Emerging Adultsin America

Coming of Age in the 2lst Century

Edited by Jeffrey Jensen Arnettand Jennifer Lynn Tanner

r""2"2:*

D E C A D E ' r ' '

u f BEHAVIOR

Americon Psychologicol Associot ionWoshington, DC

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3

Emerging Structuresof Adult Thought

Gisela Labouuie-Vief

Several writers of the past century called attention to the fact that contempo-rary life has transformed the entry into adulthood. InCulture and Commitment,for exampie, Margaret Mead (1970) argued that if once lives had been firmiygrounded in secure roles, such roles were beginning to break down; as a result,individuais had begun to experience a dislocation from a self whose life coursewas prefigured by his or her predecessors in a predictable generational se-quence. Modern times, she suggested instead, were witnessing the emergenceof a postfigurative self that could no longer rely on such clear plans. Indeed,the very notions of commitment and identity, according to Mead, sprang upbecause of this move toward a postfigurative society.

The uprooting of individuals from a sense of secure grounding in an inter-generational flow has become even more pronounced as the worldwide plural-ism in politicai ideologies, religions, and ethnicities has become a source ofglobal concern. The need to deal with such a complex world demands complexcognitive skills, as individuals need to reconstruct their intuitive sense of whatis firm and secure at a much more abstract level (Kegan, 1982). Even thoughmost adolescents and youth who enter this transition appear to be developmen-tally prepared to acquire such abstract skills, they are highly dependent onthe availability of contexts that nurture those skills.

This chapter, as a consequence, deals with emergence in two senses. Thefirst is that the social and intellectual transformations of the past centurycreated the need to address new forms of thinking and being. Until the turnof the 20th century, thinking had been described in terms of certainty, stableoutcomes, and rational processes;in the 2Oth century interest arose in processesof thinking that deal with the uncertain and changrng nature of knowledge,the acknowledgment of diversity, and the importance of nonrational (e.g., auto-matic and affective) processes in decision making. In cognitive-developmentalpsychology, too, this search emerged as the attempt to question availablenotions of growth from childhood to adolescence, especialiy as embodied in the

Preparation of this work was supported by National Institute on Aging Grant AG09203.

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GISELA LABOUVIE.VIEF

theory of Jean Piaget. Around the year of 1980, a flurry of writings appeared

suggesting that befrnning in later ad olescence or perhaps even following adoles-

cence, many indirliduals experience a disequilibration of their thinking that

can lead. to a significant expansion of thinking, indeed a new level or stage, or

even series of stages.The second sense of emergence deals more specifically with the life stage

discussed in this volume-the question of how these emerging structures of

thought map into the period of emerging adulthood' I present data to show

that indeed, the capaciiy for new and complex forms of thinking emerges after

adolescence and matures rapidly during emerging aduithood. But even so, I

suggest that this period uppuutt to present a kind of critical stage in which these

thought structures get taunched but are not necessariiy brought to fruition'

In this chapter, I present theory and research on the emergence of these

more compiex adult thought structures as individuais enter adulthood. In the

first section of the chapteil locate the origin of these proposals in movements in

contempo rary thinking about development. In the second section, I summanze

some of the major proposals concerning the emergence of adult thought struc-

tures and present data to suggest that they begin to appear at the entry into

emerging *d,r1thood. These data also suggest that because many individuals

at thl developmental stage are in transition, the support of appropriate con-

texts (such as those related to education and work) is of great importance' This

role of contexts, both inner and outer, in emerging thought structures is the

topic of the third section, in which I discuss the variability of thinking in the

period of emerging adulthood.

The Emergence of Relativism

The topic of emergrng adult thought structures-and the possibility of a new

stage tnuy imply-lporred on the stage of developmental theory some 40 years

ugo *ittr ihe work of Lawrence Kohlberg (e.g., 1969, 1973). Inspired by Piaget's

(trrheldel^ & Piaget, 1958) theory of the development of thought structures,

Kohlberg (1969; began in the 1960s to outline a general cognitive-

developiental framework proposing that cognitive growth reorganized individ-

uals,understanding of seflnJ reality as reflected in such domains as morality,

authority, laws, riglts, and norms. Following Piaget's conviction that the devel-

opmenf tf ,trrrct.r.es of thinking reorganizes children's understanding of con-

cepts of physical laws, moral issues, and emotions, Kohlberg laid out a broad

.og",'itirr"-d",relopmental theory proposing general levels (or stages) of complex-

it,ltrrat undergird indiniduals' understanding of social reality at different points

of development. Like Piaget, Kohiberg assumed' that underlying the under-

standing of these diverse domains was a naive epistemology (see also

Broughton, 1980), an evolving awareness of how humans can know and judge

important issues of life.

In 1969, in an article with Kramer (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969), Kohiberg

reported on a foilow-up of his original standard.tzation sample into early adult-

frooa and noted that many individuals who in their late adolescence had ap-

peared to have acquired a principled and universal sense of morality appeared

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EMERGING STRUCTURES OF' ADULT THOUGHT

to have regressed some years later, after entering college. Many of these youth

had begun to show signs of relativism and questioning the firm values they

had pr&iously he1d. Kohlberg and Kramer did not, at first, conclude that this

increase in relativistic thinking signaled the entry into a new stage of thinking

about morai issues. Instead, they proposed that it reflected a retrogression'

This regressive interpretation came at a time when traditional concepts

of rationality were being thoroughly revised. In science and philosophy, the

notion that universal truths could be arrived at by rational analysis from

axiomatic ground principles was being overturned. Instead, context, interpreta-

tion, perspective, and change all were being acknowledged as part and parcel

of truth claims (e.g., Baynes, Bohman, & McCarthy, 1987; Del,ong, I970; Witt-

genstein, 1953). ! 'or some writers, this led to the rejection of the very concept

of rationality and to the belief in the radical relativity of all knowledge' But

others (see Habermas, 1984) suggested that the notion of rationality was not

so much outdated; rather, it was being transformed from something that could

be concretely grasped by the individual mind to something that emerges out

of the confrontation and coordination of multiple perspectives. Thus laws and

truths were more like complex systems that change, like coming-into-being of

forms that are the subject of evolution.In developmental psychology, too, contextualism rose as an important

theoretical stance as the roles of context (Labouvie-Vief & Chandler, 1978;

Riegel, 1976) and cohort (Schaie & Labouvie-Vief, I974) were being proposed

u, i*portant factors in development. Following this emerglng zeitgeist of con-

textualism and postmodernism, Kohlberg (1973) and Turiel (1974) eventually

proposed that these coliege students had not really regressed. Rather, they

hadbegUn to question earlier views that were quite absolutist. Turiel suggested

that this phase of relativism represented an opening up of an earlier view of

morality that, even though it claimed universal validity, was too much rooted

in conventional social practices. Thus what at first had seemed a kind of

regressive movement, he proposed, might actually reflect a disequilibration of

a closed" form of thinking-a disequilibration that eventually could lead to

further structural advances in adult thinking.

Almost simultaneously with Kohlberg's grappling with issues of relativity,

William Perry (1968) had begun to study relativism in Harvard students as

they progTessed through the college years. Perry suggested that when they

entlrld.oll.g", these individuals held a particular view of the nature of knowl-

edge that fit quite well with the traditional concept of rationality. They believed

that they were in college to learn what was right or true. This notion led them

to polari ze the world into right and wrong, a dualism that was extended not

only to matters intellectual but also to those who held the views-especiaily

professors and other authorities.Taken aback at first by the coexistence of so many truth claims, many of

these students soon came to understand that the source of their confusion was

their own dualistic view of the nature of knowledge. Thus, the sense that there

were safe, objective facts that were somehow outside the realm of human

subjectivity began to crumble, giving way to a position of relativism.

Perry noted that relativism not only can move the bottom of certainty out

from under youth but also can lead them to a new and transformed model of

62 GISELA LABOWItr-VIEF

rationality, one in which the old notion of objective knowledge is wedded to

subjective engagement and commitment (see also Belenky' Ciinchy' Gold-

berger, & Tarul!, 1986). The- individual now can become a much more active

participant in itL pro..ss of knowledge. There is vastly increased tolerance

for diversity, yet the self can be '"to'-"iy anchored' in its own viewpoint that

is understood to have strong subjectiv. ui".rrurrts' Thus, subjectivity in self and

others is understood to be valid and necessary'

The work of Kohlberg and Perry was extremely influential because it set

the stage for subsequent inqulries inio changes in thinking as individuals move

from adolescence into adulthood. Kohlberg'i subsequent rev1sion of his coding

system (see Colby & Kohlberg, iggZl indeed 'oggutttd tJrlt the emergence of

reiativism prefigured the d.rruiop*ent of moretiut"t" "*11 lntnking'

Most of

the writers theieafter wouid agr"" that the relativism emerging sometime in

Iate adolescence prefigured a m"ore complex way of thinking whose significance

was extremely broad, stretching from general assumptions about the nature

of morality, truth, and reality t"o underitanding of self' others' and emotions'

Despite much criticism, this cognitive-det'elopmental s-t1nce has survived

and matured as it absorbed the confiontation with contextual diversity. current

adherents of this approach (".g., commons, Richard's, & Armon' 1984; Dawson'

2002; Dawson, Xie, & Wilson, 2003; Fischer & Yan, 2002; I.ischer, Yan, &

Stewart, 2003; Karmiloff-Smith, rgbg; Labouvie-Vief' 2003; Pascual-Leone'

1984)adoptmuchmoredynamicviewsoftheevolut ionofcogni t ivestructuresin which context and variability play important roles' Even so' the notion

that there are structures of thinking that pervade many domains of life has

pers is ted ;onecou ldevensay i thasbecomere inv igora ted 'However 'as lpo in tout in the following section, most researchers working in the field prefer to

talk about levels rather than stages, indicating a current belief that orders of

complexity are logically independent from age or the time at which they enter

into the individuals' repertoire'

Levels of Adult Thought

since the early work of Kohlberg and Perry, research on cognitive development

in emerging adulthood has blosJomed and suggested a rather coherent picture'

In this section,I outrine this research, which indicates that emerging adulthood

mayb"up", lodthatishighlysignif icantforthelaunchingandevensolidif ica-tion of these complex forms of thinking'

Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Judgment

I twouldbeimpossib letodiscussworkontheemergenceofst ructuresofadul tthought without detailing the contribution of Kohlberg' At the core of his theory

was an extension of the physicalistic model of rearity of piaget's theory-of the

child as scientist. Kohlberg's core assumption was that our social reality as

humans is interpersonally constituted' Adopting from James Mark Baldwin

(1906) and George Herbert Mead (1934) the assumption that the self develops

Iih{IiRGIN6 51'ftUCTUI'iES 0I.. ADL]I,II' 'TI]OLTCHl'

Table 3.1. Adult Stages of 'N{oral Judgrlrent

St r rr, ,

Conr.entir iual

3 ( Interpersoualexpectat ions &

conlblnrity )

4 tsoc ia l s1 's tcnt &

corrsc iencc )

Pci stct.tttv cttt i rltl trl

5 l Soc ia l cont ract &

ind i i ' idua l l igh ls t

6 tL in i ve l sa l e th i c i t l

p r - i nc ip l cs t

. ' :I : i '

: ' i l

" } t' )

. i ; :

; , i

t

' ;

' 1 r . ,

: t , t

: : : ;, !r ' 1 , :

t : : :

6jl

Perspcct ive of ' the incl iv iduer i in re lat iorr rv i th ot ' l - rer

indiv iduals l Aware of shared I 'eei ings, agl 'eenlcnts, and

expectat io ls that takc pr i l ] r t lc ] ' o\ rer ipc l iv idul l ip teyests '

Rc,lates poilt-. of vier,v tl-1'ougl1 the cgt'rc'rete Golclell Rule,"put t ing yoursel i ' i t r the ' othei ' gu\"s shot 's ;" L)oers r lot

cons ic l c t ' genc r ' : r l i zcd svs tc t r l pc rsp t ' t ' t i v t '

Di f l 'erent iates socie. ta l pr l i r l t of ' r - i tn ' { l 'or l l in terpet 'sot l i t l

agl .eeutc l l t or mot iVcs; ' fakcs

the pOi i l t of v icr 'v of ' t l - r t :

-qvstem that c lef ines lo ies ar t lc l t 'u les; ( lor ls idels i r ld i r - idual

l e la t i ons in te t ' n rs r . , l ' p l i l t t ' i r i t l r t sys te t r l .

P | i o r . - to -soc ic tV pe : rs l tec t rVe : Perspec t i ve o { ' va lucs l i t t r l

rigl-rts priol tr-r soci:rl aLtachtrli: ' l ' i ts l i l lcl cotrti ' lrcl,s. Itrtegrtrtcs

perspect ives by {brrnal ntechat l isr t rs o{ ' a! { l 'eenlcnt , cgtr t t ' i rc t .

object i r ,e i r lpart is i i tv , : r1d duc prgcc,ss; cgls idct 's t t ' to l ' r l

and leg : r l po i r ] t s o f ' v iew : r ' ecogn izcs tha t the l son te t i t r t t s

conf l ic t : rnd f i r tds i t d i fT icul t to integr-at t ' tht ' rn '

Pcrspect ive of 'n loral point of v ic\v f l 'om n,hic l ' r soci : r l

ur ' r 'u .g"n1ents der ive; I 'c |spcct iYe is that o{ 'an indiVic lual

lecogniz i t rg t l - re natrue of n loral i t ) ' ot ' t l ie l i rc t pelsr) l ls A1'c l

encls in t l - remselves at ld n lust l le t reateci i rs st tc l l '

in a shar.ed matr ix rv i th other selves. Kohlberg (see also Selman, 198() t posi ted

a ser ies of genergl stages out l in ing how indiv iduals dcal lv i th succcssiVely tnore

complex ways of undlrstanding reciproci ty ar ld equal i ty. Kohlberg rvas less

concei.ned u,ith subject-object relations than with betu'eeu-subject relatiot-ts,

or intersubject iv i ty. In a sense, one could say that he la id out a ser ies o1'

incr.easir-rg15r conrpiex forms of intersubjectivity t l-rat can guide inclividuals'

th inking and behavior.At Kohlberg's preconventional level, the rules that orgarlize humatl utldeL-

standing ur. .. lut.d to individuals' immediate experier-lce vis-a-r' is others-

such as parelts-lr.ho are seen as powel'ful and r,vhom individuals' ainr to

please. The abi l i ty to relate to more abstract nol 'ms ar-rd rules enlerges at the

conver-r t io1al and postconvent ional levels, rvhich arc displa-ved in Table 3 '1. At

the conventiopal leyel. indivicluals begir-r to understand that a nlol 'e abst|act

sharecl reality of comnron rules and norms superordinates the concrete precou-

'entional reality. This is f irst evident at Stage 3 as a sense that group expecta-

tior-rs take prececience over individual feelings. At Stage 4, a more comlllex

societal perspect ive emerges in u 'h ich a more general ized sociai-svstems per-

spect ive of ' formal ized laws takes precedence even over the rules of ot te 's imme-

diate groLlp. At Level 3, the postconvent ional 1evel , th is -*ocial-systems perspec-

tive becomes r,r, iclened further into a perspectir,e that involves change and

T

64 GISELA LABOI'Wtr-VIEF

diversity. Postconventional thinking at first appears to be initiated by a sense

of doubt about whether the laws and truths one has come to accept are, indeed,

unalterable, and the suspicion that context and history matter. Such transi-

tional doubt further leads individuals to wonder if such change and diversity

can be orderly and principled. This doubt matures into the conviction, at

Stage b, that change can come about in an ordered way if individuals integrate

their varying perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement, contract, objec-

tive impartiality, and due process. In this w&y, it is possible to critique the

validity of laws in terms of the degree to which they preserve and protect

fundamental rights and values; thus the sense of right and wrong is more

procedural. At Stage 6, finally, individuals adopt a more universalizing perspec-

tive affirming the equality and dignity of human beings. Thus social agTeements

are valid to the extent that they honor such general principles.

Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, and Lieberman (1983) studied these adult stages

of moral reasoning in a sample of 84 boys ages 10, 13, and 16 years and followed

Iongitudinally for 20 years. Between the ages of about 18 and 28, there was a

noted decline in the proportion of Stage 3 responses and a corresponding in-

crease in Stage 4 responses, indicating a social-systems perspective. Stage 4

thinking was virtually absent before late adolescence; in fact, only one individ-

ual younger than 18 displayed it. Stage 4 responses then rose systematically

througholt adulthood., reaching about 607o at the oldest age level, 36. The

transition to Stage 5 occurred even later, about the mid-2Os; but Stage 5 re-

sponses never rose above I07o. Overall, the pattern looks quite similar for high

socioeconomic status (StrS) and low StrS individuals, although that of the high

SES individuals looks somewhat more favorable.

Overa1l, then, Kohlberg's data suggested that the period of emergrng adult-

hood constitutes a critical phase for the beginning of individuals' ability to

think beyond a purely interpersonal-conventional perspective and to embrace

a conventional abstract systems perspective. A similar picture has also emerged

in a recent reanalysis of severai Kohlbergian studies (Dawson,2002), although

this reanalysis also suggested that during emerging adulthood, most individu-

als may just begin to elaborate such a perspective, as many of them score in

the transitional levei.I think it is difficult to overestimate Kohlberg's view of the prior-to-society

perspective for the emergence of adult thought, from both a philosophical and

a psychological point of view. To a radical postmodern relativism that maintains

that different abstract perspectives are incommensurable, it proposes that they

can be intercoordinated and related at a more complex level that involves

negotiation and communication. This view underlies an ideal vision of political

pror.rr but also of scientific inquiry; it is a perspective that allows a vision of

ordered change rather than one directed by mere convention or social power.

On a more concrete level, it can permit individuals to resolve the conflict or

even clash between the role expectations (e.g., ones related to one's religion,

political conviction, or gender roles) of the group in which one is embedded

and those that are formalized in more legal systems. Perry's work had ended

on a note of a relativism that left room for a more comp).ex view of objectivity.

But Kohlberg affirmed that relativism does not necessarily suspend rational

discourse nor justify a more abstract form of individualism. As is true of the

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EMERGING STRUCTURBS OF ADULT THOUGHT 65

work of Habermas, Kohlberg suggested that individuals continue to search for

new levels of intersubjectivity that interrelate and coordinate perspectives'

Most subsequent writers were profoundly influenced by both Kohlberg and

Perry, but most agreed with Kohlberg that relativism does not form the most

mature form of kiowledge. Broughton's (e.g.' 1980) work, for example' sug-

gested that relativism is superseded by a new form of objectivity in which the

self cocreates knowledge through an active, dialectical, social process. This

theme became the topic of a number of theoretical and empirical investigations

that addressed how lndividuals began to interrelate subjective and objective

aspects of knowledge. Basseches (t9k+a, 1984b), Kramer (1983), Labouvie-Vief

(1984, Igg4), and sinnott (1984, 1989) all suggested that the discovery of

seemingly incompatible and contradictory systems of knowledge confronted

young udllt, with issues of interpretation and perspective; and all agreed that

voo.rg adults eventually resolve these contradictions as they integ::ate them

into an "overridirrg -oru inciusive whole made up of two or more formally

consistent systems" (Kramer, 1983, p' 93)'

Leuels of Thinking in Emerging Adults

That the period of emer$ng adulthood marks the beginning of a more complex

way of thlnking-one thatls better able to deal with contradiction, diversity,

and the individual's own role in the process of knowledge-has been confirmed

by a number of authors who have charted individuals' emerglng ability to

differentiate and reintegrate such dualities as objective and subjective, infor-

mation and interpretation, individual and generalized perspectives, and so

forth (Bassech.r, ig84u; Blanchard-Fields, 1986; Kramer, 1983; D. Kuhn, Pen-

nington, & Leadb eater,1983; Labouvie-vief, 1980, L994; Sinnott, 1989)' The

various proposals for such thought structures have covered a variety of different

domains, but the most gunurul theory is probably that developed by Michael

commons (commons et aI., 1984) and Kurt Fischer (Fischer, 1980; Fischer et

al., 2008). Both theories describe successive levels as increasingly complex

intercoordination of representations and skills that in many ways extend the

analyses of formal thinking Piaget had offered. Fischer, in particular, has

worked on applying such general levels of abstractions to a variety of domains,

from reflective iSi"t itrg to emotions and interpersonal representations. This

work has most recentlylesulted in a general system for analyzing the develop-

mental complexity of representations as they may occur in many domains

of thinking.one example of how this theory is used is its application to a study of

critical thinking by Kitchener and King (King & Kitchener, 1994; Kitchener

& King, 1981). itt... authors worked with individuals ranging in age from 16

to 34. The research participants were given problems that required making

judgments about .ontro,r.ttiul issues. One problem, for example, asked that

they take a stand on the controversy of religious versus scientific accounts of

evolution: Did they believe the creationist teaching that God had created all

life in a single instant, or did they believe the scientific account of gradual

biological evolution?

--:t-

o o GISELA LABOT'VIE-VIEIT

Table 3.2. Kine and Kitchner (1994): Reflective Juds-ment

Stage Description Example

Knowing is limited to singleconcrete observations: what aperson observes is true.

Two categories for knowing: rightanswers and wrong answers.Good authorities have knowiedge;bad authorities lack knowledge.

In some areas, knowledge iscertain and authorities have thatknowledge. In other areas,knowledge is temporarilyuncertain. Only personai beliefscan be known.

Concept that knowledge isunknown in several specificcases ieads to the abstractgeneralization that knorvledgeis uncertain.

Knowledge is uncertain and mustbe understood within a context;thus justification is contentspecific.

Knowledge is uncertain butconstructed by comparingevidence and oprnion on differentsides of an issue or acrosscontexts.

Knowledge is the outcome of aprocess of reasonable inquiry.This view is equivalent to ageneral principle that isconsistent across domains.

"I know what I have seen."

"If i t is on the news, i t has to be true."

"When there is evidence that peoplecan give to convince everybody one wayor another, then it will be knowledge;until then, it's just a glress."

"I 'd be more incl ined to bei ieveevolution if they had proof. It's just likethe pyramids: I don't think we'l1 everknow. Who are you going to ask? Noone was there."

"People think differently and so theyattack the problem differently. Othertheories could be as true as my own,but based on different evidence."

"It's very difficult in this life to be sure.There are degrees of sureness. Youcome to a point at which you are sureenough for a personal stance on theissue."

"One can judge an argument by howwell thought-out the positions are,what kinds of reasoning and evidenceare used to support it, and howconsistent the way one argues on thistopic is as compared with other topics."

Note. Data from King and Kitchener (1994).

Kitchener and King scored individuals' justification of knowledge claimsinto seven stages (Table 3.2). The first of those are prereflective, as individualsdo not recognize a need to justify knowledge ciaims. They assume that truthis simply what one observes or believes in, and no justif ication is necessary;in a somewhat more complex fashion, individuals juxtapose right views withwrong ones, and right or wrong is adjudicated by authority. For example, atStages 3 and 4, individuals master a single first-order abstraction, such astruth, but cannot cleariy understand (even though they may have intuitive

EMERGING STRUCTURES OF ADULT THOUGHT

hunches) that truth can be affected by one's perspective, nor are they able toelaborate how. In contrast, at Stage 5 they begin to display a second-orderabstract perspective that compares arguments and viewpoints and relates themto their contexts. Stages 6 and 7 bring the individual beyond a simplecontextualist-relativist perspective as they begin to search for a principle thatcan examine and perhaps compare and even unify different perspectives. Thethird-order abstractions of Stage 6 bring the realizatton that comparison ispossible, but only the fourth-order abstractions of Stage 7 permit the individuaito reconcile notions of relativity with systematic standards of how evidencecan be compared. Rather than being identified with concrete positions, notionsof truth come to be based on procedural criteria such as the adequacy of methodsof inquiry. Here, then, individuals realize that truth does not so much have todo with objective facts but rather with an attitude of critical thinking, carefulevaluation, and openness to falsification and change-the complex intersubjec-tive perspective Kohlberg outlined for Stage 5 thinking.

Kitchener and King's work has been widely replicated, and the authors(King & Kitchener, 1994) report the results of reflective judgment scores onmore that 1,300 individuais. Data indicate that scores increase as individualsprogress through the educational system; they approach Stage 4 relativism atthe end of high school and the beginning of the college years and increasethrough the college years, graduate school, and postgraduate training. Evenso, the very highest levels are relatively rare even among individuals with themost advanced education.

How general are patterns of intellectual evolution such as those outlinedby Kohlberg in the moral domain and by Kitchener and King in the domainof reflective thinking? In a series of recent papers, Dawson (2002; Dawson etal., 2003) used the Commons-Fischer general scheme of levels of abstractionto develop a general, content-independent scoring method in which the complex-ity of individuals' verbal statements is coded. Applying her analysis to severalstudies of Kohlberg's moral levels coding, for example, she finds a correlationof .92 between this latent complexity dimension and moral stages. Relation-ships to age and education show the usual patterns: Age shows a monotonicallyincreasing quadratic relation to complexity scores, whereas education and levelare correlated in a linear fashion with a correlation of .80. I discuss the possibleimplication of this strong relationship to education in the third section ofthis chapter.

Self and Emotions

Epistemological assumptions about the nature of truth are not the only kindsof cognitions that mark the entry into adulthood. Rather, the assumptionsinherent in them about the nature of right and wrong are carried into dailyexperiences of individuals and expand their emotions and their sense of selfand reality. These expansions are important in how individuals deal with thepolarizations that often occur when thinking about self and others in sucharenas as roles and responsibilities and ways of interacting with others (Kegan,1982). They are also important in the religious arena (Fowler, 1981) in which

-ril-

1:a

68 GISELA LABOTryIE-VIEF

the evolution of more complex forms of thinking affords individuals the under-

standing that diversity in belief does not contradict the notion of abiding faith

and religious commitment. Such social-cognitive forms of cognition form an

important component of the general cognitive changes outlined so far.

How individuals' thinking about self and emotions develops is the topic of

an ongoing longitudinal-sequential study of individuals from 10 years to over

80 yuu.. of ug" (Labouvie-Vief, Chiodo, Goguen, Diehl, & Orwoll, 1995;

Labouvie-Vief & Medler ,2002).This study involved the follow-up of an original

sample of 400 community-living individuals randomly selected from three sub-

urban communities of a Midwestern metropolitan area on the basis of 1990

Census information. Along with completing an extensive battery of cognitive

and socioemotional measures, individuals wrote a brief narrative describing

the self--likes and dislikes as well as thoughts. These narratives were tran-

scribed and coded into four levels of adult emotional and self-development (see

Table 3.3).At Level 1, individuals describe the self in terms of the values of the

immediate social group, such as their relationships and the immediate social

network. They emphasi zefeatures of the self and others that make for immedi-

ate group acceptance. (e.g., "I am outgoing and friendly"). At Level 2, one finds

self-descriptions that reflect a more individualized, differentiated, and inner

sense of self. For example, the self is described in terms of fairly self-directed

values and goais, often related to achievement and institutionalized social

roles. However, the individuai accepts these roles rather than reflects on them

(e.g., "I am family oriented and active in my community"). In contrast, individu-

als of Level 3 have a more contextual view of the se1f. Their descriptions often

are critical of conventions as institutional goals are reexamined and placed in

historical perspective, including reflections of how they have shaped the self.

One now finds more dynamic self-descriptions that emphasize the role of histori-

cal and psychological factors, with many references to processes and contrasts

over time (e.g., "I am relearning who I am"). Finally, at Level 4 these descrip-

tions are even more multifaceted as individuals describe themselves in the most

complex way in terms of underlying, unconscious motivations and reciprocai

interactions. The view of self is truly dynamic as individuals realtze that activi-

ties and goals are subject to continual revision as one gains knowledge of self

and others. Overall, the sense of self conveyed is one of process, becoming, and

emergence. Thus identity is viewed as transforming over time as a result of

an inner psychological reorgani zation-

Our results show, as one might expect, that most of the adolescents' re-

sponses, about 907a, are coded below Level 2.In contrast, fot 20- to 29-yeat-

oidr th. percentage of these lower level responses drops by about 507c; instead,

they show an increase of about 407o of responses that are Level 2 ot higher'

This level stays virtualiy unchanged for the 30- to 5-year-olds but is highest

for those ug"d 46to 59. Even so, my analyses in the next section suggest that

emerging udoltr find it difficult to integ.rate their complex thinking, and that

integration is not achieved until later in adulthood. In turn, the age groups

over 60 show a dramatic increase in lower level responses.

These results reflect that individuals of the emerging adulthood period

begin to profoundly restructure their sense of se1f. As Jung proposed (see

69

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EMERGING STRUCTURES OF ADULT THOUGHT

Whitmont, 1969), early adulthood is a period in which the role of institutions

in development is powerful in shaping the sense of self, and my findings do

suggest that this process begins approximately at the transition from adoles-

cence to emerging adulthood and demonstrates the most dramatic growth

during that period.In sum, there is ample evidence that the period of emerging adulthood,

from about the age of 18 to around 30, is a significant time for the development

of mature thought structures. These thought structures appear to permeate

many dimensions of individuals' lives. They permit them to project self into

the future and into complex roles and communal activities and to participate

creatively in many activities of adult life. At the same time, research indicates

that this period appears to mark the emergence of these structures rather

than their culmination, and that only a portion of individuals may come to

master them.One aspect of this emergence of adult thought is potentially troubling,

however: Again and again, studies demonstrate that whether or not individuals

begin to evolve more mature forms of thinking in emergrng adulthood is strongly

dependent on education. One might conclude from this strong linkage that these

forms represent somewhat esoteric ways of thinking that do not necessarily

illuminate a general developmental process. Instead, I suggest that the diver-

sity of forms of thinking that is evident in emergrng adulthood-and indeed

at any stage of development-can be more profitably viewed if they are placed

in a broader social context and their role in adult life is examined, more gener-

a1ly. That is, what are the conditions that foster or hinder their growth, and

what are their relations to adjusting to the demands of adulthood?

Variations in Cogrritive Growth

The preceding review suggests that during the period of emerging adulthood,

thinking begins to change in profound ways. In general, the capacity emerges

to think beyond the conventional and accustomed and to develop more system-

oriented views about reality. Although research has not addressed the specific

time at which these higher order forms of thinking emerge, they do appear to

mark the end of adolescence and transition into emergrng adulthood. At the

same time, it is evident that mature adult structures of thought begin to emerge

only after late adolescence, and neither the emergence nor the continued devel-

opment of mature thought are givens. Rather, they appear to constitute a

potentiality that needs to meet certain conditions if it is to be realized. Many

individuals may continue to function in ways that are very concrete and

conventional.This period of emerging adulthood might be thought of, then, in Eriksonian

terms as a crisis. The ideal outcome of that crisis is the ability to contribute

to society in a principled manner-in a way that reflects not only the internai-

ization of cultural values and roles but also a capacity to reflect on them and

a creative ability to work with them and transform them. Yet this outcome

remains just that-an ideai-and the lives of many individuals may require

that they function in ways that are more concrete and conventional. In some

72 GISELA LABOUVIE-VIEF

cases, such conventionality may be a result of temperament or endowment,but in others, it may mirror the structure of the embedding environment. What,then, are factors that promote or discourage complex, mature thought?

Dynamics of Cognition

One major reason that individuals may not evidence high-level thinking is thatcognitive structures appear to be responsive to a set of dynamic circumstances.The conventional view of the development of thought structures held that theyemerged quite inevitably in a step-like sequence of stages, at least in a good-enough environment. Each stage was assumed to form a structure d.'ensemblepervading many or even most domains of life. Many current views of cognitivegrowth have abandoned this view in favor of one more compatible with moderndynamic-systems thinking (e.g., Dawson, 2002; Fischer, 1980; Karmiloff-Smith,1998; Labouvie-Vief & M6rquez Gonzalez, 2004). One core feature of moredynamic views is that they tend to replace the notion of age- or life-period-correlated stages with that of levels. Levels are amore abstract ordering princi-ple that may or may not be highly correlated with age, and may or may notform a domain-general sequence of development. Thus, although the generalstructure of levels can be applied to many domains, individuals' behavioralrepertoire across different domains can consist of many different levels simulta-neously. Such a structure is called "a web" by Fischer (e.g., tr ' ischer et al., 2003).In a web, there may be many developmental strands (or domains), each of adifferent level of complexity, depending on the specific contexts and activities.In addition to such across-strand variability will be within-strand variabilitydepending on whether certain supporting conditions are available. Thus evenwithin a domain, performance can vary aiong several levels, forming a rangeof levels or developmental range.

According to this dynamic view of levels, it is not necessarily problematicthat levels of cognitive-emotional development are somewhat idealized andreached by only relatively few individuals. In fact, it is possible to see the useof idealized levels not so much as a prescription for what one would expectmost individuals to accomplish, but rather as a diagnostic tool that can be usedto determine their current performance and the pattern of causes associatedwith it. In that sense, the use of cognitive levels could be said to be more akinto the use of an idealized standard of perfect health. Such a standard doesnot demand that most individuals possess perfect health; rather, it serves todiagnose why individuals differ from this idealized standard, each in their ownunique way. Indeed, without such a standard, it would not be possible todetermine deviations from it, nor prescribe possible courses of actions thatmight bring individuals closer to it. In that w&y, I suggest that instead ofexpecting high levels of thinking to be achieved by all individuals under allcircumstances, those of us in the field should focus on systematically examininghow and why individuals differ in the level of their cognitive functioning (seeLabouvie-Vief, 1994).

In the context of adult cognitive ievels, Kitchener, Lynch, Fischer, andWood (1993) applied this notion to the reflective judgment task in individuals

EMERGING STRUCTURES OF ADULT THOUGHT

aged 14 to 28 when performance was assessed under different conditions.One was the usual condition in which individuals performed under standardinstructions, without any special support. In contrast, a second condition wasone of high support-individuals read a prototypical statement of each leveland then responded to a series of questions about each 1evel. These questionshighlighted basic concepts, and individuals' attention was directed to the criti-cal aspects of those. Finally, respondents summartzed the prototypic state-ments in their own words, and scores for these summaries were derived.

The results of this study showed that under the high-support condition,individuals achieved significantly higher scores than they did under the stan-dard condition. F or example, stage 6 responses appeared to spurt at about theage of 20, when about 5A7o of responses were scored at this level; another spurtat about age 25 raised the percentage to nearly 100. As Fischer et ai. (2003)

noted, data such as these suggest that one's functional level may lag consider-ably under one's optimal level-in fact, a level may not become functional untilthe next higher level emerges under optimal (high support) conditions. Thus,support and scaffolding are inherent conditions for the development of reflectivethinking-and higher order reflective thinking cleariy appears in the period

of emerging adulthood.Findings such as these are important in interpreting the relation of higher

level thinking to education. I have noted throughout that levels of complexityof thinking are strongly correlated with education: Colby et al. (1983) reporteda correlation of .54 between moral reasoning and education, but Dawson (2002)

reported one as high as .80. Such high correlations with education and adevelopmental outcome are often considered problematic because they mayindicate dependence on verbal output that should be parceled out. In contrast,I suggest that education reflects a critical theoretical variable from both acultural psychology and a neurobiological perspective on development becauseeducation is the very process or means by which culture imparts knowledgeto the younger generations. The deveiopment of younger generations is embed-ded into a system of knowledge provided by current and prior generations ofmature adults. Thus education forms the very mechanism by which individualsare initiated into the storehouse of cultural knowiedge. Just as research sug-gests a period of emerging structures of mature thought at the transition intoadulthood, so it also suggests that the middle-aged generation manages thisstorehouse; they are the carriers of the most complex thought structures integ-rating high-level knowledge.

The presence of mature adults, then, provides knowledge in highly orga-nized, well-structured form, an essential ingredient of effective education. Eventhough Piaget described the individual as a discoverer of knowledge, many ofthe skills he described-such as knowing the laws of balances, pendulums,

and hydraulic presses-would hardly emerge on the same time frame unlessthe laws underlying them were already part of a culture in which competentadults can aid adolescents in breaking down the critical parameters of suchproblems. In fact, the typical Piagetian experiment often amounts to a teachingsituation in which the youngster's attention is directed to a few well-isolatedcritical variables. It would be impossible to acquire these laws-which, afterall, may have required the lives of generation of scientists of the past to

formalize-on their own. Rather, much as Gould 0977) has suggested that

biological development in many ways incorporates the results of the evolution

of prior g*rr"ruiions, so individual psycholog-r-cal development is nested in a

process of cultural evolution of wtrictr ttre middle-aged generation represents

the culmination. Younger generations are not just knowledge builders but

also are novices mentored by more skilled knowers. Thus, their continued

development d.epends on the presence of an informational differential or gradi-

ent provided by more mature generations'

The dependence of knowledge acquisition on the guidance of more mature

adults has been wel noted bi child developmentalists (e.g., Rogoff, 1990;

vygotsky, 1978) who have examined. processes of knowledge transmission of

adults to children. This dependen.. ulry much continues into adulthood' yet

only a few researchers on youth and adulthood have examined this continuing

dependence. one of the theorists who commented on it was Jung (see whitmont'

1969), who saw the period of emer$ng adulthood (indeed the whole beginning

of the lif'e span) as a process of becoming entrenched in society's institutions.

On a more positive ..roiu, Caspi and Roberts (2001) recently noted that as young

adults begin to make commitments to and invest in those institutions' they

also evidence a profile of improved and more stable adjustment; Helson (1999)'

in her longitudinal study or uius college women, also noted that between

college age and early adulthood, the women increased in norm-orientation'

which suggests greater institutional and role commitment'

Nobody ,ucJgrir"d the necessary alliance between individuals entering

adulthood and --utrrru adurts who master the tasks of adulthood better than

did Erikson, who suggested that the entry into adulthood depended on the

presence of knowreageaute and generative udottr. Erikson's point is especially

important as many Jf tn. tasks-of adulthood are no longer so well-structured

but move into arenas in which knowledge must be applied in ill-defined situa-

tions, or even created anew as one goes along. Such ill-structured problems

place increasingly high demands on pirrorral and emotional factors as individu-

als tolerutu uoinigoit' inherent in a knowledge process that is open-ended

and uncertain.To be sure, not all institutions have the primary goal of fostering such a

pattern of principled autonomy; in fact, as Kohn and schooler (1978) showed'

institutions can invest ln ...uting conformity and dependency for a group of

adults, such as those of low ,o.iou.onomic status, who will work in highly

structured institutional settings. In such settings, autonomy and critical think-

ing can be considered a liability rather than an asset. As a consequence' ques-

tions of continued cognitive growth throughout the period of emerging adult-

hood and thereafter are inextricably intertwined with aspects of social

stratification and the degree to which it affects participation in higher education

(Schooler, 1987).

74 GISELA LABOUVIE-VIEF

Affectiue ComPlexitY

The importance of adults who manage knowledge systems also highiights the

emotional dimensions of knowredge. irr"r complex institutionalized knowledge

f - - lz

EMERGING STRUCTURES OF A-DULT THOUGHT 75

systems, as T. S. Kuhn (1970) pointed out, serve not only informational andscientific functions but also social-regulatory and emotional functions; theydefine networks of power and authority that affirm congruent claims and sup-press ones that challenge them. Thus individuals sometimes experience a con-flict between their need to feel sociaiiy affirmed and appropriate and potentiallyimportant insights they may develop.

Erikson (1984) described how such conflicts idealty are held at bay becauseof a common generational bond young and mature adults share. He suggestedthat young adults need mature adults to help them maintain a sense of coher-ence as they mirror their growing competencies and to affirm for them anideology worth investing in. However, middle adults, in taking on roies ofauthority-parent, teacher, religious, or political leader-need to feel affirmedby youth that they are, in the eyes of youth, numinous models who transmitideals and values. Yet this generational linkage, like that between parentand children, has its dark side and can breed what he terme d totalism andauthoritism, in which a complex world picture yields to the need to be acceptedby a charismatic leader. How individuals understand emotional processes islikely to affect the degree to which they are vulnerable to such social influences.

In recent work by my colleagues and me (Labouvie-Vief, 2003; Labouvie-Vief & M6rquezGonzalez,2004; Labouvie-Vief & Medler, 2002),we have begunto explore how individuals are able to dynamically coordinate the demands ofconceptual complexity and social acceptance. It has been a strength of cognitive-developmental theories (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1980) that they proposeda transformative view of emotions, somewhat in contradiction to prevalenttheories that emphasize primary emotions (*.g., Ekman, 1984; Izard, lggT).According to this transformative view of emotions, emergrng cognitive capaci-ties transform the very functioning of emotions, even causing at times theemergence of new emotions that appear to be linked to higher levels of complex-ity. An example is the emergence of self-conscious emotions such as shame orpride that already presume a capacity to represent others' evaluation of one'sown behavior (Lewis, 2000; Schore, 7994). Even so, this reflective emotionprocessing system is but one route to emotional processing-one that LeDoux(1996) cailed the high or cortical road. In contrast, many situations requireemotions to be processed through a low or limbic road that secures successfulemotion regulation in emergency situations that do not permit resource-richreflective processes. Thus high levels of emotion understanding and regulationremain quite vulnerabie to the potentially disruptive effects of emotions.

Although the road of reflection, then, increases the adaptive repertoire ofindividuals, it does not guarantee good adaptation. Indeed, a large body ofresearch indicates that measures of conceptual complexity are quite indepen-dent of measures of emotional adjustment. That is, high levels of conceptualcomplexity can also serve maladaptive functions such as distortion of realityin defensive maneuvers. For this reason, in my own work I have emphasizedthat successful adaptation requires individuals to coordinate a concern withcomplexity and high-level reflective control with the ability to maintain suffi-ciently positive levels of positive affect and to ward off extreme levels of negativeaffect. In recent work, I referred to these different strategie s as differentiationand optimization.

76 GISELA LABOUVIE-VIEF

To describe such a dynamic between differentiation and optimization, my

collaborators and I (Labouvie-Vief, 2003; Labouvie-Vief & MS.rquez Gonzalez,20Aq expanded Piaget's concept of an interplay between two core strategiesof processinginformation (assimilation and accommodation) through a general-

ization of the Yerkes-Dodson law (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). This law postu-

lates a compensatory and curvilinear relationship between an individual's level

of emotional activation or arousal and the degree to which complex, integrated

behavior is possible. Slight elevations of activation foster integrated, well-ordered thinking and behavior. However, when activation rises to extremelyhigh levels, it tends to disrupt or degrade integr:ation. At high levels of activa-tion, automated nonconscious thoughts and behaviors, which are less easilydisrupted by high arousal or activation, take over in an effort to maintainaffect in a sufficiently positive range.

For an example of such degradation, think about common reactions to afrightening event, such as the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Thereactions to these attacks involved not only an increase in patriotic feelings

and an emphasis on family values but also increases in racial and ethnicstereotyping. This example shows that the degradation of complex thinkingdue to high emotional activation does not necessarily result in complete frag-

mentation but can be relatively coherent or graceful. First, behavior becomesmore automatic and schematized (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Second, the abilityto coordinate positive and negative aspects about self and others is disrupted,which leads to a positivity bias in which attention is diverted from negativeinformation about the self. In contrast, negative affect and information oftenare projected on others, resulting in increased black-and-white thinking, stereo-typing, and polarization among in-groups and out-groups (e.g., Paulhus &Lim, 1994). In a sense, trading off differentiation and complexity in favor ofoptimizing positive emotions makes good sense in situations that pose a threatto the well-being and survival of the se1f. Such situations stimulate emergencyresponses in which resources are focused on the self-protective task of restoringequilibrium and securing survival (Bodenhausen, L992). However, as Erikson(1984) has discussed, this self-protective response also has a dark side-theexclusion of others from the circle of humanity in which one includes oneself.

The principle of dynamic integration usually works flexibly in response tosituational demands, creating -a dynamic cognitive-affective system thatadjusts its level to the flow of circumstances. However, such flexibility can berelatively permanently altered by two sets of circumstances. First, normaldevelopmental changes in cognitive resources can alter vulnerability to degra-dation. As these resources grow, individuals are better able to maintain inte-grated behavior even when levels of activation are high. In contrast, as long asthese cognitive resources remain relatively low, individuals are more stronglyaffected by overactivation (Labouvie-Vief & M6rquez Gonzalez,2004; Metcalfe& Mischel, 1999). Second, if development does not proceed in a context ofrelatively low and well-regulated arousal or activation, individuals are likelyto develop poor strategies of affect regulation; these strategies, in turn, shouldrender the individuals particularly vulnerable to the degrading affects ofoveractivation.

EMERGING STRUCTURES OF ADULT THOUGHT

To examine differing strategies of how individuals regulate their emotions,

my colleagues and I defined different ways in which individuals can deviate

from well-regulated, integrated functioning (Labouvie-Vief & M6rquez Gonza-

1e2,2004; Labouvie-Vief & Med1er,2A02). Following Werner (1957), we identi-

fled an integrated style that permits individuals to do so with relative ease.

But we also defined two major deviations from an integrated style. One was

a self-protective style in which individuals trade off complexity for positive

affect by simplifying their representation of affect, focusing positive affect on

the self and the immediate social network but negative affect on the out-group.

We contrasted this with a complex style in which individuals traded off positive

affect and social relations for conceptual complexity and individuation-hence,

while attempting to maintain a complex and objective view, they experience

lowered levels of positive affect and higher levels of negative affect and depres-

sion. Finally, we identified a dysregulated regulation style that showed aspects

of both.Self-protective individuals aim to maximize positive and minimize negative

emotion but do so by engaging in thinking of 1ow complexity. These individuals

are high in self-acceptance but low in self-doubt and value the importance of

social network, self-control, and social conformance; they place relatively low

emphasis on personal growth and score low in empathy. In contrast, complex

individuals, although high in cognitive-affective complexity, also score higher

on negative affect and depression. They value intellectuality, openness, and

independence and score high in empathy. Thus whereas one group values

smooth adaptation to the social world (Erikson's world of pseudospeciation),

the other group values growth and independence from normative values.

trach confers different sets of not only vulnerabiiities but also strengths.

The strength of the self-protective style is to foster a sense of group cohesion

and to act quickly in emergency situations; its weakness is a tendency toward

black-and-white thinking. The core strength of the complex style is its ability

to maintain a differentiated and objective view of reality; its intellectuality,

independence, and openness to psychological depth often have been associated

with high levels of creativity, but also with a number of psychological vulnera-

bilities such as increased neuroticism and depression (Helson, 1999). These

diverging affective patterns appear to indicate different identity styles, each

reflecting characteristic variations in how individuals integrate the need for

hedonic balance with that for complexity, openness, and objectivity (see Helson

& Srivastava, 2001).Table 3.4 presents the data from our research, classifyrng individuals from

seven separate age intervals according to integrated, self-protective, complex,

and dysregulated styles. The distribution by age shows a pattern highly consis-

tent with what one would expect from other developmentai findings (for review,

see Harter, 1999). Our data indicate that preadolescents fall primarily into

the self-protective g1oup: They tend to give simple descriptions biased toward

positivity; those not fitting this pattern are ciassified as dysregulated. For

ad olescents, the percentage of self-protective individuals declines considerably,

but that of dysregulated individuals increases; this pattern suggests that indi-

viduals now begin to process more negative affect but do not yet have complex

78 GISELA LABOITVIE-VIEF

Table 3.4. Distribution of Regulation Styles (7o Within Age Category)

Age Integrated Self-Protective Complex Dysregulated

Preadolescents(11.00-14.99)

Adolescents(15.00-19.99)

Emerging adults(20.00-29.99)

Adults(30.00-45.99)

Middle-aged adults(46.00-59.99)

Older adults(60.00-69.99)

Elderly adults(70.00-85.99)

0 .00 .0

0 . 0

75.0

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36.4

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20.8

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structures to begin integrating it (see Harter & Monsour , 1992). Thus they arelikely to be overwhelmed. In contrast, the emerging adults show a much lowerpercentage of overwhelmed individuals but a much higher percentage of com-plex individuals. This finding suggests that complex thinking about affect risesdramatically; yet the high percentage of dysregulated and the low percentageof integrated individuals indicate that emergrng adults are unlikely to integratecomplexity and thus they continue to show high levels of negative affect anda sense of fragmentation overall. However, the next age period of adults overthe age of 30 shows a dramatic rise in integrated individuals, and the pattern

of styles rernains fairly constant for the remainder of adulthood.These findings are in line with the frequent report that the period of

emerging adulthood may be wrought with complex and difficult emotions andattending high levels of negative affect and depression (see Reinherz, Gian-conia, Wasserman, Silverman, & Burton, 1999); thus, even those of high com-plexity have a difflcult time integrating their complex view of the world. Eventhough this age group shows an improved pattern of affect compared with theadolescents (see also Roberts, Caspi. & Moffit, 2001), this period also is clearlyset off from adulthood proper. Indeed, this period has been cailed the nadir ofadulthood from an affective perspective (Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998). In contrast,the patterns for the postemerging adulthood individuals suggest a better abilityto live more comfortably with complexity. This trend, which suggests increasingconsolidation of more complex cognitive-affective structures, continues at leastuntil midlife. Thus emerging adulthood truly does emerge as a somewhatcrucial period of the life span.

I commented in the previous section that complex, critical, and relativizingthinking emerges only in the 20s (approximately), and this fact suggests thatemerging adults continue to display emotional problems resuiting from polariz-ing thinking with attendant dependence on norms and social acceptance. Aconsiderable body of research supports this suggestion. For example, in a series

EMERGING STRUCTURES OF ADULT THOUGHT

of studies, Blanchard-Fields and colleagues observed that adolescents madeless differentiated or dialectical attributional explanations than did young andmiddle-aged adults and had more difficuity integrating discrepant informationpresented by different protagonists (Blanchard-Fields, 1986; Blanchard-Fields,Baldi, & Stein, 1999). Emerging adults have difficulty maintaining balancedcognitive-emotional representations especially if emotions are strongly acti-vated, as when issues of security and survival are activated. Research onterror management theory, thus far performed primarily with college students,supports this prediction (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). Thus,when death-related fears are aroused, college students are more iikely to giveharsh evaiuations of moral transgressors (Fiorian & Mikulincer, 1997) whileincreasing the favorableness of ratings of individuals who praise their owncultural standards (Greenberg et al., 1990; Greenberg,Pyszczynski, Solomon,Simon, & Breus, 1994;Pyszczynski et al., 1996). Death-related threat is alsolikely to increase racist attitudes (Greenberg, Schimel, Martens, Soiomon, &Pyszczynski, 2001).

Findings such as those are consistent with my view that emerging adultsare still easily swayed by their emotions to distort their thinking in self-servingand self-protective ways. Still, my results suggest that such distortion wouldbe less likely for the subgroup of emerging adults who evidence more complexthinking-the complex and integrated. My own research is suggestive in thatregard, as these two groups are high in empathy, flexibility, and autonomy.In a similar fashion, Greenberg and collaborators (Greenberg, Simon,Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992) showed that priming death-relatedthreat increases the acceptance of dissimilar others by individuals with tolerantvalues, especially if these values have been recently primed.

What causes individuals to embark on one or the other deviation from amore integrated pathway? Individual differences in temperament (Rothbart,Ahadi, & Evans, 2000), attachment history (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001), ordifficult life situations beyond one's control (Labouvie-Vief, ZL.:'ang, & Jain,2003) all may be critical factors. Again, little precise information about thesefactors is available, but research on attachment styles and emotion regulationsuggests that securely attached emerging adults (who are also more likely tobe integrated and complex) behave quite differently in many tasks of emotionand emotion representation than do insecurely attached ones. For example,they have less well-balanced self-representations, either overvaluing the selfwhile projecting negative attributes on others as in the case of dismissingindividuals, or undervaluing the self as in the case of anxious individuals(Mikulincer, 1998; Mikulincer, Florian, & Tolmacz, 1990; Mikulincer, Orbach,& Iavnieli, 1998). Securely attached emerging adults also are less like1y todistort their judgment of others in response to mortality salience, judging thetransgressions of protagonists as less severe and showing less movementtoward adherence to prevalent cultural values under conditions of stress (Flor-ian & Mikulincer. 1998).

These findings suggest that even in emerging adulthood, individual differ-ences are pronounced. They also suggest, however, that the problems of integra-tion suggested by research with college students may be somewhat specific tothis age period. In contrast, one would predict that the ability for balanced

BO GISELA LABOUUtr-VIEF

presentation increases well into midlife-although it is important to note thatbetter than 50% of individuals tend to respond in ways that are not wellintegrated. These findings, again, point to the role of middle-aged adults whoselevels of integration play a critical role. Does this generation of mentors providemodels of openness and disciplined change? Are they able to teach those emerg-ing into adulthood in ways that are generative, or do they do so in ways thatserve needs of personal aggrandizement? Questions such as these are importantfor future investigations.

Conclusion

In sum, this chapter has presented evidence of emerging structures of adultthought that begin to appear after the end of adolescence and show rapidgrowth during the period of emer$ng adulthood. These thought structures canbe described in terms of abstract levels of complexity, but go beyond high-level formal thinking, per se. A common thread that combines them is theunderstanding of forms of intersubjectivity that can extend beyond institutionalboundaries and reach toward constructive change. The understanding of suchcomplex forms of intersubjectivity forms the basis of many important adultaccomplishments, such as the formation of identity, the estabiishment of per-sonal and institutional bonds, and the extent and style of participation ineducational, economic, political, and religious life.

This review also has shown that these forms of thinking remain a potential-ity for many, a promise rather than a reality. Embedded as they are in aprocess of generational transmission, they require the support of the moreencompassing knowledge systems administered by mature adults who are thecarriers of complex knowledge. In this w?y, emerging adulthood can be seenas a period critical for the establishment of mature structures of thinking, yetalso vulnerable to stabilizing distortive forms of thinking if important familialand cultural supports are not available.

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