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Have to consider individual and organizational dimensions
Definition: Intentionally killing oneself for the purpose of killing others, in the service of a political or ideological goal
To be distinguished from: High-risk missions Fooled couriers Suicide – without homicide – for a political cause
Sri Lanka, Tamil Tigers (pioneers & innovators) Israel: 0.5% of attacks, 56% of fatalities. U.S.: 9/11 – 10 times more deadly than any
previous terrorist attack in history.
• Starts with Hezbollah in Lebanon– 1981 -- attack on Iraqi Embassy -- Beirut – 1983 -- killed 384 in six attacks
• US Embassy -- Feb• 241 Marines at Beirut Airport -- Oct
– Simultaneous attack on French
• Cars, grenades and explosive belts
• Starts with Hezbollah in Lebanon– 1981 -- attack on Iraqi Embassy -- Beirut – 1983 -- killed 384 in six attacks
• US Embassy -- Feb• 241 Marines at Beirut Airport -- Oct
– Simultaneous attack on French
• Cars, grenades and explosive belts
Exponential growth over the last two decades - more global, more frequent, more lethal
Suicide attacks account for < 5 percent of terrorist events, but 50 percent of casualties due to suicide attacks.
Gaining in strategic importance with disruptive effects that cascade upon the political, economic and social routines of national life and international relations
Also gets more media coverage than most other forms of attack
Trends: 1980s-2012
How
Suicide bombs can be delivered by multiple means, complicating security measures
Vehicle bombs: USMC barracks in Beirut, 1983; Embassy attacks in Africa, 1998; Bali and Jakarta bombs; Attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.
Boat bombs: Sri Lanka, 1990s; USS Cole, 2000; the MV Limburg, 2002
Airborne: 9/11, Marseille plot, 1994
Individual-borne bombs: the primary method of attack in Israel since 2000; Attacks in London, 2005
Mostly civilian targets (shopping malls, buses, restaurants).
Approx. 85% civilian fatalities, 15% security forces
Military bases are on the “A-List” for targeting by terrorists, but difficult to penetrate
Al Aqsa Martyr BrigadesPalestinian Islamic JihadHamasAl QaidaPKK/Kongra GelAnsar al IslamLiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)Lashkar-e-Taiba . . . and a few others . . .
Personal attributes are not the key. The critical factor is the group. Suicide terrorism is a group phenomenon.
All suicide attacks have been carried out by groups. None by individuals on their own whim.
Main goal is to inflict as many casualties as possible
Objectives include: Causing widespread fear and panic Demonstrating the targeted government’s
“weakness”
Perception -- seemingly irrational act From the perspective of a terrorist
organization it’s a strategy that is: Well planned
Logical
Designed to achieve specific political objectives
Suicide attacks have increased over the past two decades; Why?
Perception -- seemingly irrational act From the perspective of a terrorist
organization it’s a strategy that is: Well planned
Logical
Designed to achieve specific political objectives
Suicide attacks have increased over the past two decades; Why?
Strategic Advantages
Traditional concepts of security are based on
deterring terrorist attacks
Assumes the terrorist fears death or capture
But, suicide attacks depend on the death of the terrorist
The suicide bomber doesn’t care about his/her death,
imprisonment or torture at the time of the attack
No need for an escape plan, traditionally the most difficult
part of a terrorist operation
The terrorist group wants to succeed The suicide bomber does not want to die for nothing If a target is too tough, they will choose another =
Ultimate smart bomb
Suicide terrorism is always part of a larger terrorist campaign
Sacrificing its “best and the brightest” signals the organization’s costly commitment to the community, whether transnational (Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah) or national (Hamas, Hizbollah).
This underpins trust in the organization, thus increasing the organization’s political “market share” in the community.
(M. Bloom, Dying to Kill, 2005)
Influence on terrorist group’s decisions
Influence on the number of volunteers for terrorist activity in general and suicide attacks in particular
Often, competing claims for particular suicide attacks
PAPE: In 6 of the 11 campaigns that ended terrorists achieved at least partial political gains Represents 55% success rate
Target states Fully or partially withdrew from territory Began negotiations Released a terrorist leader
Suicide campaigns have been successful against a variety of democratic governments -- even hawkish ones Reagan Administration Netanyahu
Succeeded despite military raids to kill or Succeeded despite military raids to kill or arrest terrorist leadersarrest terrorist leaders
With standard military coercion stronger states pressure weaker states
Suicide attacks work because they have a different structure
With suicide terrorism model the weaker acts as coercer and the stronger actor is the target
Target of suicide campaign cannot easily adjust to minimize future damage
Suicide attacks do not achieve goals central to security or wealth
Even with a complete gain – US withdrawal from Lebanon – US had only humanitarian interest at stake
Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985, but troops remained in security buffer
1994 – 1995 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and West Bank Settlements increased IDF have no trouble going back when they believe
necessary
Unique phenomenon in the world of political violence
Driven by group strategies, decisions, and relies on public support
Traditional concepts of deterrence and security are ineffective
Requires combination of intelligence, counterideology and diminished public support to defeat
Religious fanaticism Poverty Ignorance Revenge for personal
suffering Brainwashing Psychopathology
None of these explanations are supported by significant data
Media accounts Interviews with captured would-be suicide
bombers Interviews with trainers/launchers “Psychological autopsy” of dozens of
Palestinian, Tamil and other suicide bombers (interviews with families) Jerrold Post Ehud Sprinzak Mia Bloom Scott Atran et al.
Age Marital status Gender Socio-economic level Education
Hanadi Jaradat
• No real profile– Most are male and single. BUT:– Can be any race, color, sex– Can be older, married people– Bombers often alter their appearance to “blend in” -
Terrorist groups will employ bombers and disguises most likely to defeat security measures…or profiling
Wafa Idris
Sri Lankan Sri Lankan suicide suicide bomber bomber “Dhanu,” “Dhanu,” moments moments before killing before killing former Indian former Indian PM Rajiv PM Rajiv Gandhi, Gandhi, herself, and herself, and 17 others17 others
Religious fanaticism is neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor
Most of the suicide attacks in Lebanon were
carried out by secular groups.
The LTTE and Fatah are not religious groups.
The PKK and the PFLP are pseudo-Marxist groups.
Most Hamas & PIJ members do not mention religion as main cause.
The most common result of research indicates a pattern of “normalcy”— the absence of any unique attribute or identifier that would distinguish one individual from another
“ . . .rarely mad, and very few suffer from personality disorders” (Andrew Silke)
“Many of the personal traits or characteristics . . . are neither specific to the terrorist nor serve to distinguish one type of terrorist from another.” (John Horgan)
“30 years of research has found little evidence that terrorists are suffering from psychopathology” (Clark McCauley)
Media accounts of suicide terrorists should be read/viewed with caution; too often they rely on assumptions than on empirical data and scholarly research
The majority of suicide terrorist are no more “abnormal” than you or me
Combating suicide terrorism requires strategic communications and counterideology narratives that discredit and deligitimize this tactic Until families are embarrassed, not honored, to
have a martyr, the problem will not go away
Messenger matters – the effort to eradicate this tactic must involve community, religious leaders (more than government officials)