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© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko “The Economic Way of Thinking” 11 th Edition Chapter 13: Markets and Government

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko “The Economic Way of Thinking” 11 th Edition Chapter

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© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko

“The Economic Way of Thinking”

11th Edition

Chapter 13:

Markets and

Government

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 2 of 45

Chapter 13 Outline

• Introduction

• Private Versus Public?

• Competition and Individualism

• Economic Theory and Government Action

• The Right to Use Coercion

• Is Government Necessary?

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 3 of 45

Chapter 13 Outline

• Excluding Nonpayers

• The Free-Ride Problem

• Positive Externalities and Free-Riders

• Law and Order

• National Defense

• Roads and Schools

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 4 of 45

Chapter 13 Outline

• Income Redistribution

• The Regulation of Voluntary Exchange

• Government and the Public Interest

• Information and Democratic Governments

• The Interests of Elected Officials

• Concentrated Benefits, Dispersed Costs

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 5 of 45

Chapter 13 Outline

• Positive Externalities and Government Policies

• How Do People Identify the Public Interest?

• The Prisoner’s Dilemma

• The Limits of Political Institutions

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 6 of 45

Introduction

• Key questions in constitutional political economy

– What should be left to the market?– What are the appropriate tasks for government?

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 7 of 45

Private Versus Public?

• The market usually characterizes the private sector.

• Government agencies and officials comprise the public sector.

• Question

– Does individual self-interest play a role in the public sector?

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 8 of 45

Competition and Individualism

• The market sector is often referred to as the competitive sector.

• Question

– Is there competition in the government?

• Competition in the public sector

– Elections– Government agencies– Passing legislation

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 9 of 45

Economic Theory and Government Action

• Economic Theory

– All participants are concerned with self-interest and behave rationally.

– If the marginal revenue of an activity exceeds the marginal cost, the activity should be expanded.

– If the marginal cost of an activity exceeds the marginal revenue, the activity should be contracted.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 10 of 45

Economic Theory and Government Action

• Question

– Does the government make decisions in the same way?

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 11 of 45

Economic Theory and Government Action

• Governments:

– Have limited resources.– Wants exceed the capacity of the resources.– Must allocate their resources.– Will use incentives to determine the optimal

allocation.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 12 of 45

Economic Theory and Government Action

• What is the role of property rights in government behavior?

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 13 of 45

The Right to Use Coercion

• Government possesses a generally conceded and exclusive right to coerce adults.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 14 of 45

The Right to Use Coercion

• Coercion

– To induce cooperation by threatening to reduce people’s options.

• Persuasion

– To induce cooperation by promising to expand people’s options.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 15 of 45

The Right to Use Coercion

• Examples of Coercion

– Traffic laws– Easements– Code enforcement

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 16 of 45

The Right to Use Coercion

• We may be able to achieve greater freedom and expanded options if we all accept some limitations of our freedom and some reduction in our options.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 17 of 45

Is Government Necessary?

• How much police protection did you consume last month?

• Would police protection be available without government?

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 18 of 45

Excluding Nonpayers

• Without government

– People who wanted police and/or fire protection could pay for it.

– Could their neighbors be excluded?– How does this impact a person’s willingness to pay for

protection?

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 19 of 45

Excluding Nonpayers

• Positive Externalities and Free-Riders

– Spillover benefits reduce the incentive to produce certain goods.

• Positive Externalities and Free-Riders

– Government can create an incentive to produce goods through coercion which reduces the transaction cost.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 20 of 45

The Free-Rider Problem

• Free-Riders

– People who accept benefits without paying their share of the cost of providing those benefits.

• Question

– Why don’t people do what would clearly make themselves and others better off?

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 21 of 45

The Free-Rider Problem

People are guided by the costs they expect to bear and benefits they expect to receive.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 22 of 45

Positive Externalities and Free-Riders

• Positive Externalities

– Exist alongside negative externalities.– Create a disincentive to produce.– Probably more prevalent than spillover costs.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 23 of 45

Positive Externalities and Free-Riders

• Exchange entails transaction costs.

• Transaction Costs

– Reduce exchanges if they exceed marginal benefits.

• Government Coercion

– Reduces transaction costs.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 24 of 45

Law and Order

• High transaction costs make it difficult to exclude free-riders.

• Government coercion forces everyone to pay involuntary contributions (taxes).

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 25 of 45

Law and Order

• Uniform and Consistent Rules

– Increase planning confidence– Contribute to cooperating society

• Examples

– Defining property rights– Enforcement of contracts

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 26 of 45

National Defense

• National Defense

– A public good– A traditional role of government– Can’t be provided privately due to the free-rider

problem.– Does not have to be solely provided through coercion.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 27 of 45

Roads and Schools

• Question

– Would the quantity and quality of roads be the same if coercion was not used to finance them?

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 28 of 45

Roads and Schools

• Transaction Costs

– Would be high if tolls were relied on to finance roads.

• Question

– Do others benefit from road development?

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 29 of 45

Roads and Schools

• Education

– People acquire education only as long as the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost.

– Positive externalities result.

• Education

– Less than optimal will be obtained when external benefits are not considered.

– Taxes to finance education lowers the cost and increases the demand.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 30 of 45

Income Redistribution

• The government provides special benefits to the impoverished.

• Question

– Why not rely on private philanthropy?• Hint: Free-riders

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 31 of 45

The Regulation of Voluntary Exchange

• Reducing Transaction Costs

– Licensing– Certification– Setting standards

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 32 of 45

Government and the Public Interest

• Government attempts to address sources of market failure.

– Transaction costs– Positive externalities– Free-riders

• Question

– How would the lack of perfect information and incentives impact the government’s ability to act in the public interest?

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 33 of 45

Government and the Public Interest

• Why are government policies dominated by special interests?

• Why are governments more likely to oversupply than undersupply a public good?

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 34 of 45

Information and Democratic Governments

• Question

– Why don’t you take the time to learn more about the candidates running for various offices?

• Question

– Is an interest in being re-elected likely to lead elected officials to vote and act in the public interest?

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 35 of 45

The Interests of Elected Officials

• Observation

– The few who have much to gain invest vast resources in trying to influence the political process.

• Observation

– The many with more to gain in total, but less to gain individually, invest almost nothing.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 36 of 45

Concentrated Benefits, Dispersed Costs

• Democratic political process

– Concentrate benefits on the • Well organized• Well informed• Who gain the most

– Disperse costs on• Unorganized• Ill-informed• With little to gain individually

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 37 of 45

Positive Externalities and Government Policies

• Government policies

– tend to be dominated by special interests.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 38 of 45

How Do People Identify the Public Interest?

• Scenario

– How long should a new drug be tested by the FDA?

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 39 of 45

How Do People Identify the Public Interest?

Costsand

Benefits

Time Spent in Testing

Benefits to patientsof additional testing

Costs to patientsof additional testing

Cost =Benefit

T1

Cost to the FDAfor testing

T2

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 40 of 45

The Prisoner’s Dilemma

• The Dilemma

– Choosing whether to spend two hours/week working on a public policy issue or go bowling.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 41 of 45

The Prisoner’s Dilemma

Others ChooseOthers Choose

EachEachChoosesChooses

Duty RecreationD

uty

Rec

reat

ion

GoodGoodGovernmentGovernment

BadBadGovernmentGovernment

GoodGoodGovernmentGovernment

PlusPlusBowlingBowling

BadBadGovernmentGovernment

PlusPlusBowlingBowling

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 42 of 45

The Limits of Political Institutions

• What do you think?

– Are there limits to what political institutions can accomplish?

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 43 of 45

Once Over Lightly

• Government actions follow decisions of citizens and government officials.

• They compare marginal costs and benefits of alternative actions.

• Governments have the right to use coercion.

• Thru coercion it is sometimes possible to secure goods not available thru voluntary cooperation.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 44 of 45

Once Over Lightly

• Coercion may secure the supply thru lowering transaction costs.

• Government actions reduce transaction costs and overcome free-rider problems.

• Government coercion presupposes voluntary cooperation.

• Positive externalities permeate the political process in a democratic government.

© 2006 Prentice Hall Business Publishing The Economic Way of Thinking, 11/e Heyne/Boettke/Prychitko 45 of 45

End of Chapter 13