' 'i

III

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

STUDY ON

U. S. STMTEGY

AND

NAVAL FORCE REQUIRE}iENTS

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U.S. STRATEGY AI{D NAVAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS

l. The Pol iti""l*l'{il itary Environment of the 1980s and 1990s

A. Assumpt ions About the Global l'ti I ltary Balance

B. Pol itical, Economic and Technological Assumptions

ll. Bases of U.S. Defense Policies

A. U.S. l{ational Aims

B. U.S. t'lational Security Objectives

' C. National Defense pol icy Guidance '

"

l. Sources of Pol icy

2. Strategic Nuclear Forces

3. General Purpose Forces

The Soviet l.lil itary Challenge and tts |4aritime lmpl ications

A. The Soviet Hi 1 i tary Chal lenge

B. Soviet Hi I itary Trends

C. Soviet I'laritime Challenge

D. The Challenge of Soviet Naval Forces (Sea and Air)

Factors in Developing a Haritime Pro"gram

A, Strategic,Considerations

B. Future Technological Developments

C. Vulnerability of Surfbce Ships

D. Role of the Naval Reserves

E. Maritime Forces for Freedom of the Seas

F. Key Points in a itrategy for Serving U.S. Haritime lnterests

G. Cutr,i-]i lable and i'lon-cot ,;rol !eblu Iic,rrrerrtS

H. DoD Program lmpl ications of the i4aritime Strategy

l. From Strategy to Force Structure

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V. Navy Force Bequirements

A, The Navyr s Miss ion

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B. Conduct of l,laval Operations

l. Routihe Forv.rard Deployed Posture.

2. Transition from Routine Forward Deployment posture toldorldr,ride Conf I ict

3, l^iorlclwide Conventional lJar with The Soviet Union

a, Soviet Strategy

. b. U.S. and Allied Strategy and Force Employment

(l) Sea Control

(a) Threat Characteristics that lnfluence theCampa i gn

Area Sea Control 0perations

Local Sea Control operations

l. The Atlantic

2, The Mediterranean Sea

3. The Pacific

4. The lndian Ocean

(2) Power Projection

c. Operational Ernployment of Suirporting Forges.

(l) Naval Reserve and Coast Guard Forces

(z) Al I ied contribution

(l) Land-Based Ai rcraft .

Nuclear l.tar at Sea

Current Net Assessment of Capabilities -- U.S. vs. USSR

l. icrc: Trends

2. Sea Control

a. USSR

. b. u.s.

Ma ior Force. Al ternatives

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l. The Five Year Defense Program - Alternative B

2. The Reduced Force - Alternative A

3. The lntermediate Force - Alternative C

q. The l,lavyrs Recom.,nended Force - Al ternat ive D

5. The JCS Strategic Objective Plan (.lSOp) ObjectiveAl ternat ive E

6. The JS0P Prudent Risk Force

Speci fi c Program Opt ions

A. Decision Required

l. lssues Related to Force Levels

2. lssues Related to the Compc,sition of the Navy

a. Qual itative Considerations

b. Carriers and Cost

c. Nuclear/Conventional Power.14ix

(l ) Large Deck Carriers

(2) AEGIs cruiser

d. Qual itative Hix of 0ther Surface Combatants

e. The Future of Sea-Based Air

f. New Technology

3. tssues Related to Rate of Growth

Program Options for a Decision

Opt ion I

Opt ion 2

Option J

Criteria for Decision

Pace of l4odernization

Program Detai I s

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IV

'1. Areas for Further Study

Annex A

Summary of Allied Capabilities

Areas for Al I ied Force lrnprovement Emphasis

Specific Naval Forces Recommendations

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U. S. STRATEGY AND I'JAVAL FORCE REQU I REI{ENTS

------='.-:THE P0L lT I C0-l't I L ITARY ENV I ROi-it4ENT 0F THE 1980s and I 990s

A. Assumpti.ons About the Globa.l Hilitary Balan-ce

l. The rough balance in strategic nuclear capabi I ities bet','reenthe U.S. and USSR vrill be maintained through the I990s because each sideseems determined not to fall significantly behind.

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2. The Soviet Union vrill continue to expand its military capa-bilities and maintain the overall mornentum of force modernization as partof its effort to achieve greater world influence, if not overall militarysuperiority over the U.S.

' 3. Beneath the umbrel la of mutual nuclear deterrence, the Sovietswil I continue to seek to expand their pol itico-mil itary influenie. Thiswill lead inevitably to tensions and possibly to confrontations with U.S.interests, perhaps by proxy.

\, The Soviets will expand their concepiion of their vitalinterests and may take what would today be considered to be greater risksin areas where they think the U.S. response might not be firm (vrhether be-cause of an overall weakness below the strategic nuclear level, an absenceof ready U.S. forces, or other reasons), but they will continue to try toavoid direct mil itary clashes with the U.S. ln testing the I imits ofU.S. tolerance,'the Soviets will be influenced by their estimate of U.S.abi I ity and wi I I ingness to resist.

5. U.S. access to foreign bases and facilities for unilateralcontingencies could be increasingly conStrained.

6. The U.S. will not allor^r U.S. military capabilities to fallbelow arrrough equivalenceil to Soviet power'but will not seek a rigiditem-by-item attempt at equivalence. Defense programs will be funded ator above the current percentage of GNP, providing defense capabilitiesthat wi I I not be and cannot be assessed as being inferior.

7. China will continue its pattern of erratic economic andmilitary development but by the 1990s vrill not lrave achieved strengthcommensurate with that of the U.S. or USSR.. While no single nation otherthan the USSR wil I have suff icient pot,,er to constitute a major threat tothe U.S., some lesser nations, either in combination or with Sovietbacking, could pose serious threats to U.S. regional interests.

i

B. Some.Underlying Pol itic-al, Economic ani Technological Assujnptions:

;" basic structure of the Soviet and western alliance systemswill remain essentially intactl however, the cohesion of the latter could beseriously impaired by such factors as: (a) the leftvrard dr:ift of. some of thel.Jest European countries, (n) another prolonged ,cutof f of Middle East oi I , or(.) failure to achieve coordinated alIiance action in crises involving eventsoutside of previously agreed all iance interests.

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Z. As Soviet power grows, so will the possibil ities for Sovietinterventiorr and irrvolvement around the globe. The U.S. wil I need to be

,repared to act to. protect its regional and international interests, and

to counter, thi'ough pol itical, ecorlonlic, and mil itary capabil ities, So-

viet encroachments into areas where they have had no previous involvement.

3. \/estern Europe and Japan wi'l I continue to be the most vi talareas to the U.S. outside tlre lJestern hemisphere; hov;ever, our stake inaccess to the ulor ld' s energy and rar^r mater ia I resources wi I I cont inue togrow and wiil make the U.S. interest in freedom of the seas equally vitalIn the future. lt will also mal<e it important to avoid'adverse relation-ships.in the Middle East, Africa, and South America'

4. t rreversible economic and technological trends wi I I continueto shrink the world. The securitl' 61n6 well-being of the United States willbe linkecl with the relative stability and prosperity of other key parts ofthe globe and with the continued success of an international system ofpiudJ*inantly free and open pol itical and economic 'relationships-' Economic'h"rrony

beiween developed arid Tlri rd l/orld countries wi I I be increasinglyi mportant

S, Given the conjunction of these political and economic trendsand the rise of Soviet miliiary power and political influence, the major

U.S. alliance relationships (ruAfO, Japan) will be even more important'

5. The state of the Sino-Soviet relationship will continue tobe an.important factor in determining the pattern of global politics.

(a) lt seems unl ikely that these two powers wi:ll againbecome close allies within the near future; however, we cannot excludethe possibi I ity of a significant improvement in. relations, with-a con-comiiantly harsher Chinese attitude toward the U.S. and a parallelsti ffening of Soviet pol icies toward the llest''

(b) The relationship may well go through ups and downs

that will require reassessments of geopolitical and strategic implicationsfor the U.S.

.7. The Middle East will continue to be the most important and

dangerous region in the Third t/orld for the blest. ln the absence ofeffective national energy programs, \,lestern dependence on Persian Gulf oilwill continue to grow. -The rush torvard modernization which the massive

infusions of Westlrn capital are thrusting on the fragile, feudal societiesof the Gulf states will create dangers of political instability and potentialconfl ict. With respect to the Arab-lsrael i issue, even optimistic observers

do not predict a fundamental reconciliation that rvill remove the seeds ofconfl ict.

8. political instability will plague the Th.ird 1^lorld, with sorne

trend toward further radicalization and the possible emergence of a few

g"niun" regional powers (Brazi l, I ran, lndia, lndonesia) if-they caq majl-.iain internal political stability. Dangers of hosti,tities'in southern Africaill be great. Nuclear proliferation and technology tt:ansfers could contri-

oute to making this .international instabi I ity increasingly dangerous.

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9. The pol itical ahd economic irnpcrtance of offshore resourcesdevelopment and exploitation l'ril I grow. National efforts to exercisegreater control over adjacent waters, including possible control of straitsthat are now considered international waters, are Ii:kely to continue.

10. The rapid advance of technology by both superpowers willcontinue; dif fusion of certain new teclrnologies to lesser powers willenhance their harassment potential against the two world pouJers and eacho the r.

I L Bases of U.S. Defense Pol icies

A. U.S. National Aims

l. Beyond the fundamental nationaiand pursuing domestic purposes, a basic goaiimprove relations between states so as tcl facand international cooperation.

aims of assuring U.S. autonomyof the United States is toil itate stabil i11,, Justice

2. Having moved away frorn tlre role of world poJ iceman andrefusing also to return to isolationism, the U.S. Government neverthelessrecognizes that Amei-ica's principles, strength, and resources impose uponthe nation a significant responsibtl ity to contribute constructively tothe peace, security and economic development of the r*orld. Further, theU.S. recognizes that successful aggression by one state against anothercan whet appetites that become more difficult to check.

3. Through non-mil itary means we'strive to exert a pcsitiveinf luence, by exarnple and deed, on behali of the.principles of individualfreedom, sel f-determination and economic wel i-being

4. To discharge these responsibil ities in the global conrmunity,American national security, political determinAtion, and economic vigormust be clearly established

B. U.S. National Security 0biectives

l. The fundamental tasks assigned the U.S. defense forces are topreserve the physical security and protect the political independence of theUn i ted States

2. Our ability to satisfy this objective depends on a capacity todeter aggression, to prevent coercion, and to exercise a degree of influenceto shape world events in a manner conducive to U.S. interests.

3. To achieve these ends, the U.S. must be able to:

(")' Deter the use, or threat of use,the United Sta:es, its deiloyed fo:ces, itsimportant to its security.

(b) Deter the use, or threat of use,the Un i ted States, our forces, our al I i es,our secilrity.

of nuclear weaponsal I ies or other

of conventional forcesor other nations impor-

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(d) Deny, to the extent poss ible,bases and faciIities from r^rhich they could ""urieconornic influence.

\. Beyond the irnrr:ediate security of the U.S. itsel f , the highestpriority for u.S. military forces is to heip keep western Europe and Japanstrong, friendly, and free from domination ty the Soviet Union or any otherhosti le power. These u.s. security interesti wi I I u" ue.v"a-uy-.ontributingto political-milir?ry stability in orher key areas of the worlj (".g., Miali"East, Northeast As i a)

C. Nati_onal Defen.se pol icy Gtdance .1"';o"r'_,._' {*'

I -{d) \

I . Sources of Pol icy. ,,3 - t?'''

(a) current Defense policy derives from the major ,"ui"" o& ;*'national nri I itary strategy rvhich was conrjucted in I969. rr,.-i,"srr; ;;"a;;r\--*-**"'study rvas Presidential guidance on Defense policy and strategy i;;r;; ;;;-strategic nuclear and general purpose force areas. On stratJgic nuclearforcesn NsDl4 l5 set out four.basic criteria for strategic nuciear suffi-ciency. NsDl'l 27 establ ished the so-cal led "l* l.lar" st"ratejy-foi pf anninggeneral purpose forces. Those forces were to be sufficienl for an initialdefense.against a Soviet attack ih ruRro Europe or clefens" ug"inrt a chineseattack in Asia, but not both simultaneously, plus two minor contingencies:ewhere in the world.

(bl subsequent NSDr,rs (95, 133,230) have reaffirmed thebroad outlines of that poricy and adapted it to.h"ng", in the worldsituation- New guidance has also modif ied the origi'ial ,straiegic pol icyto reflect the strategtc arms control agreemehts.

(:i ln implementing the national policy DoD has evolved itsot{n internal guidance which eiaborates on the n"iionui poli.y-ana providesrnore detailed direction for the Military Services and the Commanders ofthe Unified and Specified Commands. ln recent years this has been codifiedannually in the Defense Pol icy and Planning Guidance which ih"-Su.r"taryissues in september or October. The fottowing paragraphs outline u.s.Defense-Objectives as reflected in the Defensi buidince issued i; No;;*-ber 1976.

2, Strategic Nuclear Forces

Uppermost annng U. S. national security objectives is rnain-!3inins strategic nuclear forces sufficient to detei nv.lear aitack bythe soviet union. A triad of forces -- lcBH, SLBM anl'ronnua-rro*u"r, --is marntained to pr.ovide a range of options, roughry uar.ancu-slui"acapabilities and'!y ?rsuring stability in the strategic nucrear.compe-titions, give the soviets an incentive to enter i,i",igi.;;;;";nreements.U.s. capabilities must also suffice to ierve as a hedgi "g"init ctina inface of inrprovements in her straiegic capabi litiei unj th. ,uncertainties

-he S ino-Soviet. relationship.

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General Purpose Forces

a. The U.S. must maintain generaIthe follovting goals in a NAT0 confl

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- provide reinforcements sufficient to stop the mainattack with minimum loss of territory, then gain thestrategic initiative and restore prevJar boundaries.

- be prepared to employ theater nuclear capabilities torespond to Soviet first use of nuclear weapons or toescalate in the event of or the likelihood of failureof conventional defense;

counter Soviet military attacks elsewhere anc! ProtectU. S. interests . ,

b. These forces must also be capable of responding to require-ments elsewlrere in the world when NATo is riot at war.

c. Beyond maintaining forces for a worldwide war with the

lJarsaw pact, the U.S. must maintain forces to respond to other contingencies,to include conducting military action not involving direct and overt opposi-tion by the USSR.

d. ln the total force, the u.s. must maintain a militarycapability to ensure that the U.S. and its allies can exercise controlof vital Atlantic -- and, on a lesser priority, Pacific and Mediterranean --dea lanes in the event oi a *ar with the Soviet,Union. At other times, theU.S. must be able to protect unilaterally its free.access to vital ocean areas.

ilt. The Soviet |\'lilitarv Challenge e!!-l@

A. The Soviet Hi I i tary Chal lenge

Soviet military strategy, doctrine, and force employments stem

from geopolitical requirements that differ markedly from those of the

United States. As the dominant nation on the Eurasian land mass, thesoviet union has historically stressed defense of its land areas againstcontinental enemies. ln the current context, Germany and the Peoples

Republic of China, with borders contiguous to the Soviet tJnion and itsLlarsaw Pact allies, constitute such a threat. The U.S., however, is the

most important Soviet adVersary because its global strategic and conven-

tional military power (reinforced by enorrnus economic strength) are thefoundation of Western securitY. The Soviets have accumulated not onlythe landpower aPPropriate to their continental location bUt 'al.so a power-

ful navy whiclr, whije designed in the first instance to defend the Soviet

Union f rom the of fensive capabil ity of Western navies, qogrld. also bb used

in efforts to isolate tl're United Siates from its, a'll ies'ahd tradiirg part-ners. The Soviet mil itary chal lenge has.thus acquired global maritimelharacteristics in addition to its long-standing Eurasian ground vrar

features.

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B. Sov i et l'1i I i ta ry Trends

l. Across the spectrum of force "apat

i t i-.neral purpose, the Soviets give every erridence of

shif t in the rrcorrelation of forces'r that wi I I giveand cri s i s leverage over the U. S. and i ts al I ies.

ties from strategic toseeking a fundamentalthem sol id peacetime

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contrast

Europe --and artilcon t i nuedreflect a

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2. The emphasis in Soviet strategic programs on quantitativety, including a missi le throw-vJeight advantage, and civi I defenseapparentl.y great concern for actual war-f ighting potential, into U.S. emphasis on stabil ity.

3- lncreases in the overall size of Soviet forces in Easterntogether with increases in arrnor, armored personnel carriers,

lery -- and continued stress on force modernization show thepriority of Europe in Soviet military planning. They may alsochange in operational concept toward capabil ities for pre-emptive

thout major prior reinforcement.

\. The Soviets have builthreats and providing assurance ofor provocation.

t up forces capable of meet'ing Chinesesuccess at all levels of Chinese attack

5. Hi I itary capabil ities for povrer projection at long distancesfrom the Soviet Union are being built in consonance with a greater politicalinclination to extend influence in areas like sub-saharan Africa and toonploy higher levels of aggressiveness in so doing.

'(") lncreased Soviet naval capabil it,r, can provide forwardpresence and a basis for contesting U.S, influence

(U) lmprovements in both airlift and.merchant sealift nowprovide Soviet leaders with a long-range intervention qapability.

(.) Availabil ity of a will ing proxy -- Cuba today, possiblyothers (North Korea, Vietnam, etc.) tomorrow -- decreases <lirect Sovietmilitary involvement, thereby lowering the political cost of exercisinginfluence. Concern for adverse Chinese reaction may limit Soviet use ofAs ian proxies.

C. Soviet l{aritilre Challenge

l. A significant element of the growth of Soviet militarystrength has been the development of global maritime capability. lnaddition to the dramatic increase in Sorriet naval capabi I ities, therelras been a marked improvement in other elements of Soviet marit irne powcr.

(") The'soviet fishing fleet of over 4iSOO ocean goingvessels is one of the largest and most nr,cdern in the wor:ld and operateson a global basis, probabl), under some ciegree of naval gontrol .

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(b) The Soviet merchant fleet is now in numbers of sh{psthe fifth l.ar'gest in the world. lt is capable of working in retativ"iyundeveloped ports and has a quesi-militar;'function for resupply of theSov iet t{avy.

(.) The Soviet hydrographic research effort is extensive(ovcr 200 ships) and can augmeni ttuir fleet of naval inteltigenc. c;ii".-tors vrhich operates worldwide.

(d) The Soviet nuclear submarine construction capacityi s the la rges t in the vror l d

2- The effectiveness of Soviet global maritime activity hasbeen reinforced by the development of highly sophisticated, centrallycontrol led communications and survei I lance s;,stems

D. The Chal I e of Soviet Naval Forces {Sea and Air

l. Expansion of soviet naval capabirity has oicurred as aresult of a comprehen'sive effort whiclr gained added impetus after theCuban missile crisis demonstrated the crisis utility oi nuv"l superiority.

2. The'statistics clearly show the considerable flexibi I ity ofthe Soviet Navy in-exploiting pol itical opportunities. The min"rur.ep'ingoperations in the Suez Canal, the harbor

"i"aring effort in Banglaaesfr "

and the almost constant presence in Guinea are cases in point. The SovietNavy is obviously .capable df sustaining a.signif icantty higher level ofactivity in suppol't of Soviet efforts as a global po*"r to influence eventsin areas of new strategic importance (tnAiai 0cean, r.rt"rn n"jit"r.anean,bfest Af rica) ; see Figure l.

.3- ln 1970 the Soviets conducted their first rrprldrvide navalexercise (0rrnru-70) in which they demonstrated a basic capaciiv-io,.coordinated air, surface, and submarine activity in both the Atlanticand the Pacific; five years later OKEAN /!'gave the world an even moreimpressive demonstration of Soviet naval power and global coordinationcapabi I i ty.

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{; gtle rflV. Factors in Developing a Mariti*u ProSE* F:, 5i\---/A. .Str'ategic Considerations

I 6--;. Geographic anti poi iti;al fl^tbrs piay a l6rge ro.le in shapingU.S. strategy and its supporting po) icies. One state; oui' associatecl com-monwealths, several territories and 4l of the 43 nations with which we havedefense treaties and agreements Iie overseas. Nearly all of our ryaJor alliesare themselves maritime dependent. The standard,of I iving "and wel l-Ueing ofour citizens are closely Iinked io accessabiIity of ou"rrl", resources ahd

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markets. S ince ly'orld l{ar I I , our hi storic foreign economic ties ha*re beenreinforced through complex pol itical and mil itary relationships that form a'cundation of U.S..foreign policli. Freedom of the seas is central to thatolicy. The seas serve the. U.S. both as barriers for defense and as avenues

for demonstrating U.S. influence abrcad, ln peacetime, freedcm of rnovementb;r sea is required for commerce and for reassurence of Allies, ln wartime,vre must maintain secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs) between the U.S.,our forv,ra rd dep I oyed forces , our a I i ies and the sea areas f rom vrh ich powercan be projected ashore. To accompl ish these functions requires a broadspectrum of coordinated offensive and defensive naval forces.

7. ln contrast, the nava'! forces of the Soviet Union -- a land-povJer that shares Jand boundaries vrith mcst of its all ies and one of itspotential opponents -- have tended to be.oriented toward coastal defense.The additional acquisition and operational employment of significant open-ocea.n seapor,,'er is a relatively recent developmeni. The result of thisdifference in strategic orientations betlveen sea power and land power isan asymmetry between U.S. and Soviet maritime objectives. U.S. and Westernworld dependence upon the oceans for commerce, communication'and defenseconstitutes a vulnerability in the naritime a/ea relative to'the SovietUnion and her ailies. The Soviet maritime objective is to exploit thisvulnerability; therefore, despite the developing capacity to acquire a forcesuitable for asserting sea control, the Soviet naval mission is mainly thatof'sea denial: The Soviet naval force structure, at least over the near term,will be different from that required by the U.S. to exercise the necessarycontrol oi the seas. One result of this asymmetry of objectives and forcesis that the Soviets could thlvart U.S. objectives in some cases by usingrecia.l ized forces that might otherrvise be considered inferior 'in number orirength to those employed by the U.S. in its efforts.to sustain sea control.

3. The limited Soviet access to the open oceans of the world,while not signif icant to her role as a land power,. is'also a vulnerabi'l itythat would be exploited in time of war. The ft.S. forward strategy of meetingthe threat in the most advantageous areas does so, while simultaneouslysupPorting the objective of ,u"uting the sea linei of communication.

4. Dec i s ions affect i ng U. S. defense pol i cy cannot be made i nisolation from U,S. relationships with our friends and all ies. The con-tribution which allied navies and other forces could make with respect tothe maritime areas must be taken into account. .The capabilities, contribu-tions, and availability of other U.S. Armed Services and the Herchant Marinemust be addressed as well as the potential impact of various foreign economicand domestic policies. Further, the defense of NATO is fundamental to thedefense of the U.S. in the context of current national strategy. The CentralFront in Europe will continue to be the most critical area of operations. Thedefense of the Northern and,,southern NATO flanks will also be important inthe event of war in Europe and these are also likely to be areas of peacetimepressures or I imited 'conf I ict. U.S. commitments in.the Pacif ic,together withthe probable worldwide characteristics of a NATO war prompt conrprehensiveattention to the requirement to control the SLOC in thb Far East and thelndian Ocean. Finally, the urgency and importance of the oil.and economicSLOCs to the.U.S. must be assessed.

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Over the longer term, technologicai developments are Iikely toexercise a decisive infruence on the shafe of navar warraie.'-rn the pastthe U's' has held a significant lead in most areas.r-,".rr".logy applicationhaving mil itary importance. This has yielded us major effectiveness advan-tages as well as enabling us to interpret soviet developments even on thebasis of very scanty intelligence data. tcithin trre p"ri i"*-yJorr, however,the USSR has overtaken us in terms of resources devoted to,iiir"ry-orientedR6D, and continues to increase its RsD efforts. lf this situation does notchange we would expect, over the next ten to fifteen-t";r;,'lJ'r"" ilr"soviets introduce technological trsurprises" vrhich wil I put us at a relativeeffectiveness disadvantage and which we may noi ou "ui""ro i"riv r"a"rr,"";/r@o\

:' :l:":,':'i:",:,;;,"**,,=,, .f?, "::r,,","0 _,::!no,osica, *,"",: r"'o'\built uP over the three decadei wi.ll probably contir;;;; *Jrr'"in our fav6r\c r,/There are a number of specif ic technoiogical.'devel";;;";; ""'irr.''r,;;;=;;'-') ,,.- ,-?'now nhich rnay impact on naval warfare, e.ren'though *u ,"y "lr.u. able toforesee precisely v"hat the impact wiIi be (gi".r in parentheses after eachis a rough estimate of possible earliest daiet io1 deployment of a signifi-cant operational capabi I i ty, assuming normal develof*lni';;;-";;"isition

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,.... ..o....... As long-range missiles, both ballis-tic and cruise missiles, become a dominant anti-ship,instrument, the needfor high performance on the part of attack aircraft, to penetrate defensiveenvelopes, may decrease.

5. Hissiles may supplement or partly displace manned aircraft forstril<es against fixed larrd targets. The principal problems to be overcomearb the difficulties involved in targeting and command,/control. (tgBO-SS)To the extent that missiles do become more important in projecti.on opera-tions, launching aircraft (if retained as delivery vehicles at all) will haveless need of high performance. Further, the" comparatively small size of ad-vanced long range cruise rnissiles offers the possibility that they could belaunched from a wide variety of platforms, including surface ships, subma-r.ine.s, and aircraft, thus further cornpl icating the enemyrs targeting problem.

6. lt has been feasible for some time to construct vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/SfOl) aircraft capable of operating from restricted ship-board spaces without the Iaunch and recovery systerns employed on current

"aircraft carriers, and present developments promise to reduce.the perfor-..nance and cost penalties associated with v/STOL. (tggo-gS, except for the' AV-BB and helicopters.) Because launch and retrieval syri"*s are not a major

cost item for carriers, it is unlikely that V/ST0L will do much, if anything,

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7. A series of technology improvements being pursued by NASA underits Ai rcraft Energy El=f iciency (nCf g) p.rogram promises di-amatic improve-ments in the range and payload of subsonic aircraft without increases inaircraft cost. These improrrements could permit land-based aircraft torange over'd'istant high-interest ocean areas without depending on pol i-tically and militarily vulnerable third-countrv basing. As iidicatedabove, misslle improvements may permit such subsonic aircraft to play awider offensive role by allowing them to stay urell away from the heavilydefended target whi le sti l l del Ivering a strong attack. tiggo:il, exceptfor modif ications to current aircraft.) , '-.':

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B. Remctely-pilotecl vehicles (RPVs) appear to have the potential togive both ships and low-speeC aircraft an economica'l means of extendingtheir sensor ieach, particularly into potentially high-threat regionsThe key is development of effective all-weather, compact and lightweightsensor packages. Shipboard recovery is also a problem at this time, (1980-90)

9. The laser, vrith its high energy fiux and very great modulationbanclr,ridth could have important sensor, communications and weapons appl ica-tions. Propagation effects restrict ranges at low altitudes but thisI imi tation i s al leviated at high al t i tudes (or high elevation angles) . (BeyondI 990 for major appl icat ions. )

10. A broad range of unconventicnal vehicle types (including thesea-loiter aircraft, advanced interface vehicle, airship, surface effectship, air cushion vehicle, hydrofoil, planing ship, and small waterplaneship) offer performance v,rhich is in one way or another intermediate betvreenthat of conventional ships and conventional aircraft. The surface effectship (SgS) is receiving special attention because it comb.ines a speed sub-stantially greater than that of conventiona'l ships with the ability tooperate on the surface, and because the developrnelt uncertainties do notseem excessive. lt may be that tlre unique performarice,.,features of the SES(or of another of these vehicles) will prove to be of significant value,i:::::::.::::::::::.::::::.::::::::::::::::::::::.:::::::::::

' C. Vu I nerab i I i ty of Surface Sh i ps :

?The increasing sophistication of sensor and weapon systems may increasethe vulnerability of surface ships over the next few decades. Despite thispossibility, the need for surface naval combatants will remain essentiallyunchanged. For the foreseeable future, the wor.ldts.reliance on merchantshipping will remain the same or increase. : lt^is a'lso unlikely that non-maritime substitutes for the major resupply of allies will be developed.The need for a U.S. capability to maintain'freedom of the seas will notdiminish in the future. At the very least, from the U.S. point of view,this means that U,S. merchant ships r^ri I I require protection not only fromSoviet forces, but also from many smaller nations which possess even limitedamounts of sophisticated naval weaponry. There appears to be no feasiblesubstitute for surface combatants to provide local air defense of merchantshipping.

More importantly, the political and psychotojical uses of navalcombatants and amphibious forces for crisis situations should acquire in-creasing importance in an era of strategic parity. Being the first torespond in.a crisis sitr.ration with some visible, credible force offshoremay become:an, increasingly desirable option for the lJnited States; certain-ly the U.S. cannot allow the Soviet Uniorr tc domi'nate in the exploitationof these political and psychologica'i aspects of n9v9l power.,

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ty is also two-sided in its impact. Thebu i I d i ng more and more large Surface sh.i ps.. the '1990s are eith6r in the forces at thisboth rrations. Thus, uncertainties regardingnava I sh i ps rvi i I exi st for both the U.5. anda successfui competitor, i.e., to match and

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Therefore, while surface combatants may become more vulnerable, therewil I be no ciecrease in the need to maintain an adequate measure of maritinrepoh,er. There are no realistic alternatives tb surface ships as a significantelement of that power for the foreseeable future.

D. Role of the Naval Reserves

rying to strengthen the role of the l.laval Reiserve by reviewing existing,rissions, expanding those that have a role in mobilization planning andeliminating those that do not. One existing mission that has been consi-dered appropriate for the Naval Reserve is,anti-submarine warfare (ASW).

The USSR is the only nation possessing an appreciabl'e submarine threat,

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tn the last decade, the active surface combatants available forforward deployments have been reduced from 241 to l6l. During this periodSoviet combatant deployments have increased whil'e U.S. deployments haveremained essentially stable. The current building program for DD 953class destroyers and FFG-7 class frigates wi l I provide sufficient shipsto meet the roughly lB0 surface combatants nebded to meet, current commit-ments. As the number increases toward 230 -- the force-objective -- therewil I be a numbe'r of ships which are not needed for the ov"lru"s deploymentpool and could be part!ally manned by reservists.

Surface combatants, however, differ from other service !nits suchas artiIlery, coFgo aircraft and tanks-which are manned by reservists be-cause ships arc compl icated weapon systems with multi-mission capabil ities.Newer ship designs emphasize complex systems with minimum manpowbr. Theseships are not so amenable to reserve manning as the World lJar.ll vintage

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E. lgfitime Forces for Freedom of the Seas

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^_m;-{; F}\Jl ' Any u.s. maritime strategy requires forces bui lt around theseconsiderations:

(ul ^*ilitarily, forces of the u.s. and our ailies must becapable of exercising sea control -- particularly in the crucial porth

Atlantic and llediterranean waters -- against Soviet sea- and land-basedattack. . u.s. forces. unilaterar ry musr be capable of ;;rti;g'Jua poor" rproJection operations for crisis management'in a situation stort of gen-er'al t'rar and not.necessarily involving either confrontation with theSoviets or al I ied interests.

(b) From a broader standpoint, our forces ,ura o" able todeploy overseas to maintain u.s. politico-miiit"ry presence under non-crisisconditions and to establish a presence, to fulfili comrnit*enis and to demon-strate our larger'capacity to project por,Jer in a criris,iiu"iion. -

(:) Economically, the forces must be capable of protectingpeacetime rnaritime commerce from intimidation or harassinent ana, in theevent of non-nuclear war with the Soviet Union, .ipoui"';;-r;-;;t"iririi"gkev conrmercial sda I ines of-..*nu"i;;;i;"-;.iii*l9L on-u-iir"fv basis. -

2' The naval aspect of the maritime problem should not be treatedin isolation. At the domestic level, the U.S;,shoutJ ;;;-"i1";i" other na-ti'onal assers (u.g., Army, Air Force, coast c".;J;-H;r;;;";'ll"rin") ttrat canbe made avaiiable and employed effectively in " riritime i"r.. 0n the inter-national level, malitime capabil ities exiit ln the n"u"i, ;i;; n;;r;;"";;'"'merchant maritime forces of our alliesl gll of which musi t";";;i;;;";";"developing our maritime strategy and pians.

3' other factors which enter into the choice of forces to satisfyU.S. maritime requirenrents include: .

(a)st ics an

- We should emphasize forceicate the problem for the SovietUnionj

(OJ. Flexihil ity - Because the future is uncertain and thei ssues coirplex, trre-program Frsued shoul d permit requ"nt;;i t;;;i

s ion makingto tlre extent possibre. The nature of the thr""t *i,it-;;;i;".;;; technorosyill continue. ro-dever'op. Thus, we shourd seek to incl;;'" .;in"if icant.de_3ree of f lexibil ity inro our ror.u srructure.bnd.oi* roi.f ;";;i.p;.il ;t;;r.

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(c) Cost - DefenseI eve I s must be aclcl rEl?ua "

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bas ic approaches 'thatand achieve the goal of

(d) . Arms Control HeasLt-les. The continuing seerch for ef fec--ive means to control arms may lead to discussion of worldwide or regionalI imitations on naval deployments, J'orce structure or size, or possession ofnuclear rireapons. tie have not yet iclentified specific neval arrns controlmeasures that rvould contribute both to U.S. security and East-[,est stabi I ityand have any reill chance of successl lrourever, a long range building programmust be able to adjust to an arms control program should one be devised.

(e) lrr:!l!4ion"r 3e.qli!r91. The strate'gy ure adopt, and thelongtermplanthatW]aVetobeunderstoodbythecountry,supported over a period of years b1, the Congress, and implemented by theServ i ces .

F. ,Key__.Po_iltS_jn a- Strategy for_-9erv_ljrg .U_.

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I " Over the long term, there are twobe follovred to satisfy U.S. national objectivesfreedom of tlre seas for us and our al I ies:

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. a. Develop a uni lateral iy superior U.S. maritinre capabi I itythat can deter or counter tlre Soviet threat in a timely manner and alsocarry out other mi I i tary requi rements

b. Develop a combined U.S./Allied superiority in nraritimecapability that can deter or defeat the Soviet.threat in a timely firannernd also carry out other U. S. mi i itary requirernents.

2. Seeking unilateral maritime supericrity adequate to meet theenti re Soviet threat would be an extremely expensive option. ln additionto extensive growth of U.S. naval capability, which could probably be achievedonly at the cost of reduced investment in otl'1er mi litary capabi I ities, it wouldrequirg an undesirable degree of federal. contr:ol of the merchant marine,major expansion of land-based air dedicated to naval activities, and possibleincreased governmental activity in tlre fisheries and oceanographic researchareas. lt could also reduce al I ied incentives for naval modernization anddeveloprnent. lt would be difficult to sustain public and, therefore, Congres-sional support for such a program over the long term unless it were proved tobe absolutely necessary, i.e., there were no other practical alternatives. ltis thus evident that the latter alternative, the development of a combinedU.S./Allied maritime superiority, is the better choice as a strategy forsuccessfully countering the challenge posed by the Soviet Union and herl.Jarsaw Pact All ies. Nevertheless, the U.S. will have to maintain a signi-ficant independent capabi I ity for power projection in crisis situationiwhere all ied interests are ,irot, or are not seen as beinq, directly involvcd.

3. As its contribution to-such a cumbined effort, the UnitcdStates should develop and ntaintain a margin of naval spperiority over theSoviet Union by:

(a) Developing mi litary and cornplement'ing meqchant f I!etsrd an airl ift force which are modern, economical ly.competi tive, compatibleith U.S. needs for.tvartime resupply and vrhich con.tain sealift suff icient

to deploy and sustain U.S. forces

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(") Balance navalmulti-purpose, highly capable andother Iess capable and therefore

(b) Hainraining a capabi I ity to meet national needs forprotection of coastal rvaters (which rvill soon extend to 200 miles offshore),

(c) Employing the assets of al I l'1il itary Services and CoastGuard to exercise sea control, r'ihere required in time of war in the face ofpossi!:le Soviet actions.

(d) Ensuring that the numbers and composition of nayalforces are adequate to provide sufficient flexibility to maintain neces-sary u.s" peacetime presence and reaction to crisis contingencies.

the maintenance of freedom of the seasited States must:

capabilities between a smdller number ofexpensive,forces and larger numbers of

less expensive forces

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/-\ h r' (c) Oevelop an effective all-service means of providing airdefense against Soviet leng-range bcmbers in tlre Atlantic, pacific,

"naHediterranean areas by employing a mix of land-based and sea-based systems.

(d) continue to derrerop new-technorogy sensor and vueaponsystems to maintain highly effective forces for the-iuture and fully'exploit the capabil ities of al I avai Iab.re ships' and aircraf t.

(u) Haintain the capabi I ities to rapidly project effectivepower into crisis are6s, considering a mix of carri"r iir, -surface

combatant,amphibious, geal ift and airl ift assets. '

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(f) Retain or acquire key overseas bases'anci airfields, oraccess to such bases, to support U.S. forces in theii maritime missions.

5. ln order to ensure that, in conjunction .with our al I ies, weachieve overall maritime superiority over the Soviet Union and her aliies,the United States must:

(a) Provicie leadership and encouraqe and support our al I iesto plan and implenrent comilementary naval progr.ri (see Annex A).

(b) Provide our all i-es nevf h,eapon and sensor system. tech-nologies that would enhance their ability to perform the mariiir" tasks weare urging them to assune. (Due regard must be given to t6e impact uponU.S; technological superiority over the USSR which could result from com-promise of new U.S. systems.)

(c) - maintain a system for rflobil izing al I ied merchant f leetsquickly in time of NAT0lWarsaw pact conflict.

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lcntrol lable and IJcn-Control lablr: Elemants

l. The U.S. Government can control the force IeveJs anC force,ix of the Armed Services and the Coast Guard. The emplloyment of nii I itaryforces, and a number of econon:ic and political policies which have a bear-ing on the maritirne area are also control lable.

2. \'ihile the developrnent of the Herchant Harine can be qreatlyirrfluenced by the Government, in the absence of a concerted effort toincrease l'lerchant l'larine involvment in national defense activities, eco-nomic factors will have a far greater irnpact on its characteristics.Historical evidence suggests thet the U.S. will not be in a position torely solely on U.s. Flag shipping to fulfill wartime requirements.

3. While future narral initiatives of U.S. Al I ies cannot be con-trol,led, the U.S. can and should infiuence these developments by workingwith'our al I ies so that their maritirne capabi I ities compl"*"nt-u.s. ForJes.

4- The use of foreign overseas bases can greatly facilitate thesupPort of for|ard deployed naval forces and else the strain of overseasdeployments. ln assessirrg fleet requirements, a bese is an asset, just asis a fleet ship or squadron. The initial.avaitalility of allied bases isassumed in a NATO Y1t, ulthpugh they nrust be defended against the possibilityof enemy attack and/or seizure. ln the case of unilateial U.s. miiitary ac-tion, access to foreign bases may be lost or constr"ained by decision of thehost nation and our planning must provide hedges against t[is eventuality.

i-{. DoD Program rmpr icqtigns of the Haritijne strategy_

l. Naval forces are de.signed and configured speciflcally to carryout maritime tasl<s. ln those cases where the forces of other mil itary ,uroi..,can rnake signif icant .contributions to maritime tasks and their avaitaLil ity canbe relied upon for force planning purposes, their jppii'."ii." ln trris rein-forcement role could reduce the iequirement for sea-LuruJ rftrems to carryout these tasks. significant rel iance upon other Services for maritime tasksviould probably reguire additional funcling.for those services either to pro-cure additional forces, or to continue in the active force units planned tobe phased out, since prograrnmed forces are normally sufficient oniy to carryout the Servicestprimary mission

G.

2. The all-volunteer force concept rneans that the Servicescompete in the civilian manpob,er market for highly skilled personnel.Thus, u-S. military forces need to be more cupitui-int"n.ive and lessmanpower-intensive whenever possible. l'loreover, as new t"ctnotogy isintroduced, it may become increasingry difficuli to obtain ;h; ;"q"isitenumber of highly ski l led tec,,hnicians

3. An expan'ded role for the l"lerchant Marine in national defenseactivities could lrave extensive impact on our relative mari,i*"-rarength.Greater use of cominercial shipping to provide auxit i"ry' ,"r;;;;, for theNavy (u.s., harbor and salvage'!u6s, fuel "nJ

,torus replenishinent ships,special-mission experimental-ancl ieioarch shipsj .; ";;;;;;;;t'';"uis mishr

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enable the l'lavy to dedicate a greater proportion of its available resourcesto combatant construction and operation. Such a program r,r'ould al so tend toe>;pand the national pooi of trained mariners, ificrease merchant marine readi-ness for wartime service and help strengthen the base of U.S. shipbuildingand repair capacit;,.

4. lncreased resource commi tnrent to RED, partlcularly in thetecirnology base and option creatlon areas, will be essentlal to the main-tenance of our technological superiority over (or even parity with) theSoviets if they continue to increase their resource commitment at the pre-sent 3? per year rate. Our technology advantage is a vital counterweightto the Soviet abundance of inexpensive manpower, and provides a partiaicoiTrpensation for their abil it), to conceal many details of their weaponsdys tems

5, The U. S. can sel ect a r.ap id bu i I dqp in nava I forces ormoderate but sustained programs. A sizeable infiux of funds to build upnaval forces rapidly would indicate clearly to the world that the u.s.intends to maintain maritime superiority. lncreases in Navy ship con-struction could not he acconcnodated vdithin the pi'esent Five-year Defenseprclgram; increased construction wi ll require supplementary funding.

l. From Stratejgy to Force Structure

The foregoing sections have addressed the political, economic,'technological and strategic factors that form the underpinning of theforce planning process. That appraisal leads to the L.onclusion thatderreloping and maintaining a measure of maritime superiority is necessaryif tlre United States is to maintairr freeciom of the seas, preserve its securityand successfully pursue its objectives in the world cornnunity.

. To translate this goal of freedom of the seas and the objectiveof maritime superiority into specific naval programs for the years aheadfequjres analysis that focuses specifically on ihe naval situation. Thedevelopment of alternatiires for naval consiruction requires an assessmentof the missions that the I'lavy will have to be capable of carrying out andthe threat environment in various parts of the world in which it will berequired to operate. Such an assessment identifies the range of capabili-ties that must be built into the Navy of the future and the alternativeforce structures that could provicle the appropriate capabil ities.v. NAVY F0RCE REQU I REI{ENTS

:

A. The Nayy_'s ttissiqn

t'he analysis of the strategic environment outl ined in the previoussections of this paper led to the concluslon that the U.S. must be afforcledcontinuous freedom of the seas. To contribute to that objective, the missionof the U.S. Navy, in its most basic terms, is to conduct irompt and sustainedconrbat operations at sea and to defeat any force which seeks io curtail thefree use of the seas.

i

m*soryr ftn Cf*eld B. Ford Ubruy

20

The Navy carries out its m!ssion r,iithnational strategy in joint coordination rvithconrbined operations with our allir:s. t^/ithintwo primary responsibi l ities:

- to insure the security of the sea Ithe United States and its overseas

-'to provide components of our overseas forward dbployed forces.

To achierre its basic mission, the Navy must perform two prin"ipatfunctions: sea control and por.\,er projection.' Sea control is the auputi I ityto selectively use those portions of the seas essential to our interests.This includes the-capability to deny their use for purposes hostile to our-selves and our al I ies. sea control is a prerequisii. io-"it oir,"r navaltasks and to most sustained overseas operations by the general purposeforces of the other services. An effective sea control capability assuresthe resupply of forward deployed combat forces, provides secure areas foramphibious and carrier strlke operations, enhances the survivabi I ity of theseabased strategic deterrent, allows orher deployea navil fo;;;, to operateas required, and protects commercial shipping necessary for the nationrseconomic wel I being.

Ihu projection of power from the sea, although dependent qpgn seacontrol for assuring secure areas for the operation 6t p,:fj".tion forces,represents a discrete, f lexible'instrument of military po,-.. in support ofnational pol icy. Projection of power covers a broad.rpl"tr"* of off.nsiuurilitary operaiions, from strategic nuciear respcnse by our FBr4 force, tohe tactical util ization of our carrier based aircrafti ampnibi.ou, assaultforces, and naval -gunlire capabi I ities against enemy. targets. selectivepower projection is also integral to sea control; r" *uri be able to seizecritical straits and'to attack bases f ronr which enranat" .r-r"ir"ng"r';".;;;-control.

The capacity to perform the sea control and force projection mis-sions that would be required in a major conflict with the Soviet union isalso needed for accomplishing the Nairyls additional roles of a diplomaticand political nature' Naval forces can be used to maintain a peacetlmepresence ln geographic areas of importance io the United States and to pro-ject a measured and responsive degree of rnilitary force during a crisis orI imi ted conf I ict.

B. Condult of Naval 0perajions

uJltnln tne na-lonal strategy, navcrl forces are routinely forward deployedto various areas of the world. These forces support the total strategicpolicy aimed at deterring the outbreak of general war with the SovietUnion and its allies and they provide the National Comrnand Authoritieswith a mechanism for exercising U.S. pou/er and protecting u.s. interestsin conditions short of general war.

i

in the broad framework ofthe other Services, and 'intli i s s t ra tely , the Navy ha s

i nes of cL;lrmun i cat ion betvreenforces and al I ies, and

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vier,.,ed in historical perspective, in terms of.frequency of employmentthe Navy's most signif icant role since hrorld War ll has beeri in situationsof less than total conf I ict r,rith our major adversary, the uSSR. ln thepost-l/orld llar l l environment, u.s. pol lcymakers have repeatedly foundthemselves confronted with a requirement to demonstrate U.S. power andinterest. The ci rcumsiances have ranged from a need to remind potential lyhostile nations of our physical presence and hence bur ability to affecta given political situation to a need to use amphibious and carrier forcesto prosecute combat operations. The United states has employed naval forcesto support its policy objectives in qrisis management or contingency roleson at least 43 occasions since 1960 (rigure 2)., with the use of carrierforces in the l4ayaguez incident, the evacuation of u.s. personnel fromLebanon and the response to the North Korean attack on U.S. personnel ithe demil itarized zone being the most recent examples.

,

As a form of U.S. presence, forward deployed forces serve several

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purPoses. They reassure U.S. al I ies by providing tangible evidence of aU.s. interest in their physical secui'ity and a U.S. capability for contri-buting to that security. They signal U.S. interest in the security of areasurhere other forms of U.5. mil itary -por,rer cannot readily be maintained inpeacetime (e.g., tlre. Persian Gulf ) . They provide a counterweight to themilitary presence of the Soviet Union and serve to remind both the Sovietsand littoral states of an American interest in and a capability to react toaggression (".9., periodi'c deploymants to the lndian Ocean). in a crisis,these naval forces cen serve as a stabilizing element by deterring aggressiveacts and forcing the contending parties to consider the'possibilitV "i futureU.S. military action to protect its own interests as'well as those of friendlygovernments.

Should the Presence of naval forces -- either those routinely forward'deployed or those redeployed in response to a specific contingency -- failto produce the desired diplomatic oi political effect, the capabilities ofthose forces may then have to be exploited for a military objective. His-torically, such projection missions have involved the use of the Navy'stactical air power, gunfire support and amphibious forces in confl ictsthat did not entail a direct clash with the soviet union. Korea andVietnam are the most notable examples. The actual use of naval forcesin times of nominal peace is not, however, limited to non-Soviet conflicts,as demonstrated by the blockade of Soviet missile shipments to CubaHoreover, the Sovietsr improved ability to operate outside of traditionalhome waters could permit their increasing involvement, at least indirectly,.in future contingencies. lt is thus evident not only that our naval forcestructure must include an adequate number of ships to perform the presenceand crisis management roles, but Slso that the ships in the force must havethe capacity to follow through rvith projection and necessary sea controloperations should the situation so require.

Such use of naval forces for crisis management has wide scope becausequite independently of the Soviet Union, Third lCorld countries may increasing-ly present threats to U.S. interests. For example, whatever thL outcome of

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the Law of'the sea negotiations, Third tlorld countries may attempt toestablish national spheres of influence ln or exercise control over manystrbtegically important ocean areas where there are significarit resources,raisinq the possibil ity for crisis situations involving U.S. interests.Alternatively, communist countries, perhaps encouraged by the sovietUnion, rrright cngage in overseas advonture contrary to U.S. lnterests.Radlcal nationalist, non-communlst governments of the, sort rullng lnLiby3 and uganda could also create serlous problems In the future..

0n the basisiof our assessment of the pol itico-mil itary environmentof the future, there seerns to be little doubt that many situations lessinrnediately dire in their consequences than a general r^rar between thesuper povJers tt'ill confront our pol icymalcers over the next l0 to 15 years.The likelihood of such situations means t.hat the requirement for navelforces to perform presence/iorce projectian/crlsls management roles mustbe taken into account along with the requirements imposed by a generalwar with the Soviet Union in assesslng the adequacy of the levei and com-position of our naval forces. Certain factors are relevant to such anassessment of the adequacy of our forces for.those iess-than-general-warroles:

- The aircraft ca'i-rier has become establ ished throughout the worldas a symbol of American naval rnight.' As the largest, niost potent,and most impressive element of the Navy, it has t special utility-for the presence rof.. Because thd laige-deck carrier also has anorEanic capability to projggt military force, it is an essentialiomponent of the arsbnal of forces that are needed to perform thepower projection role.

- For certain types of force projection and presence operations, non-carrier elements of the Navy can be used. The united states hasdemonstrated this with its lndian 0cean and Middle East Force de-ployments, and it is evident that fof some missl'ons ..... o o r o i o r

................... o.. r.. o.... roi o r.CdFFiefS may beneither useful not desirable.

- There being little evidence to suggest a decline in our nationalneed for naval forces to perform the crisis management role, ourfuture force structure should include at least.as much projectionand c.risis management capacity as exists at the present time. Ourcommitment to sustain two carrier task groupi deployed in the Medi-terranean and tlvorin the Pacific, when combined with the fact thatit generally requires at least three carriers in the force to main-taii one deployed, supports the requirement for at least l2 deploy- fi[e;1able aircraft carriers which has been established by analyses of /*o fdsea control requ i rentents in a wart ime scenar io. ie

_jilA major portion of the U.S. Navy is nraintained in a combat ready

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status witlr about one-fourth of its sea- and land-based forces deployedoverseas, Positioned to support our allies and forvrard deployed U.S. groundand land based air forces, and to protect the sea lines of communication.

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Examples of these forto,ard deployed forces'are the Sixth Fleet in the Medi-terrartean, the seventh FIeet in the l\lestern Pacific and the Second Fleet inthe caribbean and tlre Atlaniic. Such forces are immediately avai lable forD\terseas relnforcement irt contingency situations as well as for geheral v,,artasks and crisis response in their o'vn areas "r,"rpoirruiiliv" :

- The respo.sibiliiies of the u.s. Navy witrrin our miritary strategy,the fortvard deployecl posture of our forcer, "nJ

the unique char""t"risticsof our forces operating in international viaters irrr"""J";r;;";;; itarycharacteristi.u gl our ships and.our navar rdqui rements i" i"""."r.Principal capabi l ities required in our fIeets, ur " resul t, are:

- an offensive capability ihat enables our fleets, togetlrer withforces of the other services, to defeat forces io"tin"ry pr.r."*in the theater of operations.

- defensive strength to cope with attackswhich can concentrate in a U.S. theaternot i ce.

a comb irrat i on of of fensthe security of the seaand i ts overseas fc'rces

from long range aircraftof operations on short

ive and defensive capabi i ities to insureI ines of communication betvreen the U.S.and al I ies,

- the ability !o project power ashore either by gunfire, missi!es,carri"r b:??9 aircraft,'or the amphibious tanaing of naiin"r.This capabir ity can be required mir itariry to ,uiport our ail iesor our ov;n land based forces ashore, to seize bases to insure ourcontinued use of vital sea areas, or to destroy enemy base areasfrom v,,hich assaults against our forces at sea may be launched.Perhaps,mcre importantry, it rends substance to oui poiiti."tinitiatives urhen the impl ied threat to use military power serves' to cott'lince other trations to act in consonance with our national! nterdsts.

- an adequate degree of logistic independence. from foreign bases.

- a cornrnand, control and corrnunicatlon system which will permitthe reconnaissance and surveillance of hostile forces and thetactical and strategic direction of our own forces in theconduct of naval warfare

!ilhile these operations hate gerrerally been conducted with theobjectlve of influencing the outcome of evenis ashore, they have beencharacterized by a largely permissive threat enrrironment "i r.", rnonly two cases, the l-cnkin Gulf incident when u. s. destroyers r"rereattacked.by I'lorth

-Vietnamese torpedo boats and the lsrael i attack onu.s.s. Liberty oif the sinai coast, were u.s. forces engageJ-in-.risismanagement operations taken under attack (the North foreai attack onthe EC-l2l and the seizure of u.s.s. pueblo do not fit this categoriza-tion). There are, however, two relatively l-u."nr-,r""ar';;";-;;;

"ilg,.

Dmlassifi6deeoryfun Crmld R Ford tinrar5r

25

the threat environment in future such operations: the increasirlgcapabi I ity and wi i I ingness of the Soviet llavy to conduct countervai I ingoPerations in tire same areas with the objective of reducing U.S. influ-ence and manipuiating the threat of escalation to superpor,rer conf I ict,and the acquisition oi nii I itari ly credible antiship weapon capabl I ity byitt ittcreas lng ttullbt-'r of nonsuperpower natlons. Both of these ti-endsittcrc:.tst' tltc risk of erirploylng naval sui:face forces to inf luence events ashorc.:ancl tttal<e i t manda.tory for U. S. forces engaged in suih operat Ions to possessthe requisite mi I itary capabi I ity to counter these threats. The uniquef lexibil ity oi naval forces to be coriibined into tasl< forces sized and com-posed of units potentially capable of prevailing over such threats shouldassuretheircontinuedutilityinthi,scontext.

2. The Transition From Routine Forward Deplovment Posture totlorldrvide Co

ffiheSovietUnioninvolVe.aninitialIocalizedinterna-tional crisis in which the superpowers have conflicting interests.and/orwhich involve opposing cl ient states, Given the retratively unstable cur-rent international poiitical scene, there are numerous volatile situationswhere superpor^rer involvement in Iocal crisis (u.g;., ,frrab-tsrael i situation)could lead to general war betleen the U.S. and USSR.

Although uncertainties abound and possible force interactions aresensitirre to key assumptions, sone general ized observations about the con-duct of naval operations in this context can be made:

;;,; ;"';";;;; ;;; ;;;';;;' ;;,1,.;; ;;,iil:1";T:i:t:?:,and from their employment as signalling devices to bolster diplo-matic act ivi ty.

- The rate of deployment,.botli in terms of quantity and qualtiyof the forces in confrontation, ffiay have a major impact on theconduct and timing of diplomacy seeking to avert open confl ict.

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' Obviously, forces cJeployed to remote areas, or those lost or damagedseriously in combat with third poi^iers which'may precede r,nrldwide war withthe Soviet Union, would not be available at the crucial outset pf the largerconfl.ict. To the extent that acceptance of some ris.k is essential to wield-ing influence in non-Soviet crisis management operations, it is possible

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that sc'me losses or damage nray be incurred'. Should the Soviets deploynaval forces in'support of their interests they run a similar risk. Therrobabil ity and magnitude of these potential losses is highly scenariodependent, holvever, arrd it is thus impossible to estimate their imfact onthe outcome of vrar betleen the U. S. and USSR. lJhat is important here is torealize that there is significant uncertainty regarding the impact of pre-vious conf I ict with thi rd parties on the larger requirements for war betr^reenthe su.prerPol^/ers.

3. UgI]-C*l.l. C."v"ttl . A worl d- 'wide confi ict with the Soviet Union and its allies is the most demandingcontingency for the tjni ted States and our al I ies. Accordingly, U.S.general purpose forces are sized against this NAT0-centered confl ict.Keeping in mind the uncertainties regai-ding the transition phase outl inedabove, the remainder of Part V describes the conduct of naval operationsin such a conflict based on functionai employment of naval forces itt sea

control and power projection operations. ln addition to the specificrequirements that result from the diverse demands of this mos.t difficultscenario, the text d iscusses broad operational" corrcepts which.are rele-vant to any conflict involving the employmeni of naval forces.

a. Soviet Strategy

Soviet naval strategy has evolved rapidly over the past fifteenyears from a concept of a short. intensive conflict almost certainly escala-ting to a nuclear war, to one envisioning both conventional and nuclear war.At the.present time, Soviet strategists probably bel ieve.that VJarsaw Pact,aval bperations against NATO would be keyed to hostilities in Europe ?!d----cheir duration would depend on the course of the ground w4r.,.............f "" .....i':" ...... When hostili-ties comnrehced, lllarsbl Pact navies would attempt to establish controlover the Baltic and Black Seas, v,rould consider conduc.ting amphibious landingsin the Turkish and Danish Straits and possibly northern Norway, and attemptto destroy NATO naval forces -: particularly aircraft carriers and submarines.Attacks on antisubmarine forceso including the SOSUS terminals in the NorthAtlantic would also be likely. While some forces might be in a position tointerdict the sea lines of cornmunication at the beginning of hostilities,and probably would do so, the deployment of anti-shipping forces in largenumbers most likely would occur as hostilities became protracted. Thedecision to deploy the forces for a campaign against shipping would be

influenced by the Sovietst assessrnent of the land war, their view of thenature of the remaining threat f rom SLBI'ls and carriers, as wel I as thes ize of thei r survivi ng forces. tdi th thei r large submarine force, theSoviets have the capabil ity,.to conduct either an intensive anti-naval ,6.tafo.rce strategy or a strategy that focuses on breaching the sea lines that y'*o

link thc. United Statis and our al I ies. They also haye.the capabil ity to i;conduct these strategies simultaneously, although with leiser forces (and %hence greaten risk of failure) than could be dedicated'to either stratcgy \*if pursue-d singlY.

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. Tp carry out their tasks, the Warsaw pact navies probably wculd beorganized into regi'onal commands. Table I shovrs.the assumed organizedal location of soviet forces ro carry our this srr"l;s;:-l;; i"ir., of de_stroying l'lAT0's nuclear-capable naval fprces ana preiinting-seJtorn" rein_forcement of Europe most rikery wourd fall primarily on fo;";;-in rheocean theaters -- the Atrantic, pac.i.fic, and probabiy the m"Jiturr"nean.Naval forces assigned to the three,'continental', theaters __ t;; northern,central, and southern European -- probably would have the taski of con-trol I ing closed seas, conducting amphibious assaults, and rrpp.raing l,/arsawPact ground forcesaaaaa araaaaaaaa aaaaa

ln an 6perational sense, sea control ,ionsists of :

27

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-;.;";r;;'" years pr-obabry wirr see a continuation of recenttrends in Soviet naval strategy. Emphasis on open-ocean anti-submarinewarfare probably will increaser.........;-l. . . . . ... . .....,. ......... .1.... ...............i- -.. -'Bat istic missire submarines may gain agreater role in theater nuclear war, and Soviet strategists might considerthe possibility of us.ing nuclear weapons at sea while [ostilities in Europeremain conventional. The Soviets probably r^rill attempt to increase the Navyrsf i repourer, endurance, and survivabi I ity in conventionai *"r. -ir,"se

cons id-.erations, as wel I as the rleed to modernize their force, probably wi I Istimulate increased production of attack submarin"s, 6ig[-;;;;;;";e'surfaces'hips, logistic support ships, and strike and anti-iubmJrine aircraft. Theyprobably also will induce the ussR to attempt to acquiru gruaier access forits naval forces to overseas ports and airfields.

b.

To counter the soviet n1u:] stra:tegy outiined above and to carry outour national strategy in a worldwicle conftict, u.s. and allied forces willbe employed in sea contror and projection opeiations.

(l) .Sea

ContrgJ

Sea control is accompl ished by the destruction of hostile air,surface, and submarine platforms and baies which could constitute a threatto the U's.'or to u.s. or friendly forces operating in those *uritime areaswe seek'to Protect. Sea control can be effected Ui O.t"rring hortile plat-forms from entering areas from which they can threaten frienity forces.However, deterrence Permits the enemy to retain a force in being and requiresthe continued presence of U.s. forces for protection. ' J

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23

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Tabl e I

SOVIET NAVAL THREAT FORCES TgIS-IgBS

cv(s)CHG

SurfaceComba tan ts

Subma r i nes

SSN/SSGNss

\i rcraft

2

2

Northe rnFl eet

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l

6tl

63

5765

90

BalticFleet

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B.l ack SeaFleet

tsB-TsBs

-;

60

235

PacificFleet

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::l

5l20

43 2\ 5655\356

25

5554 7277 38

95 85

56 Bl

25-;

Anti-ShipCapab I e)

Fixed Wing

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72 5521 20

58 t+5

36 30

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Carr i ers

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SESB#Local operations conducted by .naval forces for sel,f protect ion

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(a) Threat Characterist ics That lnf I uence the Naval Campai_gn.As shown on Tab ignificantthreat in all three naval warfare areas (air, submarine, and surficu). -

-- Soviet air can close the objective area rapidly. However, itis readily detectable and Iacks persistence and staying:power. lt is ahigl-priority threat because of the speed with which ii develops ancl themobil ity which permits massing quickly in force, Present Soviet aircriftcan pose a threat to sea lanes over widd areas (see Figure'3).

The Soviet submarine threat deploys to the objective area muchmore slowly. However, the submarine atte.mpll to make t'he rnovement covertlyand once on station the submarine may be difficult to detect and defendagainst. Submarines are a persistent threat through their staying powerand weapon reload capacity. Soviet submarines are-a high priority threatbecause of their covert narure at{ Fgl:,-r}g?g".,. Slg.U-"Siys-e- _o-f the largelo-u-i9g -i-n-ventoryrr. . . . : : : . : : : : : . . . . . . , . . . . . . . o . . . o . . . . . . . . , .

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-- The Soviet surface ship threat develops slowlyr at 25 rc 3aknots speed of advancer; . .a a o a a a. a a o a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a

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behind the submarine. . .The Soviet sirrface ship threat ranlcs

and air threat 1.......-..-.....-..... ;:..

29

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.

The addition of longer-range cr.uise missi les (whether launched fromair, surface or subsurface platforms) to the Soviet arsenal further intensi-fies the threat by making it necessary to extend defensive perimeters anddestroy not only enemy platforms but e;remy missiles as wel l.

!.... . Attack submarines, minesand land-based patrol aircraft establ ish barriers to destroy submarines asthey proceed between hcimeport and patrol areas.,... ......:...-.-.:--

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The undersea survei I lance systems assist in detecting and locatingsubmarines. They pi'ovide data witlt which other forces can respond"to thecontacts and kill the submarines. Elements of'these forces are requiredin the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Pacific. :.

The combined effect of these operations will be to reduce thethreatpreSeniedtootlrernavalforcesandalliedshipping

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. Tactical forces conplement theseor defeating attacks on cri tical al I ied I

threatening Soviet bases and out of area

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strategic capabil ities by deterringand bases as well as attacking orresupply poi nts.

measures will reducetia:l staEes'of the warand air threats must

Although area sea control capabilities are sized on and orientedthe Soviet threat, another potential enemy is the Navy of the Peoplels

ic of China. While they have a large number of ships, as shov,rn in5, most of them are coastal patrol vessels that pose little threatuse of the seas. llowever, they do have sgme nuclear submarines andrange bombers. bJhile they do not constitute a major threat at this

their future progress must be closely'monitored-s. F oca

No other enemy navy constitutes an appreciable threat to freeglobal use of the seas in the foreseeable future. However, certaincountries will have the abil ity to make operations in certain narr-owseas difficult and expensive.

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(") tocal Sea Control Operations. Area ASt/the,submarine in the inithe threat is potentially high. ln addition, surfacebe defeated.

. The principal air threat to the sea lanes is land-based Sovietnaval aviation, particularly the BACKFIRE, plus'anti'-ship cruise missileslaunched from either submarines or surface ships. "ln order to defeat thisthreat some force with the ability to kill the bombers and/or the missilesis required. The carrier force with its'embarked anti-air warfare aircraftand surface-to-air missile capable supporting surface combatants is us,edfor that purpose

The Soviet Union has a large surface fleet. Although its lack oforganic air cover and geographic disadvan.tage would inhibit its use in theopen ocean during a war, the Soviets plan to employ it against our forces.Thus the U.S. must be prepared to destroy enbmy surface forces remaining atsea during a NATO war:. This is a task for carrier forces as well as land-based ai rcraft.

'' : Lbcal sea control forces must be capable of operating simulta-neously against aii', surface and submarine threat:s', as the eneiy has theinitiative in selecting the mode of attack in some areas of .the world.tlhile major surface combatants such as carriers andl'cruisers general Iypossess the capacity to handle multiple threats, smaller sll.ips and sub-marines normally emphasize only.one, or two warfare,.areas'.'.'lThe taSk forceconcept provides for. f lexibil ity of composition 'because the task forcecan be compbsed of units that contribute'the appropriate warfare capabil ityto meet the anticipared threat

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l. The Atlantic. Area anti-subrnarine warfare forces wouldestabl ish barriErs -- .-. -:- .-.

The effectiV'eness of these U"rri"rr'culd be largely continil;;t 'rF;'thL'aui-ation of the warning period prior

.o the outbreak of hostil ities and Soviet pre-deployrnents during the rvarningperiod.

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Carrier task groups operating in the sea cohtrol mode. wouid provideair and anti-submarine defense of convoys, would search out and destroySoviet surface ships at sea and protect ail iecl bases such as 'lceland whichare essential to the sea control campaign. Contingent upcln the course ofthe sea control campaign,t-I

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' Convoy escort groups woulcl protect ships carrying combat equipment,-ombat support equipmr-:nt and mi I itary resupply. Existing and projected'numbers of 'surface

e:ji:.,rr-ts are inadequate to pernrit U.S. surface combatantsto be programmed for ;:, i-,tection of general economic shipping (includingpetroleum products). The available escorts vrill be dedicated to the higherpriority mission of reducing the submarine threat to acceptable levels asquickly as possible, thus enabl ing resumption of economic shipping. Someallied surface combatants may be available to protect a mininium amount ofgeneral economic shipping; some petroleum resupply could be incorporatedinto protected combat resupply convoys

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strength of the allied initial defense in Europe will place pressureon the Soviets to concentrate their forces in the Atlantic in an effortto sever the sea lanes. Successful allied sea control operations. in theAtlantic would thus involve very substantial submarine losses by the So-viets as wel I as perntltting i resumption of signif icant oll del i.veries f rorrrtlrc Pt.rs ian Gu.l f to Eur<:pc.

2. The Med i terranean Sea. The Hed i terranean Sea representsaspecialcase7orffiespeciall.yfciranti-aiirwarfareforces because of the proximity of Soviet air bases and the sufface com-batants and submarines of the Sovi et l4.ed i terranean Squadron. ,.iisoviat,'forces*'ight.launch'a coordinated attacl< rorith their surface.ships ahd submarines /s

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against our carrier task forces. lrr addition, there is the possibility ofa large, enti-ship missile equipped, bomber 'raid originating in the Sovietunion in cocirciinatigl _tiIll-ll:".::ff."::.:l:0.::12...r-::b.'."..i:: .".,:::l:'... : .

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3. The Pacific. The Soviet subrnarine and BACKFIRE threatsare s imilar to Those-JT tfi'e EElantic, but gecgraphlcal di f ferences and lower

.strategic priori ties a ffect the response regui red. Current pians. do not en-vision avallabil ity of adequate U.S. surface combatants to provide protectionto general econcmic shipping in the Pacific. Limited protection might be'uu"ilable for some shipping to Hawaii anc'Alaska; some allied surface combat-

'ants may be available to protect a minimum level of economic shipPing acrossthe pacific. Despite substantial internal economic dislocation for ourAsian partners, including an austere level of rationing'.and a major draw-down of stockpiies, they should be abie to endure until'!he submarine threathas been reduced. ProvIding minirnunt essential ec,olom!_g support for Asianallies woulcJ noi be as time sensitive as the requirements for early m!]-L-

. t."ry relnforcement for NAT0. Therefore more time would be available toffit attrition on Soviet submarines by. !9!ing advantggg -oJ !!u cumulativeeffect of an anti -submarine campaig!: . . : : : : : : : : . : . : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :i--.

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4. The lndian Ocean. Our NAT0 and Japanese allies will con-tinuetobedep6nde@ulfoiIwhichmustbedeliveredoverlongsea I ines of communication that initial ly cross the lndian 0cean. Recognizingthis dependence, which was accentuated,b;r the 1973 Arab oil embargo, there has

been some progress toward stockpiling and develclpment of alternative sources tohedge against future curtailment of those supplies. l.f fully.implernented,,u.h ".iions should al lc,r^i the wai effort to be sustained for 60 to !0 daysif accompanied by stringent conservation measures. ln any NATO-l.larsaw Pacthostilities, the Soviets would be hard pr:essed to deploy air, surface orsubmarine forces to the lndian 0cean because of distance and vulnerabilityfabtors ancl force requirements in other areas. Recent Soviet rnoves, such as

development of their base at Berbera,.suggest that in a non-NAT0 context, theymay be planning maritime operations in this area. lndian Ocean sea controloperations may thus have to deal with Soviet nuclear-powered guided missilesubmarines, surface ships and aircraft.

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Por^ier projection operations consist primarily of the use of tactical'air and naval gunfire in direct'suPport of land operations and'/or the use ofamphibious forces in assault on land areas. :'

ln a war with the Soviets, the first.task for th'e Navy',w!ll be securingthe sea Iines of communication to perniit early'reinfoicement and resupply ofU.S. and al lied forces. hfhile the sea contrpl mission takes precedence, 'there

36

plann i rrg for NAT0 envis ions the use oi' naval forces to strengthen the f I anks,particulariy Greece and Turkey, by amphibious reinforcement or assaul t, sup-ported.by carrier-based strilces and naval gunfire. Sr,rpport oi the centralfront by carrier-based aircraft and arnphibious operations on the northernNAT0 flank are also envisioned, but tlreir ti'ming viould depend on the progresscf tlre Atlantic sea control campaign.

Horvever, analysis indicates that the contribution of even a fourcarrier task foice to the land battle in Central Er-rrope is small when com-pared either to U.S. tacticai air capahility or NATO tactical air'capability.ln Figure 6 it should be noted that the U,S. and NAT0,columns are additiveso that compared to the total, the I'lavy sortie capability is smal I andpotential ly expensive for the incremental effectiveness provided.

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t icin- bf the flar ine A.mph ib ious Forcestudy. Surface combatants and undervray replenishment grouirsanri-submarine and air defense of the amphib'ious forces are'the al ternatives considered.

........ Theare now under

requ i red forincl uded in

c. Operat iolal Ertrplc'ymgnt of Supporting Forces

Allied naval units frequently deploy from their home waters for spe-cific visits or exercises, but few maintain distant deployments; therefore,routine forward deployments are sustained by the active U.S. Navy forces.To conduct a vrorldwide conf lict at sea with the Soviet Union and its all ies,U.S. forces would be augmented by Naval Reserve units, Coast Guard ships,al I ied naval and ai r units and land-based aircraft. The avai labi I ity ofmany of these forces, particulprly during initial, combat and periods ofheightened tensions' that would probably precede.the outbreak of confl ict,is uncertain. Among the factors that v,rould lnfluence their availability arethe response by national decisionmakers to strategic warrring signals fromthe Soviet Union, the degree of allied support prior to the commencementof hostilities and their rvillingness to'commit forces, and the demands ofother high-priority missions. 0nce these supplementary forces are avail-able, they would be employed as outl ined below.

l. Naval Reserve and Coast Guard Forces.

. Naval reserve forces include l0 destro)rers, minesweepers,and three amphibious ships for a total of about 55 ships. The reserveswill have l3 squadrons of P-3 patrol aircraft by l!B0. ln addition,the Coast Guard (which becomes a part of the Navy in wartime) nol hasl3 ships c.omparable in size to a frigate with anti-submarine warfareend helicopter,cgRqbility that can be used for convoy support. They alsohave plans for 27 smal ler ships with convoy'capabit ity, Underway replen-ishment forces would be augnented by the Military Segl ift Cornmand whiclrnow operates 9 oilers for the Navy.

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ne Amphibious Force (Unf) consists ofWing, and appropriate combat support

a Marine Di.vision, a l4arineand combat service support

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. Ihe.laraifidPhdoqr froln effdd R Ford Ubrary

38

2. Allied Contribution.

All iecl contributions in the Atlantic,, Pacific and Hediterraneanould be sigpiiicant.. I'IAT0 planning explicitly re.cognizes the current and

progr"n,r"d lapabi I ities of al I member countries except France. AlthoughFrun." is not part oF the integrated I'JAT0 del'ense, her naval forces pose

a p robl em for the Sorr i et Un ion . France iras very recent I y announced i n-

creases in her cjefense buclget and has rnoved tvro attack aircraft carriersf rorn the Atl ant ic to the l4ed i terranean.

Although less forrnal, our plans in the Pacific also assume parti-cipation by allies. tn a worldwide confiict, the NAT0 contributions can be

'."i i"d on ln planning, but al I ied participation in lesser confl icts is highly

s cena r i o-dePenden t.

Defense spending in mcst a'l I ied nations has increased in realpurchas ing por.ler s ince 197A and prograrns

- to modern ize exi st i ng un i ts or to

acquir" *od"tn combatants are being carried out. AIlied forces, in the

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-cv-ei inC above tlrose now planned, hovrever, wil I

;;;;ir;'irritbu"a pol itical efforis in the countries concerned. \thi le the

aggregate nr*ur,.-l sirengtir ol= al I ied naval forces is impressive (espe-

"ilf t! r^rhen comparecl to that of the Soviet allies), on a ship by ship basis

most of the allied forces are not as capable as.lheir U.S. counterparts but

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of ships have an impaci on the maritime balance the relative size of U.S.

and Soviet alliest naval force is relevant; however, numbers alone are not

sufficient to infer a measure of warfighting capability. See Figures 7, B

ancl ! for comparative level of U.S. and allied forces versus. Soviet and

Warsarv pact forces. Flany NATO ships and aircraft.would be expected to be

l

I

occupied with coastal missionsopen ocean sea control. Figureestinrated unit avai labi I itY.

With respect to a woridwidebased interceptor aircraft (inctudingal I ied uni ts) could participate in the

(i.e., Baltic Sea) and not available for4 in Appendix A provides a JCS summary of

J. Land:Based Airc.raf t

Land-basecl tactical ai rcraft could contribute significantly tothe conduct of conflict at sea by providing interceptor aircraft to destroyenemy anti-ship missi ie carrying aircraft and surface combatants- Their con-

iiiUution wi] l- be constrain,'ed by thei r dependence on f ixed bases and the

anticipated requirqmepts for their: employment in support of the land battle'

conf I rct with the Soviet'UnionU.S. Air Force, Ln"rine Corps,maritime war as follow ::,,

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-- A Iancl-based air defense barr ier defending the l,lorth Atlant iccould be establ ished. The resulting level of effectiveness will be a

'unction of the number of aircraft that can be dedicated to the ntission.Crucial to this issue is the vulnerabil ity of bases to capture or neutral i-zation. Lack of a l.lorth Htlant ic base would reduce the effect iveness o1'

deployed forces in rnaintaining a barrier, whi le SovieL capture of a bsse woulc!further degrade effectiveness by creating a hosti le operating environment. An

effective barrier would significantly reduce the air threat to North Atlanticconvoys and perhaps allow some naval resources to be freed for convoy protec-tion roles.

-- The nature, course and outcome oi the air. battle will be a

consideration in the defense of the l'iediterranean. lf land-based tacticalaircraft are available and could be dedicated to combatting the Soviet bomber,

missile and surface ship threat, the carrier requirement in the l{editerraneanmight be reduced.

- Range I imitations ol' current interceptors may constrain land-based defense of the Pacific areas north of Hawaii; however, the terminalpoints of the sea lines of communication to Japan and most oiher Asianpartners can be defended by land-based forces. Land-based air defenseof part of the oil route from Alaska to tire Continental United States isfeasible. To the extent Iand-based aircraft can provide such protection tosea lines of communication, the requirement for naval combatant protectionwill be reduced.

-- Land-based defense of the Persian Gulf to Straits of Halaccail r-oute vrould not be feasible unless diplomatic arrangements were made for

che use of bases in that area. From the St.raits of Malacia north to Japan,the sea lines of communication could be'defended by forces in the Philippines,Taiwan, Japan and Okinawa.

.Lack of bases would also prevent land based defense of the

peisian Gulf to Europe sea line of communication around the Cape of Good

Hope.

ln all areas, gaps in existing radar coverage would require theernployment of airborne or space-borne radar surveillance systems. The

.*irting E2C and E:3A aircraft could perform this function, but it couldrequire numbers above currently programmed _force levels

/

The employment of short-range land-based aircraft-(e.g., F-q, A-7)against Soviet surface co:nbatants -is subject to similar restrictions; however,

tf,e use of longer range aircraft (such as the B-52, F-lll and F-l54) couldmake base dependency i"ss significant. The priority requirements for these

aircraft in; support.of conil ict ashore could linrit their availability for thewar at sea. ln.viewring probable operation of land-.!ased aircraf t for thisnrission, tlren, prirnary attention initially sliould b9 9,-v-uir-tg.tJtg.".qp]gYTe-nt

....1......:.........f08O"t.

43

c. Nuclear lnle.r at Sea

Throughout this study, the threat assessment, strategy and employnrentscenarios haVe been based primarily on an assumption that *"ri.re would beconducted with conventional armament only. lntelligence analyses, drawingon a-wide range of evidence, ciearly reveal that the Soviet Union, and Sovietnaval forces in particular, have the capability to conduct war at sea withnuclear l'JeaPons. l4oreover, thei r training, exercises, and tactics abundantlydemonstrate that they are prepai'ed to wage nuc'!ear war at sea -- perhaps fromthe earliest stages of any conflict. Soviet naval strategists also show anacceptance of the use of nuclear weapon! .in theater:level-warfare, includingspecifically, anti-carrier cperations, but in consonance with their use ashJre,

Adopting an assumption.that a war.at sea with the USSR would eitherbegin as a nuclear t'Jar or would repidly hecome a nuclear war has broad impt i-cations for any study of naval force structure and strategy. Tlre types ofsh!Rs necessary for conducting conventional wer at sea, and the manner inwhich they are emPloyed, are not necessarily the same as those demanded bynuclear war.

' The soviets could initiate nuclear hostilities at sea.must determine the best way or ways to respond to the likelihoodof nuclear weapons by the soviets. This response can be made atltrategic actions, tactical measures, and, oyer the longer t"r*,to the force structure.

Thus, weof fi rst useseveral level s:modifications

At the strategic levei, we shculd seek to deter use of nuclear wea-Pons at sea'.o......... ..... .r............

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Hodifications to force structure, because they would take ffectgv ,v.Ls JLrqvLqrst utruduse f,ney WoUIO taKe gftgct

:1":ly^:t.l:l tl:l: :uplace, old, are " rons-t"rrn r.urponru. rhe precise way -,--

il_:!icfr foSce.structures should chanse n"!d, addiri;;;i-una';ii5.lrrl"t;-t':"r0h)rrr wrrrvrr rvr eE )Lr uLLuIes snoulo cnange needs additional and priority, in ,d. ftensive'analysis. lt can be argued that 'a nuclear warfare environment .ro,,^.-t-l --1..^^ rL- - I

:.ild reduce the varue of the targe carrier, which poses too iemptiwouls resuce tne vatue of the large carrier, which poses too tempting a r"!nuilear target for a rational opponent to resist. such rogi",";;;";l;" iso i,

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urge greater emphasis on submarines, which can evade nuclear attack moreeffectively than surface vesseis -- and lvhich, if armed lvith SLCl4s, could

:tain a potent capability'for fighting a war at sea and perhaps for pro-ting por,..rer ashore in a hosti Ie environment. Programs to develop large

urlilibers ol' srna] ler surface combatants would be consistent with nuclear war,as it would reduce the value of individual targets nhile proliferating thetoial number of targets. This concept suffers fron the cjisardvantage thatthe resulting I'iavy might not be very capable at fighting a conventional war.Tlre versatility and flexibility necessary for forivard deployments would bered uced.

An alternative response wouid be to focus the force structure onlarger and inherently rnore potrerfui ships that would be better able to keePthe prospective nuclear attacker at bay: larger carrier task forces withhigh technoiogy aircraft, SLCHs, multi-capaLril ity escorts that can keepthe submarines alvay from the carrier, advanced defensive systems for de-stroying incoming missi le attacks, etc. This option would retain the higherdbgree of f lexi bi 1 ity and be adaptable to al I level s -of warfare and usef ulacross a wider spectrum of national policy options- However, it would beprohibitivel.v expensive. Horeover, with adl'anceb in anti-ship capahlemissiles, ir may not be possible to eliminate leakage through the carrier'sdefen s es

It is evident that this is a highly complex and uncertain issue whichmerits intensive study in the immediate future. 0nly by careful analysis ofthe requi rernents of nuclear vrar can we ensure that the evolving naval deploy-ment program fol lows the proper course.

D. Current Net Assessment of Capabi 1 ities ;- U.S. Versus USSR

l. Force Trends. Since 1960, the size of the U.S. Navy has grownto almost lo0o sElEThen decl ined to fewer than 500, while the Sovietf leet grew f rom about 1350 to about I /00 ships, then reti.rrned to about1350. ln or-der to estimate the impact of these changes'it is necessary toaccount for qual i tat ive as wel I as numeri ca'l faitors.

2. Sea Control

USSR: The number of Soviet ships and aircraft having sea denialcapability hal-?Ecreased as a result of block obsolesence of older, lesscapable platorms. A slight downward trend in.gross numbers will probablyc.ontinue. Howeverr'in addition to a sharp increase in nuclear powered units,fronr 0 to j17,, there has been a significant upgrading in the capability ofneur const ruct i on un i ts to perform both sea c'cintrol and sea den i a I mi ss ions .

This trend will continue.

The Soviet Navy urill have sea-based tactical air.for the firsttime in the KIEV-class 'carriers. Sovigt surface combatants have remainedessentially constant in number, but newer units are larger and have bettersea keeping capabilities. ln 1960, there were only six'surface-to-surfacemissile (SqU) ships and no surface*to-ai r missile (SnN) 'ships in .the So-viet f leet. Today, ther.e are three times as many SSM*equipped."ships and

-fourth of the surface combatants have SAMs. I '

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Soviet naval aviation has been'strengthened by the addition of anti-ship missile launching aircraft and by irrtroduction of the BACI(FIRE bomberwhich could have a once-refueled radius oi about l/!0 n.m. Should a re-fuel ing capabil ity be deve'!oped for BACKFIRE, it could reach the majorconvoy routes to NAT0 and Pacific allies:

The Soviet's have developed deep sea mines, " " " .. '

The maJor area where Soviet techrtol.ogy is rnore acivanced than thatof the U.S.'is anti-ship missiles, an area in whieh they have the lead inboth numbers and capabilities. The U.S. rvill probably match the Sovietsin nurnbers by the mid-l9B0s as HARPOOi{ and long range cruise missi Ies aredep I oyed.

U.S.: Nine older anti-submarine carriers have been retired since1960, butlfi-e capabi lity has been replaced by employing the S-3 anti-sub-marine aircraft aboard all large carriers. Heasuired in terms of aggregatekill potential, carrier-based anti-subma;:ine air capability has increasedrelative to the threat since 1960,

The most drastic change since 1960 has been the reduction in thenumber of surface conib'atants anci amphibious ships. lndividual uni ts haveincreased in capability, but the decrease in numbers has been so drasticthat the net capability has been reduced

Land-based air anti-submarine forces have decreased frorn 30 to 24dct?ve squadrons, but the individual units have improved and the reserveshave inherited better aircraft, yielding a net increase in this 'capabil ity.

Continued emphasis on quieting and better sensors give the !6 ner+ersubmarines more'thanl.. .. . times the barrier,kill. width relative to tlre in-creascd threat when iompareo' to the diesel submqrines they replaced.

The U.S. trend in air defense has been toward qualitative improve-ments rvith essentially constant force levels, The F-l4 is at least fourtimes as capable as the F-B against the BACKFIRE and BADGER. Surface-to-airmissi Ie ships have only marginal capabi I ity for engaging moderate guantitiesof anti-ship missiles due to excessive reaction times and poor cbordination.These deficiencies provide the basis for the Navyrs need for the AEGIS airdefense system.

. ln anti*sl'rip lvarfare the U.S. continues toto its carrier-based air. As the HARP0ON anti-shisurface ships and anti-submarine warfare aircraft,furtlrer enhanced. j

l(

enjoy an advantage duep missile is added tothat advantage wi I I be

. . .'. ; . . . . .

has resulted in a substantialrequ i red us to bu i I d more

lnrise in the

summa'r'y, Soviet naval development,conrplexi ty of the threat, and has

'aaf

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capabilities. cost ofCing, we

r eve I s. The

into our platfor-ms.to counter them. This in turn'has raisedthe ind?vidual piatforms so thatn rvithout increases in overal'lare unable to procure sufficient numbers to niaintain our fo'rcechanges in sea controi capah,ility are summarized in Table 2.

E.

ln order to mairitain maritime superiority with respect to theSoviets, alternatives to the currently planned force structure should

consider the mission asymmetrics and qual itative trends discusseci in thenet assessment. The war-fighting components of the Navy can be consideredin four categories: strategic retal iatory forces, amphibious forces' areaanti-submarine and ocean surveil lance forces, and multi-Purpose task forces.Alternative force structures for strategic and amphibious forces are notdiscussed expiicitly in this study because they are the subject of otherongoing stuciies.

Area anti-submarine and ocean surveillance forces provide th'e caPa-

bil itv to wage an area-l4/ide attrition campaign. They include the underseas

and ocean surveillance systems, rnine forces, Iand-based patrol aircraft, and

attack subma.rines when operating in barrier and. area intercept roles. These

forces are di rected almost exclusive'iy against the Soviet ihreat, and are

structured to take advantage of geographic choke points through whichSoviet ships must pass in order to reach the sea lanes used by ourselvesand our aliies. The need for these forces is determined largely by

geography, and they must be in place at all strategic locations in ordbr- i'ccrk the bottler'; hence they are treated as an essentiaily fixed,uirement in the aiternatives considered. There are numerous Programs

...r upgracie the cepabil ities of these systems to keep pace vlith the Sovietthreat

Multi-purpose task forces made up of sea-based aircraft, surfacecombatants, ancl attacl< submarines constitute the primary elements bf ourroutinely forward deplo),ed forces; it is their mission to gain and/or main-tain conirol of tacticaliy necessary seaspace', to project power ashore, tomaintain U.S. pol itico-nril itary presence and to establ islr presence and dem-

onstrate our larger capacity to project power in crisis contingencies.The aggregate level of forces places a limit on the number of sea areas inrvhich simuitaneous operations can be conclucted. lt also constrains thestrength or density of force that can be marshalled against an enemyrsstrongest defenses and determines the amount of hedge that can be providedagainit the risk of early damage from a pre-emptive attack against our for-r^ra rd dep loyed forces

planning factor-s have been developed to describe notional task forces.A notional carrier air vring consists of 2.-3 fighter squadrons (tZ aircrafteach), 3-5 attacl( squadrons, l-2 anti-submarine squadrons, anC hel icopter,early. warning, reconnaisance electronic warfare aircraft. The notionalcartier task group consists of a carrier, 2-4 cruisers, 4-6 destroyers and

guided missi le destroyers, and 0-2 attack submarines. A nuclear carrieriask group nominally consists of a nuclear carrier, 2-4 nuclear cruisers,

..1 up to 3 attack iubmarines. Task groups are also provided for the supportmi I itary corivoys, amphibious forces, and underway replenishment groups-

D*ciaeeifiod.Fkdooryy froE Gurld R Fosd Ubrary

Fo rce Alternatives

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Declassi$edPhe&GsSt &oE Cr.rrld R Ford Ubrarg

49

The most ca-pable task forces are structured around the eircraft carrier,the aircraft from which provide survei I lance, olti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and strike capabilities, making ihe task foice a versatii;;;Jflexible combat entity. Less capable task forces are formed without carriersto operate in areas of lower threat and/or where one or more of the multi-purpose capabilities are not required.

Loqistic forces, including underway replenishment ships, tenclers andsuPport ships and aircraft ntust be provided for the warfighting elements.The number required is largely a function of the size of the force beingsupported; however, the composit!on of the support force is also sensltiveto the types and missions of the combatant forces. fn" support ship build-ing programs are needed to arrest the increasing age of this force and thedeclining trend in force levels. Key requirements include the auxiliarycategory, where there is a critical need for both tenders and repair slrips.At the end of FY 77, the average age of repair ship's wi I I be 35 years. i,tor"-over, the fleet of newly constructed, sophisticated destroyers requires theservices of modern tenders which can support their advanced anti-air and anti-submarine systems. 1,/ithin the undervrey replenishment ship category, the mostpressing requirement is for fleet oilers: Except for the ships of the Neoshoclass (20'r years of age), the remaining f leet ollers are of World l{ar ll vin-tage" The number of oilers required depends upon the size of the supportedforce and the distance between the force and i.ts source of supply. To insureresponsive underway replenishment of deployed carrier groups durlng contingencyoperations could require as many as 26 oilers. Each alternative force struc-ture defined below includes a balanced support force tailored to suit a forceof that particuiar size and composition; ,

The capabilities of alternative forces are determined by notionallydeploying the available task forces and determining the number of arees inwhich simultaneous operations can be conducted. This process is inherentlysubjective.since it involves a sequential series of judgments with respectto threat (where the Soviets wiII choose to deploy theii forces), hedgeagainst early force damage (whether or not the Soviers are likely to.on-duct a successful pre-emptive attack), and force composition (how strongdoes each task force have to be to defeat the expected threat). ln theevent of conflict with the Soviets, our current strategy accords NATOEurope the highest priority on assignment of forces. This means thatthe U.S. plans to make available to the NATO theater commanders thoseforces that are mutual ly agreed to during the annual NAT0 force planningprocess. dravring down Pacific Fleet resources as necessary. An alternativeallocation of forces between the U.S. contribution to NAT0 and U.S. forcesin the Pacific,/lndian Ocean could be made by accepting increased risk inNATO in order to retain greater capabilities in the Pacific. :

To provide a real.istically acceptable alternative, any force structuremust al'so include a sr-ifficient number and mix of ships to permit the Navy toperform its presence and crisis management roles. To preclude giving falsesignals of reciuced U.S. interesl or impaired U.S. abil ity to protect itsinterests and support its friends, future force I'evels sh6uld enable us tomaintain at least our current level of peacetime forward deployment. Thesizd 'and composition of the force neecled for the Navyrs _tol lateral pol iticaland diplomatic roles provides an additional tdst of ihe adequacy of theforce alternatives derived from analyses of war-fighting requirements.

;

'llblYlll*rr'

l. The Five-Year D-glglfle.-JrqSraT,-'AltPrnai ' Tht currentlyestabl ishecl'rive-m'nvirie> .o- benchmark against which tol.i"tt the capabil ity of major force alternatives,. The net as.sessment

linecl above is based on inis fc'rce level' Table 3 shows FY 77 forces

, displays the force structure that wiiI result in FY 85 and FY 90 fronr

inrflementing the five year shipbui lding program Presented to Congress wi th

the FY 1977 buclget re(lLrest'

The FYDP force structure contains l2 active carrier task grcups' lt has

one aciditional carrier urithout an ai r wing that is not' routinely deployable

in peacetime but could be added to the force with a reserve or Marine air wing

.in wartime. lt provides the basic area AS!/ and ocean su;veillance capability'It provides amphibious Iift of 1 ll3 Marine Amphibious Force assault echelons'

ln order to l<eep J=our carrier groupi forward deployed in peacetime v;e would

have to continue to homeport o;le overseas. ln terms of cost, it is the base

ugui"ta which the other fot"t alternatives have been compared'

There are differing vietis about vlhether forces would have to be with-drawn iro* the Eastern Mediterranean and about the effect-that woul'd.have

on the conduct of the vrar. Most anal)'ses indicate that if the USSR does

not have Egyptian bases, four .u.tiutt can.cont?ol the Mediter'ranean' There

ui* oimi lai'differences concerning the mlnimum level of 'shipping to Japan'

Both the volume or rrtipping anci Jipanrs contribution to its protection

affect'U.S. requir"**nir. Anal)'sis -indicates that Japan can make a signif-

. icant contribution to the defense of her shipping; efforts to encourage

her to do so shouid continue.

2. The Recluced Force - Alterna,t-l]|g-A - This contains the same level

"r.u ulai- i l lance forces as the

'other

rernatives but has three fewer carrier task groups than the Five-Year

Defense Program. While it can provide the sbme sea control forces for the

i:l:l:?"'ll]'FI;ir;:'::"';"il; 5'"ii"-'i;;-Y;;; ;;i";;;-riosr"*, '?':'?T? ,/#ffimise wif l have to be marle in our t"lATO force contributions' Support to tne

/*osouthern f lank could be delayed or capabil i.tier-foi carrier task,glo:1, ' i;. ;;;;;;;i;"r in the Atlantic could be reduced. .Alternatively'l"nO-::::: ,.- $r \""-.

tactical air could be rel ied upon to control the air and surface threat in \ -'f ,

the Mediterranean. Analyses suggest that, given adequate time to attrite the \'" ' '"/'.

;;;-t submarine threat, it',is foil. can perform the basic sea control function

in a NAT0 war. This force maintains amphibious Iift of I l/3 Marine Amphibious

Force assault echelons. This force cannot maintain the current forward deploy-

ment of four carriers nor meet the current l0 carrier wartime conmitment to

NATo. 0ver the next l5 years, this force wo.uld cost $43 billion less in con-

stant FY 77 budget. dollars than the presently programmed force'

3.Thglnternrediate.Force-n-]-!ell!gyeC-Thisforcecouldpro-vide six carrier@FTTc,-T;;;_in the Mediterranean and

two, in the Pacific. Two carriers are assumed to be in overhaul, one of whictr

nright be available on short notice. lt provides the sam? area anti-submarine

warfare capabir ii; ;; ;h" FyDp force but wourd provi,de additionar local pro-'

tection of "onuoyr,

task forces, and amphibious ships' Amphibious I ift for

i-* m"rine Amphibious Force assault echelons is providbd' This force can

fuup u, least four carrier task forces forvrard deployed in peacetime with

'lo ilor"porting, as can any of the larger options; Over the irbxt l5'yearswould cost about $29 Uittion more in constant FY'77 budget dollars than

$fP,ff.re present Progranr..

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l+- The Navy's Recommended Force - Alternative D - This would pro-.'ide for six carrier task groups in the Atlantic,'f ite in the t,tediterranean;

itial Iy there would be three carrier task groups in the Pacif ic, growingfive upon urgent completion of v;ork on the two carriers assumed to be

in overhaul. The eleven carrier task forces available to NAT0 Europecould be employed flexibly to support the land r.rar after sea control isachieved, to cover anphibious operations or to conduct strilces againstSoviet bases; they wouid also provide a substantial hedge against earlyfcrce darnage. Amphibious Iift capacity is provided for 1 2/3 Marine Amphi-bious Force assault echelons. 0ver the next l5 years this force would cost

.alnrost $gO Uillion more in constant FY 77 budget dollars'than the presentp rog ram.

5. The JCS Joint Strateg_ic Objective Plan (JSOP) Objective Force -Al ternat i ve E

ficreE;Ed.- to a level cons idered adequate to keep attrition of surface shippingwithin acceptable 1 imits. The JCS designate seven carrier task groups forinitial sea controi operations in the Atlantic and Iater employment in pro-jection operations. This al ternative would provide six carrier task groupsin lhe Mediterranean for initial sea control operations and sr:bsequent supportof amphibious operations in Greece and Turkey or projection operations in sup-port of tl're land battle in NAT0. Two carrier task forces are assumed to bein qverhaul at the commerlcenrent of hostil ities, so only two task forces are

. ini tial ly avai lable in the Pacil=ic. Ultimate'ly, four carrier task forceswould be available to provide limited sea control and projection operationsin the Pacific/lndian Ocean areas. Amphibious lift capacity for nearly twoMarine Amphibious Force assault echelons will provide simultaneous lift

ability in the Atlantic and Pacific. Over the next l5 years this force-rld cost $182 billion more in constant FY 7.7 budget dollars than the FYDP.

6. The JCS JS0P Prudent Risk Force: The JCS consider a force of1094 ships ne riers; 517 major surface com-batants , and I 44 attacks subs) to meet the str;ri-egy with a prudent I eve I ofrisk, bu.t this force is not attainable in the m.id-range period. lf attainable,this force could be employed with seven carrier task forces in'the Atlantjcfor initial sea control operations and later projection operations. Sixcarrier task forces in the l'lediterranean would provide for sea control oper-ations, support of amphibious operatiorrs and subsequent support of the land.battle. With two carriers initially in overhaul, five carrier task forcescould be employed in the Pacific/lndian 0ceans. This alternative would pro-vide amphibious lift to support two l4arine Amphibious Forces, one each inthe Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. 0ver the next l! years this force wouldcost $214 billion more in constant FY // budget dollars than the FYDP.

Table 4.The capabi I ities of each alternative force are summarized in

V!. SPECIFIC PROGRAH OPTIONS

A. Deci s ions Reou i red

Deci s ions are requ i red on threb i ssues : What shoul dof the Navy be? What types and mix of ships should that

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be composed of, particularlyshcu I d the ratb of g rowt.h torelated. and tradeoffs must be

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in view bf erherging new techonology? What

the force levels be? The decisions are inter-ntade in their resoiution and execution.

upon the wartime sea control capabi I i typossess, the forward deployments that

forces qeeded to maintain an appropriate

While the aiternatives that are derived from this analysis differin cost, that difference I ies rvitlrin a relativel,ri narrow range and costshould not be vielved as the driving factor. The heart of the matter isone of qualitative differences among the options: the various types andmixes of surface shipsr submarines and aircraft that will be available tothe Navy in the years ahead. Herice, in reaching decisions on the fol ibrvingissues one must keep in mirrd that the principal concern must be the inrpactthey wil I have on tlre structure and mission-performing capacity of the Navy,rather than thei r cost impi i cat ions.

l. lssues Related to Force Levels

The s i ze of the l.lavy dependsand power projection capacity it mustit must sustain in peacetime and theU.S./Soviet naval balance.

Considering the tasks outl ined previously that the U.S. Navy may

be called upon to accompltsh -- maintaining freedom of the seas, deterringwar by presenting to the vrorld evidence of determination to meet U.S. conmit-nents, and the need to retain.flexibility to meet or adapt to new threats and

concepts posed by ernerging technology -- a series of program options can be

l.le have evaluated a range of forqe alternatives for I!B! rangingfrom a reduced force of 498 ships (including l0 aircraft car'riers)to theJCS pruclent risk fo.rce of approximately ll00 ships (including 20 carriers).

Assuming that the current Navy missions wili not undergo funda-mental changes into the 1990s, the following rationale was used to narrowthe range oi for.. alternatives (Section V) and develop the program optionspresented in Section Vl.B:

-- A reduced force alterrrative, probably capable of providingminimum essential sea control in a limited geographical area, would requirea reduction in forvrard deployments that would likely be viewed as a diminutionof U.S. concern. Reduced capability in the Pacific and Mediterranean could be

viewed as representing an inferior U.S. maritime capabil ity-

-- The force approved in the current Five Year Defense Program isdeficient in'quantitative as urell as qualitative terms vrith respect to thecurrent and.projected Sov'iet threat. lt would not provide sufficient shipssoon enough to gqstain tlre desired stance of maritinre superiority or prolectvital routes and territory in the Pacific. Neiiher would it provide thefleet with the expanded AAW capabity it needs or exploit the.opportunitiespresented by continuing R&D efforts. lt would enable us to maintain thecurrent peacetime Ievels of ai rcraft carrier clepioyments. on]y unti l the SLEP

program begins in I980, with reduced levels thereafter.

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-- Two iarge force level al ternati.rres provide increased capabi I i tyin the l'lediterranean and Pacific theaters and hedge against early forcelosses. lf our al I ies vrill continue to irnprove their-capabi I ities, we canreduce our need for such hedges, Furthermore, the $lZS-ZOO bi I I ion addedl!-year costs (constant budget doi lars) of such oprions vlould inf,iil;-;;;-suit of new concepts and capabilities.

1/ithin the ren;aining range of force lerrel objectives, specificshipbui lding program options have been deveioped for each al ternative.They differ primarily in the level. ?f ',isk accepted in the NAT0 war scenario,in the level of sea control available for the Pacific and lndian oceans, andin the level of assurance provided for maintenance of current forward deploy-ments. Any proposed shipbui lding programs should, as a minimum:

lnsure that sea control can bb maintained in the Atlantic, theMediterranean, and the Eastern Pacif ic to Hav,raii and Alaska

Providein the Pacific and

Sustainant presence/crisis

minimum essential support for U.S.for our Pacific allies.

'forces forward deployed

-- Exploit new technology, while hedging against loss of currentproven capabil ities.

2. lssues Related to the Composition of the Navy

-

a. Qual i tat ive cons iderdtions

tn terms of the trends in relative 'U.the most press ing requiremenf i s 'to strqngthbn our

roughly current levels of forward deployments and attend-management capabi I i ties.

S./Soviet capabi I ities,abil ity to defeat the

three-dimensional threat in the initial stages oforder to assure our reinforcement capabil ity and

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- Extended survei I lance.ircraft cai'riers'. 0rbital. systems,rd-based aircraft, and ship-based

.ve a role.

- Greater emphasis onrather than attempting to rvard offi s improved area survei I lance (ai r,mobi le systems to intercept and des

capabi ilties for task groups vrithoutsh i p-based V/ST0L a i rc raft, long-range

RPVs all offer pronrise, and each.may

extending our offensive capabi I itiesattaiks as they approach. The keysurfs6s, and undersea) with highly

troy threats as detected.

b, Carriers and Cost

A part of the decision on holv many ships the Navy should haveis to decide what the carrier force level shoulci be. The carrier task forceis the most highly visible, capable, end flexible element of the Fleet today,and it viiil remain so for at least the next decade. Beyond that point, manybel ieve the shape of the f.lavy's task for:ces wi I I begin to change as nel^/ sys-tems now in development reach the production stage. The numbei of carriertask forces that can be formed from the active fleet determines in part theoveral I speed and conf idence with v.rhich contrcl of the sea lanes can bemaintained in an all-out war with the Soviets; it also reflects the day-to-day capability to react to contingencies and hence deters the escaiation ofconfl ict.

lf the U.S. is to have mgre than 12 carriers after 1985, a carrierbuilding program must be initiated. A lZ-carrier or lower tevul can be''tstained through the l99Os with a Seryice Life Extension Program (St-Ep)

l:the. more modern carriers. Even to maintain a ll-carrier iorce leve.t,.. carriers are required since the carrier undergoing SLEP wiii be decom-

missioned for a period of up to 2\ months, Figur-e l0 illustrates therecommended option to increase force levels to lZ-carrier and shows thecombi'nation of SLEP aniJ bui lding prograrn required. With ai rcraft carriersservi;ng as the heart of the n"uil't"it force, a decision concerning thenumber of carriers is fundamentai to the proper balancing of the remainingdefai;ls of the Navy program.

';i:;i ,Because carriers are actually floating air bases, their design is

driven by tlre number and type of aircraft they are to carry. Alternativesize 'carriers for the conventional a!rcraft piogrammed to be in servicethrough the 1990s have been studied and are d?scussed below. Design ofvertical or shorr takeoff (V/Sf0l) aircraft would fundamentally alterfutu're carrier.designs in the closing years of the century.

i'':'ir ,ln general, as sholn in Figure ll, increasing the size of a carrier

reduceis the cost per embarked aircral=t and as a conseguence reduces thecost per. generaied sortie, given that the task being performed by the car-rier lrerluires al I the sorties ii can genOrate. ln situations where thecarr-ier is being used for sustained projection 'operations that is general lythe case. ln situations slrort of all-out war with the Soviets where thecarrier is providing sea control support to a convoy, it may be less costiy

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to provide sustained capaUiiity but at a lower tempo; The Navy has investi-gated the design of a 50,0C0 ton,:i1-fired carrier (CVf-C8t-) rvhich vrouldhandle all present llavy aircraft, for use in sea control operat,ions. AfterTitle Vlll r+as enacted, the Navy studied a 50,00C ton nuclear carrier (n-S)whose lead-ship would cost less than a fourth Nl14lTZ class carrier.

The alternatives available for procurement are sholn in the follorvingtable (v/Srol Support Ship (VSs) included for comparison purposes):

CARR IER OPT IOI{5Cos t

(nT-o"iTars)

N IFl ITZ

KENNEDY

ruavy (a-5)

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tluc I ea r

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0il-Fired

0il-Fired

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$1.538

s2.48

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$1.3e

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153

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l,lhile the procurement cost of the smal I nuclear option exceeds that ofa NIHITZ follow-on, the total J0 year life cycie cost of ihe small nuclearcarrier anci i ts air wing is about t'wrc-thirds the cost of a Nli.llTZ. This isattributable to th'e smal ler air wing of the small nuclear version. The costof the 50,000 ton oil-fired carrier woulci be less than,the A-5 version.

. To build a force of mcre than .i Z deployable carriers (i.e., more thanl3 carriers in the inventory during the SLEP period) would entail greatercosts than those listed above, primarily because it would be necessary toprocure and operate additional air wings. The average annual increnentalcost of the l4th and subsequent carriers (ttttltTZ class) and their associa-ted. air vrings would be about $.E Uillion per year per carrier.

C. Nuclear/Conventional Power Hix

Title Vlll directs that al I ships procured to operate with thestrike force urill be nuclear powered. The law allows the Fresident to makea determination that itris in the national interest to build a class of shipswithout nuclear propul sion.

The appi ication of nuclear propulsion to the submarine has re-sulted in a true submersible; the advantages are so pronounced that we haveeliminated construction of any other lcind of submarine. Nuclear propulsionalso adds to the capabil ities of cruisers and aircraft carriers. Studiesand analyses have shorvn that nuclear powered cruisers.and carriers arebetter than oil-fired ships for certain operations.

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Nuclear power has tivo attributes that make it attractive forsome cairier task force missions. First, since it does, not h"ve to berefueled every few days but can sustain uninterrupted transit speeds, thecarriei- is freed frorn logistics suppor.t whiie in transit. A nuclear-powered carrier can niake an 8,C00 nm trans it and arrive on station in 10to l2 days ready to conduct,operations. lt could tlren conduct high inten-sity conrbat operations for B to l0 days before it needecl replenishnrent. lfit had accomplished its mission, it could then retire without replenishment.An oil-f ired carrier would requii'e about lB days to tran-cit the same dis-tance and, luhen it arrived, lvouid need to be replenished before it couldstart operations or before it could retire from the scene. ln contrast,hovrever, if the transit distance is only on. the order- of 4,000 nm (".;-,east coast of U.S. to eastern Mediterranean), the nuclear ind oil-firedcarrier can arrive at aboui the same time.

' Adciitionally, the freedom from the necessity of frequentlyreplenishing prgPulsion fuel gives the task force comrnander significanttactical f lexibil ity, permitting rapid and imme'diate movement ul,hich couldgreatly comPiicate Soviet efforts to target the carrier force for preemptiveattacks during prolonged periods of tension.

Tlre second advantageous feaiui'e of nuclear pcwer is that itleaves the carrier approxiinatel! twice as much tankage that can be devotedto aviation fuel. Thus, a nuclear carrier can sustain air operations abouttwice as long as a similar size oil-fired carrier. This factor significantiylessehs rel iance on underway replenishnent forces, rnakirg ;;;;iut"-r,igh speedret irement f rom the combat area vrhen replenisl;-ment of aviai ion fuel andrrr,inance beccmes necessary. '

ln responding to a contingency, these factors courd be veryimportant depending.upon the way in which the crisis developt "na

how muchtime is available to make a decision. The benefits are aifiicult to quan-tify, but they do give more flexibiiity to the decision maker. ln situationsrequiring a high-speed transit over a considerable distance followed by aperiod of high intensity'operations in an area where replenishment at seais either not available or is extremely difficult because of-trrreats to thereplenishment forces, nuclear-propulsion gives a substantial advantage incomparison to a conventional ly-powered taik force.

ln clrcumstances that involve high intensity strike operationsfor a long durat.ion in one iccation such ", Vietnam, the benefits of nu_clear power are smaller. Regardless of type of propulsion, the carriershave to be repienislred because of the large ordnance and aviation fuelexpenditure- The nuclear por^yered sh!p needs to be replenished less ire--quel!ly, but by proper design of the oiI-fired carrier, that differentialcan be nrinimized.

' ln a sustained sea control campaign such as is envisioned in aNAT0 war, where the carrier provides anti-air-waii"rul-.n,i:r"ur,1"rine r.,rar-fare, and anti-surface ship protection to'the sea I in"r-oi .;;;;"ication,the tempo of operations would not be high enough to make the replenishmentinterval a factor for ei ther type ship. -"- '"r

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the primary disadvantage of nuclear power is its'high ini{ial cost -offset a few percent by the avoidance of propulsion fuel costs. lnitial in-vestment bnd Iife cycle ccsts are compared below:

.

(l) Large Deck Carf i-er-s: 38% nore for investment (+$470 mi I I ion)lj'/, morein 3O VeaFiosts TFr-OUliIj-lion) for a follovr-on NIHtTZ class shipcomPared to same size convent ional carrier. Life cycle cost comparisons ofalJ-nuclear versus all-conventional carrier task groups yield differences offrom 9 to 20"2 depending on assurrnptions regarciing fuel costs ancl task groupcomposit ion. Navy studies indicate tirat a smaller carrier designed for seacontrol would cost nearly as muclr as a Iarge carrie'r if it were nuclearpovrered, but it would cost substantially less (about !) if oil fired.

(z) AEGIs cruiser: 772 mcre ,for investment (+$750 mil I ion) thana conventional tV poGiea-OOe -tr7 {the AEGIS variant of the DD 953 destroyer) .Comparison to a notional conventional ly powered cruiser with sirnilar mi I itarycharacteristics indicates a 3lZ (+$tgS mil I ion) investrnent cost dif ferenceand a 327, 3}-vear cost (+$468 miIIion) difference.

ln summary, the primary advantage of nuclear powered task forcesare thei r strategic mobi I ity, greater logistic independence, and tacticalflexibility. These benefits rnust be balanced against the higher unit cost ofnuclear-porvered warships. The nuclear-pcwered warshiprs Iimited access toforeign ports may also impinge upon its effectiveness as a token of U.S.interest in peacetime or Iow-intensity confl ict situations. Given budgetconstraints, the added capabi I ities must be weighed ag.rinst the savings/increased area coverage that would result from a mix of nuclear-and conven-ticnally-pcwereri ships. Figure I2 illustrates the kind of impact thepropulsion mix has on the number of ships that can be procured from a givenshipbuilding budget

lf, however, we are to procure on]y one additional large deckcarrier, the selection of nuclear rather than conventional propulsion is-iustified for a number of reasons. Reverting to conventional propulsionwould require extensive and costly redesigning of the ship and its systems,whereas another Nll"llTZ class carrier can be built from existing plans andusing existing production programs. The potential savings to be derived :

from selecting conventional propulsion would not be sufficient to permitProcurement of a significant number of other, smaller vessels. Construc-tion of a nuclear-powered carrier would maintain at least through I9B3 ttreessential industrial base that v/ould be needed if future technology andsystem development do not lead to'a timely alternative to the large deckcarrier" Final ly, pol itical real ities and the provisions of Title Vl I I

make nuclear power the choice more likely to receive Congressional support.

d. Qualitative Hix of 0ther Surface Combatants

The irumbers versus unit capability trade-ofi extends to othersurface combatants as ulel I as carriers. The currently approved programincludes a balance of high and moderate unit capaditity ships. At thehigh end of the spectrum is the strike cruiser (cseru; which is nuclear-por.rered, carries the AECIS anti-air r^rarfare weapons system, the'TOI"|AHAWK

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and HARPOON anti-shiP r{eapons systems, end the nqjor car.iber Iightweight gun.ln addit ion to its role as nn uiement lof .",rii"l"i.rr."i";;;;, the strikecruiser would add independent-mission, force presence, and possible projectioncapabilities to'the existing farce tttu.turu.' A oi",e{,..nucrear ancJ convention-aIIv-p'r'rered surface combatants carrying the nrils:iy{f-d;;;;";ppropriate andhas bec'n cert if ied by thc President'i" 6u in tn" nationat int*rurt. The con-vettt'ionallv-pot"'ered eleme't of the AEGrs rot.u *i;;";;";;"'ii,i[-,,2 class suidedmissi.le destroyer. This shir: i:; designed io-op"r"tu in-rutuJi ,uOoort of tasl<forces. lt will compienent the DD-9dj.f"r, iestroyer, which provides excel_lent anti-submarine warfare and^anti-tr'tip t*lin the'HA[P00N weapons systenr)capabilitv but possesses.only lirnited "ntijoi;--;;;";;.'""o"oiit.r. The quidedmissile frigate program (rre-7 class) tu.r i;;;iated to procure ar rour cosr aneffective open ocean surface combatant in ,uriicient nurnb"rr-io ,"place reti rincrl.lorld War I I desti-oyers and supplement u"isiing Ff_lO5Z class f rigates. TheFFG-7 class is designed to provide antr-air uni "nti:tru-"iii. p.oa""tion rom i I i ta ry and merchant convoys , uncierway ,"p t en i strment groups

""i' ;;;; i;il";"forces in areas of moderate'threat. lt is an integral part.of the program toincrease the size of the fleet. ,

since-the early r960s, the-u.s. rnine counterme'asures force hasdecl ined from 95 ocean and inshore rninesvreep.r, to 3 active and 22 reserve"'locean minesweepers augmented by a squadron of hel icopters. The average agejof the ships is 22 yuito and they are rapidly reaching the end of the usefulI ife for wood-hulled vessels. Hinesweepuru

"r" requiied for detecting andclearing deep water mines while helicopter, "r" used to-detect and clearmines in water depths... ., rh;:;;;i%-;;;Jviate theblock obsolescence of our mine countermeasur", ;;r;;"ii"i;.;:;;;'[r'r[uSoviet mine threat, which has been heiglti*;uJ=uy the development of a fami-ly of deep moored rising mines. rnese-:mii"r-.i; be anchor"; i; depths assreat,:r j. ..- . .feet and ie are deveropinE ;;;p;;;";-r;;;;;;"irri.,., *i r r beoperational in 1978 to counter these'miies.'Rnatysii shows that up to 19minesweepers coulcl. be requi red to effect rinu:';r"ir"n." i"-"il"r open oceanareas, key geographic choke points and ar;.phiriou.-"rr"rr i""r""r.

',The advisabir ity of plocuririg a barancg! mix of ships is crearryestablished' what is at itru"'is-the;r;p;;'Jomoinarion of that mix to ertainthe maximum maritime capabi iity r+ithin'uu"ir";i;-i;;;;;; ;;,";;;. Each of theshipbui lding alternatives represents o ualanced appro"ll., i" """r"r r forceconrposition.

e. The Future of Sea-Based Air

0ver the past decade, extended surveillance capability, long_range striking power, tactical flexibility anJ-reduced reliance on overseasbases have been provided to the u-s. freei ry-s*u-u"sed airpower. Thesecapabil ities have been 'indispensable. in ,nu:i"rt ano are likely to rernain soin the future, particularly ior crisi, r"nugir-r:lt. Dramatical ly increas ingcosts for large-deck aircraft carriers and;;";in"ing impro.vement of anti-carrier weapons' sensors and vessel t".nnotJgt-ur ru"1 as possible use ofnuclear weapons uv lhg enerny make it imp"rative to conslder.possible alterna-tive means for retaining these capabil iiies in ouf seapolvel-l-arse,nal. t/hi Ieit is prudent to look to continuarign 9f our'f rip,unt searbased ai r in thenear term, it is, arso importanr to dedicare ,;;;i;;;i;;"ril;;.;;'.o'.ri,"=r"_:;:i:lr:"d

developrnent proc"ss to examinq artern:;;;"r' J.']"";; deck carrier

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f . Ncrv TechnologJ

I t has been pointed out earl ier (Section lV.B.) that there*re a number of technology options of pctential importance to the navalbalance. A large RtD investment lvill be necessary to carry these optionsto the point r'.rhere we can cjecicie whicir are attractive for ful I scale develop-nrent and operational deployment, Additional (thcugh lesser) sums areneeded to support the technology base f rom which further options r."ril I

spring. To stint this essential RtD, in the face of heavy Soviet effort,could cost us our viiai sea control capabiiity in the long run regardlessof hout many conventional forces we buy

The U.S., although behind the Soviets in deployed systems, hasa five to ten year lead in the area of long range cruise missile technology.The potential advantage to be gained from this l.ead, both in terms of tech-nclogical advances and rveapon system pay-off is substantial and warrantsdedicating a primary level of effort to the field

3. lssues Related to the Rate of Growth

Any discussio:r of fleet capabi I ity must address the fleetrs readi-ness to perform its missions as wel l as the numb'er of ships avai lable. Tothe extent that the ships of the U.S. fleet are unable to perform to desigrrspeci fications, relative capabi I i ty assessments are inval idated

The readiness factors that interact to determirre the fleet's capabil-'t), are material readiness, personnel readiness'and operational readiness.e Navy judges the adequecy of each of these factors, as welI as of olreralI

.eadiness, through the use cf several readiness indicators. ln general, theseindicators tended to show downward trends fron the late 1950s and early 1970suntil FY75. Readiness factors wer'e subsequently addressed as top priorityitems in the Navy program. As a result, the indicators bottomed out in FY75and have exhibited modest improvements in FY7i. This trend is expected toaccelerate as the initiatives contained in the current program are fully im-plemented. Tlrese initiatives must be sustained to assure a high level ofreadiness of the existirrg force level

Programs to increase the size of the fieet should not be paid forby reduction in funds now programmed for operations. Neither would it suf-fice to use funds to improve the readiness of existing ships instead ofbui lding ner,v ones. The f leet al ready suf feq-s J'rom a shortage of numbersand it is neither economically nor technically practical to install thenecessary offensive and defensive capabi l ities irr existing hul Is throughmodernization. ln the final analysis, therefore, resource allocationsmusr strike a ba'lance between naintaining a prescribed level of readincssantl providing for.an adcquate hunrber of ships. A siruultanc.ous, balanct:tlpro(lranr of shlpbuilding and r:eadiness lmprovcnrents is rpquirecl.

(. ror;

B. Prograrl- 0pti-ons for a Decisi-on : \-**-.J

The key considerations in the preceding Section were used to develop-hipbui lding' program options that wi I I build and susta'in' fo'rce .levels between

ie current program and the Navy's recommended a:lternatives. They are brief ly.L€sct-ibed below and summarized in the fol lowing charts.

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OPtion I vrould procure 27 rnore ships than the present FyDp.,, Tlreseadded ships t^rould improve protection of carriers, undervray replenilshmentgroups, convoys and amphibious forces by adding anti-air warfare capabilityand by reducing the curreni rrumerical shortfall in surface combatants. Thisoption t.'ould program the sarne enrount of-ri:oney for Navy slripbullding as thecurrcnt Five-Year Defense Prcrgram (fyOp) FY 77-Bl but urould plan to buy nontgrc -ltrrqr-' !"*--.j-tl-i-g1-. The carrier service liie extension prograillsr-rp)would bc initiated sc that arr Inventory of l2 Iarge decl< carriers could bemaintairred through the i990s, accepting an operational force level iower thanl2 as the SLEP proceeded. The investment funds saved from carrier censtruc-tion ttould be used to procure additional Iow-mix surface combatants suclr asthe FFG-7 and the DDG-47. This would increase the numerical gror,ith in foi-celevels and also increase anti-air warfai-e capability that *ould redress oneof the most pressing shortcomings of our present forces. This option wouldinclude l0 rnine warfare vessels, one amphibious slrip and Jl support ships.

- . OLt.ion 2 would-buy tvrenty ships nrcre than Option I (47 ,.r.re than FyDp),including one ntore larae deck caf.rier as a hedge against possible delays i;'deveIopingl2'deployablecarniersintheforcewhile individual carriers are placed out of commission for SLEp. lt wouldpurchase the sarne number of strike cruisers (CSCtt) and DDG-47s as Option Iand tiie FYDP, but vrould purchase four fevrer FFG-7s thari 0ption l. bne V/ST0LCarrier (cvv) vlould be included late in the program if nab has demonstratedits feasibility by that time. Designed as a compromise, this option wouldcost more than the FYDP but less than Option J. lt accelerates replacementof the mine warfare force by including nine ships more than Option I and tlrefYDP and includes tvro LXs (compared to one in Option 1 and the FyDp) late inthe proErarn to'replace aging amphibious force uni'ts,, lt includes 43 suppoi-tshipsl however, it would rrot buy the V/ST0L Support Ship (VSS) included irr0ption 3, primarily on the basis that it would not be cost effective as asea control ship and would not be a vital intermediate step toward developingthe soplristicated aircraft envisioned in the V/ST0L Carrier (CVV) concept.

9ption 3 v.rould also buy oT? more@. tt would purchasetr.ro ships rnore than 0ption 2 T49 -or.ffi composition of theforce v.'ould be rr,eighted more toward the high-mix side by including two morestrike cruisers than Option 2 and five less FFG-7s. lt would incjude the samenumber of DDG-4/s as the FYDP and Options I and 2, but would add four V/SToLSupport Ships that would serve as the forerunners of later, more advancedV./ST0L Carriers. lt includes three LXs to replace aging amphibious ships andprovide modest growth and the desired level of balance of amphibious ,:.rpabii i-ties u'ithin the f leet. lt is the same as Option 2 in its inclusion of l9 mi:ier*arfare ships and 43 support ships. This option would add more anti-air war-fare capability than the other options

Each of these options would provide for a strong RtD program to explcreall the technological alternatiVes to the conventional carriei (see SectionlV.B.) and to develop those which, on inyestigation, offer the needed capa-bilities at reduced overall cost. We cannot neglect such'efforts withoutrunning grave risks to our naval position in the.long terrn.

ifitzftft

Eaclr of these options also incorporates adequate hedges for futureshaping of the iorce structure. The strong comnitment to R6D, which isintended to develop nqw alternatives to the large-deck aircraft carrier,does not preclude a future decision to resume aircraft carrier construc-tion in the evertt that RsD effort does not disclose a better viay to pre-serve the |{avyts ebil ity to carr), out its wartime rrrissions while sustainingits peacetime role as a tool of diploinacy and crisis managemcnt. Each ofthe three options v;ili preserve tlre Navy's capability to acconrpl ish itsmissions into the 1990s1 each aiso leaves open for future decision --considering intervening techno'logical developments, evolution of thepol itico-mi I itary environment, and refinement of U.S.. national interestsand public prioi-ities -- the size, composition and structure of the f leetthat rvilI be best for the Navy as the 2lst century begins. This is par-ticularly true with respect to large-deck carriers and alternatirre waysof accompl ishing the functions currently performed by sea-based aircraft.

The details of each option, including their capabil ities and approxi-mate cost, are shcwn on the following charts.

Criteria for Decision

The major differences betvreen Option I and Option 2 are that gption 2bui lds one more large decl< carrier, includes a V./ST0L carrier (cVv) late inthe program, and builds nore surface combatants. The additional large-deckcarrier gives greater assurance of having l2 deployable carriers whilevarious carriers are out of commission undergoing service I ife extension.The additional carrier couid also reduce the fempo of operations requiredto mqintain current forward deployment cormitments; The added surfacecombatants provide more local anti-air and anti-sub'naline protection forstrike, amphibious, convoy, and logistic t'ask forces. The CVV wil I providegeneral support for sea control operations and yield information and ex-perience that r^ril I be needed for further exploiiation of V/STOL aircraftcapabil ities.

Option 3 differs from Option 2 in that it would build 4 V/STSL supporr!hipi (vss) tortproofrrthe v/sTOL concept as a forerunner to v/sr0l carriers(CVV). lt would also build 2 more strike cruisers, which would provideincreased strike and crisis management capabil ity. The additional nuclearsurface combatants also move us iloser to the objective of 4 nuclear surfacecombatahts per nuclear carrier task group, providing l7 CSGN/CGN for the 5CVNs, compared to l5 in Options I and 2.

Both Option.2 and Option 3 preserve the capacity to procure additionalcarriers or air capable platforms in the 1990s as necessitated by the pre-vai I ing and projected international envi ronment and threat. Tlre nunbers ondtypes of these ships woul{ be contingent upon available teclrnoloqy and totillforce requi'rements. Thus, for the long range, both options woulrl rt.tailr irrtothe 2lst century thc capal:ll lty and.f lexibll lty ol".current arrcJ proglrarnnreclcarrier forces for crisis managelnent and projection operations without atthis time prejudging the cornposition, balance or nrix'of these future navalforces

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Pace of Hodernization

Option I builds 142 ships over a five-year period at an average ship-building cost of $6.9 billion per year in constant Fy 77 budget aoilars, afigure equivalent to the shipbuilding costs in the repriced Iurrent planFY 77-Bl (Presidentrs builget plus am-ndment). This rate of bui iding wouldproduce 568 ships by 1990 (compared to 535 under the current FyDp).' 0;;;;",2 and 3 on the other hand would reach about 590 ships by 19g5.

Thus, all 3 options prociuce an active ship total"force level abovethat of the current plan. Option I will take iong"r- but will retain theadvantage of maintailing flexibiIity to change the force size and composi-tion in response to Iikely changes in the thieat

Options 2 and 3 v,rould requi re additional funding in the near termabove that in current FYDP and would pro,vide an incrlase in the near termpace of shipbuilding over that of Option l. They,would provide a slightlyfaster rate of increase in the overall size pf the Navy.

Program Deta!11

Five-year shipbuildirrg plans and force tables for 0ptions l, Z and 3are provided in the following tables.

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vil. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

ln the codrse of. this study, v;e have identified certain important issueswhose resol ution couid have s igni f icant impl ications .for tire opti*u* foi-cestructure in the future. To avrait completion of studies ccnc"ining thoseissues before making planning decisions about the broad outlines oF futurenaval force structures l',tould introduce undue delays to an alreaay.time-consuming process. As a means of avoiding such delays, yet preserving theability to adapt to the constantly changing technologiiai and strategicenvironment, each of the Opticns addressed in detail includes, in combin-ation with its associated research and iJevelopnrent program, sufficientflexibil ity ro respcnd to the resurts of the studi", piop"i"J-uuto*.

A. What changes should be made in our force structure to betteradopt it to performing its maritime mission in an unvironnrent-ir,"a in-cludes nuclear war at sea?

B- Vhat are the potential capabilitles and associated costs of land-based aircraft dedicated to defending sea lanes against air and surfacethreats?

C- Are there alternative base locations or are there ways to makeaccess to existing overseas bases nore politically stable which could in-crease our confidence in planning their user p"rticularly in unilateralcontingency scenarios? ln view of the probanit ity of decreasing access tooverseas bases, what compensatory steps can be taften? llhat is itre impacton force sizing and composition of reduced availabilitv oi-ou"r=u", bases?

D.- To what extentsubmarine warfare resui t

will current Soviet emphasis on anti-SSBN anti_in s igni ficant improvement in capabi I i ties?E. Given the current U.S. Navy levei of effort on active local defenseof individual ships (carriers) or groups of ships (.onu"vri-"r",i.r, resurts inthe enemy being able to concentrate sea denial forces ror"'or less at will,what mission concepts or shifts in emphasis could be appropii"tu to reversethis concentration advantage, thereby permitting

" porrible reduction inship/aircraft forces required for local sea control?

F. l.lhat are the mil itary roles and reguirements for u.s. power pro-jection oPerations,,particularly for crisis management or conflicts shoi-t ofall-out conventional war with the Soviets? How ire the requirements forforward deployed carriers Iinked to independent measures such as time-dis-tance relationships?

G- l'/hat options are available to the Department of Defense to enhancethe readiness, iesponsiveness and strength of th" U.S. Merchant Marine? Towhat extent can merchant marine assets be used as a substitute for and/orcomplement to naval forces, particularly in providing support and servicefunctions to the combatant fleet? Can the u.S. merchant fleet b; ".p".a.ato have adequate.capacity, in terms of numbers and types or-rr,ipr, to meetour re-supply obligations toward our NATO allies in ii'e "riti."i openingperiod of a major confl ict?

D.cl'arsificdPhOoryY full Ctqdd R Ford Lrbrart

S{CRS7a

H. Can the Naval Reserve Force be restruqtured to achieve a higherdegree of integration into the active fleet? How can the Naval Reserve

beit contribute to U.S. maritime and naval strength in.the future environ-ment?

l. Does the Sorriet strategy presented in N. l.E. Il-15-/4 adequatelyreflect the current and projecteci capabilities of the Soviet Navy and thevarious al ternative v,'ays in wh!ch those forces could be employed againstthe U.S. and ou;' al I ies in time of prolonged international crisis as wel I

as in either f.lATO or non-i'lAT0 war? Should the national intel ligence com-

munity assign a higher priority to updating and reassessing Soviet naval

s t ra tegY?

J. What is the projected naval building capacity of the tJ.S. duringthe period under consideration? What effect would the proposed buildingprograms have on that capability? lJhat would be the minimum lead timesreqiired if a crash naval construction program were required as a resultof a deteriorating international situation?

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SUI'IIIARY OF ALL I ED CAPAB I L IT I ES

.S"gt"!ff.

o All ied forces, in the aggreEate, should improve over the nextdecade in areas of anti-ship standoff missiie capabil ities, rnining andmine countermeasures, in areas of weapon/sensor iinprovernents in anti-submarine and anti-air warfare systems anC in air anti-submarine warfareplatforrn modernization. Any force level cieclines vril I tend to be offsetby qual itative improvements except for sea-based tactical air.

o Capabil ities of selecte.d all ied anti-submarine,/surveil lance forcesare expected to increase throughout the 1970s. The British, Canadian,Japanese, Dutch, Australian and lranian navies are currently undertakingmodern i zat ion programs.

o Capabilities of several small navies (Greek, Turkish, Spanish,South Korean, Philippine, Tairvanese) will decrease as block obsolescenceprobl erns occur through the 1970s.

o France, ltaly, Denmark, Norway, Belgium and New Zealand are sus-taining modest modernization efforts but possess sufficient post-war tonnageto avoid dramatic reductions in force levels in the near term

o No single al I ied country appears very'capab'le in comparison to theU.S. or Soviet Union. However,

- U.S. all ies lrave a col lective capabil ity that is signif icantwhile, except within the cor,f ined wateri of the Baltic andBlack Seas, Soviet allies have very little in the way ofnaval capabilities.

- Degree of a!lied support depends on scenario.

- Hany smalI alIied navies would be restricted to local rvaterseitirer due to national mission priorities or due to lack oflogistics support for distant open ocean operation.

NATO Force Rational ization

o Most NATO nations maintain relatively large navies.

- I'Prgstige" forces are traditionallarger vessel s.

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NAT0 Al I ied Mi I itary Spending

o Figure I shows the trend of past NATO mi I itary spending. Whi leit does not break out spending on nava'l forces, it does indicate thai theoverali trend in non-U.S. NATO defense spending has reversed its decl ineand has increased in real terms since 1970. The increase from 1970/71to 1974/75 is conservatively estimated at about' l0Z, exciuding inflation(U.S. spending for defense went down about 2b% in reai terms, during thesame period)

Al I ied Forces - Current/Projected

o Allied forces are displayed in Figures 2, J, and 4. Figures 2 and3 show current and projected lgB5.stimates of wojldvride ncn-U-S. alliesand Warsaw Pact naval forces, including aircraft. Note that our NAT0 and

.Asian alIies possess a substantial number of fixed rving ASW aircraft, manywith modei-n sensors. Also note that our aities enphasize land-based air'-craft anti-ship capabilities to a much greater degree than'has the U.S.in the past, due p'rimari ly to al lied proximity to the Soviet Iand mass/fleets. (U.S. anti-ship capabi i ities have. centered on sea-based tacticalair (carriers) since tdorld I,Jar.ll, but the current introduction of HARPO0Non U.S. surface ships/lanC-based patrol aircraft will change this histori-cal pattern. ) Fi gure 4 d ispiays sel ected al I ied forces the JCS esr irnatewould contribuie in a major conventional conflict with the Soviet Union.

Estimated Al I ied Contributions

o Various studies indicate that allied forces are capable of makinga substantial contribution to a maritime campaign. The combined effor"tsof allied maritime patrol aircraft, surface AShl forces and submarines areestimated to. be able to account for between... ... of the subnrarinekil ls in a general war at sea. l^/hile the resu.lts of such studies may beinf'luenced by the assumptions ernployed, they tend to support the opinion,based on observation of al I ied forces and their operational capabil ities,that the allied r^'ill play a significant supporting role in any maritimecarnpa ign.

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AREAS FOR ALLIED FORCE IHPROVEHENT EHPHAS I S

The folloi"ring are general areas for longer term all ied naval force im-provernents. Degree of emphasis by country will vary depending on geography,s i zelcompos i t ion,/readiness status of exi st ing forces, appropriateness ofnri ss ions, and overal I buCget constraints.

I'IATQ/Europe Al I ies

o Carry out planned modernization programs, particularly in the areasof anti-ship standoff missi le capabi I ities, mining and mine countermeasures,and air defense and anti-submarine forces.

o Commit as many existing/planned open ocean escorts as feasible tooperations in Atlantic and l"'lediterranean areas.

o Where commitrnent of open ocean escorts to NATO shipping protectionis not appropriate, use funding to procure patrol craft and anti-ship capa-ble land-based aircraft which wiil be more effective in countering thel^Ja rsaw Pact th reat.

o lmprove fleet mobile logistic support capabilities.

o lmprove open ocean area ASI.I capabilities by modernizatibn of nrari-time patrol aircraft and ASIJ helicopter forces, increased force Ievels andimproveC weapon and sensor Systems.

o lmprove mining and mine countermeasures capabil ities.

missile capabilities by retrofit ofair units and/or adding anti-ship

systems on existing surface combatants

o Raise readiness levels by improvements in training and increasc'sin logistic support and supply, particularly combat consumables.

o lmprove anti-ship standoffmissi les into existing surface andcapable patrol vessels.

o lmprove weapon and sensorand submarines.

Major Paci fic Al I ies

o Carry out planned modernizationmaritime patrol aircraft, and submarineupgrading weapon and sensor systems formar i ne un i ts.

o lncorporate standoff anti-shiPpatrol aircraft modernization plans.

programs fo, =urf"ce combatant,forces. lmprove capabi l'i ties byexisting surface, air and sub-

missile capabil ities into maritime

A-4

o lncrease procLtrement of mines to clos.e off Soviet submarine exitsand transit arpas and/or imprcve mine countermeasure forces.

o lmprove wartime readir:ess by increasing supplies of combat consum-ables, improved logistic support, and by increasing training for open oceanoperat ions.

,$LORLT

o I mprove ant i -a i rthe approaches to Japan 'tercept forces should be

v;arfare detect ion capab i I i ty for protect i on of""' """' A rnodest increase in air in-ifiiou ra!tia-.

S PEC I F I C NAVAL FORC ES RECOI.IMEI{DAT I ONS

The fol lowing specific naval forces recommendations are real i stic forthe U.S. to stress in the near term. Although,these recommendations areprioritized, it should be noted that they pertain only to naval/maritimeforces. Some countries, particularly those which contribtrte forces to thedefense of the center region, mdy assign higher priority to intprovementsin ground and air forces than in naval forces

s"Ig1u*

Ca rry out pl ans to nrodern i ze mi rfare forces.

Canada

o Carry out program to modernize long-rangeand consider additional procurement above current

,'. -:'

o Modernize surface combatant forcac,

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patrol aircraft forcesplan.

o Carry out pl anned modern izat ion programs for pgftQl, g:c.o.r3.s i .patrol boats and minelayeis; 1... ... i. ......... .

o Reduce shortages of naval personnel in brder to increase availa-bility of operating units in the event bf mobilization.

lmprove capabi I ities for wartime mobi le logistic support

Felleral,Rgpubl ic of Germgny

o Hodernize land-based ASW aircraft forced:

o Procure additional Type 162 PHMs.

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. o lmprove integration rvith all ieci underway replenishment capabil itiesfor forces committed to convoy Protection missions

o Carry out plans to modernize .naval air arm vrith ASM-equipped ai rcraft.

F ra nce

o Carry out existing naval shipbuilding and modern.ization programs.

o Modernize sea- and land-based air ASt'l forces.

o Re-enter NATS mil itary command structure and increase participationin joint NAT0 exercises.

o lmprove mobile logistic support capabil ities/integration witha.lIied logistic support forces in order td reduce dependence on Shore-.

tjased supply faci I i ties.

o tncrease war resel've stocks of combat consumables'

Greecea

' o Modernize fixed wing air AS!'l fories

o Carry out force modernization plans, including Procurement ofsurface combatants, submarines and upgrade of weaponslsensors on existinguni ts

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Carry out existing plans for new shipslfieet.nrodbfnization.'l

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o Continue nrodernization of f ixed- and rctary-rvi.ng ai r ASi{ forces.

o Expand anti-ship missile capabilities of existing forces.

o Improve f leet iogistic suppori by increasing procurement of nrobilereplenislrment forces and better integration wi th al I ies; reduce dependenceon shore-based/al I ied logistic support for sustained wartime operations.

o lmprove personnel readiness, particularly technical ly qual ifiedspecialists

Nether l ands

o Procure additional maritime patrol aircraft

o Continue procurement of NAT0 frigates to rnodernize surface com-batant forces

o Carry out plans to improve mine r,varfare capabil iti", O, introclucingnew minehunter craft in the early l9B0s.-

o lmprove mobile logistic support capabil ities through modernizationand better integration with al I ies.

No rway

o Procure acld i t ional mari t ime patrol. a ircraf t

o Procure add it ional NAT0 SSI'1-capable PHHs.

o' Carry out plans for mine warfare force modernization.

o lmprove mann i ng I evel s.

Portr{ga I

o Modernize existing surface combatant weapon/sensor systems.

o l.{odernize maritime patrol ai rcraft. forces by procurement ofnew a ircraf t..

o lmprove upkeep, manning and training of existing rraval forces.

o Flodernize mine warfare forces with procurement of nel

o lmprove npbite logistic support forces through npdernbetter integration with al I ies.

:

5parn

Carry out current naval force modernization plans

minest'leepers.

ization and

u',i.

:':it-j-:i

oof exi s

o

osys t em.

Tu rkey

Procu reting uni

I mp rove

I mp rove

addi.tional nrarits,

ASW training.

underway repl en

o€*#{€ I

tirne patrol aircraft and

A-7

i ncrease read i ness

ishment capabil ities and supply/logistic

oaaaaaraaaa a.araaa

aaaaa

o l"lodernize ancl improve readiness of maritime patrpl/ASW squadronswith ner^r equipment, better training, inrproved manning arid increased sparessupport.

O i....

' o Procure anti-ship missile systems for surface combatants andmaritime patrol ai rcraft.

o lmprove weapons/sensors on subrnarine

o Procure additional logistic supportwith al I ied forces. tncrease inventories ofables

combatant and nuclear attack submarine con-

modernize existing maritime ASW,/patrol air-update and consider expansion of force levels

Un i ted Ki ngdom

o Continue surfacestruction programs.

o Carry out plans tocraft forces. with avionicswith new.procurement.

Austral ia

o 'Equip frigates with tactical towed array sonar.

o Procure additional maritime patrol airiraft..:

o lmprorre mobi le logistic support and devel,op logiNorthern/l.lestern coasts.

forces.

forces and improve integration;spare parts and combat consum-

stic bases on'.,:'

iE', *)t'O

"t""**ro

A-B

I ran

oadequa te

o

o

&P+o

o

o

otories.

Develop manpower prof icierrcy/skil ls, training and logisticto support navai force acqui s i t,ions.

Procure additional airborne/shipborne mine countermeasures

Carry out planned acquisition of frigates.

sys tem

a sseits .

Procure new maritime patrol aircraft

lmprove weapon/sensors on current surface escorts and ASW aircraft

lncrease mine procurement

lncrease open ocean training and incrdase combat conguntable inven-

Nelv. Zea I and

o lmprove weapon/sensor systems on current surface escorts and ASI'I

a i rcraft.

o. Procure additicnal maritime patrolness of exi st i ng un i ts;

rcraft and increase readi-at

i: ' a:',",.'6-n-. .,., --;''5

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JCS ESTII'IATT OF ALI.IED F()IICE CONTRIBUTIONSFOR C'3IIFIJICT I{iTH S()ViIT UIiI()N

Current A] I i ed ForcesmsilW-Fri gg!g__

1/

ss/ssNItlari time

Patro'l Ai rcraf t

Ati anti c

United Kingdoml,letherl ancisCanadaPortuga INor*'ayFrance 2/

Medi terraneen

Greece 3/Ita'lyTurkey VUnj ted KingdomFrance 2/

.'aci_f ig

Austra'liaNevr ZealandJapan

21

ll720

29

I6

1t

B

l893

16

65

36

124

45

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l57

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204

26I5

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5

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1/ NAT0 forces include on]y DPQ-comnritted units in Atlantic and unitsass'igned to CII{CS0UTH in l'lediterranean. l,lot included are othernational assets in the categories shown which could contribute ina conventional war with the Soviets; table does not include a'liiedcarriers, patrol/mine warfare ships, and Naval Air/Air Force anti-ship capable aircraft forces.Not bound by NAT0 agreement,Not committed.

2/7!

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