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Court of AppealSupreme Court
New South Wales
Case Name: Robinson v State of New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: [2018] NSWCA 231
Hearing Date(s): 28 June 2018
Decision Date: 16 October 2018
Before:
McColl JA at [1];Basten JA at [131];Emmett AJA at [196]
Decision:
(1) Appeal allowed. (2) Set aside the orders of Taylor DCJ and in their place make the following orders: (a) Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $5000, such judgment to take effect from 3 August 2017;(b) Defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs. (3) Respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and the application for leave to appeal.
Catchwords:
TORTS – intentional torts – false imprisonment and wrongful arrest – where no decision to charge made at time of arrest – whether arrest lawful – purpose of arrest – Law Enforcement (Powers and
Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s 99 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – contextual construction – relevance of pre-existing common law to construction of statutory scheme – principle of legality – use of legislative history and extrinsic materials WORDS AND PHRASES – “arrest” – Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s 99
Legislation Cited:
Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), s 14Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 352, 353, 353A, 355, 356B, 356C, 356D, 356W; Pt 10ACrimes Amendment (Detention after Arrest) Act 1997 (NSW), Pt 10ACriminal Code (Qld), s 679Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1883 (46 Vic. No.17), s 429Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 281Crown Proceedings Act 1988 (NSW), s 5Justices Act 1959 (Tas), s 34A(1)Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), ss 3, 4, 7, 99, 105, 107, 109, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 121, 131, 201; Pt 8, Pt 9Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW), ss 6, 8, 8KPolice Administration Act (NT), ss 123, 133AB, 137Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW), Sch 3Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW), s 25E; Pt 2AA
Cases Cited:
A v State of New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; [2007] HCA 10Adams v Kennedy (2000) 49 NSWLR 78Alderson v Booth [1969] 2 QB 216Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562; [2004] HCA 37Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S (2014) 254 CLR 247; [2014] HCA 42Attorney-General (NSW) v Dean (1990) 20 NSWLR 650Bales v Parmeter (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384; [1997] HCA 2Clarke v Bailey (1933) SR (NSW) 303Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1; [1982] HCA 67Clyne v State of New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 265Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427; [1994] HCA 15Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos (1955) 92 CLR 390; [1955] HCA 27Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503; [2012] HCA 55Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; [1935] HCA 30Daw v Toyworld (NSW) Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 25; (2001) 21 NSWCCR 389Director of Public Prosecutions v Nicholls [2001] NSWSC 523; (2001) 123 A Crim R 66Donaldson v Broomby (1982) 60 FLR 124Dowse v New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 337; (2012) 226 A Crim R 36Drymalik v Feldman [1966] SASR 227Foster v The Queen [1993] HCA 80; (1993) 67 ALJR 550George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; [1990] HCA 26Glinski v McIver [1962] AC 726Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1; [1984] HCA 80John Lewis & Co Ltd v Tims [1952] AC 676Johnstone v State of New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 70; (2010) 202 A Crim R 422Leachinsky v Christie [1946] KB 124Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; [2013] HCA 39Lule v State of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 125Marshall v Director-General, Department of Transport (2001) 205 CLR 603; [2001]
HCA 37Mighty River International Ltd v Hughes; Mighty River International Ltd v Mineral Resources Ltd [2018] HCA 38Minogue v Victoria [2018] HCA 27; (2018) 92 ALJR 668Mitchell v John Heine & Son Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 466New South Wales v Smith (2017) 95 NSWLR 662; [2017] NSWCA 194Nolan v Clifford (1904) 1 CLR 429North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd v Northern Territory (2015) 256 CLR 569; [2015] HCA 41O’Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1997] AC 286Poidevin v Semaan (2013) 85 NSWLR 758; [2013] NSWCA 334Prior v Mole [2017] HCA 10; (2017) 91 ALJR 441Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28R v Bathgate (1946) 46 SR 281R v Dungay [2001] NSWCCA 443; (2001) 126 A Crim R 216R v Walsh (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 18 October 1990, unrep)Regional Express Holdings Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots [2017] HCA 55; (2017) 92 ALJR 134Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; [2005] HCA 48Sharp v Biggs (1932) 48 CLR 81; [1932] HCA 54Smith v Corrective Services Commission of NSW (1980) 147 CLR 134; [1980] HCA 49State of New South Wales v Bouffler (2017) 95 NSWLR 521; [2017] NSWCA 185State of New South Wales v Smith [2017] NSWCA 194SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 91 ALJR 936Thompson v Vincent [2005] NSWCA 219; (2005) 153 A Crim R 577Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147; [1955] HCA 68Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority (2008) 233 CLR 259; [2008] HCA 5Webster v McIntosh (1980) 49 FLR 317Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; [1986] HCA 88Wilson v New South Wales (2010) 207 A Crim R 499; [2010] NSWCA 333Wilson v New South Wales [2011] HCATrans 218Wright v Court (1825) 4 B&C 596; 107 ER 1182Zaravinos v State of New South Wales (2004) 62 NSWLR 58; [2004] NSWCA 320
Texts Cited:
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Bill 2002 (NSW) New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 17 September 2002 New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 30 October 2013 New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Second Reading speech for Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Amendment (Arrest Without Warrant) Bill 2013 (30 October 2013) P Gillies, The Law of Criminal Investigation (Law Book Co, 1982) Parliament of New South Wales, House and Tabled Papers, Review of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) 2002 (25 October 2013)
Category: Principal judgment
Parties:Bradford James Robinson (Appellant)State of New South Wales (Respondent)
Representation:
Counsel:D Toomey SC / D Woodbury (Appellant)J K Kirk SC / G J Bateman and P F Herzfeld (Respondent) Solicitors:Foott, Law & Co (Appellant)McCabes Lawyers Pty Ltd (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2016/145043
Decision under appeal:
Court or Tribunal: District Court of New South Wales
Jurisdiction: Civil
Citation: [2017] NSWDC 289
Date of Decision: 03 August 2017
Before: P Taylor SC DCJ
File Number(s): 2016/145043
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
HEADNOTE[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]
At 5 pm on 22 December 2013, the appellant attended a Sydney police station
in response to attempts by police to contact him. Upon attendance he was
immediately arrested, without warrant, for breach of an apprehended violence
order. The appellant was offered, and accepted, the opportunity to participate
in a record of interview. He was released without charge at 6.18pm, following
the conclusion of the interview.
The appellant commenced proceedings against the State of New South Wales,
claiming damages for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment. The trial judge
(P Taylor SC DCJ) dismissed the appellant’s claim.
The trial judge accepted the arresting officer’s evidence that a decision whether
to charge the appellant depended on what he said in the interview and that, at
the time of the arrest, he had not decided to charge him.
On appeal, the key issue was whether the arrest of the appellant was lawful
under Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW)
(LEPRA), s 99, in circumstances where there was no positive intent to lay
charges at the time of arrest.
Section 99 of LEPRA relevantly provides:
99 Power of police officers to arrest without warrant
(1) A police officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person if:
(a) the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the person is committing or has committed an offence, and
(b) the police officer is satisfied that the arrest is reasonably necessary for any one or more of the following reasons:
…
(iv) to ensure that the person appears before a court in relation to the offence,
…
(ix) because of the nature and seriousness of the offence.
…
(3) A police officer who arrests a person under this section must, as soon as is reasonably practicable, take the person before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law.
Note. The police officer may discontinue the arrest at any time and without taking the arrested person before an authorised officer—see section 105.
(4) A person who has been lawfully arrested under this section may be detained by any police officer under Part 9 for the purpose of investigating whether the person committed the offence for which the person has been arrested and for any other purpose authorised by that Part.
The Court (McColl JA and Basten JA, Emmett AJA dissenting) allowed the appeal and held:
Per McColl JA and Basten JA:
1. LEPRA s 99 must be construed in its context, including general law
principles concerning the scope and purpose of arrest: [34]-[35]; [132].
North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Limited v Northern Territory (2015)
256 CLR 569; [2015] HCA 41; CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club
Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, applied.
2. In legal terminology, “arrest” is generally used to identify that deprivation of
liberty which is a precursor to the commencement of criminal proceedings
against the person arrested, justified as necessary for the enforcement of the
criminal law. The power to arrest exists, and must be exercised, for the
purpose of bringing the person arrested before a justice as soon as reasonably
practicable: [46]; [95]; [136]; [154].
Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; [1986] HCA 88; Zaravinos v State
of New South Wales (2004) 62 NSWLR 58; [2004] NSWCA 320; Dowse v New
South Wales [2012] NSWCA 337; 226 A Crim R 36; Bales v Parmeter (1935)
35 SR (NSW) 182; Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573, applied; Clyne v State
of New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 265, not followed.
3. Neither the text nor context of the statute suggests an intention to depart
from these general law constraints: [120]; [124]-[127]; [165]-[167]; [173].
Rather, they are embedded in the language of s 99, and expressly preserved
by LEPRA, s 4: [35]; [44]; [132]-[134]. As no decision whether to charge the
appellant had been made at the time of arrest, the arrest was not for the
purpose of commencing the criminal process; accordingly, it was unlawful:
[128]-[129]; [194].
Per Emmett AJA, dissenting:
4. The legislative scheme contemplates a distinction between the decision to
arrest and the decision to charge. A positive intent to charge at the time of
arrest is not a necessary precondition of the valid exercise of the power of
arrest under s 99; accordingly, the appellant’s arrest was lawful: [251]; [253];
[257]; [270]-[274].
JUDGMENT1 McCOLL JA: The appellant, Bradford James Robinson, appeals pursuant to
leave to appeal granted on 20 February 2018 against Taylor SC DCJ’s
decision of 3 August 2017, in which his Honour held that Mr Robinson’s arrest
without a warrant by a Leading Constable Adam Smith on 22 December 2013
and subsequent detention by police was lawful.1 In so doing, his Honour
rejected Mr Robinson’s submission that his arrest was unlawful having regard
to the fact that, at the time of his arrest, Constable Smith had not formed an
intention to charge him with any offence.
2 The respondent, the State of New South Wales (SNSW), is vicariously liable
for the tortious conduct of police officers pursuant to s 8(1) of the Law Reform
(Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW). Mr Robinson brought proceedings against
the SNSW claiming he had been wrongfully arrested, and thereby falsely
imprisoned, and sought to recover damages.
1 Robinson v State of New South Wales [2017] NSWDC 289.
3 Mr Robinson relies upon a single ground of appeal. He submits that the
primary judge erred in finding that his arrest and subsequent detention were
lawful in circumstances where, at the time of the arrest, Constable Smith had
not formed an intention to charge him with any offence.
4 For the reasons that follow, I would allow the appeal.
Factual background
5 The factual background is uncontroversial.
6 On 9 October 2013, Mr Robinson was served with a Provisional Order (ex
parte) Apprehended Personal Violence Order based upon a complaint made by
a Ms Roselyn Singh.
7 On 16 October 2013, the Local Court made an Apprehended Violence Order
(AVO) against Mr Robinson in standard terms with additional orders that he
must not approach or contact or enter the premises at which Ms Singh lived or
worked.
8 On 20 December 2013 Ms Singh complained to police that Mr Robinson had
threatened her by emailing one of her employees, falsely claiming that her
company was being wound up. Ms Singh’s complaint was recorded in a file,
which the primary judge found Constable Smith had read earlier on the day of
Mr Robinson’s arrest.
9 After receiving the complaint, at 11.15am on Sunday, 22 December 2013,
police, including Constable Smith, tried unsuccessfully to locate Mr Robinson.
10 Mr Robinson voluntarily attended Day Street Police Station at 5pm on
22 December 2013 and was immediately arrested by Constable Smith who told
him he was being arrested for breaching the AVO. Mr Robinson was offered,
and accepted, the opportunity to participate in a record of interview. Constable
Smith then conducted an interview with Mr Robinson. At 6.18pm, after the
interview concluded, Mr Robinson was released without charge. 2
11 At the time Constable Smith arrested Mr Robinson, he had not decided to
charge him with any offence. He gave evidence that he “did not believe there
2 Ibid at [1].
was enough to charge him.”3 He said the decision whether to charge him
depended on what Mr Robinson said in the interview. He said he did not
charge him after the interview as Mr Robinson had given an explanation during
it which led Constable Smith to believe further evidence would need to be
obtained.
Legislative framework
12 In the Second Reading Speech made on the introduction of the Law
Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Bill 2002 (NSW) which became the
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) (LEPRA), the
Attorney General, the Hon Bob Debus, explained that the Bill was the outcome
of the consolidation process envisaged by the Royal Commission into the New
South Wales Police Service to help strike a proper balance between the need
for effective law enforcement and the protection of individual rights.4 In dealing
with the powers relating to arrest, the Attorney General said that Pt 8 of the Bill
“substantially re-enacts arrest provisions of the Crimes Act 1900 and codifies
the common law.”5
13 At the time of Mr Robinson’s arrest, Pt 1 (Preliminary) of LEPRA relevantly
provided:
4 Relationship to common law and other matters
(1) Unless this Act otherwise provides expressly or by implication, this Act does not limit:
(a) the functions, obligations and liabilities that a police officer has as a constable at common law, or
(b) the functions that a police officer may lawfully exercise, whether under an Act or any other law as an individual (otherwise than as a police officer) including, for example, powers for protecting property.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1) and subject to section 9,6 nothing in this Act affects the powers conferred by the common law on police officers to deal with breaches of the peace.
…
7 Provisions in this Act
3 The SNSW accepts that the references in Constable Smith’s evidence to charging Mr Robinson were a loose way of describing the process under the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) by which criminal proceedings are commenced against a person by a police officer issuing, and then filing, a Court Attendance Notice (CAN).4 New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 17 September 2002 at 4846.5 Ibid at 4848.6 Section 9 dealt with a police officer’s power to enter premises in emergencies.
Nothing in any Part of this Act limits any functions, or prevents a police officer from exercising any functions, that the police officer has under any other Part of this Act.
Note. The general functions of police officers and other members of the NSW Police Force, and matters relating to police discipline, are dealt with in the Police Act 1990. For other Acts containing significant police and law enforcement powers, see Schedule 1.
14 Section 99 appeared in Pt 8 (Powers relating to arrest).7 Note 2 at the
commencement of Pt 8 stated “Safeguards relating to arrests by police officers,
including the requirement to state the reason for an arrest, are set out in Part
15”.
15 Section 99 relevantly provided:
99 Power of police officers to arrest without warrant (cf Crimes Act 1900, s 352, Cth Act, s 3W)
(1) A police officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person if:
(a) the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the person is committing or has committed an offence, and
(b) the police officer is satisfied that the arrest is reasonably necessary for any one or more of the following reasons:
(i) to stop the person committing or repeating the offence or committing another offence,
(ii) to stop the person fleeing from a police officer or from the location of the offence,
(iii) to enable inquiries to be made to establish the person’s identity if it cannot be readily established or if the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that identity information provided is false,
(iv) to ensure that the person appears before a court in relation to the offence,
(v) to obtain property in the possession of the person that is connected with the offence,
(vi) to preserve evidence of the offence or prevent the fabrication of evidence,
(vii) to prevent the harassment of, or interference with, any person who may give evidence in relation to the offence, to protect the safety or welfare of any person (including the person arrested), because of the nature and seriousness of the offence.
(viii) to protect the safety or welfare of any person (including the person arrested),
(ix) because of the nature and seriousness of the offence.7 Section 99 as it applied to the present case and subsection (3) of s 105 were inserted by the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Amendment (Arrest without Warrant) Act 2013 (NSW) (LEPRA Amendment Act).
(2) A police officer may also arrest a person without a warrant if directed to do so by another police officer. The other police officer is not to give such a direction unless the other officer may lawfully arrest the person without a warrant.
(3) A police officer who arrests a person under this section must, as soon as is reasonably practicable, take the person before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law.8
Note. The police officer may discontinue the arrest at any time and without taking the arrested person before an authorised officer – see section 105.
(4) A person who has been lawfully arrested under this section may be detained by any police officer under Part 9 for the purpose of investigating whether the person committed the offence for which the person has been arrested and for any other purpose authorised by that Part.
(5) This section does not authorise a person to be arrested for an offence for which the person has already been tried.
(6) For the purposes of this section, property is connected with an offence if it is connected with the offence within the meaning of Part 5. [Emphasis added.]
16 Section 99 had been significantly amended by the LEPRA Amendment Act with
effect from 16 December 2013, six days before Mr Robinson’s arrest.
17 Section 105, which also appeared in Pt 8, provided:9
105 Arrest may be discontinued
(1) A police officer may discontinue an arrest at any time.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), a police officer may discontinue an arrest in any of the following circumstances:
(a) if the arrested person is no longer a suspect or the reason for the arrest no longer exists for any other reason,
(b) if it is more appropriate to deal with the matter in some other manner, including, for example, by issuing a warning or caution or a penalty notice or court attendance notice or, in the case of a child, dealing with the matter under the Young Offenders Act 1997.
(3) A police officer may discontinue an arrest despite any obligation under this Part to take the arrested person before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law. [Emphasis added.]
18 Section 107 in Pt 8 relevantly provided:
107 Part does not affect alternatives to arrest
(1) Nothing in this Part affects the power of a police officer to commence proceedings for an offence against a person otherwise than by arresting the person ...” [Emphasis added.]
8 In the LEPRA, authorised officer means (a) a Magistrate or a Children’s Magistrate, or (b) a registrar of the Local Court, or (c) an employee of the Attorney General’s Department authorised by the Attorney General as an authorised officer for the purposes of this Act either personally or as the holder of a specified office: s 3(1).9 Section 105 had also been amended by the LEPRA Amendment Act, Sch 1[2].
19 The objects of Pt 9 (Investigations and questioning) as set out in Div 1
(Preliminary) s 109(b) and (c) include “to authorise the detention of a person
who is under arrest for such a period despite any requirement imposed by law
to bring the person before a Magistrate or other authorised officer or court
without delay or within a specified period, and … to provide for the rights of a
person so detained.”
20 Section 113, which also appears in Pt 9, Div 1 provides relevantly:
113 Effect of Part on other powers and duties (cf Crimes Act 1900, s 356B)
(1) Existing powers relating to arrest and other matters
This Part does not:
(a) confer any power to arrest a person, or to detain a person who has not been lawfully arrested, or
…
(c) independently confer power to carry out an investigative procedure. [Emphasis added.]
21 Part 9, Div 2 (Investigation and questioning powers) includes the following:
114 Detention after arrest for purposes of investigation (cf Crimes Act 1900, s 356C)
(1) A police officer may in accordance with this section detain a person, who is under arrest, for the investigation period provided for by section 115.
(2) A police officer may so detain a person for the purpose of investigating whether the person committed the offence for which the person is arrested.
(3) If, while a person is so detained, the police officer forms a reasonable suspicion as to the person’s involvement in the commission of any other offence, the police officer may also investigate the person’s involvement in that other offence during the investigation period for the arrest. It is immaterial whether that other offence was committed before or after the commencement of this Part or within or outside the State.
(4) The person must be:
(a) released (whether unconditionally or on bail) within the investigation period, or
(b) brought before an authorised officer or court within that period, or, if it is not practicable to do so within that period, as soon as practicable after the end of that period.
(5) A requirement in another Part of this Act, the Bail Act 1978 or any other relevant law that a person who is under arrest be taken before a Magistrate or other authorised officer or court, without delay, or within a specified period, is affected by this Part only to the extent that the extension of the period within which the person is to be brought before such a Magistrate or officer or court is authorised by this Part.
(6) If a person is arrested more than once within any period of 48 hours, the investigation period for each arrest, other than the first, is reduced by so much of any earlier investigation period or periods as occurred within that 48 hour period.
(7) The investigation period for an arrest (the earlier arrest) is not to reduce the investigation period for a later arrest if the later arrest relates to an offence that the person is suspected of having committed after the person was released, or taken before a Magistrate or other authorised officer or court, in respect of the earlier arrest. [Emphasis added.]
115 Investigation period (cf Crimes Act 1900, s 356D)
(1) The investigation period is a period that begins when the person is arrested and ends at a time that is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, but does not exceed the maximum investigation period.
(2) The maximum investigation period is 4 hours or such longer period as the maximum investigation period may be extended to by a detention warrant.
22 Section 116 made provision for determining what a reasonable time is for the
investigation period referred to in s 115. Section 117 identified certain times
which could be disregarded in calculating the investigation period.
23 Pursuant to s 121, also in Pt 9, Div 2, a person’s detention after arrest for
purposes of investigation may count towards sentence (cf Crimes Act 1900,
s 356W)
24 Part 9, Div 3, deals with safeguards relating to persons in custody for
questioning. Section 131(1) requires the “custody manager for a detained
person [to] open a custody record in the form prescribed by the regulations for
the person.” Section 131(2)(c) requires the custody manager to record the
grounds for the person’s detention in the custody record for the person.
25 Section 201 which appears in Pt 15 (Safeguards relating to powers) relevantly
provided that:
(1) A police officer must provide the person subject to the exercise of a power referred to in subsection (3) with the following:
…
(c) the reason for the exercise of the power.
…
(2) A police officer must comply with subsection (1) in relation to a power referred to in subsection (3) (other than subsection (3) (g), (i) or (j)):
(a) if it is practicable to do so, before or at the time of exercising the power, or
(b) if it is not practicable to do so before or at that time, as soon as is reasonably practicable after exercising the power.
…
(3) This section applies to the exercise of the following powers (whether or not conferred by or under this Act):
(a) a power to search or arrest a person … [Emphasis added.]
Primary judgment
26 The primary judge found, and Mr Robinson did not dispute at trial nor on
appeal, that at the time of his arrest, Constable Smith suspected Mr Robinson
had committed the offence of breaching the AVO.10 His Honour also held that
that Constable Smith had reasonable grounds for his suspicion that an offence
had been committed.11 Finally, relevantly, his Honour held that at the time of
the arrest, Constable Smith was satisfied that Mr Robinson’s arrest was
necessary to ensure his appearance before a court (s 99(1)(b)(iv), LEPRA) and
because of the nature and seriousness of the offence (s 99(1)(b)(ix), LEPRA).12
27 Mr Robinson’s primary challenge to the question whether Constable Smith was
satisfied that his arrest was reasonably necessary to ensure that he appeared
before a court was that Constable Smith had conceded that he had not
determined at the time of the arrest whether he would charge Mr Robinson.13
He argued that if, in the belief of Constable Smith, Mr Robinson might not be
charged, Constable Smith could not be satisfied that an arrest was necessary
to ensure that Mr Robinson appeared in court since his appearance in court
might never be necessary.14
28 Mr Robinson relied in this respect on Zaravinos v State of New South Wales,15
where Bryson JA held that an arrest was unlawful as being for an extraneous
purpose if made “for the purpose of questioning [the arrested person] and
investigating the circumstances of the suspected offence or of any other
offence”.
10 Primary judgment at [14].11 Ibid at [24].12 Ibid at [44], [48].13 Ibid at [38].14 Ibid.15 (2004) 62 NSWLR 58; [2004] NSWCA 320 (Zaravinos) at [37] (Santow JA and Adams J agreeing).
29 The primary judge rejected Mr Robinson’s submission in this respect. His
Honour held that if Mr Robinson’s interpretation of s 99(1)(b)(iv) were adopted:
“[A] person who was a known flight risk could not be arrested in reliance upon s 99(1)(b)(iv) unless the police officer was already persuaded that the person should be charged (or that the arrest would not be withdrawn under s 105). But a charge requires reasonable and probable cause, namely a positive belief and a sufficient (or reasonable) basis for the belief (see A v New South Wales [2007] HCA 10 at [77]), a higher obligation on the police officer to that imposed by s 99(1)(a), which requires only a suspicion on reasonable grounds.”16
30 Accordingly, the primary judge held that Constable Smith was satisfied that Mr
Robinson’s arrest was reasonably necessary to ensure that he appeared
before a court within the meaning of the LEPRA, s 99(1)(b)(iv).17
31 The primary judge also held that he was satisfied that Mr Robinson’s arrest
was necessary because of the nature and seriousness of the offence such that
the elements of the LEPRA, s 99(1)(b)(ix), were satisfied.18
Consideration
32 The competing contentions are whether, as Mr Robinson submits, a police
arrest without warrant is unlawful unless, at the time of arrest, the arresting
officer intends to charge the person arrested or, as the SNSW frames Mr
Robinson’s case, at the time of arrest an arresting police officer must have
decided and intended to charge the plaintiff with an offence. Alternatively, as
the SNSW contends, whether an arrest without warrant is lawful if effected for
the purpose of investigating whether to charge the person arrested.
33 The SNSW accepted in the course of oral submissions in this court that
Constable Smith’s evidence that at the time of the arrest he had not decided if
Mr Robinson was going to be charged was a sufficient evidentiary foundation
for Mr Robinson’s submission that he was unlawfully arrested.
34 Resolution of the issues raised on the appeal turns primarily upon issues of
statutory construction. As emphasised most recently by the plurality in SZTAL v
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,19 the starting point for the 16 Primary judgment at [42].17 Ibid at [44].18 Ibid at [47] – [48].19 [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 91 ALJR 936 (SZTAL) at [14] per Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ; see also [35] – [39] per Gageler J; Mighty River International Ltd v Hughes; Mighty River International Ltd v Mineral Resources Ltd [2018] HCA 38 at [42] per Kiefel CJ and Edelman J.
ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute
whilst, at the same time, having regard to its context and purpose. Context
should be regarded in its widest sense. Considerations of context and purpose
simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context,
some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary
meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be
rejected.20
35 Notwithstanding the necessity to construe s 99 by reference to its text, the pre-
existing law concerning the common law power of arrest is necessary context
for the purposes of the construction exercise.21 That is not just because the
modern approach to statutory interpretation uses “context” in its widest sense
to include such things as the existing state of the law,22 but also because the
LEPRA, s 4, presupposes the continued existence of a police officer’s powers
at common law.23
36 The SNSW however criticises Mr Robinson’s submissions as failing to grapple
with the textual and contextual matters concerning s 99. It contends that,
instead, Mr Robinson’s submissions proceed by reference to a body of case
law decided by reference to other provisions of the LEPRA including s 99 as it
stood prior to the LEPRA Amendment Act. While the SNSW accepts that the
case law may be relevant to the construction of s 99 to the extent that any
analogy is persuasive or general principle is relevant, it submits that cases on
previous provisions are not binding with respect to the new form of s 99 and
that judicial decisions are not substitutes for the text of the legislation. Such
decisions should not be given primacy.24 As much may be accepted.
Nevertheless, as I explain below, earlier decisions on powers of arrest without
warrant form part of the interpretative context, and inform the process of
interpreting s 99.20 SZTAL at [14].21 Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S (2014) 254 CLR 247; [2014] HCA 42 per Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ.22 CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 at 408; [1997] HCA 2 per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ; Regional Express Holdings Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots [2017] HCA 55; (2017) 92 ALJR 134 at [19] per Kiefel CJ, Keane, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ.23 Poidevin v Semaan (2013) 85 NSWLR 758; [2013] NSWCA 334 at [21] per Leeming JA (Ward and Emmett JJA agreeing).24 Marshall v Director-General, Department of Transport (2001) 205 CLR 603; [2001] HCA 37 at [62] per McHugh J; referred to with approval in Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority (2008) 233 CLR 259; [2008] HCA 5 at [31] per curiam (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
37 The SNSW emphasises the statement in Commissioner of Taxation v
Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd,25 that (footnote included):
“[39] ‘This court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the [statutory] text’. [67 Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41 at [47]]. So must the task of statutory construction end. The statutory text must be considered in its context. That context includes legislative history and extrinsic materials. Understanding context has utility if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text. Legislative history and extrinsic materials cannot displace the meaning of the statutory text. Nor is their examination an end in itself.” [Emphasis added].
38 It is “plainly of critical importance to the existence and protection of personal
liberty under the law that the circumstances in which a police officer may,
without judicial warrant, arrest or detain an individual should be strictly
confined, plainly stated and readily ascertainable.”26 There is “a legal immunity
from arrest and from the threat of arrest unless and until the conditions
governing the exercise of the arresting power are fulfilled.”27
39 Finally, “the principle of legality favours a construction, if one be available,
which avoids or minimises the statute’s encroachment upon fundamental
principles, rights and freedoms at common law”.28
The text
40 The SNSW accepts that the effect of s 4 of LEPRA was to preserve the
common law power of arrest, although it argues that that power had, to a
significant extent, been overtaken by the LEPRA (no doubt by reason of the
words “Unless this Act otherwise provides expressly or by implication”) or, at
least, by virtue of s 7, that the s 99 power of arrest without warrant was not
inhibited by the continuation of the common law power.
41 The SNSW recognises that an arrest is the start of a process which must end
within a limited time, either by the person arrested being taken before an
25 (2012) 250 CLR 503; [2012] HCA 55 (Consolidated Media Holdings) at [39] per curiam (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ).26 Donaldson v Broomby (1982) 60 FLR 124 at 126 per Deane J (Kelly J agreeing) referred to with approval in Prior v Mole [2017] HCA 10; (2017) 91 ALJR 441 at [22] per Gageler J and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd v Northern Territory (2015) 256 CLR 569; [2015] HCA 41 (NAAJA v NT) at [222] per Nettle and Gordon JJ; Smith v Corrective Services Commission of NSW (1980) 147 CLR 134 at 139; [1980] HCA 49 per curiam (Stephen, Mason, Murphy, Aickin and Wilson JJ); Minogue v Victoria [2018] HCA 27; (2018) 92 ALJR 668 at [46] – [48] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ.27 Webster v McIntosh (1980) 49 FLR 317 at 322 per Brennan J (Deane and Kelly JJ agreeing).28 NAAJA v NT at [11] per French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ.
authorised officer or released pursuant to s 105. However, the SNSW argues
that the fact that one of the two possible endings to the process is that the
arrested person is charged does not mean that there must be a positive
intention to charge that person at the time of arrest.
42 It contends that the effect of Mr Robinson’s argument is to read in a third
condition, namely that at the time of arrest a decision had to have been made
by the arresting officer or his superior (s 99(2)) to charge the arrested person.
The SNSW contends that there was no textual foundation for that contention. It
concedes, however, that the requirement in s 99(3) to take the arrested person
before an authorised officer “as soon as is reasonably practicable … to be
dealt with according to law” supports Mr Robinson’s argument.
43 That concession is properly made. As I explain below, at common law, the
requirement to take the arrested person before an authorised officer is
intended to enable that person to be charged and to seek to regain his or her
personal liberty as soon as practicable either absolutely or on bail by a justice’s
order. It is therefore unlawful for a police officer having the custody of an
arrested person to delay taking that person before a justice in order to provide
an opportunity to investigate that person’s complicity in a criminal offence,
whether the offence under investigation is the offence for which the person has
been arrested or another offence.29
44 What the SNSW’s concession, and a contextual analysis of s 99, demonstrates
is that common law principles are embedded in s 99, in particular, in ss 99(1)
(a) and 99(3). It is necessary to turn to the common law at this stage to
demonstrate why that is so. The principles of common law, expressly
preserved by s 4, provide both contextual background to the LEPRA and
inform its interpretation.
45 “Arrest … ‘may be called the beginning of imprisonment’”. Those who arrest a
person must justify the whole imprisonment and not its beginning alone.30
29 Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; [1986] HCA 88 (Williams) at 299 – 301 per Mason and Brennan JJ, at 305 per Wilson and Dawson JJ.30 Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 (Christie) at 600 per Lord du Parcq.
46 Arrest is the first step in a criminal proceeding against a suspected person on a
charge which is intended to be judicially investigated.31 The power to arrest
exists for the purposes of bringing the person arrested before a justice and
conducting a prosecution.32 The point at which an arrested person is brought
before a justice upon a charge is the point at which the machinery of the law
leading to trial is put into operation, the point from which the judicial process
commences and purely ministerial functions cease.33
47 The common law conferred on constables a power to arrest without warrant on
suspicion on reasonable grounds of commission of a felony, but the authority to
keep the person arrested in custody was limited “till he can be brought before a
justice of the peace”.34 At common law it was compulsory for a constable, in
order to justify an arrest, to show that he had taken the arrested person without
delay, and by the most direct route, before a justice, unless some
circumstances reasonably justified a departure from these requirements.35 An
arrested person could not be detained for the purposes of being questioned.36
48 Section 99(1)(a) substantially reflects s 352(2)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900
(NSW) considered in Bales v Parmeter,37 albeit, whereas s 352(2)(a) enabled
an arrest without a warrant where a constable had “reasonable cause [to]
suspect”, s 99(1)(a) requires the suspicion to be held “on reasonable grounds”.
49 In Bales v Parmeter, Jordan CJ held that s 352(2)(a) “like the common law …
authorise[d] the [arresting officer] only to take the person so arrested before a
justice to be dealt with according to law.”38 In so holding, his Honour referred 31 Christie at 584 – 585 per Viscount Simon approving Scott LJ’s statement to that effect in the Court of Appeal: Leachinsky v Christie [1946] KB 124 (Christie CA) at 130.32 Zaravinos at [37] per Bryson JA (Santow JA and Adams J agreeing).33 Williams at 306 per Wilson and Dawson JJ; cited with approval in NAAJA v NT at [24] per French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ.34 Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1 at 12; [1984] HCA 80 per Brennan J; Williams at 292 – 293 per Mason and Brennan JJ.35 Clarke v Bailey (1933) SR (NSW) 303 at 309 per Davidson J giving judgment for the Supreme Court in banco.36 NAAJA v NT at [23]; Williams at 292 – 293 per Mason and Brennan JJ referring to Wright v Court (1825) 4 B & C 596 at 598; 107 ER 1182; at 305 per Wilson and Dawson JJ; see also Foster v The Queen [1993] HCA 80; (1993) 67 ALJR 550 (Foster) at 555 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ (Brennan and McHugh JJ agreeing with their Honours’ orders); Nolan v Clifford (1904) 1 CLR 429; Zaravinos at [37] per Bryson JA (Santos JA and Adams J agreeing).37 (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182.38 Ibid at 189 (Stephen and Street JJ agreeing). At that time, s 352(2)(a) of the Crimes Act empowered a constable to arrest without a warrant “any person whom he, with reasonable cause, suspects of having committed any such offence or crime … and take him …before a justice to be dealt with according to law.” The words “such offence” referred to the expression “offence punishable, whether by indictment, or on summary
with approval to Clarke v Bailey, where Davidson J held the effect of s 352(2)
(a) was “merely to reinforce the common law principle, and [was] not intended
to give the constable discretion in the matter except to the same extent as
existed before.”39
50 In Foster, the appellant was arrested without warrant pursuant to s 352 of the
Crimes Act, then relevantly in the same terms as in force when Bales v
Parmeter was decided. It was common ground between the parties, and
accepted by the plurality, that the appellant’s arrest was unlawful in
circumstances where the police gave evidence at the trial to the effect that,
without a confession by him, they “did not have any other evidence to charge
him” and that, at the time of his arrest, “the police did not intend to charge
him.”40 The plurality did not, therefore, discuss the principles leading to their
acceptance of this position. However, it is clear, in my view, that it followed
from their Honours’ view that “the appellant’s arrest [had been] solely for the
purpose of questioning, as distinct from the purpose of taking the appellant
before a ‘Justice’ to be charged.”41
51 A conclusion that at the time of an arrest without a warrant there should be an
intention to charge the person arrested also flows from the common law
requirement that the person arrested should be informed of the reason for the
arrest. That meant that the arresting officer should inform the person arrested
of the charge on which he or she was being arrested. That did not mean
“technical or precise language” needed to be used; a statement of the act for
which the person was arrested was sufficient.42 The common law obligation to
inform the person arrested of the reason for the exercise of the power of arrest
is also found in the LEPRA, s 201(1)(c).
52 In Christie, the House of Lords unanimously accepted Scott LJ’s explanation in
the Court of Appeal of the rationale for the obligation to inform a person
conviction, under any Act” in s 352(1)(a): Thompson v Vincent [2005] NSWCA 219; (2005) 153 A Crim R 577 at [107] per Mason P (Handley JA and Pearlman AJA agreeing).39 At 309.40 Foster at 552.41 Ibid.42 Christie at 587 – 588 per Viscount Simon (Lord Thankerton and Lord Macmillan agreeing) at 591 – 593 per Lord Simonds; at 598 – 600 per Lord du Parcq; see also Johnstone v State of New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 70; (2010) 202 A Crim R 422 at [56] per Beazley JA (McColl and Young JJA agreeing).
arrested without a warrant of the reason for his or her arrest.43 That obligation
is based, by way of analogy, on an arrest authorised by magisterial warrant, or
proceedings instituted by the issue of a summons.44 In such cases, the warrant
or summons had to specify the offence and the warrant “in normal cases” had
to be read to the person arrested. This was “for the obvious purpose of
securing that a citizen who is prima facie entitled to personal freedom should
know why for the time being his personal freedom is interfered with”. Scott LJ’s
reasoning was that “if the law circumscribed the issue of warrants for arrest in
this way, it could hardly be that a policemen acting without a warrant was
entitled to make an arrest without stating the charge on which the arrest was
made.”45
53 Scott LJ’s conclusion, Viscount Simon pointed out, was supported by “direct
authority, both in text books of acknowledged weight and in cases actually
decided, that in normal circumstances an arrest without warrant either by a
policeman or by a private person can be justified only if it is an arrest on a
charge made known to the person arrested”.46
54 Christie reflects the common law in New South Wales in regard to the
obligation to notify an arrested person of the reasons for the arrest.47
55 Christie was applied in Dowse v New South Wales,48 where Basten JA stated
“an arrest will not be valid merely because the officer believes that an offence
has been committed, in circumstances where the officer has no intention of
charging the person or having the person charged with that offence”.
56 The SNSW contended that Basten JA’s remarks should be understood in the
light of a case where the arresting officer has decided not to charge the
arrested person with an offence, presumably as opposed to this case, where
43 See Christie CA at 130 (Uthwatt J agreeing).44 The comparable process in this case would be a CAN.45 Christie at 585 per Viscount Simon; see also Lord Simonds at 591 – 592.46 Ibid at 586 – 587; see also Lord du Parcq at 600ff.47 Adams v Kennedy (2000) 49 NSWLR 78 at [24] per Priestley JA (Sheller JA and Beazley JA agreeing); see also Wilson v New South Wales (2010) 207 A Crim R 499; [2010] NSWCA 333 at [60] per Hodgson JA (McColl and Young JJA agreeing); special leave refused: Wilson v New South Wales [2011] HCATrans 218.48 (2012) 226 A Crim R 36; [2012] NSWCA 337 at [27] per Basten JA (McColl and Hoeben JJA agreeing). Dowse considered s 99, LEPRA, as in force prior to the LEPRA Amendment Act.
Constable Smith had not determined to charge Mr Robinson with any offence
and gave evidence that he “did not believe there was enough to charge him.”
57 I do not accept the SNSW’s submission in this respect. After the passage to
which I have referred Basten JA observed that, “[i]f that were not so, the legal
requirement that the person arrested be informed of the true grounds of the
arrest would be rendered nugatory”.49 In my view his Honour’s statement is
equally applicable to the circumstance that at the time of the arrest, the
arresting officer had not determined to charge the arrested person. The effect
of both the common law and s 201 of the LEPRA is that the person arrested
must know why he or she has been deprived of his or her liberty. The only
purpose for which that can be done is to charge the person with an offence and
take him or her before an authorised officer as soon as possible.
58 An obligation to inform the person arrested without warrant of the charge on
which he or she is being arrested, presupposes that a decision has been made
at the time of the arrest to so charge that person.
59 It is uncontroversial, and consistent with the obligation to inform the arrested
person of the reason for the arrest, that whether at common law, or pursuant to
the LEPRA s 99, the arresting officer’s state of mind to sustain the legality of
the arrest, “must exist as a matter of fact at the time of the arrest”.50
60 As I have earlier indicated, the proposition that the arresting officer must intend
to charge the person arrested at the time of arrest is consistent with the
obligation in s 99(3) to take the person arrested as soon as is reasonably
practicable before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law.
Section 99(3) reinforces the common law principle that it was compulsory for a
constable, in order to justify an arrest, to show that he had taken the arrested
person without delay, and by the most direct route, before a justice, unless
some circumstances reasonably justified a departure from these
requirements.51
49 Ibid.50 Lule v State of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 125 (Lule) at [2] per Beazley P; State of New South Wales v Bouffler (2017) 95 NSWLR 521; [2017] NSWCA 185 at [87] per Beazley ACJ, Ward and Gleeson JJA; see also Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; [2005] HCA 48 at [40] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ.51 Clarke v Bailey at 309; see also Zaravinos at [26].
61 The common law requirement, reflected in s 99(3), to take the person arrested
before a justice “as soon as practicable” allowed reasonable time for the
arrestors to formulate and lay appropriate charges for the purposes of bringing
a person before a justice.52 It did not empower “the police … to detain an
arrested person to enable them, by further investigation, to gather the evidence
necessary to support a charge.”53
62 The s 99(3) requirement recognises the ordinary right to liberty of the citizen by
ensuring that an accused person is transferred as soon as practicable after
being charged by the executive branch of government to the judicial branch of
government where the question of bail can be independently considered.54
63 The proposition that proceedings must be commenced against a person
arrested pursuant to s 99 “as soon as is reasonably practicable” is also
supported by s 107 of the LEPRA set out above (at [18]). It is implicit in s 107
that the power to arrest without a warrant has been exercised in order to
commence proceedings against that person. Coupled with s 99(3), those
proceedings must be commenced as soon as reasonably practicable.
64 The consequence of this analysis is that the power to arrest without a warrant
expressed in s 99(1)(a), carrying with it the obligation to inform the person
arrested of the reason for the exercise of the power of arrest (s 201(1)(c))
means that at the time of arrest, the arresting officer must inform the person
arrested of the charge to be preferred. To do so, the arresting officer must have
an intention to so charge the arrested person.
65 Thus, properly understood, s 99(1)(a) requires the arresting officer at the time
of an arrest without warrant to have formed the intention to charge the arrested
person and to advise the arrested person of that charge in the terms I have
earlier discussed.
52 Williams at 298 (Mason and Brennan JJ); at 312 (Wilson and Dawson JJ).53 Ibid at 312 – 313 (Wilson and Dawson JJ).54 Attorney-General (NSW) v Dean (1990) 20 NSWLR 650 at 653 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby P and Priestley JA; see also Williams at 305 per Wilson and Dawson JJ. Although, as Samuels JA said in R v Walsh (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 18 October 1990, unrep) (Walsh) at 24, this “statement may strictly be obiter’”, I would agree with his Honour’s observation that “it is a very strong expression of opinion and entitled to the greatest respect.”
66 Section 99(1)(b) is cumulative on s 99(1)(a). It is notable that it does not confer
a power upon the police to investigate the offence. Such an investigation can
only be undertaken pursuant to Pt 9.
67 The SNSW does not contend that an intention to investigate per se suffices as
the basis for an arrest without a warrant. It accepted that in order for Mr
Robinson’s arrest to have been lawful, it was necessary that it satisfy both
s 99(1)(a) and (b).
68 The SNSW submits that s 99(1)(b) sets out exhaustively the purposes for
which a person may be arrested. It argues that Mr Robinson seeks
impermissibly to add another purpose. It also contends that various of the
s 99(1)(b) purposes are inconsistent with implying a requirement of a decision,
or intention, to charge the arrested person at the time of arrest.
69 In this respect the SNSW points to s 99(1)(b)(ii) (to stop the person fleeing from
a police officer or from the location of the offence); s 99(1)(b)(iii) (to enable
inquiries to be made to establish the person’s identity if it cannot be readily
established or if the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that identity
information provided is false); s 99(1)(b)(v) (to obtain property in the
possession of the person that is connected with the offence); s 99(1)(b)(viii) (to
protect the safety or welfare of any person (including the person arrested)); and
s 99(1)(b)(ix) (because of the nature and seriousness of the offence) as being
matters directed to the investigation of an offence, or, more generally to the
protection of the public, rather than to laying a charge.
70 I cannot accept that submission. As Mr Robinson submitted, the s 99(1)(b)(ii)
power to stop the arrested person fleeing is consistent with the posited
requirement being necessary only if it is proposed by the arresting officer to
take the person before a court to answer a charge as required by s 99(3).
Second, the s 99(1)(b)(iii) power enabling inquiries to be made to establish a
person’s identity is arguably only necessary to obtain that information if it is
proposed that the arrested be charged. Third, the s 99(1)(b)(v) power to obtain
property in the possession of a person can only be necessary for the purpose
of securing evidence to be used against that person when prosecuted. Fourth,
the s 99(1)(b)(viii) power to protect the safety or welfare of any person on its
face would be directed to protecting such people who may be adversely
affected by the offence the police officer suspects the arrested person as
having committed or was committing at the time of the arrest. Fifth, the s 99(1)
(b)(ix) power to arrest because of the nature and seriousness of the offence
appears to be directed to the proposition that the arrested person may repeat
the offence the police officer suspects that person has committed or was
committing at the time of the arrest.
71 Finally, while still dealing with Pt 8, s 105, which enables a “police officer [to]
discontinue an arrest despite any obligation under this Part to take the arrested
person before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law”, does not,
in my view, assist the SNSW. As Mr Robinson submitted, it depends upon
there having been a prior lawful arrest.
72 The SNSW also placed great weight on the provisions of Pt 9 permitting
detention of the arrested person for the purposes of investigation. It contends
that, while the primary judge recognised that “it is not lawful to arrest for the
purpose of investigation … because it is not a permissible reason under s 99”,
his Honour also correctly stated that it was “a different question whether a
person properly arrested may nevertheless be detained for the purposes of
investigation, as s 109(4) [sic, s 99(4)] permits.”55 As will be recalled, s 99(4)
provides that “[a] person who has been lawfully arrested under [s 99] may be
detained by any police officer under Part 9 for the purpose of investigating …”.
73 As will be apparent, the route to Pt 9 proceeds via the express requirement in
both Pt 8 (s 99(4)) and Pt 9 (s 113(1)(a)) that such further investigation may
only be undertaken if there has been a lawful arrest, a requirement also implicit
in s 114(1). However, a lawful arrest can only be effected pursuant to s 99 if
both s 99(1)(a) and (b) are satisfied.
74 The position is analogous to s 353A(1) of the Crimes Act considered in Clarke
v Bailey. Section 353A(1) provided that, “[w]here a person is in lawful custody
upon a charge of committing any crime or offence, any constable may search
his person and take from him anything found upon his person.” Sub-sections
(2) and (3) were also predicated upon the arrested person being “in lawful
55 Primary judgment at [44].
custody”. Davidson J held that the “terms of the three sub-sections to [s 353A]
indicate clearly that the intention of the Legislature was directed to the time
when an arrested person is in custody after a formal charge had been laid
against him”.56 [Emphasis added.] Such, in my view, is equally the case in
relation to s 99(4).
State of mind to effect an arrest
75 One of the reasons the primary judge gave for rejecting Mr Robinson’s
submission that an arrest was unlawful if made for the purpose of questioning
or investigating the person arrested was his Honour’s concern that “a charge
requires reasonable and probable cause, namely a positive belief and a
sufficient (or reasonable) basis for the belief (see A v New South Wales57), a
higher obligation on the police officer to that imposed by s 99(1)(a), which
requires only a suspicion on reasonable grounds.”58
76 In supporting this aspect of the primary judge’s reasons, the SNSW submitted
that in none of the early authorities dealing with s 353(2) of the Crimes Act,
such as Bales v Parmeter, did the court consider what the SNSW contends is
the differing mental states relating to the decision to arrest and the decision to
prosecute.
77 It is not the case that previous authorities did not consider the mental state
relating to the decision to arrest and the decision to prosecute in the context of
an arrest without warrant. However, it is apparent that the courts did not draw
the distinction for which the SNSW contends. Thus, in Bales v Parmeter, a
case concerning both unlawful arrest and false imprisonment, Jordan CJ
held:59
“There is no doubt that in an action for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment by a police officer it is a good defence if the defendant proves that he had reasonable and probable cause for his actions. Such reasonable and probable cause may be established by proving that he, with reasonable cause, suspected the person whom he arrested of having committed a crime or offence.” [Emphasis added.]
56 At 310.57 (2007) 230 CLR 500; [2007] HCA 10 (A v NSW) at [77].58 Primary judgment at [42].59 At 186; see also Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147 at 152; [1955] HCA 68 per Fullagar J.
78 The phrase “with reasonable cause” reflected s 352(2)(a) of the Crimes Act as
then in force.
79 Mason and Brennan JJ spoke to like effect in Williams,60 a case concerning
unlawful detention as a basis for excluding evidence of records of interview
containing confessions allegedly made to the police by the applicant, where
their Honours explained:
“Nor is there any reason to think that, in general, an arresting police officer would be unable properly to make a complaint or to lay an oral information until he had had an opportunity to question the person arrested. In the ordinary case of an arrest on suspicion, the arresting officer must have satisfied himself at the time of the arrest that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting the guilt of the person arrested, although the grounds of suspicion need not consist of admissible evidence. If the arresting officer believes the information in his possession to be true, if the information reasonably points to the guilt of the arrested person and if the arresting officer thus believes that the arrested person is so likely to be guilty of the offence for which he has been arrested that on general grounds of justice a charge is warranted, he has reasonable and probable cause for commencing a prosecution: see Mitchell v John Heine & Son Ltd; Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain; Glinski v McIver.” [Emphasis added; citations omitted.] 61
80 When the LEPRA was enacted, the phrase “with reasonable cause” in s 352(2)
(a) of the Crimes Act was not repeated. Rather, as I have said, s 99(2)
empowered a police officer to arrest a person without a warrant on suspicion
“on reasonable grounds” that the person had committed an offence under any
Act or statutory instrument. That language has been continued in the present
s 99. Accordingly, Jordan CJ’s statement in Bales v Parmeter would now be:
“There is no doubt that, in an action for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment by a police officer it is a good defence if the defendant proves that he had reasonable and probable cause for his actions. Such reasonable and probable cause may be established by proving that he, on reasonable grounds, suspected the person whom he arrested of having committed a crime or offence.” [Emphasis added.]
60 At 300.61 The italicised passage was drawn almost verbatim from Dixon J’s reasons in Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343 at 382; [1935] HCA 30 and was cited with approval by the plurality in A v NSW at [82] in support of what will sustain “the objective aspect of an allegation of absence of reasonable and probable cause”. Although their Honours counselled at [60] against the “inevitable tendency to translate the negative question – whether the defendant prosecutor acted without reasonable and probable cause – into the different question – what will constitute reasonable and probable cause to institute criminal proceedings”, because of “the importance of the burden of proof and … the variety of factual and forensic circumstances in which the questions may arise”, it is plain they accepted the basic principle applied in Williams as to what will constitute reasonable and probable cause to arrest.
81 The test for “reasonable and probable cause” in this context conforms to the
state of mind required to be held by the person arresting the person without
warrant pursuant to s 99(1)(a). There are not two states of mind. Rather, on
this approach the state of mind of the arresting officer which justifies the arrest
of a person without warrant is also sufficient to found a finding that the
arresting officer who charges the person arrested had “reasonable and
probable cause” to do so.
82 I do not accept that either A v NSW or George v Rockett62 (discussed below)
lead to a different conclusion.
83 A v NSW concerned, relevantly, the test to be applied to determine for the
purpose of the tort of malicious prosecution that the defendant acted without
reasonable and probable cause. Consideration of that question involved, in
part, consideration of the five conditions Jordan CJ held in Mitchell v John
Heine & Son Ltd63 had to be met if a person was to have reasonable and
probable cause for prosecuting another for an offence. To succeed on the
issue of reasonable and probable cause the plaintiff had to establish “that one
or more of these conditions did not exist”. The plaintiff could do this “by
proving, if he can, that the defendant prosecutor did not believe him to be
guilty, or that the belief in his guilt was based on insufficient grounds.”64
84 After an extensive consideration of Mitchell, the question whether it was
inconsistent with observations by Dixon J in Sharp v Biggs,65 (the plurality held
it was not),66 the plurality held that Jordan CJ’s five conditions were not, and
could not have been, intended as “directly or indirectly providing a list of
elements to be established at trial of an action for malicious prosecution.”67
85 When the plurality considered the issue of what is absence of reasonable and
probable cause, their Honours explained that there are two kinds of inquiry to
determine that issue: one subjective (what the prosecutor made of the
62 (1990) 170 CLR 104; [1990] HCA 26.63 (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 466 (Mitchell).64 A v NSW at [64], referring to Mitchell at 469.65 (1932) 48 CLR 81 at 106; [1932] HCA 54.66 A v NSW at [65] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ; cf Callinan J at [165], [174], following Sharp v Biggs, albeit without discussing Mitchell.67 Ibid at [66].
available material) and the other objective (what the prosecutor should have
made of that material).68
86 The subjective issue concerns the sufficiency of the material then before the
prosecutor to warrant setting the processes of the criminal law in motion.69 As
their Honours explained, “absence of reasonable and probable cause will not in
every case be shown by demonstrating that the prosecutor had no positive
belief that the accused person was, or was probably, guilty.”70 Insofar as the
subjective test was concerned, the plurality concluded that “[t]he expression
‘proper case for prosecution’ is not susceptible of exhaustive definition without
obscuring the importance of the burden of proving the absence of reasonable
and probable cause, and the variety of factual and forensic circumstances in
which the questions may arise. … [I]t will require examination of the
prosecutor’s state of persuasion about the material considered by the
prosecutor.”71
87 The objective aspect of an allegation of absence of reasonable and probable
cause is “to an objective standard of sufficiency”, resolution of which is
“ultimately one of fact”, depending “upon identifying what it is that the plaintiff
asserts to be deficient about the material upon which the defendant acted in
instituting or maintaining the prosecution.”72 That is to say, the objective aspect
turns upon an analysis of the prosecutor’s subjective state of mind based on
the materials to which he, she or it had regard in either setting the processes of
the criminal law in motion or continuing a prosecution.
88 This two-step test for determining the validity of a warrantless arrest pursuant
to the previous s 99 was accepted in Dowse,73 where Basten JA held that
“there are two elements to be satisfied for a warrantless arrest to be valid,
namely an honestly held suspicion in the mind of the arresting officer and
information in the mind of the arresting officer which when objectively assessed
68 Ibid at [70].69 Ibid at [71]. The word “prosecutor” was used throughout A v NSW to refer both to the police officer who preferred charges against A and to the Director of Public Prosecutions who took over the prosecution from the police: see [13] – [14].70 Ibid at [76].71 Ibid at [81].72 Ibid at [84] – [85].73 At [26].
provides reasonable grounds for the suspicion” that the person being arrested
“is committing or has committed an offence”.74 This is to ensure that “[t]he
arresting officer is held accountable”.75 “Accountable” is clearly used in the
sense of the arresting officer being accountable for the legality of the arrest.
89 George v Rockett concerned the proper construction of s 679 of The Criminal
Code (Qld), a provision concerning a justice issuing a search warrant which
required a sworn complaint going to issues of both reasonable grounds for
suspicion and belief. It was in that context that the High Court referred to the
proposition that “suspicion and belief are different states of mind … and the
section prescribes distinct subject matters of suspicion on the one hand and
belief on the other.”76 Their Honours observed that the “facts which can
reasonably ground a suspicion may be quite insufficient reasonably to ground a
belief, yet some factual basis for suspicion must be shown.”77
90 That statement recognises, rather than excludes as the SNSW appears to
contend, the proposition that facts which can reasonably ground a suspicion
may be sufficient reasonably to ground a belief. It will turn on the facts of each
case. As much is apparent as I have sought to explain from Bales v Parmeter
and Williams. As was said in George v Rockett, when used in a composite
phrase such as that in s 99(1)(a) (suspects on reasonable grounds), suspicion
“requires the existence of facts which are sufficient to induce that state of mind
in a reasonable person”.78
91 Although I accept that in Bales v Parmeter Jordan CJ spoke in terms of the
police officer “proving that he, with reasonable cause suspected …”, the
outcome of such a factual finding was to establish “reasonable and probable
cause” for arresting and imprisoning the defendant. It is plain that his Honour
was of the view that if the police officer proved the relevant suspicion was held,
that would demonstrate the relevant belief to ground a finding of “reasonable
74 Macfarlan JA (Beazley P and Barrett AJA agreeing) reached the same conclusion in relation to the present form of s 99 in Lule at [62] – [66]; see also per Beazley P at [2] in relation to s 99(1)(b).75 O’Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1997] AC 286 at 291, per Lord Steyn (Lords Goff of Chieveley, Mustill and Hoffmann agreeing).76 At 115.77 Ibid.78 Ibid at 112; see also New South Wales v Smith (2017) 95 NSWLR 662; [2017] NSWCA 194 (NSW v Smith) at [122] per McColl JA.
and probable cause” to which his Honour referred three years later in
Mitchell.79
92 The position is made even plainer in Mason and Brennan JJ’s reasons in
Williams from which it is apparent that the information held in the case of an
arrest on suspicion based on reasonable grounds (now of course the language
of s 99(1)(a)) will, where there is evidence to the effect to which their Honours
referred, sustain a finding of reasonable and probable cause to prosecute, that
is to say, to charge a person.
93 On the SNSW’s submission, and the primary judge’s reasons, no arrest which
conformed either to the common law test of “arrest without warrant on
suspicion on reasonable grounds of commission of a felony” or the like s 99(1)
(a) requirement, could be an arrest with “reasonable and probable cause” for
the purposes of the tort of malicious prosecution. The position may differ, of
course, as the prosecution is maintained. This is because, as explained in A v
NSW,80 an action for malicious prosecution has a temporal element, and
necessarily directs attention to the material the prosecutor had available for
consideration when deciding whether to maintain the prosecution.
94 The proposition that there is a different state of mind to charge a person from
the state of mind warranting a person being arrested (whether or not with a
warrant) is inconsistent with the authorities to which I have referred.
95 Moreover, as a matter of principle it does not, in my mind, withstand scrutiny.
This is particularly so when it is recognised that the purpose of arrest is to
charge the person arrested, that is to say, to set the processes of the criminal
law in motion.
96 In my view the primary judge fell into error in drawing a distinction between the
state of mind to arrest and the state of mind to prosecute.
Context: previous cases
97 The SNSW relies upon a number of cases decided under previous statutory
iterations of the power of arrest to contend that case law did not establish as
broad a proposition as that for which Mr Robinson contends.
79 At 469.80 At [59].
98 The SNSW contended that Gleeson CJ’s reasons in Walsh,81 decided when
the statutory power of arrest was found in Crimes Act, s 352(2), were
consistent with its submission that the arresting officer did not have to intend to
charge the person at the time of the arrest.
99 In Walsh, the police officers who arrested the appellant at the direction of a
senior officer did not charge him immediately because they were waiting for the
senior officer to arrive. They expected the senior officer both to question and
charge the appellant. Gleeson CJ held that “the question whether if they had
regarded it as necessary or appropriate to do so, they could have obtained
enough information to charge the appellant themselves, was not explored in
evidence”.
100 The Court of Criminal Appeal heard argument on the appeal to the effect that
on the facts as found there had been an unlawful arrest or detention of the
appellant and that, in those circumstances, the trial judge should have
exercised a discretion to reject evidence of admissions the appellant was said
to have made.
101 Gleeson CJ rejected the appellant’s submission that it was unlawful for the
police officers to arrest him if they did not have sufficient knowledge or
information about the crimes of which he was suspected to charge him then
and there. His Honour said82 in the passages on which the SNSW relied:
“The appellant was arrested without warrant, but he was reasonably suspected of having committed offences. The officer in charge of the investigation into the shooting on the night of the 11 April, who was apparently also investigating earlier armed robberies, obtained the assistance of other police officers to effect the actual arrest of the appellant. There is no reason to consider that this is either unusual or irregular.
…
However, the delay that occurred in the present case was not one which, in my view, was shown to involve a contravention of the relevant statutory requirements. … It should also be noted that the police officers, whose evidence was accepted, were adamant in their denials that the appellant was being held solely for questioning.”
81 (Samuels JA and Studdert J agreeing.)82 At 8 – 9.
102 The SNSW contends that if Mr Robinson’s submissions were correct, the
absence of an intention on the part of the junior officers to charge the appellant
should have been fatal to the lawfulness of his arrest.
103 I would not accept that submission. First, immediately preceding the first
passage quoted by the SNSW, Gleeson CJ observed that “[a]s the High Court
pointed out in Williams …, and as this Court has pointed out on numerous
occasions, it is of the utmost importance that police officers pay proper regard
to their obligation to take an arrested person before a court or justice as soon
as practical.” As is apparent from the passage I have quoted, his Honour also
referred to the evidence the trial judge accepted from “the police officers [who]
were adamant in their denials that the appellant was being held solely for
questioning (cf Williams 161 CLR 278 at 313)”.
104 In the passage to which Gleeson CJ referred, Wilson and Dawson JJ
emphasised the common law obligation that an arrested person should be
taken before a justice as soon as is reasonably possible and that neither the
common law nor s 34A(1) of the Justices Act 1959 (Tas) there under
consideration permitted delay merely for the purpose of further investigation
either of the offence for which the person was arrested or of any other offence
or offences. That statement was preceded by their Honours’ statement on the
previous page of Williams that, “there must be reasonable time to formulate
and lay appropriate charges for the purpose of bringing a person before a
justice.”83 It is clear that Gleeson CJ was accepting that the junior officers had
not arrested the appellant to interrogate him, and expected the senior officer to
charge him. The intention to charge the appellant was held contemporaneously
with the appellant’s arrest, albeit it was held by the senior officer.
105 Gleeson CJ’s reasons also have to be understood in the context of the facts
more fully set out in Samuels JA’s reasons. As his Honour explained, the
senior officer gave evidence that when he arrived at Flemington police station
where the appellant was being held, he had already decided to charge him with
two of the charges of armed robbery upon which he was ultimately arraigned.
In Samuels JA’s view,84 applying the doctrine of principal and agent, there was
83 At 312.84 At 24.
no reason why the senior officer’s “reasonable suspicion that the appellant had
committed two armed robberies should not be attributed to the arresting police
so as to make the arrest lawful.” His Honour added that if the doctrine were to
be extended to circumstances such as those before the court, “the arresting
officers ought to be put in possession of the details of the charge before they
are dispatched to take up the suspect; or they should be in the position to
obtain those details immediately after the arrest has been made.”
106 Next, the SNSW submits that in Clyne v New South Wales85 this Court had
rejected the proposition for which Mr Robinson contends. In Clyne,
Macfarlan JA rejected a submission by Ms Clyne to the effect that the trial
judge had erred in rejecting her submission that she had been wrongfully
arrested because those who arrested her did not intend to take her before an
authorised officer to be dealt with according to law but, rather, had arrested her
for the purpose of questioning.86 Macfarlan JA held that the trial judge had not
erred as s 352(2), Crimes Act, as in force at the time of Ms Clyne’s arrest (15
October 2003), “neither explicitly nor implicitly authorised arrests only if they
were effected for the purpose of taking the person arrested before an
authorised Justice.”87
107 Macfarlan JA also held that “[c]onsistently with ss 356C and D, the arresting
officer’s intent at the time of arrest might lawfully be only to question the person
and deal with him or her as required by s 356C(4), that is, release the person
or bring him before an authorised Justice.”
108 Macfarlan JA’s conclusion was, as the SNSW accepts, reached without
reference to the authorities on which Mr Robinson relies. However, in reaching
this conclusion, his Honour agreed with the view to like effect expressed by
Adams J in Director of Public Prosecutions v Nicholls.88
109 In DPP v Nicholls, Adams J accepted that s 352(2) of the Crimes Act qualified
the common law principle “that there is no power to detain a citizen for the
purpose of questioning him or her, still less that the intention to do so could
85 [2012] NSWCA 265.86 At [62] – [64] (Campbell and Meagher JJA agreeing).87 At [63].88 [2001] NSWSC 523; (2001) 123 A Crim R 66 (DPP v Nicholls) at [15] – [16].
justify a delay in bringing the arrested person before a justice in as a short a
time as is reasonably practicable.”89 His Honour referred to passages in
Williams as supporting that proposition.90 However, Adams J reached his
conclusion that this principle did not apply on the facts he was considering by
reference to Pt 10A of the Crimes Act.91
110 In DDP v Nicholls, Adams J appears to have accepted the DPP’s submission
that Mr Nicholls had been detained under s 356C in Pt 10A of the Crimes Act
(substantively, relevantly, in the same terms as s 114 of LEPRA) by reason of
the expanded definition of “under arrest” in s 355 (cf s 110(2) LEPRA). It was in
that context, as I understand Adams J’s reasons, that his Honour held such an
arrest might lawfully be for the purposes of investigation. It was that reasoning
which Macfarlan JA applied in Clyne.92
111 However, after DPP v Nicholls was decided, the Court of Criminal Appeal
reached a contrary conclusion in R v Dungay.93 In that case, Ipp AJA held that
an arrest solely for investigative purposes was unlawful. In the course of doing
so, his Honour held that lawful detention for the purposes of investigation
pursuant to Pt 10A of the Crimes Act was dependent upon lawful arrest having
been effected, referring to s 356B(1)(a), s 356C(1) and s 356C(2).94 It does not
appear that R v Dungay was drawn to the Court’s attention in Clyne. It is
directly contrary to the conclusion Adams J reached in DPP v Nicholls. This
court will follow decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal unless convinced
they are plainly wrong.95 In my view R v Dungay was not “plainly wrong”,
rather, it was correct. Regrettably, it does not appear to have been drawn to
the court’s attention in Clyne. It follows, in my view, that Clyne was decided per
incuriam and should not be followed.
89 At [8].90 Per Mason and Brennan JJ at 295; per Wilson and Dawson JJ at 306.91 Part 10A was inserted in 1997: Crimes Amendment (Detention after Arrest) Act 1997, Sch 1(4).92 DPP v Nicholls also appears to have been a very different case factually to Clyne having regard to the police officer’s evidence as to why he placed Mr Nicholls “in custody”: see [3] – [5], [14]. It was for that reason that Adams J had regard to the expanded definition of “under arrest”. In Clyne, there was no doubt that Ms Clyne had been arrested as that term is ordinarily understood: see Clyne at [6].93 [2001] NSWCCA 443; (2001) 126 A Crim R 216.94 At [28] – [29] (Studdert and James JJ agreeing).95 Daw v Toyworld (NSW) Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 25; (2001) 21 NSWCCR 389 at [70] per Heydon JA (Priestley and Sheller JJA agreeing).
112 The SNSW also relied upon Dowse as having been incorrectly decided
because the Court was not referred to Clyne. As I have earlier explained (at
[55]-[57]), I disagree with the SNSW’s submissions concerning Dowse
independently of the fact Clyne was not referred to. Having regard to my
conclusion concerning Clyne, the failure to refer to it in Dowse cannot advance
the SNSW’s case.
113 What is apparent from an examination of the authorities throughout the various
iterations of the statutory power to arrest without warrant is that where the
requirement to take person arrested before a justice or an authorised officer is
limited by words such as “as soon as practicable”96 or “without unreasonable
delay”97 it cannot be extended to provide time for interrogation.
114 Contrary to Clyne and DPP v Nicholls, and as I have already explained, that
decision cannot be reached insofar as Pt 9 of LEPRA is concerned, unless
there has been a lawful arrest pursuant to Pt 8.
Context: the LEPRA Amendment Act
115 Finally, the SNSW contended that if there were any doubt about its
submissions concerning the text and previous authorities, such doubt was
dispelled by the context provided by the LEPRA Amendment Act which
introduced the current form of s 99 and subsection (3) into s 105. It relied, in
this respect, on the Second Reading Speech to the LEPRA Amendment Act
and on a report by the former shadow Attorney General, Mr Andrew Tink, and
the former police minister, the Honourable Paul Whelan,98 which it contended
were extrinsic materials legitimately to be taken into account in construing
s 99(1), LEPRA.
116 In my view, whatever use may be made of the Tink/Whelan report, it should be
noted, as the SNSW acknowledges, for its statement that “[t]he intent of the
[proposed] legislation is not to allow police the power to arrest in order to
investigate”.99 Somewhat inconsistently with this observation, in the next
paragraph the authors refer to the then proposed s 99(1)(b)(v) (which was
96 Section 34A(1), Justices Act 1959 (Tas).97 R v Bathgate (1946) 46 SR 281 at 283 per Maxwell J, referred to with approval in R v Walsh per Samuels JA.98 Review of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) 2002 [sic], Report Part 1 – Section 99, (25 October 2013) (Tink/Whelan Report).99 At page 4.
ultimately enacted) as having “been drafted in such a way to allow police to
arrest to obtain property, without conferring a wider power allowing police to
arrest for the purpose of investigation.” Elsewhere, the Tink/Whelan report
states that subsection 3 of s 105 was to be included “for abundant caution and
transparency”.100
117 In addition, the SNSW relies on the Second Reading Speech to the LEPRA
Amendment Act in which the premier, the Hon Mr Barry O’Farrell, described its
purpose as being “to ensure that police have clear, simple and effective powers
of arrest to protect the community”.101
118 In reliance on these extrinsic materials, the SNSW submits that the “features”
of the new section 99 as compared to its predecessor sat uneasily with a
continued insistence that the purpose of arrest must be to bring the arrested
person before an authorised officer as soon as reasonably practicable, all the
more so when s 99 was “now linked more strongly to the investigative
provisions in Pt 9 by the presence of s 99(4)”.
119 For the reasons I have earlier given, the pathway to Pt 9 lies in there having
been a lawful arrest under Pt 8.
120 The extrinsic material to which the SNSW refers, does not, in my view, assist
its submissions. In any event, it should be borne in mind that such material
“cannot be determinative: it is available as an aid to interpretation” and cannot
displace the text but can illuminate its meaning.102 In my view the extrinsic
materials to which the SNSW refers cast no light which supports its
submissions.
Conclusion
121 In NAAJA v NT,103 the plurality described as “an obvious application of the
principle of legality that clear words are required if a statute is to authorise
holding an arrested person in custody for a purpose other than for the purpose
of charging that person and bringing him or her before a justice of the peace or
100 At page 7.101 New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 30 October 2013 at 25092; see also the Tink/Whelan report at pp 2, 3 and 6.102 NAAJA v NT at [86] per Gageler J; see also at [229] per Nettle and Gordon JJ.103 At [23].
court as soon as is practicable if he or she is not earlier released on bail or
unconditionally.” In my view, such clear words are not found in the LEPRA.
122 The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant
provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the
provisions of the statute.104 While the text is both the starting and the end
point,105 the meaning of the provision must be determined “by reference to the
language of the instrument viewed as a whole”.106
123 While it has been said that “the context, the general purpose and policy of a
provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than
the logic with which it is constructed”,107 in the case of s 99 both its text, logic
and context, as well as the overall logic of the LEPRA support Mr Robinson’s
contention.
124 As is apparent from the textual analysis of the LEPRA, in particular s 99,
nothing in the LEPRA expressly requires the police to charge a person arrested
without a warrant. But that must occur at some stage. The SNSW accepts that
that obligation is embedded in the s 99(3) requirement to take a person before
an authorised officer, unless the person is released. As I have said, that
interpretation is also supported by s 107 which is found in Pt 8.
125 Further, nothing in s 99 expressly permits the police to interview the person
arrested without warrant to determine whether he or she committed the offence
referred to in s 99(1)(a). The s 99(1)(b)(iii) power to make inquiries as to the
arrested person’s identity “if it cannot be readily established or if the police
officer suspects on reasonable grounds that identity information provided is
false”, would presumably permit asking questions of the arrested person, but
confined to the subject of the power.
126 The only ability to detain and interview the arrested person to “investigat[e] …
the person’s involvement in the commission of an offence”108 is found in Pt 9.
104 Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28 (Project Blue Sky) at [69] per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ.105 Consolidated Media Holdings at [39].106 Project Blue Sky, op cit.107 Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos (1955) 92 CLR 390 at 397; [1955] HCA 27 per Dixon CJ.108 LEPRA, s 109(a), s 114(1) and (2).
As I have explained, the route to Pt 9 is found in Pt 8, s 99(4) of which
proceeds on the premise there has been a lawful arrest pursuant to s 99.
127 The consequence is first, that the intention to charge the arrested person must
have been formed at the time of the arrest pursuant to s 99 and, second,
subject to the confined s 99(1)(b)(iii) power, the arrested person cannot be
interviewed in relation to the s 99(1)(a) offence (or any other, I would add out of
abundant caution). Logic dictates that the decision to charge must also have
been made at that time.
128 Constable Smith had not made any such decision. Rather, he had not decided
if Mr Robinson was going to be charged. Consistently with that state of mind,
he did not inform Mr Robinson of the reason for his arrest. He arrested Mr
Robinson in order to interview him in relation to the reported breach of the
AVO.
129 Mr Robinson’s arrest was, accordingly, unlawful.
Orders
130 I propose the following orders:
(1) Appeal allowed.
(2) Set aside the orders of Taylor DCJ and in their place make the following orders:
(a) Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $5000, such judgment to take effect from 3 August 2017;
(b) Defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs.
(3) Respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and the application for leave to appeal.
131 BASTEN JA: On 22 December 2013, the appellant, Bradford James Robinson,
was arrested when he voluntarily attended a Sydney police station in response
to a request from police. The sole question in this case is whether the arrest of
the appellant was lawful in circumstances where the arresting officer conceded
that he did not have an intention to lay charges when he carried out the arrest.
The appellant contends that such an intention was an essential precondition to
a lawful arrest. The State contends that the essential preconditions are to be
found in s 99(1) of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act
2002 (NSW) (“Law Enforcement Act”) and they do not include an intention to
charge.
132 Although the State insisted that the question should be answered by reference
to the terms of the Law Enforcement Act, as is often the case, the statute uses
language having a specific legal meaning which provides essential context in
which to understand its operation.109 It is necessary to start with a correct
understanding of the common law.110 That is not to deny the importance of s 99
of the Law Enforcement Act in identifying the powers of a police officer to arrest
without a warrant. Nor is it to accord pre-emptive force to the principle of
statutory interpretation known as the principle of legality. That principle requires
a clear statement of legislative intent in order to construe a statute as impairing
or overriding a fundamental right or freedom accorded to individuals under the
common law, or as interfering with the general system of administration of law.
133 This was the approach adopted by all members of the majority in the High
Court in considering the scope of police powers in North Australian Aboriginal
Justice Agency, to which further reference will be made below.
134 The need to identify relevant common law principles arises, in further part,
because the Law Enforcement Act specifically addresses the relationship
between its provisions and the common law in s 4:
4 Relationship to common law and other matters
(1) Unless this Act otherwise provides expressly or by implication, this Act does not limit:
(a) the functions, obligations and liabilities that a police officer has as a constable at common law, or
(b) the functions that a police officer may lawfully exercise, whether under an Act or any other law as an individual (otherwise than as a police officer) including, for example, powers for protecting property.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1) and subject to section 9, nothing in this Act affects the powers conferred by the common law on police officers to deal with breaches of the peace.
109 CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 at 408 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ); [1997] HCA 2.110 Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278 at 304 (Wilson and Dawson JJ); [1986] HCA 88; North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd v Northern Territory (2015) 256 CLR 569; [2015] HCA 41 at [222] (Nettle and Gordon JJ).
135 All these matters aside, it is necessary to identify the scope and operation of
the common law powers of a constable to carry out an arrest without warrant in
order to test the appellant’s description of the limitation upon which he relies.
Without undertaking that exercise it is not possible to say whether the statute
varies the limitation, either expressly or by implication. The fact that it does not
do so expressly will be unsurprising if the limitation does not arise in the terms
contended for.
136 The conclusion reached below is that in legal terminology “arrest” is generally
used to identify that deprivation of liberty which is a precursor to the
commencement of criminal proceedings against the person arrested, and
which may be justified as necessary for the enforcement of the criminal law.
There is no indication in the Law Enforcement Act that it is used in any other
sense. Accordingly, an arrest without warrant in exercise of the power
conferred by s 99(1) of the Law Enforcement Act is not a valid arrest unless
carried out for that purpose.
Arrest under the general law
(i) scope of powers
137 The common law accepted that a police constable had power to arrest and
detain a person without warrant upon holding a reasonable suspicion that the
person was committing or had committed a felony. Other persons could arrest
in such circumstances, but the arrest would only be lawful if the person
arrested had in fact committed the offence.111 The power, even for a police
officer, to arrest without warrant for a lesser offence depended upon statute
rather than the common law.
138 That power has long since been extended to cover other offences, in the
process providing a statutory basis for the common law powers of arrest. As
the categorisation of crimes as felonies and misdemeanours has been
abandoned it is more accurate to speak of general law powers, rather than
common law powers. Thus, s 352 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), as enacted,
provided (not for the first time):
Apprehension of offenders
111 Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 596 (Lord du Parcq).
352 (1) Any constable or other person may without warrant apprehend,
(a) any person in the act of committing, or immediately after having committed, an offence punishable, whether by indictment, or on summary conviction, under any Act,
(b) any person who has committed a felony for which he has not been tried,
and take him, and any property found upon him, before a Justice to be dealt with according to law.
(2) Any constable may without warrant apprehend,
(a) any person whom he, with reasonable cause, suspects of having committed any such crime,
(b) any person lying, or loitering, in any highway, yard, or other place during the night, whom he, with reasonable cause, suspects of being about to commit any felony,
and take him, and any property found upon him, before a Justice to be dealt with according to law.
139 The predecessor to s 352 was s 429 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of
1883 (46 Vic. No.17), which provided:
Apprehension of Offenders and Search Warrants
429. Every constable or other person may without a warrant apprehend any person in the act of committing or immediately after having committed an offence punishable whether by indictment or on summary conviction under this or any other Act and take such person together with any property found upon him before a Justice to be dealt with according to law—And may in like manner apprehend and deal with any offender who has committed a crime punishable by death or penal servitude and for which he has not been tried—And every constable may without warrant apprehend and in like manner deal with any person whom he with reasonable cause suspects of having committed any such crime….
140 Those provisions expanded the common law power of a constable, and indeed,
in subs 352(1), the powers of other persons. The power to arrest without
warrant on suspicion in subs 352(2) extended to the same crimes, namely
statutory offences and felonies. Nevertheless, this was not a codification of the
law relating to arrest. For example, it said nothing about how an arrest was to
be carried out; there was no reference to the need to communicate the
intention to arrest and, if the person does not submit, to at least touch the
person.112 Nor, importantly for present purposes, was there any reference in
these sections to the obligation of the arresting officer to notify the person of
the reason for the arrest.
112 Alderson v Booth [1969] 2 QB 216 at 221 (Lord Parker CJ).
141 What must be conveyed to the arrestee is not necessarily the charge, but the
conduct in respect of which the person is being arrested. Thus, in Christie v
Leachinsky, Lord Simonds stated that “if a man is to be deprived of his freedom
he is entitled to know the reason why.”113 Lord Simonds continued:
“If, then, this is, as I think it is, the fundamental rule, what qualification if any must be imposed upon it? The cogent instances given by Lawrence LJ are conclusive that an arrest does not become wrongful merely because the constable arrests a man for one felony, say murder, and he is subsequently charged with another felony, say manslaughter. … It is clear that the constable has not been guilty of an illegal arrest, if he reasonably suspected that murder had been done. Again, I think it is clear that there is no need for the constable to explain the reason of arrest, if the arrested man is caught red-handed and the crime is patent to high Heaven. Nor, obviously, is explanation a necessary prelude to arrest where it is important to secure a possibly violent criminal. … These and similar considerations lead me to the view that it is not an essential condition of lawful arrest that the constable should at the time of arrest formulate any charge at all, much less the charge which may ultimately be found in the indictment. … It leaves untouched the principle, which lies at the heart of the matter, that the arrested man is entitled to be told what is the act for which he is arrested. The ‘charge’ ultimately made will depend upon the view taken by the law of his act. In ninety-nine cases out of hundred the same words may be used to define the charge or describe the act, nor is any technical precision necessary: for instance, if the act constituting the crime is the killing of another man, it will be immaterial that the arrest is for murder and at a later hour the charge of manslaughter is substituted. The arrested man is left in no doubt that the arrest is for that killing.”
142 As was made clear in Christie, the underlying principle was one that might
today be described as procedural fairness. It was necessary to explain the
reason both to justify the deprivation of liberty and to allow the person an
opportunity to provide an immediate explanation to allay the suspicion
underlying the arrest.
143 The case law accepted that s 352 of the Crimes Act represented an expansion
of common law powers of arrest without warrant, and not their displacement. In
one such case, Clarke v Bailey,114 the plaintiff sued for damages for an unlawful
arrest and search. He was found to have been lawfully arrested, but was
subsequently taken to a hotel and searched without lawful authority. The Full
Court upheld the jury’s award of damages in respect of the post-arrest conduct.
The Court stated:115
113 Christie at 592.114 (1933) 33 SR (NSW) 303 (Davidson J, Street CJ and James J agreeing).115 Clarke at 309.
“Section 352 of the Crimes Act … provides that any constable may, without warrant, apprehend any person whom he, with reasonable cause, suspects of an offence punishable on summary conviction, and take him and any property found upon him before a justice to be dealt with according to law.
At common law it was compulsory for a constable, in order to justify an arrest, to shew that he had taken the arrested person without delay, and by the most direct route, before a justice, unless some circumstances reasonably justify a departure from these requirements …. And, in my opinion, the effect of the section is merely to reinforce the common law principle, and is not intended to give the constable discretion in the matter except to the same extent as existed before.”
144 Authority for the common law constraint was found in Wright v Court (1825).116
It has been affirmed in various jurisdictions over the years.117 It is sufficient for
present purposes to note that Clarke v Bailey was applied in Bales v
Parmeter,118 Jordan CJ stating:119
“The jury found that there was an arrest at the flat and an imprisonment at the police station. Accepting those findings, it is impossible, on the defendants’ own evidence, to escape the conclusion that any such restraint on the plaintiff’s liberty was, not for the only purpose for which in the circumstances it could have been justified – that of taking her before a magistrate to be charged and dealt with according to law – but for the purpose of asking her questions or making investigations in order to see whether it would be proper or prudent to charge her with the crime. If a person has been arrested, and is in [the] process of being brought before a magistrate questioning within limits is regarded as proper in New South Wales – indeed, within very narrow limits, it is regarded as proper in England; but a police officer has no more authority to restrain the liberty of a suspected person for the purpose, not of taking him before a magistrate, but of interrogating him, than he has of restraining the liberty of a person who may be supposed to be capable of supplying information as a witness.”
The reasoning in Bales v Parmeter was expressly approved by the High Court
in Williams v The Queen.120
145 As will be discussed below, the Law Enforcement Act varies the constraints
imposed on police by these authorities. However, consistently with the
appellant’s submissions, there is support in Clarke and Bales v Parmeter for
the view that the arresting officer must have had an intention at the time of
arrest of taking the plaintiff before a magistrate, or the arrest would have been
invalid.
116 (1825) 4 B&C 596; 107 ER 1182.117 See Gillies, The Law of Criminal Investigation (Law Book Co, 1982), p 185.118 (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182 at 189 (Jordan CJ, Stephen J and Street J agreeing).119 Bales at 190.120 Williams at 293 (Mason and Brennan JJ), 306-307 (Wilson and Dawson JJ); [1986] HCA 88.
(ii) the inconsistency challenge
146 Counsel for the State submitted that there is an internal inconsistency or
incoherence in this approach. That is because the power of arrest under s 99
of the Law Enforcement Act is expressly conditioned upon a reasonable
suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence, or as it was
earlier described in s 352 of the Crimes Act, the person should “with
reasonable cause” suspect that the person has committed the offence. On the
other hand, it is now generally accepted that, to lay a charge, an informant
must have reasonable and probable cause to believe that a prosecution would
be likely to succeed. That language is derived from an element of the tort of
malicious prosecution, although absence of reasonable and probable cause
alone will not establish liability for the tort.121 However, if that be the test to be
satisfied before a charge can be laid, it is a higher test than the requirement of
reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offence, which is sufficient for a
valid arrest. It would render the law incoherent, it was submitted, if two differing
standards were to be applied to the same activity (arrest) in order for it to be
lawful. It is, perhaps, curious that this potential anomaly has not been squarely
addressed in the cases dealing with the common law power.
147 The leading case in Australia, prior to the extensive statutory amendments in
the last three decades expanding the powers of police to interrogate and
investigate following an arrest, was Williams v The Queen. Of the three
judgments in Williams, Gibbs CJ took a more liberal approach to the powers of
police than did other members of the Court. Nevertheless, the Chief Justice
concluded that there was “no power to detain a citizen merely for the purpose
of questioning him”;122 rather, “[t]he power given by the common law, and by
[statute], to arrest a person reasonably suspected of having committed a crime
is given for the purpose of enabling that person to be brought before a justice
as soon as is reasonably practicable so that he may be dealt with according to
law.”123 He accepted, however, that the police had broad powers of
investigation within such a temporal framework, so long as the period of
reasonable delay was not exceeded.124
121 A v State of New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; [2007] HCA 10 at [1].122 Williams at 283.123 Williams at 284-285.124 Williams at 285.
148 Mason and Brennan JJ rejected the proposition adopted by the Tasmanian
Court of Criminal Appeal that it must be lawful “to continue detention for a
reasonable period to enable investigating officers to establish with some
precision the charge or charges upon which the accused is to be presented to
the justice and what evidence there is to support any such charges.”125 Their
joint reasons continued:126
“Nor is there any reason to think that, in general, an arresting police officer would be unable properly to make a complaint or to lay an oral information until he had had an opportunity to question the person arrested. In the ordinary case of an arrest on suspicion, the arresting officer must have satisfied himself at the time of the arrest that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting the guilt of the person arrested …, although the grounds of suspicion need not consist of admissible evidence …. If the arresting officer believes the information in his possession to be true, if the information reasonably points to the guilt of the arrested person and if the arresting officer thus believes that the arrested person is so likely to be guilty of the offence for which he has been arrested that on general grounds of justice a charge is warranted, he has reasonable and probable cause for commencing a prosecution: see Mitchell v John Heine & Son Ltd;127 Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain;128 Glinski v McIver.129 There is no practical necessity to construe the words ‘as soon as is practicable’ … so as to authorize the detention by the police of the person arrested for the purpose of questioning him or conducting inquiries with his assistance.”
149 Mitchell, Brain and Glinski were all cases involving the tort of malicious
prosecution; they were dealt with in some detail in A v State of New South
Wales,130 another case dealing with malicious prosecution and not unlawful
arrest. In effect the reasoning of Mason and Brennan JJ acknowledged the
theoretical discrepancy between the respective tests for arrest and laying a
charge, but rejected it as a basis for extending the powers of police to arrest
without being in a position to lay a charge.
150 Mason and Brennan JJ in Williams also adopted the following statement from
Lord Porter in John Lewis & Co Ltd v Tims:131
“Those who arrest must be persuaded of the guilt of the accused; they cannot bolster up their assurance or the strength of the case by seeking further evidence and detaining the man arrested meanwhile or taking him to some spot where they can or may find further evidence.”
125 Williams at 291, quoting Underwood J in the court below.126 Williams at 300.127 (1938) 38 SR(NSW) 466 at 469.128 (1935) 53 CLR 343 at 382.129 [1962] AC 726 at 766-767.130 A at [64]-[81].131 [1952] AC 676 at 691; Williams at 297.
151 John Lewis v Tims involved an arrest by shop detectives of two customers who
were believed to have stolen goods, the arrest taking place after they had left
the shop. The shop detectives returned with them to the shop in order to allow
a senior person in management to decide what steps should be taken, the
decision being to hand them over to the police to pursue charges. The House
of Lords rejected the proposition that they were to be taken before a justice
immediately or forthwith, accepted that the requirement was to take them
before a justice as soon as reasonably practicable, and held that there was no
breach of that standard involved in taking them back to a responsible officer,
who might then deliver them to the authority of the police. Being an arrest by
private citizens, the validity of the arrest presumably turned on whether a theft
had been committed.
152 The second joint judgment in Williams, that of Wilson and Dawson JJ, also
addressed the potential inconsistency between allowing an arrest on the basis
of reasonable suspicion and, in effect, requiring that the arresting officer be in a
position to proceed immediately to lay a charge. The joint reasons stated:132
“This being the purpose of arrest, any delay in bringing a person under arrest before a justice, even if it is to effectuate some other purpose such as the questioning of that person in order to dispel or confirm the suspicion which was the basis of the arrest, is to defeat, however temporarily, the true purpose. Where no delay is involved, there can, of course, be no objection to the occasion of the arrest and subsequent detention being used for the purpose of further investigation of the offence in question or, for that matter, any other offences …. But to conduct an investigation which does not cut across the purpose for which a person is held under arrest is one thing; to disregard that purpose in order to carry out an investigation is another thing, however much the further investigation may be otherwise necessary or desirable.”
153 Wilson and Dawson JJ joined with Mason and Brennan JJ in rejecting the
approach adopted in England of allowing a period in which to obtain evidence
which may be necessary to formulate a charge, concluding:133
“There is no real protection for the individual in any formula which says that the police may not detain an arrested person longer than is necessary to enable them to prefer a charge. Obviously there must be reasonable time to formulate and lay appropriate charges for the purpose of bringing a person before a justice. The common law allows time for this and it is covered by the words ‘as soon as is practicable’. But it is something quite different to say that the police should be able to detain an arrested person to enable them, by further investigation, to gather the evidence necessary to support a charge.”
132 Williams at 306.133 Williams at 312.
(iii) rationale as to purpose of arrest
154 It therefore appears from the cases that, at least in Australia, under general law
principles, an arrest must be carried out for the purpose of taking the person
before a court or justice as soon as reasonably practicable. As explained in
Williams by Wilson and Dawson JJ, the rationale for the principle is as
follows:134
“A person who is arrested may be detained only for the purpose of bringing him before a justice (or nowadays before some other person with power to deal with him) to be dealt with according to law. For arrest is the beginning of imprisonment and, whilst it is recognized that imprisonment before trial may be necessary in the administration of criminal justice, it must be justified in accordance with the law. There must be a charge and if the person charged can establish his entitlement to bail and can furnish it, the law requires that he be released subject to any conditions which might be imposed upon him. … The point at which an arrested person is brought before a justice upon a charge is the point at which the machinery of the law leading to trial is put into operation. It is the point from which the judicial process commences and purely ministerial functions cease.”
155 It does not follow that the person carrying out the arrest must personally intend
to lay a charge; an expectation that others will do so may be sufficient. In
Williams itself, the suspect was arrested in Scottsdale, a town in northern
Tasmania and detained until senior officers came from Launceston. He was
then taken by police vehicle to Launceston. Having been arrested at 6am at
Scottsdale, he arrived at Launceston at about 11am and could reasonably
have been taken before a magistrate at about 2.15pm. The further conduct of
interviews thereafter which led to his appearance being delayed until the
following day rendered the detention unlawful for the additional period.
156 In John Lewis v Tims, it does not appear that the arresting store security
officers were those responsible for laying the charges. Similarly, in relation to
police, in Regina v Walsh135 the offender was arrested at about 3pm in relation
to a shooting which had occurred the previous day. The arrest was carried out
by police officers under the instruction of a senior officer, Detective Sergeant
Rees, who informed them of his suspicions but not the detail of the specific
offences. Walsh was taken to a police station and the senior officer notified.
Had Detective Sergeant Rees driven directly to the police station, he would
have arrived at about 5.30pm; however, he travelled first to another area to 134 Williams at 305.135 Unrep, 18 October 1990, NSW CCA (Gleeson CJ, Samuels JA and Studdert J).
endeavour to arrest a suspected co-offender, arriving at the police station
where Walsh was being held at about 8.15pm. Gleeson CJ stated:
“It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that it was unlawful for the police officers to arrest him if they did not have sufficient knowledge or information about the crimes of which he was suspected to charge him then and there. I cannot agree. The appellant was arrested without warrant, but he was reasonably suspected of having committed offences. The officer in charge of the investigation … obtained the assistance of other police officers to effect the actual arrest of the appellant.
…
There was no attempt at the hearing to investigate the question whether, apart from the absence of Detective Sergeant Rees, and apart also from the desire of the arresting officers to leave it to him to lay the charges, it would have been practicable to take the appellant before a court or justice sooner than he was in fact so taken, that is to say, at 10am on the following day.”136
157 It must therefore be concluded, for the reasons set out by Wilson and Dawson
JJ in the extract at [152] above, that an arrest can only lawfully be carried out
for the purpose of bringing the suspect before a justice to be dealt with
according to law. It does not follow, however, that the arrest is invalid if the
arresting officer does not at the time of the arrest have the state of mind
necessary to lay charges, so long as a superior does. This approach is
illustrated by the cases which refer to detention following an arrest becoming
unlawful where the arrest has been carried out “otherwise for a lawful
purpose”.137 To similar effect, the Supreme Court of South Australia in Drymalik
v Feldman138 stated:
“We think that the appellants had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the plaintiff had committed the offence for which the appellants purported to arrest him, and, if he had been taken before the justice without unnecessary delay, the plaintiff would have had no ground of complaint. But if the purpose of the arrest was to afford an opportunity for questioning, then the arrest was unlawful, and, be that how it may, the detention whilst the plaintiff was being questioned was unlawful.”
158 These cases, and the reasoning in Williams, explain why a reasonable
suspicion must be accompanied by an intention to charge the person being
arrested, but need not be accompanied by a clearly formulated charge, and
may be subject to contingencies. The officer must give a reason for the arrest,
but this should refer to the suspected conduct rather than an offence. The
136 The judgment, pp 8-9; see also pp 14-15 (Samuels JA) and p 16 (Studdert J agreeing with the Chief Justice).137 Bales v Parmeter at 189.138 [1966] SASR 227 at 235 (Napier CJ, Bright J and Mitchell J).
specific state of mind of the arresting officer will depend on the facts of the
case; in one case the existence of an offence may be in doubt, in another the
identity of the offender. The purpose must be to lay a charge within a
reasonable time frame to allow the suspect to seek his liberty, if he or she
wishes.
159 To similar effect, this Court in Zaravinos v State of New South Wales139 held
that s 352 of the Crimes Act did not displace general principles with respect to
powers of arrest; rather, in providing that a constable is to take the arrested
person and any property before an authorised justice, the section used
language reflecting the common law and “must be understood as indicating the
only proper purpose for which an arrest may be carried out.”
160 At least in a formal sense, the incoherence of a dual test of intention for a
lawful arrest may be resolved by treating the obligation to take the person as
soon as practicable before a justice as a separate obligation imposed by law
once an arrest has taken place, rather than a requirement that the arresting
officer have a particular subjective intention. On that understanding, an arrest
based on reasonable suspicion would remain valid, and the detention lawful,
until the reasonable period had elapsed. From that point, if the suspect had not
been taken before a justice (or released), the detention would become
unlawful. It would also follow that, if the person were released before the
reasonable period expired, there would be no unlawful detention. However,
that conclusion is not consistent with the passages from Bales v Parmeter and
Drymalik v Feldman set out above; the reason is that the purpose of
commencing the criminal process attaches at the moment of arrest.
Effect of statutory amendments
(i) the power of arrest
161 The first step in considering the effect of relevant statutory provisions is to note
that the common law referred to above developed against the background of
statute, including provisions equivalent to s 352 of the Crimes Act, to which
reference has already been made.
139 (2004) 62 NSWLR 58; [2004] NSWCA 320 at [23] (Bryson JA, Santow JA and Adams J agreeing).
162 The replacement of s 352 of the Crimes Act with the current s 99 of the Law
Enforcement Act came about through a series of stages, which included the
addition of various provisions to the Crimes Act before the relevant parts
(Pts 10 and 10A) were removed. Thus, ss 114 and 115 of the Law
Enforcement Act were formerly ss 356C and 356D of the Crimes Act. Although
the stages may be relevant in considering the authorities, it is sufficient to
consider the provisions of the Law Enforcement Act in their present form, as
applicable to the present case. Section 99 relevantly provides:
99 Power of police officers to arrest without warrant
(1) A police officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person if:
(a) the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the person is committing or has committed an offence, and
(b) the police officer is satisfied that the arrest is reasonably necessary for any one or more of the following reasons:
…
(iv) to ensure that the person appears before a court in relation to the offence,
…
(ix) because of the nature and seriousness of the offence.140
…
(3) A police officer who arrests a person under this section must, as soon as is reasonably practicable, take the person before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law.
Note. The police officer may discontinue the arrest at any time and without taking the arrested person before an authorised officer—see section 105.
(4) A person who has been lawfully arrested under this section may be detained by any police officer under Part 9 for the purpose of investigating whether the person committed the offence for which the person has been arrested and for any other purpose authorised by that Part.
163 There are several aspects of this provision to be noted. First, s 99(1)(a)
provides that a police officer may arrest a person if he or she “suspects on
reasonable grounds that the person … has committed an offence”. That
language does not suggest any variation in principle from the language of
s 352, as enacted in 1900 (or indeed 1883).
164 Section 99(1)(b), however, imposes a constraint on the use of the power of
arrest without warrant. It requires that the officer be satisfied that the arrest is
140 These were the paragraphs satisfied in the present case; the full provision is set out at [15] above.
“reasonably necessary” for one or more of a number of reasons. Those
reasons provide, in effect, that the police functions of law enforcement would
not be sufficiently carried out by steps short of arrest, which, with respect to the
commencement of proceedings, would commonly mean the issue of a court
attendance notice. Thus, a failure to consider such an alternative course
resulted in a finding that an arrest was unlawful in State of New South Wales v
Smith.141 There is, however, no reason to derive from the existence of the
additional constraint an implied variation of the long standing requirement that
an arrest must be a preliminary step in invoking the criminal process.
165 Indeed, this purpose is expressly referred to in s 99(3), which imposes a
requirement that the officer who arrests a person must, as soon as reasonably
practicable, take the person before an authorised officer to be dealt with
according to law. This statement of the general law obligation is not in the form
of a condition precedent involving a state of mind of an arresting officer.
Rather, it constitutes a statement of obligation which is engaged by the
carrying out of an arrest.
166 On the other hand, that is the form which the obligation has taken since the
enactment of the Crimes Act in 1900 (and in 1883); it has never been
expressed as the required purpose of the arrest, absent which an arrest will be
invalid. Nevertheless, throughout that period, the existence of such a purpose
has been held to be a condition of validity. The terms of s 99(3) do not suggest
a change in the law in this regard.
167 Further, if the effect of the new legislative form were to remove the
conventional purpose underlying a valid arrest, it has been done without any
indication as to any alternative purpose or rationale. If the State were correct in
submitting that the general law obligation has been removed, it must be
sufficient that the officer have, as a sole purpose of the arrest, the questioning
of the suspect or the taking of some other step in an investigation into the
suspected offending.
168 Emmett AJA has referred to the Parliamentary Review of the Law Enforcement
Act undertaken in 2013. Part 1 of the Report of the Review proposed
141 [2017] NSWCA 194 (McColl JA, Leeming JA and Sackville AJA agreeing with additional observations).
amendments to s 99, including the insertion in what is now s 99(1)(b) of
additional matters justifying an arrest. Under a subheading, “to obtain property
in the possession of the person that is connected with the offence” (a reason
now to be found in par (b)(v)), the following comment appears:
“The Parliamentary Counsel has advised that if the provision were drafted to allow police to lawfully arrest a suspected offender in order to ‘obtain’ evidence, this would effectively give police the power to arrest without warrant for the purpose of investigating an offence. The intent of the legislation is not to allow police the power to arrest in order to investigate. It is noted that the proposed section 99(4) clarifies that once a person has been lawfully arrested the person may be detained under Part 9 of LEPRA for investigative purpose.” [Emphasis added.]
(ii) express powers to investigate – Part 9
169 The extrinsic materials therefore provide express support for the view that the
legislation was not intended to vary the pre-existing requirement as to the
purpose for which an arrest might be carried out. The extrinsic materials do,
however, draw attention to provisions in Pt 9 of the Law Enforcement Act which
permit further investigation subsequent to an arrest. Part 9 is headed
“Investigations and questioning”. The explanatory note to the Bill stated that the
provisions in Pt 9 “re-enact existing NSW legislation”. That is so: equivalent
provisions were found in Pt 10A of the Crimes Act, introduced in 1997. Section
114 now provides that a police officer may detain a person “who is under
arrest” for the investigation period provided for by s 115. The officer may detain
the person “for the purpose of investigating whether the person committed the
offence for which the person is arrested.” Where the officer forms a reasonable
suspicion of the person’s involvement in another offence, that offence may also
be investigated. Section 115 identifies a period which commences “when the
person is arrested” and extends for a reasonable period not exceeding six
hours (which may be extended by a detention warrant).
170 In their terms, these provisions permit investigation following arrest, whilst the
suspect is in detention. However, they assume that an arrest has taken place.
Further, s 111 states that Pt 9 applies “to a person … who is under arrest by a
police officer for an offence”. There must be a valid arrest before the powers in
Pt 9 are engaged.
171 Not only do the powers not expressly affect the power of arrest, s 113 provides
(in part):
113 Effect of Part on other powers and duties (cf Crimes Act 1900, s 356B)
(1) Existing powers relating to arrest and other matters
This Part does not:
(a) confer any power to arrest a person, or to detain a person who has not been lawfully arrested, or
(b) prevent a police officer from asking or causing a person to do a particular thing that the police officer is authorised by law to ask or cause the person to do (for example, the power to require a person to submit to a breath analysis under Division 2 of Part 2 of Schedule 3 to the Road Transport Act 2013), or
(c) independently confer power to carry out an investigative procedure.
172 It is tolerably clear from these provisions that there is no intention to affect the
conditions of a valid arrest or otherwise affect the power to arrest. Part 9
confers powers which are only engaged upon the carrying out of a valid arrest.
173 In short, neither the Act nor the extrinsic materials provide any basis for
concluding that an arrest is now something other than a preliminary step to the
commencement of the criminal process and a step to be taken only for the
purpose of commencing the criminal process.
(iii) a codification of preconditions to power of arrest
174 The State nevertheless contends that s 99(1) provides a complete statement of
the preconditions to a valid arrest. As the second limb of subs (1) (namely par
(b)) imposes an additional constraint, the primary condition for the carrying out
of an arrest must be the existence of a reasonable suspicion that the person
has committed an offence. However, that proposition, if correct, would remove
the fundamental rationale for the power to arrest without warrant, namely that
imprisonment before trial may be necessary in the administration of criminal
justice, but is only justified for the purpose of laying a charge and thus
commencing the criminal process. To accept that submission would be
inconsistent with principle and would create a basis for depriving a person of
his or her liberty which has not hitherto existed.
175 There is one further matter relied on by the State. Although s 99(3) requires
that the person be taken as soon as practicable before an authorised officer to
be dealt with according to law, that obligation is now qualified by the conferral
of a power on a police officer to “discontinue an arrest at any time”.142 That step
may be taken either because the person is no longer a suspect or because it is
no longer necessary to bring the person before an authorised officer in order to
deal with the relevant offence.
176 It may be conceded that this power qualifies the obligation to commence the
criminal process by taking the person before a magistrate. However, it is
unclear why the conferral of an additional power to release following an arrest
should be read as allowing an arrest for a purpose other than the conventional
purpose.
177 Subject to consideration of authorities dealing with the amended statutory
provisions, the better view is that there is nothing in Pt 8, read with Pt 9, of the
Law Enforcement Act which should be taken to broaden the power of arrest in
a manner inconsistent with its long acknowledged purpose as part of the
administration of criminal justice.
(iv) case law
178 It will be necessary to refer to decisions dealing with the New South Wales
legislation below; before taking that step it is appropriate to address the
approach adopted by the High Court in North Australian Aboriginal Justice
Agency with respect to legislation in the Northern Territory which, while not
following the form of the Law Enforcement Act, adopted a similar structure.
179 Section 123 of the Police Administration Act (NT) conferred power on a police
officer to, “without warrant, arrest and take into custody any person where he
believes on reasonable grounds that the person has committed, or is
committing or is about to commit an offence.” (It is doubtful that the additional
words “and take into custody” add anything to the concept of “arrest”.) Section
137(1) provided that “a person taken into lawful custody … shall … be brought
before a justice or a court of competent jurisdiction as soon as is practicable
after being taken into custody, unless he or she is sooner granted bail under
the Bail Act or is released from custody.” (This provision reflects s 99(3) and
s 105 of the Law Enforcement Act.) That obligation was subject to a power,
142 Law Enforcement Act, s 105(1).
with respect to certain defined offences, to hold the person “for a reasonable
period” to enable the person to be questioned or investigations to be carried
out.143 With respect to relatively minor “infringement notice offences” the person
could be held in custody for a period up to four hours or, if intoxicated, for a
longer period until the police officer believed the person was no longer
intoxicated.144
180 The case involved a challenge to the constitutional validity of those provisions.
The challenge was rejected. Relevantly for present purposes, the joint reasons
of French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ stated:
“[24] Absent s 137, the common law would have imposed the like requirement that a person arrested under s 123 be taken before a justice of the peace as soon as practicable after arrest. At common law delay, even if for some purpose such as questioning or to dispel or confirm the suspicion which was the basis of the arrest, would defeat the true purpose of arrest.145 Custody after arrest is an executive measure not an exercise of judicial power. As Wilson and Dawson JJ also observed in Williams:146
‘The point at which an arrested person is brought before a justice upon a charge is the point at which the machinery of the law leading to trial is put into operation. It is the point from which the judicial process commences and purely ministerial functions cease.’
The common law was modified by s 137(2) and (3) to enable post-arrest custody to be extended to ‘a reasonable period’ for the purpose of questioning the person arrested or for further investigations in relation to offences attracting custodial penalties. Similar modifications have been made in all Australian jurisdictions.147 That modification reflected recommendations made by the Australian Law Reform Commission … in its interim report entitled Criminal Investigation published in 1975.”
181 Nettle and Gordon JJ stated:
“[223] Here, s 137(1) reflects the basic common law tenet that a person must be taken before a court as soon as reasonably practicable following arrest. A statute that departs from that fundamental position would need to be expressed in unmistakably clear terms.”
Nettle and Gordon JJ concluded that “the outer limit of four hours set by
s 133AB(2)(a) is without prejudice to the requirement, which applies under
s 137(1) to a person arrested under s 123 for an infringement notice offence, 143 Police Administration Act, s 137(2) and (3).144 Police Administration Act, s 133AB(2).145 (1986) 161 CLR 278 at 306 per Wilson and Dawson JJ.146 (1986) 161 CLR 278 at 306.147 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), ss 23C‒23DA; Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), ss 114‒121; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Q), ss 403‒411; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA), s 78; Criminal Law (Detention and Interrogation) Act 1995 (Tas), s 4; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 464A‒464B; Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA), ss 140‒142; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 212.
that the person be taken before a justice or court as soon as practicable after
arrest unless sooner released ….”148
182 It is convenient to turn to authorities in this Court. Clyne v State of New South
Wales149 dealt with provisions in Pt 10A of the Crimes Act as they operated in
March 2003. (Relevant provisions of the Law Enforcement Act did not come
into effect until 1 December 2005.150) At that stage, (a) s 352(2) was in its
historical form, including the obligation to take the arrested person before an
authorised justice to be dealt with according to law; (b) s 356B reflected the
current s 113; (c) s 356C reflected the current s 114, and (d) s 356D reflected
the current s 115.
183 The critical reasoning in Clyne, at [63], commenced with the proposition that
“s 352(2) … neither explicitly nor implicitly authorised arrests only if they were
effected for the purpose of taking the person arrested before an authorised
Justice.” If that were literally true, it is a proposition which ignores the continued
operation of the common law obligation (which was at least reflected in the
language of s 352(2)) and is inconsistent with the approach adopted by the
High Court in Williams, as well as earlier decisions of this Court in Clarke v
Bailey and Bales v Parmeter.
184 The reasoning in Clyne continued in relation to s 352(2):
“It simply required the constable to in fact take the arrested person before a court. However if some other statutory provision came into operation before the arrested person was taken before a court, the obligation to take the arrested person before a court might be displaced. Consistently with ss 356C and D, the arresting officer's intent at the time of arrest might lawfully have been only to question the person and deal with him or her as required by s 356C(4), that is, release the person or bring him or her before an authorised Justice.”
185 Section 356C (now s 114) dealt with detention after arrest for the purpose of
investigation and is conditioned upon the person already being under arrest.
For the reasons set out above, in my view the approach adopted in Clyne in
relation to these sections is inconsistent with basic principle and therefore
untenable.
148 North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency at [230].149 [2012] NSWCA 265.150 Part 8A came into effect in December 2004.
186 A different approach was adopted by a differently constituted court in Dowse v
New South Wales.151 It was no doubt unfortunate that Dowse was argued
before Clyne, but judgment was delivered after Clyne. Clyne was not referred
to in Dowse, which considered the relevant provisions of the Law Enforcement
Act as in force in March 2007. I stated (with the agreement of McColl JA and
Hoeben JA):
“[26] While it is true, as Lord Hope explained in O'Hara, that there are two elements to be satisfied for a warrantless arrest to be valid, namely an honestly held suspicion in the mind of the arresting officer and information in the mind of the arresting officer which when objectively assessed provides reasonable grounds for the suspicion, these are not abstract and independent elements. They justify a deprivation of liberty which in turn is part of an ongoing process by which the person arrested must be taken before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law: Law Enforcement Act, s 99(4). In other words, the arrest is a first step in the process by which the person is to be made answerable for the offence, the commission of which the officer suspects. The same underlying purpose is to be found in s 99(3) which limits the circumstances in which an officer may arrest a person ‘for the purpose of taking proceedings for an offence against the person’; it thus assumes that such a purpose must underlie a valid arrest.
[27] In other words, an arrest will not be valid merely because the officer believes that an offence has been committed, in circumstances where the officer has no intention of charging the person or having the person charged with that offence. If that were not so, the legal requirement that the person arrested be informed of the true grounds of the arrest would be rendered nugatory: see State of New South Wales v Delly [2007] NSWCA 303; 70 NSWLR 125 at [9]-[11] (Ipp JA), adopting the reasoning of Lord Simonds in Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 591-592. …”
187 In favour of the reasoning in Clyne, it may be said that the issue now being
addressed appears to have been directly raised in Clyne, but not in Dowse.
Nevertheless, the approach adopted in Dowse is to be preferred; the result is
consistent with that in relation to similar legislation upheld in North Australian
Aboriginal Justice Agency.
(vi) other forms of arrest
188 The foregoing discussion has not addressed the common law power of an
officer or a private person to carry out an arrest to prevent, or prevent the
continuation of, a breach of the peace. Neither party suggested that any
assistance was to be obtained from consideration of that power.
151 [2012] NSWCA 337; 226 A Crim R 36.
189 Nor has consideration been given to the handful of particular statutes which
permit an arrest without warrant, but for a purpose other than commencing the
criminal process. Thus, s 25E of the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002
(NSW) permits the arrest of a person suspected of a terrorist offence “for the
purpose of investigative detention” under Part 2AA of that Act. Schedule 3 to
the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) provides for a police officer to arrest the
driver of a vehicle in relation to testing for alcohol and drug use for the purpose
of the person providing a blood sample. The prescription of a specific purpose
of arrest renders these statutes irrelevant; at least neither party suggested that
such provisions assisted in determining the present issue.
Application of principles
190 The appellant presented himself at Sydney City Police Station in response to
attempts by police to contact him, of which he had learned indirectly. He was
immediately arrested by Constable Smith. Constable Smith was aware of the
history of police concerns, which included a complaint that the appellant had
breached an apprehended violence order. The trial judge was satisfied by
Constable Smith’s evidence that at the time of the arrest he held a reasonable
suspicion that the appellant had committed an offence, for the purposes of
s 99(1)(a) of the Law Enforcement Act. The judge also accepted Constable
Smith’s evidence that he thought it reasonably necessary to arrest the
appellant pursuant to s 99(1)(b)(iv) and (ix).
191 Further, the judge stated:152
“[50] Constable Smith gave his reasons for the arrest, exhaustively, and a purpose of investigation was not one of them. It was not put to him that the purpose of the arrest was to investigate the offence or question Mr Robinson. While such a purpose would be improper there was nevertheless no evidence to support it. I am not persuaded that it was a purpose of Constable Smith.”
192 On the other hand, the judge also accepted Constable Smith’s concession that,
at the time of the arrest, he had not determined whether he would charge
Mr Robinson.153 The case was run on the basis that whatever Constable
Smith’s purpose in carrying out the arrest (assuming he had one) it did not
involve taking Mr Robinson before a court to be dealt with according to law,
because he then had no intention to charge him. Although not challenged in 152 Robinson v State of New South Wales [2017] NSWDC 289.153 Robinson at [23] and [38].
this Court, it is convenient to set out the brief evidence which supported that
finding. In the course of his cross-examination, Constable Smith gave the
following evidence:154
“Q. So there is a procedure in place to deal with persons such as Mr Robinson who turn up voluntarily at a police station?
A. If we don’t believe there’s enough to arrest them under [the Law Enforcement Act] then they can be dealt with through the voluntary way.
Q. You didn’t believe there was enough to charge him, did you?
A. No.
Q. So what, you could have held him, do you believe, for hour upon hour?
A. No.
Q. Day upon day?
A. No, that’s not what part 9 allows me to do.
Q. But you could have interviewed this man without arresting him.
A. I believe there was enough to arrest him. I believe I had grounds under [the Law Enforcement Act] to arrest him.”
193 This evidence, which was accepted, was sufficient to allow the judge to form
the view that Constable Smith was stating that he believed paragraphs (a) and
(b) of s 99(1) were satisfied, and that that was sufficient to allow an arrest and
thereby engage the powers under Pt 9 of the Act.
194 For the reasons set out above, that was not sufficient to allow an arrest in the
absence of any intention at the time of carrying out the arrest to charge the
appellant and take him before a justice (or bail officer) to be dealt with
according to law. It will often be possible to infer the relevant purpose without
evidence of a subjective intention; however, given the express evidence of an
absence of such an intention, that inference was not drawn. There was, in
effect, no purpose of commencing the criminal process contemporaneous with
the arrest.
195 It follows that the judgment dismissing the claim for wrongful imprisonment
must be set aside. The trial judge having contingently assessed damages in an
amount of $5,000, it is appropriate that Mr Robinson have judgment against the
State for that amount, together with the costs of the trial, to be assessed on a
154 Tcpt, 01/08/17, p 53(5).
basis appropriate to such an award. The State should pay his costs of the
proceedings in this Court.
196 EMMETT AJA:
Introduction
On 22 December 2013, the appellant, Mr Bradford Robinson (Mr Robinson),
voluntarily attended Day Street Sydney City Police Station in response to a
request from the police that he do so. He was immediately arrested by
Constable Adam Smith (Constable Smith). Following his arrest, Mr Robinson
was interviewed by Constable Smith. He was then released without charge,
having been detained in custody for a period of approximately one hour and 18
minutes.
197 Mr Robinson sued the respondent, the State of New South Wales (the State),
in the District Court, claiming damages for alleged wrongful arrest and false
imprisonment by Constable Smith. Under s 8(1) of the Law Reform (Vicarious
Liability) Act 1983 (NSW) (the Vicarious Liability Act), the State is vicariously
liable for torts committed by a person in the service of the Crown in right of
New South Wales. At all times, Constable Smith was, by the operation of s 6 of
the Vicarious Liability Act, deemed to be a person in the service of the Crown.
The State is liable to be sued pursuant to s 5 of the Crown Proceedings Act
1988 (NSW).
198 On 3 August 2017, for reasons published on that day, a judge of the District
Court (the primary judge) directed the entry of judgment for the State and
ordered Mr Robinson to pay the State’s costs of the proceedings. By Notice of
Appeal filed on 1 March 2018, pursuant to leave granted by this Court on
20 February 2018, Mr Robinson appeals from the orders made by the primary
judge.
The Arrest
199 It was common ground that, at the time of the arrest, Constable Smith had not
formed the intention to charge Mr Robinson with any offence. However, the
primary judge found that, when Constable Smith arrested Mr Robinson, he
suspected that Mr Robinson had committed an offence under s 14 of the
Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), namely, breach of
an apprehended violence order (the Relevant Offence). His Honour also
found that Constable Smith had reasonable grounds for that suspicion and that
Constable Smith was satisfied that the arrest was reasonably necessary:
to ensure that Mr Robinson appeared before a court in relation to the Relevant Offence; and
because of the nature and seriousness of the Relevant Offence.
200 Having made those findings, the primary judge held that s 99 of the Law
Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) (the Law Enforcement Act) afforded the State a lawful justification for Mr Robinson’s
arrest. I shall refer to s 99 in some detail below. None of the above findings is
challenged by Mr Robinson in the appeal.
The Appeal
201 The only question raised by the appeal is whether s 99 of the Law Enforcement
Act afforded a defence to a claim by Mr Robinson against the State that he was
wrongly arrested and falsely imprisoned, in circumstances where Constable
Smith, as the arresting officer, had not, at the time of arrest, formed an
intention to charge Mr Robinson. Before dealing with that question, it is
desirable to say something about the provisions of the Law Enforcement Act.
The Law Enforcement Act
202 Section 4(1) of the Law Enforcement Act provides that, unless the Act
otherwise provides expressly or by implication, the Act does not limit:
the functions, obligations and liabilities that a police officer has as a constable at common law; or
the functions that a police officer may lawfully exercise whether under any act or any other law as an individual, otherwise than as a police officer, including, for example, powers for protecting property.
203 Further, s 4(2) provides that nothing in the Law Enforcement Act is to affect the
powers conferred by the common law on police officers to deal with breaches
of the peace. In addition, s 7 relevantly provides that nothing in the Law
Enforcement Act is to limit any functions, or prevent a police officer from
exercising any functions, that the police officer has under the Law Enforcement
Act.
204 Relevantly for present purposes, s 99 provided that a police officer may,
without a warrant, arrest a person if, first, the police officer suspected, on
reasonable grounds, that the person was committing, or had committed, an
offence, and secondly, the police officer was satisfied that the arrest was
reasonably necessary for either of the following reasons:
to ensure that the person appears before a court in relation to the offence;
because of the nature and seriousness of the offence.
205 Section 99(3) of the Law Enforcement Act provided that a police officer who
arrests a person under s 99 must, as soon as is reasonably practicable, take
the person before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law. An
authorised officer for the purpose of the Law Enforcement Act is a magistrate,
a registrar of the Local Court or an employee of the Attorney General’s
Department authorised by the Attorney General as an authorised officer for the
purposes of the Law Enforcement Act. Section 105 relevantly provided that the
police officer could “discontinue the arrest” at any time without taking the
arrested person before an authorised officer. The use of the term “discontinue”
in relation to arrest is slightly unusual. Ordinarily, the term “arrest” would refer
to the apprehension of a person, or a ship, by legal authority or the seizure or
laying hold on of a person155. Once that has occurred, the arrest would be
complete. The word “arrest” appears to be used in s 105 as referring to the
continued “detention” of a person once arrested.
206 Under s 99(4) a person who has been lawfully arrested, in compliance with
s 99, may be detained by any police officer under Pt 9 of the Law Enforcement
Act for the purpose of investigating whether the person committed the offence
for which the person has been arrested and for any other purpose authorised
by Pt 9. Part 9, which consists of ss 109 to 132 inclusive, deals with
“investigations and questioning”. Division 2 of Part 9 of the Law Enforcement
Act, which consists of ss 114 to 121 inclusive, deals with “investigation and
questioning powers” where persons are under arrest. The State places some
store on the provisions of Pt 9, in so far as they are referred to expressly in
s 99.
155 See Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.
207 Under s 114(1), a police officer may, in accordance with s 114, detain a person
who is under arrest for the investigation period provided for by s 115. The
investigation period begins when the person is arrested and ends at a time
that is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, but does not exceed
the period of six hours or such longer period as may be provided for under a
detention warrant issued under s 118. Under s 114(2), a police officer may so
detain a person for the purpose of investigating whether the person committed
the offence for which the person is arrested. If, while a person is so detained
under s 114(3), the police officer forms a reasonable suspicion as to the
person’s involvement in the commission of any other offence, the police officer
may also investigate the person’s involvement in that other offence during the
investigation period for the arrest. Section 114(4) requires that the person must
be released within the investigation period or brought before an authorised
officer or court within that period or as soon as is practicable after the end of
that period.
208 Under s 116, in determining what is a reasonable time for the purposes of
s 115, all the relevant circumstances of the particular case must be taken into
account. Relevantly, for present purposes, the following circumstances are to
be taken into account:
whether the presence of a person is necessary for the investigation;
the number, seriousness and complexity of the offences under investigation;
the time taken to complete any searches or other investigative procedures that are reasonably necessary to the investigation, including any search of the person or any other investigative procedure in which the person is to participate; and
the time required to carry out any other activity that is reasonably necessary for the proper conduct of the investigation.
209 Section 117 provides that certain times are not to be taken into account in
determining how much of an investigation period has elapsed. For example,
any time that is reasonably required to convey the person from the place where
the person is arrested to the nearest premises where facilities are relevantly
available; any time reasonably spent waiting for the arrival of police officers;
any time that is reasonably spent waiting for facilities complying with s 281 of
the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) to become available; any time that is
required to allow the person to communicate with a friend, relative, guardian,
independent person, Australian legal practitioner or consular official; and any
time that is required to allow such a friend, relative, guardian independent
person, Australian legal practitioner or consular official to arrive at the place
where the person is being detained, is not to be taken into account.
210 Section 118 relevantly provides that a police officer may, before the end of the
investigation period, apply to an authorised officer for a warrant to extend the
maximum investigation period beyond six hours. An authorised officer must not
issue a warrant to extend the maximum investigation period unless satisfied
that:
the investigation is being conducted diligently and without delay;
a further period of detention is reasonably necessary to complete the investigation;
there is no reasonable alternative means of completing the investigation; and
circumstances exist in the matter that make it impracticable for the investigation to be completed within the four hour period.
Relevant Common Law Principles
211 Mr Robinson placed great reliance on the common law purpose of arrest. The
statutory requirement to bring a person arrested before a justice or a court, as
soon as is practicable, has its origins in the common law. Accordingly, s 99 of
the Law Enforcement Act must be construed in the context of the general law
in relation to the arrest of a citizen, against the background of which it, and its
legislative predecessors, were enacted. Moreover, s 4 of the Law Enforcement
Act specifies that the Act is not to derogate from the functions, obligations and
liabilities of police officers under the common law, which arguably includes the
common law purpose of arrest. Therefore, before addressing the detail of the
parties’ submissions, it is desirable to describe the nature and substance of the
common law in relation to arrest, as well as its interaction with s 99 of the Law
Enforcement Act.
212 Under the common law, a person cannot be deprived of personal liberty except
to the extent, and for the time, that the law prescribes. The authority to hold the
arrested person in custody is limited to the time necessary to bring the person
before a justice or a court for the purpose of charge and prosecution. Thus, a
police officer who arrests a person must bring the arrested person before a
justice or a court in as short a time as is reasonably practicable, unless the
person is earlier released unconditionally or on bail.156
213 Under the common law, a police officer does not have power to arrest a person
merely for the purpose of questioning that person157. That is because arrest is
the beginning of imprisonment and, whilst it is recognised that imprisonment
before trial may be necessary for the administration of criminal justice, it must
be justified in accordance with the law. There must be a charge and if the
person charged can establish entitlement to bail and can furnish bail, the law
requires that the person be released, subject to any conditions that might be
imposed upon the person. The point at which an arrested person is brought
before a justice or court upon a charge is the point at which the machinery of
the law leading to trial is put into operation. It is the point from which the judicial
process commences and purely ministerial functions cease. Therefore, any
delay in bringing an arrested person before a justice or a court, even if it is to
effectuate some other purpose, such as the questioning of that person in order
to dispel or confirm the suspicion that was the basis of the arrest, is to defeat,
however temporarily, the true purpose158.
214 An arrest may be lawful under the common law even if the police officer who
effects the arrest does not immediately charge the arrested person because he
or she is waiting for a superior officer to arrive, who, the arresting officer
expects, will then charge the arrested person. Moreover, it is not unlawful for
such an arrest to occur, notwithstanding that the arresting officer does not have
sufficient knowledge or information about the crime or crimes of which the
arrested person was suspected, and to charge the person then and there, if the
superior officer had such knowledge and information and was merely obtaining
the assistance of the inferior officer to effect the actual arrest. That is because
the reasonable suspicion of the superior officer that the arrested person had
committed offences can be attributed to the arresting officer. On the other
hand, the arresting officer ought to be put in possession of the details of the 156 See Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278 at 292-293; [1986] HCA 88 (Williams); Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 26; [1982] HCA 67.157 See Williams at 305-306; Zaravinos v New South Wales (2004) 62 NSWLR 58; [2004] NSWCA 320 at [37] (Zaravinos).158 See Williams at 305-306.
charge or should be in a position to obtain those details immediately after the
arrest is made159.
215 A police officer who has arrested a person reasonably suspected of having
committed a crime must be allowed time to make such inquiries as are
reasonably necessary either to confirm or to dispel the suspicion upon which
the arrest was based160. Therefore, reasonable time must be allowed for
making a decision to prefer a charge and then preferring the charge.
216 Nevertheless, while the common law allows a reasonable time to formulate and
lay appropriate charges for the purpose of bringing a person before a justice, in
that it must be done “as soon as is practicable”, it is a different matter
altogether to permit a police officer to detain an arrested person to enable the
evidence necessary to support a charge to be gathered by further investigation.
For example, it is one thing to take a suspected shoplifter to an office for the
purpose of getting authority to prosecute. It is another thing to take the suspect
to an office for the purpose of filling in gaps in the evidence161. Such a power,
without limits, could, in cases where the evidence is complex, be used to hold
persons in custody for longer periods than would be consistent with a citizen’s
basic right to freedom and personal liberty162. If the law requires modification in
that regard, that modification should be effected by legislation, not by the
courts, because there must be safeguards, such as in the form of time limits,
and those safeguards must be set with particularity that cannot be achieved by
judicial decision. Legislative change ought to take place against the
background of the common law, which has always viewed detention for the
purpose of investigation as an unwarranted encroachment upon the liberty of
the citizen163.
Legislative History of s 99
217 Before dealing with the construction of s 99 of the Law Enforcement Act
against that common law background, it is necessary to have regard to the
legislative history of s 99. The relevant provisions of the Law Enforcement Act
159 See R v Walsh (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), Gleeson CJ and Samuels JA, 18 October 1990, unrep).160 See Williams at 283-284.161 Ibid at 298.162 Ibid at 289-290.163 Ibid at 312-313.
were preceded by provisions of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (the Crimes Act). Further, s 99, as originally enacted, was subsequently amended. It is desirable
to say something about the various iterations of the provisions.
218 Section 352 of the Crimes Act relevantly provided that any constable was
authorised, without warrant, to apprehend any person whom the constable,
with reasonable cause, suspected of having committed certain offences and to
take the person before an authorised justice to be dealt with according to law.
Section 352 did not purport to be a code or a whole statement of the power of a
constable or other person to apprehend without warrant. There was no
indication in its terms of an intention to displace general principles of law
relating to the exercise of discretionary powers conferred by a statute or by law
relating to powers of arrest. It was not regarded as displacing or being
substituted for the general powers and duties of a person effecting an arrest.
219 Section 352 stated what a constable was to do after apprehending a person,
namely, take the person before an authorised justice. That corresponded with
the common law purpose of arrest and must be understood as indicating the
only proper purpose for which an arrest could be carried out, namely, bringing
the person before a justice or a court for the purpose of conducting a
prosecution. Questioning and other investigation could take place during the
time available between the arrest and when the arrested person was brought
before a justice or a court. However, the time available could not be extended
so as to allow for questioning or other investigation164.
220 Even if the circumstances mentioned in s 352 existed, the lawfulness of an
arrest was examinable, and the arrest was unlawful unless each decision to
arrest was made to give effect to the true, common law purpose of arrest.
Arresting a person for any other purpose was an arrest for an extraneous
purpose and was unlawful165.
221 The same underlying restriction was to be found in s 99(3), as originally
enacted, under which a police officer could only arrest a person “for the
purpose of taking proceedings for an offence against the person”. That is to
say, the provision assumed that that purpose underlay a valid arrest, such that 164 See Zaravinos at [23].165 Ibid at [27].
an arrest would not be valid merely because the officer believed that an
offence had been committed in circumstances where the officer had no
intention of charging the person or having the person charged with that
offence. If it were otherwise, the legal requirement that the person arrested
should be informed of the true grounds of the arrest would be rendered
nugatory166.
222 Section 99 of the Law Enforcement Act was amended by the Law Enforcement
(Powers and Responsibilities) Amendment (Arrest Without Warrant) Act 2013
(NSW) (the Amending Act). The Amending Act was enacted as a result of a
report presented to Parliament following a review of the Law Enforcement Act
commissioned by the Premier of New South Wales (the Parliamentary Report). The authors of the Parliamentary Report were asked to inquire into
and report on the Law Enforcement Act and, in particular, to provide advice on
legislative amendments to ensure that police have clear, effective powers to do
their job and to protect the community.
223 The Parliamentary Report stated that the then current provisions of s 99 were
complicated and difficult to apply and that the lack of clarity around arrest
powers had led to offenders escaping conviction, even in instances where an
arrest had been made in good faith. The Parliamentary Report said that the
authors were mindful that the Premier had requested clear and effective
powers and responsibilities, and that they were of the view that the revised
s 99, as proposed by them, was clearer and simpler and would be easier to
apply in the field. The Parliamentary Report asserted that the proposed
simplification of s 99 would also make the provision more transparent and
would address the community’s expectation for police powers and
responsibilities to be clear and effective.
224 One interpretation that had been propounded was that arrest powers should be
confined to circumstances where an offence was currently being committed or
had just been committed. The Parliamentary Report recommended that s 99(1)
and s 99(2), as originally enacted, be combined into one section to make it
abundantly clear that police could arrest a person for any offence if they
reasonably suspected an offence was being, or had been, committed.166 See Dowse v New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 337 at [25]-[27].
225 The Parliamentary Report referred to concerns that the list of reasons for which
police could arrest without a warrant in the then form of s 99 was not broad
enough to allow police to arrest offenders in order to protect the community
and prevent crime. It confirmed, however, that the intent of the legislation was
not to allow police the power to arrest in order to investigate, although the
proposed s 99(4) clarified that once a person had been lawfully arrested, the
person could be detained under Pt 9 of the Law Enforcement Act for
investigative purposes. Accordingly, the Parliamentary Report said s 99(1)(b)
(v) had been drafted in such a way as to allow police to arrest to obtain
property without conferring a wider power that would allow police to arrest for
the purposes of investigation.
226 The Parliamentary Report did not support the introduction of a general power
of arrest, as preferred by the police, but preferred the current formulation of a
finite power with expanded reasons for arresting a suspected offender. It
supported the inclusion of a power to arrest without warrant if the nature and
seriousness of the offence warranted that course of action. The authors
considered that that provision would give certainty to police to make an arrest
when confronted with sufficient evidence of, for example, a domestic violence
offence. They accepted that international academic research had
demonstrated that arresting domestic violence offenders deterred future
domestic violence offending.
227 The Parliamentary Report reported that the police were of the view that where
a person is fleeing from police, there should be a corresponding power of
arrest if the police reasonably suspect that person of having committed an
offence. The authors were convinced by the argument that were that criterion
to be omitted, then it may invite argument in court that Parliament intended that
police could not arrest a person who was reasonably suspected of committing
an offence who was running from the scene of a crime or from a police officer.
228 The Parliamentary Report concluded that the recommendations made by it, if
implemented, would expand the list of reasons under which a police officer
could arrest. The authors noted that concerns had been raised that increased
arrest rates may also increase remand rates, but also noted that police rejected
such a concern because not all people who are arrested are remanded and
some arrests would be discontinued once the purpose of arrest no longer
existed, in circumstances, for example, where the person’s identity had been
ascertained. The Parliamentary Report said that, for more abundant caution
and transparency, a provision that clearly stated that a police officer could
“discontinue” an arrest should be included, referring to the proposed s 105(3).
229 In his speech on the second reading of the Bill for the Amending Act, the
Premier observed that the “job of frontline police is already hard enough,
without being made harder by having to deal with legal complexities”. The
Premier said that the reforms proposed by the Parliamentary Report could give
the community confidence that police would have the powers they needed to
“keep the peace across the communities of New South Wales". The Premier
said that the new provisions would clarify that police could arrest without a
warrant for any offence that they reasonably suspected a person was
committing or had committed, and that the proposed amended s 99(1)(a) made
that abundantly clear. He said that the proposed amended s 99(1)(b) replicated
and simplified the existing reasons for arrest contained in the previous form of
s 99 and introduced new reasons to arrest without a warrant that, the Premier
said, better reflected the circumstances in which police “are called on to act in
order to keep the community safe”.
230 The Premier also said that under the proposed amended s 99, police would be
able to arrest a suspected offender without a warrant if the person’s
identification could not be readily ascertained by other means or if the officer
suspected on reasonable grounds that identity information supplied was false.
He said that the realities of day-to-day policing were also reflected by the
inclusion of a power of arrest without warrant when a suspected offender who
was fleeing from police or from the scene of a crime. Further, he said, the
proposed amended s 99 clarified that a police officer could arrest a person
without a warrant if directed to do so by another police officer who had reason
lawfully to arrest that person.
231 The Premier also referred to the proposed amendment to make clear that an
arrest may be “discontinued” and the person released without requiring the
person to be brought before an authorised officer, saying that that might occur
when inquiries revealed that the reasons for arrest no longer existed or if the
police decided it was more appropriate to deal with the matter in some other
manner, such as by issuing a penalty notice or Court Attendance Notice.
232 Finally, the Premier said s 99 would be amended to make it clear that a person
who was “lawfully arrested” under s 99 could be detained for the purpose of an
investigation in accordance with Pt 9, an amendment that was intended to
remove uncertainty about whether a person who was otherwise “lawfully”
arrested could be detained for questioning under Pt 9.
Relevant Principles of Construction
233 Clear words are required in a statute before it will be construed as authorising
the holding of an arrested person in custody for a purpose other than for giving
effect to the common law purpose of arrest167. It is of critical importance for the
existence and protection under the law of personal liberty, that the
circumstances in which a police officer may, without warrant, arrest or detain
an individual be strictly confined, plainly stated and readily ascertainable.
Arrest should be reserved for circumstances in which it is clearly necessary
and where it is inappropriate to resort to the power of arrest when the issue
and service of a summons would suffice adequately168.
234 It is improbable that the legislature would overthrow fundamental principles,
infringe rights or depart from the general system of law described above
without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness. To give any such
effect to general words, simply because they have that meaning in the widest,
usual, or natural sense, would be to give them a meaning in a sense in which
they were not really used. Curial insistence on a clear expression of an
unmistakable and unambiguous intention to abrogate or curtail a fundamental
freedom enhances the parliamentary process by securing a greater measure of
attention to the impact of legislative proposals on fundamental rights169.
167 See North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd v Northern Territory of Australia (2015) 256 CLR 569; [2015] HCA 41 at [23].168 See State of New South Wales v Smith [2017] NSWCA 194 (Smith).169 See Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 at 437-438; [1994] HCA 15; Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; [2013] HCA 39 at [310] (Lee).
235 However, while that notion extends to the protection of fundamental principles
and systemic values, it ought not be extended beyond its rationale. Thus, the
notion does not exist to shield those rights, freedoms, immunities, principles
and values from being specifically affected in the pursuit of clearly identified
legislative objects by means that are within the constitutional competence of
the enacting legislature170. That principle of construction is fulfilled in
accordance with that rationale where the objects or terms or context of
legislation make plain that the legislature has directed its attention to the
question of the abrogation or curtailment of the right, freedom or immunity in
question and has made a positive legislative determination that the right,
freedom or immunity is to be abrogated or curtailed171.
Construction of s 99
Submissions
236 Mr Robinson contends that his arrest was unlawful because it was effected for
an extraneous purpose. He asserts that, because the only proper purpose for
the exercise of the power of arrest under s 99(1) is to bring the arrested person
before a justice in order to conduct a prosecution, there is an additional
requirement to those specified in s 99(1), namely, that the arresting officer, or
the officer directing arrest under s 99(2), must hold a positive intention, at the time of the arrest, to charge the arrested person, and that in the absence of
such a positive intention, the arrest will be effected for an extraneous and
unlawful purpose.
237 Mr Robinson contends that, if an arresting officer does not form such an
intention, then that constitutes an arrogation by the police officer to himself or
herself of the power of imprisonment vested only in the judiciary or an
authorised officer. He bases that contention on the proposition that the arrest of
a person is the first step in the process by which the arrested person is to be
made answerable for the offence that the arresting police officer reasonably
suspects the person of committing.
238 Mr Robinson relies on the proposition that a person must not be arrested, and
thereby imprisoned, otherwise than upon the authority of a justice or a court
170 See Lee at [313].171 Ibid at [314].
except to the extent reasonably necessary to bring that person before a justice
or a court to be dealt with according to law172. He asserts that that proposition
holds good even if the matters set out in s 99(1) are strictly satisfied, and that
reasonable satisfaction of the s 99(1)(b) matters cannot exist independently of
the purpose of bringing the arrested person before a justice or a court for the
purpose of conducting a prosecution173.
239 Mr Robinson contends that s 99 does not displace the fundamental purpose of
arrest recognised by the general law and that the provisions of s 99
supplement the general law rather than derogate from it.174 Thus, he contends,
unless the arrest of a person is for the purpose of bringing that person before a
justice or a court and conducting a prosecution, the fact that the purpose of
arrest might be one of those specifically referred to in s 99(1)(b) does not of
itself prevent the arrest from being unlawful. Moreover, he says, if s 99
provided a power of arrest in circumstances where the purpose was not to take
the arrested person before a justice and conduct a prosecution, that would
need to be expressed in clear, unambiguous language175. That is so, he says,
because the allowance of such a power abrogates, or curtails, both the
common law purpose of arrest and the fundamental common law principle of
personal liberty.
240 The State contends that, in circumstances where it is clear that the current
form of s 99 was introduced in order to broaden the powers of police arrest
without a warrant, it is erroneous to assume that s 99 must operate in the same
way as previous iterations176. The State contends that if the effect of the current
form of s 99, properly construed, differs from previous iterations, which have
been construed in previous cases, then the current form must be given effect
according to its terms.
241 The State accepts that an arrest will not be lawful if the purpose of the arrest is
merely for making further inquiries or asking further questions. It also accepts
that an arrested person must be brought before a justice as soon as
172 See Williams at 306.173 See Zaravinos at [37].174 See Law Enforcement Act, s 4.175 See Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562 at 577; [2004] HCA 37.176 See Clyne v State of New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 265.
reasonably practicable. However, the State says the purpose of bringing the
arrested person before a justice as soon as reasonably practicable is more
accurately described as being to bring the arrested person before a justice as
soon as reasonably practicable, if a decision is taken to charge the person.
The State contends that if the purpose is understood in that way, then any
tension between the mental state required for arrest, on the one hand, and the
mental state required for prosecution, on the other, will be removed. That is to
say, while reasonable suspicion is sufficient for a lawful arrest, unless
reasonable and probable cause is acquired before the expiration of the time
within which it is reasonably practicable to bring the arrested person before a
justice, the arrested person must be released without charge. The State
contends that the purpose of arrest understood in that way is consistent with
the requirement that what must be stated to an arrested person at the time of
arrest is not necessarily the precise charge, if any, to be laid, but, rather, the
true ground for the arrest177.
Consideration
242 The task of statutory construction begins with the text of the statute. There are
several textual matters that point away from Mr Robinson's contentions.
243 Section 99(1) specifies, in some detail, the state of mind that a police officer
must hold in order lawfully to arrest a person without warrant. The section
states expressly that a police officer may, without warrant, arrest a person if the
relevant state of mind is shown to have existed. In those circumstances, the
express language of s 99, which does not make any reference to an intention
on the arresting officer’s part to charge the arrested person, is contrary to the
existence of a further requirement as to the state of mind of the arresting police
officer, as posited by Mr Robinson.
244 Mr Robinson’s only response to the above proposition is that it is an
overstatement to observe that the text of s 99(1) does not state the
requirement posited by him. That contention calls for the recognition of an
unexpressed requirement as to the state of mind of a police officer that is in
tension with the state of mind for which express provision is made.
177 See Law Enforcement Act, ss 201(1)(c) and 201(3).
245 Under s 99, it is a condition for a lawful arrest without warrant that the police
officer suspects, on reasonable grounds, that the person is committing or has
committed an offence. Nevertheless, Mr Robinson contends that before
arresting a person without a warrant, a police officer must have reasonable and
probable cause for commencing a prosecution.
246 An arresting police officer will have reasonable and probable cause for
commencing a prosecution if the arresting officer:
believes that information in his or her possession points to the guilt of a person;
reasonably believes the information to be true; and
therefore believes that the person is so likely to be guilty of the offence for which the person has been arrested that a charge is warranted178.
Thus, Mr Robinson’s contention raises the distinction between suspicion, on
the one hand, and belief, on the other.
247 In the case of arrest on suspicion, the arresting police officer must have
satisfied himself or herself, at the time of the arrest, that there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting the guilt of the arrested person. However, the grounds
for the suspicion need not consist of admissible evidence. Suspicion is a state
of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking and the facts that can
reasonably ground a suspicion may be quite insufficient to ground a
reasonable belief. Nevertheless, a suspicion that something exists is more than
a mere idle wondering whether it exists or not and there must be some factual
basis for the suspicion. A suspicion is a positive feeling of actual apprehension
or mistrust, amounting to a slight opinion but without sufficient evidence179.
Consequently, a reason to suspect that a fact exists is more than a reason to
consider the possibility of the existence of the fact. The reason to suspect is
something that, in all the circumstances, would create in the mind of a
reasonable person an actual apprehension or fear of the relevant matter180.
248 However, the objective circumstances sufficient to show a reason to believe
something must point more clearly to the subject matter of the belief than
suspicion of the matter. Belief is an inclination of the mind toward assenting to, 178 See Williams at 300.179 See Lule v State of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 125.180 See George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 112, 115-116; [1990] HCA 26.
rather than rejecting, a proposition, and the grounds that can reasonably
induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave
something to surmise or conjecture181.
249 If a police officer must have reached that higher standard of having reasonable
and probable cause to commence a prosecution before effecting a lawful arrest
without a warrant, as Mr Robinson contends, the mental state necessary for a
police officer to effect a lawful arrest without a warrant is something different
from the mental state expressly referred to in s 99(1)(a), namely, suspicion on
reasonable grounds. There is, therefore, a real tension between the express
words of s 99(1)(a) and the implication for which Mr Robinson contends.
250 Mr Robinson responds to the suggestion of tension or inconsistency between
the state of mind required by s 99(1)(a) and the state of mind required to
commence a prosecution by saying that the distinction is, in practice, unreal.
Thus, he says, there is no reason to think that, in general, an arresting police
officer would be unable properly to make a complaint or lay a charge until the
officer had had an opportunity to question the person arrested.
251 Moreover, while an arrested person must be brought before a justice, the time
needed to bring the arrested person before a justice as soon as reasonably
practicable is such as to allow time to decide whether or not to lay a charge.
That is to say, even if there must be an intention to charge at the time of arrest,
the actual decision to do so is the next step in the process. Thus, the purpose
of bringing the arrested person before a justice as soon as reasonably
practicable should be understood as being bringing the arrested person before
a justice as soon as reasonably practicable if a decision is made to lay a
charge against the person. Understood in that way, any tension between the
mental state required for arrest and prosecution would be resolved.
Reasonable suspicion is sufficient for arrest. If reasonable and probable cause
to commence a prosecution is not reached by the expiry of the time within
which it is reasonably practicable to bring the arrested person before a justice,
the arrested person must be released without charge, as s 105 makes clear.
That understanding is consistent with the fact that what must be stated to an
181 Ibid at 115-116.
arrested person at the time of an arrest is not the precise charge to be laid, if
any, but, rather, the true ground for the arrest182.
252 It is clear from s 105(1) that a police officer may “discontinue” an arrest at any
time. Section 105(2) demonstrates that the discontinuance might be for any
reason, including because it is more appropriate to deal with the matter in
some other manner, such as by issuing a warning or a caution. Section 105(3)
provides expressly that discontinuance may occur despite any obligation on the
part of a police officer to take the arrested person before an authorised officer
to be dealt with according to law. The concept of “discontinuance” of an arrest
is consistent with arrest being a process, which commences at the time when
an arrest begins and continues through the subsequent detention. Thus, it is
the detention that is discontinued.
253 When s 99 is read with s 105, it is clear that an arrested person might or might
not be brought before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law,
depending upon the circumstances. Accordingly, while the arresting police
officer must intend that the arrested person will be brought before an
authorised officer, the police officer is not required to have decided that he or
she will bring the person before an authorised officer for whatever reason.
Those provisions, read together, recognise the kind of uncertainty on the point
that may work on the mind of an arresting officer in the position of Constable
Smith at the time of an arrest.
254 Mr Robinson asserts that such a contention misunderstands the purpose of
s 105(1), which, he says, does no more than make it clear that if a police officer
changes his or her mind about proceeding with the charge originally
contemplated because, for example, the original suspicion has been dispelled
by further investigation, then the officer would be under no obligation to
continue the arrest merely to satisfy the duty imposed by s 99(3) to take the
arrested person before an authorised officer. Mr Robinson’s contention, of
course, assumes the correctness of his basic proposition.
255 Mr Robinson accepts that there is nothing on the face of s 99(1) that expressly
addresses the state of mind of an arresting police officer at the time of the
182 See Law Enforcement Act, ss 201(1)(c) and 201(3).
arrest, but contends that the imposition by s 99(3) of a duty on the police officer
to take the arrested person before an authorised officer to be dealt with
according to law, as soon as reasonably practicable, suggests the additional
requirement posited by him. Mr Robinson says that there can be no occasion
to take the arrested person before an authorised officer unless there is an
intention to charge the person. He also points to the fact that s 99(3) is
consistent with, and has its origins in, the common law.
256 Again, Mr Robinson’s contentions do no more than repeat his basic proposition
that there is an additional requirement that must be met before an arrest is
lawful. The fact that s 99(3) imposes a duty on the police officer to take the
arrested person before an authorised officer as soon as reasonably
practicable, to be dealt with according to law, says nothing about the state of
mind of the arresting police officer at the time of the arrest.
257 It is clear from s 99(4) that a person who has been lawfully arrested under
s 99(1) may be detained under Pt 9 for the purpose of investigating whether
the person committed the offence for which the person was arrested and for
any other purpose authorised by Pt 9. However, it is inconsistent with the
facility for which Pt 9 provides that an arresting officer must, at the time of
arrest, have concluded already that the arrested person will be charged. The
notion underlying s 114(1) is that, following arrest, further investigation may be
required before the commencement of criminal proceedings: the period of
detention may need to be prolonged to permit that to occur. That indicates that,
while the arresting police officer must have the intent to charge, the arresting
officer is not required to have made the decision to do so.
258 While the linking of Pt 9 to s 99 is significant, the arrest must be “lawful”.
Whether or not an arrest is lawful depends upon the correctness of
Mr Robinson’s basic proposition. Mr Robinson contends that the statutory
provision for detention to investigate is not inconsistent with an intention on the
part of the arresting police officer, at the time of the arrest, to charge the
arrested person. By the operation of s 105, the arrested person will be released
if any subsequent investigation dispels the police officer’s original suspicion
that led to the formation of the intention to charge the arrested person. Those
considerations rather support the conclusion that the link between Pt 9 and
s 99 is equivocal as to the question presently under consideration.
259 The State also contends that certain of the reasons specified in s 99(1)(b), for
which a police officer may consider arrest of a person to be reasonably
necessary, are inconsistent with the requirement posited by Mr Robinson. For
example, the State says, the purposes specified in pars (ii), (iii), (v), (viii) and
(ix) are more directed to the investigation of an offence or to the protection of
the public, rather than to laying a charge. The State propounds, by way of
example, the circumstance of a police officer happening upon a person
standing over a body, who, upon seeing the police officer, seeks to flee. It
suggests that that may readily be a circumstance in which the police officer
forms a reasonable suspicion, not necessarily amounting to a positive belief,
that the person committed an offence, such that arrest is necessary to stop the
person’s flight. It would be difficult, the State says, to see how, without further
investigation, the police officer could form a positive belief as to guilt so as to
have reasonable and probable cause to commence a prosecution and
therefore to charge a person. Nevertheless, the purpose of the arrest is not
investigation. Rather, it is one or other reasons of the reasons set out in s 99(1)
(b), depending on the circumstances. Additional information may be required to
take the next step, which is limited by the six hour period in the Law
Enforcement Act. Thus, a balance has been struck by the legislature.
260 Mr Robinson contends that the five reasons in s 99(1)(b) relied upon by the
State are not inconsistent with the existence of the requirement posited by him.
Thus, he says, a power to stop a person fleeing from a police officer is
consistent with an intention to charge, being necessary only if it is proposed by
the police officer to take the person before an authorised officer to answer a
charge. Mr Robinson says that the power to enable inquiries to be made to
establish a person’s identity is not inconsistent with the posited requirement
because it is only necessary to obtain the person’s identity if it is proposed that
the person be charged.
261 Mr Robinson also asserts that the power to obtain property in the possession of
the arrested person that is connected with the offence can only be necessary
for the purpose of securing evidence to be used against the person after a
charge has been laid. Further, the power to protect the safety and welfare of
persons other than the arrested person must, Mr Robinson asserts, be
understood as concerning only those persons connected with, namely
adversely affected by, the suspected offence. He says that the provision is
consistent only with an intention on the part of the arresting officer to hold the
arrested person accountable for the relevant offence. Finally, Mr Robinson
says that the reference to the nature and seriousness of the offence should
properly be regarded as supplementary to the considerations of securing the
person’s attendance before a court and the protection of the safety or welfare
of others. He asserts that it is self-evident that the more serious the offence,
the greater the risk of flight.
262 Mr Robinson asserts that all of the reasons set out in s 99(1)(b) are directed to
the question of whether a Court Attendance Notice would be appropriate or
whether, because of one or more of the considerations in s 99(1)(b), the police
officer concerned could be satisfied that it is “reasonably necessary” to arrest.
He asserts that that approach is consistent with the proposition that arrest
should be reserved for circumstances in which it is clearly necessary and the
proposition that it is inappropriate to resort to the power of arrest when issuing
a Court Attendance Notice would suffice183. Those considerations support the
conclusion that the matters relied on by the State in that regard are also
equivocal as to the question presently under consideration.
263 Consideration of the context provided by the Amending Act, and of the
differences between ss 99 and 105 before and after the amendments effected
by the Amending Act, may be significant. Such a comparison helps to identify
the mischief to which the amendments were directed.
264 First, the former s 99(3), which was expressed as a limitation on the power of
arrest for the purpose of taking proceedings for an offence, has been deleted
and incorporated in s 99(2), which no longer refers to the purpose of taking
proceedings for an offence. That alteration weakens the connection between
the arrest and the taking of proceedings, which lies at the heart of
Mr Robinson’s contentions. It also makes clear that there is a second step 183 See Smith at [102].
required, namely, to decide to charge. The purpose is not to commence
prosecution, since that is a discrete phase.
265 Secondly, the reasons why a police officer may consider the arrest of a person
to be reasonably necessary have been considerably expanded under the new
s 99(1)(b) to include matters that are more directed to the investigation of an
offence or for the protection of the public. That supports the State’s contention
that the common law purpose of arrest, to bring the arrested person before a
justice or court as soon as is reasonably practicable, is but one of a number of
lawful purposes, or reasons, for arrest.
266 Thirdly, if the reason for an arrest is, for example, to establish the identity of
the arrested person rather than to charge the person, that purpose may be
achieved relatively swiftly. The arrest may then be discontinued without
bringing the person before an authorised officer. That would explain the
introduction of s 105(3), as was acknowledged in the Parliamentary Report.
267 Fourthly, the Parliamentary Report referred to the view that the former terms
of s 99 were complicated and difficult to apply and were lacking in clarity,
saying that the proposed amended form of s 99 was intended to be clearer,
simpler and more transparent. The current form of s 99 does not sit easily with
a continued insistence that the purpose of arrest must be to bring the arrested
person before an authorised officer as soon as reasonably practicable,
particularly when s 99 is linked expressly to the investigative provisions in Pt 9
by s 99(4). The recognition of implied limitations, going beyond those expressly
stated in s 99, would sit uneasily with the purpose of simplifying the provision
so that it would be clearer and more transparent. Such considerations militate
against the recognition of an implied limitation to the effect that the arresting
officer must, before arrest, have formed the intention to charge the arrested
person.
268 Mr Robinson contends that the text of s 99 is entirely consistent with the
proposition for which he contends, as is the context in which s 99 was enacted
and subsequently amended. He emphasises that the common law recognises
as the only purposes of arrest and detention the purposes of charging the
arrested person and taking the person before a court. He says that nothing in
s 99 abrogates the right to personal liberty secured by the recognition of those
purposes by the common law. He says that if the State’s contention were
accepted, there would be nothing in ss 99, 105 or the provisions of Pt 9 that
would prevent a person from being subjected to serial arrests in respect of the
same offence despite the fact that, on the occasion of each arrest, albeit that
on such occasions the arrest is effected in good faith, the arresting officer had
formed no intention of laying a charge. He asserts that such an outcome would
be contrary to the fundamental right of personal liberty and at odds with the
only purpose of arrest recognised by the common law.
269 It is difficult to imagine circumstances where there would be serial arrests that
were all effected in good faith. The contention also ignores the fundamental
stance adopted by the State that the current form of s 99 was intended to
modify the common law, to the extent that the common law is inconsistent with
the explicit terms of s 99.
Conclusion
270 The dual requirements of ss 99(1)(a) and 99(1)(b) must be met. However,
arrest is the start of a process that must end within a limited time, either by the
person arrested being taken before an authorised officer or by the person
being released pursuant to s 105. The fact that one of the two possible endings
to the process is laying a charge against the person does not mean that there
must be a positive intent to lay a charge at the beginning of the process.
271 Mr Robinson’s contentions do not grapple with the textual and contextual
matters outlined above but proceed by reference to case law concerned with
other provisions, including earlier iterations of s 99. While such matters may be
relevant to the construction of s 99, to the extent that analogous reasoning is
persuasive or general principle is relevant, the decided cases in relation to
earlier, differently worded provisions are not determinative of the proper
construction of the current form of s 99.
272 The restrictions that the common law places upon the purpose for which an
arrested person may be held in custody may well, on occasions, hamper the
police, sometimes seriously, in their investigation of crime and the institution of
proceedings for its prosecution. That is to say, the jealousy with which the
common law protects the personal liberty of the subject may not assist the
police in the investigation of crime. However, such functions of the police are
carried out in the interests of the community as a whole and not for some
private end. Thus, legislative modification of such principles of the common law
may be seen as reflecting a need that the common law does not meet. The
striking of a balance between personal liberty and the exigencies of the
investigation of crime is nevertheless a function of the legislature, not the
courts. If the legislature considers that it is right to enhance the armoury of law
enforcement, it is for the legislature to prescribe safeguards that might
ameliorate the risk of unconscionable pressure being applied to persons under
interrogation while being kept in custody184. In the absence of precise limits
upon the power of police to detain an arrested person for questioning, the
swing would be too far in favour of increased investigative powers at the
expense of individual freedom185.
273 The principle of the common law, that the freedom of an individual should not
be restricted without a warrant simply for the purpose of investigation, is of
fundamental importance. While s 99 does not modify the common law principle
to the extent contended by Mr Robinson, it has modified the common law to the
extent that there is no longer a requirement that the person be charged. It is
clear that, by amending s 99, the legislature intended to introduce a second
step in the arresting process, the first being to satisfy ss 99(1)(a) and 99(1)(b),
and the second being the exercise of discretion by a police officer when
deciding to charge. In that way, the ultimate purpose of arrest is still to bring
the arrested person before an authorised officer, by laying a charge, and the
arrest cannot be for the purpose of investigation.
274 It follows that the conclusion of the primary judge was not erroneous and s 99
afforded a defence to the State against Mr Robinson’s claim. Mr Robinson’s
appeal should be dismissed. Mr Robinson should pay the State’s costs of the
appeal.
***************
184 See Williams at 296.185 Ibid at 312-313.
Amendments
17 October 2018 - [25] - changed "provides" to "provided"
[36], [115] and footnote 48 - changed "2013 Amendment Act" to "LEPRA
Amendment Act"
[42] - changed "that effect" to "that the effect"
[69] - inserted "(b)" after "99(1)" where cited
[70] - inserted "(1)" between "99(b)"
[77], [80] - changed "has" to "had" in Jordan CJ quote
[80] - changed "an arrest" to "to arrest"
[81] - changed "warrants" to "justifies"
[110] - changed "relatively" to "relevantly"
[114] - removed italics from "and"
[157] - changed "Dawson and Wilson JJ" to "Wilson and Dawson JJ"
[182] - changed "s 365C" to "s 356C"
[189] - inserted "to" after Schedule 3"
[197] - changed "s 8K" to "s 8(1)
[206] - inserted "Part 9 of" "after Division 2 of"
[225] - final sentence - changed "considering" to "conferring"
[259] - final sentence - changed "four hour" to "six hour"
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