12366 : :Slovenia : : : : 843 933 825 843 1142 968 : :Finland 115 154 209 220 177 192 224 221 236 253 259 :Sweden 253 262 300 323 238 258 202 194 221 211 222 :United

Kingdom 6536 6509 6353 6336 4907 4908 4730 4740 5932 5944 5308 :Norway 140 177 265 220 54 120 150 160 225 61 99 :

:=Not available                      Source: Eurostat (2008)

275

TABLE 2. SALES OF HERBICIDES IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (T OF ACTIVE INGREDIENT)

Countries 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

EU (15 countries)

115884 112984 117854 117766 109486 111833 : : : : : :Belgium 5953 4543 4965 4475 5188 4908 5022 : : : : :

Denmark 2915 2726 2619 1892 1982 2164 2105 : : : : :

Germany16541 16485 17269 15825 16610 14942 14328 15351 15922 14699 : :

Estonia 84 172 167 167 275 298 211 268 197 : : :Ireland 879 1260 1413 1314 1289 1641 1820 1854 : : : :Greece 2717 2116 2303 2318 2331 2650 : : : : : :Spain 8652 9153 9413 9066 9942 12138 : : : : : :

France 36052 33576 36439 42462 30845 32122 28780 24502 26104 29209 23068 26808Italy 9888 10536 10665 9741 9507 10063 11829 : : : : :

Latvia : : : : 177 255 236 316 414 486 1497 735Luxembourg 148 121 183 198 : : : : : : : :

Hungary 3247 2489 2894 2831 2682 3130 3599 4076 4340 4138 : :Malta : : : : 10 19 15 22 : : : :

Netherlands3016 2984 2921 2842 2605 2171 2215 2210 2443 2482 2533 2736

Austria 1536 1601 1603 1659 1609 1436 1459 1435 1533 1466 : :Poland 5534 5167 4401 4546 4795 4748 4926 3772 3740 8381 9317 8435

Portugal 1584 1769 1914 1955 1826 2235 2125 2398 2104 1751 : :Slovenia : : : : 405 362 189 325 286 289 : :Finland 677 734 844 790 862 1120 1278 1339 1174 1077 1274 :Sweden 1236 1303 1269 1285 1364 1432 1447 1817 690 1280 1432 :United

Kingdom 10711 10752 11168 11138 10783 10770 10770 10253 10537 10679 9131 :Norway 503 504 544 449 283 377 632 458 502 420 549 :

:=Not available                      Source: Eurostat (2008)

276

TABLE 3. SALES OF INSECTICIDES IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (T OF ACTIVE INGREDIENT)

Countries 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

EU (15 countries)

26238 29268 28569 27203 26505 27059 : : : : : :Belgium 1179 996 1023 1002 925 893 806 : : : : :

Denmark 36 51 55 46 41 49 43 : : : : :

Germany792 769 1036 953 846 740 742 779 1081 977 : :

Estonia 1 2 2 3 3 3 6 6 2 : : :Ireland 85 86 86 72 60 66 47 42 : : : :Greece 2440 2436 2505 2835 2864 2638 : : : : : :Spain 9758 9944 10173 9985 10470 11781 : : : : : :

France 5399 6074 4672 3612 3103 2487 2308 2224 2460 2505 2140 2100Italy 4433 6931 6985 7066 7135 6941 4450 : : : : :

Latvia : : : : 3 5 8 11 10 13 34 25

Luxembourg 10 9 11 19 : : : : : : : :Hungary 1041 667 893 805 771 926 1307 1439 1640 1524 : :

Malta : : : : 47 34 42 27 : : : :

Netherlands513 440 396 338 260 227 186 216 200 176 173 179

Austria 98 100 87 90 105 99 97 102 113 138 : :Poland 434 581 648 409 571 549 463 560 494 500 497 553

Portugal 501 435 439 463 476 414 607 441 409 425 : :Slovenia : : : : 99 81 44 52 34 36 : :Finland 55 47 46 67 55 42 49 34 22 28 24 :Sweden 13 15 27 57 17 12 30 21 14 18 36 :United

Kingdom 853 876 965 901 652 650 650 516 557 551 675 :Norway 16 18 19 20 8 8 10 12 9 6 6 :

:=Not available                      Source: Eurostat (2008)

277

TABLE 4. SALES OF OTHER PESTICIDES* IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (T OF ACTIVE INGREDIENT)

Countries 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

EU (15 countries)

35700 39516 41194 40602 37723 39665 : : : : : :Belgium 869 1155 1219 1054 784 742 766 : : : : :

Denmark 87 104 175 135 110 116 : : : : : :Germany 4343 4070 4809 3751 3233 3957 4332 4002 3705 3652 : :Estonia 7 8 9 6 7 9 21 18 17 : : :Ireland 268 312 442 301 325 349 471 390 : : : :Greece 1465 1378 1940 1293 1260 963 : : : : : :Spain 4661 3627 3500 3585 3657 3927 : : : : : :

France 7813 6092 7835 11406 7912 10896 8009 8481 10360 10630 10447 11428Italy 8655 14691 13271 12376 10812 10819 15236 : : : : :

Latvia : : : : 47 49 26 9 76 111 369 146Luxembourg 18 20 12 18 : : : : : : : :

Hungary 588 567 547 469 430 684 1062 804 1142 1404 : :Malta : : : : 22 29 29 14 : : : :

Netherlands 2694 2619 2277 2452 2320 1961 2090 2212 2252 2470 2724 3116Austria 235 304 178 277 251 262 224 137 163 151 : :Poland 466 695 741 931 978 743 1259 908 1412 2243 2164 1618

Portugal 625 1149 1537 1704 2312 1281 1381 1253 1966 1804 : :Slovenia : : : : 122 23 106 141 98 91 : :Finland 65 64 65 64 52 70 69 73 57 72 89 :Sweden 27 28 33 33 33 36 32 17 17 18 17 :United

Kingdom 6332 6351 6896 6924 7259 7198 7198 7054 6437 6427 6037 :Norway 47 55 126 107 33 13 26 27 88 24 36 :

:=Not available                      Source: Eurostat (2008)* This group includes various pesticides which are not included under the heading insecticide, herbicide or fungicide. Definitions of these pesticides differ from country to country.

278