| bl-l · SECRET/NOFORN FOP 2. )IdentityoftheTarget Thetargetofthis applicationis CarterW.. b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 Page,aU.S. person, andanagentofaforeignpower,describedindetailbelow

All information is considered

unclassified except where otherwise FOPSECRETHNOFORN US. FOREIGHshown. CTELLIGERCEINTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SURVEILLANCE COURT

- Classify By: J23J98T32 206 OCT .Reason: (C) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTua uy bl-1Derived From: FBI NSICG,dated 102016 . LEEA, i rua ed HA - b3-1Declassify Oi CLERK Ur COURTeclassify On: . WASHINGTON,D.C. b7A-1

($) IN RE CARTER W.PAGE,A U.S. Docket Number:

| bl-l

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(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

(8) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to

conductisas describedherein, pursuant

bl-1.to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended,Title 50, United b3-1 |

b7A-1States Code (U.S.C),Ss(FISA or the Act). b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

|} 1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This application is

made byMEa Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)of the Federal

Bureauof Investigation (FBI) whoseofficial duties atFBI Headquarters include 1-1b3-1

supervision of the FBI's investigation ofthe above-captioned target based upon eT

b7C-1informationofficially furnishedoii b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FOPSECRETH/NOFORN

Classifiedby: bielDerived from: Pe

b3-1Declassify on: P| | | at

OI Tracking No: 143045

17-cv-597(FBI) - 1

FOPSECRET/NOFORN

2. ) Identity of the Target The target of this application is Carter W.. b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power, describedin detail below. The

| b7E-1, 2,3, 6status of the target was determined in or about October 2016 from information

provided by the U.S. Departmentof State.PO]

3. §) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts

bl-1and circumstances in supportof this application. b3-1

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a. () Thetargetof this application is an agent of a foreign power. b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

$8) The following describes the foreign powerandsets forth in detail a

description of the target andthe target's activities for or on behalf ofthis foreign

power.

(U) (6) The Governmentof the Russian Federationis a foreign power as

defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).

(U)(%) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally

recognized foreign governmentand,as of the executionof this application,is listed

in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States DepartmentofState, and in

Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its

establishments in the United States are components thereof.

FOPSECRETHNOFORN

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-FOP-SECRET/NOFORN

' ¥S) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation

a

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b7E- 1,2|(U) (8) Carter W, Pagi

| . b7A-1knowingly engage in

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clandestine intelligence activities (other thanintelligence gathering activities) for

or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to

involvea violation of the criminalstatutes of the United States, or knowingly

conspires with other persons to engage insuch activities and, therefore, is an

agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

(§XMR) This application targets Carter Page. The FBI believes Page has been

the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Governmenti

ESb3-1

undermine and influence the outcomeof the 2016 U.S. Presidential election in re

; b7C-2violation of U.S. criminal law. Page is a former foreign policy advisor to a b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Candidate for U.S. President (Candidate #1).Pe

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|1 () (31/0) RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.

(SMR) During a recentinterview withan identified news organization, the

Director of NationalIntelligence (DNI) stated, “Russia hastried to influenceU.S.

elections since the 1960s during the Cold War”and “there’s a tradition in Russia of

interfering with elections, their own and others.” The DNI commentedthat this

influence included providing money to particular ¢candidatesor providing

disinformation. The DNIaddedthat “it shouldn’t comeasabig shock to people, wes

I thinkit’s more dramatic maybe because they have the cyber tools that they can

bring to bear in the same effort.”iii

aMh17-cv-597(FBI) - 5

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(SANKIn or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the

Democratic National Committee (DNC).1Se

7There has been speculation in U.S. media that the Russian Government was

behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvementin the hack. Russian

_ President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was not

responsible for the hack, butsaid that the release of the DNC documents wasa net

- positive: “The importantthingis the content that was given to the public.” Despite

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* (GKANEX According to information onits website, WikiLeaksis a multi-national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in theanalysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwiserestricted officialmaterials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open sourceinformation, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of e-mails it sayse from the accounts of DNCofficials.

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I28,accorcing to 3b7A-1

an October7, 2016 Joint Statementfrom the DepartmentofHomeland Security and the b7E- 1, 2,3

Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence on Election Security (Election Security Joint

Statement), the USICis confident that the Russian Government directed the recent

compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S.

political organizations. The Election Security Joint Statementstates that therecent

disclosures of e-mails on; among others,sites like WikiLeaks are consistent with the

methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. According to the Election

Security Joint Statement, these thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with

the U.S. election process, activity that is not new to Moscow -— the Russians have

used similar tactics and. techniques across Europe and Eurasia, for example, to

influence public opinion there. The Election Security Joint Statementstatesthat,

basedonthe scope and sensitivity of these efforts, only Russia’s senior-most officials

could have authorized these activities.

(SHXIEK) Based on the Russian Government's historical efforts to influence

US. elections,i27

the information discussed herein regarding Russia’s coordination with Carter Page bl-1

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17-cv-597(FBI) - 7

FOP

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MIermine anc improperly and illegallyinfluence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.

(U) ON)eeeeaestated in thelegislative history of FISA:

Not only doforeign powers engage in spying in the UnitedStates toobtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended toharm the Nation’s security by affecting the course of our Government, thecourse of public opinion, orthe activities of individuals. Such activitiesmayincludepolitical action (recruiting, bribery or influencingof publicofficials to act in favoror the foreign power), disguised propaganda(including the plantingof false or misleadingarticles or stories), andharassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals whooppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democraticinstitutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of ourcitizens,

HLR. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

IL. (U)XGY/KIK) The Russian Government's Attem ts to Influence the 2016 U.S.

es

attempts

to

influencethe2016U.S.

Presidential Election.

XRF) In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos? and Carter Page(the |

targetof this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part ofhis/her

foreign policy tam.[aa

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17-cv-597(FBI) - 8

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athe FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts are being

coordinated with Page and perhapsother individuals associated with Candidate

1's campaignSE

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FtAs discussed below, Pagehasestablished relationships with Russian

Governmentofficials, including Russian intelligenceofficers

111.(U)(g) Carter Page.

(U) A. (&) Page’s Connections to Russia and the RIS.

{XANE) Page, a U.S.citizen,is the founder and managing partner of Global

Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment managementand advisory firm that

focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets,Fs , pal7E-1, 2.

asa

as

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GEfrom approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived inRussia

9

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business dealings withGazprom

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(3XNK) According to information provided by Page during7 a2

agees:

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T

O

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oe . . — -b7C-2GHEE) According to information provided by Page during || interview jon12

with the FBI,

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(U) XSZAXKKIn or about jaruary 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov

and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court

| for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 US.C.§§ 371 and 951

(conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agentof a foreign government).

According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the

SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an

employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two

other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev,to gatherintelligence on behalf of

TOP

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“13- 47-cv-597(FBI) - 13

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Russia.* The complaintstates that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy

and Sporyshevinchided, amongotherthings, attempting to recruit New York City

residentsas intelligence sources for Russia.

‘SYRG

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(U) * (@NKIEX Buryakov wasarrested in or about January 2015. At the time ofBuryakov’s arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshevno longerlived in the United States andwere not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakovpled guilty to conspiring to actin the United States as an agent of Russia, without providingprior notice to theAttorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov wassentenced to 30 months inprison.

oe 17-cv-597(FBI) - 14

ll(U) B. @ANKEXPage’s Coordination with Russian GovernmentOfficials on 2016.

U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.

ASKIN) According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to

Russia and delivered the commencement addressat the New Economic School.” In

addition to giving this address, the FBI has learned that Page met with at least two _

Russian officials duringthis trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI

confidentialhuman source (Source#1)?reported that Page had a

(A)= | :

395and has been an FBI source since

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|Source #1’s reporting has been corroborated and usedin criminal proceedings 74-1

and the FBIassesses Source #1 to be reliable. Source #1 has been compensated

by the FBI and the FBI is unaware of any derogatory

information pertaining to Source #1.

(TEXRSEX Source #1, who now ownsa foreign business/financial intelligence+

firm, was approachedby an identified U.S. person, whoindicated to Source #1 that a

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U.S.-basedlawfirm had hired the identified U.S. person to conductresearchregarding Candidate #1’s ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source#1have a long-standing business relationship). The identified'U.S. person hired Source#1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as tothe motivationbehind the research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. The FBIspeculates that the identified U.S. person waslikely looking for information thatcould be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

(U) BSXASBY Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisiteinformation. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s), describedherein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who hadhired Source #1 and to the FBI.

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XKSZAXR) Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the researchinto Candidate #1’s ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting historywith the FBI, whereby Source #1 Providedreliable informationto the FBI, the FBI bl-1believes Source #1's teporting herein to be credible. b3-1

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secret meeting with Igor Sechin, whois the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy

company] and

a

close associate to Russian President Putin.”Fo bl-l

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reported that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy b7A-1

, b7D-1

cooperation and the prospects for an associated moveto lift Ukraine-related Western b7E- 1, 2

sanctions against Rusia,i

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(U) 10 @@KIEX In or about April 2014, the U.S. Departmentofthe Treasury

(USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government

officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was

identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the

President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he

continues to hold. The USDOT announcementalso stated Sechin was formerly the

Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from

2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin.

The USDOTsanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone whohas “shown

utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin —a key componentto his current standing.”

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XESANE) Feaccording to Source1,

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_——— brEEDivyekin [whois assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin] b7A-1

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esmetsecretly with Page

and thattheir agendaforthe meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or

“kompromat”?? that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility ofit

being released to Candidate #1’s campaign."es

11 (bl-1b3-1

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(UU) x» (3) Kompromatis a Russian term for compromising material about apolitician or Political figure, which is typically used to create negative publicity or

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|

OUJuly 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that

| Candidate #1’s campaign worked behind the scenes to makesurePolitical Party #1’s

platform would notcall for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian andrebel

- forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political Party #1’s foreign policy leaders

in Washington. Thearticle stated that Candidate #1’s campaign sought “to make

sure that[Political Party #1] would not pledgeto give Ukraine the weapons it has

beenasking for from the United States.” Further, an August 2016 article published

by an identified news organization characterized Candidate #1 as soundinglike a

supporter of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in September [2015], adopted a “milder”

-tone regarding Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The August 2016article further

reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate #1 might recognize Crimea as Russian

territory andlift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia. Thearticle opined that

while the reason for Candidate #1’s shift was not clear, Candidate #1’s more

conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party #1's official platform,follow

Candidate #1’s recent association with several people sympathetic to Russian

influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor CarterPage. to

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ae}|:

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IV.(U) (GME) Page’sDenial of Cooperation with the Russian Government.

(U) (HNMR) On or about September23, 2016, an identified news organization

publishedan article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news

organization’s Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence

officials are investigating Page with Tespect to suspected efforts by the Russian

Governmentto influence the U.S. Presidential election. Accordingto the September

23rd News Article, US.officials received intelligence reports that when Page wasin

Moscowin July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencementaddressat the New

Economic School, he met with two senior. Russian officials. The September 23rd

NewsArticle stated that a “well-placed Westernintelligence source” told the news

organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former

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Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their

alleged meeting, Sechin raised theissue ofthelifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd News Article, the Westernintelligencesource also

reported thatU.S.intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another

top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as

deputy chief for internal policy andis believed by US.officials to have

responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies aboutthe U.S.election.

(U) (SNE Accordingto the September 23rd News Artide, certain members of

Congress were “taken aback” after being briefed on the alleged meetings and

viewed the meetings as a possible back channel tothe Russiansthat could undercut

‘US. foreign policy. The September 3rd NewsArticle-also stated that, following the

briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director, andciting the reports

18 () As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate to

conduct research into Candidate#1’s ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the results

of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business

associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business

associate in thefirst place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided this — bh

information to the business associate and the FBI. b3-1b7A-1

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The FBI does notbelieve that Source #1 directly

providedthis information to the press. .

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of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamedin the

letter, butthearticle indicated that the advisoris Page] and “high ranking

sanctioned individuals”[in context, likely a reference to Sechin]in Moscow over the

_ summeras evidence of “significant and disturbing ties” between Candidate #1’s

campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI.

(U) §SXANB} Based on statementsin the September 23rd News Article, as well as

in other recentarticles published by identified news organizations, Candidate f’s

campaign repeatedly has made public statements in an attemptto create the

appearance of distance between Page and Candidate #1’s campaign. For example,

the September 23rd News Article noted that Page’s precise role in Candidate #1’s

campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #1’s

campaign called Page an “informal foreign advisor” who“doesnot speak for

[Candidate #1] or thecampaign.” In addition, another spokesperson for Candidate

#1’s campaign said that Page “has no role” and added “[w]e are not aware of any of

his activities, past or present.” However,the article stated thatthe campaign

spokesperson did not respond when asked why Candidate #1 had previously

described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25, 2016, an

. identified news organization publishedan article that was based primarily on an

_ interview with Candidate #1’s current campaign manager(the September 25th News

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Article). During the interview, the campaign managerstated, “[Page is] not part of

the campaign I’m running.” The campaign manager added that Page is not part of |

Candidate #1’s nationalsecurity or foreign policy briefings since he/she became

campaign manager. In responseto a question from the interviewer regarding

reports that Page has been meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to

conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign -

manager responded,“If [Page is] doing that, he’s certainly not doing it with the

permission or knowledgeof the campaign... .”PO

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| (U) (SKMKKOn or about September 25, 2016, Page senta letter to the FBI Director.

Inthis letter, Page madereferenceto the accusations in the September 23rd News |

Article anddenied them. Pagestated thatthe source of the accusations is nothing

more than completely false media reports and that he did not meetthis year with

any sanctionedofficial in Russia. Page also stated that he would Be willing to

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discuss any “final” questions the FBI mayhave.”

EXANEY Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news

organization published an article that was based onan interview with Page

(September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated

thatall of the accusations are complete “garbage” and that he did not meet with

Sechin or Divyekin. Pagealso stated that he wouldbe taking a leave of absence

from his work with Candidate #1’s campaign because the accusations are a

“distraction.”b1-1b3-1

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6)

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b7E- 1, 2, 3,6|VII. (U) Conclusion.

(U) (SXASEY As discussed above, the FBIbelieves that Page has beencollaborating

“os . . b7A-1and conspiring with the Russian Governneni

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I5503on tneforegoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to

believe that Page(iis

.owinglyengage in

clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gatheringactivities) for or

on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other personsto

engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by

50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

CO) Gx,b7A-1

eeeeth. FBI submits that there is probable causeto believe that

such activities involve or are aboutto involve violations of the criminal statutes of

FOPSECRET/NOFORN

-32- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 32

FOPSECRETNOFORN

the UnitedStatsb7A-1

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4. (§) Proposed Minimization Procedures Asto all information acquired

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5. (9%) Nature of th Information Sought Throughthe authorities Py

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requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with b7E-1, 2, 3,6

respectto the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the

certification set forth below. Asindicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBIis

seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to theability of

the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an

intelligence service or network ofthis foreign powerorby agents of this foreign

power, and information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that

relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conduct of the

foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally

acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.

(8)

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~40- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 40

FOP-SECREFHNOFORN

6. () Certification Thecertification of the Assistant to the Presidentfor

National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the bl-l

b3-1Presidentas a certifying official in Executive Order Numberfii b7A-1

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SI2s 20sec, is set forth below.

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(U) The Purpose of the Authorities Requested

®& The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in

the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the

authorities requested in this application may produce information and material

which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidenceof a

violation of United States law, and this investigation mayresult in an eventual

FOPSECRET/NOFORN

-41- - 47-cv-597(FBI) - 41

FOPSECRET/NOFORN |

criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at

least a significant purpose of this request1 iii__s

ais to collect foreign intelligence information aspart of the FBI’s investigation

of this target.

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-42- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 42

FORSECRETHNOFORN .

9. %) Duration of the Authorities Requested (See ds)as'

b3-1

The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

intelligence information hasfirst been obtained. Additional information of the same

type will be obtained on a continuousbasis throughoutthe entire period requested.

The activitieswhich the United States must identify and monitor are incremental

and continuous, and communicationsrelating to such activities are often disguised

to appear innocuous. The type offoreign intelligence information being sought and

the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusionthat, at a

given time,all such information has been obtained and collection can be ended.

Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period

of ninety (90) days.

SS

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(UYS) Specific Authorities Requested Based uponthe foregoing information,

the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct the activities

described immediately below for the period requested herein.

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“51 17-cv-597(FBI) - 51

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~---- The remainder of this pageis intentionally left blank. --~-

8 17-cv-597(FBI) - 52

TOP

SECRET/NOFORN

(U) (8) The FBI has reviewedthisverified application foraccuracy in accordance

with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copy ofthe draft to the

appropriatefield office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to

the Court.

----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----

-53- ~ 47-c¢v-597(FBI) - 53

FOP-SECRETHNOEORN

(U) VERIFICATION

($) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information

regarding Carter W.Pageis true and correct. Executed pursuant to Title 28, United

/o Sbbl-1

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States Code, § 1746 on

b6-1

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Supervisory Special Agent b7C-1Federal Bureauof Investigation

A Wah» LeeAnn Flynn Hall, CI rk, FISC,Certify that this documentisa true and correct copy

FOP

SECRET/NOFORNof the original,

17-cv-597(FBI) - 54

FOPR-SECRET/NOFORN

(U) CERTIFICATION

($) I, the undersigned, having been designated as one ofthe officials

authorized to makethe certifications required by the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do hereby certify with regard tothe

EE=equested in this verified application targeting a

| | b7A-1

Carter W.Page, an agent of the Government of Russia, a foreign power,as follows: 47p-1, 2, 3, 6

(A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is |

foreign intelligence information.

(B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to

obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstandingthe related criminal

mattersdescribedin this application, theprimarypurpose of theauthoritiesOT

requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other

than thosereferred to in the Act, 50 USC. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign

intelligence crimes.

(C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities bl-1b3-1

requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques. b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3,6

(D) (&) The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the

authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C), i-e.,

FOP

SECRETF/HNOFORN

55- 47-cv-597(FBI) - 55

FOP

SECRET/NOFORN

information that relates andis necessary to the ability of the UnitedStates to protect

against clandestineintelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this

foreign poweror by agentsof this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B),

ie., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and

is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conductof the foreign affairs

of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign

intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).

. vn a bl-1(E) (&) The basis for mycertification that the information soughtis the type b3-1. b7A-1of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

be obtained by normal investigative techniquesis as follows.

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SECRET/NOFORN

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(3) |(U) (3) Based uponthe foregoing information,it is the Government’sbelief that

the authorities requested herein targeting Pagearecritical investigative means for

obtainingthe foreign intelligenceiriformation identified herein,

----- The remainderofthis pageis intentionally left blank, -----

-62-6 17-cv-597(FBI) - 62“

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN

& Accordingly, Lexecutethis certification regarding Carter W.Page in

accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of

1978, as amended.

John F. Kerry

Secretary of State

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Andrew G. McCabe AntonyJ. Blinken

Deputy Director Deputy Secretary of State _

_ Federal Bureau of Investigation

John O. Brennan. Ash Carter .

Directorof the Central Secretary of Defense

Intelligence Agency

James R. Clapper,Jr. - Susan E. Rice

- Director of NationalIntelligence Assistant to the Presidentfor

National Security Affairs

Stephanie O'Sullivan

Principal Deputy Directorof

National Intelligence .bl-1

[o tl . b3-1b7A-1

Dat

JakShit|, LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk, FISC,

certifythat this documentisTOPSECRETHNOFORN

a true and correct copy

at the original. 7 . 6.

17-cv-597(FBI) - 63

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN

(U) APPROVAL

(U) (8) I findthatthis application regarding Carter W. Pagesatisfies the

criteria and requirements for such applicationsset forth in the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approveits filing

with this Court.

6)

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“64 17-cv-597(FBI) - 64

FOP-SEERET/NOFORN

(&) Accordingly, I approvethefiling of this application regarding Carter

W. Pagewith the Court,oa

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Loretta E. Lynch

Attorney General of the United States

Sally Quilliarbyat ~_C) |Deputy Attorney General of

thé

United States

Assistant Attorney General for National Security bI- 13-1

b7A-1

~eh alike,\, LeeAnn Flynn Hail, Clerk,

certify that this documentis


at the original.FOP-SECRETHNOF

ORN

-65- --47-cv-597(FBI) - 65

FOP

SECREFYNOFORN

(VU) (8) WHEREFORE,the United States submits that this application

regarding Carter W.Pagesatisfies the criteria and requirementsof the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that

this Court authorize the activities describedherein, and enter the proposed

orders and warrants which accompanythis application.

Respectfully submitted,

b6-3

b7A-1b7C-3

U.S. DepartmentofJustice

30 uoI, sconesos br iso,certify that this documentisa true and correct copy

of the original. .

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN

~66- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 66

Filed

All Informationis considered unclassified | United States Foreign

except where otherwise shown SECREF Intelligence Survelliance Court

UNITED STATES oct a 2016

Classify By: J23J98T32_— : LeeAnn Flynn Hail, Clerk of Court

Reason: (C) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT bl-1

Derived From: FBI NSICG,dated 10ff}2016 | ad

Declassify On:a WASHINGTON,D.C. b7A-1

IN RE CARTER W.PAGE,A U.S. Docket Number:bl-1

PERSONb3-1

;b7A-1

PRIMARY ORDER ANDWARRANT

1. An application having been made by the United States of America

pursuantto the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50

U.S.C. §§es4or the Act), for an order and warrant

(hereinafter “order”) forae27£1

consideration having been givento the matters set forth therein, the Court finds

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as follows:b3-1

. b7A-1

. og . b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

2. The application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by the

Attorney General;

3. On the basis of the facts submitted in the verified application, thereis

probable cause to believe that:

SECREF

Derived from: . Application to the USFISC bl-l

in Docket Numbercaptioned above b3-1

Declassify on: P| b7A-1

17-cv-597(FBI) - 67

SECREF

(A) The Governmentof the Russian Federation (Russia)is a foreign

powerand Carter W. Pageis an agentof Russia, as defined by b7A-1

~ -b7E-1,2

i 4. The minimization procedures proposedin the application have been bd;

b3-1adopted by the Attorney General and meetthe definition of minimization b7A-1| b7E-1, 2, 3, 6procedures undefis

9. The application containsall statements and certifications required byf

ee:thecertification is notclearly erroneouson the basis

b1-1ofthe statements macerere, 3:b7A-1

any other information furnished undera b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

WHEREFORE,IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,pursuantto the authority

conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the UnitedStatesis

GRANTED,andit is

FURTHER ORDERED,asfollows:

“2- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 68

SECRET

| 1. The United States is authorized to conductf

BDthe target as follows;[IS

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17-cv-597(FBI) - 69

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SECRET

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 61“7- 47-cv-597(FBI) - 73

SECRET

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“8 17-cv-597(FBI).- 74

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47-cv-597(FBI) - 75

bl-1

SECRET _

b3-1esb7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3,6

- 6. The authorities approvedarefor the period indicated below unless

b1-1otherwise ordered by this Court.b3-1b7A-1

Asto all information acquired through the authorities approved herein,

the FIshalErase

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17-cv-597(FBI) - 76

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Vil-12- 17-cv-597(FBI)-

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78

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-13- 47-cv-597(FBI) - 79

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iit

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“14 17-cv-597(FBI)- 80

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| |bl-1b3-1b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

- bl-1

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b7E-1, 2, 3,6il-15- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 81

SECREF

ablab3-1 -

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-16-

17-cv-597(FBI) - 82

SECREF

This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expires atWEEastern Time

on the __ day of January, 2017. | bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

Signed 10-20167 Eastern Time

Date . Time

tay Jl—ROSEMARY M. COLLYER -foe United States Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Court

lala~ {, LeeAnn Flynn Hall, ibe SC,

cartify that this documentis


at the original.

-17- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 83

All information is considered

unclassified except where

otherwise shown. _

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

Classify By: J23J98T32

Reason: (C) UNITED STATESDerived From: FBI NSICG,dated 01-2017

Declassify On: MD pOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE,—

bled CeeOfakWASHINGTON, D.C. 43.1 Mis

- b7A-1(9) IN RE CARTERW.PAGE, A U.S. Docket Number:

PERSON. / bilb3-1b7A-1


(S) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to

conduct[iEdescribed herein, pursuantto the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended,Title 50, United bi-l

b3-1

b7A-1

States Code (U.S.C.), §SEEEPISA or the Act). b7E-1, 2,36

|e 1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This applicationis

made bya:Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)of the Federal Bureau bl-1

\ , b3-1

of Investigation (FBI) whoseofficial duties at FBI Headquarters include supervision on '

. sg ; . . b7C-1of the FBI’s investigation of the above-captionedtarget based upon information b7E-1, 2.3.6

officially furnished to[ED

FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA

CwcitedyDerived from: Pe b3-1

Declassify on: [x b7A

OI Tracking No. 144610

17-cv-597(FBI)-84

FOP-SECRETHNGOFORN/FISA

2. ( Identity of the Target Thetarget of this application is Carter W.

Page, a U.S. person, and an agentof a foreign power, describedin detail below. The

status of the target was determinedin or about December 2016 from information

provided by the U.S, DepartmentofState.PObl1-1b3-1esb7E-1, 2, 3, 6

3. (%) Statementof Facts The United States relies upon the followingfacts

and circumstances in supportof this application. __ bl-l

b3-1a. (&) The target of this application is an agentof a foreign power. a 136

(&) The following describes the foreign power andsets forth in detail a

description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf ofthis foreign

power.

(U) (&) This verified application reports on developmentsin the FBI's

investigation of the above captionedtarget since the mostrecent application

described herein. Unless stated otherwise herein, information presented in previous

applications has been summarized or removed not because it was factually

inaccurate butin order to create a more concise document.

(U) (&) The Governmentof the Russian Federationis a foreign power as

defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).

FOP

SECRETF/NOFORN/FISA

-2-

17-cv-597(FBI)-85

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

(U) (& The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally

recognized foreign government and,as of the execution of this application,is listed

in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States Departmentof State, and in

Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its

establishmentsin the United States are components thereof.

(U) (§) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

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FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

47-cv-597(FBI)-86

FOP

SECREFYNOFORN/FISA

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

es

es

es

es

es

es

es

eses

es

a

(O) (Carter W. Page

EEE

peer(X) gb3-1

: . b7A-1kk ly enesnowingly engagein 7"clandestineintelligenceactivities (other than intelligence gatheringactivities) for

or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involveor are about to

involvea violation of the criminalstatutes of the United States, or knowingly

conspires with other personsto engagein suchactivities and, therefore, is an

agent of a foreign poweras defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).


17-cv-597(FBI)-87

FOR

SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

I, (U) Overview.

(ARRThis application seeks renewed authority to conductbl-1

ee~Carter Page. The FBI believes Page has been the on

as ; b7A-1

subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Governmentiab7C-2

- b7E-1, 2, 3, 6Page is

a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate for U.S. President (Candidate #1).’

Asdiscussed in greater detail below,the FBI believes that the Russian Government

engaged in efforts to undermine andinfluence the outcomeofthe 2016 U.S.

Presidential election.bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E- 1,2

_ 1(8) On or about November8, 2016, Candidate #1 was. elected President. |

Although Candidate #1 is now the President-elect, in order to maintain the historical ble

accuracy of the background information, unless otherwise stated, the original

references to Candidate #1 and membersof Candidate #1’s campaign team will

remain the sameasin theinitial application filed in this matter (see docket number

b3-1

b7A-1

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-5-47-cv-597(FBI)-88

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

bl-1

es

es b7E- 1,2

I. {XANF) The FBI Believes that the Russian Government Engages inInfluence Operations Against the United States.

(U) A. @HNEX RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.

(SANKXDuring an interview with an identified newsorganization, the

Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, “Russia has tried to influence U.S.

elections since the 1960s during the Cold War” and “there’s a tradition in Russia of

interfering with elections, their own and others.” The DNI commentedthat this

influence included providing moneyto particular candidates or providing

disinformation, The DNI added that“it shouldn’t come as a big shockto people,...

I think it’s more dramatic maybe because they have the cyber tools that they can

bring to bea in the sameeforPEes —_

b3-17“b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

FOP

SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

17-cv-597(FBl)-89

FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA

bl-1

ab7A-1

es brE-1,2(SNE) In or about July 2016, WikiLeaksreleased a trove of e-mails from the

Democratic National Committee (DNC)ns

bl-1

aThere has been speculation in the U.S. media that the Russian Government 3-1

b7A-1

was behindthe hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvementin the hack. b7E- 1,2,3

Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was

not responsible for the hack, butsaid that the release of the DNC documents was a

net positive: “The important thing is the content that was givento the public.”

Despite Russia'sden

esb3-1

ab7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

2 (BMMEXAccording to informationonits website, WikiLeaks is a multi-

national media organization and associatedlibrary. WikiLeaks specializes in the

analysis and publication oflarge datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official

materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source bi-1

information,in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of e-mails it says b3-1

are from the accounts of DNC officials.PO b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

FOP

SECRET/NOEORN/FISA

17-cv-597(FBI)-90

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

bl-1es b3-1b7A-1

addition, according to an October7, 2016 Joint Statementfrom the Departmentof b7E-1, 2, 3

Homeland Security and the Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence on Election

Security (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian

Governmentdirected the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and

institutions, including from U.S.political organizations. The Election Security Joint

Statementstates that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, amongothers,sites like

WikiLeaksare consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed

efforts. Accordingto the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and

disclosures were intended to interfere with the U.S. election process; activity thatis

not new to Moscow- the Russians haveused similar tactics and techniques across

Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there. The Election

_ Security Joint Statementstated that, based on the scope andsensitivity of these

efforts, only Russia’s senior-most officials could have authorized these activities.

Morerecently, on December 29, 2016, the White Houseissued a statementthat the

US. President had ordered a numberofactions in responseto the Russian

Government's aggressive harassmentof U.S.officials and:cyber operations aimedat

the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the current U.S.

Presidential Administration publicized its assessment in October [2016] that Russia


-8-

17-cv-597(FBI)-91

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

took actions intended to interfere with the U.S.election process and that these

activities could only have been directed by the highest levels of the Russian

Government[in context,thisis likely a reference to the Election Security Joint

Statement].

(SANIRKBased on the Russian Government's historical efforts to influence

US. and foreignelections,

i:the information discussed herein regarding Russia’s coordination _ bl-1

oo b3-1

eeb7E-1, 2

I«2 2227: to undermine and

improperly andillegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. P|

(1)

b7A-1

Ss —PoAsstated in the legislative history of FISA:

FOR

SECRETYNOFORMN/FISA

-9-17-cv-597(FBI)-92


Notonly do foreign powers engage in spying in the UnitedStates toobtain information, they also engagein activities which are intended toharm the Nation’s security by affecting the course of our Government, thecourse of public opinion,or the activities of individuals. Such activitiesmayinclude political action (recruiting, bribery orinfluencing of publicofficials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda(includingthe plantingoffalse or misleadingarticles or stories), andharassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals whooppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democraticinstitutions as well as directly threaten the peace andsafety of ourcitizens.

HLR. Rep. No. 95-1283,pt. 1, at 41 (1978).(U)

B. (YNEX The Russian Government's Coordinated Efforts to Influencethe 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

X3/ANK) In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos? andCarter Page (the

target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate#1 as part of his/her

foreign policy tear.ae

FYthe FBI believes that the Russian Government'sefforts to influence the

2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other

individuals associated with Candidate #1’s campaignisio

esas

Ss


-10-

17-cv-597(FBI)-93

bl-1

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TOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

bl-1

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Cuss

_

As discussed below, Pagehasestablished relationships with

Russian Governmentofficials, including Russian intelligence officers,

|

|

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FOR

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

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47-cv-597(FBI)-94

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

bl-1

b3-1esb7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

(U)Ill. (& Carter Page.

(U)A. (%) Page’s Connections to Russia and the RIS.

RSKASRY Page, a U.S.citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global


focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging marketsay

b7A-1Ls

bl-1Pe, =|b7A-1esb7E-1,2

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FOP-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

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17-cv-597(FBI)-95

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISAbl-1

es

—

|,b7A-1

CC)5

GEfrom approximately 2004 - 2007, Pagelived inRussiab7A-1

During this time, Page began 7E-1, 2

business dealings with Gazprom

bl-1

XSAN) According to information provided by Page duringi b3-1b6-2b7A-1b7C-2b7E-1, 2

interview with the FBIPage

bl-1

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bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3

FOP

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-13-47-cv-597(FBI)-96

bl-1

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eseses

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FOP

SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

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17-cv-597(FBI)-97

FOP

SECREFHNOFORNIFISA

bl-1b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2b7E-1, 2, 6I

(U)

—

%SYAXF) In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov

and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S.District Court

for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951

(conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government).

According to the complaint, Buryakov workedin the United States as an agent of the

SVR. Specifically,Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an

employeein the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two

other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev,to gather intelligence on behalf of

Russia.” The complaintstates that the intelligence gatheringefforts of Podobnyy

and Sporyshevincluded, among other things, attemptingto recruit NewYork City

(U) 7 (GAR) Buryakov was arrested in or about January 2015. At the time of

Buryakov’s arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev no longer lived in the United States and

were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiring to act

in the United States as an agentof Russia without providing prior notice to the

Attorney General. In or about May2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 monthsin

prison.

FOR

SECREFHNOFORNFISA

-15-17-cv-597(FBI)-98

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

residentsas intelligence sources for Russia,

eee

eesweLs|asaeSeespnLS|:LsmEaesayeses

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-16-

17-cv-597(FBI)-99

FOPSECRETYNOFORN/FISA

(U)

B. @YNF) Page’s Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016

U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.

(SNK) According to open source information,in July 2016, Page traveled to

Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.* In

addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page met with at least two

Russian officials duringthis trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI

confidential human source (Source #1),?PFreported that Page had a

)a

X@SHNE) Source #1 has been an FBI source since

in or about October 2016, the FBI suspendedits

relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1’s unauthorized disclosure of

informationto the press. Notwithstanding the suspension of its relationship with

Source #1, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from

Source #1 has been corroborated and usedin criminal proceedings. Moreover, the

FBInotes that the incidentthat led to the FBI suspendingits relationship with

Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting thatis described herein.

(U) @f8NK) Source #1, who now ownsa foreign business/financial intelligence

firm, was approachedbyan identified U.S. person, whoindicated to Source #1 that a

U'S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research

regarding Candidate #1’sties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1

have a long-standing businessrelationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source

#1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 asto

the motivation behindthe research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. The FBI

speculates that the identified U.S. person waslikely looking for information that

could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

FOR

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-17-

17-cv-597(FBI)-100

b1-1

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bl-1

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F

O

P

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

(U) XESYANB) Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisiteinformation. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) describedherein, Source #1 provided the informationto the identified U.S. person who hadhired Source #1 and to the FBI.

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1,2

(RXASE) Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the researchinto Candidate #1’s ties to Russia, based on Source#1's previousreporting historywith the FBI, whereby Source #1 providedreliable information to the FBI, the FBI bl-1believes Source #1's reporting herein to be credible. b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1b7E-1,2

17-cv-597(FBI)-101

FOP-SECRET/HNOFORN/FISA

_ secret meeting with Igor Sechin, whois the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy

bl-1

company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.” ceported a '

that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy eT 5

cooperation and the prospects for an associated movetolift Ukraine-related Western

sanctions against Russia.[i

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JOCKSANE) MEE according to Source 1IIS 55)

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(U) 1 (SMM) In or about April 2014, the U.S. Departmentofthe Treasury b7E-1, 2




President and Chairman of the ManagementBoardfor Rosneft, a position he




The USDOTsanctions announcementidentified Sechin as someone whohas “shown

utter loyalty to Viadimir Putin - a key componentto his current standing.”

: bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

47-cv-597(FBI)-102


REDivyckin [whois assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin],§j

I3230:seccetiy with Pageand that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or

“kompromat”®that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it

being released to Candidate #1’scampaign.

(TS)aeses

(U)8 @) Kompromatis a Russian term for compromising material about apolitician or political figure, whichis typically used to create negative publicity orblackmail.

17-cv-597(FBI)-103

bl-1

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bl-1

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FOR-SECRETHNOFORNFISA

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bl-1

b3-1

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FOP-SECREFHNOFORNFISA

-21-17-cv-597(FBI)-104

F

O

P

SECRET/NGOFORN/FISA

bl1-1esb7A-1Aesb7E-1, 2

a.July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that

Candidate #1’s campaign worked behindthe scenes to make sure Political Party #1’s

platform would notcall for giving weaponsto Ukraineto fight Russian and rebel

forces, contradicting the view of almostall Political Party #1’s foreign policy leaders

in Washington. Thearticle stated that Candidate #1's campaign sought “to make

FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-22-

17-cv-597(FBI)-105

FOPSECRET/NGOFORN/FISA

sure that[Political Party #1] would not pledgeto give Ukraine the weaponsit has

been asking for from the United States.” Further, an August 2016article published

by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding

like a supporter of Ukraine’sterritorial integrity in September[2015], noted that

Candidate #1 had recently adopted a “milder” tone regarding Russia’s annexation of

Crimea. The August 2016article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate

#1 might recognize Crimeaas Russianterritory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions

against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1’s shift was

not clear, Candidate #1’s more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party

#1's official platform, follow Candidate #1’s recent association with several people

sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, includingforeign policy advisor Carter

Pageeeb3-1

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|:b7A-1

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-23-

17-cv-597(FBl)-106


Iv.) SXANEX Page’s Denial of Cooperation with the Russian GovernmenttoInfluence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(U) (SXAEX On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization

publishedan article (September 23rd NewsArticle), which was written by the news

organization’s Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S.intelligence

officials are investigating Page with respect to suspectedefforts by the Russian

Governmentto influencethe U.S. Presidential election. According to the September

23rd NewsArticle, U.S.officials received intelligence reports that when Page wasin

Moscowin July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New

Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd

NewsArticle stated that a “well-placed Western intelligence source” told the news


Russian deputy minister whois now the executive chairmanof Rosneft. At their

alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue ofthelifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd NewsArticle, the Western intelligence source also

reported that U.S.intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another


deputy chief for internalpolicy andis believed by U.S.officials to have


-24-

17-cv-597(FBI)-107

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FOR

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responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election.”

(U) SXRSEF According to the September 23rd News Article, certain members of

Congress were “taken aback” after being briefed on the alleged meetings between

Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the

Russians that could undercut U.S.foreign policy. The September 23rd NewsArticle

19 (8) As discussed above, Source #1 was hired bya business associate to

conduct research into Candidate#1’sties to Russia. Source #1 provided theresults

of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business

associate likely provided this information to the law firm thathired the business

associate in thefirst place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided this

information to the business associate and the FBI.

bl1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

The FBI does notbelieve that Source #1 directly

provided this information to the identified news organization that published the

September 23rd News Article.

(U) (XSKNK) In or aboutlate October 2016, however,after the Director of the

FBI senta letter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned of

new informationthat might be pertinent to an investigation that the FBI was

conducting of Candidate #2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she was frustrated with |

this action and believed it would likely influence the 2016 U.S.Presidential |

election. In response to Source #1’s concerns, Source #1 independently, and

againstthe prior admonishmentfrom the FBI to speak only with the FBI onthis

matter, released the reporting discussed herein to an identified news

organization. Although the FBI continuesto assess Source #1’s reporting is

reliable, as noted above, the FBI has suspendedits relationship with Source #1

because of this disclosure.

FOP

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-25-

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FOP

SECREFT/NOFORN/FISA

also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI

Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the

advisor was unnamedin the letter, but the article indicated that the advisoris Page]

and “high ranking sanctionedindividuals” [in context, likely a referenceto Sechin]

in Moscow over the summeras evidenceof “significant and disturbingties”

between Candidate #1’s campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated

by the FBI.

(U) (SMF) Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as

in otherarticles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1’s

campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attemptto distance Candidate

#1’s campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that

Page’s precise role in Candidate #1’s campaignis unclear. Accordingto thearticle, a

spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign called Page an “informal foreign

advisor” who “does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign.” In addition,

another spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign said that Page “has no role” and

added “[w]e are not awareof any ofhis activities, past or present.” However, the

article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why

Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about

September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was


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TOPSECRETYNOFORN/FISA

based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1’s then campaign manager.

During the interview, the campaign managerstated, “[Pageis] not part of the

campaign I’m running.” The campaign manager addedthat Page has not been part

of Candidate #1’s national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became

campaign manager. In responseto a question from the interviewer regarding

reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to

conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign


permission or knowledgeof the campaign... .”PO

es) b7E-1, 2

“(U) (SXANF) On or about September25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director.

In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News

Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations was nothing

more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any

sanctionedofficial in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss

FOPSECRETHNOFORNFISA

-27-

: 17-cv-597(FBI)-110

FOPR-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

any “final” questions the FBI may have.”

PSE Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news

organization published anarticle that was based on an interview with Page

(September 26th NewsArticle). In the September 26th NewsArticle, Page stated

- that all of the accusations were complete “garbage” and that he did not meet with

Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he was taking a leave of absence from his

work with Candidate #1’s campaign because the accusations were a “distraction.”

bl-1

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— —

FOPSECREFHNOFORN/FISA

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17-cv-597(FBI)-111

a >

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-29-

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TOPSECRETFHNGEORN/FISA

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-30-

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FOR-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

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SECRETHNOFORNFISA

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17-cv-597(FBI)-115


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b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

|bl1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E- 1, 2, 3,6


-33-

17-cv-597(FBI)-116

FOP-SECRETHYNOFORN/FISA

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E- 1, 2, 3,6

: Ko ta *

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E- 1, 2, 3,6

FORSECRET//NOFORN/FISA

-34-

17-cv-597(FBl)-117

FOP

SECRETFHNOFORNIFISA

TOR

SECRETHNOFORNIFISA

-35-47-cv-597(FBI)-118

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1,2

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E- 1,2

FOP

SECRETFY/NOEORN/FISA

bi-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E- 1, 2

@ sux)

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E- 1, 2, 3,6


-36-

17-cv-597(FBI)-119


Bi sxx)

FOPSECRET//NOFORN/FISA

-37-

bl1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

17-cv-597(FBI)-120

wn >

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6


-38-

17-cv-597(FBI)-121

iMo bit

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7D-1

b7E-1,2, 3, 4, 6

a3b3-1b6-2

ee

=—

37;b6C-2

es=}.b7E-1, 2, 3,6

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E- 2, 4 17-cv-597(FBI)-122

F

O

P

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA


-40-

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7D-1

b7E-1,2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

17-cv-597(FBl)-123

FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISAbl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

(S b7C-2b7E-1, 2, 3,6

(Ff ''|

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1b3-1

b6-2b7A-1b7C-2 !b7E-1,2,3,6 |

i'l

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

' -41-

17-cv-597(FBI)-124

A

a >

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Ml

Coo

SIDQO

>OnE

—_—

b7C-2

ee67-1, 2,3, 6


-42-

17-cv-597(FBI)-125


b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

||

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

VII. (U) Conclusion.

(U) (S{XNR) As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating b7A-1b7E-1,2

and conspiring with the Russian Governmentiii


-43-

17-cv-597(FBI)-126

foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to

b7A-1

believe that PageimsEE«.owingly engagein

clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or

on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other persons to

engagein suchactivities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign poweras defined by

50 U.S.C.§ 1801(b)(2)(E).

CO) (SNK)ee

Me|

ee}:FBI submits that there is probable causeto believe that b7E-1,2

such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of

the Unitedss

)esb7A-1

Ee


-44-

17-cv-597(FBI)-127


ee

|b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bi-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

eebeb7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6


-45-17-cv-597(FBI)-128

FOP

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

}i

as

a

as

Ssa |

es

as

|

es

es

a

a |FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

-46-

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-129

TOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

bl1-1

ee b3.b6-2

b7A-1

Re bredb7E-1,2, 3, 6

bi-1

Fb3-1b6-2

eeae

|b7C-2b7E-1, 2,3, 6

Fe

@)Cs

abitb3-1b7A-1b7E-1,2, 3,6

FOR-SECREFHNOFORMNFISA

-47-17-cv-597(FBI)-130

FOP

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

esa

enbE12.3.6eseseesa

es

©)APeerseesbl-1SS|b7A-1

es

FOP

SECREFYNOFORN/FISA

-48-

17-cv-597(FBI)-131

FOP-SECRETFHNGOFORN/FISA

|blb3-1

b7A-1es

4. (&) Proposed Minimization Procedures Asto all information acquired

throughthe authorities requested herein, the FBI will followP|

bl-1

Ssb7A-1

2

bl-10b7A-1

FOP-SECREFHYNOFORN/FISA

-49-

17-cv-597(FBI)-132

TOPSECRET/NOEFORN/FISA

Ds || b3-1

FR]aeb7E-2, 3

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 ee|

b3-1

eS|.] ; b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FORSECRETH/NOFORNFISA

-50-

17-cv-597(FBI)-133

TOP-SECRETHNOFORNFISA

)

bl-1

es=}!b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(x)aa

|| bl-1

(&)Fe b3-1

BebEb7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(U) 5, (@) Natureof the Information Sought Through the authoritiesbl-1

requested herein, the UnitedStatesis seeking foreign intelligence information with me \

b7E-1,2, 3, 6

respectto the activities of the target described above and detailed furtherin the

certification set forth below. As indicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBI is

seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to the ability of

the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an

intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign

power,andinformation with respectto a foreign poweror foreign territory that

relates and is necessaryto the national defense, security, and the conduct of the

FOR

SECRETHNOFORNFISA

-51-

17-cv-597(FBI)-134


foreign affairs of the United States. These sameauthorities mayalso incidentally

acquire otherforeign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.

—

es

es

a

es

a

eses

a

a

FOP

SECRETHNOEORN/FISA

-52-

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1b3-1b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-135

FOPSECRETH/NOFORN/FISA

S

n

eee—“(‘;‘sSCtéib3-1

ne1.75.1b7E-1, 2, 3,6

Se

a (8) Certification Thecertification of the Assistant to the President for b1-1b3-1

National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the > 3.6

President as a certifying official in Executive OrderNumber

as amended,is set forth below.

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2,7


-53-

17-cv-597(FBI)-136

FOPSECRETINGEORN/FISA

(U) The Purposeof the Authorities Requested

(3) TheFBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in



which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a

violation of United States law, and this investigation mayresult in an eventual

criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussedin thecertification, at

least a significant purposeof this request nr ii__

; . . . ; 1: .,. 63-1a: to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI's investigation b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

of this target.

ne§=—°7E-1, 2.3.6


-54-

17-cv-597(FBI)-137

TOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

a — bhb3-1

CePoEb7E-1, 2, 3, 6

a5 bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

9, (S) Duration of the Authorities Requested (Seealso,aebl-1

The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign b3-1b7A-1

intelligence information has first been obtained. Additional information of the same 675-1, 2, 3,6


The activities which the United States must identify and monitor are incremental

and continuous, and communications relating to such activities are often disguised

to appear innocuous. The type of foreign intelligence information being sought and

the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusion that, at a

giventime,all such information has been obtained andcollection can be ended.



FOR

SECREFHNOFORNIFISA

-55-17-cv-597(FBI)-138

FOP

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

ies bl-1b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

bl-1.es

b3-]

b7A-1

esD7E1,2

bl-1

b3-1Sb7A-1b7E-1, 2


-56-

17-cv-597(FBI)-139


b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

a B

bl1-1

Ss|.b7A-1

b7E-2, 6

eSb3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

a 2


-57-

17-cv-597(FBl)-140


b1-1

Ssb7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

ee

eee

ee

po

ee

ee, bl-1

ee b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

ee

ee

|

aeee

ee

ee

b3-1b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FORSECRETFYNOFORN/FISA

-58-

17-cv-597(FBI)-141


bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(5)

bl-1SSb3-1

eCSSC‘(‘éiéRYSb7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

, b3-1ee

eeb7E-1, 2, 3,6


-59-

17-cv-597(FBl)-142

TOP-SECREF/NOFORN/FISA

(U)(&) Specific Authorities Requested Based uponthe foregoing information,

the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conducttheactivities


©; b1-1

See}b7A-1

F . b7E-1, 2, 3,6

(my

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

FOP-SECRETH/NOFORN/FISA

-60-

17-cv-597(FBl)-143

a g


B

(3)

FOPSECRETHNOFORMNMFISA

-61-

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

b1-1

b3-1b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

17-cv-597(FBI)-144

FOPSECREFYNOFORNFISA

6Oo

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-145

FORSECREFHNOFORN/FISA

FOPSECREFHYNOFORN/FISA

-63-

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

17-cv-597(FBl)-146

eeb3-1ee b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Csb3-1

b7A-1

es

a blb3-1

a b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6


-64-

17-cv-597(FBI)-147

TOPSECRET//NOFORN/FISA

| bl-1b3-1

ns+74.). b7E-1,2, 3, 6

ee

| |

Se

Pe

ee

ee

Pe bi-lb3-1

Ssb7E-1, 2, 3,6

Ss |, ! b3-1

as v7b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Ss

FOPSECRET/HNOFORN/FISA

-65-

17-cv-597(FBI)-148

FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA: bi-1

b3-1

a b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(U) (& The FBI has reviewedthis verified application for accuracy in accordance

with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copyof thedraft to the


the Court.

----- The remainderof this page is intentionallyleft blank. -----

FOPSECREF/NOFORN/FISA

-66-

17-cv-597(FBI)-149

—TOP

SECRET/NOFORNIFISA

(U) VERIFICATION

(8)I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information

pursuantto Title 28, United bl-1

b3-1

States Code, § 1746 on SJenuonens | 2or} . b7A-1

regarding Carter W.Pageis true and correct. Executed

b6-1b7A-1

b7C-1 Supervisory special Agent

Federal Bureauof Investigation

<cy a1 ‘7|, LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Cler«, FISC,

certify that this document is _a true and correct copy FOP SECRET/NOFORN:

of the original. IFISA

67-

17-cv-597(FBI)-150

eEB

Ee

FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

(U) CERTIFICATION

(8) 1, the undersigned, having been designated as oneof the officials

authorized to makethecertifications required by the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do herebycertifywith regard tothe

questedin this verified application targeting

Carter W. Page, an agent of the Governmentof Russia, a foreign power,as follows:bl-1

b3-1

(A) (U) The information sought throughthe authorities requested herein is_ b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6


(B) (U) Atleast a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to


matters describedin this application, the primary purpose of the authorities


than thosereferred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign


(C) (U) Theforeign intelligence information sought by the authorities bil

b3-1requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normalinvestigative techniques. 74-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(U) (D) (S) The typeof foreign intelligence information being sought through the

authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C), ie.,

FOP-SECRET/NOFORNIFISA

-68-17-cv-597(FBI)-151


information thatrelates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect


foreign powerorby agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B),

i.e., information with respect to a foreign poweror foreign territory that relates and

is necessary to the national defense orsecurity, and the conduct of the foreign affairs

of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign

intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot b7E-1, 2, 3,6

(E) (&) The basis for mycertification that the information soughtis the type

be obtained by normal investigative techniquesis as follows.

|b3-1esb7E-1, 2

|

es

—FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

-69-

17-cv-597(FBI)-152

FOPSECRETFYNOFORMFISA

Ssb3-1

a ab7E-1, 2

bl-1

5ee|;b7A-1

| b7E-1, 2

Ch —“CSCSCSCsSC(‘CSCSCUOSb3-1

ee =}b7E-1, 2, 8

FOPRSECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-70- |17-cv-597(FBI)-153

AY

FOPSECREFYNOFORN/FISA

b1-1

ee boab7A-1. aSyb7E-1,2, 8

) S)ee |)b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2


-71-

17-cv-597(FBI)-154

TOR

SECRETHNOFORMFISA

()

il)

FOP

SECRETHNOFORNFISA

-72-

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

17-cv-597(FBI)-155

FOP

SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

b1-1es

b3-1

b7A-1

esb3-1

b7A-1es Bd

(b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

FOP-SECRETFYNOFORN/FISA

-73-

17-cv-597(FBI)-156


bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2,3

8 bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

ee|||b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3


-74-

17-cv-597(FBI)-157

FOPSECRETF/NOFORN/FISA

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

(U) (8) Based uponthe foregoing information,it is the Government's belief that

the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for

obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.

----- The remainderofthis page is intentionally left blank. -----

FOP-SECRETF/NOFORN/FISA

-75-

17-cv-597(FBI)-158

" FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

&) Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W. Page in

accordance with the requirements ofthe Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of

1978, as amended.

es B. Comey L John F. Kerryirector Secretary of State

Federal Bureauof Investigation

Andrew G. McCabe AntonyJ. BlinkenDeputy Director Deputy Secretary of StateFederal Bureau ofInvestigation

John O. Brennan Ash CarterDirectorof the Central Secretary of DefenseIntelligence Agency

JamesR. Clapper,Jr. Susan E.RiceDirector of National Intelligence Assistant to the Presidentfor


Stephanie O'SullivanPrincipal Deputy Director ofNationalIntelligence .

b1-1

b3-1uf \F b7A-1Date '

XN

FORNIFI, LeeA | aha); nn Flynn Hall, Cler , FISC

sacertify that this document isa true and correct copy

76-of the original.

17-cv-597(FBI)-159

FOR

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

(U) APPROVAL

(U) (&) I find thatthis application regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the

criteria and requirements for such applicationsset forth in the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approveits filing

with this Court.

sfb3-1

Ss —fb7E-1, 2,6

FOP

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-77-

17-cv-597(FBI)-160


@&) Accordingly, I approvethefiling of this application regarding Carter

W.Page with the Court,| | | bil

b3-1

b7A-1b7E-1

Loretta E. Lynch

Attorney General of the United States

De OH MeSally Quilliar’YatesDeputy Attorney General of th ited States

Assistant Attorney General for National Security on

\ "7 b7A-1 Date

~hy 2 [ale|, LeeAnnFlynn Hall, Cletk, FISC,

certify that thisdocumentis |

a true and correctCopy

TOP

SECRET/NOFORNFFISAof the original.

-78-

17-cv-597(FBI)-161

FOP

SECRETF/NOFORN/FISA

(U)(%) WHEREFORE,the United States submits that this application

regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign


this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed



b6-3

b7A-1

b7C-3

Attorney

U.S. Departmentof Justice

x , 7 ‘ 2 .

es Aa}1, LeeAnn Flynn Hail, Clerk, FISC,

certify that this document is

a true and correct COpy

TOR

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

of the original.-79-

17-cv-597(FBI)-162

Classify By: J23J98T32Reason: (C)

FiledDerived From: FBI NSICG,dated oI2017United States Fareign tDeclassify On:

SECRET intelligence Surveillance Cou

( b1-1

All information is consideredJAN a 20t7UNITED STATES 63.1

LeeAnn Flynn Hail, Clerk of Court BTAFOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

unclassified except whereotherwise shown.

WASHINGTON,D. C.

IN RE CARTERW. PAGE, AUS. Docket Number: fo

bl-1PERSON

b3-1b7A-1

PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT

1. An application having been made by the United States of America

pursuantto the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50U.S.C.SNor the Act), for an order and warrant

(hereinafter “order”) fora«.:consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds

bl-1as follows:

b3-1b7A-12. The application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by the D7E-1, 2,3, 6

Attorney General;

3. Onthe basis of the facts submitted in the verified application, thereis

probablecause to believe that:

SECREF

Derived from: Application to the USFISCin Docket Number captioned above bi-1Declassify on: Fe

i i

17-cv-597(FBl)-163

SECRET

(A) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign b7A-1

b7E-1, 2powerand Carter W. Page is an agent of Russia, as defined by

4, The minimization procedures proposedin the application have been

bl-1

b3-1b7A-1

procedures undefia b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

5. The application contains all statements and certifications required by

PTthe certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis 1-1

b3-1

ofthe statements madeindni b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3,6

adopted by the Attorney General and meet the definition of minimization

. WHEREFORE,IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,pursuantto the authority

conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United Statesis

GRANTED,anditis

FURTHER ORDERED,as follows:

17-cv-597(FBl)-164

SECRET

1. The United States is authorized toconduc

MEINE0he target afollows;

it

|I

|

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

17-cv-597(FBI)-165

abl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-166

ym

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47-cv-597(FBI)-180

!

This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expires

on the

01-2017aSigned

Date

SECREF

Eastern Time

day of April, 2017.

-19-

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

Eastern Time

Time

WUMerSo_MICHAEL W. M ANJudge, United States oreignIntelligence Surveillance Court

b6-3

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b7C-3

17-cv-597(FBI)-181

All information is considered bl-1unclassified except where FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA b3-1otherwise shown.

b7A-1Classify By: J23J98T32 UNITED STATESReason: (C) os wary

iceprom: FBINSICG,dated EQREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT |” / fi’P|Declassify On: F|

WASHINGTON,D.C.

6) IN RE CARTERW.PAGE,A U.S. Docket Number:

~ b3-1b7A-1


@) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to

oni,25 described herein, pursuant

to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50, United oy

States Code (US.C.), SQMINIBFISA or the Act). _—-bIE-1,2,3,6

a 1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This applicationis

made b , a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) of the Federal Bureau a

of Investigation (FBI) whoseofficial duties at FB] Headquarters include supervision ey

b7C-1of the FBI's investigation of the above-captioned target based upon information b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

officially furnishedtof


Chesed eeDerived from: Po b3-1

. b7A-1Declassify on: (xy


17-cv-597(FBI)-182

FOR-SECRETHNOEORMFISA

2. &) Identity of the Target The target of this application is Carter W.

Page, a U.S. person, and an agentof a foreign power, described in detail below. The

status of the target was determined in or about December 2016 from information

provided bythe U.S. Department of State.iSb3-1

ne37;b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |

3. (&) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts

and circumstances in support of this application. bl-1b3-1b7A-1

a. §§) Thetarget of this application is an agentof a foreign power. b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(&) The following describes the foreign powerandsets forth in detail a

description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign

power.

(U) &) This verified application reports on developmentsin the FBI's

investigation of the above captioned target since the most recent application


applications has been summarized or removed not becauseit was factually

inaccurate but in order to create a more concise document.

(U) (X The Governmentof the Russian Federation is a foreign power as

defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).


-2-

17-cv-597(FBl)-183

r

TOP

SECRETHNOFORNIFISA

(U) (Sy. The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia)is an internationally

recognized foreign government and,as of the execution of this application,is listed


Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, andits

establishments in the United States are components thereof.

(U) (§) ClandestineIntelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation

Sa

17-cv-597(FBI)-184

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(0) (©) Carter W, PageneersNN(0i31y engage in 43-1

b7A-1clandestineintelligenceactivities (other thanintelligence gatheringactivities) for b7E-1,2

or on behalf of such foreign power, whichactivities involve or are about to

involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly

conspires with other personsto engage in suchactivities and, therefore, is an

agentof a foreign poweras defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

“FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

17-cv-597(FBI)-185

TOP

SECRET/NOFORN/ISA

1 (U) Overview.

(SINK) This application seeks renewed authority to conduc{i

bl1-1

eeof Carter Page. The FBIbelieves that Page has been on

b7A-1

the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Government[ib7C-2

b7E-1, 2,3,6.

Page is a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate for U.S. President (Candidate

#1).! As discussedin greater detail below, the FBI believes that the Russian

Governmentengaged in efforts to undermine and influence the outcome of the 2016

USS.Presidential election,aan b1-1

=|,b7A-1

aWE}?

1) On or about November 8, 2016, Candidate #1 was elected President.

Although Candidate #1 is now the President, in order to maintain the historical bl-1

accuracy of the background information, unless otherwisestated, the original me‘ '

references to Candidate #1 and members of Candidate #1’s campaign team will

remain the same as in=applicationsfiled in this matter (see docket numbers

TOP-SECRETHNOFORNIISA

-5-17-cv-597(FBI)-186

b1-1b3-1

b7A-1es

be

Il, (U)XS7RSR) The FBI Believes that the Russian GovernmentEngagesinInfluence Operations Against the United States.

(U) A, XSZAXF) RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential] Elections.

(SNM) During a September2016 interview with an identified news

organization,the then Director of NationalIntelligence (DNI) stated, “Russia has

tried to influence U.S.electionssince the 1960s during the Cold War” and “there's a

tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own andothers.” The then

DNI commentedthatthis influence included Providing moneyto particular

candidates or providingdisinformation. The then DNI addedthat “it shouldn’t

- comeasa big shock to people, ... I thinkit’s more dramatic maybe because they

have the cybertools that they can bring to bearin the same effort.”Fs bl-1

b3-1esees b7A-1.b7E-1, 2

17-cv-597(FBI)-187


Ss |b3-1, b7A-1 |

ee

KXASBY In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the

Democratic National Committee(DNC).

f|There hasbeen speculation in the U.S. media that the Russian Government b7E-1, 2,3

wasbehind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvementin the hack.


’ not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents wasa

net positive: “The importantthing is the content that was givento the public.”

Despite Russia'sdeni!bl-1

Ss |b7A-1

b7E-1,2,3

2 (KI) According to information on its website, WikiLeaksis a multi-

national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the

analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restrictedofficial

materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source

information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousandsof e-mails it says

are from the accounts of DNCofficials. at

. b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

-FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

17-cv-597(FBI)-188

FOP-SECREF/NOFORN/FISA

ee

aaddition, according to an October 7, 2016 Joint Statementfrom the Department of

Homeland Security and the Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence on Election

Security (Election Security Joint Statement) the USIC is confident that the Russian



Statementstates that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, among others, sites like

WikiLeaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed

efforts. According to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and

disclosures wereintended to interfere with the U.S.election process; activity that is

not new to Moscow - the Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across


Security Joint Statementstated that, based on the scope andsensitivity of these

efforts, only Russia’s senior-mostofficials could have authorized theseactivities.

Morerecently, on December29, 2016, the White House issued a statementthat the

U.S. President had ordered a numberof actions in response to the Russian

Government's aggressive harassmentof U.S.officials and cyber operations aimedat

the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the U.S. Presidential

FOPSECRETHYNOFORN/FISA

17-cv-597(FBl)-189

‘bl-1

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Administration publicized its assessmentin October[2016] that Russia took actions

intendedto interfere with the U.S.election process andthat these activities could

only have beendirected by the highest levels of the Russian Government [in context,

this is likely a reference to the Election Security Joint Statement].

(S{QXR) Based on the Russian Government’s historical efforts to influence

US. and foreign elections,{iii

maand the information discussed herein regarding Russia’s coordination

with Carter Page

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

to attempt to undermine and

improperly andillegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. fF

©)A

PoAsstated in thelegislative history of FISA:

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-9-

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

17-cv-597(FBI)-190

FOP

SECRETF/NOFORN/FISA

Notonly do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States toobtain information, they also engagein activities which are intendedtoharm the Nation’s security by affecting the course of our Government, thecourse of public opinion, orthe activities of individuals. Such activitiesmay includepolitical action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of publicofficials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda(including the plantingof false or misleadingarticles or stories), andharassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals whoopposethe foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democraticinstitutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of ourcitizens.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

(U) B. X$NX) The Russian Government’s Coordinated Efforts to Influencethe 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(SXNEX In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos? and Carter Page (the

target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her

foreign policy teor.ees

|

OYthe FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the

2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other

individuals associated with Candidate #1’s campaign.asi

“

F

O

P

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

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17-cv-597(FBI)-191

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FOPSECREFYNGFORNFISA

Chote |As discussed below, Page has established relationships with

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-11-

17-cv-597(FBl)-192

FOPSECRETYNOEORN/FISA

Russian Governmentofficials, including Russian intelligence officers,P| b7A-1b7D-1

Ss

a—“‘t‘SCtSSSb3-1

ee7].b7E-1, 2,3

III. (U)(S) Carter Page. :

(U)A. (8) Page’s Connections to Russia and the RIS. (

(SANK) Page, a U.S.citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global i


focuses on the energy sector primarily in emergingmarkets.

b7A-1b7E-1, 2


-12-

17-cv-597(FBI)-193


7b7E-1, 2

es>)b3-1

sfb7E-1, 2

CO)SN)

PRcom approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in RussiaPO

b7A-1

SEuring this time, Page began 575-1,

business dealings withGazprom

bl1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2 FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-13-17-cv-597(FBI)-194

FOPSECREFTHNOFORN/FISA

(ARK) According to information provided by Page duringPo

rJ ga ointerview with the FBI


-14-

17-cv-597(FBI)-195

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b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

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bl-1b3-1

b7A-1b7E-1, 2,3


b6-2(XRF) Accordingto information provided by Page duringafoterview b7A-1

b7C-2

withChe b7E-1, 2

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1,2,6

(U) (KR) In or about January 2015, Podobnyy,along with Evgeny Buryakov

and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaintin the U.S. District Court

for the Southern District of New Yorkfor violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951

(conspiringto act, andacting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government).

According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the


employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two



-15-

17-cv-597(FBI)-196

FOP-SECRETYNOFORNFISA

Russia.? The complaintstates that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy

and Sporyshev included, amongother things, attempting to-recruit New York City

residents as intelligence sources for Russia. |

bl1-1

b3-1

o o tw

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

(U) 8 (6XRIE) Buryakov wasarrestedin or about January 2015. At the time of

Buryakov’s arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev nolongerlived in the United States and

were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiringto act

in the United States as an agentof Russia without providing prior notice to the

Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov wassentenced to 30 monthsin

prison. According to information provided by the Federal Bureauof Prisons,

Buryakov wasreleased on March 31, 2017.

FOPR-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-16-17-cv-597(FBl)-197

TOP

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

ee|:b3-1

ab6-2

b7A-1

—*b7E-1, 2

(U)B. S6XRB{ Page’s Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016

U.S.Presidential Election Influence Activities.

KXBNEY According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to

Russia and delivered the commencementaddressat the New Economic School.? In

addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page metwith at least two a

| b7A-1Russian officials duringthis trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI p7p-1

b7E-1, 2

confidential human source (Source#1),reported that Page had a

b3-1

b7A-1

O) > 5)ee 71,2,4

10 (POLAND} Source #1

had been an FBI source since b1-1

Source #1 has been compensate ‘by the FBI. As (TS) b3-1

discussed below in footnote 20, in or about October2016, the FBI suspendedits b7A-1

relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1’s unauthorized disclosure of b7E-1, 2,5

informationto the press. Subsequently, the FBI closed Source #1 as an FBI source.

Nevertheless, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from

Source #1 has been corroborated and usedin criminal proceedings. Moreover, the

TOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-17-17-cv-597(FBl)-198

FOP

SECRETHNGFORN/FISA

FBInotes that the incidentthatled the FBI to terminateits relationship withSource #1 occurred after Source #1 providedthe reporting that is described herein.

(U)

—

GESXANEX Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financialintelligencefirm, was approachedby an identified U.S. person, whoindicated to Source #1 that aU.S.-based law firm hadhiredthe identified U.S. person to conduct researchregarding Candidate #1’s ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source#1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as tothe motivation behindthe research into Candidate #1’sties to Russia. The FBIspeculates thatthe identified U.S. person was likely looking for information thatcould be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

(U) KDEX/MF) Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisiteinformation. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) describedherein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who hadhired Source #1 andto the FBI.

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

(2SYANH) Notwithstanding Source#1's reason for conducting the research bilinto Candidate #1’s ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previousreporting history b3-]with the FBI, whereby Source #1 providedreliable information to the FBI, the FBI b7A-1believes Source #1's reportin g herein to be credible. b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECRETH/NOFORN/FISA

-18-

17-cv-597(FBI)-199

FOR

SECREFHNOFORNFISA|

bl-1

. ;b3-1

secret meeting with Igor Sechin, whois the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy b7A-1

b7D-1 |

company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.”GE-eported b7E-1,2.

b3-1 :b7A-1 |b7D-1 |

b7E-1, 2.

(

|bl-1b3-1

b7A-1

.

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

b7A-1

i

ee

b7D-17

bE

1 (FONK)bi-1b3-1b7A-1b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

(U) 2y¥$¢f50R) In or about April 2014, the U.S. Departmentof the Treasury



_ identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the

President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he




The USDOTsanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone who has “shown

utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin — a key componentto his current standing.”


-19-17-cv-597(FBI)-200

FOR

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA !that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy b1-1

b3-1cooperation and the prospects for an associated movetolift Ukraine-related Western va

b7E-1, 2senctions against Russia

I

iirra

(TSAR)Ieccording to Source #1IIISammmmmmees ba

b3-1ee b7A-1b7D-1RRDivyekin [whois assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin], J b7E-1,2

esmet secretly with Page

andthattheir agendafor the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or

“kompromat”™that the Kremlin Possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it

b1-113 KSANR)

(b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

(U) # @&) Kompromatis a Russian term for compromising material about aPolitician or political figure, whichis typically used to create negative publicity or


-20-

17-cv-597(FBI)-201

FOP-SECRETHNOFORNIFISA

being released to Candidate #1’s mpeign

FOP-SECRETHNOFORNIFISA

-21-

17-cv-597(FBI)-202

bl-1b3-1

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b7D-1b7E-1,2

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bi-1b3-1 !b6-4b7A-Lb7C-4b7E-1, 2

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-22-

17-cv-597(FBI)-203

F

O

P

SECRET//NGEORN/FISA

bl-1b3-1

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a EdPsila,aa.July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that

Candidate #1’s campaign worked behind the scenes to makesure Political Party #1’s

platform would notcall for giving weaponsto Ukraineto fight Russian and rebel


F

O

P

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-23-

17-cv-597(FBI)-204


in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #1’s campaign sought “to make

sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weaponsit has



like a supporterof Ukraine’sterritorial integrity in September[2015], noted that


| Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate

#1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions


notclear, Candidate #1’s more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party

#1’s official platform, follow Candidate #1’s recent association with several people

sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter

rd 2 aq ©

(8555Fr

FOR

SECRETHNGFORN/FISA

-24-

17-cv-597(FBI)-205

bl-1

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b3-1

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b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

FOP

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

abab3-1

b7A-1

a

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

IV. (U)GYAN Page's Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Governmentto

Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(U) SXANEF Onor about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization

published anarticle (September 23rd News Article), which waswritten by the news

organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence

officials are investigating Page with respect to suspectedefforts by the Russian

Governmentto influence the U.S. Presidential election. According to the September

23rd NewsArticle, U.S.officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in

Moscowin July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement addressat the New

Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd

NewsArticle stated that a“well-placed Western intelligence source” told the news



alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issueof thelifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd NewsArticle, the Westernintelligence source also

reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another



-25-17-cv-597(FBI)-206

FOP

SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

deputy chief for internal policy andis believed by U.S. officials to have

responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies aboutthe US. election.”°

(U) (SKN) Accordingto the September 23rd News Article, certain members of

Congress were “taken aback”after being briefed on the alleged meetings between

Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the

Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd NewsArticle

* (8) As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate toconduct research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. Source #1 providedthe resultsof his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the businessassociate likely provided this information to the law firm thathired the businessassociatein thefirst place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided thisinformation to the business associate and the FBI.

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

The FBI doesnotbelieve that Source #1 directlyprovided this information to the identified newsorganization that published theSeptember 23rd NewsArticle.

(U) (¥8ANK) In or about late October 2016, however, after the Director of theFBIsenta letter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned ofnew information that might be pertinentto an investigation that the FBI wasconducting of Candidate #2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she was frustrated withthis action and believed it would likely influence the 2016 U.S. Presidentialelection. In response to Source #1’s concerns, Source #1 independently, andagainstthe prior admonishment from the FBI to speak only with the FBI on thismatter, released the reporting discussed herein to an identified newsorganization. Although the FBI continues to assess Source #1’s reporting isreliable, as noted above, the FBI has now closed Source #1 as an active source.


-26-

17-cv-597(FBI)-207

FOP-SECREF/NOFORN/FISA


Director, andciting the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the

advisor was unnamedin theletter, but thearticle indicated that the advisoris Page]

and “high ranking sanctioned individuals” [in context, likely a reference to Sechin]

in Moscow over the summerasevidence of “significant and disturbingties”

between Candidate #1’s campaign and the Kremlin that neededto be investigated

by the FBI.

(U) (S{XMX) Based on statementsin the September 23rd NewsArticle, as well as

in otherarticles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1’s

campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attempt to distance Candidate

#1’s campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd NewsArticle noted that

Page’s precise role in Candidate #1’s campaign is unclear. According to the article, a

spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign called Page an “informalforeign



added “[w]e are not aware of any ofhis activities, past or present.” However, the

article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why




-27-

17-cv-597(FBI)-208

FOP

SECREFYNOFORN/FISA


Duringthe interview,the campaign managerstated, “[Page is] not part of the

campaign I’m running.” The campaign manager added that Page has not been part


campaign manager. In response to a question from the interviewer regarding



manager responded,“If [Pageis] doing that, he’s certainly not doingit with the

7

permission or knowledge of the campaign... .’

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

(U) (XK) On or about September25, 2016, Page senta letter to the FBI Director.

In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News

Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations was nothing




-28-|

17-cv-597(FBI)-209

FOP-SECRETHNOFORNFISA

any “final” questions the FBI may have.”

(SMXR) Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news

organization published an article that was based on an interview with Page

(September 26th News Article). In the September 26th NewsArticle, Page stated

that all of the accusations were complete “garbage” and that he did not meet with

Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he was taking a leave of absence from his


FOR

SECREFHNOFORNFISA

-29-17-cv-597(FBI)-210

bl1-1

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b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

17-cv-597(FBI)-211

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7D-1b7E-1, 2, 5, 6

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es

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eC“ testi‘a b7E-1, 2, 3


-31-

17-cv-597(FBI)-212


bl-1b3-1b7A-1 |b7E-1, 2,3 —

A

Oiies$lb3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

ab7E-1, 2, 3,6


-32-

47-cv-597(FBI)-213

FOP

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

bl-1b3-1b6-2 ib7A-1b7C-2b7D-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6i

5>bl-1

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es|.b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl1-1

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ilFOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-33-47-cv-597(FBI)-214

FOP

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

F

O

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SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-34-

17-cv-597(FBI)-215

P >

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2,3

bi-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6Hl

bl-1

b3-1b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6


-35-

17-cv-597(FBI)-216

TOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA

bl1-1

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b7A-1

ns>72-),2,3,6

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b3-1

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wh


-36-

17-cv-597(FBI)-217


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-37-

17-cv-597(FBI)-218


bl-1

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b7E-1, 2

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(SR b7D-1b7E-1, 2

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bl1-1

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b7E-1,2

FORSECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-38-

17-cv-597(FBl)-219


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2

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-39-

17-cv-597(FBI)-220


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b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

5bl-1

b3-1

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FORSECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-40-17-cv-597(FBI)-221


bl-1

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(5

Peyh IVEY a


-41-

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b7E-1, 2, 3,6

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b7E-1, 2, 3,6

17-cv-597(FBI)-222

FOP-SECRET/NOEORN/FISA

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

ESb7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6.

bl1-1

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bl1-1

b3-1

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6Wh

FOP-SECRET/NOFEORN/FISA

-42-

17-cv-597(FBl)-223


ns>).—-b3-1b6-2b7A-1b7C-2 |b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |

5cbl-1

rs2b6-2

b7A-1

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b3-1b7A-1

b7E-2


-43-

17-cv-597(FBI)-224


bl-1

ES°°b6-2

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Tnee

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a(U) G. (8//NF) Page’sLetter to the U.S. DepartmentofJustice.

(SANEKIn or around February 2017, Page senta letter to the U.S.

Department of justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, urging the review of

what Page claimed was“severe election fraud in the form of disinformation,

suppression of dissent, hate crimes and other extensive abuses led by members of

[Candidate #2’s] campaign andtheir political allies last year.” In his letter, Page

claimsthat hehas notdirectly supported a political campaign since September

2016, but continues to be subjected to personal attacks by former members of

Candidate #2’s campaign basedonfictitious information. Page wrote that his

academic lecture and related meetings with scholars and business people in

Moscow had no connection to the U.S. election. Page attributes the assertions in

the September 23rd NewsArticle that Page met with two senior Russian officials

FOP-SECREFYNOFORN/FISA

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FOR

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

(i.e., Sechin and Diveykin) while he was in Moscow in July 2016to give the

commencement address at the New Economic School, which Page claimsis “false

evidence,” to Candidate #2’s campaign. Page further claims that the information

relied on by Candidate #2’s campaign, certain members of the U.S. Congress, and

the mediaare lies that were completely fabricated by Candidate #2’s paid

consultants and private investigators.


-45-17-cv-597(FBI)-226

bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

F

O

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SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

(SHINE) l(SANK)

FOP

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-46-

17-cv-597(FBI)-227

bl-1b3-1

b6-2 !b7A-1 |b7C-2 :b7E-1, 2

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

bl1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

FOP

SECREFINOFORN/FISA

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

bl-1b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2ii

bl1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

(SANE)


-47-

17-cv-597(FBI)-228

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

bl-1b3-1b6-2b7A-1b7C-2b7E-1, 2

bl-1b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

(SHNK)

FOP

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

-48-

17-cv-597(FBI)-229

FOR

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

b1-1

a b3-1,

b6-2

|b7C-2

pe aia

ANY

bl-1

ee+.

b6-2

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FOR

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-49-17-cv-597(FBI)-230

Say |bl-1rs b3-1b6-2

b7A-1b7C-2

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 4,6

bl-1

()b3-1OOesb7A-1

b7C-2esaoea

:eses

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-2, 4


-50-

17-cv-597(FBI)-231


5


-51-

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1,2, 3, 6

bl-1

b6-2

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b7A-1

b7C-2

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |

17-cv-597(FBl)-232

FORSECRET/NOFORN/FISA

b1-1

|b6-2

b7A-1 |

b7C-2 |

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bi-1b3-1b6-2b7A-1b7C-2b7E-1, 2, 3,6.


-52-

17-cv-597(FBI)-233

Sb1-1

(SANK b3-1

b6-2b7A-1b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

17-cv-597(FBI)-234

FOR-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1,2, 3, 6

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1,2, 3,6 |


-54-

17-cv-597(FBI)-235

b7C- |b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

a(i)EY

b3-1

Ss*b7E-1, 2, 3,6

VIII. (U) Conclusion. (U) (SINK) As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating

and conspiring with the Russian Governmentii

EEBase! on the


believe that Page[Is

NS<1owingly engage in

clandestineintelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2


-55-

17-cv-597(FBl)-236

FORSECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

Ss =nnas()

Pothe FBI submits that there is probable causeto believe that b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of

the United Statesiii

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esa | b3-1

b6-2Os7;

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67-1,2,3,6—

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-56-

17-cv-597(FBI)-237

(8)

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assSSSSes

a

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a


_ -57-

b7E-1,2,3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1,2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

17-cv-597(FBI)-238



-58-

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1,2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-239

FOPSECRETY/NOFORN/FISA

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

SSee|b3-1b6-2

b7E-1, 2,3,6 |

ee

SSS

a

ee =||b3-1

ee b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6


-59-

17-cv-597(FBI)-240


bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

B

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl1-1b3-1

b7A-1 !b7E-1, 2,3,6 |

a


-60-

17-cv-597(FBI)-241


= 4. (& Proposed Minimization Procedures Astoall information acquired

through the authorities requested herein, the FBI willfollow

eCb3-1

|b7E-1, 2, 3,6,

es :

es

Ce

ee

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FPb1-1

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-61-

17-cv-597(FBl)-242


bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

ee

reb1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 |

bl-1

b3-1

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b7E-1, 2, 3,6

i

!

as|

b3-1|7A.

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FORSECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

-62-

17-cv-597(FBI)-243

ee|.b3-1

ESb7E-1,2, 3,6

a

a|b3-1

es|b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with }77) > 3 6

5. (& Nature of the Information Sought Throughthe authorities

respectto the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the

certification set forth below. Asindicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBI is

seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to the ability of

the United States to protect against clandestineintelligence activities by an

intelligence service or network of this foreign poweror by agentsof this foreign

power, and information with respect to a foreign powerorforeign territory that

relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conductof the


-63-

17-cv-597(FBl)-244


foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities mayalso incidentally


bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

&

bl1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(8)b1-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6


-64-

17-cv-597(FBI)-245

FOR-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA|

es>|b3-1

©b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

A

a

6. (SX Certification The certification of the Assistant to the President for _b1-1 |

b3-1 |

National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the nt 33.6 |“hy Sy > 6

' President as a certifying official in Executive Order Numberfi

Es22ered, is set forth below.

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

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b7E-1,2,7ilFOPRSECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-65-17-cv-597(FBI)-246


(U) The Purposeof the Authorities Requested

(3) The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in


authorities requested in this application may produceinformation and material


violation of United States law, andthis investigation may result in an eventual

criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at

bl-1least a significant purposeofthis request(os b3-1b7A-1

7is to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI’s investigation 7E-1,2,3,6 —

of this target.

2

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b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

CeeeeS


-66-

17-cv-597(FBI)-247

FOP-SECREFHYNOFORN/FISA

Rn orb3-1

b7A-1

eee | b7E-1, 2,3, 6

a.5

|b3-1

||b7E-1,2, 3, 6

_ nes bl-19. (&) Duration of the Authorities Requested (See0b3-1

b7A-1

The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign b7E-1,2, 3,6

intelligence information hasfirst been obtained. Additional information of the same

type will be obtained on a continuousbasis throughout the entire period requested.

The activities which the United States must identify and monitor are incremental

and continuous, and communicationsrelating to such activities are often disguised

to appear innocuous. Thetype of foreign intelligence information being sought and

the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing precludethe conclusionthat, ata

given time, all such information has been obtained andcollection can be ended.




-67-17-cv-597(FBI)-248

FOR

SECRET/NOFORN/FISA

Bsb1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1,2

yy bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2


-68-

17-cv-597(FBI)-249

eS+b3-1

esb7E-1, 2

5a .

|:b7A-1

b7E-2, 6

a bab3-1

b7A-1

Ss

5es2b3-1

eSb7E-1, 2, 3, 6


-69-

417-cv-597(FBI)-250

FOP

SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

INFOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-70-

17-cv-597(FBI)-251

b1-1b3-1b7A-1 |b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6


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ns>?)2.3.6

bl-1

b3-1

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A

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-71-

17-cv-597(FBI)-252


(%) Specific Authorities Requested Based upon the foregoing information,

the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conducttheactivities


3iiibl-1

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P| b7E-1, 2, 3,6

})i

bl-1

b3-1

Ssb7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1b3-16S b6.2b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6


-72-

17-cv-597(FBI)-253

FOPSECRETHINOFORN/FISA

SS

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bl-1

b3-1b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

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b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

17-cv-597(FBI)-254

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6a

M >

bl-1b3-1b6-2b7A-1b7C-2 :b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

| ee

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-255


5S

ee

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

blllb3-1

b7A-1


-75-

17-cv-597(FBl)-256


bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6


-76-

17-cv-597(FBI)-257

FOP-SECREFTHNOFORN/FISA

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

es

=

(3.1b7A-1

nneeee—s—SC—CCSCSCSs‘(‘aS Ow b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

17-cv-597(FBI)-258

FOPSECRETHNOFORN/ .FISA bt

b3-1a bIA-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(U) (&) The FBI has reviewedthis verified application for accuracy in accordance

with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copyof the draft to the

appropriate field office(s). A copy of those procedures waspreviously provided to

the Court.


-78-

17-cv-597(FBI)-259


(U) VERIFICATION

(8) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information

regarding Carter W. Page is true and correct. Executed pursuantto Title 28, United bl-l

States Code, § 1746 0n_April[M20 bat

b6-1

b7A-1

b7C-1 . Supervisory Special Agent

Federal Bureau of Investigation —


-79..

17-cv-597(FBI)-260


(U) CERTIFICATION

(&) I, the undersigned, having been designated as oneof the officials

authorized to makethecertifications required by the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Actof 1978, as amended, do herebycertify with regard tothe

b1-1 cecuestedin this verified application targeting b3-1

b7A-1

Carter W.Page, an agent of the Governmentof Russia, a foreign power,as follows: 7E-1,2,3,6 |

(A) (U) The information sought throughthe authorities requested herein is


(B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to


matters described in this application, the primary purposeof the authorities


than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign


(C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities bl-1b3-1

requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques. an 136

(D) (&) The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the

_authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C), ie.,


-80-

17-cv-597(FBI)-261

FOR

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA |

informationthat relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect


foreign poweror by agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B), |

| i.e., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and

is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs .

of the United States. These same authorities mayalso incidentally acquire foreign

intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e). bled

b3-1

(E) %) Thebasis for my certification that the information sought is the type b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

of foreignintelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot

be obtained by normalinvestigative techniquesis as follows.

5)a. bl1-1 |

Psb7A-1 |

ee Eb?

SS)

Ss)FOP

SECRETFYNOFORN/FISA

-81-

17-cv-597(FBI)-262


SS5bi-1b3-1a b7A-1b7E-1, 2

55

bl1-1a b3-1b7A-1eeEe

b1-1a b3-1b7A-1

sf

F

O

P

SECREFHNGEORN/FISA

-82-

17-cv-597(FBI)-263

bl1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1,2, 8|

a.

|

(U) (&) b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2


-83-17-cv-597(FBl)-264

FOPSECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

a


-84-

17-cv-597(FBI)-265

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1,2

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3


bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

bl1-1

b3-1

eeeee—s—CSCCSC‘(‘CNSCSSRRSSb7E-1, 2, 3


-85-17-cv-597(FBl)-266


B

bl-1

se 86b7A-1

b7E-1,2, 3

Se bI-1b3-1

ee

—

7Ab7E-1, 2,3

es°b3-1

eeb7E-1, 2,3


-86-

17-cv-597(FBI)-267

FOP-SECRETHNOFORNFISA

(U) (&) Based uponthe foregoing information,it is the Government's belief that

the authorities requested herein targeting Pagearecritical investigative means for


FOPSEGCRETHNOFORN/FISA

-87-

17-cv-597(FBI)-268

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3


%&) Accordingly, I executethis certification regarding Carter W. Pagein

accordance with the requirementsof the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Actof

1978, as amended,

{Jaynes B. Comey / Rex Tillerson

irector Secretary of State


Andrew G, McCabe

Deputy Director Deputy Secretary of State


Michael R. Pompeo _ JamesN. Mattis .

Director of the Central Secretary of Defense

Intelligence Agency

Daniel R. Coats H.R. McMaster

Director of NationalIntelligence Assistant to thePresidentfor


Principal Deputy Directorof

National Intelligence

bl-1b3-1b7A-1

FOP-SECRETHNGFORN/FISA

-88-

17-cv-597(FBI)-269

FOR-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA

(U) APPROVAL

(U) (8) I find that this application regarding Carter W.Pagesatisfies the

criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approveitsfiling

with this Court.

Se: bl-1

b3-1b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 6


-89-

17-cv-597(FBI)-270

FOP-SECRETHNOFPORN/FISA

(8) Accordingly, I approvethefiling of this application regarding Carter

W. Page with theCou,

LiceLoraDanaJ. Boente?”

Acting Attorney Generalof the United Statesa?

” (U) Pursuantto Executive Order 13787 (March 31, 2017), DanaJ. Boenteis serving as the Acting Attorney General with respect to this matter by virtue ofthe Attorney General’s recusal.


-90-

bl-1

b3-1b7A-1

- b7E-1

17-cv-597(FBI)-271


(U) (9) WHEREFORE,the United States submits that this application

regarding Carter W. Pagesatisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign


- this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed



b6-3

b7A-1

b7C-3



17-cv-597(FBI)-272

All information is considered unclassified

Fitge

except where otherwise shown. haa feed Staton Rane: |SECRET intelligence sone ForeignClassify By: J23J98T32 Urveillance Court |Reason: (C)APR 2017Derived From: FBI NSICG,dated UNITED STATES |of

LeeannFlynn Hail, cy |. ;

» Clerk of CourtDeclassifyOn: FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 1-1b3-1

WASHINGTON,D. C. b7A-1

IN RE CARTER W.PAGE, A U.S. Docket Number:

bl1-1PERSON a| b3-1b7A-1


I, An application having been made by the United States of America


U.S.C.SSSAor the Act), for an order and warrant

(hereinafter “order’) for[iond fullconsideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds

: bl-1as follows: 7 b3-1

b7A-1

Attorney General;

3. Onthebasis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there is

probable causeto believe that:

SECRET

Application to the USFISC bl-1Derived from: b3-1in Docket Number captioned above 7

Declassify on:

17-cv-597(FBI)-273

2. The application has been madebya Federalofficer and approved by the b7E-1, 2, 3,6

Pe Pact

SECREF

(A) The Governmentof the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign

powerand Carter W.Pageis an agent of Russia, as defined by ea ,

| _ 4, The minimization procedures proposedin the applicationhave been ~~ _—_iOb*I-1

. b3-1

adopted by the Attorney General and meetthe definition of minimization er 336)

procedures ndici 5. The application contains all statements andcertifications requiredoy

Dethe certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis 1-1~ b3-1

ofthe statements madein874: b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

any other information furishedncWHEREFORE,IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,pursuantto the authority

conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United Statesis

GRANTED,andit is

FURTHER ORDERED,as follows:

17-cv-597(FBl)-274

SECRET

Zi 1. The United States is authorized to conducfii

Eetarget as follows;res

bl1-1

b3-1

b7A-1 |

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1,2,3,6 |

bl-1

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b7E-1, 2, 3,6

i!'1

||

|

17-cv-597(FBI)-275

:|

‘ _ ‘

bl-1

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b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

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b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

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b6-2

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b7C-2b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBl)-276

bl1-1

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-b7C-2

b7E-1,2, 3, 6

bl-1

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b7C-2

b7E-1,2, 3, 6

bl-1

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b6-2

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b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-277

t nN T

bl-1

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b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

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bl-1

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b7E-1, 2, 3,6

17-cv-597(FBI)-278

bl-1

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b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

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b7E-1,2, 3, 6

bl-1

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-279

SECREF

eS|b3-1

esb7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl1-l

b3-1b7A-1 :b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |

i

i bi-lb3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-280

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1ab7E-1,2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-281

bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1,2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1,2, 3, 6art

-10-17-cv-597(FBI)-282

SECRET

EE OE bitb3-1as b7A-1b7E-1,2,3,6 |

bI-l |es b3-1 :|b7A-1 i

ns

6. The authorities approved are for the period indicated below unlesse= Asto all information acquired throughthe authorities approvedherein, .as

-1the FBI shall follow b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

otherwise ordered by this Court.

-11-

17-cv-597(FBI)-283

-12-

bl-1 |b3-1 !b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

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17-cv-597(FBI)-284

bl-1

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|Jf.

;

-13-17-cv-597(FBI)-285

-14-

||

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17-cv-597(FBI)-286

bl-1

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eS:. b3-1

eS°|| : b7E-1, 2,3, 6

bl-1

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|

:

-15-17-cv-597(FBl)-287

SECREF

es

|

+71,2,3,6

a

bl1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1,2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

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bl-1 |b3-1 |

es b7A-1 |b7E-1, 2,3, 6

|OO

.

:

| -16- 17-cv-597(FBI)-288

Ml-17-

b1-1

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17-cv-597(FBI)-289

bl-1

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----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank.-----

-18-17-cv-597(FBl)-290

SECREF

This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expires atIEastern Time

day of June, 2017. bl-1b3-1

b7A-1

on the

ied

stned paDate

Eastern Time

ime

ANNE C. CONWAYJudge, United States Foreign


Bnew! (ghee

b6-3b7A-1b7C-3

-19-17-cv-597(FBI)-291

FOP-SECRETHNOFORNIFISA oe

UNITED STATESAll information is considered unclassified

except where otherwise shown.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT :=~.

Classify By: J23J98T32bl-1

Reason: (C)

Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated WASHINGTON,D.C. b3-1

06.2017 DectassifyOn: | b7A-1

(&) IN RE CARTERW. PAGE, A USS. Docket Number:bl-1

PERSON.7 b3-1

b7A-1


(8) The United States of America herebyapplies to this Court for authority to

<ondc2s lescribed herein, pursuant i-1. ~ b3-1

to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended,Title 50, United b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

States Code (U.S.C), 5en154or theAct).

- 1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This application is pL

, 3-1

made byPFa Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)of the Federal Bureau 6-1

b7A-1

of Investigation (FBI) whose official duties at FBI Headquarters include supervision )7C-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

of the FBI’s investigation of the above-captioned target based upon information

officially furnishedto

TOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

eeDerived from: FP

ee 1

Declassify on:. f


47-cv-597(FBI)-292

FOP

SECREF/NOFORN/FISA

2. (8) Identity of the Target Thetargetofthis application is Carter W.

Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power,described in detail below. The bi1-1b3-1status of the target was determinedin or about June 2017 from information provided 67A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6by the US, Department of Sia,III

3. (8) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts j-}

b3-]and circumstancesin support of this application. b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3,6

a. (&%) Thetarget of this applicationis an agentof a foreign power.

(3) The following describes the foreign powerandsets forth in detail a

description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign

power.

(U) (% This verified application reports on developments in the FBI's

investigation of the above captioned target since the mostrecent application


applications has been summarized or removed not becauseit was factually

inaccurate butin orderto create a more concise document.

(U) &) The Governmentof the Russian Federationis a foreign poweras

defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).

FOP

SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

-2-

17-cv-597(FBI)-293

FOP-SECRET/INGFORN/FISA

(U) (&% The Governmentof the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally

recognized foreign governmentand,as of the execution of this application, is listed


Permanent Missionsto the United Nations published by the United Nations, andits

establishments in the United States are componentsthereof.

&) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation

Se

bl-1

es}3-b7A-1

b7E-1, 2


17-cv-597(FBI)-294


bl-1b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

%

bl1-1

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Cc(U)

—

B) CarterW, Pac[I

owingly engagein 53-1

b7A-1

clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for b7E-1, 2

or on behalf of such foreign power, whichactivities involve or are aboutto

involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly

conspires with other persons to engage in suchactivities and, therefore, is an

agent of a foreign poweras defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).


17-cv-597(FBI)-295

TFOPR-SECRETINOFORN/FISA

I. (U) Overview.

(S//KIE) This application seeks renewed authority to conductigbl-1

eeCarter Page. The FBIbelieves that Page has been b3-1. b6-2

the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Government eines

(G//INK) Pageis a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate for U.S.

President (Candidate #1).’ As discussed in greater detail below, the FBI believes that

the Russian Government engaged in efforts to undermine and influence the outcome

bi1-1

of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.eeb3-1

b7A-1

Oe W7E-L2

1 (8) On or about November8, 2016, Candidate #1 was elected President. biel

Although Candidate #1 is now the President, in order to maintain the historical b3-1

accuracy of the background information, unless otherwise stated, the original b7A-1

references to Candidate #1 and membersof Candidate #1’s campaign team will

remain the same asin previous applications filed in this matter (see docket numbers

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

47-cv-597(FBI)-296

FOP-SECREFH/NOFORN/FISA

es bl-1b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

II. (U) (3//IXR) The FBI Believes that the Russian Government Engages inInfluence Operations Against the United States.

(U) A. @//MR) RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.

(3//NE) During a September 2016 interview with an identified news

organization, the then Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, “Russia has

tried to influence U.S.electionssince the 1960s during the Cold War”and “there’s a

tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own and others.” The then

DNI commentedthatthis influence included providing moneyto particular

candidatesor providing disinformation. The then DNI addedthat“it shouldn’t

comeas a big shock to people, ... I think it’s more dramatic maybe because they

have the cybertools that they can bringto bear in the sameeffort.”PF

bl-1Pe,b7A-1STes

17-cv-597(FBI)-297

FORSECRETANGFORN/FISA

(S7/INK) In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the

Democratic National Committee (ONC)?aaa

GEThere has been speculation in the U.S. media that the Russian Government

was behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvementin the hack.


not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents was a

net positive: “The important thing is the content that was given to the public.”

Despite Russia'sdena!

2 @//MK) According to information on its website, WikiLeaksis a multi-

national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the

analysis and publication oflarge datasets of censored or otherwiserestricted official

materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source

information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousandsof e-mails it says

are from the accounts of DNC officials.

TOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-7-

17-cv-597(FBI)-298

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

b1-1

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bl-1

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b7E-1, 2, 3

bl-1

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Ss —: b3-1

es1 bEb7E-1, 2,3

addition, according to an October 7, 2016 Joint Statementfrom the Departmentof

Homeland Security and the Office of the Director ofNationalIntelligence on Election

Security (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian



Statementstates that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, amongothers,sites like

WikiLeaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed

efforts. According to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and

disclosures were intended to interfere with the U.S.election process; activity thatis

not new to Moscow - the Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across


Security Joint Statement stated that, based on the scope and sensitivity of these

efforts, only Russia’s senior-most officials could have authorized theseactivities.

Morerecently, on December29, 2016, the White Houseissued a statementthat the

U.S.President had ordered a numberofactionsin response to the Russian

Government's aggressive harassmentof U.S. officials and cyber operations aimed at

the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the U.S. Presidential


17-cv-597(FBI)-299


Administration publicized its assessment in October [2016] that Russia took actions

intended to interfere with the U.S. election process and that these activities could

only have been directed by the highest levels of the Russian Government [in context,

this is likely a reference to the Election Security Joint Statement].

(%/KE) Based on the Russian Government’s historical efforts to influence

US. and foreignelections,PBand the information discussed herein regarding Russia’s coordination bi-l

b3-1

. b7A-1with Carter Pa[Iams 1

I«3 28:20t0 undermine andimproperly and illegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. po

CO) S/XK)ee

ee bEb7E-1, 2

POAsstated in thelegislative history of FISA:


-9-

17-cv-597(FBI)-300


Notonly do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to

obtain information, they also engagein activities which are intended to

harm the Nation’s security by affecting the course of our Government, the

course of public opinion,or the activities of individuals. Such activities

may includepolitical action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public

officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda

(including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and

harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who

oppose the foreign power. Suchactivity can undermine our democratic

institutions as well as directly threaten the peace andsafety of ourcitizens.

ELR. Rep. No. 95-1283,pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

(U) B. (3//KE) The Russian Government’s Coordinated Efforts to Influence

the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(8//NB) In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos? andCarter Page (the

target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her

foreign policy te.rr br.b3-1

b7A-1abyD.1

b7E-1, 2PFthe FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the

2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhapsother

individuals associated with Candidate #1’s campaignii bl-1b3-1

b7A-1ab7D-1b7E-1, 2

eee ; bl-1

- b3-1b7A-1

b7E-1, 2


-10-

17-cv-597(FBl)-301

FORSECREFYNGEORN/FISA

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

sori As discussed below, Page hasestablished relationships with b3-1. b7E-1, 2

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

FOPR-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-11-

17-cv-597(FBI)-302

' FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA

Russian Governmentofficials, including Russianintelligence officersi

Ii. (U)&) Carter Page.

(U) A, (@) Page’s Connections to Russia and the RIS.

(H/INR) Page, a USS.citizen, is the founder and managingpartner of Global

Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that

focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets.Po


-12-

17-cv-597(FBI)-303

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

bl-1

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b7E-1, 2,3

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

U) (3XC)re

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2comapproximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in RussiaPo

EE(uring this time, Page began

business dealings with Gazpromi

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2 FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

-13-

17-cv-597(FBl)-304


(S{/MIR) According to information provided by Page duringQi b7A-1b7E-1, 2

interview with the FE iiiiiiiiinneD2c

bl-1

ieee—“(C;isSCSCSCSCsiésC®S,b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1,2

b1-1b3-1

6 (&//KIE) b6-2b7A-1b7C-2b7E-1,2

bl-1b3-1b7A-1 |b7E-1,2,3

FOPSECREFI/NOFORN/FISA

-14-

17-cv-597(FBI)-305

FOP

SECRETHNOFORN/FISA b6-2b7A-1

(//KIK) According to information provided by Page during AZinterview ae 5

v

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 6

z. > ct|

@ ee ow

(U) (8//IMR) In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov

and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court

for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951

(conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agentof a foreign government).

Accordingto the complaint, Buryakov workedin the United States as an agentof the


employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakovworked with two



-15-

17-cv-597(FBl)-306


Russia.’ The complaint states that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy

and Sporyshev included, amongotherthings, attempting to recruit New York City

residents as intelligence sources for Russia.

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

:

(U) * (8//MK) Buryakov wasarrested in or about January 2015. Atthe time ofBuryakov’s arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshevnolongerlived in the United States and

. were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiring to act

in the United States as an agent of Russia without providing prior notice to the

Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 monthsin

prison. According to information provided by the Federal Bureauof Prisons,

Buryakov wasreleased on March 31, 2017.


-16-

17-cv-597(FBI)-307


bl1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

(U) B. (&//IIK) Page’s Coordination with Russian GovernmentOfficials on

2016 U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.

(8//XIK) According to open source information,in July 2016, Page traveled to

Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.’ In

addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page metwith at least two

Russian officials duringthis trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI at

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

confidential human source (Source #1),<poried that Page had a

(U)> (S//<X)ee! ||}a |

b7A-1b7E-1,2, 4

10 (KSV/MIR) Source #1

Source #1 has been compensated . bl-1

discussed below in footnote 22, in or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its —_b3-1

relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1’s unauthorized disclosure of - b7A-1

information to the press. Subsequently, the FBI closed Source #1 as an FBI source. b7E-1, 2,5

Nevertheless, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from

Source #1 has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the


-17-

17-cv-597(FBl)-308


FBI notes that the incident that led the FBI to terminateits relationship with

Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting that is described herein.

(U) (KS¥/MK) Source #1, who now ownsa foreign business/financial intelligencefirm, was approachedbyan identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that aU.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research

regarding Candidate #1’s ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1

have a long-standing businessrelationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source

#1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to

the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. The FBI

speculates that the identified U.S. person waslikely looking for information thatcould be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

(U) (X3//INR) Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisiteinformation. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) describedherein, Source #1 provided the informationto the identified U.S. person who hadhired Source #1 andto the FBI.

@£8//NK) Notwithstanding Source #1’s reason for conducting the researchinto Candidate #1’s ties to Russia, based on Source #1’s previous reporting historywith the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI

believes Source #1’s reporting herein to be credible.

FOPR-SECREFYNOFORN/FISA

-18-

17-cv-597(FBI)-309

b3-1 |b7A-1b7D-1b7E-1, 2

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

bl-lb3-1b7A-1b7D-1b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECREFINOFORN/FISA

bl-1

b3-1| . b7A-1

company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.”EDreported b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

secret meeting with Igor Sechin, whois the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

Ub7A-1(U)ES//DER) aeb7E-1, 2

1 (S/R) bl-1b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

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=

Sle

12 (//ME) In or about April 2014, the U.S. Departmentof the Treasury(USDOT)announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government



President and Chairman of the ManagementBoard for Rosneft, a position he




The USDOTsanctions announcementidentified Sechin as someone who has “shown

utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin —- a key componentto his current standing.”

FOPR-SECREFHNOFORNFISA

17-cv-597(FBI)-310 :

FOP-SECRETINGFORN/FISA

that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy

cooperation and the prospects for an associated movetolift Ukraine-related Western

sanctions against Russia,Ias


-20-

17-cv-597(FBI)-311

bi-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

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bl-1

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bl-1

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b7E-1, 2


bl-1

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b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

(80) Icording to Source #1aa(O/ occording 7b3-1

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Divyekin [whois assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin],§j

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b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2


-21-

17-cv-597(FBI)-312

FOPSECRETFYNOFORN/FISA

Ictsecretly with Pageand that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekinraising a dossier or

“kompromat”’ that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility ofit

being released to Candidate #1’s campaign.'*i

(U) * (&) Kompromatis a Russian term for compromising material about apolitician or political figure, whichis typically used to create negative publicity orblackmail.

7 (XS//MR)

18 (KX/NIE)

FOPR-SECREFYNOFORN/FISA

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17-cv-597(FBI)-313

bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7D-1b7E-1, 2

bl1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

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bl-1 :b3-1b7A-1b7D-1b7E-1, 2

FOR-SECRETANOFORNFISA

-23-

17-cv-597(FBI)-314

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

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bl1-1

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b7E-1, 2

b6-4

b7A-1

b7C-4

b7E-1, 2

FOPSECRETINOFORN/FISA

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FOP-SECREFINOFORN/FISA

-24-

17-cv-597(FBl)-315


b1-1

Ssb7A-1

b7D-1

0b7A-1

2F|a July 2016article in an identified news organization reported that

Candidate #1’s campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #1’s

platform would notcall for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel


in Washington. Thearticle stated that Candidate #1’s campaign sought “to make

sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weaponsit has



like a supporter of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in September [2015], noted that


Crimea. The August 2016article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate

#1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions


not clear, Candidate #1’s moreconciliatory words, which contradict Political Party

#1’s official platform, follow Candidate #1’s recent association with several people


-25-

17-cv-597(FBI)-316


sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carterbl-1

b3-1Page.age b7A-1

7B12

esb3-1

eSb7D-1

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bl-1

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aeb7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

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FOPSECREFANOFORN/FISA

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17-cv-597(FBI)-317


bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

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b1-1

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FOP-SECREFT/NGOFEORN/FISA

abl-1

S|b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Iv. (U)g/m) Page’s Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Governmentto

Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(U) (S/R) On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization

published an article (September 23rd NewsArticle), which was written by the news _

organization’s Chief Investigative Correspondent,alleging that U.S.intelligence

officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian

Governmentto influence the U.S.Presidential election. According to the September

23rd NewsArticle, U.S.officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in

Moscowin July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencementaddressat the New

Economic School, he met with two senior Russianofficials. The September 23rd

NewsArticle stated that a “well-placed Western intelligence source” told the news



-28-

17-cv-597(FBI)-319



alleged meeting, Sechin raisedtheissueof thelifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd NewsArticle, the Western intelligence source also

reported that U.S.intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another

top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now servesas

deputy chief for internal policy andis believed by U.S.officials to have

responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies aboutthe U.S.election.

* (S) As discussed above, Source #1 washired by a business associate toconduct research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the resultsof his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the businessassociate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the businessassociate in the first place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only providedthisinformation to the business associate and the FBI.

The FBI does notbelieve that Source #1 directlyprovidedthis information to the identified news organization that published theSeptember 23rd NewsArticle.

(U) (X8//NK) In or about late October 2016, however, after the FBI Director sent aletter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned of new informationthat might be pertinentto an investigation that the FBI was conducting of Candidate#2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she wasfrustrated with this action and believeditwould likely influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. In response to Source #1’sconcerns, Source #1 independently, and against the prior admonishmentfrom theFBI to speak only with the FBI onthis matter, released the reporting discussed


-29-

17-cv-597(FBI)-320

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECREFTINOFORN/FISA

(U) (&//IX® According to the September 23rd NewsArticle, certain members of

Congress were “taken aback”after being briefed on the alleged meetings between

Page and Russianofficials and viewedthe meetings as a possible back channelto the

Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd NewsArticle


Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the

advisor was unnamedin theletter, butthe article indicated that the advisoris Page]

and “high ranking sanctioned individuals”[in context, likely a reference to Sechin]

in Moscow overthe summeras evidenceof “significant and disturbing ties”

between Candidate #1’s campaign and the Kremlin that neededto be investigated

by the FBI.

(U) (8//INK) Based on statements in the September 23rd NewsArticle, as well as

in other articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1’s

campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attemptto distance Candidate

#1’s campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd NewsArticle noted that

Page’s precise role in Candidate #1’s campaign is unclear. Accordingto thearticle, a

spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign called Page an “informal foreign

herein to an identified news organization. Although the FBI continuesto assess

Source #1’s reporting is reliable, as noted above, the FBI closed Source #1 as an active

source.


-30-

17-cv-597(FBI)-321




added “[w]e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present.” However, the

article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond whenasked why




Duringthe interview, the campaign managerstated, “[Pageis] not part of the

campaign I’m running.” The campaign manager added that Page has not been part


campaign manager. In responseto a question from theinterviewer regarding |




permission or knowledge of the campaign... .”Po

(U) (&//RE) On or about September 25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director.


-3]-

17-cv-597(FBI)-322

FOPSECRETF/NGFORN/FISA

In this letter, Page madereference to the accusations in the September 23rd News

Article and denied them. Pagestated that the source of the accusations was nothing



any “final” questions the FBI may have.

(U)(S7/KK) Additionally, on or about September26, 2016, an identified news

organization published anarticle that was based on an interview with Page

(September 26th NewsArticle). In the September 26th NewsArticle, Page stated

that all of the accusations were complete “garbage” and that he did not meet with

Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he wastaking a leave of absence from his


bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

bl-123 (8/ASE) b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2


-32-

17-cv-597(FBI)-323

a

< (G//KIX)

(3//XR)


-33-

17-cv-597(FBI)-324

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2, 6


bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

(S/N)

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

U)b7A-1

sb7E.1, 2,3

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3


-34-

17-cv-597(FBI)-325


bl-1

b3-1b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

Bax)

3

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6


-35-

17-cv-597(FBI)-326

FOP-SECREFYNOFEORN/FISA

1.

SE

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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b3-1

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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ES°°

FORSECREFHNOFORNFISA

-36-

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6»

17-cv-597(FBI)-327


bl-1b3-1b6-2b7A-1b7C-2b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

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b7E-1, 2, 3,6

TORSECRETHNOFORN/FISA

-37-

17-cv-597(FBI)-328


bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1b3-1b6-2b7A-1b7C-2 |b7E-1, 2, 3,6


-38-

17-cv-597(FBI)-329

FOPSECRETYNGFORN/FISA

5rs

5 (S/R)


-39-

17-cv-597(FBI)-330

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

bl-1

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b7E-1, 2

b1-1

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b6-2

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FOPSECREF/NGOFORN/FISA

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

:

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6


-40-

17-cv-597(FBI)-331


bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1. b3-1

ES. b7A-1

b7C-2b7E-1, 2, 3, 6


-41-

_17-cv-597(FBI)-332

FOPRSECRETINOFORN/FISA

(S/O)re

bl-1b3-1b6-2 |b7A-1b7C-2b7E-1, 2

bl-1b3-1b6-2b7A-1b7C-2 |b7E-1, 2,3,6 |


-42-

17-cv-597(FBl)-333

TFOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

%


-43-

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

bl-1

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b1-1

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17-cv-597(FBI)-334


Bos


-44-

17-cv-597(FBI)-335

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7D-1

b7E-1, 2

bl-1

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:

EST°b3-1

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ns171,2,3,


-45-

17-cv-597(FBI)-336

FOPSECRETHNGOFEORN/FISA

bl-1b3-1

b6-2b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6


-46-

17-cv-597(FBI)-337

FOP-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

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72-1,2,3,6

|

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b7E-1, 2,3, 6


-47-

17-cv-597(FBl)-338

F

O

P

SECRETJ/NOFORN/ ]FISA bl-1 !

b3-1 :

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F

O

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SECREFTHNOFORN/FISA

-48-

17-cv-597(FBl)-339


bl1-1

°°b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(U) G. (&/AXF) Page’s Letter to the U.S. Departmentof Justice.

(6//K®) In or around February2017, Pagesent a letter to the U.S. Department

of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, urging the review of what Page

claimed was“severeelection fraud in the form of disinformation, suppression of

dissent, hate crimes and other extensive abuses led by members of [Candidate #2’s]

campaign andtheir political allies last year.” In his letter, Page claims that he has


-49-

17-cv-597(FBI)-340


not directly supported a political campaign since September2016, but continues to

be subjected to personal attacks by former members of Candidate #2’s campaign

basedonfictitious information. Page wrote that his academic lecture and related

meetings with scholars and business people in Moscow had no connection to the

U.S. election. Page attributes the assertions in the September 23rd NewsArticle that

Page met with two senior Russian officials (i.e., Sechin and Diveykin) while he was

in Moscowin July 2016 to give the commencement address at the New Economic

School, which Pageclaimsis “false evidence,” to Candidate #2’s campaign. Page

further claims that the information relied on by Candidate #2’s campaign, certain

membersof the U.S. Congress, and the mediaarelies that were completely

fabricated by Candidate #2’s paid consultants and private investigators.

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

MS/ase)

(8//KR)bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

FOP-SECRET/NOEORN/FISA

-50-

17-cv-597(FBl)-341

FORSECRETHNGFORN/FISA

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

(S/ANE)

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

FOPSECRET/NOFORNFISA

-51-

17-cv-597(FBI)-342


gz

(S7/NR)


-52-

17-cv-597(FBI)-343

bl-1

b3-1

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b7A-1

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b1-1b3-1

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a &

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b7E-1, 2, 3,6

FOPSECREF/NOFORN/FISA

-53- .

17-cv-597(FBI)-344

TOP-SECRETFINOEFORN/FISA

bl-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

8)S)bl-1

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ne|74.:b7C-2

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-54-

17-cv-597(FBI)-345

FOP

SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

bl-1

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bl-1

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-55-17-cv-597(FBI)-346

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17-cv-597(FBI)-348


FOPSECREFHYNOGFORN/FISA

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17-cv-597(FBI)-349


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-60-

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FOR

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17-cv-597(FBI)-353


FORSECREFHNOFORN/FISA:

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bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3,6 -

(3//IKR)

VIII. (U) Conclusion.

(U) (S¥/KXIR) As discussed above, the FBIbelieves that Page has been collaborating

and conspiring with the Russian Governnenii b7A-1

b7E-1, 2Based on the


believe that PageIs

FOP-SECRETANOFORN/FISA

-64-

17-cv-597(FBI)-355


CSicsosincly engagein BAb7E-1, 2

clandestineintelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or

on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other personsto

engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agentof a foreign poweras defined by

50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

(CU) (S/S)

TALP<FBI submitsthat there is probable causeto believe that b7E-1,,2

such activities involve or are aboutto involveviolations of the criminal statutes of

the United Statesiii

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-65-

17-cv-597(FBI)-356


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-66-

17-cv-597(FBI)-357

FOPSECRETYNGFORN/FISA

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bl-1b3-1b6-2 |

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-67- |17-cv-597(FBI)-358


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FOPSECREFHYNGFORNFISA

-68-

17-cv-597(FBI)-359



-69-

17-cv-597(FBI)-360

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bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |

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4, (§) Proposed Minimization Procedures Astoall information acquired

| throughthe authorities requested herein, the FBI will followP|

b1-1ee

b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

FOPSECRETYNGOFORN/FISA

-70-

17-cv-597(FBI)-361


aa

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17-cv-597(FBI)-362

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-72-

17-cv-597(FBl)-363

b7E-1,2,3,6

5. (3) Nature of the Information Sought Throughtheauthorities a

; ; . ne ; . ; 4 b7A-1requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with b7E-1.23,6

respect to the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the

certification set forth below. As indicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBIis |

seeking foreign intelligence informationthat relates andis necessary to the ability of

the United States to protect against clandestine intelligenceactivities by an

intelligence service or networkof this foreign poweror by agentsof this foreign

power, and information with respect to a foreign poweror foreign territory that

relates and is necessaryto the national defense, security, and the conductof the

foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally


re

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-73-

17-cv-597(FBI)-364

FOPSECRET//NOFORN/FISA

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FOPSECRETHNOEORN/FISA

-74-

17-cv-597(FBI)-365


6. (8) Certification Thecertification of the Assistant to the Presidentfor bl-1

b3-1

NationalSecurity Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Presidentas a certifying official in Executive OrderNumber

s amended,is set forth below.

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b6-2

b7A-1b7C-2

b7E-1,2, 7

(U) The Purpose of the Authorities Requested

(%) The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in

the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However,the




-75-

17-cv-597(FBl)-366

FOPSECRETFYNOEORNFISA

violation of United States law, and this investigation may result in an eventual

criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussedin thecertification, at

b1-1

least a significant purposeof this request 1 (ii_on :

| ; a . ; hoi ote ge. DIE-1, 2, 3, 6ais to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI's investigation

of this target.

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-76-

17-cv-597(FBI)-367

.

F

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9 & Duration of the Authorities Requested (See 7:

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; bl-1The authorities requested should not automatically terminate whenforeign b3-1b7A-1

intelligence informationhasfirst been obtained. Additional information of the same 7E-1,2, 3, 6


Theactivities which the United States mustidentify and monitor are incremental

and continuous, and communications relating to such activities are often disguised

to appearinnocuous. Thetypeofforeign intelligence information being sought and

the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusionthat, at a

given time, all such information has been obtained andcollection can be ended.



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-77-

17-cv-597(FBl)-368

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FOR

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-78-

17-cv-597(FBI)-369


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17-cv-597(FBI)-371

TOR

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(U) (&) Specific Authorities Requested Based uponthe foregoing information,the UnitedStates requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct-the activitiesdescribed immediately below for the period requested herein.

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17-cv-597(FBI)-373

FOPSECREFHNOFORNFISA

)

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17-cv-597(FBI)-375


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17-cv-597(FBl)-376

FOPSECREFYNOEORN/FISA

SS


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17-cv-597(FBI)-377

TOPSECRETINOFORN/FISA

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(U) (8) The FBI has reviewed this verified application for accuracy in accordance

with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copyof the draft to the


the Court.

wao~ The remainderofthis page is intentionally left blank. -----


-88-

17-cv-597(FBI)-379


(U) VERIFICATION

(&) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information

regarding Carter W. Pageis true and correct. Executed pursuantto Title 28, United bL-l

States Code, § 1746 on | 2011 b3-1

b7A-1

b6-1

b7A-1

. b7C-1 upervisory special Agen



-89-

17-cv-597(FBI)-380

FOPSECRETINOFORN/FISA

(U) CERTIFICATION

(3) I, the undersigned, having been designatedas one ofthe officials

authorized to make thecertifications required by the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do herebycertify with regard to h_iii

EE¢cested in this verified application targeting

/ b1-1Carter W. Page, an agent of the Governmentof Russia, a foreign power, as follows: b3-1

b7A-1. . vs _, b7E-1, 2, 3,6

(A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is


(B) (U) Atleast a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to

obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstanding the related criminal

matters described in this application, the primary purposeof the authorities


than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign


|

| (C) (U) Theforeign intelligence information sought by the authoritiesa bl-1iz requested herein cannotbe reasonably obtained by normalinvestigative techniques. on 1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

|

}

| D Thetype of foreign intelligence information being sought through the——— (D) @) typ & & § Soug 8

es authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C),i.e.,


-90-17-cv-597(FBI)-381


informationthatrelates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect

against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this

foreign poweror by agentsofthis foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B),

i.e., information with respect to a foreign poweror foreign territory that relates and

is necessary to the national defenseor security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs

of the United States. These same authorities mayalso incidentally acquire foreign

intelligence information asdefined by other subsectionsof 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).

bl-1

(E) (8) The basis for my certification that the information soughtis the type 3-1

b7A-1

of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot b7E-1,2, 3,6

be obtained by normalinvestigative techniquesis as follows.

5)a

ee :b3-1

Os bab7E-1, 2

FOP-SECREFHNOFORNFISA

-91-17-cv-597(FBI)-382


2esbI-1b3-1a b7A-1b7E-1, 22:

a bl-1b3-12 °es|b7E-1, 2

Ss bhb3-1

b7A-12es°


-92.

17-cv-597(FBI)-383


@)

il(U) (®


-93-17-cv-597(FBI)-384

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1,2,8

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

FOPR-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA |

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3Ml

FOP

SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

-94-

17-cv-597(FBI)-385

TFOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3il(a

eeeedb3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1,2, 3

FOR-SECRETHNOFORNIFISA

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FOP

SECRET/NGOEORN/FISA

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FOP-SECREFYNGFORN/FISA

-96-

17-cv-597(FBI)-387


eSb3-1

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7b7E-1, 2, 3

es(U) (8) Based upon the foregoing information,it is the Government's belief that |

the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for



'-97- .17-cv-597(FBl)-388

-FORSECREH/NOFORN/FISA

(&) Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W.Pagein

accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of

1978, as amended.

Director


Rex Tillerson

Secretary of State

AndrewDeputy Director


John J. Sullivan

Deputy Secretaryof Stale

Michael Pompeo

Director of the Central

Intelligence Agency

James N. Mattis

Secretary of Defense

Daniel R. Coats

Director of National Intelligence

Principal Deputy Director of

NationalIntelligence

ea

7

Date

H.R. McMaster

Assistant to the President for


bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

FOR

SECRETYNOFORN/FISA

-98-

17-cv-597(FBI)-389

FOP

SECREFINOFORN/FISA

(U) APPROVAL

(U) (&) I find thatthis application regarding Carter W. Pagesatisfies the

criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approveits filing |

with this Court.

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 6


-99-

17-cv-597(FBI)-390

-FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA

(8) Accordingly, I approve the filing of this application regarding Carter

b3-1

anes 7$= b7A-1SL). oo b7E-1

General of the United States


-100-

47-cv-597(FBI)-391

TORSECREHNOTORITITSA

YsWHEREFORE,the United States submits that this application

regarding Carter W.Pagesatisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Actof 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that

this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed

orders and warrants which accompany this application.


b6-3

b7A-1

b7C-3


TOPSBERERHNCEDRNFISA

-101-

17-cv-597(FBI)-392

Filed

SECRET IntotigesosSeriesun

All Information is considered UNITED STATES JUN Za 2017

unclassified except whereLeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk

otherwise shown FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT reverk of Court

Classify By: J23J98T32bl-1

Reason: (C) WASHINGTON,D.C.b3-1

Derived From: FBI NSICG_dated

062017 Deckeronb7A-1

IN RECA v. PAGE, A U.S. Docket Number:

PERSONRa

b7A-1


1. An application having been made bythe United States of America


U.S.C. §§eessor the Act), for an order and warrant

(hereinafter “order”)ora27

consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Courtfinds

bl-1

as follows:b3-1

b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

2. The application has been madeby a Federalofficer and approved by the

Attorney General,

3. Onthebasis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there isr?

probablecauseto believe that:

SECREF

Derived from: Application to the USFISC b1-1

in Docket Number captioned above b3-1

Declassify on: f b7A-1

17-cv-597(FBI)-393

of the statements made und

SECRET

(A) The Governmentof the Russian Federation (Russia)is a foreign

power and Carter W.Pageis an agentof Russia, as defined by b7A-1b7E-1, 2lh

4, The minimization procedures proposedin the application have been _b1-1b3-1b7A-1

adoptedby the Attorney General and meetthe definition of minimization b7E-1, 2.3.6

procedures unde

5. The application containsall statements and: certifications required by ble

b3-1

FS

ssCStandthe certification is not clearly erroneousonthebasis b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6d

any other information furnished und

WHEREFORE,IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,pursuantto the authority

conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United States is

GRANTED,anditis

FURTHER ORDERED,asfollows:

17-cv-597(FBI)-394

SECREF

[a 1. The United States is authorized to condci

SEhetarget as(011s;bl-1

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Pe

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17-cv-597(FBI)-395

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b7A-1

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-396

I] 1}

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b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6|I

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b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-397

i!

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b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-398

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1,2, 3,6

bi-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-399

eseses

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eseeaesSEespe

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b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

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b7A-1

b7E-1,2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1es2, 3,6

SECRET

17-cv-597(FBI)-400

WI MI iI

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

17-cv-597(FBI)-401

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6Hibl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6I-10-

17-cv-597(FBI)-402

SECRET

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Ps |b7A-1

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b7A-1

f

|b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Ce wun

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. SECREE-11-

17-cv-597(FBl)-403

—

|6. The authorities approved are for the period indicated below unless

otherwiseordered by this Court.

Asto all information acquired throughthe authorities approved herein,

the FBI shall follow

-12-

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3,6

17-cv-597(FBI)-404

pa Y

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b7A-1

b7E-1,2, 3, 6

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b7E-1,2, 3, 6

bl1-1

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b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bi1-1

b3-1

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b7E-1,2, 3,6

17-cv-597(FBl)-405

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bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-14-

17-cv-597(FBI)-406

-15-

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

47-cv-597(FBI)-407

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iieses

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bl-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

17-cv-597(FBI)-408

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3,6

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:|

|:

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-17-17-cv-597(FBI)-409

|-18-

b1-1

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b7E-1, 2, 3,6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bi-1

b3-1

b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

17-cv-597(FBI)-410

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1,2, 3,6

----- The remainderof this pageis intentionally left blank. -----

-19-

17-cv-597(FBI)-411

SECREF

This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expiresatEastern Time

on the: |day of September, 2017.

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b3-1b7A-1

06a291,Signed Eastern Time

Date Time


b6-3

. b7A-1

Fstyeand correct copy of the SECRET b7C-3s origin -20-

17-cv-597(FBI)-412

Documents

| bl-l · SECRET/NOFORN FOP 2. )IdentityoftheTarget Thetargetofthis applicationis CarterW.. b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 Page,aU.S. person, andanagentofaforeignpower,describedindetailbelow